AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S LAST WAR, 1914-1918
(ÖSTERREICH-UNGARNS LETZTER KRIEG, 1914-1918)

EDITED BY THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE ARMY AND WAR ARCHIVE

Under the Direction of
Edmund Glaise-Horstenau

Edited by
Josef Brauner, Eduard Czegka, Jaromir Diakow,
Friedrich Franek, Rudolf Kiszling, Eduard Steinitz,
and Ernst Wisshaupt

Translated by Stan Hanna

Vol 2 (1915)
FROM THE BATTLE OF LIMANOWA-LAPANOW FINALE
TO THE TAKE OF BREST-LITOWSK

With 40 leaflets and 36 sketches

1931
Publisher of Military Science Releases
Vienna

© 2005 Stan Hanna. All Rights Reserved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE SECOND VOLUME (1915)

I. The Situation at the End of 1914 and Start of 1915............1
   A. Summary of the Situation on the Various Fronts......................1
   B. Condition of Austria-Hungary's Land Forces........................6
      1. The soldiers and their equipment................................6
      2. The military leadership......................................22
      3. Morale............................................................29
      4. The national make-up of the Army............................32

II. THE CARPATHIAN WINTER, 1914-1915............................53
   A. The Pursuit of the Russians after Limanowa-Lapanow..............53
      1. The pursuit on 13 December is unsatisfactory; decisions of theleaders on both sides..................................................53
      2. Operations of 3rd and 4th Aus-Hung. Armies through 17 December.....56
      3. The Russian retreat north of the Vistula (15-18 December).........63
   B. The Last Actions of 1914........................................67
      1. Events south of the Vistula......................................67
         a. The Russians build a new front; Austro-Hungarian measures on 17
            December.........................................................67
         b. Actions at Tarnow and the Dunajec (18-20 December).............69
         c. 3rd Army's offensive falters (18-20 December)..................72
         d. The conference at Oppeln (19 December)........................74
         e. The Russians begin to counterattack (21-24 December)..........77
         f. Intervention of X Corps on the right wing of 3rd Army, and Pflanzer-
            Baltin's attacks through 25 December..............................83
         g. Retreat of 3rd Army to the Carpathian crest and defensive fighting of
            the south wing of 4th Army (25-27 December).....................86
         h. Events at Przemysl and in Pflanzer-Baltin's Group through the end of
            the year.................................................................90
         i. Deliberations and plans of the leadership on both sides (27-28
            December)................................................................92
         j. 3rd Army moves further back (28-31 December)......................93
         k. 4th Army's defensive battle (28-31 December)......................96
      2. Events north of the Vistula......................................98
         a. 1st Army's actions on the Nida (20-31 December)................98
         b. 2nd Army's actions at Tomaszow (19-31 December)...............101
      3. The New Year's conference of the allies at Berlin...............109
   C. The First Offensive in the Carpathians and the Russian Response....112
      1. The allies' new plans for an offensive............................112
      2. The aftermath of the December fighting...........................116
      3. Preparations for the January offensive............................124
      4. Orders of battle on the East front, January-April 1915...........130
      5. The Russian plans................................................148
      6. The offensive begins and breaks down.............................150
         a. The attack of 3rd and South Armies, 23-26 January..............150
         b. Changeable actions by South Army and at the Uzsok Pass, 27 January-5
            February............................................................155
         c. Brussilov's counterattack against the k.u.k. 3rd Army, 27 January-5
            February.............................................................159
      7. Measures taken to recapture the Mezolaborcz area................170
      8. Re-arrangement of the command structure in the central Carpathians and
         simultaneous events, 6-15 February...............................173
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

9. Pflanzer-Baltin's offensive to Kolomea-Nadworna (31 January to 16 February).............................................................................................................180
10. The Winter Battle in Masuria and its results..................................................185
11. The basis for new decisions by the AOK..........................................................190
12. Carpathian actions through 26 February..........................................................193
   a. The right wing and its attack toward Dolina (16-26 February)......................193
   b. Activities of 3rd and 4th Armies (15-26 February)........................................199
D. The Second Carpathian Offensive.......................................................................206
   1. The 2nd and 3rd Armies make new preparations to thrust over the mountains..........................................................206
   2. Events on the flanks of the allied forces, through 22 March.......................213
      a. Pflanzer-Baltin's actions against increasingly superior Russian forces (27 Feb-22 March)...........................................................213
      b. South Army fights with varying fortunes (27 Feb-23 March)...................218
      c. Events north of the Vistula through 22 March........................................221
   3. The final attempts to relieve Przemysl..............................................................222
      a. Results of the first attacks by 2nd and 3rd Armies, and the reaction at Teschen.................................................................222
      b. The attack by 4th Army (27 February-17 March)........................................224
      c. Climax of the actions by 2nd and 3rd Armies (2-10 March)......................227
      d. The relief attempt is finally shattered (11-20 March).................................231
   4. The fall of fortress Przemysl..............................................................................237
E. Ivanov's Counter-Offensive..................................................................................250
   1. Decisions of the Russian and allied commanders............................................250
   2. Increasing pressure on 2nd and 3rd Armies....................................................253
   3. The Crisis of 26-31 March..............................................................................260
   4. Last actions of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe and the South Army during March...................................................................................267
   5. The Easter Battle in the Carpathians, 1-6 April.................................................270
      a. 2nd Army pulls back behind the Carpathian crest.......................................270
      b. 3rd Army holds off the Russian attack (1-5 April)......................................275
F. The Carpathian Fighting Winds Down...............................................................282
   1. Brussilov's attacks after Easter week; the Germans capture the Zwinin (6-14 April)..................................................................................282
   2. Fighting ebb's in the second half of April.........................................................285
   3. Results of the Carpathian Winter....................................................................291
G. The Transition from a Two- to a Three-Front War.............................................296
   1. Austria-Hungary's political-military situation in April 1915............................296
      a. The pause in operations in the Balkans.......................................................296
      b. Italy abandons the Triple Alliance..............................................................301
         1) Italy's military forces and plans...............................................................304
         2) The Monarchy's defensive measures against Italy....................................308
   2. The Central Powers decide to attack the Russians..........................................315
      a. Development of plans for the Gorlice offensive.........................................315
      b. The intentions of the Russians...................................................................326
   3. Orders of battle in spring 1915.......................................................................329
H. From Gorlice to Lemberg....................................................................................368
   1. The breakthrough battle at Gorlice, 2-8 May 1915..........................................368
      a. Deployment for the battle...........................................................................368
      b. The thrust to the Wisloka, 2-5 May.............................................................371
      c. The capture of Tarnow and advance by Dukla, 6 May...............................384
      d. Continuing the attack over the Wislok, 7-8 May........................................388
         1) The Russians decide to retreat over the Wislok.......................................392
         2) The allies break the Russian front at Krosno and Rymanow....................394
      e. Events in the forest Carpathians and in Pflanzer-Baltin's sector in the first week of May.................................................................396
      f. The Aus-Hung. high command between 4 and 9 May.................................398
2. The Russians retreat to the San, 9-13 May
   a. The Battles of Sanok and Rzeszow, 9-10 May
   b. The Russian counterattack
   c. The Russians decide to retreat to the San, 10 May
   d. Pursuit actions on 11-12 May
   e. The Russians start to pull back west of the Vistula

3. The recovery of central Galicia, 12 May-5 June
   a. Orders of both sides for continuing the campaign, 12-13 May
   b. The Battle of Jaroslau, 14-20 May
   1) The allies thrust over the San
   2) The Russians counterattack
   c. The Battle of Opatow, 15-22 May
   d. Start of the (III) Battle of Przemysl
   e. Actions on the allied right wing

4. The decisions of the two sides before Italy declared war
   a. Plans of the Central Powers for offensives in Italy and Serbia
   b. Decisions to defend the Isonzo and continue the attack against Russia
   c. The Russian-Italian military convention and further plans of the Russian leadership

5. The (III) Battle of Przemysl, 24 May-4 June
   a. Unsuccessful fighting east of Husakow
   b. Mackensen's thrust through Radmyno
   1) The setback at Sieniawa
   b) 11th Army continues its offensive
   c. The capture of Przemysl
   1) The strike against the works at Pralkowce
   2) Ivanov's counterattack against 11th and 4th Armies
   3) The fall of the fortress on the San, 3-4 June
   d. The capture of Stryj

6. The Thrust into East Galicia
   a. The allies decide to attack toward Lemberg
   b. Preparations for the attack toward Lemberg
   c. The Russians are pushed from the south Dniester bank (5 to 15 June)
   1) Letschitzky attacks; Pflanzer-Baltin counterattacks
   2) The capture of Kalusz and Stanislau
   3) The Russian counterattack at Mikolajow and Zurawno
   4) Pflanzer-Baltin advances to the Dniester; South Army faces a new crisis
   d. The breakthrough battle of Mosciska-Lubaczow (12-15 June)
   1) The thrust east and northeast of Sieniawa
   2) Decisions and plans of the two sides

7. The Battle of Grodek and Magierow
   a. The capture of Niemirow and Lubaczow (16-19 June)
   b. The thrust to the Wereszycia and to the Tanew
   c. The breakthrough at Magierow and forcing of the Wereszycia
   d. Actions south of the Dniester

8. The Capture of Lemberg (20-22 June)
   a. Measures of the Headquarters
   b. The decisive combats around Lemberg

I. First Actions on the Southwestern Front
   1. Plans of campaign
   a. Austria-Hungary
   b. Italy
   2. Border actions in Tyrol, May and June 1915
   a. Operational expectations and measures on both sides
b. Events on the west front of Tyrol and in the "South Tyrol" District .................................................................555

c. The defense of the Dolomite front........................................559

3. Fighting on the Carinthian front, 23 May to early July 1915........561
a. First fighting on the border, and the arrival of the VII k.u.k. Corps (to the end of May)........................................562
b. Fighting on the Carinthian crest, early June to early July........567
c. Fighting between Krn and Flitsch, late May to late June.........570

4. First combats in the coastal lands........................................572
a. The Italian invasion, and response of k.u.k. 5th Army..........572
b. Meeting engagements between Krn and Tolmein, 2-4 June........577
c. First fighting between Plava and the sea, 5-22 June.............579

J. The Campaign of Brest-Litovsk........................................584

1. The offensive on the Gnila Lipa........................................584
a. The military-political situation after the capture of Lemberg...584
b. The Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka - first phase (23-28 June)....590
c. Activity of Mackensen's Army Group, 23-28 June...............595
1) Preparations to attack north........................................595
2) The thrust to Tomaszow, 26-28 June..............................598
d. Advance of 1st Army toward Zawichost and Gliniany, 23-28 June...600
e. The Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka - the decision (26-28 June)...601
f. Combat on the Dniester, 23-28 June...............................604

2. The thrusts to the Zlota Lipa and through Krasnik and Zamosc, 28 June to 13 July..................................................606
a. The prospects of the high commands at the end of June.........606
b. The Russians abandon the San-Tanew line, 29-30 June..........609
c. The Battle of the Gnila Lipa and pursuit to the Zlota Lipa........612
d. 1st Army's last actions west of the Vistula, 29 June-2 July.......620
e. The II Battle of Krasnik, 1-10 July................................621
1) The initial actions, 1-2 July........................................621
2) The attack of 4th Army reaches its high point, 3-6 July........625
3) Preparations for a further offensive..............................632
4) The Russian counterattack toward Krasnik........................633
f. Major command decisions in the first half of July..............640

3. Driving the Russians from the middle Vistula........................644
a. Actions on the Dniester, 14-19 July...............................644
1) Fighting on the first two days......................................644
2) Events on 7th Army's eastern wing, and on the Zlota Lipa........647
b. The allies advance to Cholm, Lublin and Ivangoord (15 July to 1 August).......................................................649
1) Plans and preparations of the Armies............................649
2) The Battle of Krasnostaw, 16-18 July..............................653
3) The k.u.k. 1st Army captures Sokal, 15-18 July...............656
4) The k.u.k. 4th Army attacks on both sides of the Bystrzyca, 16-18 July.............................................................658
5) Woyrsch breaks through at Sienno, 16-18 July..................660
6. The Battle of the Chodelbach and reorganization of Mackensen's Army Group, 19-28 July........................................661
7) Woyrsch advances to Ivangoord and crosses the Vistula at Ryczewol, 19-31 July....................................................667
8) The capture of Lublin and Cholm, 29 July-1 August.............675
c. Hindenburg's thrust over the Narew, 13 July-4 August...........680
d. The capture of Ivangoord, 1-4 August..............................682
e. Operations between the Vistula and Bug from 2 to 4 August.......684
f. Actions on the Bug, 19 July-4 August..............................688
1) Fighting around the Sokal bridgehead, 20-31 July...............690
2) Böhm-Ermolli's Army clears the west bank of the Bug, 20-26 July.692
3) 13th Russian Army retreats behind the Luga, 1-4 August

4. From the middle Vistula to Brest-Litovsk
   a. Command decisions on both sides at the start of August
   b. The Battle of Lubartow, 5-8 August
   c. The fighting on the Ostrow position, 8-11 August
   d. The German eastern front, 5-11 August
      1) Prince Leopold's Army Group advances to Lukow and Siedlec
      2) Hindenburg advances past Ostrow and Lomza
   e. Further measures of the opposing commanders
      1) The allied high command and Mackensen's army group
      2) The Russian commanders
   f. The advance toward Brest-Litovsk, 12-17 August
   g. The German eastern front, 12-17 August
   h. Preparations of the allies, 14-19 August
   i. The thrust through Kovel, 19-26 August
   j. Mackensen's wings cross the Bug; Brest-Litovsk is enveloped on both sides, 18-23 August
   k. Prinz Leopold and Hindenburg continue their offensive, 18-23 August
   l. The capture of Brest-Litovsk, 24-26 August

5. Summary of the campaign of summer 1915

K. The summer battles against Italy
   1. The I Battle of the Isonzo, 23 June to 7 July
      a. Artillery preparation and scouting actions, 23-29 June
      b. The decisive days of the battle, 30 June to 7 July
   2. The II Battle of the Isonzo, 18 July to 10 August
      a. Preparation of the units and initial actions on the high Karst plateau and in front of Görz, 18-19 July
      b. Loss and recovery of Mt S Michele, 20 to 24 July
      c. Action around the Görz bridgehead, 20 to 24 July
      d. Italian attacks in the Krn area, 19 to 25 July
      e. The high point of the battle on the high Karst plateau, 25 and 26 July
      f. The battle dies out
   3. The Carinthian Front from the start of July to the Middle of August 1915
      a. New orders of battle and construction of positions by both sides
      b. Actions on the Carinthian border
      c. Actions on the upper Isonzo in the second half of August 1915
         1) The Italian plan of attack; relative strengths
         2) Actions at Tolmein, 12-20 August
         3) Fighting around the Flitsch basin
         4) Events in the last days of August
         5) Events in the western sector of Rohr's Armee gruppe
   4. The summer fighting in Tyrol
      a. The Italian Dolomite offensive
      b. The Italian attack in Val Sugana and on the plateau of Poligaria-Lavarone
      c. Events in the Etsch valley and on Tyrol's western front
   5. An analysis of the first campaigns against Italy

L. Appendices to the Second Volume
I. The Situation at the End of 1914 and Start of 1915

A. Summary of the Situation on the Various Fronts

The Central Powers had based their initial strategic plan on an effort to free themselves from the choking pressure of a two-front war by a decisive stroke in the West; the hope that this would succeed was shattered on the Marne. The Entente had counted on the enormous strength of the millions of Russians soldiers who made up the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch's "steam roller", but it had come to a halt in the actions of Lodz-Lowicz and Limanowa-Lapanow. After the "Race to the Sea" in the West had ended with the Battle of Ypres, the war bogged down into trench fighting. Soon a double line of barbed wire and earthen fortifications extended from the English Channel to the Swiss border near Basel. Around Christmas the fighting in the East between the lower Vistula and the Carpathian crest took a similar turn.

These events had proven General Field Marshal Graf von Moltke correct. He had predicted that a modern war based on massive forces, on entire peoples in arms, would not be decided in one or two campaigns. Armies of millions had clashed in a dozen major battles and in countless smaller actions, and more than once the fate of one or the other side had hung on the razor's edge. However, as the eventful year 1914 drew to a close none of the warring nations was ready to give up because the game was lost. As the tide of battle surged back and forth, the grim rage and the determination to carry on the war to a conclusion seemed to constantly increase. The soldiers at the front who had dreamed of returning home by Christmas 1914 were bitterly disappointed. The end of the bloody struggle stood in an unforeseeable future.

Beginning of economic and psychological warfare by the Entente

This painful realization caused both warring camps and the entire neutral world to wonder whether the passage of time was more favorable to the Central Powers or to the Entente. However, this question was already being partly decided against the Central Powers in the early months of the war, thanks to the activity of England. On the day the war began, the British embarked on a deliberate policy of economic warfare which they hoped would sooner or later force the enemy to their knees. With the willing
support of their allies, with whom for better or worse they had signed a treaty at London on 4 September, the English destroyed most of the international trade and communications of Germany and its allies in the first weeks of the war. They used a variety of weapons: prohibition of trade or payment to the enemy, destruction of all German and Austro-Hungarian business enterprises in the Entente countries, interruption of postal service, etc.

On 2 November 1914 the British government declared the North Sea a war zone. The approaches to that sea between Scotland and Norway would be blocked by mine fields, while neutrals who wished to trade with Germany were forbidden to use the English Channel. From the beginning the English began to ignore the difference between military and non-military goods which had formerly been recognized in international law, and finally from 1916 ignored the difference altogether. The enemy was to be deprived of all imports, regardless of whether or not they had any direct military use; all neutral shipping was subject to English oversight. The blockade of the Central Powers was extended to the land by the clever creation of trading groups. Even the United States of America had to agree to England's unconditional control over its export of cotton, rubber and metals.

Simultaneously with economic warfare, a significant propaganda war was launched against the Central Powers. The technical preparations began on the night of 4-5 August, when the English severed the Germans' trans-Atlantic cable. A dis-information campaign was opened, supported by the largest newspapers on both sides of the Ocean. Germany and its allies were charged with being wholly responsible for starting the war and with cruel atrocities in the areas of Belgium and Serbia which they occupied. The entire world was urged to hate and scorn them. In addition, subversive activities were soon initiated among the peoples of Austria-Hungary who spoke Slavic and Romance languages.

**Turkey enters the war**

While initiating economic and propaganda warfare, the Entente also strove to win new supporters from the ranks of hesitant or undecided neutral powers. However, the first success in this area was scored by the Central Powers when they secured the support of Turkey. On 31 October 1914 the Sublime Porte severed diplomatic relations with the Entente powers, and fourteen days later was at war. Even aside from Germany's economic interest in the Bosporus and Asia Minor, the adherence of Turkey as an ally
was politically and strategically of great importance to the Central Powers. The Tsarist Empire was threatened on its southern flank. The Dardanelles, the most important sea route between the Russian wheat fields and the industrial nations of the West, were blocked. England felt a threat to its most important colonial possessions, India and Egypt, from Mesopotamia and the Sinai Desert.

However, these advantages were accompanied by significant disadvantages which posed serious problems to the leaders of the Central Powers. Turkey had excellent soldiers, but lacked weapons and other military equipment. Its allies would have to help out, even though they didn't have all the supplies they needed for themselves. The lack of an open land route between central Europe and Constantinople was another drawback. Although Bulgaria maintained a benevolent neutrality vis a vis Turkey, Romania refused to allow any military supplies to be shipped through its territory. Therefore the German high command in fall 1914 wanted the Austrians to occupy the Negotin area of northeast Serbia as soon as possible to open a land route. In 1915 GdI Falkenhayn continued to harbor offensive plans against Serbia until he was finally able to carry them out in October.

Moreover, the defense of the outlying areas of Turkey was extraordinarily difficult for soldiers and generals because Asia Minor lacked railroads (only certain sections of the Constantinople-Baghdad route had been completed) and highways, and was itself an insufficient source of supplies.

The great problems already raised by the war became more intense and confusing when Turkey entered the fighting. The Entente's greedy longing to seize Turkish and Persian lands intensified greatly now that there was a chance to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Russia aspired to annex Constantinople and Armenia and to increase its sphere of influence in northern Persia, which had been established by the treaties of 1907. England was prepared to support Russia's demands, but wanted for itself Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean ports of Jaffa and Acca, a pre-eminent position in southern Arabia, and a larger sphere of influence in oil-rich southern Persia. The Caliph hoped to frustrate the British plans when on 14 November 1914 he unfurled the green flag of the Prophet to proclaim a "Jihad" or holy war. However, his hopes were in vain and his proclamation raised only a faint echo in the Islamic world. Egypt, already under the influence of Great Britain before the war, declared its independence on 18 December; the pro-Turkish Khedive was replaced by a "Sultan" who was accommodating to British interests. The Caliph's holy war had
some adherents in Arabia, but in the summer of 1915 the Grand Sherif of Mecca went over to the English side, primarily for economic reasons. In return, his realm was recognized as the Kingdom of Hejaz, independent of Constantinople. In Afghanistan, the target of adventurous journeys by German agents, there was initially a strong pro-Turkish party; however, England's threat to that country from two directions - India and south Persia - kept it neutral. India remained quiet.

In conjunction with the Russian and English aspirations, France obtained recognition from its allies for its claim on Syria and a sphere of influence reaching east from that country to the upper Tigris. The first agreements between the Entente powers for the partition of Turkey were completed in March 1915.

By this time the actions in the Turkish peripheral lands had long been under way. In Mesopotamia an English-Indian expeditionary corps advanced to the confluence of the two Biblical rivers (Tigris and Euphrates). In Armenia, Enver Pasha's army won some initial successes in the mountains northeast of Erzerum but in mid-January suffered an almost annihilating setback; thereafter there were months of stalemate on this front. Soon afterwards, in February, Djemal Pasha made an attempt to cross the Suez Canal with 20,000 Turks plus some highly unreliable Arabs, but was defeated by Indian and New Zealand units. He had to withdraw to Palestine.

Before the Russians were victorious on the borders of their Trans-Caucasian possessions, the Entente started to plan a relief attack against the Dardanelles. This led initially to an unsuccessful attempt on 18 March by an Anglo-French fleet to force its way through the narrow waters, and four weeks later to the landing of an Anglo-French expeditionary corps on the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The attitude of the neutrals

Hopes that Italy would follow the example of Turkey soon disappeared completely. Although Italy assured its allies of its benevolent neutrality when the war began, even Foreign Minister Marchese San Giuliano - considered a friend of the Triple Alliance - was already sending feelers to the Entente powers at the start of August 1914 to find out what price they would pay if his country joined them.¹ San Giuliano died a few weeks later. His successor Sonnino had still advocated fulfilling Italy's responsibilities as a member of the Triple Alliance when the war

¹ Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege (Berlin, 1927), pp. 263 ff.
started. However, on 11 December - immediately after the Habsburg Monarchy suffered defeat at the Battle of Arangjelovac - he publicly agreed with Prime Minister Salandra's policy of "sacro egoismo." At the same Italy stridently renewed its demand for compensation from the Monarchy under the terms of Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty.

The Austro-Hungarians refused to recognize the Italian claims. Nonetheless, they made no objection when the Italians landed on the island of Saseno off Albania on 30 October, and when Italian detachments occupied Valona at Christmas time. Shortly thereafter Italy completely dropped its disguise and began to state its claims on age-old Austrian territories, completely against the spirit of the Triple Alliance. The allies were all the more concerned about Italy's attitude because prior experience had shown that it would influence the position of Romania.

Although leading circles in Bulgaria had inclined toward the Central Powers since the war started because of their enmity against Romania and Serbia, the Entente also attempted to win the Bulgarians over during the winter of 1914-15. Nonetheless the Austrian and German diplomats retained the upper hand, even though the Austrian defeat in Serbia had made the Bulgarian government cautious. Farther south, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos from the start had advocated joining the Entente, which tempted him with brilliant promises. However, in March 1915 the pro-German King Constantine, a brother-in-law of the German Emperor, informed Venizelos that he didn't agree with this policy.

Activity on the high seas and in the German colonies

It was of decisive importance for the strategy of the Central Powers that they should attempt to overcome England's domination of the oceans. When the war started the Germans had given up any idea of sending their Navy out to seek battle, despite the advice of Grand Admiral Tirpitz and other well-informed experts. Thus they conceded the truth of the assertion of the English Admiralty that the mere deployment of their squadrons along the British coasts (as a "fleet in being") was sufficient to secure the impregnable position of the island Kingdom.

2 Translator's Note - "Sacro egoismo" (roughly, "sacred self-interest") was a phrase coined by Salandra himself to describe the attempts by his government to blackmail his nominal allies and finally to stab them in the back.
Nonetheless the German Navy didn't lack the spirit to fight. This was proven in the naval Battles of Coronel (1 November 1914) and the Falkland Islands (8 December), the action at the Dogger Bank (24 January 1915) and numerous operations carried out by isolated cruisers on all the oceans of the earth. However, England's naval pre-eminence, which allowed it to deploy its most effective weapon - the hunger blockade -, wasn't affected by the deeds of the German sailors. Germany's exclusion from the open sea sealed the fate of its colonies, all of which were lost by summer 1915 except for East Africa.³ Emperor Franz Joseph had ordered the crew of the Aus-Hung. cruiser "Kaiserin Elisabeth" to assist the Germans at the defense of Tsingtau, which fell on 7 November 1914; the men were then taken prisoner by the Japanese. The disappearance of the Central Powers from the open seas naturally affected the attitude of neutral states on both sides of the Atlantic. Especially countries with long coastlines, such as Italy and Greece, had to take English command of the sea into account as they formulated their policies.

B. Condition of Austria-Hungary's Land Forces

1. The soldiers and their equipment

Extraordinarily difficult tasks were assigned to Austria-Hungary's armed forces during the Central Powers' defensive fighting in the year 1914. In the northeast they were confronted at the outset with the main body of the Russian Army, which they attacked four times (at first alone, then in close cooperation with their allies). Finally, with units burnt out almost to cinders, they were able to bar the enemy's road to Prague and Vienna in the area south of Cracow. Thus part of the k.u.k. Army fulfilled its mission of guarding the doors toward the east from a covetous, war-hardened and death-defying enemy. The Austro-Hungarian forces had also twice tried their luck in offensives in the Balkans; this was due partly to an over-estimate of their own capabilities, but also to the fact that there were serious drawbacks to a purely defensive strategy in this theater. The fact that these offensives achieved their strategic aim (the defense of the Monarchy's borders) couldn't hide the fact that they had ended in frightful catastrophes. The morale of the troops was badly damaged by the shocking setback at Arangjelovac.

The weakening of Austria-Hungary's armies during the tense two-front campaigns of 1914 is most clearly illustrated by the

³ Translator's Note - This is not completely true, since the fighting in Cameroon continued until the first days of 1916.
casualty figures. The armies in the north and south had brought a combined total of about 1 and 1/2 million combat troops into the field. In the course of the first four months another 800,000 had come to the front from the interior (see Tables 1 and 4, below). However, at the end of 1914 the total combat strength was barely 1,000,000 men (680,000 in the north, 240,000 in the south). The situation is revealed even more clearly if one considers the rifle strength of the infantry instead of the total number of combat troops (see Tables 1 and 2). There were only 254,000 riflemen in the widely dispersed armies on the northern front. Losses in the north and south together had already reached about 1 1/4 million, which was not much less than the strength of the entire Army at the start of the war (see Table 3).

The summary of the strengths of individual units on the Russian front as of 31 December 1914, in Table 2, shows that about half of the divisions had no more combatants than a regiment at full wartime strength, and several were the size of just two or three battalions.

---

4 In Table 1 the figure of 176,000 riflemen in the Balkans includes the security forces in fixed garrisons. The strength of the mobile units at the front was considerably less.
TABLE 1 - Movement of men to the front, August 1914 to January 1915

(The casualty figures shown are those suffered by the entire available strength, i.e. the ration strength. However, in reality the vast majority were suffered by riflemen. For this reason, and because the original figures didn't differentiate between the two groups, the same casualty totals appear under the "ration" and "rifle" columns. It should be remembered that in reality the number suffered by riflemen was slightly smaller.)

a) Figures by front

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ration Strength</th>
<th>Rifle Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North front</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field army</td>
<td>1,612,000</td>
<td>810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Landsturm troops</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Lst initially part of GdK Rohr's Group (in the south), then to the front</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II, III, IV and half V March Bns</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>385,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TO THE FRONT</td>
<td>2,232,000</td>
<td>1,319,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties through end of December</td>
<td>979,000</td>
<td>979,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So available forces then were</td>
<td>1,253,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the start of January the second half of the V March Bns arrived</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So strength at the end of the first week of January was</td>
<td>1,333,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ration Strength</th>
<th>Rifle Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkan front</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field army</td>
<td>468,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Landsturm troops</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Lst initially part of GdK Rohr's Group (in the south), then to the front</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II, III, IV and half V March Bns</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TO THE FRONT</td>
<td>711,000</td>
<td>447,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties through end of December</td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So available forces then were</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the start of January the second half of the V March Bns arrived</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So strength at the end of the first week of January was</td>
<td>486,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ration Strength</th>
<th>Rifle Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GdK Rohr's Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(On the Italian border)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was entirely made up of new Landsturm troops</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength as of first week of January</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) Total figures for both fronts and Rohr's Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ration Strength</th>
<th>Rifle Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field army</td>
<td>2,080,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Landsturm troops</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>227,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II, III, IV and half V March Bns</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>519,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TO THE FRONT</td>
<td>2,988,000</td>
<td>1,796,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties through end of December</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So available forces then were</td>
<td>1,738,000</td>
<td>546,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the start of January the second half of the V March Bns arrived</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So strength at the end of the first week of January was</td>
<td>1,864,000</td>
<td>657,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2 - Rifle strengths on the northern front, 31 December 1914

(German units appear in italics; their strengths are not included in the total figures. Cavalry figures include both mounted and dismounted combat troops belonging to cavalry units.)

1st Army
5 ID.................. 6,780
46 ID.................. 9,621
25 ID.................. 6,274
33 ID.................. 4,822
37 ID.................. 11,200
4 ID.................. 6,506
14 ID.................. 9,680
Group Kletter........... 8,965
TOTAL.................. 63,700
Plus cavalry............. 2,500

2nd Army
31 ID................. 7,526
32 ID................. 5,100
16 ID................. 7,102
35 ID................. 4,400
27 ID................. 6,100
35 Res ID............. 5,800
TOTAL.................. 30,200
Plus cavalry............. 2,200
### 3rd Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part of 6 ID</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 ID</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 ID</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 ID</td>
<td>2,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ID</td>
<td>6,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 ID</td>
<td>4,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 ID</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 ID</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII Corps</td>
<td>8,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 Inf Bde</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW IR # 5</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,800</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus cavalry</td>
<td><strong>5,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4th Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 Inf Bde</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Inf Bde</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ID</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 ID</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 Res ID</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.H. IR # 1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 ID</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ID</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 &amp; 86 Inf Bdes</td>
<td>7,200 (Total for both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 ID</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 ID &amp; Kornhaber</td>
<td>7,500 (Total for both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 ID</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 ID</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 ID</td>
<td>4,500 (Main body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 ID</td>
<td>4,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 ID</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Inf Bde</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 ID</td>
<td>5,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,700</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus cavalry</td>
<td><strong>4,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AG Pflanzer-Baltin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ronai-Horvath</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofmann</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durski</td>
<td>4,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haller</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schreitter</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schultheisz</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus cavalry</td>
<td><strong>1,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle strength</td>
<td>254,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>16,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cracow garrison.........16,600 (Rifle strength)
Przemysl garrison.......51,800 (Rifle strength)

TABLE 3 - Casualties through the end of December 1914

A. North front

1) Combat troops of the field army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>POW/Missing</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>4,580</td>
<td>5,062</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>14,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>84,909</td>
<td>231,024</td>
<td>160,833</td>
<td>180,448</td>
<td>58,960</td>
<td>716,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>87,008</td>
<td>235,604</td>
<td>165,895</td>
<td>182,453</td>
<td>59,833</td>
<td>730,883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Individuals directly under Army HQ or belonging to dissolved formations

TOTAL (officers and men together)..........................264,000
So GRAND TOTAL was...........................................994,883

B. Balkan front

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>2,599</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>7,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>27,216</td>
<td>118,911</td>
<td>44,117</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>73,988</td>
<td>266,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>28,285</td>
<td>122,122</td>
<td>46,716</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>74,644</td>
<td>273,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Summary

(To create these totals, the figures in the "unknown" category of section a under North front and the figures in section b were extrapolated and distributed evenly among the remaining categories. The percentage figures show the relative share of each type of casualty in the grand total of casualties.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>POW/Missing</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>27,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.7%)</td>
<td>(36%)</td>
<td>(36.5%)</td>
<td>(12.8%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>150,700</td>
<td>470,409</td>
<td>275,273</td>
<td>344,404</td>
<td>1,240,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
<td>(37.9%)</td>
<td>(22.2%)</td>
<td>(27.8%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>154,800</td>
<td>480,459</td>
<td>285,473</td>
<td>347,964</td>
<td>1,268,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.2%)</td>
<td>(37.9%)</td>
<td>(22.5%)</td>
<td>(27.4%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4 - Movement of men between the interior and the front

Peacetime strength.......Officers & officials..............36,000
Men..............................................414,000
TOTAL...........................................450,000

Called up during
mobilization ................ Officers & officials .......... 54,000
Men .................................. 2,846,000
TOTAL .................................. 2,900,000

(Figure for men includes the recruit contingent of 1914, i.e. men born in 1893, plus 66,000 civilian workers)

Thus the active strength in August 1914 was ............... 3,350,000
Of whom the following went to the front ............... 2,080,000
So the following were still in the interior ............... 1,270,000

Further troops called up in the interior...
The recruits of the 1915 contingent (i.e. born in 1894) who were prematurely called up in October 1914, as well as additional men from the active 1890-1893 contingents ............... 361,000
Men who had been abroad and came home ............... 6,000
Sick and wounded men from the front who had recovered by the end of December 1914 ............... 200,000
Thus the following was the total available in the interior through end of 1914 ............... 1,837,000

Troops who left the interior for the field forces through the end of 1914....
II, III, IV and part of V March Bns ...................... 620,000
New Landsturm formations ...................... 288,000
TOTAL ............................................. 908,000

Men in the Danube bridgeheads (belonging to mobile forces, but in fixed garrisons) ............... 48,000

Thus the following was the total in the interior as of the end of December 1914 ............... 881,000

Further changes at the beginning of 1915...
The second half of the V March Bns went to the field in first week of January ............... 126,000
Men used to form the VI March Bns by the end of January ...................... 170,000
So the troops still in the interior at the end of January were ...................... 585,000

The following sick and wounded men became available again during January (approximate) ............... 50,000

In January and February additional men became available who'd been called up in November and
When generals were studying staff situation maps in December 1914 and saw symbols that represented divisions, they had to remind themselves that the infantry strength of these units was only a small portion of that which was authorized when the war began. It is true that the same problem of diminished combat strength always existed in the enemy camp, particularly among the Russians. However, it appears that the enemy never had this worry in the same degree as did the k.u.k. Army at this point.

The tense situation at the front, which was thinly held because of all the casualties, made the lack of officers an even greater burden. The exact number of officers who took the field in 1914 is unfortunately not certain. An estimate of 50,000 may be a little high; it includes active and inactive men, as well as all those detailed to staffs and to duty on the lines of communication, and a rather large number of military bureaucrats. Of these 50,000, about 3,200 had been killed and 7,800 wounded; there were also about 7,800 who had become ill and 2,800 taken prisoner or missing (some of the latter category had actually died). Thus there had been 22,000 officer casualties. This was 44% of the original establishment, and 6.4% had died. In other words, at least one of every 15 professional or reserve officers had been left on the battlefield.

Among the rank and file, 43% of all the men who had taken the field in the first four months became casualties (3.9% had died). Thus by the end of 1914 one of every 25 men who had marched off would never return to the homeland. The figures show that the percentage of fatal casualties was twice as great among the officers than among their men. On the other hand, losses due to sickness were about 50% higher in the officer corps, probably because of their considerably higher average age. Both groups had paid a substantial tribute already to this man-devouring war.

Most of the casualties suffered by the Army came from the infantry. Due to the nature of their service, the cavalry, artillery and other groups had only a small number of losses in comparison to those of the foot soldiers.

Replacements for the combat troops

After the field army marched off, the ersatz units in the interior still constituted a substantial force of 1,350,000 men. This total included the training and administrative staffs of the
ersatz battalions, office and auxiliary personnel of the administrative services, the staffs of hospitals depots and other bureaus, and surplus men who hadn't been incorporated into field units or the Ist March Battalions; it also contained the entire recruitment contingent of 1914, which had been called up at the start of mobilization. In October and November they were joined by the recruits of the year 1915 (called up ahead of time) and by additional men from earlier recruit contingents; these groups totalled 360,000 men. There were also 200,000 troops who had been sick or wounded but had recovered (see Table 4, above, for further details).

Of these nearly two million men, more than 860,000 had joined the field army as part of March battalions or Landsturm units.\(^5\) Another 90,000 men were watching the Italian border or were in the Danube bridgeheads.

At the start of 1915 there were still almost a million armed men in the interior. However, 126,000 were sent to the front in the first days of January (mostly as part of the Vth March Battalions), while 170,000 were forming the VIth March Battalions. On the other hand, during January and February the reserves back home were swelled by the influx of 619,000 newly mobilized troops; they were mostly older men from earlier recruit contingents which had not yet been fully called up. There were also a further 50,000 soldiers who'd been wounded or ill who were again becoming fit for duty in January.

Mustering and organizing this large mass of men was made more difficult because many ersatz units from areas occupied by the enemy had to be given new homes. The existence of such a horde indicates the Monarchy's inability to properly utilize its manpower so that it would be immediately ready for the field when the war broke out. Inevitably one wonders how much stronger the Army could have been for the opening battles. On the other hand, the availability of large numbers of men would now greatly facilitate restoring strength to the field units. Another question which arose during the campaigns was whether at least part of the reserves in the interior should be used to create new units rather than as replacements.

However, the performance of the Ist March Battalions under independent units indicated that this would not be a wise

\(^5\) Of these 860,000, about 800,000 were considered combat reinforcements, which is why the figure 800,000 is given above in the second paragraph of this section. Also see Table 1.
course. Therefore the high command was resolved in the future to resist the idea; in fact, they didn't hesitate to dissolve a number of Landsturm formations in late autumn of 1914. On the other hand, both in the north and the south they were willing to make an exception in moments of extreme danger by throwing an occasional independent March battalion into the fighting. And there were several new units which appeared at the front, such as those which made up Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe. The Balkan forces and the border defenses against Italy also received assistance of this kind. The k.u.k. War Ministry, the k.k. Ministry for Land Defense, and the k.u. Honved Ministry were all eager to conform to the wishes of the high command.

The replacement of officers was very difficult. The lack of active officers soon became a particularly acute problem, aggravated by the fact that most officers in this category had been sent to the battlefields in either the field regiments or the Ist March Battalions. Now it was necessary to seek replacements from the staffs, from the cavalry (which had suffered a smaller number of casualties), from the small group of officers who had stayed in the interior, and from the military schools. The return of some sick and wounded officers also helped. Nonetheless, it became normal for captains to command battalions, while lieutenants or ensigns commanded companies; there were few battalions that had several active officers. Since so many of the pre-war staff officers were rather old, the majority of them proved unable to stand the strains of wartime.

The shortage of officers, especially active officers, remained a chronic evil throughout the war. And, despite the relatively large body of men available in the interior, replacements to the rank and file could very seldom keep up with the needs of the Army during the great war of movement. As each March Battalion came up, it was quickly consumed by the burning flames of battle. There were concerns about shirking, self-mutilation, attempts to leave the front because of light wounds or feigned illnesses, and cases where individuals spent more time than necessary in hospitals; these abuses occurred in all armies. However, incidents of such behavior were only a minor factor compared to losses due to enemy action, exhaustion from campaigning, and the hardships of life in the field, which was accompanied by such illnesses as cholera and dysentery. Fortunately it was possible to halt the spread of a dangerous cholera epidemic relatively quickly through quarantines and vaccination.

---

6 This was demonstrated at the outset by the dismal showing of the March Brigades of 3rd Army when they were ordered to attack in the Lemberg fighting.
Another problem hampering personnel replacement was the fact that in some phases of the war the casualties were unevenly distributed through the various units. The complex national make-up of the Army and resultant language difficulties made it inadvisable to simply send available reinforcements to the most depleted units. Nonetheless, this occasionally couldn't be avoided; for example, in the spring of 1915 the Kaiser Jaeger from Tyrol temporarily received an influx of largely Czech troops (this was partly due to national-political reasons). Later in the war there were other instances where replacements of various nationalities were mixed for political purposes. Generally, however, units continued to draw replacements from their own home areas even when they were already fully staffed. This led to some strange anomalies. For example, by spring 1915 the regiments in the relatively quiet sector north of the Vistula had increased in size to five, six or seven full-sized battalions, while regiments fighting in the Carpathians had just three, two or even one weak battalion apiece. When necessary, the high command pulled brigade-sized groups from quiet sectors to assist decimated units in other areas.

Replacements uniforms and equipment

Another obstacle to quickly rebuilding units was the shortage of uniforms, weapons and other equipment, which soon became a major problem in itself.

After the field forces mobilized, there were very few extra uniforms available at the depots. Thus the first ersatz units had to make do with uniforms of cheap material or in the old dark-blue colors. Many security troops in the interior wore their civilian clothes supplemented with black-yellow arm bands. Indeed, some of the soldiers guarding the Carpathians under Pflanzer at the end of 1914 were still dressed this way.

The outfitting of men who'd just been called up wasn't the only chore facing the offices responsible for military clothing. The men already in the field needed new uniforms. In general the uniforms worn at the start of the war had been adequate, although somewhat warm in summer. However, they were colored "pike grey", a shade which had originated in the Jaeger battalions and which before the war had been adopted by all of the other branches and

7 Translator's note - One "national-political" reason was an attempt to scatter politically suspect Czech troops among units which were considered more reliable. The other reason was that there were many Italians in the Kaiser Jaeger recruiting areas, and they were trusted even less than the Czechs.
specialties except the cavalry for wear in the field. Because the color had a bluish tinge, it didn't provide as much camouflage as expected. Therefore beginning in spring 1915 the pre-war color was gradually replaced by "field grey" which blended better with the terrain. Moreover, the dye for this shade was easier to obtain than any blue-green or brown color, which was another advantage in a time when all raw materials were becoming scarce.

Besides the standard gear, the winter campaign made it necessary to issue heavy coats, woollen underwear, furs and other cold-weather clothing of various kinds. In the first winter of the war there was no shortage of these items, especially since private volunteer organizations back home helped to provide them.

The Aus-Hung. infantry man was provided with a wide range of equipment. He carried a rifle, ammunition, spade, mess kit, knapsack, blanket roll, and part of a tent; often the load weighed nearly 30 kg. Bent under this burden, with his face toward the ground, he had to cover many hundreds of kilometers. Thus it isn't surprising that in the first retreats - when the bonds of discipline slackened - the soldiers believed they could do without their stylish and expensive hide knapsacks and threw them away. In their place the men adopted the linen rucksacks that had long been part of the equipment of the Tyrolean Kaiser Jaeger; after half a year the knapsacks had almost completely disappeared. Most Aus-Hung. soldiers were identifiable by their rucksacks and very practical soft caps. Leather harnesses also disappeared due to their cost and the lack of resources, and leather was replaced by hemp.

**Infantry weapons and ammunition**

The most serious shortage in the first months after the war started was a lack of rifles. When mobilized, the Army had 2.5 million rifles, of which a third were of the latest M.95 model. Most of the other two-thirds were of a similar 8 mm caliber model, but already 26 years old. There were also still 100,000 Werndl single-shot rifles. The major munitions plant at Steyr provided 75,000 Romanian 6.5 mm weapons and 70,000 Mexican 7 mm repeater rifles (M.13 and M.14). 8 60,000 Mauser 7.9 mm rifles were obtained from the allied German Empire, and about 10,000

---

8 Translator's Note - The "Mexican" weapons were Mausers which had been manufactured for Mexico but commandeered when the war started; they were withdrawn from service after the shortage of the M.95 model was finally overcome. See J.S. Lucas, "Austro-Hungarian Infantry 1914-18" (Surrey, 1973); this work contains a good summary of technical details of all the rifles and other infantry weaponry mentioned in this section.
multi-shot weapons from Switzerland. As time went on the factories of Steyr and Budapest produced ever-larger numbers of new rifles. Thus Steyr's production increased from 2,000 in September 1914 to 26,000 in December and to 32,000 in January 1915. The Budapest factory, which was considerably smaller, was able to provide 6,000 rifles per month. There was also an increasing number of weapons taken from the Russians, which had to be re-tooled to accept our ammunition.

These new rifles, added to those available at the start of the war, would have been sufficient if there had been no losses due to damage or enemy action. However, from the outset rifles were vanishing at an alarming rate despite all counter-measures of the high command (such as harsh punishment for deliberate loss or misuse, cash rewards for wounded men who brought their rifles back from the front, etc.). By the end of 1914 a million weapons were considered lost (although this figure does include some rifles that were being "saved" by the Armies, i.e. deliberately hidden from inventories as a reserve).

The principal victims of this shortage were the ersatz units, which had to train using dummy "rifles" made of wood. The transport of many such units to the front was delayed because real rifles hadn't been issued. Nonetheless, often they were still without weapons when they arrived. In crises, several commanders suggested that the new unarmed men should be kept as close to the line as possible so that they could immediately take rifles from dead or wounded troops. The high command refused permission for this option. On the other hand, many ersatz troops entered battle for the first time after firing only one or two shots in "training." This situation was aggravated by the fact that the rest of the preparation of the new units had only lasted for a few weeks. Detachments made up primarily of such raw personnel had little staying power in the field and suffered excessive losses both in marching and in combat.

The supply of small-arm ammunition posed no small difficulties because the Army's rifles were of different calibers. One problem was in general avoided because the Werndl single shot weapons stayed in the interior with the Landsturm security forces. However, there were instances, especially in Pflanzer-Baltin's improvised Armeegruppe, where a brigade - or even one battalion - was armed with two or three different models of repeating rifles. It was hard to keep these detachments supplied with sufficient ammunition. There was an even more chaotic mixture of weapons among the security troops on the Italian border.
Around the start of the new year, the question of developing a more modern type of rifle began to appear along with the issue of increased delivery of existing models. However, schemes for introducing an automatic weapon were abandoned when decisions were made regarding ordnance in March 1915. Even the introduction of an improved non-automatic rifle was put off until later in the war because the Army had other, more urgent needs.

From the start of the war, the machine gun was an especially important infantry weapon. Its own excellent qualities were enhanced by the fact that its use could offset the reduced strength of the units and lack of artillery. Therefore cries were soon heard from all parts of the battlefields for more machine guns. The initial goal was to increase the number of weapons per infantry battalion from two to four; this would mean an addition of 1400 guns to the pool of 2500 which existed when the war began. Production of these relatively complicated weapons would pose a considerable challenge to the Steyr Arsenal in the next few months.

In comparison to providing more powerful weapons and their ammunition, the question of supplying bullets for rifles became a secondary issue. The course of modern battles demonstrated that less ammunition was needed than had been estimated before the war. Around the start of 1915 it was even possible to cut back the production of infantry cartridges to divert more resources to artillery ammunition.

The first flamethrowers already appeared at the front in November and December 1914, but were not used to any noteworthy extent. At the same time plans were considered for providing the artillery with poison gas shells, but no practical method had been developed. However, lively experimentation was already taking place to create weapons that would be of great use in the altered conditions of trench warfare: trench mortars, grenade launchers and hand grenades. Also the development of an "infantry gun" was initiated in early 1915, and became a major project of ordnance experts.9

The need for more artillery

9 Translator's Note - The infantry gun was never intended to replace field artillery, but was developed as a light, easily handled weapon to provide short-range support. The first gun to enter service, the 3.7 cm Škoda M.1915 model, had a maximum range of 1968 yards, weighed 124 pounds, and could fire an average of 8 shots per minute. (See Lucas, "Aus-Hung. Infantry", pp. 86-87.)
The need to expand and improve the artillery had become a matter of life and death for the infantry. The difficulties under which this honorable branch of the Army labored in the first months of warfare in the north and south have been chronicled in as much detail as possible in the first volume of this work. The field artillery was too weak: it lacked middle and heavy caliber guns; moreover, three types of guns - mountain cannon, field howitzers and 15 cm howitzers - proved to be totally obsolete and of little fighting value. Even more troublesome was the lack of ammunition. Complaints about these problems were heard immediately after the battles around Lemberg, and didn't cease thereafter. The high command first reached into its reserve pool of field cannon, 800 pieces in all. The first priority was to replace losses due to action, which for example cost the 4th Army alone 84 field cannon in the first campaign. All of the mountain batteries which hadn't already deployed in the Balkans were sent to fight on the plains and hills of Galicia. Also the 24 cm and 3.05 cm mortars went to the front; the ammunition of the latter weapons - which were supposed to be used against fortifications - had to be modified for action against enemy personnel. Any further improvements, such as forming new batteries or rearming old ones, couldn't be immediately accomplished; they would have to be carried out as part of a careful long-range plan.

In October 1914 the AOK sent notes to the War Ministry and Military Chancellery outlining the following demands:
. Mass production of more light field cannon (without impairing work on other types of guns);
. Production of a modern field howitzer to replace existing models; and
. Production of new types of 15 cm howitzers, 10 cm cannon, and mountain guns.
Prototypes of the new weapons existed; they had been tested on firing ranges, although not yet in actual combat. Work on improved field cannon models was postponed because the existing guns were already of adequate quality and because it was becoming evident that cannon were less useful than high-trajectory weapons.

In February 1915 the high command asked for an artillery program which would equip each infantry division with 24 field cannon and 36 light field howitzers. Each division would also have a heavy field artillery battalion of four 10 cm cannon and four 15 cm howitzers. Thus there would be 68 guns per division. Corps artillery would consist of three heavy field artillery battalions

10 Similar figures for the other Armies are not available.
(armed like the heavy battalions in the divisions). The mountain artillery would expand to 14 full regiments. Fortress artillery would also expand, especially by the production of more 30.5 cm mortars.\footnote{This is based on a manuscript of GM Pflug, who was the artillery expert of the AOK from the beginning to the end of the war.}

It is hardly necessary to add that months would go by before the war industries would be able to produce the weapons needed to carry out this plan. Something would have to be done in the meantime. Fifty five new cannon batteries were formed from the 800 reserve guns mentioned above, and were sent to the Army. As was being done with the rifles, artillery pieces ordered by foreign countries from the Skoda Works were confiscated: 52 mountain cannon, 24 field cannon and 18 field howitzers which had been ordered by China plus 50 medium field howitzers ordered by Turkey. In the course of 1914 all of these guns were shipped to the Army, as well as 30 new 15 cm howitzers, six 30.5 cm mortars and two 42 cm coastal howitzers. Even these meager reinforcements were eagerly welcomed on their arrival. However they were completely inadequate for the lengthened front, which now stretched from Piotrkow to the southern corner of Bukovina.

Thus it is understandable that the Army's artillery situation was at its lowest point around the start of 1915, especially since the difficulties were compounded by the lack of ammunition. Our descriptions of actions will often turn on this painful point. Army commanders wished to attack only when they could do so without noteworthy expenditure of artillery ammunition; guns in quiet sectors could fire just a couple of well-aimed shots per day; sometimes batteries had to be pulled from an action because their limbers and munitions wagons were empty. This situation, which placed the outcome of entire campaigns in doubt, continued throughout the winter; the supply of shells never even reached the level considered in peacetime to be "normal" (and which was far below actual wartime requirements). It was a time of frustrating helplessness which was bitterly resented by both the infantry and artillery.

The status of the cavalry

The events and lessons of the first months of the war also profoundly affected the cavalry. Pre-war theories about the use of this arm were shown to be greatly in error. Neither the equipment nor the tactical doctrine passed the test. Most of the glamorous uniforms disappeared during the gray Galician autumn, replaced by plainer field gear. Fire fights with carbines took

\footnote{This is based on a manuscript of GM Pflug, who was the artillery expert of the AOK from the beginning to the end of the war.}
the place of charges with cold steel. Some of the hussars who fought at Limanowa-Lapanow were said to have resorted to kicking at the enemy with their spurred boots because they lacked bayonets. The cavalry demanded to be equipped with the entrenching tools that were of such great importance to the infantry, and this demand was finally answered. There were still enough horses in the Monarchy to replace the animals who'd been lost, but time was needed to train them; this couldn't be accomplished in a few weeks. Therefore toward the end of 1914 several cavalry divisions formed men who didn't have horses into the first "rifle detachments"; this practice would accelerate as the war went on. At this time there were still some opportunities for large scale mounted operations, such as had been expected in peacetime. However, the units involved fought as mounted infantry, a role which was surprising to both their elite officer corps and excellent rank and file.

This completes the summary of the condition of the three principal arms at the start of 1915. The following section on "Military Leadership" will also include a summary of developments among the other arms and supporting services.

2. The military leadership

Austria-Hungary's military leadership in 1914 was dominated by two noteworthy personalities: Conrad in the north and Potiorek in the south. The spirited Conrad, rich in ideas and never at a loss to improvise plans, was particularly suited for the war of movement in the wide theater of Galicia and Russia. This commander always found ways and means to seize the initiative from the enemy, despite the overwhelming size of their massive force, by attacking. Like the German generals in the east, he was able to avoid the danger of succumbing to the Russians' will. Naturally Conrad observed with increasing anxiety how the war was bogging down into positional fighting: first in the Polish lands along the Vistula, then on the Dunajec. Thus in the winter of 1914-15 he was forced against his will to cast his gaze farther east toward the Carpathians and the Dniester, where - despite unfavorable terrain and weather conditions - it still seemed possible he could deploy his forces with greater freedom.

Potiorek was no less dedicated than Conrad to mobile warfare, as he demonstrated by repeatedly taking the offensive. He launched repeated attacks against his hardy, veteran opponents; this was due in part to the unfavorable prospects for carrying on a defensive campaign on the southeast borders of the Monarchy. As noted in the first volume, these difficulties played a large part
in the Feldzeugmeister's decision to make his primary effort in a sector other than the historical main road through Belgrade.

**Strategic Considerations**

In the initial campaigns, both commanders gave greater prominence to envelopment attacks than to the other strategic option, frontal breakthroughs. This is noteworthy because Conrad, at least, had paid equal attention to alternative options in his pre-war exercises and war games. Neither Conrad nor Potiorek attempted to carry out Schlieffen's prescription for a double-sided envelopment (like Hannibal's at Cannae). Rather they tried to overcome one wing of the enemy by flank attacks; meanwhile the central enemy group was to be pinned down by spoiling attacks. It was relatively easy for the enemy in most cases to reinforce the threatened sector so that the blow at the flank turned into a frontal offensive; when this happened the k.u.k. leadership was more likely to gradually shift still farther toward the enemy's new flank rather than to attempt to break the opposing line. However, when gaps were detected in the enemy's front - as happened during the initial campaign against Russia - attempts were made to envelop the separated groups rather than to thrust directly into the enemy rear areas. The emphasis was on moving quickly to take advantage of local opportunities rather than to conduct operations with a long-range fixed goal in mind.

This limitation on strategic planning was necessary because of the disparity in forces, which became ever greater. A wide-ranging envelopment maneuver would have greatly weakened the strength of the holding forces, which - due to their limited artillery support - would not have been able to defend their lines for long. Moreover, it is clear that the commanders of many units were more inclined to launch flank attacks than to try to march further around their opponents. On one or two occasions this circumstance caused chances for a brilliant Austrian success to be lost. Yet even the German Army only won one battle - Tannenberg - that was a real "Cannae" in the spirit of Schlieffen.

The unfavorable balance of forces, the lack of sufficient artillery, and the under-estimation of the effectiveness of even a relatively small force on the defensive, led to another unexpected result: despite pre-war theories it was seldom possible to deploy enough troops at one important point to win a decisive success. Battles thus developed as had been predicted by Maximilian von Csicserecs, who as a k.u.k. General Staff Colonel had witnessed the Russo-Japanese War and published the
lessons he'd learned during that struggle.\textsuperscript{12}

Knowledge of the enemy situation was initially defective; thus the first campaign in the north was hampered by the failure to recognize the strength of the Russian forces entering east Galicia. Soon, however, commanders at all levels received a source of information of inestimable value as Russian radio broadcasts were intercepted and deciphered. The specialists who overheard the Russian messages could almost always provide a complete picture of the enemy situation, often earlier than was possible for the enemy generals; it can be said without exaggeration that this was worth whole Armies to the allies. Traditional espionage services were much less important than this factor, especially since they were not initiated on a large scale until it was too late to gather much more information. Cavalry reconnaissance was also inadequate, as was the new air scouting service (due to the lack of serviceable planes). However, intercepted broadcasts were supplemented by information gleaned from deserters and prisoners of war; the result was normally a rather reliable picture of the enemy situation. The high command thus had the advantage of being able to anticipate and double cross enemy actions before they really got started. This helped to cancel the growing numerical superiority of the Russians.

\textbf{Technical equipment}

For internal communications, the high-level staffs relied as much as possible on telegraph messages; they also preferred to use the Hughes apparatus rather than the telephone. Soon many corps headquarters as well as armies were issued the Hughes equipment. Couriers increasingly used motor vehicles, so that "mounted ordnance officers" on horseback appeared only at the divisional level. On the battlefields the telephone was used to great effectiveness thanks to the self-sacrificing spirit of the field phone units.

Both in the north and the south, it was extremely difficult to move and supply the Armies because of road conditions. Heavy wagons and horses were replaced in Galicia by light carts, and in Bosnia and Serbia also by pack animals. Because of strenuous work and unspeakable conditions, the loss of horses in this service was very great. The soaked roads afforded little opportunity to use trucks or even small personal cars.

The movement of 2nd Army from the Carpathians to Prussian Silesia was the first time that such a large body of troops was

\textsuperscript{12} Csicseryics, "Die Schlacht" (Vienna, 1908)
transferred by rail from one battlefield to another. The newly-introduced, speedier military trains successfully carried the troops from the Carpathians in a wide arc almost through the center of the Monarchy despite the lack of prior experience. At the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, the commanders used rebuilt railroads to bring their men practically to the front lines; this technique would be repeated on a much larger scale during the Carpathian fighting at the beginning of 1915. The population of the capital cities - Vienna and Budapest - were both surprised and pleased to see German soldiers as well as Austrians taking part in these movements.

The tremendous logistical importance of railroads was tragically illustrated in the southeast, just before the Battle of Arangjelovac, when Potiorek's exhausted and hungry divisions used up their last strength to secure the small rail line in the Kolubara valley because it was essential to restore their supply services. Naturally the movement of sick and wounded men by rail presented problems to the military transportation offices that were no less difficult than the movement of material and of healthy personnel.

Maintenance and repair of lines of communication were the responsibility of the sapper and pioneer companies, the railroad construction detachments, and numerous formations of laborers. Other responsibilities of the technical troops included bridging numerous rivers and destroying roads, railroads and bridges to delay enemy pursuit during retreats. When our forces later returned to the offensive, the destroyed facilities of course had to be restored.\footnote{During the retreat to the Dunajec and into the Carpathians in September, 4600 km of railroads and 800 stations were abandoned to the enemy or destroyed. In the October advance, about 1100 km of the rail net up to the new front on the San had to be restored as quickly as possible while the fighting was still raging. The logistical situation was completely dependent on the success of this rebuilding project.}

At this point there was still no lack of supplies available for men and horses; the problem, however, was to get them to the troops in the front line despite difficult conditions. Thus, for example, in October 1914 the Armies engaged on both sides of Przemysl had to subsist for a considerable time by using up the rations of the fortress; they could not survive on their own supplies because the destruction of the rail lines and poor road net made it impossible to bring them to the front.

**Beginning of a revolution in tactics**
The eternal laws of strategy hadn't changed despite the development of enormous armies and improved weaponry; when they were violated by either side the guilty party usually suffered an immediate defeat. However, in the first months of the war all armies, including those with the most recent campaign experience, discovered that tactical conditions on the battlefield were undergoing a revolutionary change. Doctrine and methods would have to be altered. The experience of the Aus-Hung. armed forces would be duplicated to a greater or lesser degree by those of all the other contending nations.

The Austro-Hungarian Army had been trained for an offensive war of movement, perhaps more so than any other army in the world. Except for a few dissenters (of whom there were always a few in service), pre-war theorists expected a quick and decisive campaign, based on the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The infantry, operating almost independent of the artillery, would first attempt to win a brief and violent fire fight within close range; then they would move as quickly as possible to storm the enemy position. Based on the regulations, it was widely believed that an actual hand-to-hand struggle would be unnecessary in many cases; the enemy, shaken by well-directed fire, would evacuate the position as soon as our troops began to advance. Little emphasis was placed on gaining fire superiority by the artillery as well as by the infantry. The concepts of a hurricane barrage, a creeping barrage, or of interdiction fire had not even been discussed.

However, in cases where the tactical doctrine was applied and resulted in success, it resulted in prohibitive casualties among both officers and men. In most cases, it simply failed. The experience of the troops was completely different from what they had undergone in training and pre-war maneuvers. Above all, the infantry were operating in an apparently empty battleground; their opponents were well-trained in the use of terrain and deceptive measures and were practically invisible. Only bursts of shrapnel fire in the air betrayed the location of the enemy. In peacetime the infantry were taught that they could begin to fire their rifles effectively at 1500 or 2000 paces from their objective. Now, however, they were advancing much closer without even seeing anything to shoot at; meanwhile, however, they were being pummelled by enemy artillery. Suddenly, in the midst of the empty battlefield, they were confronted by infantry armed with machine guns. Often these were advanced detachments whose only mission was to slow down and weaken our units before they reached the enemy main line; this was another development not

14 See the description in Pitreich, "Lemberg" (Vienna, 1929), pp. 131 ff.
anticipated in pre-war training. Then the main action finally developed at close quarters, and involved heavy casualties and nerve-shattering anxiety.

Contrary to expectations, the enemy was seldom shaken by the preliminary fire fight, since they had dug trenches for protection. The low trajectory fire of our field cannon was insufficient to destroy the entrenchments; the high trajectory fire of our obsolete howitzers often didn't have sufficient range to reach these targets. The fire of the infantry rifles and machine guns, when they finally sighted the enemy, had almost no effect on the earth works. Meanwhile our troops began to hear the crackle and rattling of their opponents' small arms and machine guns in addition to the crash and thunder of the shells and shrapnel; often the fire came from flanking positions that hadn't been discovered until the last moment. The lines of infantry lay without any protection under this rain of destruction. If they sought to end their torment by continuing their advance into the midst of the enemy, they often were halted by intact barbed wire or an abatis.

In response, our troops soon began to build trenches of their own. At first these were just shallow depressions (such as had been prescribed in peacetime); quickly, however, the men were digging deeper until they were covered by earth up to their hips and finally to their shoulders. Meanwhile it was hoped that after a position was dug close to the enemy, new impetus could then be given to the assault by hastily bringing up reserves for a final decision. Often, however, there was a setback: either our own lines began to crumble under fire or the enemy, after a very heavy artillery bombardment, launched their own infantry counterattack which could no longer be withstood. No matter the outcome, the course of events was completely different from that anticipated before the war.

The results of these new developments have been illustrated in several places in the first volume of this work. Perhaps the clearest and most disturbing example was the campaign of October 1914 along the San, when the best infantry regiments of the k.u.k. Army were unable to prevail against the Russians dug in on the west bank of the river, despite a considerable numerical superiority. Here, and later at Cracow and Limanowa-Lapanow, it was apparent that the Aus-Hung. infantry still had much to learn about attacking under the new conditions. Meanwhile, however, the troops' confidence in success had already greatly diminished. The hard-fighting infantry looked back in vain toward their own artillery, which seemed to be the only resource that could
restore their hope.

The artillery, however, was just as hamstrung as its sister weapon. They also were learning lessons that hadn't been taught in peacetime. A more important obstacle, though, was their deficient armament, which was discussed earlier. At least the Russians also increasingly suffered from lack of ammunition as the war entered its first winter.

A real respite was enjoyed by the fortunate divisions which held the war's first "permanent positions" in Russian Poland and on the Dunajec. Here fortified battlefields developed which looked entirely different from the positions envisioned before the war. Instead of a few fixed fortifications, there were long lines that put an end to the war of movement; instead of hastily erected local defenses in various places there was a continuous network of trenches. Parallel to these works there was an increasingly wide belt of barbed wire. Communications trenches led back to the rear, where second and even third lines gradually were constructed. Meanwhile the first line was constantly being improved. Shelters of boards with a thin cover of earth were built to cover the trenches; although called "shrapnel shields", they were really useful against adverse weather conditions rather than enemy fire. Many kinds of loopholes were devised and added to the breastworks. Both shrapnel shields and loopholes cost the troops much labor before it was belatedly recognized that they were impractical and given up. Foxholes, which at first were not built with sufficient protection against artillery fire, offered more shelter during the meager hours of rest; as the war went on they were improved and became more habitable. Tables, benches and other furniture, as well as doors and windows, appeared in the dugouts. Along with the gaily burning fires of small ovens, they gave the troops a glimmer of the comforts of home which they would lack for such a long time. As spring approached, here and there flowers grew along the trenches, sometimes through the bleached bones of unknown soldiers.

However, only the more fortunate regiments were able to enjoy even this limited respite during the winter, as more soldiers were needed for the Carpathian fighting. Division after division was pulled from the "fleshpots" of Russian Poland and west Galicia, or from their winter quarters in Syrmia, and sent to the ominous, ice-covered forests that covered the mountainous northern borders of Hungary.
3. Morale

It isn't surprising that the difficult experiences of the first months of the war destroyed the initial enthusiasm. The growing realization that the war would continue for many more months, perhaps for years, depressed the spirits of officers and men. A considerable degree of war-weariness was already evident at the start of 1915. A more hopeful mood developed during the spring victory at Gorlice. The effects on morale in an Army composed of several national groups at various cultural levels naturally differed from group to group. A substantial number of the soldiers - and by no means just those who spoke German - persevered. They replaced their original exaggerated high spirits with a sense of duty to their ruler and the fatherland, and with a sense of honor; they didn't want to fail in the face of adversity. Members of culturally backward groups were impelled more by obedience and strict military discipline than by ethical considerations.

Development of nationalistic unrest

It wasn't surprising to the high command that in these weeks and months the mood of the Slavic and Latin solders was affected by adverse currents from two directions: from the Monarchy's interior and from the enemy camp. Information about the national revolution of the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy is available in an enormous literature in all European languages. The beginnings of this revolution can be traced to the period we are now discussing. The responses of the concerned military and government officials are also well documented.

From the beginning, the attitude of the Czechs, who lived in the very heartland of the Empire, was decisive for that of the other groups. Public opinion in Bohemia and Moravia after the initial setbacks in Galicia and Serbia left much to be desired. As unfavorable tidings arrived from the fronts, newspaper articles written by the intelligentsia were hardly able to conceal their satisfaction, even through the constraints imposed by the government under the state of emergency. There were ominous incidents when the IInd March Battalions left for the front in mid-September. Some troops carried banners and ribbons in the pan-Slavic colors (red, white and blue) which were also used on enemy insignia. Others who were called up wore signs of mourning. Although anti-Austrian feeling was initially restricted to a small circle of intelligentsia in the cities, it spread further among the masses as the Russians approached the fortress of Cracow and thus also the borders of the lands of St
Wenceslaus' Crown. Proclamations from the Grand Duke Nicholas and (surprisingly) from General Rennenkampf were circulated in secret; preparations were initiated to welcome the "liberators." In response, the first death sentences were pronounced against traitors. This was the unfavorable situation from which the Czech reservists were called to the front to fill the gaping holes which the war had already torn in the Army's ranks.\textsuperscript{15}

The enemy camp also tried to seduce Habsburg soldiers. When the war started, Czechs living in Russia established societies to care for Slavic prisoners of war. These men were called by their newspapers, "an army of our brothers who had been taken by the sword, and who now must also be spiritually conquered." At the same time a Czech Legion was created; although the Tsar wouldn't allow it to be used as combat troops, the first detachments were already available in the winter for espionage and propaganda service. The Austrian authorities also received reports that any prisoner who could prove he was a member of the National Organization of Sokols ("Falcons") would receive favorable treatment. Be this as it may, evidence shows that in general there were fewer cases of direct treasonable contact with the enemy than the authorities believed. On the other hand, there were indirect results of this political activity. The most notorious case was the failure of Czech troops at Jaroslau on 26 October. This involved IR # 36 and LW IR # 30, which were recruited in the districts of Jungbunzlau and Hohenmauth where National Socialist and anti-military feeling was particularly strong.\textsuperscript{16} Thus the effect of political agitation was to wear down the power of resistance of certain regiments.

There were similar incidents involving units with Serbian contingents, although on a smaller scale. When the war started, most Serbs in the Bosnian regiments were detached and placed in construction detachments behind the front lines. They asked to return to their regiments. When this concession was granted, many of them took the first opportunity to go over to the enemy. The troops from Istria did not fight satisfactorily in the Carpathians. The occupation of east and central Galicia by the Russians caused concern about the Polish-Ruthenian regiments recruited there. These soldiers knew that their families, homes and farms were now behind enemy lines undergoing an uncertain fate. It's surprising that so few of them actually responded to the Russians' invitation to return unarmed to their home towns.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Molisch, "Vom Kampf der Tschechen um ihren Staat" (Vienna, 1929), pp. 33 ff.
\textsuperscript{16} Translator's Note - The National Socialists of Bohemia were a pre-war radical Czech party.
\textsuperscript{17} The occupied areas included about one-eighth of the Army's recruiting
The reaction of the high command

The high command watched the impact of unfavorable political influences on the Army with growing concern. They correctly identified the source of all the evils as the national political developments inside the Monarchy.\footnote{Translator's Note - This sentence summarizes the Army's viewpoint on this issue throughout the war. The other viewpoint was that the "unfavorable political influences" stemmed in large part to public reaction to the shortcomings of the military high command itself. This is a "chicken and egg" problem.} Although treasonous and other questionable behavior had been suppressed since the war started in the areas under immediate military jurisdiction, this didn't seem to go far enough.\footnote{See Redlich, "Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege" (Vienna, 1925), pp. 119 ff.} The AOK strove to win both governments over to a stronger course, but were stymied by the reaction of both cabinets and of the Emperor himself. The prime ministers didn't deny that there had been incidents of treason, but believed that the AOK was exaggerating them. They were also of the opinion that harsh counter-measures would only further enflame the situation. Suggestions that a military governor should be appointed for Bohemia, or a general as Ban of Croatia, were rejected. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, GdI Sarkotic was named governor around Christmas 1914 and set about pacifying the area with a firm hand.\footnote{When Archduke Eugene was named commander of the Balkan units he wanted to make Sarkotic his Chief of Staff. The Emperor, however, decided to send the General to Sarajevo, where he was in charge until November 1918.}

The German allies first came into close contact with the Aus-Hung. Armies during October. The opinions which they expressed about these forces at the start of 1915 were quite gloomy. However, their feelings were greatly influenced by some temporarily unfavorable circumstances; in the same period Falkenhayn was calling his own German Army a "ruined tool."\footnote{Reichs-Archiv, "Der Weltkrieg 1914-18" (Berlin, 1929); Vol. VI, pp. 363 and 415. Hereafter cited as "German official history"}

Cooperation between the two allies would grow closer during the Carpathian actions of the first quarter of 1915. In their own Army, the German officers had discovered early in the war that regiments with soldiers from Alsace and Lorraine had to be moved from the French theater to the East. Now they were getting to know an Army where such problems were multiplied many times. They encountered units from all nations of the Monarchy and were astounded by the diversity of a military force whose labor and districts.
achievements couldn't be measured by the standards they used in their own units.

This Army of the Habsburg Monarchy - which had been burnt almost to a cinder and then reconstituted as a mainly militia force - was led in January 1915 into a new and extremely difficult trial. Though given tasks beyond its strength, and suffering heavy losses, the Army would once more conduct itself with honor.

4. The national make-up of the Army

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE -
At this point the original work presents a chart showing a brief overview of the national composition of the Army's units, drawn from the "Militärstatistischen Jahrbuch für den Jahr 1911" (Vienna, 1912). In its place we have inserted a complete list of infantry and cavalry units with their national composition.

Nationalities by Unit

The primary sources for this summary are the above-cited statistical year-book for 1911 (which gives a picture of the pre-war units), and the statistics in Richard Plaschka, "Innere Front" (Vienna, 1974), Vol. II, pp. 335-351, which cover the first months of 1918.

The extent and presentation of data in the two sources is different. The 1911 figures include only the k.u.k. forces (not the Landwehr or Honved); the 1918 figures include all branches, but data is lacking for a few units that weren't on the Italian front at that time. Moreover, the 1911 statistics for individual units list only languages spoken by at least 20% of the personnel (such languages were considered "official" within their units, and officers were expected to use them in addressing the men). The 1918 statistics list any language spoken by at least 1% of a unit (although in our summary we usually excluded groups of less than 10%).

Two additional anomalies should be mentioned. "Yiddish" was not counted as a separate language, but included with German. This gives a misleading impression that the Galician regiments contained a substantial German minority; actually most of these men were Yiddish-speaking Jews. The other problem is that for perfectly valid linguistic reasons the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats were all lumped together in the "Serbo-Croatian" category;
however, the attitudes of the three groups to the Monarchy and its Army varied considerably. Where further data was available, we have attempted to differentiate between the three.

LINE (K.U.K.) INFANTRY REGIMENTS

IR # 1 - In 1911 was 82% German, rest mostly Czech. In 1918 was 72% German, 17% Czech and 8% Polish
IR # 2 - In 1911 was 61% Magyar (mostly Szekel), 27% Romanian. In 1918 was 50% Magyar, 31% Romanian, 10% German
IR # 3 - In 1911 was 83% Czech, rest mostly German. In 1918 was 91% Czech, 6% German
IR # 4 - In 1911 was 95% German. During the war absorbed a large Italian contingent from outside its recruiting area, and in 1918 was 77% German and 18% Italian
IR # 5 - In 1911 was 58% Magyar, 39% Romanian. The Magyar element was deliberately increased during the war, and in 1918 the unit was 74% Magyar, 19% Romanian

IR # 6 - In 1911 was 41% German, 27% Serbo-Croatian (mostly Serbian). In the war absorbed many Magyars and Slovaks from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 33% German, 23% Magyar, 15% Slovak, 13% Serbian and 10% Croatian
IR # 7 - In 1911 was 75% German, rest mostly Slovene. In 1918 was 74% German, 18% Slovene
IR # 8 - In 1911 was 67% Czech, 31% German. In 1918 was 70% Czech, 25% German
IR # 9 - In 1911 was 73% Ruthene, with a Polish minority. In 1918 was 65% Ruthene, 11% Polish, 11% Jewish/German
IR # 10 - In 1911 was 47% Ruthene, 43% Polish. In 1918 was 52% Polish, 31% Ruthene, 8% Jewish/German

IR # 11 - In 1911 was 79% Czech, 20% German. In 1918 was 72% Czech, 17% German
IR # 12 - In 1911 was 56% Magyar, 31% Slovak. In 1918 was 57% Magyar, 31% Slovak
IR # 13 - In 1911 was 82% Polish. In 1918 was 84% Polish, 8% Jewish/German
IR # 14 - In 1911 was 98% German. In 1918 was 95% German
IR # 15 - In 1911 was 62% Ruthene, 29% Polish. In 1918 was 52% Ruthene, 22% Polish, 18% Jewish/German

IR # 16 - In 1911 was 97% Croatian. In 1918 was 86% Croatian
IR # 17 - In 1911 was 82% Slovene. In 1918 was 82% Slovene, 12% German
IR # 18 - In 1911 was 75% Czech, 23% German. Had same nationalities in 1918, but percentages are unknown
IR # 19 - In 1911 was 95% Magyar. In 1918 was 88% Magyar
IR # 20 - In 1911 was 86% Polish. In 1918 was 81% Polish, 10% Ruthene

IR # 21 - In 1911 was 87% Czech, rest mostly German. In 1918 was 75% Czech, 25% German
IR # 22 - In 1911 was 92% Serbo-Croatian. In 1918 was 55% Croatian, 35% Serbian
IR # 23 - In 1911 was 52% Magyar, 34% German; there was a Serbo-Croatian contingent of under 20%. In 1911 was 43% Magyar, 33% German, 15% Serbo-Croatian
IR # 24 - In 1911 was 79% Ruthene. In 1918 was still mainly Ruthene, but percentage is unknown
IR # 25 - In 1911 was 56% Magyar, 41% Slovak. In 1918 was 80% Magyar, just 16% Slovak

IR # 26 - In 1911 was 53% Magyar, 38% Slovak. During the war the Slovaks were mostly replaced by a German contingent from outside the recruiting district; in 1918 the unit was 62% Magyar, 35% German
IR # 27 - In 1911 was 94% German; there was a small Slovene group. During the war obtained a Czech contingent from outside the recruiting district; in 1918 was 75% German, 14% Czech and 7% Slovene
IR # 28 - In 1911 was 95% Czech. Rebuilt in 1915-16, the Regt was still mainly Czech but wa given extra German officers; also a Serbo-Croatian contingent was introduced. In 1918 was 80% Czech, 10% Serbo-Croatian (rest mixed)
IR # 29 - In 1911 was 44% Serbian; other groups were Germans, Magyars and Romanians (each under 20%). In 1918 was 29% Serbian, 25% German, 23% Magyar, 14% Romanian
IR # 30 - In 1911 was 59% Ruthene, 31% Polish. In 1918 was 51% Ruthene, 32% Polish, 11% Jewish/German

IR # 31 - In 1911 was 69% Romanian, 25% German; there was a Magyar contingent of less than 20%. In 1918 was 63% Romanian, 22% German, 13% Magyar
IR # 32 - In 1911 was 91% Magyar. During the war got a Czech contingent from outside the recruiting district; in 1918 was 76% Magyar, 15% Czech
IR # 33 - In 1911 was 54% Romanian, 28% Magyar; there was a German contingent of less than 20%. In 1918 was 42% Romanian, 34% Magyar, 19% German
IR # 34 - In 1911 was 91% Magyar; there were a few Slovaks. In 1918 was 94% Magyar, 4% Slovak
IR # 35 - In 1911 was 60% Czech, 39% German. In 1918 was 51% Czech, 46% German
IR # 36 - In 1911 was 95% Czech. Dissolved in 1915
IR # 37 - In 1911 was 49% Romanian, 48% Magyar. In 1918 was 49%
Magyar, 35% Romanian
IR # 38 - In 1911 was 97% Magyar. During the war got a small
Romanian contingent from outside the recruiting district; in 1918
was 73% Magyar, 11% Romanian
IR # 39 - In 1911 was 92% Magyar. In 1918 was 82% Magyar, 16%
 Romanian
IR # 40 - In 1911 was 97% Polish. In 1918 was 78% Polish, 10%
 Ruthene, 5% Jewish/German
IR # 41 - In 1911 was 54% Romanian, 27% Ruthene; there was a
Jewish/German group of less than 20%. In 1918 was 40% Romanian,
26% Ruthene, 24% Jewish/German
IR # 42 - In 1911 was 86% German. In 1918 was 81% German, 16%
Czech
IR # 43 - In 1911 was 78% Romanian; the Serbian and German
contingents were under 20% apiece. In 1918 was 75% Romanian, 12%
 German; there was a very small Serbian contingent
IR # 44 - In 1911 was 88% Magyar; there were a few Germans. In
1918 was 91% Magyar; there were a few Germans
IR # 45 - In 1911 was 47% Ruthene, 46% Polish. In 1918 was 41%
 Polish, 32% Ruthene, 16% Jewish/German
IR # 46 - In 1911 was 79% Magyar. In 1918 was 84% Magyar
IR # 47 - In 1911 was 77% German; Slovene contingent was under
20%. In 1918 was 72% German, 23% Slovene
IR # 48 - In 1911 was 82% Magyar. In 1918 was 82% Magyar, 12%
 Croatian, 3% German
IR # 49 - In 1911 was 98% German. In 1918 was 90% German
IR # 50 - In 1911 was 71% Romanian, 22% Magyar. In 1918 was 61%
 Romanian, 31% Magyar
IR # 51 - In 1911 was 62% Romanian, 34% Magyar. In 1918 was 48%
 Romanian, 46% Magyar
IR # 52 - In 1911 was 52% Magyar, 38% German. In 1918 was 67%
 Magyar, 21% German
IR # 53 - In 1911 was 97% Serbo-Croatian (almost all Croatian).
In 1918 was 89% Croatian, 6% Serbian
IR # 54 - In 1911 was 64% Czech, 30% German. In 1918 was 59%
 Czech, 31% German
IR # 55 - In 1911 was 59% Ruthene, 26% Polish. In 1918 was 57%
 Ruthene, 25% Polish, 12% Jewish/German
IR # 56 - In 1911 was 88% Polish. In 1918 was 81% Polish, 10%
 Jewish/German
IR # 57 - In 1911 was 91% Polish. In 1918 was 87% Polish
IR # 58 - In 1911 was 72% Ruthene and less than 20% Polish. In
1918 still had Ruthenes plus some Poles (percentages unknown)
IR # 59 - In 1911 was 97% German. In 1918 was 95% German
IR # 60 - In 1911 was 98% Magyar. In 1918 was 89% Magyar

IR # 61 - In 1911 was 38% Romanian, 37% German; rest were a
mixture of Magyars and Serbs (both groups under 20%). In 1918
was 42% German, 39% Romanian, 17% Magyar, 7% Serbian
IR # 62 - In 1911 was 49% Magyar, 46% Romanian. In 1918 was 52%
Magyar, 39% Romanian
IR # 63 - In 1911 was 73% Romanian, less than 20% Magyar. In
1918 was 66% Romanian, 23% Magyar, 8% German
IR # 64 - In 1911 was 86% Romanian (rest mostly Magyar). In 1918
was 74% Romanian, 17% Magyar, 8% German
IR # 65 - In 1911 was 83% Magyar, less than 20% Slovak. In 1918
was 59% Magyar, 22% Slovak, 12% Ruthene

IR # 66 - In 1911 was 46% Slovak, 25% Magyar, 22% Ruthene (rest
were mostly Romanian). The Ruthenes left during the war; in 1918
the unit was 52% Slovak, 40% Magyar, 6% Romanian
IR # 67 - In 1911 was 70% Slovak; rest were a mixture of Magyars,
etc. In 1918 was 60% Slovak, 26% Magyar, 8% German
IR # 68 - In 1911 was 98% Magyar. In 1918 was 90% Magyar
IR # 69 - In 1911 was 92% Magyar. In 1918 was 93% Magyar
IR # 70 - In 1911 was 79% Serbo-Croatian. In 1918 was 77% Serbo-
Croatian, 11% German

IR # 71 - In 1911 was 85% Slovak. In 1918 was 80% Slovak, 14%
Magyar
IR # 72 - In 1911 was 51% Slovak, 28% Magyar, 20% German. In
1918 was 65% Slovak, 24% Magyar, 11% German
IR # 73 - In 1911 was 97% German, plus a few Czechs. In 1918 was
87% German, 8% Czech
IR # 74 - In 1911 was 63% Czech, 36% German. In 1918 was 62%
Czech, 37% German
IR # 75 - In 1911 was 79% Czech, 20% German. In 1918 was 79%
Czech, 19% German

IR # 76 - In 1911 was 54% German, 39% Magyar. In 1918 was 46%
German, 40% German
IR # 77 - In 1911 was 69% Ruthene, less than 20% Polish. In 1918
was 56% Ruthene, 22% Polish, 14% Jewish/German
IR # 78 - In 1911 was 84% Serbo-Croatian. In 1918 was 90% Serbo-
Croatian. (Relative size of the two groups is unknown)
IR # 79 - In 1911 was 96% Serbo-Croatian (in 1914 = 56% Croatian,
40% Serbian). In 1918 was 58% Croatian, 42% Serbian
IR # 80 - In 1911 was 68% Ruthene, 25% Polish. In 1918 was 64% Ruthene, 23% Polish, 8% Jewish/German

IR # 81 - In 1911 was 69% Czech, 30% German. In 1918 was 66% Czech, 33% German

IR # 82 - In 1911 was 88% Magyar/Szekel. In 1918 was 78% Magyar/Szekel, 12% Romanian, 9% German

IR # 83 - In 1911 was 55% Magyar, 34% German. In 1918 was 72% Magyar, 17% German

IR # 84 - In 1911 was 97% German. During the war absorbed a large Italian contingent from outside its recruiting area, and in 1918 was 74% German and 20% Italian

IR # 85 - In 1911 was 33% Ruthene, 29% Romanian, 28% Magyar. In 1918 was 37% Romanian, 31% Magyar, 25% Ruthene

IR # 86 - In 1911 was 76% Magyar, 20% Serbo-Croatian. In 1918 was 71% Magyar, 8% Romanian, 6% German, 5% Serbian, 4% Croatian

IR # 87 - In 1911 was 86% Slovene, rest mostly German. In 1918 was 84% Slovene, 10% German

IR # 88 - In 1911 was 72% Czech, 26% German. In 1918 was 68% Czech, 31% German

IR # 89 - In 1911 was 69% Ruthene, 20% Polish. In 1918 was still Ruthene and Polish (percentages unknown)

IR # 90 - In 1911 was 75% Polish, with a Ruthene contingent of under 20%. In 1918 was still Polish and Ruthene (percentages unknown)

IR # 91 - In 1911 was 54% German, 45% Czech. In 1918 was 51% German, 47% Czech

IR # 92 - In 1911 was 80% German, with a Czech contingent of under 20%. In 1918 was 81% German, 19% Czech

IR # 93 - In 1911 was 60% German, 35% Czech. In 1918 was 59% German, 36% Czech

IR # 94 - In 1911 was 76% German, 22% Czech. In 1918 was 91% German, just 8% Czech

IR # 95 - In 1911 was 70% Ruthene, 20% Polish. In 1918 was still Ruthene and Polish (percentages unknown)

IR # 96 - In 1911 was 97% Serbo-Croatian (almost all Croatian). In 1918 was 93% Croatian, and had a small Serbian contingent

IR # 97 - In 1911 was 45% Slovene, 27% Croatian, 20% Italian. Had same groups in 1918, percentages unknown (but it is known that the Italian contingent increased considerably)

IR # 98 - In 1911 was 68% Czech, 28% German. In 1918 was 65% Czech, 29% German

IR # 99 - In 1911 was 60% German, 37% Czech. In 1918 was 63% German, 36% Czech
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR #</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>37% Polish, 33% Czech, 27% German. In 1918 was 38% Polish, 26% German, 18% Czech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>84% Magyar (rest mostly Romanian). In 1918 was 87% Magyar, 10% Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>91% Czech (rest mostly German). In 1918 was 85% Czech, 14% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Romanian and Magyar (percentages unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>89% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>88% Magyar, 7% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>52% Magyar, 37% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>84% German, 8% Slovene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>67% Czech, 21% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>50% Ruthene, 36% Polish, 9% Jewish/German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>73% Polish, 17% Ruthene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>52% Czech, 46% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>86% Slovak, 8% Magyar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>85% Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>91% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Ruthene and Polish (percentages unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>65% Croatian, 15% Serbian; rest of troops were mixed groups from outside the recruiting district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Mainly Slovene (percentage unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>70% Czech, 24% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>60% Czech, 32% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>32% German, 24% Czech, 22% Polish. Also had a Slovene contingent from outside the recruiting district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>58% German, 30% Czech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>63% Croatian, 24% Slovene, 5% Serbian (the Regt had a unique recruiting area that crossed the Austro-Hungarian border)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>58% Magyar, 30% German, 8% Serbo-Croatian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>60% Ruthene, 15% Jewish/German, 13% Polish, 7% Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>55% Magyar, 38% Slovak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>89% Magyar, 6% Slovak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>69% German, 8% Slovene; rest were a mixture of groups from outside the recruiting district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>44% Magyar, 9% German, 8% Romanian; rest were a mixture of groups from outside the recruiting district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>29% German, 24% Serbian, 20% Magyar, 10% Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>49% Ruthene, 27% Polish, 6% Jewish/German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>55% Magyar/Szekel, 21% German, 16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Romanian
IR # 132 - In 1918 was 79% Magyar; rest were a mixture of Hungarian nationalities from outside the recruiting district
IR # 133 - In 1918 was 63% Magyar, 17% Romanian, 8% German; there was also a Slovak contingent (10%) from outside the recruiting district
IR # 134 - In 1918 was 78% Magyar, 12% Ruthene
IR # 135 - In 1918 was 89% Croatian, 6% Serbian
IR # 136 - In 1918 was 60% Czech, 18% German; there was also a Polish contingent (13%) from outside the recruiting district
IR # 137 - In 1918 was 61% German, 17% Czech; from outside the recruiting district, there were also Ruthenes (11%) and Poles (10%)
IR # 138 - In 1918 was 52% Romanian, 33% Magyar, 11% German
IR # 139 - In 1918 was 59% Magyar, 35% Romanian

IR # 203 [ex # 103] - Very mixed; in 1918 was 28% Croatian, 20% Magyar, 13% Serbian, 13% Slovak, 8% Czech, 7% German, 6% Romanian; there were also a few Poles, Ruthenes and Slovenes
IR # 204 [ex # 104] - Very mixed; in 1918 was 26% Croatian, 22% Magyar, 18% German, 13% Polish, 6% Ruthene, 6% Serbian; there were also a few Romanians, Slovaks and italians
IR # 205 [ex # 105] - In 1918 was mainly Magyar (percentage unknown)
IR # 206 [ex # 106] - Unknown
IR # 207 [ex # 107] - Unknown

Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 1 - In 1911 was 58% German, 38% Italian. Most Italians were removed in 1915; during the war a Czech contingent joined. In 1918 was 89% German, 9% Czech
KJR # 2 - In 1911 was 55% German, 41% Italian. Most Italians were removed in 1915; during the war a Czech contingent joined. In 1918 was 86% German, 8% Czech, 6% Italian
KJR # 3 - In 1911 was 59% German, 38% Italian. Most Italians were removed in 1915; during the war a Czech contingent joined. In 1918 was 85% German, 7% Czech
KJR # 4 - In 1911 was 59% German, 38% Italian. Most Italians were removed in 1915; during the war a Czech contingent joined. In 1918 was 82% German, 11% Czech; there was also a small group of Ladins

Bosnia-Herzegovina IR # 1 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (94% in 1911, 95% in 1918)
BH IR # 2 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (93% in 1911, 89% in 1918)
BH IR # 3 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (94% in 1911, 96% in 1918)
BH IR # 4 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (95% in 1911, 93% in 1918)
BH IR # 5 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (93% in 1918)
BH IR # 6 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (95% in 1918)
BH IR # 7 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (82% in 1918); there was also a German contingent of 14% from outside the recruiting district
BH IR # 8 - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs & Croats (94% in 1918)

LINE (K.U.K.) CAVALRY REGIMENTS

DR # 1 - In 1911 was 48% Czech, 46% German. In 1918 was 58% Czech, 37% German
DR # 2 - In 1911 was 61% Czech, 26% German. In 1918 was 47% Czech, 45% German
DR # 3 - In 1911 was 97% German. In 1918 was 94% German
DR # 4 - In 1911 was 99% German. In 1918 was 93% German
DR # 5 - In 1911 was 51% Slovene, 44% German. In 1918 was 56% German, 34% Slovene
DR # 6 - In 1911 was 61% Czech, 38% German. In 1918 was 68% Czech, 30% German
DR # 7 - In 1911 was 50% Czech, 50% German. In 1918 was still Czech and German (percentages unknown)
DR # 8 - In 1911 was 58% Czech, less than 20% German (rest were mixed). In 1918 was 65% Czech, 26% German

DR # 9 - In 1911 was 50% Romanian, 29% Ruthene (other groups under 20%). In 1918 was 34% Ruthene, 28% Romanian, 22% Jewish/German, 10% Polish
DR # 10 - In 1911 was 62% Czech, 29% German. In 1918 was 67% Czech, 28% German
DR # 11 - In 1911 was 90% Czech, with just a few Germans. In 1918 was 66% Czech, 30% German
DR # 12 - In 1911 was 50% Czech, 40% German. In 1918 was 42% Czech, 35% German, 21% Polish
DR # 13 - In 1911 was 51% Czech, 48% German. In 1918 was 54% German, 42% Czech
DR # 14 - In 1911 was 59% Czech, 29% German. In 1918 was 49% Czech, 49% German
DR # 15 - In 1911 was 93% German, plus a few Czechs. In 1918 was still mostly German with a few Czechs (percentages unknown)

NOTE: The Hussar Regiments were unique; they were deliberately recruited mostly from Magyars rather than from other Hungarian nationalities.

HR # 1 - Was 85% Magyar in 1911; percentage in 1918 unknown
HR # 2 - In 1911 was 89% Magyar/Szekel; in 1918 was 79% Magyar/
Szekel, 10% Romanian, 9% German

HR # 3 - In 1911 was 68% Magyar, rest mixed Hungarian. In 1918 was 67% Magyar, 16% Romanian, 8% German

HR # 4 - Was 71% Magyar in 1911; percentage in 1918 unknown

HR # 5 - Was 90% Magyar in 1911, 86% in 1918. There was a small Slovak minority (8% in 1918)

HR # 6 - Was 90% Magyar both in 1911 and in 1918

HR # 7 - Was 98% Magyar in 1911, 94% in 1918

HR # 8 - In 1911 was 74% Magyar, rest mixed Hungarian. In 1918 was 70% Magyar, 14% German, rest mixed

HR # 9 - In 1911 was 81% Magyar. In 1918 was 82% Magyar, 8% Slovak, 6% German

HR # 10 - In 1911 was 97% Magyar. In 1918 was 85% Magyar, 10% German

HR # 11 - Was 96% Magyar in 1911; percentage in 1918 unknown

HR # 12 - In 1911 was 96% Magyar. In 1918 was 82% Magyar, 15% Slovak

HR # 13 - Was 97% Magyar in 1911, 96% in 1918

HR # 14 - In 1911 was 92% Magyar. In 1918 was 84% Magyar, 12% Slovak

HR # 15 - In 1911 was 91% Magyar. In 1918 was 88% Magyar, 7% Slovak

HR # 16 - In 1911 was 94% Magyar. In 1918 was 79% Magyar, 17% Romanian

UR # 1 - In 1911 was 85% Polish. In 1918 was 65% Polish, 15% Ruthene, 10% Jewish/German, 10% Czech

UR # 2 - In 1911 was 84% Polish. In 1918 was 77% Polish, 11% Jewish/German, 10% Czech

UR # 3 - In 1911 was 69% Polish, 26% Ruthene. In 1918 was 60% Polish, 33% Ruthene

UR # 4 - In 1911 was 65% Ruthene, 29% Polish. In 1918 was 60% Ruthene, 27% Polish (rest mixed)

UR # 5 - In 1911 was 97% Serbo-Croatian, in 1918 was 98% Serbo-Croatian (at both dates mainly Croatian, with a few Serbs)

UR # 6 - In 1911 was 52% Polish, 40% Ruthene. In 1918 was 49% Ruthene, 43% Polish

UR # 7 - In 1911 was 72% Ruthene, 22% Polish. In 1918 was 59% Ruthene, 30% Polish, 7% Jewish/German

UR # 8 - In 1911 was 80% Ruthene, and under 20% Polish. In 1918 was 48% Ruthene, 22% Polish, 18% Jewish German

UR # 11 - In 1911 was 65% Czech, 35% German. During the war received a large contingent from Galicia that eventually outnumbered the original groups; thus in 1918 was 31% Polish, 28% Ruthene, 23% German and just 18% Czech

UR # 12 - In 1911 was 81% Serbo-Croatian (mainly Croatian).
During the war received large contingents from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 60% Croatian, 13% Serbian, 13% Polish, 9% Magyar

UR # 13 - In 1911 was 55% Ruthene, 42% Polish. During the war gained an Italian contingent from outside the recruiting area. In 1918 was 50% Ruthene, 24% Polish, 14% Italian (rest mixed)

K.U.K. FELD JAEGER BATTALIONS

FJB # 1 - In 1911 was 62% German, 36% Czech. In 1918 was 51% German, 42% Czech
FJB # 2 - In 1911 was 74% Czech, 26% German. In 1918 was 53% Czech, 41% German
FJB # 3 - Formed 1915; in 1918 was Serbo-Croatian (percentages unknown, but apparently had more Serbs than Croats)
FJB # 4 - In 1911 was 77% Polish, less than 20% Ruthene. In 1918 was 38% Polish, 27% Ruthene, 14% Jewish/German; rest (11%) were of mixed nationalities from outside the Galician recruiting area
FJB # 5 - In 1911 was 37% German, 35% Czech, 25% Polish. In 1918 was 45% German, 33% Czech, 21% Polish

FJB # 6 - In 1911 was 69% Czech, 30% German. During the war gained a large Polish contingent from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 49% Polish, 33% Czech, 18% German
FJB # 7 - In 1911 was 85% Slovene, rest mostly German. In 1918 was 52% Slovene, 27% "Serb and Croatian", 17% German (it's not clear if the "Serbs and Croats" - presumably mostly Croats - were from the Istrian portion of the III Corps area or were outsiders)
FJB # 8 - In 1911 was 78% German, rest mostly Slovene. In 1918 was 64% German, 15% Slovene; rest were from outside the recruiting area (including a 10% Serbo-Croatian contingent)
FJB # 9 - In 1911 was 96% German, plus a few Slovenes. In 1918 was 84% German, 8% Slovene
FJB # 10 - In 1911 was 98% German. During the war, like other Viennese units, picked up some Italians from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 87% German, 11% Italian

FJB # 11 - In 1911 was 52% German, 44% Magyar. The German element declined during the war; in 1918 was 61% Magyar, just 22% German, plus 12% Slovak
FJB # 12 - In 1911 was 67% Czech, 32% German. In 1918 was 57% Czech, 38% German
FJB # 13 - In 1911 was 47% Polish, 36% Ruthene. Same nationalities in 1918, but percentages are unknown
FJB # 14 - Formed 1914; had Poles and Ruthenes (percentages unknown)
FJB # 15 - Formed 1915; in 1918 was 80% Magyar, 14% Slovak
FJB # 16 - In 1911 was 56% German, 34% Czech. Same nationalities in 1918, but percentages are unknown

FJB # 17 - In 1911 was 63% Czech, 36% German. During the war got a Polish contingent from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 52% Czech, 36% German, 12% Polish

FJB # 18 - Formed 1914; had Poles and Ruthenians (percentages unknown)

FJB # 19 - In 1911 was 58% Slovak, 32% Magyar. In 1918 was 53% Slovak, 37% Magyar, 9% German

FJB # 20 - In 1911 was 48% Slovene, 31% Italian (rest mixed). The Italians were removed in 1915 and replaced by troops from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 the unit was 43% Slovene, 30% German, 17% Croatian and 7% Serb

FJB # 21 - In 1911 was 98% German. In 1918 was 94% German

FJB # 22 - In 1911 was 50% German, 49% Czech. In 1918 was 61% German, 31% Czech

FJB # 23 - In 1911 was 68% Romanian, 28% Magyar. In 1918 was 55% Romanian, 44% Magyar

FJB # 24 - In 1911 was 86% Magyar. In 1918 was 92% Magyar

FJB # 25 - In 1911 was 75% Czech, 22% German. In 1918 was 69% Czech, 30% German

FJB # 26 - Formed 1915; in 1918 was 91% Magyar

FJB # 27 - Formed 1914; had Romanians, Ruthenians and Jews/Germans (percentages are unknown)

FJB # 28 - In 1911 was 73% Romanian and under 20% Magyar. In 1918 was 49% Magyar, 35% Romanian, 14% German

FJB # 29 - In 1911 was 67% Slovak, 29% Magyar. In 1918 was 48% Magyar, 40% Slovak, 8% Ruthene

FJB # 30 - In 1911 was 70% Ruthene, rest mixed. In 1918 was 56% Ruthene, 18% Romanian, 14% Jewish/German, 9% Polish

FJB # 31 - In 1911 was 95% Serbo-Croatian. In 1918 was 92% Serbo-Croatian. Mainly Croatian rather than Serbian

FJB # 32 - In 1911 was 74% Slovak, rest mainly Magyar. The Slovak contingent declined during the war; in 1918 the unit was 46% Magyar, 39% Slovak

BH FJB # 1 - In 1911 was 96% Bosnian-Serb-Croatian. In 1918 was 91% Bosnian-Serb-Croatian

BH FJB # 2 - In 1918 was 94% Bosnian-Serb-Croatian

BH FJB # 3 - In 1918 was 89% Bosnian-Serb-Croatian

BH FJB # 4 - In 1918 was 93% Bosnian-Serb-Croatian

K.U.K. GRENZ JAEGER BATTALIONS
These units were pre-war companies, expanded to battalions in 1916...

**Grenz JB # 1** - In 1918 was 49% German, 29% Slovene, 15% Czech

**Grenz JB # 2** - In 1918 was 42% German, 41% Polish, 15% Czech

**Grenz JB # 3** - In 1918 was 91% Magyar (rest were mixed north Hungarians)

**Grenz JB # 4** - In 1918 was 40% Czech, 24% German, 23% Polish, 10% Croatian

**Grenz JB # 5** - In 1918 was 34% Magyar, 32% Slovak, 15% Croatian, 10% Polish

**Grenz JB # 6** - Had Croats and Serbs (percentages unknown)

**K.K. LANDWEHR INFANTRY (later Schützen) REGIMENTS**

**Regt # 1** - Mainly German; in 1918 was 75% German, 15% Czech

**Regt # 2** - Mainly German (90% in 1918)

**Regt # 3** - Mainly German (82% in 1918); picked up Poles from outside recruiting area during the war (8% in 1918)

**Regt # 4** (in 1917 became Mountain Schützen Regt # 1) - In 1914 was 79% German, rest mostly Slovene. In 1918 was 63% German, 27% Slovene

**Regt # 5** - Had Italians (61% in 1918), Slovenes (20%) and Germans (10%)

**Regt # 6** - Had Germans (71% in 1918) and Czechs (24%)

**Regt # 7** - Had Czechs (48% in 1918) and Germans (41%)

**Regt # 8** - Had Czechs (72% in 1918) and a few Germans (15%)

**Regt # 9** - Had Germans (72% in 1918) and Czechs (23%)

**Regt # 10** - Had Germans (50% in 1918) and Czechs (40%)

**Regt # 11** - Had Czechs (55% in 1918) and Germans (38%)

**Regt # 12** - Had Czechs (86% in 1918) and a few Germans (9%)

**Regt # 13** - Had Germans (50% in 1918) and Czechs (41%)

**Regt # 14** - Had Czechs (83% in 1918) and a few Germans

**Regt # 15** - Had Germans (65% in 1918), Czechs (22%) and Poles (12%)

**Regt # 16** - Had mostly Poles (90% in 1918)

**Regt # 17** - Had mostly Poles (77% in 1918) and a few Ruthenians (11%)

**Regt # 18** - Had Ruthenians (46% in 1918), Poles (41%) and Jews/Germans (9%)

**Regt # 19** - Had Ruthenians (63% in 1918) and Poles (33%)

**Regt # 20** - Had Ruthenians (57% in 1918), Poles (21%) and Jews/Germans (14%)

**Regt # 21** - In 1914 was almost all German. During the war got
troops from outside the recruiting district; in 1918 was 63% German, 19% Slovene, 14% Polish

Regt # 22 - Had Ruthenes (39% in 1918), Romanians (27%), Jews/Germans (22%) and Poles (9%)
Regt # 23 - In 1914 was 82% Serbo-Croatian (mostly Croatian). During the war got large contingents from outside the recruiting district. In 1918 was only 36% Croatian; rest were Czechs (20%), Germans (15%), Serbs (11%) and 18% mixed others
Regt # 24 - Had Germans (76% in 1918) and Czechs (17%)
Regt # 25 - Mostly Czech (88% in 1918) plus a few Germans (7%)
Regt # 26 - In 1914 was 77% German and under 20% Slovene. The Slovene contingent increased considerably during the war, and in 1918 the unit was 61% Slovene and just 31% German
Regt # 27 (in 1917 became Mountain Schützen Regt # 2) - Had mostly Slovenes (88% in 1918) plus a few Germans (7%)
Regt # 28 - Had a Czech majority (57% in 1918) and a German minority (21%). During the war gained a Polish contingent from outside the recruit area (11% in 1918)
Regt # 29 - Had Czechs (49% in 1918) and Germans (43%)
Regt # 30 - Had mostly Czechs (77% in 1918) and a few Germans (16%)
Regt # 31 - Had Poles (50% in 1918), Germans (25%) and Czechs (22%)
Regt # 32 - Had mostly Poles (81% in 1918) and a few Jews/Germans (totalling 8%)
Regt # 33 - Had Ruthenes (62% in 1918) and Poles (23%)
Regt # 34 - Had Ruthenes (46% in 1918), Poles (43%) and Jews/Germans (9%)
Regt # 35 - Had Ruthenes (60% in 1918), Poles (23%) and Jews/Germans (14%)
Regt # 36 - Had Ruthenes (71% in 1918) and Poles (20%)
Regt # 37 - In 1914 had Croats and some Serbs from south Dalmatia. During the war drew many recruits from outside this district; in 1918 was 46% Croatian (no Serbs!), 19% German, 17% Czech and 11% Polish (rest were mixed)

K.K. LANDES-SCHÜTZEN (later Kaiser-Schützen) REGIMENTS

Regt # I - In 1914 had Germans and Italians (presumably at about a 60-40 ratio). The Italians left during 1915, and thereafter the Regt recruited a few Slavs to supplement the Germans. In 1918 was 75% German, the rest were mixed Slavs
Regt # II - In 1914 had Germans and Italians (presumably at about a 60-40 ratio). The Italians left during 1915, and thereafter
the Regt recruited a few Slavs to supplement the Germans. In 1918 was 77% German, the rest were mixed Slavs

Regt # III - In 1914 had Germans and Italians (presumably at about a 60-40 ratio). The Italians left during 1915, and thereafter the Regt recruited a few Slavs to supplement the Germans. In 1918 was 83% German, the rest were mixed Slavs

K.K. LANDSTURM INFANTRY REGIMENTS

Lst IR # 1 - In 1914 was mostly German. During the war recruited a Czech minority from Moravia; in 1918 was 74% German, 14% Czech

Lst IR # 2 - In 1914 was mostly German. During the war added recruits from outside the Corps district; in 1918 was 54% German, 17% Czech, 14% Ruthene, 13% Polish

Lst IR # 3 - Was mostly German

Lst IR # 4 - Had mostly Germans plus some Slovenes

Lst IR # 5 - Had Italians and Slovenes

Lst IR # 6 - Had Germans (59% in 1918) and Czechs (32%). Also recruited a few Poles from outside its district during the war

Lst IR # 7 - Had Czechs and Germans

Lst IR # 8 - Had Czechs and a few Germans

Lst IR # 9 - In 1914 had Germans and Czechs. During the war added Italians from outside Bohemia; in 1918 was 39% German, 21% Czech and 20% Italian (rest mixed)

Lst IR # 10 - Had Czechs and Germans

Lst IR # 11 - In 1914 had Czechs and Germans. During the war added Poles from outside the district; in 1918 was 54% Czech, 28% German, 10% Polish

Lst IR # 12 - Had Czechs and a few Germans

Lst IR # 13 - In 1914 had Czechs and Germans. During the war added Poles from the Galician part of Ist Corps District; in 1918 was 47% Czech, 43% German, 10% Polish

Lst IR # 14 - Had Czechs and a few Germans

Lst IR # 15 - Had Germans, Czechs and Poles

Lst IR # 16 - Was mostly Polish

Lst IR # 17 - Had Poles and a few Ruthenes

Lst IR # 18 - Had Ruthenes and Poles

Lst IR # 19 - Had Ruthenes and Poles

Lst IR # 20 - Had Ruthenes and Poles

Lst IR # 21 - Was mainly German

Lst IR # 22 - Had Ruthenes (50% in 1918), Poles (23%), Jews/Germans (12%) and Romanians (12%)

Lst IR # 23 - In 1914 had mostly Croats and a few Serbs from Dalmatia. Added many outsiders during the war; in 1918 was 55% Croatian, 17% Polish; rest were mixed (mainly Ruthenes and
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

Germans)

Lst IR # 24 - Had Germans and Czechs
Lst IR # 25 - In 1914 had Czechs and Germans. During the war added Poles from outside the recruiting district; in 1918 was 69% Czech, 19% German, 11% Polish
Lst IR # 26 - Had Germans and Slovenes. Percentages unknown, but in the parent LW IR 26 the Germans were in the majority in 1914, the Slovenes in 1918
Lst IR # 27 - In 1914 had mainly Slovenes plus a few Germans. During the war recruited more Germans plus troops from outside the district; in 1918 was 51% Slovene, 25% German; rest were a mixture of Czechs, Poles and Ruthenes
Lst IR # 28 - Had Czechs and Germans
Lst IR # 29 - Had Czechs and Germans
Lst IR # 30 - Had Czechs and Germans
Lst IR # 31 - Had Poles (38% in 1918), Germans (32%) and Czechs (23%)
Lst IR # 32 - In 1914 was mostly Polish. During the war added a few Ruthenes and Czechs from outside the recruiting district, but in 1918 was still 82% Polish
Lst IR # 33 - Had Ruthenes and Poles
Lst IR # 34 - In 1914 was 75% Polish; rest were mostly Ruthenes
Lst IR # 35 - Had Ruthenes and Poles
Lst IR # 36 - Had Ruthenes and Poles
Lst IR # 37 - Had Croats and some Serbs from south Dalmatia. The parent LW IR 37 recruited widely outside Dalmatia during the war, and this unit may have also; however, statistics for 1918 are lacking
Lst IR # 38 - Was mostly Czech

Lst IR # 51 - Had Poles, Germans and Czechs (percentages unknown)
Lst IR # 409 - Had Czechs (39% in 1918), Germans (27%) and Poles (20%)

(Tyrol) Lst IR # I - Had Germans and Italians
(Tyrol) Lst IR # II - Had Germans and Italians

K.K. LANDWEHR UHLAN (later Reitende Schützen) REGIMENTS

Regt # 1 - Had Ruthenes and Poles (percentages unknown)
Regt # 2 - Had Czechs (48% in 1918) and Germans (44%)
Regt # 3 - Had Poles and Ruthenes (percentages unknown)
Regt # 4 - Had Poles (46% in 1918), Germans (23%) and Czechs (21%)
Regt # 5 - In 1914 had Germans, Czechs and Slovenes. The Slovene contingent virtually disappeared during the war, while the unit
got a Polish group from outside the original recruiting districts; in 1918 was 56% German, 28% Czech and 12% Polish

Regt # 6 - In 1914 was 60% German and 39% Czech. During the war the relative proportion of these two groups changed, and the unit got a Polish group from outside the recruiting districts; in 1918 was 56% Czech, 31% German, rest mostly Polish

K.U. HONVED INFANTRY REGIMENTS

HIR # 1 - In 1914 was mostly Magyar. During the war gained Romanians from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 78% Magyar, 15% Romanian
HIR # 2 - Was mostly Magyar
HIR # 3 - In 1914 was mainly Magyar (presumably with a few Romanians). During the war the unit picked up Ruthenes from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 69% Magyar, 23% Ruthene; rest were mixed (with no Romanians)
HIR # 4 - Had Magyars (58% in 1918) and Romanians (31%)
HIR # 5 - Was mostly Magyar

HIR # 6 - Had Magyars (61% in 1918), Germans (15%) and Serbs (13%). Based on population statistics, it's likely that the Serbian contingent had been somewhat larger in 1914
HIR # 7 - Had Serbs, Romanians, Germans and Magyars
HIR # 8 - Had a Romanian majority, plus some Magyars and Germans
HIR # 9 - Had Magyars (59% in 1918) and Slovaks (37%)
HIR # 10 - Was mostly Magyar (96% in 1918)

HIR # 11 - Had mostly Magyars (77% in 1918) and some Ruthenes (15%)
HIR # 12 - Had Magyars (42% in 1918), Romanians (30%) and Ruthenes (23%)
HIR # 13 - In 1914 was 51% Slovak, 28% Magyar, 21% German. In 1918 was 48% Magyar, 38% Slovak, 14% German
HIR # 14 - Had Magyars (79% in 1918) and Slovaks (18%)
HIR # 15 - Had Slovaks (70% in 1918) and Magyars (24%)

HIR # 16 - Had Magyars (55% in 1918), Slovaks (22%), Romanians (12%) and Germans (8%)
HIR # 17 - In 1914 was mostly Magyar. During the war picked up Romanians from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 74% Magyar, 18% Romanian
HIR # 18 - Had Magyars (61% in 1918) and Germans (25%)
HIR # 19 - In 1914 had mostly Magyars plus some Germans. During the war picked up Romanians from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 66% Magyar, 13% Romanian, 11% German
HIR # 20 - In 1914 was mostly Magyar. During the war picked up
Romanians from outside the recruiting area; in 1918 was 71% Magyar, 12% Romanian

HIR # 21 - In 1914 had a Romanian majority and Magyar minority. The proportion was reversed during the war; in 1918 was 54% Magyar, 42% Romanian

HIR # 22 - Had Romanians (53% in 1918) and Magyars (42%)
HIR # 23 - Had Romanians (58% in 1918) and Magyars (33%)
HIR # 24 - Had Magyars/Szekels (51% in 1918), Romanians (38%) and Germans (7%)
HIR # 25 - Had Croats (89% in 1918) and a few Serbs (8%)

HIR # 26 - Had Croats (65% in 1918) and Serbs (33%)
HIR # 27 - Had Croats (74% in 1918) and Serbs (21%)
HIR # 28 - Had Croats (64% in 1918) and Serbs (26%)
HIR # 29 - In 1914 was mostly Magyar. During the war picked up Romanians from outside central Hungary; in 1918 was 73% Magyar, 23% Romanian
HIR # 30 - In 1914 was mostly Magyar. During the war picked up Romanians from outside central Hungary; in 1918 was 65% Magyar, 16% Romanian, 9% German

HIR # 31 - In 1914 had Magyars and a few Slovaks. During the war picked up Romanians from elsewhere in Hungary; in 1918 was 74% Magyar, 15% Romanian, 7% Slovak
HIR # 32 - Had Romanians (49% in 1918) and Magyars (42%)
HIR # 33 - Had Croats (75% in 1918) and Serbs (24%)
HIR # 34 - Had Magyars (65% in 1918), Slovaks (14%) and Germans (13%)

HIR # 300 - Originally had a Romanian majority, plus some Magyars and Germans. The percentages changed during the war, and the Magyars became a majority; Slovaks were added from outside of east Hungary. In 1918 was 56% Magyar, 17% Romanian, 14% German and 9% Slovak
HIR # 301 - Initially had a mixture of nationalities from east Hungary and during the war added a Slovak contingent from outside that area. In 1918 was 48% Magyar, 16% German, 14% Serb, 12% Romanian and 9% Slovak
HIR # 302 - Had a Magyar majority, but by 1918 gained large contingents of other east Hungarian groups: at that time it was 51% Magyar, 23% German, 19% Romanian

HIR # 305 - Recruited in a mainly Magyar area, they were always the largest group; however, from at least 1916 the unit also had a sizeable Romanian contingent. By 1918 included Slovaks from outside of east Hungary; in 1918 was 50% Magyar, 19% Romanian,
14% Romanian, 14% German, 11% Slovak
HIR # 306 - Had Magyars (53% in 1918), Romanians (35%) and Germans (8%)
HIR # 307 - Had Magyars (54% in 1918), Romanians (15%), Germans (14%) and Slovaks (13%)
HIR # 308 - Had Magyars (62% in 1918) and Romanians (29%)
HIR # 309 - Had Magyars (53% in 1918), Romanians (35%) and Germans (7%)
HIR # 310 - Had Magyars (57% in 1918), Romanians (37%) and Germans (4%)
HIR # 311 - Had Croats and Serbs (percentages unknown)
HIR # 312 - Unknown (dissolved in 1916)
HIR # 313 - Had Magyars (52% in 1918), Romanians (17%), Slovaks (13%) and Ruthenes (9%)
HIR # 314 - Had Magyars (37% in 1918), Slovaks (35%), Romanians (12%) and Germans (11%)
HIR # 315 - Had Magyars (47% in 1918), Slovaks (31%) and Romanians (14%)
HIR # 316 - Had Magyars, Serbs and Croats (percentages unknown)

K.U. LANDSTURM INFANTRY REGIMENTS

Lst IR # 1 - Was mainly Magyar; by 1918 also had a few Slovaks from north of Budapest. In 1918 was 78% Magyar, 9% Slovak
Lst IR # 2 - Was mainly Magyar
Lst IR # 3 - In 1914 was mainly Magyar; also acquired Romanians during the war. In 1918 was 60% Magyar, 24% Romanian
Lst IR # 4 - Had Magyars and Romanians
Lst IR # 5 - In 1914 had mostly Magyars from west Hungary. From 1916 recruited from other parts of the country as well; in 1918 was 50% Magyar, 31% Romanian, 9% Slovak
Lst IR # 6 - In 1914 had Magyars, Germans and Serbs from south central Hungary. During the war began to recruit in Transylvania as well, and got a Slovak contingent from north Hungary; in 1918 was 62% Magyar, 14% Romanian, 11% Slovak, 2% German
Lst IR # 7 - Had Serbs, Romanians, Germans and Magyars
Lst IR # 8 - In 1914 had a Romanian majority plus some Magyars and Germans; the wartime changes are unknown
Lst IR # 9 - Had Magyars and Slovaks
Lst IR # 10 - Was mostly Magyar

Lst IR # 11 - Was mostly Magyar, with some Ruthenes
Lst IR # 12 - Had Magyars, Romanians and Ruthenes
Lst IR # 13 - Had Slovaks, Magyars and Germans
Lst IR # 14 - Had Magyars and Slovaks
Lst IR # 15 - Had Slovaks and Magyars
Lst IR # 16 - Had Magyars and Slovaks plus a few Germans
Lst IR # 17 - Always was mainly Magyar; in 1918 was 79% Magyar, 15% German
Lst IR # 18 - Had Magyars and Germans
Lst IR # 19 - In 1914 had Magyars and a mixture of other south Hungarian nationalities. By 1918 was also recruiting in Transylvania; at that time the unit was 54% Magyar, 18% German, 13% Romanian, 9% Serbian (the "Serbian" figure actually included a few Croats)
Lst IR # 20 - Mainly Magyar, but picked up a substantial Romanian contingent during the war; in 1918 was 55% Magyar, 25% Romanian
Lst IR # 21 - Had a Romanian majority and Magyar minority
Lst IR # 22 - Had Romanians and Magyars
Lst IR # 23 - Had Romanians and Magyars
Lst IR # 24 - Had Romanians and Magyars
Lst IR # 25 - Had Croats and a few Serbs
Lst IR # 26 - Had Croats and Serbs
Lst IR # 27 - Had Croats and Serbs
Lst IR # 28 - Had Croats and Serbs
Lst IR # 29 - Was mainly Magyar (90% in 1918)
Lst IR # 30 - In 1914 was mainly Magyar. In 1918 the depot was in west Hungary, but besides the Magyars the unit also had Romanians
Lst IR # 31 - Was mainly Magyar (percentage unknown)
Lst IR # 32 - Had Romanians and Magyars

K.U. HONVED HUSSAR REGIMENTS
(Like the line hussars, these units deliberately were maintained as Magyar preserves. The exception was Regt # 10, recruited in Croatia where there hardly any Magyars.

HHR # 1 - Was mainly Magyar (92% in 1918)
HHR # 2 - Was mainly Magyar (84% in 1918); rest were Slovaks and Ruthenes
HHR # 3 - Was mainly Magyar (75% in 1918); also had Romanians (12%) and Germans (8%)
HHR # 4 - Was mainly Magyar (88% in 1918)
HHR # 5 - Was mainly Magyar (77% in 1918) plus some Slovaks (16%)
HHR # 6 - Was mainly Magyar (90% in 1918)
HHR # 7 - Was mainly Magyar (90% in 1918) plus some Slovaks (9%)
HHR # 8 - Was mainly Magyar (80% in 1918); rest were Germans and Romanians
HHR # 9 - Was mainly Magyar (78% in 1918); also had Romanians (14%) and Germans (6%)
HHR # 10 - Had Croats and Serbs (percentages unknown)
Nationalities among the officers

The original text contains a chart, drawn like the summary on the enlisted men from the statistical yearbook for 1911. The chart is presented as definitive. However, from the exhaustive analysis by Istvan Deak ("Beyond Nationalism": Oxford, 1990; pp. 178 to 185) it appears that the data are of dubious quality. While keeping careful records regarding the languages spoken by the rank and file (if only because this was necessary to ensure a certain amount of efficiency), the authorities were less interested in the native tongue of the officers. This was because regardless of their actual national affiliations, the officers were expected to have a reasonable knowledge of German.

Deak's conclusion (based on a wide range of additional statistics and some analysis for which there is no space here) was that the actual percentage of officers who were born German-speakers was between 50% and 55% (rather than the 76% which appears here). He states "While there can be little doubt that Germans constituted an absolute majority of the career officers, others, particularly the Magyars, Czechs and Serbo-Croats, were also fairly well represented."

With this caveat, the following are the figures from the 1911 yearbook. The numbers are given per 1000 officers; thus the figure "761" in the first column indicates 761 officers out of 1000 (therefore 76.1%).
II. THE CARPATHIAN WINTER, 1914-1915

A. The Pursuit of the Russians after Limanowa-Lapanow

1. The pursuit on 13 December is unsatisfactory; decisions of the leaders on both sides

Ever since 3rd Army had intervened in the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, the AOK had been considering ways to cause as much damage as possible to the portions of the Russian Army engaged south of the Vistula. As of the evening of 11 December, Conrad envisioned Boroevic continuing his offensive toward the north, sending his left wing toward Zakliczyn-Gromnik, his center toward Tuchow-Pilzno, and his right wing (VII Corps) toward Frysztak-Strzyzow. The Chief of the General Staff hoped to hem Dimitriev's forces in and deal them a destructive blow. For the moment it didn't seem necessary to shift more toward the right, i.e. toward the northeast, because the Russians were still standing deep in west Galicia.

Although GdI Boroevic still didn't know about Conrad's plan, the orders he issued his Army on the 13th gave the same objectives. He learned from the AOK at Teschen that Szurmay and Berndt were no longer needed on the western bank of the Dunajec, and therefore could turn sharply toward the north. Pilots reported that the area north of Jaslo-Biecz was crowded with Russian supply wagons, which indicated the enemy was pulling back.

22 Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit (Vienna, 1921-25); Vol. V, pp. 728 ff.
considerably toward the rear.

The Army commander encouraged his troops by telling them that "A last effort will turn our opponents' retreat into a rout", and demanded a "ruthless pursuit." 4 CD, strengthened by infantry detachments, would be in the lead as it moved up the west bank of the Dunajec. Szurmay would push ahead in the sector between the Dunajec and the Biala; the objective of his center was Zakliczyn. IX Corps would reach the Gromnik-Tuchow area. III Corps would send its right wing through Pilzno, and VII Corps would thrust ahead to Frysztak-Strzyzow. Krautwald's objective was the Sanok-Lisko area. 6 ID, as the Army reserve, would advance to Stroze. The fortress HQ at Przemysl was asked to send its planes to reconnoiter the area Jaroslau-Debica-Krosno-Sanok.

The commanders hoped that the pursuit would lead to a decisive success, but their expectations weren't fulfilled.

Opposite 4th Army, the enemy began to retrench in the Lososina valley on 13 December. Amid rear guard actions, FML Arz followed them with his left wing (parts of 13 and 45 LW ID plus 6 CD) up to the arc of hills which stretches from the Kobyla through Height # 493 next to Michalczowa; his right wing reached the point where the Lososina flows into the Dunajec at Witowice. In these actions the Russians lost about 2,000 prisoners, a large supply train, and a considerable amount of military gear. However, the enemy still held their lines with undiminished strength in front of the rest of the Archduke's Army (that is, in the sector north of Bytomsko [Bytomska]); they maintained a lively artillery fire that kept the Austrians from closing in.

Aerial reconnaissance reported that long columns of troops and wagons were marching east; this confirmed that the local resistance by the Russians was merely aimed at gaining time. The high command had no intention of launching a frontal attack on the Russians who were holding their ground in the nearly impregnable position near Bochnia. In fact, they reckoned that the envelopment operation of 3rd Army into the enemy rear would be all the more effective if the Russians continued tolinger in the advanced part of their front west of the Dunajec. Once again consideration was given to increasing the success on the right wing of 4th Army by committing the entire XVIII Corps to this sector. However, it would take three or four days to deploy the Corps, and in the meantime it would still be in the rear at the time when it was most needed to put pressure on the enemy. Moreover, it was still possible that the Russians might counterattack to ensure that their retreat would not be disrupted;
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

Information from prisoners and spies indicated that they planned to thrust toward Gdow. Therefore 4th Army HQ moved the bulk of XVIII Corps from Wieliczka to the Gdow-Dobczyce area.

It wasn't possible to move quickly to threaten the road from Zakliczyn to Gromnik, which was the enemy's main line of retreat; there weren't many paths through the ice-covered forests and hills in this area. The advance was easily held up by rear guards in the narrow areas where movement was possible. Moreover, a strong Russian cavalry force under General Dragomirov was covering the withdrawal of the corps on the inner flanks of 3rd and 8th Armies. The exhaustion of the Aus-Hung. troops and the skilful tactics of the retreating troops spared Ivanov any catastrophic or heavy losses.

The results of the pursuit by 3rd Army on 13 December were also disappointing.

Because of the destruction of the bridges over the Poprad, 4 CD only reached Neusandez. The 38 and Combined Hon ID, skirmishing with enemy cavalry, reached a point about 10 km from the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road; GM Nottes' 11 Lst Terr Bde followed the Honveds. 6 ID, in Army reserve, went to Stroze. The two divisions of IX Corps moved forward in opposite directions, while fighting pursuit actions: 26 LW ID gained ground relatively quickly but couldn't take the enemy positions at Staszkowka; 10 ID, fighting on both sides of the Ropa, sought to break the Russians' resistance southwest of Biecz. The main body of III Corps pushed the Russian 4 Rifle Bde out of the area north of Zmigrod in the direction of Jaslo; however, 44 LW Bde on the Corps' left wing wasn't able to drive out the enemy force dug in on the Ostra Ga. IR # 27 was diverted from Zmigrod toward the east to support VII Corps. The VIIth was engaged for four hours against parts of XII Russian Corps north of Dukla, and finally drove them from their positions; a mixed detachment reached the road junction at Miejsce Piastowe on the night of 13-14 December, without fighting. The enemy also fell back in front of 5 Hon CD, which had been reinforced by a regiment of 20 Hon ID. As on the previous day, Krautwald's Group moved forward smoothly: 1 CD approached the vicinity of Zagorz, but then came up against a strong Russian position; the advance elements of 56 ID and 8 CD reached the area southwest and south of Baligrod. The headquarters of 3rd Army moved from Kaschau to Bartfeld.

The Russian high command reacts

23 The rest of the Corps - 86 LW Bde (5 battalions and 2 batteries) - came under Roth's command at Tymbark on the 14th.
Meanwhile the Stavka was reacting to the heavy pressure of the situation. Since the fall of Lodz the Germans in Poland had been hammering the Russian front west of the lower Bzura; at Russian HQ in Baranowicze it seemed that the Germans were planning to thrust ahead through Mlawa. Ivanov's plan on 9 December for Dimitriev to attack in west Galicia had won an initial success on the Stradomka, but then had collapsed; the hoped-for attack by Brussilov against the columns of Boroevic's Army as they advanced through the Carpathians hadn't materialized.

To discuss the forthcoming operations, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch invited both Front commanders to a conference at Brest-Litovsk on the 13th.24 Here it was decided that the 1st, 2nd and 5th Armies would pull back to prepared positions behind the Bzura and Rawka; thus they would guard as wide an area as possible west of Warsaw and also north of the Vistula in the direction of Mlawa. The Armies of the Southwest Front would also pull back from their opponents' lines. By shortening the front, units would be freed to reinforce 10th Army in East Prussia and also Brussilov's 8th Army, which would attack Boroevic.

General Ivanov thereupon prepared to have 4th and 9th Armies occupy a new front between Tomaszow and Checiny, and behind the Nida. 9th Army would assemble at least two divisions - and if possible two corps - as reserves behind Checiny-Stopnica-Staszow. 3rd Army was ordered to move back to the Duanjec and the Biala. There it should be ready for new operations within two days; two reserve divisions from 9th Army would cross the Vistula to join the 3rd. To protect 3rd Army's withdrawal, 8th Army would delay Boroevic's advance toward the Tarnow-Jaroslau railroad. 11th Army would continue to blockade Przemysl, but also prevent any enemy advance through Dynow-Dubiecko toward Przeworsk-Jaroslau; its left wing should be ready to support Brussilov as soon as any Aus-Hung. forces moved against his eastern flank at Sanok and Lisko.

2. Operations of 3rd and 4th Aus-Hung. Armies through 17 December

In accordance with these decisions, the Russian units west of the Vistula began to withdraw in the gray winter evening of 14

---

December. In Galicia, on the other hand, throughout the day General Ivanov continued to hold his lines at the Vistula-Dunajec confluence with his usual stubbornness. Therefore 39 Hon ID and the right wing of the German 47 Res ID were unable to win any significant ground against the Russian rear guard position at Rajbrot-Tropie (on the Dunajec between Witowie and Czchow); the other parts of 4th Army were no more successful.

In accordance with Army orders issued in the afternoon of 14 December, 4th Army would deploy against Dimitriev's positions but wouldn't attack until the offensive of the neighboring Army on it right began to have an effect in the enemy's rear. Boroevic would thrust to the Tarnow-Rzeszow road and break the Karl Ludwig Rail line at Rzeszow. The Dunajec River, up to the mouth of the Biala, would separate the zones of the two Armies. Finally, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was ordered to send his most battle-worthy cavalry division to reinforce the east wing of 3rd Army. For this purpose he selected 10 CD.

As morning dawned on 15 December, all the Russians between the Vistula and Zakliczyn were finally in full retreat; they were pursued by the k.u.k. 4th Army, which was only lightly engaged against rear guards in a few sectors. Although all bridges had been destroyed by the enemy, and despite inevitable friction, the pursuit on the 15th and 16th went forward smoothly. By the evening of the 16th the troops had reached the line Zakliczyn-Biadolina-Szlicheckie-Szczerowa. 6 CD and the badly reduced 11 Hon CD were sent to recuperate in the area northwest of Neusandez. Colonel Brauner's Landsturm Group (1 and 35 Lst Inf Bdes), which had been temporarily attached to 4th Army by the Cracow fortress command, crossed over to the north bank of the Vistula at Niepolomice to join 1st Army during its advance. 4th Army HQ came up from Wadowice to Myslenice on the 16th.

The western wing of Boroevic's Army encountered fierce resistance in the sector between the Dunajec and Biala south of Zakliczyn-Gromnik, where the Russian rear guards had been ordered to stand their ground as long as possible to cover the movement of their main body toward the rear.

4 CD and Szurmay's foremost troops thus encountered the enemy as soon as they resumed their advance. They drove the Russians from two temporary positions, but were unable to reach Zakliczyn, where the enemy forces were snarled in a potentially dangerous traffic jam. Nevertheless, the k.u.k. artillery was able to bombard some of the Russian supply trains.
The right wing of IX Corps took Biecz in the morning of the 15th. FML Kralicek thereupon decided to send both his divisions toward the north (instead of also moving northeast toward the bridge over the Biala at Gromnik). The Russians pulled slowly back in front of III Corps, and evacuated Jaslo. Without any noteworthy action, VII Corps reached Krosno and sent a detachment toward Iskryzynia. 5 Hon CD, by now reduced to just 500 horsemen, spent the night of 14-15 December at Rymanow. It seemed that the Russians in front of Krautwald were preparing to make a stand at Lisko; therefore the Group commander spent the 14th in preparing his forces for the upcoming attack.

Based on orders from the AOK, Boroevic now directed Szurmay's Group, including 11 Lst Terr Bde, toward Tarnow; this was also the objective of 4 CD. IX Corps would advance east of the Biala toward the area east of Tarnow, III Corps on both sides of the Wisloka toward Pilzno and Debica, and VII Corps from Krosno to Ropczyce-Sedziszow. The cavalry of VII Corps would guard its eastern flank in the direction of Rzeszow. Krautwald would follow VII Corps in echelon east of the line Brzozow-Luteczka-Rzeszow and leave strong forces at Sanok to guard the Army's right flank. 6 ID would march on the 15th from Stroze to Zagorszany (southwest of Biecz).

If the Russians couldn't prevent Boroevic's Army from advancing to the Tarnow-Rzeszow road, they would be unable to hold the line of the lower Dunajec, which would be outflanked. This aspect of the situation was also obvious in Barfeld. On the 15th, Boroevic wired his subordinate commanders: "The duty of 3rd Army is to foil any attempt by the enemy to hold a line south of the Karl Ludwig Railroad by an unending thrust toward the north."

**Russian resistance increases**

Nonetheless, on the 15th only Boroevic's west wing made progress, and even it was unable to reach its stated objective. In close cooperation with Arz' Group, Szurmay hemmed the enemy forces in the Zakliczyn area tighter together. The Combined Hon ID was ordered to shift to its left, thus cutting off the enemy facing 38 Hon ID from retreat over the Dunajec; the Division also sent a mixed detachment toward Tarnow. However, the tough Russians were once again equal to the occasion; they held onto Zakliczyn and fended off Szurmay's troops, who were assisted on their left wing by 4 CD.

The enemy fought even more stubbornly against IX Corps. When 26 LW ID advanced again toward Gromnik, it was confronted by
substantial parts of the Russian 13 ID in the Biala valley; IX Corps gained only some insubstantial ground. The advance of III Corps through Jaslo also stalled; the brigade on its left wing attacked over the Ropa, but was thrown back to the south bank of the river. The divisions of IX and of III Corps now had scarcely more than 3,000 riflemen apiece.

Under VII Corps, the 17 ID became embroiled in a heavy action on the heights northwest of Krosno; 20 Hon ID stormed the hill north of this city, but then was forced onto the defensive; Iskrzynia could not yet be taken. 5 Hon CD had been attacked from the north and east by the enemy where it had camped for the night, and had to be supported by parts of 17 ID. Krautwald's attack on Lisko had to be postponed because 56 ID and 8 CD weren't ready yet.

To get the operation moving again, Boroevic ordered 6 ID, which had been held as the Army's reserve, to deploy on the left wing of III Corps on the 16th; the Division would thrust toward Siepietnica. Meanwhile Szurmay would help 26 LW ID of IX Corps, which was lagging behind. 10 CD, arriving from 4th Army, was ordered toward Biecz.

On the 16th, Arz' and Szurmay's Groups were both engaged in a narrow area on both banks of the Dunajec; 38 Hon ID was able to enter Zakliczyn. While the advance guards of this Division pursued the enemy, Kornhaber was heavily engaged against the Russians all day; his right wing was unable to take the bridges over the Biala at Gromnik.

Because of heavy fire from the Russian artillery, the attacks by IX and III Corps gained no tangible success. Kralicek's troops were engaged mainly on the lines they had reached the day before; a detachment attempted to seize the Tuchow bridge by a coup de main, but was defeated and suffered significant casualties.

Boroevic had hoped that the flank attack by 6 ID would not only open up the route through the Wislok valley for III Corps, but also lend fresh impetus to the offensive by IX Corps. Neither hope was fulfilled. 6 ID advanced forward only far enough to fill the gap between the two Corps; III Corps was still bogged down in the action north of Jaslo.

With its front facing northeast, the VII Corps drove the Russians back somewhat, and established firm control of Krosno. In the night and morning Krautwald had to fend off repeated thrusts by the enemy, who was becoming more aggressive; his own offensive,
however, despite the deployment of 56 ID on the right wing, soon came to a halt.

**Continued optimism at Teschen**

At Teschen, meanwhile, the AOK was tenaciously determined to expand the victory at Limanowa-Lapanow into as large a check as possible to the Russians; therefore 3rd Army should operate energetically against the enemy's lines of retreat. However, the next moves of the Russian commanders were still difficult to determine. If the enemy renewed their resistance west of the San, a thrust against their southern wing would promise success. If, on the other hand, they retreated over the river without pausing, while maintaining their positions in Poland, then Conrad intended to send 4th Army over the Vistula to cooperate with the units already north of the river to drive toward the east; meanwhile 3rd Army would stay in place to secure the San line.

On 15 December, while the high command was weighing these alternatives, Boroevic was still engaged in the Sanok-Krosno-Jaslo area; therefore nothing would hinder the Russians, covered by Brussilov's rear guards, from retreating to the San downstream from Przemysl or - though this was less probable - from sending substantial forces to the north bank of the Vistula. In either case it was necessary to strengthen the east wing of 3rd Army so that it could thrust with fresh units through Jaroslau-Przemysl-Chyrow.

Conrad desired if possible to force the Russians into an action west of the San, then to drive them east and relieve Przemysl. For a time he considered an offensive by FML Krautwald's Group in cooperation with the fortress garrison. However, GdI Boroevic was rightly concerned that the situation required his right wing to continue in a northerly direction; his 3rd Army was not strong enough to also launch an attack toward the east. Therefore on the 15th the AOK decided to transfer most of Arz' Group (39 Hon ID and 45 LW ID) from 4th to 3rd Army, just as it had already transferred 10 CD. On the next day, though, Conrad's fears mounted that the Russians would be able to escape unscathed behind the San. Therefore he contemplated moving the majority of Dankl's Army to the east wing of GdI Boroevic; finally he chose to only use X Corps for this purpose (even though it was already participating in 1st Army's pursuit of the Russians north of the Vistula, where they were pulling back to the Nida). On the 17th, X Corps would march to Cracow to entrain; the Corps HQ with 24 ID would take the line to Mezőlaborcz, while 2 ID took the line to

the Uzsok Pass. Boroevic was ordered to use the Corps to envelop the Russians' eastern flank on the west bank of the San. It remained to be seen whether this reinforcement would arrive in time to have the desired effect.

Meanwhile our forces were still always outnumbered by the Russians. In mid-December the entire k.u.k. northern army had only about 274,000 riflemen. By the second week of February 1915 it would increase to a half million men by the arrival of March formations, if it didn't suffer further substantial casualties in the interval.

Although the improved situation after the battle in west Galicia had renewed the confidence of the high command, they still found it advisable to urge subordinate commanders to exercise caution; this would prevent any setback from interrupting the tide of victories. There were dark clouds on the southern horizon, where Belgrade had been evacuated on the 14th; this gave the Serbs an opportunity to prepare new offensives over the Sava and Danube. Conrad also heard rumors that the Germans were conducting separate peace negotiations with the Tsar's government; he was concerned enough on the 14th to ask Count Berchtold to use his influence against this development.\textsuperscript{26}

In reality, after the German setback at Ypres on the Western front GdI Falkenhayn had asked Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to explore the possibility of a separate peace with Russia through diplomatic channels. He believed that "we must renounce any attempt to fully overthrow the enemy by military means." Meetings and negotiations based on this concept began on 18 November and lasted about a month. Then, however, they were abandoned because the soundings had determined that there was no inclination in Russia to seek peace.\textsuperscript{27}

The situation at Przemysl in mid-December

When the k.u.k. 3rd Army opened its offensive, the Przemysl garrison had sortied on 9 and 10 December to prevent the Russian blockading army from reinforcing the field forces opposite Boroevic. A smaller sortie was undertaken from the southwest corner of the fortifications on the 13th, merely to determine which enemy units were stationed there. As 3rd Army advanced farther north, however, the time was approaching when the garrison would be expected to intervene to protect the east flank of GdI Boroevic's forces. 3rd Army HQ was in continuous contact

\textsuperscript{26} Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 722 and 754 ff.

\textsuperscript{27} German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 406 ff.
with Przemysl by radio, kept its commander fully informed of the general situation, and repeatedly asked the fortress' aerial units to undertake reconnaissance missions.

On the 14th, the AOK told the garrison to do everything possible to prevent the Russians confronting the fortress from marching toward the west. Soon afterwards, 3rd Army HQ notified Przemysl that the Army in its front was retreating in very disorderly fashion. Gdj Kusmanek asked that FML Krautwald should be sent to relieve the garrison, and planned to work directly with him. On the 15th, FML Arpad von Tamasy led 17 1/4 battalions and 13 batteries from the fortress in the direction of Bircza. While being reinforced with another 3 battalions he took some important Russian strong points on the 15th and 16th; this tore a hole in the blockading line, and opened the road to Bircza. Tamasy also had 3 1/2 squadrons available to break through.28 If it had been ordered, a further advance might have been successful; the appearance of a strong detachment of the garrison in the rear of the enemy front at Sanok-Lisko could have been of decisive importance.

December 17

However, on the 17th there was a crisis. The Russians at Lisko attacked Krautwald and drove him back considerably to the southwest; they also brought reinforcements up against the troops who'd sortied from Przemysl and halted their attack with heavy losses. Although no one realized it at the time, this would be the last opportunity to relieve the fortress. The disappointing end to this action did great harm to the garrison's morale. On the evening of the 17th Kusmanek was informed by radio of FML Krautwald's setback; since the Russians had meanwhile opened an attack on the outer works north of Przemysl, the commander ordered the units which had conducted the sortie to return to the fortifications.

When the AOK placed Arz' Group under 3rd Army, Boroevic had at least received reinforcements, but they were unfortunately situated on his less important western wing. At noon on the 16th, he ordered Arz to continue the pursuit toward Tarnow on the 17th; on Arz' right, Szurmay would advance through Tuchow toward the area east of Tarnow with 38 Hon ID and Nottes' 11 Lst Terr Bde. The Combined Hon ID was removed from Szurmay's Group and

28 Translator's Note - The number of squadrons under Tamasy is added to the original from Forstner, "Przeymsl" (Vienna, 1987), p. 212. The same source gives the total infantry strength as 24 battalions, and the artillery as 15 batteries, which is discrepant from the information in ÖULK.
placed under IX Corps; it would advance through Gromnik into the rear of the enemy units opposing 26 LW ID. IX Corps' task was to move through Ryglice toward Czarna. III Corps was still under orders to attack to Pilzno-Debica; it would detach one of its divisions into the Army's reserve as soon as circumstances permitted. VII Corps would cover the Army's right flank and send any free units toward Ropczyce. FML Krautwald was ordered to hold off the enemy, while sending 1st CD - reinforced with some infantry - toward Brzozow and Lutcza in support of VII Corps. As soon as the assistance from 1 CD began to be effective, Archduke Joseph would attack with his Corps toward Ropczyce-Sedziszow. 4 CD, which was no longer needed on the Army's west wing, would follow 10 CD to the east wing.

After Krautwald's Group suffered the defeat described above, he ordered the detachment which had almost reached Sanok (under Major Oskar Zeiss) to keep the enemy from advancing on Rymanow; this would prevent any menace to the flank of VII Corps during its already difficult action.

The setback on the eastern wing was somewhat offset around noon on the 17th when Russian resistance to III and IX Corps weakened; III Corps in particular was able to gain substantial ground. Arz crossed the Dunajec at Zakliczyn on a military bridge. His advance east of the river was covered on the left by 13 LW ID (which had been detached from its own group), and on the right by Szurmay's units.

3. The Russian retreat north of the Vistula (15-18 December)

The pursuit by Dankl's Army and Woyrsch's Army Detachment was in full stride on the 15th. The former passed over the battlefield on which they had fought from 16 to 28 November, and at nightfall on 17 December reached the Nidzica and the line Dzialoszyce-Deszno. The next day was used to close ranks. Rain and snow, roads totally destroyed by traffic, and the great exhaustion of the troops made a short halt necessary. The X Corps, following the orders issued by the high command on the 16th, marched back to Cracow where they would entrain to move to the east wing of Boroevic's Army.

By evening of the 19th, 1st Army had reached the rain-swollen Nida: FML Kletter's Landsturm Group (106 Lst ID; 1, 35 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes) was deployed from the Vistula north to Wislica; V Corps (33 and 14 ID, 37 Hon ID) held the next stretch up to the mouth of the Mierzawa; then came Ist Corps (5 and 12 ID, 46 LW
ID) and on the far left the II Corps (4 and 25 ID, 2 CD) whose line stretched to a point north of Brzegi. There had been hardly any fighting; only Kletter's Landsturm Group was engaged in some minor skirmishes during the advance. 2 CD, hurrying forward on the Army's left wing toward Kielce, found the bridge at Brzegi destroyed and the heights on the opposite bank held by the Russians. According to diary entries by the various Corps, about 7,000 prisoners were taken during the advance to the Nida.

On the left of 1st Army, the south wing of Woyrsch's Group fought some Russian rear guards, and on the 17th crossed the upper Pilica between Koniecpol and Krzetow.

Meanwhile Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army was advancing on Woyrsch's northern wing. Forward elements of 27 ID from Gallwitz' Corps (which also included 1st Gd Res ID and Hauer's cavalry), occupied the city of Piotrkow, which had been abandoned by the Russians, on the night of 15-16 December. During the 16th, XII Corps was sent from Noworadomsk toward Przedborz; after light skirmishes, its leading division reached Kodrab. IV Corps, only briefly held up by the enemy, reached the Mierzyń-Lubien area. Gallwitz sent 27 ID through Piotrkow, and 1 Gd Res ID to Sulejow. General Gillenschmidt's Russian cavalry divisions, hitherto entrusted with guarding the north flank of Evert's Army during the retreat, now pulled back northeast toward Tomaszow-Wolborz. Between the left wing of 5th Russian Army on the Wolborka and the right wing of 4th Army there was only a group from XIV Corps in about brigade strength. Hauer hastened forward with his horsemen, but when he reached Sulejow on the Pilica he came up against very stubborn resistance. Some infantry of Gallwitz' Corps also came up to the river during the 16th, but were unable to force a crossing.

On this day the units under Plehve (2nd and 5th Army) were still holding their position behind the Wolborka and Mroga opposite Mackensen's south wing. However, the 1st Russian Army opposite the Germans' north wing had not even waited to be attacked, but since the 13th was retreating hastily toward the east bank of the Bzura. In this sector, Mackensen sought to outflank the enemy south of Sochaczew. Since Plehve's troops were still west of the Rawka, it seemed possible that they could be taken in a pincers if Gallwitz' Corps thrust north while the group near Sochaczew thrust south. Therefore, late in the evening of the 16th Woyrsch ordered Böhm-Ermolli to continue his pursuit toward the east, but to also send one division north through Tomaszow toward

29 The 12 ID, which had been sent to Zarki, now rejoined 1st Corps.  
30 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 307
1st Gd Res ID was selected for this mission, and reassigned to GO Mackensen. On the 17th the Guard reservists, along with Frommel's Cavalry Corps on the south wing of 9th Army, took the road through Wolborz against the rear of the enemy corps which were still stationed west of the Rawka. However, during the night of 16-17 December the Russians had already begun to retreat to the Rawka. GO Mackensen immediately sent 1st Gd Res ID and Frommel's cavalry to pursue the Russians east of the Pilica, toward Nowe Miasto and Groje; with the four corps of his right wing he wanted to push east against the enemy, while the four corps of his left wing thrust over the Bzura to the rail line leading from Skierniewice to Warsaw. Thus from the north he would outflank the three Russian Armies (# 1, 2 and 5) which he believed to be in full retreat to the middle Vistula.31

Böhm-Ermolli's Army was able to cross the swampy low ground along the Pilica in only two points on the 17th; all the bridges had been destroyed and there were still Russian rear guards on the east bank. On the left wing, Gallwitz' Corps sent 27 ID and 9 CD to cross the Pilica at Sulejow, but they failed; however, 3 CD was able to reach the opposite bank above the mouth of the Czarna. Under XII Corps, the Hermannstadt 16 ID reached the outskirts of Przedborz in the afternoon. The lead battalion of the Division stormed the town's half-burnt bridge and drove the enemy away; that night they hastily established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Pilica.

In the night of 17-18 December, the Russians broke off all contact with Gallwitz and abandoned the sector of the Pilica at Sulejow.

When Böhm-Ermolli learned that the Russians were retreating from Mackensen's left wing, he didn't expect them to make a stand on the Czarna or the at Opoczno. He believed Evert's Army was retreating to the Vistula, and was determined to hurt them by a vigorous pursuit.

Early on the 18th, the troops of 2nd Army crossed the Pilica on boats and hastily assembled plank bridges. Gallwitz, with 27 ID and Hauer's cavalry (3 and 9 CD) moved down the road toward Opoczno as far as Mniszow and the area south of Tomaszow. Further advance was impossible because the troops encountered strong Russian positions. Meanwhile IV Corps advanced over the Czarna upstream from Przylek; then, however, they came under fire...

31 Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 309 ff.
from entrenched Russian riflemen. In the evening the enemy drove them back to the west bank. XII Corps, which advanced on the road from Przedborz toward the Czarna and in the sector farther south, also saw action. 16 ID stormed Czermno during the night, but 35 ID couldn't advance through the heavily defended village of Pilczyca.

South of 2nd Army, the German divisions of Gö Woyrsch on this day reached Malogoszcz-Kajetanow after fighting enemy rear guards; they found themselves facing a strong Russian position behind the Lososina.

Thus the pursuit of Woyrsch's group was coming to an end on the evening of the 18th. He recognized that the enemy was digging in again, and therefore ordered his south wing to go over to the defensive in front of the Russian positions on the Lososina. 32

In Mackensen's Army, the 1st Gd Res ID advanced on the 17th and 18th north of the Pilica through Tomaszow toward the east; its south wing reached the Rawka. The Russians abandoned the Bzura as far as Łowicz, but then stood their ground. Reports about the stubbornness of enemy resistance made it likely that the Russians intended to fight for this sector. Thus disappeared the hope that the enemy could be enveloped from the north and decisively defeated.

There was also doubt at Teschen as to whether the Russians would continue their retreat to the central Vistula. In Conrad's opinion, now more than ever the decision should be sought on the flanks. His efforts to strengthen his Armies' southern wing have already been noted; he remained convinced that the war of movement in the East could be continued to a victorious conclusion if the Germans stayed on the defensive in France and threw substantial reinforcements against Russia. His goal was still a double envelopment of the Russian masses on a grand scale, taking advantage of the enormous length of the front in the Vistula valley and west Galicia. 33

On the 18th, the k.u.k. high command told Woyrsch to operate in conjunction with Mackensen's south wing along the Pilica, and to reach the line Odrzywol-Konsk-Cminsk. From this position, Woyrsch could next attempt an envelopment operation from the north in conjunction with Mackensen on his left; Conrad envisioned Mackensen advancing southeast from the Skierniewice-Warsaw rail line. Dankl's Army would advance with its right wing

32 German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 311 ff.
on the Vistula, and be prepared to also intervene south of that river.\textsuperscript{34} For the thrust of the Archduke's 4th Army on the other side of the Vistula had come suddenly to a halt on the 17th. Bitter fighting broke out on its entire front, and initiated a new phase of the campaign.

**B. The Last Actions of 1914**

1. Events south of the Vistula

a. The Russians build a new front; Austro-Hungarian measures on 17 December

In the second half of December there were further actions in the aftermath of the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, that would have significant influence on the continuing war in the East.

On the enemy side, Ivanov's orders of the 13th for the retreat and redeployment of 3rd and 8th Armies were being implemented. Opposite Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and the west wing of Boroevic's Army, Dimitriev's north wing (half of IX Corps and all of IX) was hurrying back to the lower Dunajec; XXI Corps and the other half of XI were withdrawing to the Tuchow area, while X Corps pulled back toward Debica. Brussilov moved those of his units which had been directly engaged in the west Galician battle back by forced marches to a new front facing toward the south. Thus he recalled 10 CD from its promising operation in the Kamenica valley to guard the connection between XXIV and XII Corps. XII Corps was given a flanking position east of Krosno-Rymanow and charged with the protection of the approaches to Przemysl; XXIV Corps held the Jodlowa-Brzostek sector. VIII Corps was in the Army's reserve by Rzeszow-Krosno. Finally, Brussilov instructed 11 Army to send a division to drive the Austrians away from Sanok and then to thrust through Sanok toward Rymanow. The key sector in the front opposite Boroevic was no doubt the area between the Biala and Wisłoka, where the Russians had to prevent their opponents from rolling up the Dunajec position from behind. The two divisions from 9th Russian Army were crossing the Vistula: 61 ID would become a reserve for 3rd Army, while 70 ID joined the half of XI Corps east of Tuchow to create a combined Corps under General Sakharov, on the left of

\textsuperscript{34} This was the same plan of advance which Conrad has given 1st Army at the start of October (see Volume I).
GdI Boroevic was constantly trying to strengthen his east wing. He planned to pull IX Corps from the front and send it through Krosno toward Sanok. Then it would be possible to unload the entire X Corps from their trains in the Ung valley; that Corps, along with Csermak's Group - which would again come under 3rd Army - could undertake a wide maneuver through Turka to the right and envelop the Russians. The Army order of the evening of the 17th was based on this idea. The objectives of the west wing (VI Corps and Szurmay's Group) remained basically the same: Tarnow and the area to its east; the only changes were that Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID was returned to Szurmay, while 11 Lst Terr Bde would move through Gromnik and Biecz under command of IX Corps. The IX Corps would halt its advance and move through Jaslo as the Army's reserve. The objectives of III Corps - Pilzno and Debica - were also unchanged; the Corps would send a mixed detachment through Frysztak into the rear of the Russians opposing VII Corps. The VII Corps would send 17 ID toward Frysztak, 20 Hon ID and 5 Hon CD to Lutcza-Domaradz. 4 CD would join IX Corps, 10 CD would join VII Corps. Army HQ didn't know yet about Krautwald's recent defeat; they ordered him to stay in the Sanok-Lisko area (where they thought he was still located).

Meanwhile the AOK had decided to also transfer XVIII Corps from 4th Army to GdI Boroevic; the entire X Corps would move to Mezőlaborcz while XVIII Corps entered the upper Ung valley on a parallel rail line.

Shortly after Boroevic issued the orders to his units summarized above, a general order from Teschen arrived at his HQ in Bartfeld. The AOK approved his plan for shifting his forces toward the east; in the west, after VI Corps reached the Tarnow area it would be transferred from 3rd back to 4th Army. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would advance on the main Tarnow-Pilzno-Debica road, with a strong right wing. 3rd Army's left wing would pursue toward Ropczyce-Rzeszow. The enemy must be prevented from establishing a new line on the Wisloka by an effective threat against his line of retreat. If the Russians made a stand on the San, Boroevic would initiate a deeper envelopment by X and XVIII Corps.

36 These AOK orders included measures to restore order to units whose components had become intermingled. 4th Army HQ was instructed not to send 86 LW Bde through Tarnow so that the Brigade could rejoin its parent XVIII Corps. GM Reymann's Combined Bde of II Corps (IR # 81, BH IR # 1 and four batteries) would move from the 4th back to 1st Army.
Shortly after this order was wired from Teschen, news arrived that the two divisions from 9th Russian Army (61 and 70) had crossed the Vistula at Nowy Korczyn and were marching south. Therefore 3rd Army HQ was ordered to postpone shifting their units to the east until Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had crossed the Biala-Dunajec line north of Tarnow; until this was accomplished he would still need support from Boroevic's western wing.

As this new phase of the campaign opened, the weather became a handicap. Gusty rains in the last few days had saturated the ground and made movement difficult. The artillery could be brought into position only after unspeakable labor.

b. Actions at Tarnow and the Dunajec (18-20 December)

On the 17th, the actions of the Archduke's Army on the approaches to the middle and lower Dunajec indicated that the Russians were in no hurry to pull back over the river; in Roth's Group, the German 47 Res ID suffered a severe setback and lost about 600 men as prisoners.\(^{37}\) 4th Army HQ and the AOK were both convinced that the Tarnow area would have to be taken first; then a thrust from Tarnow to the north would roll up the enemy positions near the Dunajec. Therefore 4th Army ordered that on the 18th the Russians should be pushed hard, but that isolated actions and heavy casualties should be avoided. The two cavalry divisions assembled south of Zakliczyn were given ambitious goals: 6 CD was to advance to Przeclaw and 11 Hon CD to Dabrowa. XVIII Corps (minus 86 LW Inf Bde, which was still under Roth's Group) had already left the Army and was marching to Cracow.

18 December

4th Army was surprised on 18 December when it became engaged in serious fighting on the west bank of the Dunajec; the enemy couldn't be driven back. Although the river was right behind them, the Russians stubbornly defended some strongly garrisoned villages; apparently they wanted to maintain bridgeheads on the west bank for an eventual counteroffensive.

The HQ of 4th Army moved from Myslenice to Okocim Castle (by Brzesko). At this time the largest force near Tarnow was VI Corps, which had already deployed on the 17th between the Dunajec and Biala, facing north; however, it was still under GdI

\(^{37}\) German official history, Vol. IV, pp. 314 ff.
Boroevic's command. Because of the situation, this Corps would have to fight at the point where the Biala flows into the Dunajec, and if possible also east of the river in order to take Tarnow. 6 CD, which had been unable to break through the strong Russian front, was placed under FML Arz for operations against the flank and rear of the units opposing him. FML Roth was once again ordered to avoid costly frontal attacks. GdI Kritek had learned of the transfer of the two Russian divisions over the Vistula to the south, and wanted to cross the lower Dunajec as a counter-measure, but 4th Army HQ refused him permission.

These measures were fully in accordance with the thinking of the AOK. During the 18th, the staff at Teschen came to the conclusion that the enemy was once again making a serious stand, especially since the offensive of 3rd Army was beginning to falter. Therefore, that evening the 4th Army was ordered to forego an offensive over the Dunajec; instead, they should stand on the defensive along the Dunajec and Biala while preparing a strong force on the right wing for the thrust to Tarnow. This would also enable the 3rd Army to switch more of its weakened formations toward the east. The Cracow fortress was instructed to send the Archduke 8 batteries (two with 30.5 cm mortars, four with 15 cm howitzers, and two with 12 cm cannon).

19-20 December

While the pursuit operations of 1st Army and of Woyrsch's Group were coming to a standstill on the Nida and the Czarna, and on the bend in the Pilica south of Tomaszow, Russian resistance was also increasing south of the Vistula on the 19th.

In the night of 18-19 December the enemy did evacuate the west bank of the lower Dunajec in front of 4th Army's north wing; Kritek's troops immediately established themselves firmly along the river. Farther south, however, all the attempts of Ljubicic's Group and the north wing of Roth's Group to capture the towns which the Russians still held on the west bank were unsuccessful.

FML Roth wished to assist VI Corps, whose attack had stalled at the mouth of the Biala, by having 13 LW ID make a frontal attack over the Dunajec toward Tarnow; the Archduke, however, vetoed this hazardous operation. Meanwhile the HQ both at Teschen and Okocim had become convinced that it was impossible to quickly take Tarnow with Arz' Corps while it was deployed in the narrow strip of land between the Biala and Dunajec. Therefore the AOK ordered that parts of Roth's Group should relieve VI Corps, while
Arz concentrated on the east bank of the Biala for another blow at the city.

In the late afternoon, FML Schmidt-Georgenegg – commander of 43 LW ID – crossed the Dunajec on a military bridge near Wojnicz with 86 LW Inf Bde and most of Reymann's Combined Inf Bde. They took over the sector hitherto held by VI Corps. The AOK had just ordered 86 LW Bde to immediately join XVIII Corps and the Combined Bde to return to 1st Army, but this order arrived too late – after they had already occupied their new line.

The AOK believed that the Russians were leaving only a minimal force to confront the Archduke while sending the bulk of Dimitriev's and Brussilov's Armies to attack Boroevic. Until the arrival of X and XVIII Corps, 3rd Army might be heavily outnumbered. Therefore the XI Corps (11 and 30 ID) was ordered to transfer from 4th to 3rd Army; also, 11 Hon CD would immediately ride to the east. Finally, LW IR # 5 (of two battalions), which had been in garrison at Pola, was sent by rail to reinforce Boroevic.

On the 20th the Archduke's Army was once again unable to complete the occupation of the entire west bank of the Dunajec; the Russian pockets still held out against the center of the Army.

There still had not been any combined operations along with 1st Army. On the evening of the 19th, GdK Dankl had planned to move 14 ID from V Corps to his right wing; there it would join GM Kletter's Landsturm Group in a thrust over the Vistula between the mouths of the Dunajec and Nida and assist the advance of Kritek's Group. However, on the 20th the HQ of 1st Army gained the impression that there were only five or six Russian divisions deployed on the Nida between its mouth and Checiny, while other units had moved to Kielce to be transported to the north. Therefore Dankl decided to attack over the Nida on the 21st to take Nowy Korczyn; this would threaten the bridge which the Russians were using to send troops back and forth over the Vistula.

In the night of 20-21 December the XI Corps began to leave the front of 4th Army. Thus the Archduke's HQ would command only the two large Groups of Roth and Kritek.38

---

38 Pilsudski's Polish Legion, which had been recuperating at Neusandez after the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, was sent to Zakliczyn.
c. 3rd Army's offensive falters (18-20 December)

GdI Boroevic was meanwhile striving to quickly gain ground toward the north. However the unfavorable situation, particularly the great length of the front, prevented him from making a decisive thrust with a strong right wing. In that sector, Krautwald repulsed a Russian attack on the 18th. On the next day, 3rd Army HQ ordered him to send more reinforcements to aid his hard-pressed neighbor on the left. He had already sent Major Zeiss' Detachment, which was engaged with enemy infantry and cavalry west of Sanok; now he also sent 1 CD, which moved through Bukowkso.

VII Corps was heavily engaged with the enemy XII Corps, which was clearly gaining reinforcements. When Archduke Joseph asked for help, Boroevic could only recommend that he deploy 5 Hon CD against the enemy's left wing, along with 10 CD (which was still riding east in the area south of Jaslo); VII Corps was ordered to firmly hold onto Krosno, which covered the Army's eastern flank. On the morning of the 19th, the left wing of 20 Hon ID captured the forested heights north of Odrzykon; however, the Russians drove back the attackers at several points during the afternoon. The advance of 10 CD and 5 Hon CD against the enemy's east flank was soon cancelled because it was learned that Russian reinforcements had arrived in the area east of Brzozow.

III Corps tried in vain to break the enemy's resistance at Brzostek and Jodlowa, even after 6 ID intervened in the latter sector. To help close the gap that had developed between III and VII Corps while the latter was engaged to the southeast, Boroevic told GdI Colerus that for now he should just hold onto the terrain he had won, while preparing a strong reserve in echelon behind his right. Nonetheless, Colerus tried on the 19th to gain ground toward Brzostek, while simultaneously capturing the heights north of Jodlowa; these efforts were unsuccessful.

In a smooth operation the IX Corps reached the Ryglice area on the 18th, and send its advance guards up to the heights north of the town, which were occupied by the enemy. On the 19th, the 26 LW ID and Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID - which now was on the Corps' left wing - reached the hill north of Ryglice, but then were halted by impregnable defenses. 10 ID was hit by a furious enemy attack and thrown back. Szurmay, deployed to the east of VI Corps with 38 Hon ID and 11 Lst Terr Bde, took the heights northeast of Tuchow on the morning of the 19th, but then was heavily engaged against a Russian counterattack.
At Teschen and Bartfeld it was hoped that the moribund offensive of 3rd Army could be brought back to life by the troop movements which had been ordered, especially the intervention of X and XVIII Corps. Covered by FML Krautwald's and Col. Csermak's Groups, the X Corps was sending 24 ID along the Mezölaborcza-Sanok road and down the Oslawica valley; its lead elements were at Komancza; the Corps' 2 ID was farther back, at Vidrany and in the Laborcza valley. XVIII Corps was in the Ung Valley, with its lead elements assembling at Csontos. However, the first units of these reinforcements would not be able to intervene effectively on the east wing of 3rd Army before 22 December. Until then Boroevic would have to rely on his original, badly decimated units. The Army commander doubted that victory at Tarnow was possible, and anyway placed little emphasis on driving the Russians from the Dunajec line; therefore on the morning of the 20th he approached the AOK with a new plan. To give decisive impetus to the action of his east wing, he wanted to concentrate 8 or 9 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions here. Four of the cavalry divisions (4 and 10 plus 5 and 10 Hon CD) would initially reinforce VII Corps; Boroevic intended to use them afterwards as an enormous cavalry corps in advance toward Przemysl. The AOK approved the diversion of VI and XI Corps to the east, and 11 Hon CD was already on its way. If the Russians didn't retreat, the 4th Army and west wing of the 3rd would stay on the defensive until GdI Boroevic's east wing was ready to attack.

However, the events south of the Vistula on the 20th didn't fully illuminate the intentions of the enemy in front of 4th or 3rd Army. On the right wing of 3rd Army, VII Corps was unable to bring the exhausting actions at Krosno to a decisive conclusion. 17 ID had to give up some ground before 4 CD entered the fighting as a welcome reinforcement on its left wing. Similarly, 20 Hon ID was able to extend its lines facing toward the northeast when 5 Hon CD arrived. 10 CD, attempting to thrust through Besko toward Brzozow, was soon confronted by a much larger enemy force.

Defensive fighting also predominated in the sectors of III and IX Corps, as well as of FML Arz' Group (which temporarily also commanded Szurmay and Kornhaber). 6 ID won an initial success in the direction of Jodlwowa; however, a Russian counterattack drove it back. This forced the right wing of the neighboring IX Corps to pull back at an angle. Under this Corps, 10 ID had just 1400 riflemen, while 26 LW ID had 1000.

39 GM Anton Ritter von Pitreich, who at that time was Chief of the Operations Section at 3rd Army HQ, reports that the original plan was for an attack toward Stary Sambor with 7 divisions (in a letter of 27 May 1929).
d. The conference at Oppeln (19 December)

On 17 December, while it was reported that the Russians were in retreat on the entire front of 9th Army, a conference was held in Berlin between Falkenhayn, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Ludendorff; it was decided that the offensive must continue until the line of the middle Vistula was reached. On the next day, the German representative at Teschen, General von Freytag-Loringhoven, told the k.u.k. Chief of the General Staff that Falkenhayn would like to meet to work out common objectives; "winter is coming ever nearer, and we can't fight forever." On the 19th the two Chiefs of Staff met at the railroad station in Oppeln.

The difference of opinion between the two men regarding the conduct of the war in the East became apparent right at the start of the meeting. Thus there was no satisfactory answer to the question of what should happen if the Russian evacuated the areas west of the Vistula and the San. In Falkenhayn's opinion, in this case a "Chinese Wall" should be created on the west bank of the Vistula in Poland, so that any enemy thrust would be destroyed. Once this was achieved, the General wanted to take as many units as possible from the German eastern armies and use them for a decisive offensive in France at the start of February.

This was opposed by Conrad, who felt that the Russians must be broken by envelopment attacks on both flanks, regardless if this happened west or east of the Vistula. If the enemy did pull back over the river, the main body of the German eastern armies should attack over the Narew toward Siedlec, as had been planned when the war started but unfortunately not implemented. There was an opportunity to overthrow the Russians. If this were successful, France would also collapse; without protection from the Tsar, the Balkan enemies would also be reduced to impotence.

Falkenhayn completely disagreed. He believed that the Russians would always be able to avoid major damage by retreating; then no decision would be possible in either the East or West. Moreover, French resistance was being stiffened by the British. The proposed operation through Siedlec would require substantial forces which were also needed in East Prussia to oppose the 10th

40 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 310
42 Also present were Glt von Freytag-Loringhoven, the German Col. Tappen (Chief of the Operations Detachment of OHL) and k.u.k. Lt Col. Kundmann.
Russian Army. And meanwhile what would happen in the West? If the German front there collapsed, any victory in Russia would be nullified. However, the whole issue wouldn't arise until the Tsar's armies were driven over the Vistula. The German Chief of Staff assured his colleague that he wouldn't take any units away from the eastern army until they had achieved the objective outlined at the earlier Breslau conference (the advance to the Vistula).

Conrad's opinion was that if the Russians were thrown over the Vistula and the offensive didn't continue, a force of five German and Aus-Hung. corps should be left to guard the river. However, they wouldn't form an "unbroken defensive line", but rather would only leave advance guards on the river in strongly fortified posts. The main body would be farther back, held in echelon on both flanks. This incident illustrates Conrad's well-founded mistrust of setting up a defensive cordon with units distributed in equal length throughout the line. However, neither he nor any other commander was able to break free of the constraints of positional warfare.

Thus no issues regarding strategy were settled at Oppeln.\textsuperscript{43} There was also a discussion regarding the occupied territories in Poland. Falkenhayn wanted each ally to administer the districts occupied by its own troops except that Bendzin and Czenstochau would stay under German administration. No agreement could be reached on this issue either.\textsuperscript{44}

The k.u.k. AOK issued guidelines for the continuation of operations late in the evening of 20 December. As previously, the primary goal was a double envelopment of the Russian forces, from the north by 9th German Army (which first would have to capture a suitable base for their thrust) and from the south by 3rd Army. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, Dankl and Woysrch would stay in place for now, and only attack if the enemy removed units from their sectors. If the situation developed favorably, Conrad still intended to send the right wing of 3rd Army farther east to relieve Przemysl and thus ensure the security of the Carpathians. The AOK, which still believed that the Russians would retreat behind the San, wasn't sure whether they would make more than a

\textsuperscript{43} At Oppeln there were also discussions regarding the feasibility of occupying the Negotin sector in Serbia in order to find a way to send arms and ammunition to Turkey.

\textsuperscript{44} The main controversy regarded the coal and industrial resources of Bendzin-Dabrowa. On 10 January 1915, an allied meeting at Posen determined that they would divide this territory so that it could be exploited by both of them.
temporary stand on that river. In a note to the Foreign Minister the next day, the Chief of Staff outlined the general situation in a rather favorable light. "The operations of all the contending parties have stalled, so that the situation is stationary; the daily local actions aren't altering this picture..." He believed that success in the area east of Tomaszow would be possible only if at least six German divisions were committed to that sector.

The outlook from the Russian side

While GdI Conrad thus wanted to continue the campaign until the enemy army was overthrown, the Russians were also discussing new plans to win a decisive victory west of the Vistula and the San.

General Russky believed that his armies were no longer strong enough to withstand the German attacks behind the Rawka and the Bzura; therefore he wished to pull back to a "position in front of Warsaw" between Novo Georgievsk and Gora Kalvarja. This would also free him of anxiety about whether his opponent would launch a thrust from Mlawa. The German Graudenz Corps had pushed the parts of 1st Russian Army operating north of the Vistula back to Sierpc, Ciechanow and Przasnysz at the start of December. In mid-month the intervention of Russian reinforcements caused these invaders to withdraw to the southern border of West Prussia. By this time, however, Russky had lost all his confidence. The offensive of his 10th Army in East Prussia was stalled on the Angerapp and the Masurian Lakes; he believed that his units in Poland would have no fighting capacity unless they were brought back to their authorized strength.

On the other hand, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo didn't want to finally abandon his plan for an enormous invasion of Germany. He wanted to restore the situation of the Northwest Front by a counterattack from the Armies assembled on the Pilica and Bzura (the 4th, 5th and 1st). Without heeding a protest from Ivanov, on 16 December the Grand Duke ordered the Guards to leave 9th Army for the Siedlec area, where they came directly under the Stavka. At the end of December this reserve group would be joined by IV Siberian Corps. Meanwhile the 3 Turkestan Rifle Bde moved by rail from Brest-Litovsk to Warsaw to directly strengthen the Northwest Front. Nonetheless, on the 17th Russky was contemplating a further retreat. If the high command agreed with him, it would be necessary for Ivanov to evacuate the Nida line to maintain his connection with Russky; 4th and 9th Armies would

45 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 832
have to go back to Ivangoord. Therefore Ivanov made earnest objections to the Grand Duke, because it was necessary to maintain the line on the Nida to cover the flank of the Galician armies as they prepared for a decisive stroke against the Austro-Hungarians. Once again Ivanov won the contest between the two Front commanders. Nicholas Nikolaievitch ordered Russky to stay in place with 2nd and 5th Armies on the lower Bzura; the 4th and 9th Armies were instructed to hold the line Lubocz (on the Pilica west of Nowe Miasto) - Opoczno - Radoszyce - Lososina River - Nida River. The security of 4th Army's right flank would be ensured by a powerful counterattack.

e. The Russians begin to counterattack (21-24 December)

21 December was the turning point of the operations south of the Vistula. Until this time, GdI Boroevic's attacking columns had crossed the main crest of the Carpathians as rather isolated groups. Only on the Army's western wing was there a continuous, though rather thin, line; farther east, and particularly on the right flank, the various groups were connected very tenuously. As Ivanov had gradually erected a new defensive wall toward the south, it became apparent that the 3rd k.u.k. Army wasn't strong enough to make a decisive thrust to its north. On the 21st the Russians began their own counterattack. XXI Corps struck at the Biala-Dunajec confluence, Sakharov's Combined Corps toward Gromnik-Biecz, X Corps near Jodlowa, and XXIV and XII Corps at Jaslo and the area farther east. Meanwhile General Shcherbatchev held the Dunajec line against the Archduke's Army with IX Corps and half of the XIth.

The fighting on the Dunajec

However, even on the Archduke's front there was heavy fighting on the 21st, because the Russian commander wanted to carry out his mission with offensive tactics. He threw three battalions over the river north of Radlow, but they were defeated when Kritek's 82 Hon Inf Bde launched a successful counterattack. Since Shcherbatchev was aware that the k.u.k. XI Corps was trying to depart, he also had his 5 ID attack at Radlow and farther to the south; this caused 8 and 3 ID of Fabini's Group to waver temporarily. 47 Res ID also had to fend off Russian attacks.

47 The activities of VIII Corps aren't covered by Nesnamov (Vol. III, pp. 23 ff.). It had been placed in Army reserve by Brussilov, and was initially in the Pilzno area. Apparently it didn't stay there long, but deployed farther southeast between the Wislok and Wisloka Rivers. Later it entered the front near Jaslo between X and XXIV Corps, and with one division at Dukla (town).
FZM Ljubicic still was able to send 11 ID on its way toward the south; however the heavy Russian fire delayed the departure of 30 ID from the line; 88 L-Sch Bde had to be kept at Radlow in case an emergency developed. Although the enemy attacked again on the 22nd, the Aus-Hung. front remained solid, and in the afternoon the Landes-Schützen were able to follow the rest of XI Corps toward the rear.

The fighting was hotter at the mouth of the Biala. After the VI Corps (45 LW and 39 Hon ID) had been relieved by FML Schmidt-Georgenegg's Group (86 LW Bde and parts of Reymann's Combined Inf Bde), the Russians struck their new opponents with full fury and pushed them back somewhat. A brigade of 6 CD, the Polish Legion, and the rest of Reymann's Bde were sent to the rescue with great haste. 4th Army HQ planned, if necessary, to take Schmidt's men back to the heights on the western bank of the Dunajec between Zakliczyn and Wojnicz; the next available reserves, XI Corps, would intervene in the fighting on Schmidt's right.

The events at the junction between 3rd and 4th Armies were also followed closely at Teschen. On the afternoon of the 22nd, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was ordered to prevent a Russian breakthrough by cooperating with Boroevic and by making an attack of his own. For this purpose, 4th Army gave FZM Ljubicic command over the units between the Dunajec and Biala; thus he led Schmidt's Group and 6 CD as well as his own XI Corps. Roth would support the Feldzeugmeister's attack with his heavy artillery.48 Thus the XI Corps (6500 rifles) had been diverted from its original mission of joining 3rd Army. Ljubicic reinforced Schmidt's troops, who'd suffered heavy casualties, with a brigade. As ordered by the AOK, he deployed the main body of his force in echelon behind the right wing of the line in preparation for an attack.

3rd Army faces a crisis

The VI Corps (10,300 rifles) had begun to march on the 21st toward the east wing of 3rd Army immediately after leaving the front; its route was covered by Szurmay's Group, which was fighting on both sides of Tuchow. However, Arz had to leave behind a mixed detachment to aid Szurmay. On the morning of the 21st the Russians drove IX Corps back from the chain of forested heights south of Ryglice; this forced Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID to pull back its right wing. To support the weakened IX Corps,

48 The heavy and medium artillery of Roth's Group, including the units taken from the Cracow fortress, were stationed at various points west of Wojnicz and at Radlow.
Boroevic halted 11 Hon CD - which had been riding toward the east - at Biecz and placed it under Kralicek's command.

On the 22nd Szurmay had to withstand Russian attacks and suffered substantial casualties; IX Corps was again heavily beset by the enemy. Because his own units were so weakened, and because of the unfavorable course of the fighting of the neighboring III Corps, FML Kralicek pulled back his right wing (10 ID) to the heights south of the stretch of road between Olpiny and Olszyny. Meanwhile, under VI Corps the 45 LW ID was marching from Gromnik toward Biecz and 39 Hon ID from Ciezkowice toward Zagorszany. These units heard the sounds of fighting to their north growing ever stronger. FML Arz had already decided to divert 45 LW ID to support 10 ID - in whose ranks the 11 Hon CD was now fighting - when he received orders from 3rd Army HQ to send the entire VI Corps on a thrust through Olszyny into the enemy flank. The rest of the day was spent regrouping for this operation.

III Corps, whose three divisions (6 and 28 ID, 22 LW ID) numbered just 10,200 riflemen, also had to give way on the 21st to superior numbers of the enemy; during the night they fell back to a position on both sides of Jaslo. 4 CD was reassigned to III Corps from the VIIth, and took up a position on its right wing.

Boroevic now saw all his plans unravelling. The corps which were supposed to be marching to support his right had been drawn into the heavy fighting on his left (western) wing. 86 LW Bde and XI Corps were stuck in the area between the Biala and Dunajec, VI Corps and 11 Hon CD were diverted to help the IX Corps. There was no prospect of sending any of these units to the eastern wing. Because of this new situation, in the afternoon of the 22nd the Army commander decided to make the best of a bad situation by shifting his main effort to the sector between the Biala and the Wisloka; he hoped to deliver a heavy blow against the enemy at Tarnow. The AOK approved this plan, but wouldn't place XI Corps under Boroevic as he had anticipated. Instead, 4th Army would control XI Corps during the new offensive and commit other units as it developed. The planned attack by the east wing of 3rd Army would have to await the arrival of X and XVIII Corps.

Meanwhile, on the 21st the VII Corps created three battle groups. On the left was 17 ID, the farthest advanced unit; although it couldn't break through to Frysztak, it held onto the ground already gained. In the center were 20 Hon ID and 5 Hon CD (the latter had 680 horsemen); they had to pull back to a shorter front. On the right the 10 CD came together near Besko with the
units sent by Krautwald - 1 CD and Major Zeiss' detachment. Because of the danger that his Corps' right flank might be enveloped, Archduke Joseph wanted to pull 17 ID back to the south to guard the Dukla Pass. 3rd Army HQ, however, insisted that he stay in place; they were counting on the intervention of 24 ID of X Corps within 24 hours. However, on the 22nd the VII Corps could no longer withstand the continuing enemy assaults. It became ever more obvious that the Russians intended to push the Corps west, away from its line of communications south to the Dukla Pass. The Krosno area could no longer be defended. 17 ID retreated behind the Jasiolka west of Krosno; 20 Hon ID, whose lines were broken by the Russians, pulled back with 5 Hon CD to Dukla town during the night of 22-23 December. The right wing group fought throughout the day against enemy units advancing from the east and northeast; finally the defenders retreated from the Rymanow area to Deszno.

This loss of terrain was extremely unwelcome to 3rd Army HQ, because VII Corps was supposed to form a solid pivot for the attack by X Corps. Boroevic again demanded a firm stand. Therefore Archduke Joseph ordered GM Peteani's Group at Deszno (1 and 10 CD plus Major Zeiss' Detachment) to counterattack on the 23rd. Farther east, FML Krautwald had renewed his advance toward Lisko on the 22nd as instructed. Since most of the Russians in this area had moved away to attack VII Corps and hadn't been replaced, Krautwald's attack quickly gained ground. Whether the operations on the eastern wing would succeed now hinged on the intervention of X and XVIII Corps, whose troops were rapidly approaching the battlefields.

Indecisive actions near the Dunajec

While the situation of 3rd Army became critical, the plans for 4th and 1st Armies to jointly attack in the sector where their flanks came together had again come to nothing. Martiny's Group (14 ID plus Kletter's Landsturm Group) was itself attacked by the Russians just north of the Vistula. South of the river, Kritek had to send all available units to reinforce the continuing actions of the left wing of Roth's Group at Radlow.

The preparations of XI Corps for its counterattack were delayed. 4th Army HQ, at AOK's direction, ordered FZM Ljubicic to first drive the enemy back toward the north, and then to move east with his right wing toward Plesna, thus pushing the Russians over the battlefield from the northeast).

49 Apparently the Russian units in this sector were parts of 60 ID (thrusting west from Sanok) and all of 2 Combined Coss Div (which came to the battlefield from the northeast).
Biala. Roth would finish establishing control of the west bank of the Dunajec, while his heavy artillery fired over the river against the dominant position of the Gorski Heights on the east bank.

FZM Ljubicic's troops attacked on the 24th, but by the afternoon they had only advanced slightly after great difficulties. Thus their rather complicated plan of operations couldn't be carried out. Then their neighbors in Szurmay's Group of 3rd Army were forced out of parts of their line west of Tuchow; Ljubicic had to divert troops to help Szurmay. This crisis was already anticipated the day before, when 38 Hon ID suffered crippling losses while using up most of its artillery ammunition. Szurmay asked for and received permission from 3rd Army to pull his units back on both sides of the Biala to a point half way between Tuchow and Gromnik. There they were in close contact with 26 LW ID, stationed south of Ryglice. On the evening of the 23rd the Landwehr division was placed under Szurmay.

3rd Army's plans are shattered

As already noted, FML Arz ordered his VI Corps to prepare a flank attack to relieve 10 ID; that unit, along with 6 ID of III Corps, would join the attack. On the 23rd, Arz' Corps initially advanced smoothly toward the northeast; its right wing moved north of Olpiny, its left passed the wooded Dobrolyn Hill. As the latter group left the high ground, however, its flank was no longer protected by 26 LW ID; the Russians struck this open left flank and drove the troops back to Dobrolyn. FML Kralicek's Group (now 6 and 10 ID) supported Arz in a series of hard-fought actions that flowed back and forth. Meanwhile, however, the unit to the right of Kralicek - 43 LW Bde of III Corps - had withdrawn to a new defensive position after setbacks to its neighbors farther east. A strong Russian attack toward Jaslo had caused GdI Colerus and III Corps to retreat in one bound to the heights on both sides of Zmigrod. Later he justified his action on the grounds that 17 ID of VII Corps had initiated the retreat; this had left his right wing (4 CD and parts of 28 ID) exposed to a threat from the northeast and endangered his line of communication with Zmigrod.

3rd Army HQ didn't yet know the rationale for Colerus' decision to retreat nearly a day's march. He was ordered to return toward the north to fill the gap which he had allowed to develop between Kralicek's Group on his left and VII Corps on his right.

When morning broke on the 24th, Colerus ordered his three
infantry brigades and 4 CD to retrace their steps toward the northeast. At this point fresh enemy units, believed to be two divisions, surged forward between the Wisloka and Jasiolka and forced III Corps to once again withdraw to the heights south of Zmigrod. This was an unfortunate day. Instead of carrying out the planned flank attack, VI Corps with its exhausted and poorly supplied troops remained stuck all along its line. The Russians renewed their thrusts against Kralicek's Group and forced back both 6 ID and 43 LW Bde. Therefore FML Arz was ordered to stay on the defensive and send any available units through Biecz to Kralicek, who would use them to plug the gap that had developed between his right and the III Corps.

The hole in the line was of great concern to 3rd Army HQ because it would allow the enemy to move unhindered through Jaslo. Boroevic therefore requested more reinforcements from both Teschen and Okocim; he wanted the mixed detachment which VI Corps had left under 4th Army, and at least the 88 L-Sch Bde from XI Corps (he had originally been promised the whole Corps). The answers he received weren't encouraging. Just parts of XI Corps could be sent to Biecz, and only after the actions at the mouth of the Biala had ended and Roth had established himself on the east bank of the Dunajec. Meanwhile, 5 Cav Bde of 6 CD was the only unit which would immediately move toward Biecz.

It was now evident to Boroevic that his plan for an advance between the Wisloka and Biala was ruined.

On 23 December the AOK could no longer doubt that the Russians intended to stand their ground west of the Vistula and San. Our own forces were inadequate to throw them over the rivers. Because no further divisions had come to the East from the French theater of operations, the Russians had been able to recover from their defeats at Lodz and Limanowa-Lapanow.50

There were actions on virtually all of the Eastern front on 24 December. At the beginning of December the Pope had requested that all the warring nations should observe a truce to respect the holiest feast of Christendom. However, the Russians had refused to comply on military grounds.51

50 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 863
51 Translator's Note - Blaming the Russians for the failure of Pope Benedict's attempt to observe a peaceful Christmas was quite dishonest on the Austrians' part. Conrad's memoirs make it clear that he found the notion of a truce quite ridiculous, but was cynically prepared to let the Russians take the lead in turning it down (Conrad, Vol. V, p. 693 and pp. 724-725). His sarcastic remarks show how little he appreciated the close historical connection between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Church.
f. Intervention of X Corps on the right wing of 3rd Army, and Pflanzer-Baltin's attacks through 25 December

Both at Teschen and Bartfeld, the staffs were observing the events taking place at and east of the line Krosno-Mezőlaborcz with great tension. They still hoped that the intervention of X and XVIII Corps on the Russians' right flank would give fresh impulse to 3rd Army's offensive; thus the fruits of the victory at Limanowa-Lapanow could be fully harvested.

The actions of X Corps

X Corps was the first to see action. Its leading unit, 24 ID, detrained at Mezőlaborcz through 20 December and began marching that day through the Lupkow Pass. From the start, however, the deployment of the central Galician corps took place under conditions that robbed it of its strength. 3rd Army HQ told FML Krautwald to control the march of its units until the corps commander (GdI Hugo Meixner) arrived. Based on earlier orders, the Corps was supposed to leave the railroad and then deploy on the east bank of the San; therefore Krautwald sent the first component to arrive, 47 Inf Bde, toward Wola Michowa. Under the pressure of recent developments, however, Boroevic wanted X Corps to deploy in the wide gap between Krautwald's and Archduke Joseph's Groups. Therefore at noon on the 21st he ordered that 24 ID should move forward as far as possible toward Bukowsko that day; then it would enter the line near Sanok. 2 ID, coming up behind 24 ID, would assemble at Komancza-Palota. By this time, however, 47 Inf Bde had already reached Wola Michowa. The result of the extra marching was that when 24 ID finally reached Bukowsko on the 22nd the men were very tired. For the next day, X Corps was ordered to thrust against the enemy units which were threatening the rear of VII Corps. IR # 40 of 2 ID, which was north of the Beskid Pass, was sent to help 24 ID; the rest of 2 ID would move as quickly as possible through Jasliska toward Rymanow to directly support VII Corps. There was no overall commander to coordinate the movements of VII and X Corps.

As noted above, the actions of VII Corps on the 22nd had ended with the withdrawal of many units toward the town of Dukla. On the next morning, 3rd Army gave the Corps strict orders to pin

52 As in earlier parts of this work, the operations of X Corps are partly based on an un-published study of FML Kralowetz, who at this time was Chief of Staff to the Corps.
down the enemy in its sector, so that the thrust of 24 ID into
the rear of the Russians would be as effective as possible.
Events on the 23rd, however, didn't turn out at all as the Army
commander had expected. The enemy fell upon the isolated 17 ID
and forced it to retreat in the area northeast of Dukla. 20 Hon
ID and 5 Hon CD arrived at the town of Dukla itself at an early
hour after a night march. GM Peteani's Group (1 and 10 CD plus
Major Zeiss' Detachment) moved back from Deszno to Krolik-Polski.

These developments made it easy for the Russians to divert parts
of their 69 ID toward the east to set up a covering shield
against 24 ID. The 24th moved up from Bukowsko and became
engaged at Odrzechowa. The divisional commander hesitated to
continue his thrust toward Rymanow because his north flank was
unprotected and his rear was under continuing danger from the
direction of Sanok; moreover he was completely in the dark
regarding the situation of VII Corps. Thus the advance of his
Division soon ended east of Odrzechowa. The bulk of 2 ID marched
toward Jasliska. Krautwald continued to gain ground and on the
24th drove his opponents back to their final position south of
Sanok.

For December 24 the X Corps was ordered by 3rd Army to send its
separated components into an attack toward Rymanow: 24 ID through
Odrzechowa from the east and 2 ID from the south. This planned
pincers attack never took place. The main body of 2 ID moved
slowly and was content to end the day behind Peteani's Group at
Krolik-Polski. Since 2 ID didn't appear as anticipated, 24 ID -
which was still fearful of attack from the rear - retreated to
Bukowsko. The operation of X Corps, which had begun under an
unlucky star, was already falling to pieces.

On the 25th an attempt was made to retrieve the situation.
Archduke Joseph - whose Corps hadn't been heavily engaged by the
Russians the day before - decided to support the attack which GdI
Meixner had ordered the 2 ID to make toward Rymanow. For this
purpose the Archduke assembled a strong reserve behind his right
wing. Meixner hoped to also bring 24 ID forward once more from
Bukowsko; Boroevic demanded that the unit should immediately
attack. Around noon, however, crises developed simultaneously at
Dukla and Bukowsko, and sealed the fate of the entire action.
Before either VII Corps or 2 ID began their advance, the Russians
struck toward Dukla. The town was lost; the hard-pressed troops
pulled back on the heights to the south and southeast. Meanwhile
both of Peteani's totally exhausted cavalry divisions were
ordered by 3rd Army HQ to withdraw through the Dukla Pass to
quarters in the rear for rehabilitation. 2 ID used these
developments and the approach of enemy detachments toward its own right wing as the rationale for cancelling its advance. 24 ID was hit by a surprise attack at Bukowsko. In thick fog, the commanders failed to control their men, who fled to the rear. They were finally brought back into order at Kulaszne, where Krautwald's left wing provided some support to the badly smashed Division.

The events of 25 December destroyed any remaining hopes that X Corps would be able to win the campaign. Now the three brigades of FML Tschurtschenthaler's XVIII Corps were the last remaining trump in the Army commander's hand for the bloody game.

Pflanzer-Baltin's operations

Meanwhile the neighboring Armeegruppe on Boroevic's right had remained active. On 15 December, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin had decided to help FML Hofmann recover his lost positions on the Galician-Hungarian border. The Armeegruppe would attack the enemy in a double envelopment. Three battalions and two batteries from 52 ID were sent by rail to Col. Csermak, who would capture the Uzsok Pass. The initial plan was that Hofmann would advance northeast while Durski, on his right, moved northwest to set up a pincers movement. Haller would thrust ahead to Zielona, and Schultheisz toward Uscie Putilla. However, since the Russians near Vezerszallas had been completely inactive for the last few days, the Armeegruppe commander decided instead to make his main effort against the Uzsok Pass; for this purpose he diverted units from Hofmann. On the 19th, FML Ronai-Horvath took command over Csermak's reinforced Group; two days later he began his attempt to recover this important route through the mountains using 20 battalions and 9 batteries. Guilleaume's Detachment also made a new approach to the Pass through Tiha.

Hofmann and Durski became engaged on 18 December. On the next day, 55 ID took Vezerszallas and 131 Inf Bde took Almamezö; Durski covered the right flank of the attacking forces. However, their further advance toward the Verecke Pass soon stalled because of a lack of reserves and great logistical problems.

The arrival of the fresh units of XVIII Corps in the Ung Valley gave GdK Pflanzer-Baltin the idea of using at least some of them to gain the objectives of his group. Since he was still concerned about a possible setback to Hofmann, it seemed all the more important that he should capture the Uzsok Pass as soon as possible. He sent three messages by wire to Bartfeld in the night of 21-22 December to request that when the first troops of
XVIII Corps arrived they should join Ronai-Horvath's attack on the heights near the Pass. As soon as the Russians were driven away, he would return the bulk of these men to 3rd Army, while retaining a few for a thrust through Libuchora to the southeast, into the flank and rear of Hofmann's opponents. Boroevic objected, however, that this would divert XVIII Corps from its primary task, to attack toward the north; he intended to send the Corps through Balligrod toward Lisko. Since Ronai-Horvath seemed to already be strong enough for the Uzsok Pass operation, Pflanzer-Baltin's request was turned down. On the 23rd, XVIII Corps therefore marched out of the Ung Valley through Takcsany and Cisna toward Balligrod.

On the 25th, Ronai-Horvath captured the stoutly defended route through the mountains at Uzsok after four days of fighting. Despite the fears of the Armeegruppe commander, Hofmann's and Durski's brave troops were able to carry out their difficult mission, and withstood all Russian attacks during this period.

g. Retreat of 3rd Army to the Carpathian crest and defensive fighting of the south wing of 4th Army (25-27 December)

3rd Army

The storm of overwhelming Russian attacks continued against the entire front of 3rd Army.

As the defenders had feared, on 25 December the enemy thrust through Jaslo into the gap between Colerus' and Kralicek's Groups. From this central position they attacked the exhausted and depleted k.u.k. troops with such force that resistance broke down and the whole front crumbled. Kralicek led his Group toward Biecz; in the following night, with the permission of 3rd Army HQ, they went back further to the area northeast of Gorlice; a detachment guarded the right flank against the Russians who'd advanced through Jaslo. The units which FML Arz had been ordered to hold ready to march to Biecz were committed to keep the enemy from completely wiping out Kralicek's 10 ID, now reduced to just 1,000 riflemen. On the night of 24-25 December, Arz had checked the enemy with a counterattack, but in the following afternoon the lines of his 45 LW ID were broken; having used up all his reserves, he withdrew to a point just east of Olszyny. The left wing of his Group was still in contact with Szurmay's Group, but on the right a new gap had developed between him and his other neighbor, Kralicek.
Except for Krautwald, all of the subordinate commanders of 3rd Army submitted unfavorable reports about the overwhelming enemy pressure. The artillery lacked ammunition. GdI Boroevic in turn reported to Teschen that it now seemed doubtful that he would be able to win the success he had anticipated from the operations of X and XVIII Corps. There weren't enough riflemen available to cover the extensive front. Therefore the Army would have to retreat to a shorter line and there receive fresh manpower and artillery shells. It would stay on the defensive until he could assemble enough troops by rail on his right wing to resume the offensive. In the meantime he proposed to deploy as follows:

FML Krautwald's Group, reinforced by 24 ID, would hold the area northeast of the Lupkow Pass. It might be possible for XVIII Corps to attack. Otherwise the major routes through the Carpathians would be guarded by five groups: the Rymanow-Jaslika-Mezölaborcz axis by GdI Meixner (with 2 ID, later to be reinforced by 1 and 10 CD), Dukla Pass by VII Corps, the Zmigrod-Alsopagony route by III Corps (plus 4 CD), Gorlice-Zboro by Kralicek's Group, and Grybow-Bartfeld by VI Corps.

The AOK approved only some of Boroevic's proposals. They didn't want to abandon their plans for an offensive. On the contrary, they wanted Tschurtschenthaler and Krautwald to first attack toward Lisko-Sanok, then relieve the rest of 3rd Army by thrusting toward Rymanow. The proposed deployment of VII and III Corps was approved, but Army HQ was warned not to overlook the danger that they would be pushed too far to the south. The vital lines of communication running through Silesia and Moravia to Vienna must be sufficiently covered. This in turn required that operations on the inner flanks of 3rd and 4th Armies must be closely coordinated. For this reason, the AOK reassigned Kralicek's, Arz' and Szurmay's Groups to the Archduke's Army; they ordered that the heights on both sides of Gorlice and the area north of Luzna-Gromnik should be strongly held. 4th Army would send 13 LW ID and substantial parts of Szurmay's Group to Kralicek's right wing to ensure that the enemy didn't penetrate into the area that marked the new boundary between the two Armies. After the front was solidified, 6 and 24 ID would return to their parent Corps (III and X, respectively).

At 10:00 PM, 3rd Army HQ notified its subordinates that the offensive was temporarily suspended. III and VII Corps, as well as Krautwald's and Meixner's Groups, were given authority to pull back to the crest at the Carpathian watershed if hard-pressed by
the enemy. This permission would soon have some unfortunate consequences.

4th Army

Under 4th Army, Ljubicic's Group failed to advance at the mouth of the Biala. On the 25th they gained some ground toward the Russian position, but in the evening the units fighting next to the Dunajec (Schmidt's Group) were pushed back by the enemy. 4th Army HQ wished to reinforce Ljubicic with 13 LW ID; that unit had just been relieved from Roth's south wing and was marching toward the military bridge over the Dunajec downstream from Zakliczyn. However, late that evening the AOK ordered that the 13th should be sent past the Dunajec and over the Biala bridge at Gromnik to join FML Kralicek (the infantry were conveyed by truck). To provide reserves for the important southern wing, 4th Army HQ sent 38 Inf Bde and 15 ID from Kritek, leaving him with just 37 Inf Bde and 82 Hon Inf Bde (a total of 9,000 rifles). In Kritek's sector the enemy was constantly trying to expand their holdings on the west bank of the Dunajec; however on the 26th their thrusts were repulsed by 82 Hon Inf Bde.

The situation always kept changing. The Russians opened powerful attacks against Ljubicic on the 26th; his 86 LW Bde suffered such great losses that he considered pulling his entire Group back to the west bank of the Dunajec at Zakliczyn. This would have made it impossible for the units of 3rd and 4th Army on the Biala to keep their positions. However this danger was warded off. Ljubicic's regiments stoutly defended the Wal Heights; the Russians launched continuous attacks on this position until evening of the 27th, but they were in vain. Moreover, Army HQ deployed 38 Inf Bde between Ljubicic's and Roth's Groups as additional support.

The main concern of 4th Army HQ was now its new southern wing. Parts of X Russian Corps followed Kralicek's Group along the Jaslo-Biecz-Gorlice road and farther south, attempting to drive a wedge between the two k.u.k. Armies; however, it proved relatively easy to break contact with the enemy. 11 Hon CD and half of 6 CD south of Biecz were even able to stay in place throughout the morning of the 26th. FML Kralicek skillfully pulled his troops out of the threatened encirclement and brought them together on the 27th on both sides of the Gorlice-Grybow road, with his center on the west edge of Gorlice and his right...

---

53 It was possible for 13 LW ID to leave Roth's line because the German 47 Res ID took over a larger sector to its right; in turn, FML Fabini's Group (3 and 8 ID) took over part of the erstwhile northern wing of the Germans.
wing somewhat farther ahead at Sekowa. Behind the front he assembled the remnants of 10 ID, reduced to just about 600 riflemen and without any combat value. Fortunately on this day Kralicek was reinforced by 13 LW ID (although it had just 3,000 rifles); moreover the Russian advance had been delayed by the rain-soaked ground.

Meanwhile the front north of Kralicek's Group also solidified. FML Arz had led VI Corps back to the Mszanka-Staszkowka area and established a firm connection between his right wing and Szurmay's Group, which was now placed under his command. The enemy didn't approach the new Aus-Hung. line until the 27th; then they tried to break through 39 Hon ID but were defeated.

Further travails of 3rd Army

GdI Boroevic wasn't very happy about losing substantial parts of his Army, and informed the AOK that it would be a mistake to leave his forces weak for very long. The success won recently at Limanowa was due to the offensive of his Army; any further success would also have to come in his sector, which threatened the enemy's lines of communication, running from east to west. The current wretched condition of the roads and paths in the enemy's rear would make an offensive by 3rd Army doubly effective. On the other hand, if the Army retreated further south the position of the neighboring 4th Army would become more difficult. If the flanks of the two Armies separated, the security of the Kaschau-Oderberg railroad would be menaced. 3rd Army remained the decisive factor; the enemy couldn't advance further west as long as it held its ground.

To do his part to ensure that he didn't get separated from 4th Army, GdI Boroevic had III Corps place reserve units behind his left wing; they would cover the routes through the Magora hills in cooperation with Kralicek. Moreover, VII Corps sent 10 CD through Bartfeld to Tylicz and 5 Hon CD to Zboro; both cavalry divisions were responsible for scouting in the area up to the south wing of the Archduke's Army. 10 CD would moreover block the way over the Tylicz Ridge. Finally, Boroevic wanted to send LW IR # 5, on its way by rail from Pola, to the junction of the Armies.

III and VII Corps misunderstood Boroevic's permission to retreat further if attacked. Interpreting it as an order to immediately full back, they began to do so at daybreak on 26 December. III Corps went to Krempna, VII Corps to Tylawa on both sides of the road leading back to the Dukla Pass. This did nothing to help
the troops; they had to camp in the open because during the
Russians' retreat in the first half of December they had burnt
down all villages in the area. The enemy followed Archduke
Joseph's Corps; in the evening of the 27th, aided by fog and snow
squalls, they captured the heights southeast of Tylawa. 20 Hon
ID and parts of 17 ID tried in vain to recover the lost territory
by a counterattack.

Farther east, 2 ID was instructed to block the Jasiel Valley;
while fighting rear guard actions it pulled back on the 26th to
the heights south of Jasliska. When darkness fell on the 27th
the Russians tried to attack through this town, but were stopped
cold. At the same time Boroevic cancelled the march of 1st CD to
Felső-vizköz, where it was supposed to recuperate. Instead its
660 horsemen and 16 guns would stay under Meixner's Group.

The retreat of 24 ID had left an area about 16 km wide on both
sides of the Wislok empty of our troops. Therefore on the
evening of the 25th, the 3rd Army HQ ordered XVIII Corps to send
a mixed detachment to block the route between the Wislok through
Komancza. That Corps was still approaching Baligrod on the 26th
and 27th. Meanwhile, on the 26th the Russians again assaulted
24 ID and drove it back. This forced Krautwald to give up the
gains in the direction of Lisko which had cost his men so much,
and to pull back to the line Baligrod-Pasika Heights (west of
Komancza). He planned to counterattack from the Pasika on the
28th with a strong left wing. 8 CD - holding the area north of
Baligrod - was attacked by the enemy and had to be reinforced by
several battalions of XVIII Corps. All these events delayed the
advance of Tschurtschenthaler and Krautwald on Lisko-Sanok,
originally scheduled to begin on the 27th.

h. Events at Przemysl and in Pflanzer-Baltin's Group through the
end of the year

The main reason why GdI Kusmanek had broken off the sortie by the
Przemysl garrison on 18 December was that the Russian 82 ID had
attacked and captured part of the forward position at Na Gorach-
Batycze on the other side of the fortress. The enemy here
obviously wanted to help their comrades south of the fort;
perhaps they also wished to camouflage the movement of units
which had crossed the San north of Przemysl and which later
attacked the east flank of VII Corps. 54 Parts of the garrison

54 Beginning on the 17th, the garrison had noted that strong enemy units were
marching from Mosciiska toward Radymno. It still cannot be determined
whether these were the reinforcements expected by Ivanov (62 and 64 ID of
7th Army), replacement troops for 3rd and 8th Armies, or newly arrived
fought from the 20th to the 22nd without success to recapture the lost portion of the forward position, and suffered heavy casualties. On the 26th, the AOK ordered GdI Kusmanek by radio to support the advance of the east wing of 3rd Army on the next day by another sortie toward the southwest.\(^{55}\) As noted above, the operation of Tschurtschenthaler and Krautwald was postponed; however, the fortress HQ wasn't informed because 3rd Army staff thought it would be useful if the diversionary attack from Przemysl opened before the offensive by the east wing. Therefore Kusmanek attacked from the southwest line of fortifications on the 27th with 15 battalions and 13 batteries. Although this was a substantial force, it couldn't prevail against the improved defensive positions of the Russians and gained no ground. Undoubtedly the brave garrison hadn't recovered from the bitter disappointment they'd suffered during the sortie ten days earlier, and this affected their eagerness to fight. This unfortunately pointless operation was the last offensive by the fortress. When the year ended Kusmanek had 83,700 combat troops. Numerically this was a larger force than any of the k.u.k. Armies that were engaged against Russia in the open field; however, it included 69,000 Landsturm soldiers.

Like the last sortie by the Przemysl garrison, the operations of Pflanzer-Baltin didn't help GdI Boroevic's east wing. The Armeegruppe commander wished to exploit the capture of the Uzsok Pass by having Ronai-Horvath's troops continue their advance through Turka; then they could swing toward the northwest to intervene in the actions by 3rd Army near Lisko. However, Ronai-Horvath's exhausted group had already passed the high tide of its success; only a weak force was sent as planned through Libuchora into the rear of the enemy facing Hofmann. Nonetheless, Pflanzer-Baltin ordered an attack along his entire front for the 20th. Hofmann and Durski would renew their advance and 54 ID would open the thrust toward Uschie Putilla which had been abandoned on the 17th. A detachment of the 54th under GM Schuler was sent from Kopilas through Szybeny. Finally, Col. Fischer was ordered to advance to the Little Sereth.

On the 28th and 29th, FML Ronai-Horvath advanced slowly toward the heights at Borynia; on the next two days, however, he was attacked by superior forces and pushed back almost to the north

\(^{55}\) Siberian units.

It is now certain that the contents of this radio traffic weren't kept secret from the Russians, who had learned how to decipher the broadcasts. Major Stuchkheil reports that in March 1915, when the fortress commander had surrendered and was moving through Cholm on the way to imprisonment, he was told by General Ivanov that the Russians were always well informed about everything that happened in the fortress.
end of the Uzsok Pass. He intended to pull his badly damaged battalions back into the Pass on New Year's Day to give them a change to recover. On the 29th the situation of 3rd Army had caused the AOK to order that the Uzsok Pass should be strongly defended, but that no further attacks should be initiated in this sector. Hofmann's 55 ID also couldn't break through. Guilleaume's Detachment, reinforced slightly by Ronai-Horvath, had appeared in the flank and rear of the enemy units opposite Hofmann on the 31st, but the Russians brought up fresh troops by motor transport and prevented any further advance. After Lt Col Haller had thrown back the enemy at Zielona on the 17th and recovered the position at Rafailowa there had been no actions worthy of mention there or in the Tartar Pass. As ordered, Col Fischer sent his advance detachments up to the Little Sereth on the 28th; however, on the last two days of 1914 he had to pull back again because of enemy pressure.56

Meanwhile the Russians refrained from launching any further attacks against Pflanzer-Baltin's Armee gruppe.

i. Deliberations and plans of the leadership on both sides (27-28 December)

On the 27th the Russians had reached the limit of their offensive capability. They could congratulate themselves on having evaded the serious danger that Boroevic's Army would capture the Tarnow-Rzeszow road. There was no longer any reason for them to retreat behind the San and the Vistula. However, Ivanov decided to halt his own advance in order to renew the fighting strength of his units. On 27 December he ordered 3rd and 8th Armies to continue their pursuit with just some advance guards; this at least would cause some trouble for the Austrians, as Ivanov himself emphasized.57 No attempt would be made for now to advance over the Dunajec, over the Biala between its mouth and Grybow, or beyond the line Gorlice-Zmigrod-Dukla (town)-Sanok-Lisko. If the east wing of Boroevic's Army renewed its offensive, Brussilov should immediately hurl them back into the mountains. On the left wing of the Southwest Front, parts of 11th Army would guard the crossings through the Forest Carpathians. The rest of that Army would prepare for "decisive operations" against the Przemysl

56 The enemy recognized the importance of Col Fischer's leadership. The Russian military governor notified the population of Czernowitz that anyone who killed Fischer or rendered him unfit for duty would receive a reward of 50,000 rubles. Anyone who took him prisoner would receive 100,000 rubles and an official position under the Russian government.

Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

The Russians would therefore attack the south wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army, since it was still positioned in front of the line which they wished to occupy. Boroevic's Army, however, would be left alone in the positions it now held. Meanwhile, the immediate concern of the staffs at Teschen, Okocim and Bartfeld was to prevent the enemy from breaking through southeast of Gorlice. The Russians began to push toward this town. On the 26th the AOK had already ordered GdK Dankl to send 23 Inf Bde to Cracow, while the rest of 12 ID would march as soon as possible to Bochnia; the Division would proceed to Neusandez and thence to the right wing of 4th Army. Furthermore a Cavalry Corps would be created under the command of GM Berndt to guard the open space southeast of the Magora hills and the lines of communication leading into Zips County, as well as the Kaschau-Oderberg railroad. It would consist of 4 and 10 CD, 5 and 11 Hon CD, and the two battalions of the "Pola" LW IR # 5. The AOK at Teschen was still determined to have the right wing of 3rd Army launch a relief attack toward Rymanow; after reinforcements arrived, the wing would then attack further toward the north.

The previous operations of the east wing of 3rd Army had failed because:
. the divisions of X Corps were too widely separated,
. the local commanders failed to control the situation,
. the troops of the burnt-out VII Corps were unable to support the offensive, and
. the attack took place without waiting for XVIII Corps. If the X and XVIII Corps had moved together the offensive would have involved three and a half relatively fresh divisions. However, the commanders had felt obliged by the situation to commit X Corps to the fighting as soon as it arrived.

j. 3rd Army moves further back (28-31 December)

The prospects for the offensive by the east wing of 3rd Army were quite unfavorable. FML Lehmann's group (56 ID and 8 CD, the latter reinforced by several battalions from XVIII Corps) was able to hold its ground in the Baligrod area. However, FML Tschurtschenthaler didn't think he could attack successfully between Baligrod and the San because Russian units at Chrewt threatened his flank. On the 28th the Russians pushed FML Krautwald back on both sides of the railroad leading to Lupkow. 24 ID held its lines northeast of the Lupkow Pass only after the

58 As of the 28th, 4 CD was on the left wing of III Corps, 10 CD in the Tylicz area, 5 Hon CD at Zboro and Komlospatak, and 11 Hon CD near Uscie Ruskie.
personal intervention of the Group commander. Krautwald's counterattack from the Pasika Heights had some success at first, but then had to be stopped because of the situation of 2 ID farther to the west. The right flank of 2 ID had been heavily attacked south of Jasliiska; X Corps HQ commanded the Division to retreat to the heights on both sides of Laborczfö, leaving a rear guard on the ridge near Czeremcha. This in turn was necessary because VII Corps, which had been hard pressed at Tylawa on the 27th, pulled back through the Dukla Pass on the 28th. The Corps' rear guard at the north end of the pass fended off Russian scouting detachments. Boroevic took 1 CD away from GdI Meixner's reserves and sent it to block the Hoszanka Valley at Miko. Then he ordered Colerus' Group (28 ID, 44 LW Inf Bde and 4 CD) to retreat to the line Pilipinski vrch-Czarne. Before beginning its withdrawal, 44 LW Bde drove the enemy back with a powerful counterstroke; it was also able to keep the Russians from approaching its new position.59

Boroevic notified Teschen on the 28th that his 40,000 riflemen were grossly outnumbered by the Russians, who had 120,000.60 Therefore he intended to keep retreating step by step: with III Corps through Bartfeld, VII Corps through Felsö-vizköz and Giralt, X Corps through Stropko, Krautwald's Group through Mezölaborcz and Wola Michowa, and XVIII Corps through Cisna-Takcsany. By a coincidence, 3rd Army HQ was planning a retreat at the same time that the Russian commanders had ordered their offensive to halt, just as had happened at the start of December. With a heavy heart, the AOK approved Boroevic's plans; they told the Army commander to bring III, VII and X Corps closer together. XVIII Corps and Krautwald's divisions would operate as self-sufficient groups, prepared to attack if the situation warranted. The high command ordered further:

"The various groups of the Army should be reminded that the enemy's advance can be stopped or at least delayed only if they hold out stubbornly and cooperate by intervening in each other's actions. In this manner the groups in the east Carpathians - whose units are made up largely of second-line troops - have already been fighting successfully for several months against a significantly more numerous enemy."

59 GdI Colerus reported to 3rd Army HQ that sickness was increasing among his officers and men; moreover, many of the horses in the artillery were dying off. "...I fear that because of the progressive deterioration of sanitary conditions I will not have enough strength to hold my allotted sector..."

Another problem was the wretched condition of the roads, which made it extremely difficult to bring supplies to the front lines.

60 This assertion about the Russians' strength cannot be substantiated.
This last order offended the Army commander. He immediately replied that the Russians had always attacked his groups simultaneously rather than individually and that they were separated by distances of 8 to 20 kilometers. He hesitated to pass on the AOK's instructions about "intervening in each other's actions" because the reduced strength of the various units could make such activity dangerous. Finally he stressed that the actions in the east Carpathians had taken place under different circumstances than his own, so any comparison was misleading.

On the morning of 28 December Boroevic issued an Army order to regroup according to the latest instructions from the AOK. Tschurtschenthaler - with XVIII Corps, 56 ID and 8 CD - should guard the mountain crossings at Wola Michowa and Cisna while Krautwald (24 and 34 ID) covered the routes into the Laborcza Valley. GdI Meixner (2 ID and 1 CD) would move to the southeast, closer to VII Corps; both VII and III Corps were still governed by their old orders to secure their lines of communication. Boroevic renewed his frequent requests for the return of 6 ID and 43 LW Inf Bde, which had been attached to IX Corps; otherwise their own III Corps, with just three brigades, would not be able to maintain a long defensive cordon while gathering reserves on its important left wing. 4th Army HQ, however, put off their neighbor's entreaty; they would return the units in question after 12 ID arrived (from 1st Army) to replace them. However, the Archduke's Army became engaged in a heavy action on the 30th, and then declared that they couldn't spare the units for the time being.

Because the enemy advanced toward Banica and the Jasionka Heights, Colerus took his troops back farther on the 29th, leaving only rear guards on the Carpathian watershed; on the next day his troops sought shelter in the towns nearest to the mountain positions they would hold. VII Corps shifted its main body somewhat toward the west on the 29th; the Russians didn't follow them through the Dukla Pass. Meixner's rear guard on the Czeremchya Ridge, and a detachment of his men at Jasiel, held off some strong exploratory thrusts by the enemy. Krautwald's 34 ID drove the Russians out of Radoszyce. In Tschurtschenthaler's Group, the lines of 56 ID were broken; this caused all of his units to pull back to the south in the night of 29-30 December. While 56 ID and 8 CD took up a new position in the area south of Wola Michowa, XVIII Corps continued to fall back on the 31st for no particular reason, and stopped in the area of Cisna.

To the considerable surprise of the AOK, 3rd Army HQ moved on the 29th from Bartfeld back to Kaschau.
Now the high command ordered that the troops of 3rd Army were not to willingly give up another foot of the ground that they had recently won after such difficult fighting; this would keep the enemy from increasing the pressure against the south wing of 4th Army. The AOK placed particular emphasis on having Boroevic's east wing hold on stubbornly; they planned to send two more infantry divisions to that wing at the start of January, if events didn't force their commitment to the west wing. These reinforcements must be "used in a sustained operation, not like the last two fresh Corps whose intervention was ineffective."  

Boroevic thereupon told XVIII Corps that under no circumstances was it to pull back behind the line Wola Michowa-Cisna-Smerek. The Russians were attempting to envelop the south wing of the Archduke's Army (as will be described in the next section); to answer his neighbor's request for help, Boroevic ordered III Corps and GM Berndt's Cavalry Corps to attack toward the north. Before the necessary preparations were complete, the new year 1915 had begun.

**k. 4th Army's defensive battle (28-31 December)**

For the north wing of 4th Army, where Kritek's and Roth's Groups kept watch on the Dunajec, the last four days of the year were uneventful except for some inconsequential artillery duels. In Roth's Group, the 3 ID changed its position from the left (north) of 47 German Res ID to that unit's right.

However, this period was quite busy for the other parts of the Army. On the 28th the Russians attacked FZM Ljubicic and were able to drive back 11 ID and the left wing of 30 ID on the line Gromnik-Wal Heights. The enemy repeated their assaults on the 29th and 30th against the Heights, but without success; the k.u.k. 15 ID had to deploy to help the defenders. Both sides suffered bloody casualties in these actions. All indications were that the pause in fighting on the 31st would be only a brief

---

61 Conrad wrote in his memoirs (Vol. V, p. 954) that "I could not ignore the remonstrances of 3rd Army HQ on 29 December and the tendency of the Army to give ground, which was illustrated by the movement of their HQ back to Kaschau. The operations of Pflanzer's and Krautwald's groups had shown how energetic seizure of the initiative could check the Russian attacks in Galicia." In a paper of 29 May 1929, GM Pitreich defended the decision to move 3rd Army HQ to Kaschau. He said that Bartfeld was too close to the left wing, while the right wing would be the more important sector in the immediate future; moreover, there were better railroad and wire connections in Kaschau.
rest for the defenders.

On the Army's right wing, since the 28th FML Arz had command over Groups led by Kralicek (43 LW Inf Bde and 6 ID in the first line, 10 ID and 13 LW ID in reserve), Hadfy (45 LW ID, 39 Hon ID, 26 LW ID), and Szurmay (38 and Combined Hon ID). Dimitriev massed a strong attacking group in the area from the Dunajec southwest of Tarnow to the neighborhood of Gorlice. These men were ready to move if Ivanov gave the command to thrust forward to the river lines. FML Arz saw that the Russians apparently would seek to envelop his south wing; he wanted to anticipate them by launching his own offensive. For this purpose he took 26 LW ID away from Hadfy and gave it to Kralicek. However, 4th Army HQ wouldn't agree to this bold plan; they didn't want to risk the security of the Gorlice-Neusandez road by initiating a risky action. If, however, the Russians broke into the gap between 4th and 3rd Armies, Kralicek was supposed to fall upon their flank. Meanwhile a host of laborers were preparing a second line of defense between Florynka and Gromnik.

Enemy movements were detected on the 29th at Zagorszany and Gorlice; at the end of the day skirmishes developed in some sectors. During the 30th the Russians brought their main forces to the front line along the entire front, and unleashed their offensive that night. The brown-clad masses rolled forward through snow and quagmire, tormented by the fire of the defenders from their water-filled trenches; the latter were reinforced by reserve units stationed nearby. The primary Russian thrust was directed against Hadfy. Apparently the enemy wanted to first master the part of the front next to the Biala before falling upon Kralicek at Gorlice and at his south wing. Hadfy's Group lost some ground in the morning of the 31st, but then stood fast in front of the Biala; parts of 26 LW ID hurried back to this sector and contained the enemy at Staszkowka and on the Pustki Heights. Kralicek's Group was even more successful on this day. All Russian attacks on our lines at Gorlice were repulsed by 6 ID, 13 LW ID, 43 LW Inf Bde and parts of 26 LW ID, plus 6 CD. A probing maneuver by the enemy against the southern flank was defeated by 10 ID, which was inserted into this sector. Evening was already falling on the blood-soaked battlefield when 43 LW Inf Bde at Sekowa and parts of 10 ID east of Rychwald went over to the attack and drove the enemy away in flight. Meanwhile the first elements of 12 ID, which had detrained at Neusandez, were approaching the scene of action through Grybow. While bells were ringing in the New Year back home, all the commanders of 4th Army were completely confident that their gallant troops would bring this heavy action to a successful conclusion on the coming day.
The AOK followed the various phases of this battle with great tension. Its outcome would determine whether the next reinforcements pulled from 1st Army would be committed to the western or eastern wing of Boroevic's Army. As noted above, the latter would be the preferable course, if events permitted.

2. Events north of the Vistula

a. 1st Army's actions on the Nida (20-31 December)

The guidelines issued by the AOK on 20 December had especially emphasized that 1st Army should send all available units to its southern wing and "in conjunction with 4th Army should advance as far forward as possible while supporting 4th Army from north of the Vistula."

Even before receiving this instruction, but completely in the same spirit, GdK Dankl had ordered that his right wing should secure the crossings of the Nida River by attacking on the 21st. Early on the morning of this day FML Martiny began to cross the Nida between Nowy Korczyn and Wislica; for this purpose he used three regiments from FML Kletter's Landsturm Group, which he was commanding as well as his own 14 ID; the 110 Lst Inf Bde, on the Vistula, covered the assault. The Russian XVII Corps defended its positions on the east bank with great stubbornness, while the attackers on the west bank had great difficulty even moving into place through the swampy river valley. Russian artillery on the south bank of the Vistula enfiladed the Austrian lines, despite efforts by Kritek's batteries to stop them. Nonetheless, by the 22nd Martiny's troops had advanced their right wing through the swamps nearly as far as Nowy Korczyn, and their left had also gained a foothold east of the Nida. To add impetus to the advance, 1st Army HQ placed 33 ID of V Corps under FML Martiny. After difficult fighting, parts of 106 Lst ID took Nowy Korczyn on the 23rd. However, the enemy held fast to Wislica, where 33 ID could send only small detachments over the river. Farther up the river, 37 Hon ID of V Corps established a bridgehead on the other side.

Meanwhile, GdK Karl Kirchbach of Ist Corps wished to gain control of the sandy hills southwest of Chmielnik; he sent parts of 46 LW

---

62 According to a note by GO Dankl to the Military Archives on 7 March 1930, 1st Army HQ originally wanted to make its main thrust in the direction of Kielce.
ID and 5 ID over the Nida on the night of 20-21 December below Pinczow and at Motkowiec. At dawn the 46 LW ID drove the enemy away from the bend in the river west of Pinczow, but couldn't take the approaches to the town. 5 ID storm the Russian position north of the road to Chmielnik. To avert the threatened breakthrough, the Russian commanders threw all available units into the front line, and in the afternoon told their XVIII Corps to counterattack out of the woods at Pinczow and Kije. 46 LW ID suffered heavy losses and had to pull back to the west bank of the Nida. Because of this severe setback, Kirchbach now ordered 5 ID - which until now had been stoutly defending itself - to also evacuate the east bank. Before the withdrawal began, the Russians once again attacked the Division; the gallant Silesian IR "Kaiser" # 1 was able to cover the retreat but suffered heavy casualties. For the next few days, Ist Corps was content to hold its sector of the river on both sides of Pinczow. The majority of 12 ID had already come up from the Army's reserve at Jedrzejow to support the now cancelled offensive on Pinczow; 1st Army HQ ordered GdK Kirchbach to instead deploy these men as a second line behind the badly battered 46 LW ID.

On the 23rd the only activity on the entire front of 1st Army was artillery fire. It appeared that the Russians were now preparing to attack the south wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment.

To strengthen his own north wing and provide some support for Woyrsch on his left, GdK Dankl placed the remainder of his Army reserve - 23 Inf Bde - and 2 CD at the disposal of II Corps at Jedrzejow. On the south wing of the Army he planned to have FML Martiny resume his attack on the 24th; however, it became doubtful that this could be carried out because reliable reports indicated that the Russians themselves would be taking the offensive in this sector with three divisions.

As expected, in the first hours of the afternoon on the 24th the Russians did open a deadly crossfire from three sides against 106 Lst ID's bridgehead at Nowy Korczyn, then attacked. They took the town and drove the Landsturm back over the river, although Martiny's 14 and 33 ID were able to maintain their bridgeheads farther upstream.

Martiny's difficult situation forced 1st Army HQ to take 24 Inf Bde away from Ist Corps and send it to the south wing. Moreover, GdK Dankl asked 4th Army to make a strong effort to pin down the enemy on the lowest reaches of the Dunajec, and thus relieve the

63 The failed attempt to cross the Nida cost Ist Corps about 5700 men; according to the Russians, this figure included 3000 prisoners.
southern flank of his 1st Army. However, Kritek's small Group lacked the strength for offensive operations.

On the morning of the 25th, the Russians sought to roll up Martiny's remaining forces east of the Nida, using the newly captured town of Nowy Korczyn as a base. Their attack was repulsed by 14 ID. However, the enemy thrusts seemed to menace the flanks of our positions; behind our men was the broad and swampy river valley, in which the continuing wet weather had ruined all the paths. Therefore, in the night of 25-26 December Martiny took 14 ID back over the Nida. His three divisions were now instructed to hold the river line between the Vistula and a point west of Wislica. On the next day the decimated 106 Lst ID would be relieved by 24 Inf Bde when it came up from Army reserve; the 12 ID's 23 Inf Bde was also being sent to the Army's south wing. Under II Corps, parts of 25 ID which had been serving north of the Nida were relieved by Bredow's German division and took the place of 12 ID as the Army's reserve near Jedrzejow.

On 26 December it seemed that the Russians were planning to break through at the junction between 1st and 4th Armies, while defeating Dankl's south flank. In the afternoon the enemy thrust forward to Ksany, on the peninsula where the Nida flows into the Vistula. However, 24 Inf Bde had meanwhile arrived to relieve the totally exhausted 106 Lst ID, and brought this dangerous Russian advance to an end.64

Further units are taken away from 1st Army

Although the fighting on the Nida still continued, the AOK ordered 1st Army to send 12 ID to reinforce operations south of the Vistula; at the same time they indicated that they might also send 33 ID in the same direction. Since the Russians didn't immediately resume their attacks, 1st Army began to regroup on the 27th without being disturbed.65 GdK Dankl had protested against the loss of 12 ID, but when the order was renewed he sent 23 Inf Bde back to Cracow on this day. 24 Inf Bde was to follow on the morning of the 29th, but new fighting meanwhile broke out on the lower Nida.

64 Since 2 October the 106 Lst ID had only enjoyed a few day's rest; otherwise it had been constantly either marching, fighting, or patrolling defensive sectors.
65 14 ID and parts of 46 LW ID would take over the positions that had been held by 110 Lst Inf Bde and 24 Inf Bde in the area by Ksany near the Nida-Vistula confluence. Vth and 1st Corps would increase the frontages of their other units so that 33 ID could leave the line.
On the afternoon of the 28th, 24 Inf Bde was bombarded by Russian artillery in its flank and rear, then heavily attacked from Str. Korczyn; it had heavy losses and was forced to retreat. However, the FJB # 11 and 19 from 14 ID drove the pursuing Russians back to Str. Korczyn. Because of the new danger on the lower Nida, it seemed inadvisable to move 33 ID, or to have 37 Hon ID take its place as had been planned. At the same time, enemy pressure was increasing south of the Vistula, and it seemed possible that 4th Army might have to retreat from the Dunajec. The AOK recognized that the situation was ominous, and already on the 28th had advised 1st Army HQ to prepare a fall-back position north of Cracow through Skala and Wolbrom to a position west of Zarnawiec-Szczekociny.

Because of this situation, the right wing and center of 1st Army (i.e. Group Martiny, V and Ist Corps) would stay on the defensive. On the left wing, II Corps had prepared an attacking group from parts of 25 ID; on the 31st it would join a planned thrust by its neighbor on the left, Bredow's Division, as soon as the Russian heavy batteries had been neutralized. However, this offensive to support the Germans didn't materialize, except for a night-time raid by one Jaeger battalion over the Nida, because the southern half of Woyrsch's Army Detachment had fallen back on the defensive after some initial successes. After 37 Hon ID and the main body of 12 ID marched off to Bochnia early on the 31st - on their way to reinforce 3rd Army - the AOK ordered 106 Lst ID to relieve 33 ID; V Corps HQ and 33 ID would follow 37 Hon ID to Bochnia.

Thus Dankl's Army had lost eight divisions since the start of December (in order - # 27, 15, 39, 24, 2, 12, 33 and 37); except for 27 ID, they were all needed for the campaign in Galicia. Because of its reduced size, 1st Army would have to remain on the defensive.

b. 2nd Army's actions at Tomaszow (19-31 December)

As related above, on the afternoon of 18 December the AOK instructed 2nd Army to reach the line Odrzywol-Konsk. After a cautious analysis of the situation, GO Woyrsch wrote Böhm-Ermolli

At this point Martiny's Group consisted solely of 14 ID. 106 Lst ID (which now commanded 110 Lst Inf Bde and Col. Köckh's Lst Inf Bde) and 1st Lst Inf Bde (reinforced by the remnants of 35 Lst Inf Bde) were recuperating west of the lower Nida. They were available as reserves for either Group Martiny or V Corps.
that he should at first just have his units in a state of readiness in front of the positions of Evert's Army west of Opoczno and on the Czarna. Only Gallwitz' Corps on the left wing of 2nd Army would initially advance; this Corps had been holding somewhat back in comparison with Mackensen's south wing, which had reached Lubocz and the Rawa. Therefore Gallwitz should advance on the 19th on the east bank of the Pilica, farther toward the northeast. On the other hand, XII and IV Corps on this day would only scout the enemy positions. Under XII Corps, 16 ID was on the Czarna north of the road from Przedborz to Konsk, with the German 35 Res ID on its right; 35 k.u.k. ID was in reserve in the rear. IV Corps occupied the west bank of the river with 32 and 31 ID on both sides of Klew. As ordered, GdA Gallwitz attempted to gain ground toward Opoczno and in the sector east of the Pilica with 27 ID and Hauer's Cavalry Corps. 27 ID, however, soon came under heavy Russian artillery fire and didn't advance at all; Hauer was able to reach the area south of Smardzewice.

Fighting in the Pilica bend

Meanwhile Böhm-Ermolli requested the AOK through Woyrsch to have 1st Gd Res ID (which had moved through Tomaszow toward the east) diverted south through Inowlodz; thus it might be able to hit Evert's north wing, believed to be at Opoczno. In the evening, Gallwitz reported to Piotrkow - the new HQ of 2nd Army - that he didn't expect the enemy to offer serious resistance at the bend in the Pilica; thereupon Böhm-Ermolli decided to unleash the entire 2nd Army the next day. GO Woyrsch, however, remained convinced that the Russians were resolved to stubbornly hold their position. He even anticipated an enemy counterattack against 2nd Army from Opoczno, and therefore told Böhm-Ermolli not to assault the Russian lines frontally until pressure from the allies had begun to affect both the enemy wings. 2nd Army should assemble the strongest possible force on its north wing and then attack at the exact moment when 1st Gd Res ID opened its enveloping maneuver over the Pilica toward the south. GdK Böhm-Ermolli, however, held to his earlier orders which envisioned breaking through the junction of the two Russian Fronts before the enemy could again reinforce their center.

67 On 19 December an advanced battle group of 32 ID was attacked on three sides at Starzechowice (northeast of Czermno on the Czarna). 1st Lt Franz Matheis, a company commander of IR # 23, saved the group from destruction by a bold bayonet attack into the enemy's flank, which he carried out on his own initiative. For this feat he received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.

68 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 314
On the morning of the 20th, GdA Gallwitz sent 27 ID out of the Mniszkow area toward the northeast, hoping to go around III Caucasian Corps, which he believed to make up Evert's right wing, near Opoczno. The Division couldn't break through, however, and was soon itself attacked by the Russians; its left wing was pushed back. This setback hampered Hauer's activities. 3 CD was ordered to occupy the area north of Opoczno and there to halt the movement of 45 Russian ID of XIV Corps, which was known to be marching toward Inowlodz. The cavalry forced the strong enemy forces coming out of Opoczno to deploy for action, and then conducted a fighting withdrawal to Brzostow. 9 CD pulled back toward the Pilica. The other two Corps had no better luck. Under IV Corps the 31 ID took a Russian advanced position; 32 ID crossed the Czarna at Przylek but in the night was forced back over the river. XII Corps made no impression on the strong Russian lines north of the road to Konsk.

Meanwhile GFM Hindenburg had halted the advance of the right wing of 9th German Army because it had been in danger from the south. Parts of this Army - Frommel's Cavalry Corps, Menges' Division and the Posen Corps - now turned to face the Russians who were hurrying north through the Opoczno area. When Böhm-Ermolli learned that Frommel would move over the Pilica at and downstream from Tomaszow, he urged the German commander to hurry to assist his hard-pressed Army. Hauer's Cavalry Corps would mount a new thrust to the northeast to support Frommel.

On the evening of the 20th the AOK issued new general orders (as noted in an earlier section). These orders included instructions to Woyrsch to cover the south wing of 9th German Army by making his own north wing as strong as possible. Böhm-Ermolli thereupon instructed his corps to dig in and stand their ground. At the same time he began to shift 32 ID north to reinforce Gallwitz; Woyrsch agreed to shift his Landwehr Corps toward the left, which in turn allowed 35 Reserve ID and the k.u.k. 35 ID of XII Corps to relieve 32 ID from its present position. Before this additional division reached the north wing of 2nd Army the situation took an unfavorable turn.

**Russian pressure in the Tomaszow area**

General Evert had assembled strong forces on the Pilica between Inowlodz and the Czarna (half of XVI Corps; all of XIV and III Caucasian Corps, plus Gillenschmidt's Cavalry Corps). At Ivanov's urging he now attacked southeast of the Pilica bend, hoping to break through the allied front at the point where it
made a right angle.\footnote{Nesnamov, Vol. III, p. 12 and pp. 33 ff.}

The Russian attack toward Mniszkow-Bukowiec had already forced 27 ID to give way on the night of 20-21 December. Russian units thrust between 27 ID and 3 CD, which was covering the crossings of the Pilica at Brzostow by Frommel's Corps. The enemy once again assaulted the flank of 27 ID toward noon on the 21st. The 9 CD was sent to cover the north flank of the 27th, but had to fall back toward the Pilica; at the same time a gap developed farther south between the 27 and 31 ID. The reserves of IV Corps (three battalions, half a squadron and a battery) were very quickly sent to Mniszkow; they were able to close the gap in time. In the north, meanwhile, 3 CD had been driven over the Pilica by the advancing XIV Russian Corps. There was a grave danger that the enemy would be able to take the area around Lubocz where the lines of Böhm-Ermolli and Mackensen came together. However, Mackensen had already taken measures to secure his flank by deploying the units specified by Hindenburg. He now also ordered Richthofen's Cavalry Corps (6 and 9 German CD) to leave the center of 9th Army and hasten by forced marches to the south. Thus by the 22nd the Germans would have three Landwehr brigades and five cavalry divisions (including 7 k.u.k. CD) assembled between Tomaszow and Lubocz.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli now hoped that Frommel's and Richthofen's cavalry would mount a powerful thrust over the Pilica that would relieve Gallwitz' Corps and enable him to resume the offensive. The Posen Corps, however, which had deployed two brigades southeast of the Pilica at Tomaszow, was unable to open the way into the enemy's flank for the German cavalry. These events soon made it clear to the commander of 2nd Army that seven cavalry divisions (including the two under Corps Hauer) were not a strong enough force to win a decisive success in the forested low lands around Tomaszow. Therefore he attempted by messages sent through GO Woyrsch and the AOK to induce the German eastern command to send a large infantry force into the rear of the Russians who had concentrated in front of Gallwitz. 9th Army however had already committed all its units in an attempt to cross the Bzura and Rawka Rivers, and was thus unable to agree to his request.

Although fighting slowed down on the north wing of 2nd Army on the 23rd, it intensified for the Germans around the Pilica crossings at Inowlodz. Here the 18 ID of Russian XIV Corps established a temporary bridgehead on the north bank; the infantry attached to Richthofen's Corps and artillery from
Tomaszow had to be diverted to this sector.\(^{70}\)

Gallwitz had meanwhile been reinforced by 32 ID and was able to resume his attacks on the 25th. German 9th Army had promised to have Frommel and the Posen Corps support him. 32 ID deployed on Gallwitz' left wing, attacked south of Smardzewice, and reached the main Russian position. The south wing of 32 ID was guarded by 27 ID near Bukowiec and the north wing by Hauer (who had dismounted 9 CD but kept 3 CD on horseback). The Posen Corps with two brigades advanced out of the Tomaszow bridgehead on both sides of the rail line to Opoczno, and reached Wawol and Brzostow. Frommel's German 5 CD and Aus-Hung. 7 CD were still in reserve at Tomaszow. At Inowlodz a German Landwehr brigade, along with the infantry and artillery of Richthofen's command, established themselves on the south bank of the Pilica.\(^{71}\)

Böhm-Ermolli wanted to continue his offensive toward the east on the next day with all units north of the Czarna. Gallwitz, however, felt that the time hadn't yet come when the long-anticipated envelopment of the Russians' north wing was feasible, since the Posen Corps and Frommel were hanging back and the thrust which the Germans were planning from Inowlodz for this day had not yet started.\(^{72}\) 32 ID and the left wing of 27 ID advanced with only limited objectives, and didn't gain any substantial ground. The Russians began to counterattack. When 2nd Army HQ learned of this, they in turn ordered IV Corps to attack. After a short engagement, all of the k.u.k. skirmishing lines were pinned down in front of the main enemy position. 3 CD meanwhile drove the enemy back north of 32 ID.

At Böhm-Ermolli's urging, the AOK asked Hindenburg's HQ to have the Posen Corps and Richthofen's Corps advance together under a united command on the 27th from Tomaszow to Krasnica in support of 2nd Army. However, no agreement could be reached. The Germans wanted to send just their 5 CD and the Aus-Hung. 7 CD to join the main body of the Posen Corps, engaged at Brzostow. Otherwise they would remain in place on the north bank of the Pilica and resume the offensive only after the burnt bridge at

---

70 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 335
71 Translator's Note - The actual German deployment was apparently somewhat different from that described in the text. According to the situation map (Skizze 3) the Landwehr brigade in question was the detached third brigade of the Posen Corps, which deployed on Richthofen's left wing rather than in the Inowlodz bridgehead. Instead, the infantry engaged at Inowlodz were parts of IR # 148 which had been attached to Richthofen (per the Prussian General Staff work, "Schlachten und Gefechte des Grossen Krieges" (Berlin, 1919), p. 75).
72 Gallwitz, "Meine Führertätigkeit im Weltkrieg 1914/16" (Berlin, 1929), p. 167
Inowlodz had been replaced.

Thus the situation prevented the left wing of 2nd Army from continuing its offensive on the 27th. Prisoners' reports and intercepted radio broadcasts made it seem likely that the Russians were reinforcing their position in the Pilica bend, and bringing units from the north to the south bank of the river. Because of the adverse ratio of strength, the prospects for continuing to thrust toward Opoczno were not good. Böhm-Ermolli therefore decided to pull 35 ID from the IV Corps front and send it to the more important northern wing to join GdA Gallwitz.

At this point a unified command structure was finally established in the Tomaszow area after an agreement with Mackensen. The elements of the Posen Corps and Frommel's Corps deployed beyond the Pilica were placed under GdA Gallwitz for an offensive that would start on the 29th. The German corps commander thus would have four infantry and four cavalry divisions available.\textsuperscript{73}

The last attacks of 2nd Army

Fog and rain hindered the preparatory artillery bombardment on the 29th. FML Fox was in charge of most of 32 ID, half of 35 ID, and rifle detachments from Hauer's Corps on the north wing; he would advance south of Brzostow on the rail line toward Opoczno.\textsuperscript{74} However, without artillery support Fox was unable to penetrate the wide belts of barbed wire covering the Russian positions. Gallwitz thereupon requested that the operation be postponed until the next day. At this point, 2nd Army HQ at Piotrkow learned that the enemy XVI Corps had left its position in front of the south wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment and that the German Division Bredow as well as the Landwehr Corps would seek to exploit this development by attacking on the 30th. Böhm-Ermolli therefore accepted Gallwitz' proposal; the offensive wouldn't proceed until the 30th, but then would involve all of 2nd Army. However, Gallwitz' operation would be restricted to capturing the low ground along the Slomianka Brook, because Böhm-Ermolli now recognized that the breakthrough between the two Russian Fronts which he had been seeking for weeks was unattainable with the units he had available. He reported this conclusion to the AOK and to GO Woyrsch, and also mentioned his rather substantial casualties and lack of artillery ammunition.

\textsuperscript{73} 27, 32 and 35 ID; two Landwehr brigades from the Posen Corps; Hauer's Cavalry Corps (9 and 3 CD) and Frommel's Cavalry Corps (5 German and 7 Aus-Hung. CD).

\textsuperscript{74} Gallwitz, p. 170
GdI Conrad agreed with Böhm-Ermolli's analysis, especially since no further reinforcements would be available for 2nd Army. Mackensen's exhausted troops were already engaged against superior forces on the Bzura and Rawka. The k.u.k. Chief of Staff's hopes that the Germans would be able to thrust toward the southeast and envelop the Russians' north wing had thus disappeared. Also, there was no prospect of an advance in Galicia to shake the Russian position north of the Vistula. Therefore Conrad said that 2nd Army's mission would be accomplished if "it would close the gap in the line between its units and 9th Army, protect the latter's flank, and prevent the enemy from moving units away from its sector. This should be accomplished without wearing down the strength of our own troops and without suffering any setbacks."

As had been feared, the attack of Gallwitz' Corps on the 30th made no substantial progress in the thickly wooded and swampy terrain in which the Russian III Caucasian and XIV Corps had built their strong positions. Similarly, the Germans' thrust through Inowlodz toward the south didn't last for long and the right wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment won only some local actions, no decisive success. It was planned to continue Gallwitz' attack on the 31st, if only to further solidify the connection with Mackensen's right wing at Inowlodz; however there was no further heavy fighting on this day. Richthofen's Cavalry Corps did enlarge the bridgehead at Inowlodz by capturing the area at the mouth of Slomianka Brook.

A pause in operations

Thus ended the actions of 2nd Army near Tomaszow. The poor weather - at first cold, but turning warmer and rainy around Christmas - caused illnesses to spread; there were also outbreaks of dysentery and typhus. Böhm-Ermolli's Army had shrunk to just about 38,000 riflemen and 2,700 cavalry, so he would have to be content to hold the lines he already held. At least he was able to pull the burnt-out 35 ID and Hauer's Cavalry Corps from the front for urgently needed rehabilitation in the rear. During 1-2 January 1915 the 27 ID was placed under IV Corps, and all of the German units which had come south of the Pilica to support 2nd Army were returned to the jurisdiction of 9th Army. 7 k.u.k. CD, which had been fighting bravely under Frommel's Corps since the November operations at Zdunska Wola, was placed under 2nd Army.

As the new year began, the allied units west of the Vistula reverted generally to the defensive after their recent gallant actions. The main body of the Russians had retreated to the
Bzura and Rawka during Mackensen's latest offensive. North of the Vistula the Germans' Graudenz Corps had pulled back to Bielsk, Ciechanow and Przasnysz. In East Prussia their 8th Army had fended off attacks by 10th Russian Army. Although the two Aus-Hung. Armies in the center of the Eastern front - Dankl's and Böhm-Ermolli's - had been unable to drive the enemy over the Vistula, they had still given substantial help to Hindenburg's operations to halt the "Russian steamroller." They had opposed the enemy's first rush into the gap in the front leading to Silesia, pinned down the Russian 4th and 9th Armies, and thus prevented substantial forces from intervening against 9th German Army.

No one yet knew that it would be months before the Central Powers again made a decisive advance in the East and gained substantial ground, but in fact positional warfare was beginning just as it had already developed in the West and the Balkans. However, the AOK did have the impression, "that the activities of both sides were becoming limited; both need rest, at least for a short time." Conrad still hoped, however, that he could resume the offensive in the Carpathians with 3rd Army on 5 January. The outlines of the next operations were already becoming clear.

At this point the following were the relative strengths of the opposing armies in the East:

The Russian Northwest Front totalled 52 1/2 ID:
. 15 ID and 4 CD in 10th Army in East Prussia
. 4 ID and 1 CD under General Bobyr north of the Vistula
. 33 1/2 ID in 1st, 2nd and 5th Armies between the Vistula and Pilica

They were opposed by 32 1/2 German ID:
. 6 1/2 ID and 1 CD in 8th Army in East Prussia
. 4 ID and 2 CD under General Zastrow north of the Vistula
. 22 ID and 4 CD in 9th Army between the Vistula and Pilica

The Russian Southwest Front totalled 52 ID:
. 8 1/2 ID and 4 CD in 4th Army between the Pilica and Kielce
. 9 ID and 2 CD in 9th Army between Kielce and the Vistula
. 11 ID and 1 CD in 3rd Army between the Vistula and Gorlice
. 13 ID and 2 CD in 8th Army Gorlice and Lupkow Pass
. 5 ID and 2 CD besieging Przemysl (under 11th Army)

75 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 950
76 Translator's note - In the original this material appears as Beilage 6. The total number of "divisions" in the various commands includes independent brigades, each reckoned as 1/2 a division.
5 1/2 ID and 2 CD in the eastern Carpathians (also under 11th Army)

They were opposed by 47 1/2 allied ID:

- 9 1/2 ID under Woyrsch's Army Detachment...
- 5 k.u.k. and 1 1/2 German ID plus 3 k.u.k. CD in 2nd Army, and
- 3 German ID directly under Woyrsch
- 8 1/2 ID and 1 CD in 1st k.u.k. Army
- 13 k.u.k. and 1 German ID plus 1 k.u.k. CD in 4th Army
- 9 ID and 5 CD in 3rd k.u.k. Army
- 4 1/2 ID in Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe
- 2 ID in the Przemysl garrison

Finally, the Russians also had 4 1/2 ID in their Stavka's reserve.

3. The New Year's conference of the allies at Berlin

It seemed ever more urgent to the k.u.k Chief of Staff to win a decisive success before the end of winter. He was firmly convinced that such a decision couldn't be won in the West, but only in the East. He had learned that the Germans were forming four new corps; therefore on 27 December he sent a telegram to Falkenhayn requesting that fresh units be committed to a decisive stroke against Russia. Meanwhile the allies on the East front were confronted at every point by larger enemy forces. Until February the Aus-Hung. divisions would only be equivalent in terms of combat strength to brigades. It was all the more necessary to quickly commit troops from the West or from the newly-created German army corps because it was possible that the allies would face new enemy countries around the beginning of March. "If there is concern that [reinforcements] sent to the line north of the Vistula would be pinned down opposite the fortified line on the Narew, they should instead be employed in the area between the Pilica and the Nida (on the north wing of Woyrsch's group). Then they could break through the weak point in the Russian line toward Radom and force the enemy to retreat behind the Vistula-San line." In his request, Conrad harked back to the pre-war agreements under which substantial German forces would be sent to the East as soon as a great success was won in France. As he had repeatedly noted, the outcome of the Battle of the Marne made it necessary to fight a defensive campaign in the West while reinforcing the German Eastern armies as well as their exhausted allies. The decision should be sought against Russia.
Conrad sent GFM Hindenburg a telegram containing the same ideas. He noted that it might be necessary to pull Böhm-Ermolli's Army out of the fighting in Poland to help their comrades in the difficult campaign south of the Vistula; the Germans would have to send more units to the East to replace this Army in the line. Finally, Conrad asked Hindenburg to pass his concerns on to the German OHL at Mezieres.\textsuperscript{77} On the 28th Conrad received reports that Russian troop movements were in progress and that three corps had left their front in Poland. Then he began to plan in earnest to move 2nd Army back to Bartfeld and Mezolaborcz. However he didn't want to make a decision until he got a reply to his latest telegram to Falkenhayn.\textsuperscript{78}

The reply arrived in Teschen on the 29th. The German Chief of Staff felt that his colleague's latest proposals contradicted the decisions made at the last conference in Oppeln. He therefore requested a face-to-face meeting at Mezieres or one of the towns nearby. He also indicated that for the time being most of the Aus-Hung. forces should stay in their present positions, while the 9th German and 2nd k.u.k. Armies continued their attempt to wear down the enemy.

Conrad in turn responded that the agreements in Oppeln had pertained to the situation that would develop after the Russians pulled back behind the Vistula-San line. However, our forces north of the Vistula had been unable to force the enemy to retreat as had been anticipated at Oppeln. Nor had the k.u.k. 3rd and 4th Armies been able to push the Russians over the San, despite the victory at Limanowa-Lapanow. "The only new point I raised in my telegram of the 27th was the necessity of winning a decision in the East because of the anticipated attitude of the neutral powers next spring."\textsuperscript{79}

At the end of his message, Conrad stated that he didn't see any need for another conference; he had only made a proposal and requested Falkenhayn's opinion. The latter, however, repeated his desire to meet and suggested that they do so at Berlin. Therefore Conrad travelled to the German capital city on New Year's Eve. The conference took place on New Year's day in the offices of the Prussian War Ministry; General Ludendorff also took part.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{77} Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 913 ff. The German commander in the East had suggested on the 26th that if the front in Galicia held firm an Aus-Hung. corps could be transported to Mlawa in north Poland.
\textsuperscript{78} Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 928 ff.
\textsuperscript{79} Conrad, Vol. V, p. 942
\textsuperscript{80} Our account of these negotiations is based in part on a study prepared by the German archives, "The German South Army, from the start of January to
Conrad took this opportunity to urge once more that "everything be placed on hold" in France and that success be sought only in the East. Six German divisions should be inserted between 9th Army and Woyrsch's Army Detachment for an operation that would favorably influence the entire strategic situation. Ludendorff, on the other hand, said that if the new Army corps were sent to the East he would prefer to thrust out of East Prussia toward Bialystok. Here, at least, Conrad and Falkenhayn were in agreement; they felt that the proposed operation was too far removed from west Poland to influence the situation there.

Ludendorff responded with yet another idea. Since the prospects of success on Mackensen's front no longer seemed favorable, he was ready to place three or four divisions from the German 9th Army under the Austro-Hungarians. Conrad gladly accepted this offer; he said he would use the German divisions to relieve Böhm-Ermolli's Army and then move that force to the eastern flank of the k.u.k. 3rd Army. The two Armies could envelop Brussilov's left and break out of the Carpathians. Ludendorff countered that he would prefer to leave the k.u.k. 2nd Army in Poland so that German troops could participate in the proposed Carpathian offensive; Conrad had no objection to this proposal.

Falkenhayn, however, was completely opposed to a Carpathian campaign. He pointed out:

- that the difficult terrain presented insuperable difficulties, and
- that the Russians had better inner lines of communication so that they could quickly transfer units to parry the thrust.

A frontal attack in west Poland seemed to the General to be the most feasible course. Under the impression that his opinion had been accepted by the other paries, he left the conference to return to his own headquarters.

Already on the next day, Conrad received a report from Falkenhayn, stating that Emperor Wilhelm agreed with his Chief of Staff that it was presently impossible to divert units from the West. The question of the deployment of the new German corps would be settled in the next three weeks. The OHL also instructed its own Eastern Command to seek a decision west of the Vistula by exerting heavy pressure in the Pilica area; it was anticipated that the Aus-Hung. fronts in south Poland, west Galicia and the Carpathians would remain stationary.
C. The First Offensive in the Carpathians and the Russian Response

1. The allies' new plans for an offensive

At the new year's conference in Berlin, GdI Conrad was able to base his statements about political issues on reports he had just received from Count Berchtold. The Foreign Minister, along with Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe (the ambassador to Berlin) had visited Teschen on 30 December. He told Conrad that for the moment the situation to the south of the Monarchy was not threatening. He didn't think that Italy's renunciation of the Triple Alliance was imminent, and hoped he could divert the cabinet at Rome by the promise of territorial expansion in Albania. The Italians had been satisfied by the unfortunate result of the actions in Serbia, but hadn't been aroused to action. Nevertheless, the retreat over the Sava had been very troubling to the Minister because of the uncertain position of Romania. He also feared that Turkey would go over to the enemy camp if the road to that country wasn't cleared for the shipment of military supplies. Therefore Berchtold suggested that the northeast corner of Serbia should be occupied with the help of two German divisions to secure the connection with Bulgaria. Conrad didn't agree; he felt that if it was necessary to request any German help it should be used to seek a decision against Russia. 81

Despite Berchtold's generally soothing assurances, in the first week of January the AOK received alarming reports from the Ballhausplatz and the Military Attaché in Rome regarding danger in the south. On 5 January, Archduke Frederick wrote to the Emperor that "It is certain that an attack by both Italy and Romania or even by just one of these states would place the Monarchy in a militarily untenable position. This situation demands prompt action, specifically a success against Russia as soon as possible." As at the end of December, the AOK would seek this success by sending the strongest possible force out of the Carpathians toward the north. No doubt the desire to quickly relieve Przemysl influenced the selection of this point of attack; moreover, it was necessary to protect Hungarian soil from Russian invasion.

Further negotiations with the Germans

The German Eastern command had a different opinion than Falkenhayn and essentially supported the AOK's plan for an

offensive out of the Carpathians, which they wanted to accompany with an offensive out of East Prussia. On 2 January the Eastern HQ at Posen repeated to Teschen the offer which Ludendorff had made at Berlin: if the 9th German Army was unable to advance west of Warsaw, it could send four or five infantry divisions to the left wing of Boroevic's Army. This generosity, however, was somewhat diminished after Mackensen won an unexpectedly substantial success over the Russians at Bolimow and Rawa on the 5th. Thereafter the Germans were reluctant to detach substantial forces for fear of undermining this promising action. They reduced their offer to two and a half infantry and one cavalry divisions. A dispute which arose at this time between the respective allied military governments in Poland regarding the division of the Bendzin district added to the cooling of relations between the two HQ. Because of this mistrust, the Eastern Command wanted to place certain conditions on the use of the promised reinforcements which the k.u.k. leadership couldn't accept. The Austrians said they would rather just relieve Böhm-Ermolli's Army with German troops than bring the Germans to the Carpathians. This dispute, however, was soon settled by a declaration of loyalty from Posen.

Falkenhayn was less willing to cooperate. The objections which he had raised at the Berlin meeting regarding the feasibility of an offensive in the difficult terrain of the Carpathians in winter were well taken. He also felt that at best the result would only be to push the Russians out of the mountains into the flat plains of Galicia, which would hardly be enough to dampen warlike urges in Italy. Most German statesmen, with whom Falkenhayn agreed, felt that the Italians could be bought off only by agreeing to their territorial demands as quickly and completely as possible. For this reason, the German Chief of Staff now proposed operational ideas directly contradictory to those of Conrad.

Falkenhayn wanted to take German troops away from Mackensen and send them to Serbia rather than the Carpathians. He would reinforce them with units from other parts of the East front for a decisive blow against the Serbian Army, which had already been badly weakened by combat and disease, and which suffered from a crippling lack of military equipment. This would restore Austria-Hungary's status in the Balkans and vis a vis Italy. The attitude of Romania, the hoped-for adherence of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, and the great importance of establishing communications with Turkey were all dependent on the situation in

82 The possible threat to the southern flank of the German armies on the West front from a hostile Italy may have influenced Falkenhayn's position.
Serbia. This undertaking could be carried to a conclusion if Boroevic's Army would be able to hold the Carpathian passes without reinforcements for six to eight weeks, and if Przemysl would be safe until the end of February.

The staff in Teschen were completely opposed to such plans. They also opposed the German OHL's desire to have the k.u.k. Foreign Ministry offer concessions to Italy. Conrad disagreed with Count Berchtold, who wanted to buy Italian neutrality with territorial compensation. The k.u.k. Chief of Staff also warned that even an enormous victory over Serbia would be politically meaningless if there was no decisive success against Russia. Later the Archduke-Successor visited Emperor William mainly to oppose plans to concede Austrian territory to Italy.

Creation of the German South Army

After these fruitless attempts to gain a consensus regarding the use of German units on the Eastern front, on 8 January the OHL notified the AOK that it would provide two and a half infantry and one cavalry divisions for the Carpathians. These units, along with an equally strong Aus-Hung. contingent, would become the South Army, commanded by the German General GdI von Linsingen. His Chief of Staff - much to the surprise of all observers - would be Ludendorff.

Details regarding the employment of the South Army were to be settled by direct consultation between the AOK and the German Eastern Command. When Falkenhayn learned that the German troops, who were without any experience in mountain warfare, would deploy east of the Uzsok Pass, he had a new reason to regard the entire operation in an unfavorable light. It would be difficult to move the German artillery and their heavy supply trains through this roadless terrain in the winter season; therefore it would be preferable to deploy South Army west of the Pass to cooperate closely with the 3rd Army. Conrad wired that the roads and

83 Falkenhayn, "Die Oberste Heeresleitung 1914-1916 in ihren wichtigsten Entscheidungen" (Berlin, 1929), pp. 48 ff.
84 Probably this surprising attempt to separate Hindenburg from his esteemed collaborator was due to the rivalry between Falkenhayn and the victorious commanders of the German East front. Since Ludendorff had so warmly espoused the Carpathian operation, he should also be responsible for carrying it out.
85 The representative of the OHL at the AOK, GLt von Freytag-Loringhoven, had also warned Falkenhayn against the use of German troops in the Forest Carpathians. He had instead proposed that the German divisions be used for an offensive together with the right wing of Boroevic's Army toward Sambor and Przemysl; this would relieve the Przemysl fortress. (Freytag-Loringhoven, "Menschen und Dinge, wie ich sie im Leben sah," p. 259)
terrain were no different in the area which Falkenhayn suggested than in the area chosen by the AOK. East of the Pass, the Germans would have two good roads and a rail line at their disposal; the Austrians could provide light wagons and pack animals for their allies; finally, the South Army would also contain k.u.k. units which had already had months of opportunity to learn their way through the mountains and who were armed with mountain artillery. Falkenhayn, however, was still not satisfied. He had another conference with Conrad at Breslau on 11 January, in which he finally concurred. Generals Linsingen and Ludendorff, who were also present, declared that the task of the South Army would be difficult but certainly feasible; they didn't expect to decide the entire war, but hoped to win a great victory.

Despite worsening relations with Italy, the k.u.k. AOK was not to be diverted from their operational plans. Now they wanted to make it clear to the governments in Rome and Bucharest that any attack on the territory of the Danube Monarchy would encounter German resistance. They wanted to send half a German battalion apiece to Trient, Görz and Kronstadt to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance to both neutral states. For the same reason, one of the German battalions destined for the South Army had already been sent on a detour through the Banat. This was also designed to mislead the enemy at a time when - as will shortly be related - units were actually being sent from Archduke Eugene's Army to the Russian front. However the OHL denied the request of the AOK for the half-battalions on the grounds that their deployment in the border areas could be interpreted by Italy and Romania as a threat. This would undermine the negotiations going on with the Consulta (the Italian foreign ministry). Romania would never take the field against the Danube Monarchy without Italy.

On 16 January, Conrad proposed to the OHL that the newly-raised German corps should be deployed northeast of Warsaw for a thrust in the direction Mlawa-Pultusk; this would be of assistance to the Carpathian offensive. If all available units were concentrated in this sector to smash the Russians' northern wing, the enemy would have to retreat from their positions west of the Vistula. Falkenhayn agreed that the new units would be deployed against Russia, although he wasn't yet ready to decide on a specific sector of the front. "With a heavy heart" he was now resigned to avoiding any large-scale offensives in the West, because he believed there was a danger that Austria-Hungary would soon collapse under the burden of the war.86 His viewpoint was

86 Falkenhayn, pp. 49 ff.
overly pessimistic. Although the k.u.k. forces were confronted by a heavy burden, they proved Falkenhayn wrong by continuing to struggle for over three and a half more years.

The fighting in the snow-covered Carpathian wilderness was already raging on 26 January when Falkenhayn reported to Teschen that the new 10th German Army would commence operations in East Prussia on 7 February. Led by GO von Eichhorn, it consisted of three of the new corps plus the XXI Corps, which transferred from the West front. An offensive in this sector, to be sure, wasn't fully consistent with the desires of the k.u.k. Chief of Staff.

2. The aftermath of the December fighting

Both sides on the Eastern front undoubtedly needed a period of rest around the 1st of the year. Thus the operations already in progress trailed off into minor actions while both sides planned and made preparations for more decisive blows.

North and west of the Vistula

On the allies' extreme north wing, GdI Otto von Below's 8th Army had continued to hold off thrusts by the 10th Russian Army at the Masurian Lakes and on the Angerapp. Zastrow's Group prevented the enemy 12th Army from advancing into Below's rear. GO von Mackensen's 9th Army won some success against the 2nd and 5th Armies on 5 January; on the next day they began to pull two and a half infantry and one cavalry divisions from the line to join the South Army. Mackensen's Army continued to make a little progress through the 12th, after which their front became static.

Woyrsch's Army Detachment, which made up the left wing of the units under the AOK, had halted their actions on the Pilica near Tomaszow-Inowlodz. GO Woyrsch's mission was now to pin down the enemy on his front and prevent units from shifting to fight his neighbors to the north. He increased the frontage of his units on the left so that the parts of 9th Army which had been engaged south of the Pilica could return to Mackensen's main body. At several points the Russians worked their way closer to the allied trenches, but when they launched an attack in the night of 20-21 January it was shattered by the vigilant German Landwehr.

The right wing of the k.u.k. 1st Army held off Russian attacks against the strong point at Czarkow on the 10th, 11th and 12th. The waters of the Nida were swollen in the following days; they

87 Moreover, 8th Army provided one infantry regiment and one artillery battalion for South Army.
overflowed their banks and flooded some trenches that had to be evacuated. Neither GO Woyrsch nor GdK Dankl could even consider launching their own offensives, especially since the 1st Army had to send 37 Hon ID and 33 ID off to the Carpathians.

**Actions at the junction of 3rd and 4th Armies**

While there was no noteworthy activity on the fronts to the north and west of the Vistula, the fighting initiated south of the river in late December lasted a while longer.

As described earlier, Dimitriev's heaviest attack on the Zakliczyn-Gorlice sector was shattered on December 31 by the stout defenses of 4th Army. Nonetheless the Russian commander didn't completely abandon his attempts, since he was still under orders from Ivanov to throw his opponents over the Biala. Therefore at the start of the new year the Russians attempted again to envelop the Archduke's Army from the south, while threatening the important Gorlice-Grybow-Neusandez road. The right wing of Kralicek's Group (43 LW Inf Bde plus parts of 10 and 12 ID), which ran toward the southeast, kept the enemy from rolling up the front in a series of actions. The unit posted on the extreme right wing, 11 Hon CD from Berndt's Cavalry Corps, gave up some ground toward Uscie Ruskie and had to be reinforced by half of 6 CD.

The enemy could now easily thrust between the 4th and 3rd Armies. To avoid this danger, III Corps and Berndt's four cavalry divisions should attack north and bring the enemy advance to a halt. The first unit engaged was LW IR # 5 (attached to Berndt), which was ordered in the direction of "Ridge 604 Road" and encountered the Russians at Gladyszow. As requested by 4th Army HQ, GM Berndt had already moved the rest of his Cavalry Corps to the line Gladyszow-Uscie Ruskie on the 2nd; III Corps (which was just three brigades strong) deployed farther left in echelon on the next day. One brigade of 28 ID on the right of LW IR # 5 attacked Banica; the other brigade was forced by Russian units to move more toward the northeast. 44 LW Inf Bde (the other component of III Corps) had to remain behind at Ozenna to guard the flank against a Russian group at Krempna.

Because of the operational significance of developments at this weakly-held point where the two Armies came together, the AOK felt obliged to coordinate their actions. On the 3rd, they ordered that on the next day III Corps must be in firm control of

88 The "Ridge 604 Road" was the point where the Żborno-Gorlice road crossed the Magora Hills north of Gladyszow.
the sector Banica-Dlugie-Grab-Ozenna. If the enemy continued to attack, the inner wings of the Armies must be ready to respond with a simultaneous pincer attack from the south and west. The Cavalry Corps, which had first reinforced the action of LW IR # 5 at Gladyszow with dismounted troops from 11 Hon CD plus foot detachments and bicyclists from 5 Hon CD, should deploy behind the gap in the line waiting for the right moment to intervene. Meanwhile FML Kralicek was shaking off the Russians who were pushing toward Gorlice and against his Group's right wing; his men smashed a Russian battalion and took it prisoner. The attack toward Banica opened on the 5th. To support III Corps, Kralicek sent a column over the Ridge 604 Road. LW IR # 5 moved east at Gladyszow and the neighboring brigade of 28 ID worked its way forward toward Banica from the south.

Now, however, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand announced that his southern wing couldn't extend itself indefinitely past Ridge 604 Road. 3rd Army countered that they wouldn't attack by themselves to the heights at Banica because if their units weren't supported they would be unable to hold onto that position. Therefore Boroevic halted III Corps, which pulled back its inner flank; IX Corps did likewise. Thus the whole operation was abandoned, and 3rd Army HQ pulled the Cavalry Corps back behind the lines. On the 6th, the 4 and 10 CD plus 5 Hon CD took up quarters in a wide area around Bartfeld; 11 Hon CD was once more placed under 4th Army.

Despite energetic leadership, the Cavalry Corps was unable to carry out its mission because of the mountainous terrain. Moreover it hadn't been supported by the artillery, left behind on the snow-covered, bottomless roads. The weak units of III Corps were hampered by constant concern that the enemy might attack their flank from Krempna. This setback foreshadowed the frictions that would continue to plague operations for the next four months whenever the inner wings of the two Armies tried to use their apparently favorable position to mount a coordinated assault.

**Diversion of units from 4th Army**

In this period Groups Szurmay and Ljubicic, especially the latter, also had to withstand Russian attacks. To ensure Ljubicic's success, 4th Army HQ therefore provided him with an

---

89 For this reason Boroevic once again asked for the return of 6 ID and 43 LW Inf Bde from 4th Army so they could rejoin III Corps.
90 This episode was described in greater detail than usual because it illustrates the operational and tactical difficulties of fighting at a point where two commands come together.
The situation on the north wing of 4th Army was almost completely quiet. The enemy's offensive operations died down along the Army's entire front from 5 January; the Russians dug in and prepared strong defenses everywhere.

The AOK was certain already on New Year's Day that the 4th Army would hold its lines; therefore the trains carrying V Corps (37 Hon ID and 33 ID) from 1st Army were directed ahead to GdI Boroevic's east wing. Afterwards there were reports that the enemy was also diverting units toward the southeast, and it became clear that the commander of 3rd Russian Army was not planning any powerful offensive thrust. This caused the AOK to take three divisions away from 4th Army for use on the right wing: the main body of 43 LW ID (86 Bde plus the division's artillery and cavalry) from Ljubicic's Group, 6 ID and 43 LW Inf Bde from Arz' Group, and 19 ID (whose units had been split up among four Corps - XVII, XIV, XI and VI).

The high command was fully aware that weakening 4th Army in this manner posed something of a risk. This was clear as Dimitriev didn't remain completely inactive, but made several attacks against the Wal Heights. To at least provide support for the Archduke's two wings, the 106 Lst ID of 1st Army was stationed near the Vistula bridge at Jagodniki, ready to intervene if necessary south of the river, and Boroevic was instructed to leave 43 LW Inf Bde, which had returned to his command, at Zboro.

Thus the troops of 4th Army didn't rest in the next two weeks because of numerous unit transfers. The Army HQ was also concerned about the national composition of its units. The artful Russians spread rumors through various channels that east and central Galician deserters would be permitted to return to their "liberated" home villages. 4th Army commanded XI Corps (11 and 30 ID) as well as 45 LW ID and half of 43 LW ID, whose personnel stemmed from the areas just behind the enemy's front; there seemed to be a danger of mass desertion. The situation of XI Corps was helped somewhat by the presence of the Tyrolean 88 L-Sch Bde, which was split up into battalion groups behind its lines. The enemy was tireless in thinking of other ruses.

91 On 19 January a volunteer detachment of the German 47 Res ID attacked the Russian bridgehead on the west bank of the Dunajec north of the railroad to Tarnow. The enemy was taken by surprise and their bridge was destroyed by artillery fire.

92 However, there are no reports that the units in question suffered any noteworthy desertions to the enemy. On the other hand, a few days after the end of the actions described above there was an incident involving south Slavs rather than Ruthenes. A sergeant and 184 men from BH IR # 1
Russians in Aus-Hung. uniforms made surprise attacks on our patrols and other small detachments, even in broad daylight.

3rd Army

The enemy in front of Boroevic's Army, on the other hand, were content with the successes they had won in the last half of December. The actions of III Corps, described above, were substantially supported by the lively patrol activity of VII Corps, its neighbor on the right; Archduke Joseph also moved his security detachments nearer to the enemy on both sides of the road to Dukla Pass. 1 CD, hitherto in Meixner's Group, was placed under VII Corps.

Under X Corps there were actions on 1, 3 and 5 January for possession of the mountain village of Jasiel; parts of 2 ID were involved as well as parts of 24 ID from Krautwald's Group. Apparently the Russians planned to open the way through the Jasiel Valley in the Mezőlaborcz area. However, they were unable to establish a firm footing in Jasiel; they were also repulsed on the Pojana Heights (on the border crest 3 km west of Jasiel), which the Austrians had recently added to their defensive line. On the 5th, FML Krautwald took over X Corps in place of GdI Meixner, who had asked to be relieved of his post; from this time the Corps consisted of 2, 24 and 34 ID. On the 7th, the 2 ID recaptured the heights west of Jasiel which had been lost the day before; then the Division's exhausted troops, who'd been engaged without stopping for a long time, were finally able to go into shelters. 34 ID pushed forward to Komancza, where it skirmished with the enemy.

As ordered by 3rd Army HQ, the XVIII Corps also prepared for the next offensive by moving its lines forward somewhat; they established firm control of the Kalnica area. The main body of 43 LW ID was brought by rail from 4th Army; they detrained on the 10th at Szinna and Takcsany and moved up to the front. 56 ID and 8 CD were removed from XVIII Corps; they left the lines south of the main Carpathian crest for rest and rehabilitation at Telepocz. However, these exhausted units were to enjoy only a short break.

Activity south of the Uzsok Pass

went over to the Russians. Afterward the Regiment was placed under 19 ID and sent to South Army, where it fought near Wyszkow. In that sector, about 100 men of Serbian nationality deserted to the enemy on the night of 7-8 February.
On New Year's eve, the Russians took the northwestern bulwark of Pflanzer-Baltin's front, the Uzsok Pass. The commander of this sector, FML Ronai-Horvath, had already been planning to pull back his battalions - badly damaged in earlier fighting - to a position just behind the heights alongside the Pass. However, the enemy anticipated this maneuver. The Russians launched a surprise attack under cover of darkness, and one of their detachments outflanked the left wing of the confused defenders; Col. Csermak was mortally wounded in this action. The right wing, composed of Ruthenian Landsturm, offered little resistance. The troops fled back into the Ung Valley in a disorderly rout; they were finally brought back under control on the line Revhely-Sohat. Meanwhile, however, the way through Szinna into the flank and rear of 3rd Army lay open.

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin made a vain attempt to halt the movement to the rear. Then he sent 1st Lst Huss Bde from Huszt to aid Ronai-Horvath. He also brought up several Hungarian Landsturm companies from the interior for this purpose, and requested a substantial reinforcement from the AOK. Instead, however, the high command decided to reassign the Uzsok Pass sector to 3rd Army.

GdI Boroevic took immediate measures to support Ronai-Horvath's units, which seemed to be falling apart. The nearest potential reinforcements were the troops who'd recently pulled back to Telepecz for rehabilitation; therefore the 128 Lst Inf Bde (into which all remnants of 56 ID had just been organized) was quickly sent through Utczas to help. At first it was intended to send the other unit in question, 8 CD, to thrust through Wolosate into the flank and rear of the Russians as they advanced in the Ung valley; then it was decided to also send the cavalry through Utczas. Both units assembled at Utczas on the 4th.

There was a rapid change in the command of this sector: Ronai-Horvath was replaced by FML Siegler, who in turn was succeeded by FML Bartheldy; finally FML Szurmay was entrusted with this important post. Originally the AOK intended to recapture the Uzsok Pass after bringing order to the battered formations and providing reinforcements; then they decided to await the arrival of V Corps. Finally Teschen agreed with the suggestion of 3rd Army HQ that the operation should be carried out at the same time as the general offensive in the Carpathians. Meanwhile the Russians felt that their new positions on both sides of the Ung valley were dangerously exposed and therefore pulled back their leading detachments; in response, FML Bartheldy advanced on the 10th to be nearer the enemy.
Operations on Pflanzer-Baltin's front

By now additional divisions and brigades were arriving in the Carpathians and leaving their trains. Besides the units from elsewhere on the Eastern front, a substantial reinforcement was coming from 5th Army. Its commander (GdK Archduke Eugene) and chief of staff (FML Alfred Krauss) agreed on 6 January to send five divisions against the Russians; two more divisions would follow ten days later. This was possible because the Balkan forces would stay strictly on the defensive against Serbia. Of the first five divisions, three would join Boroevic's Army: 7 and 29 ID (XIX Corps) through Mezölaborcz and 40 Hon ID through Ungvar-N. Berezna; the other two - 36 and 42 Hon ID (XIII Corps) - would join Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe.

Pflanzer-Baltin's center had been almost completely quiet since the new year, while pressure had been building up against both his flanks. Because of the setback at the Uzsok Pass, Hofmann's Group on the left moved back somewhat south of Vezerszallas on 3 to 5 January, allowing the Russians to occupy that town. On the right, Schultheisz' Group (54 ID), whose Landsturm troops had been fighting on barren mountain heights for two weeks, repulsed a Russian attack on 1 January and inflicted heavy casualties; however, on the 2nd they also withdrew. Schultheisz took up a new position at the Luczyna stud-farm; his rear guard was engaged on the 4th at Izwor. The gallant defender of the Bukovina, Col. Fischer, was obliged to pull his badly-reduced gendarmerie detachments back to the Mesticanestie position at Jacobeny, fighting constantly during the retreat. Fischer had become seriously ill, so at Jacobeny he turned his command over to Major Papp of the engineer staff.

Pflanzer-Baltin became concerned that his right wing would be unable to withstand its opponents: half of Russian 71 ID (which would shortly be brought to full strength) plus a Cossack force of about division size. Although from an operational point of view the Russians could do most damage by advancing through Borsa to Maramaros-Sziget, it also would be undesirable to allow them to push through Dorna Watra and the Borgo Pass because of the attitude of Romania. Therefore the Armeegruppe commander wished to support Papp by holding the Transylvanian Gendarmerie Battalion in readiness at the western end of the Borgo Pass. Pflanzer-Baltin also asked the AOK for jurisdiction over the

---

93 The Military Command at Hermannstadt had combined the Gendarmerie detachments into a battalion to protect Transylvania against Russian raiders.
Ersatz units in Transylvania, which he proposed to combine into an infantry brigade for use in this area.

At this point Count Tisza, the Hungarian Minister President, raised objections against withdrawing troops from Transylvania. He persuaded the AOK to cancel the proposed deployment of the Gendarmerie Battalion and even to remove the detachments of Hungarian gendarmerie already at the front back to the rear. Teschen also cancelled the creation of the combined infantry brigade, but in compensation sent the Armeegruppe four Landsturm infantry battalions and a Landsturm Hussar battalion from the Cracow fortress garrison.

Pflanzer-Baltin now learned that the German South Army would be inserted between 3rd Army and his own Armeegruppe of 28,000 riflemen. Before the offensive started, he would be reinforced by 6 ID (from 4th Army) and 5 Hon CD (from 3rd Army), which would arrive by rail through Maramaros-Sziget. When GdI Linsingen established the HQ of his South Army at Munkacs, he would take over Hofmann's Group and Col. Burggasser's 12 Lst Terr Bde.

On 11 January, FML Durski began to march his Polish Legion battalions from Ökörmező to the area northwest of Borsa, where they would provide a reserve for Schultheisz' Group. On the 12th, the Russians launched an envelopment attack against Schultheisz, who retreated from Luczyna to the fortified heights of Prislop and Rotundul.

On the 14th, GM von Lilienhoff took over Papp's Group, which had been reinforced by the Landsturm from Cracow; soon thereafter he had to withstand heavy Russian attacks against his position at Mesticanesti, which they sought to envelop on both flanks. The enemy gave up these attacks on the 20th, when FML Schultheisz, who'd been joined by parts of the Polish Legion, launched a relief attack through Kirlibaba into the Russians' rear. On the 22nd Schultheisz secured the dominant Flutorica Heights and the area around Kirlibaba.

During these actions a Russian battalion near Dorna Watra had crossed through Romanian territory. The border, at which Pflanzer-Baltin's right wing ended, was covered by a strong cordon of Romanian troops; their officers provided the Russians worthwhile information about the location and strength of the

94 Most of Pflanzer-Baltin's units - since they weren't first line troops - didn't have Ersatz cadres to provide replacements; although they periodically received Landsturm march companies, this was insufficient to fully replenish the ranks.
k.u.k. units.

Covered by FML Hofmann's and Col. Burrgasser's Groups, the new units of South Army began to arrive: the German 1 ID and 3 Gd ID at Munkacs, the German 48 Res ID and k.u.k. 19 ID at Huszt, and the German 5 CD south of Csap. The rail movement was substantially delayed. There was an accident in Prussian Silesia, and then it became apparent that the small stations in north Hungary were inadequate to handle the increased volume of incoming traffic. The lines were soon clogged with incoming trains and empty ones on their way to the rear. The deployment was delayed by about 30 hours; the German XXIV Res Corps (48 German Res ID and 19 k.u.k. ID) had to postpone its advance from the 23rd to 24 January.

3. Preparations for the January offensive

The preceding sections have shown why the large-scale transfer of troops from quieter sectors to the Carpathians could be carried out only in stages; the movement was also complicated because the objectives of the reinforcements kept changing along with the situation.

The plans of 3rd and South Armies

3rd Army would play the decisive role in the offensive over the Carpathians. Therefore it received six more infantry divisions: V Corps (33 ID, 37 Hon ID), XIX Corps (7, 29 ID), and 40 Hon ID plus 43 and 86 LW Inf Bdes. GdI Boroevic had already been advised on 2 January to group his forces so that when the operation started the center could made a combined and powerful offensive to Lisko-Sanok. The Army's east wing would cover the operation in the direction of Uzsok Pass. The west wing, which was opposite strongly fortified enemy positions, would join the attack later in the direction of Rymanow-Krosno-Jaslo. In general, the plan was for a repetition of the December offensive.

95 General Ludendorff, during his brief posting as Chief of Staff to Linsingen, objected to deployment of 5 CD in the mountainous terrain of the forest Carpathians, and wanted to return the horsemen to Poland. However, the AOK would need the unit for reconnaissance missions after the mountains were crossed, and therefore overrode his objection. Ludendorff refused to give in; both he and the AOK raised the issue of the Cavalry Division at the German Eastern HQ in Posen. Hindenburg refused to get involved, since the unit was no longer under his jurisdiction.

96 Ratzenhofer, "Truppentransporte beim Winterfeldzug in den Karpathen" (in "Wissen und Wehr", Vol. 8 for year 1929)
In an operational study on 12 January, GdI Boroevic laid special emphasis on reaching the railroad at Usztryzki Dl. as quickly as possible; this would compel the enemy farther west at Lisko and Sanok to pull back. Brussilov's 8th Army held a continuous line only as far as the Cisna-Baligrod-Lisko road; their left wing as far as the Uzsok Pass consisted only of isolated infantry groups and a large cavalry contingent. Therefore it was hoped that the main thrust through Lutowiska-Baligrod would soon wheel around the Russians' eastern flank.

However, the original plan for deploying 3rd Army's units was modified. Although the change seems unimportant at first glance, it nonetheless had wide-ranging consequences. It came to pass because of the concerns of the German South Army.

GdI Linsingen and his Chief of Staff Ludendorff arrived at Munkacs on 13 January. According to the guidelines issued by the k.u.k. high command, their Army would advance on the 23rd in conjunction with Szurmay's Group from the line north of Szolyva and Vucskomezö; they would attack through Verecke-Tucholka-Volovec-Tuchla and Toronya-Wyszkow. After crossing the mountains they would reach the Dolina-Stryj-Synowodsko area. Their subsequent movement would be determined by the results of 3rd Army's actions south of Przemysl and by the deployment of the expected Russian reinforcements. If Boroevic still hadn't reached the Sambor-Przemysl area, GdI Linsingen would shift west to help him; if Boroevic had reached his objective, Linsingen would thrust northeast through Zydaczow, Zurawno and Martynow against the flank and rear of the retreating enemy. But if strong Russian forces had deployed at Stanislau, Nadworna and Kolomea, Linsingen would move due east to defeat them. In this case he would be given command of the left wing of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, advancing through the Pantyr Pass.

General Ludendorff believed that the strength of Szurmay's Group would not be sufficient to quickly capture the Uzsok Pass. Therefore he suggested that FML Szurmay should be reinforced either by 6 ID (whose troops were used to mountain operations) or by Linsingen's 3 Gd ID. Furthermore, the units sent to attack Uzsok Pass should be subordinated to South Army HQ for the duration of the fighting in the Carpathians. The AOK agreed only to reinforce Szurmay; however, instead of 6 ID he would receive 7 ID, which originally was to constitute a reserve for 3rd Army behind the inner wings of Puhallo's and Krautwald's Groups.

97 By this time, however, most of 6 ID was already joining Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe.
Since Szurmay's Group would be stronger, the high command told 3rd Army that they should be in firm possession of the heights at Borynia by 26 January. By the same date, 3 Gd ID would shift through Ungvar, N. Berzna and Csontos to the area south of Uzsok Pass (the infantry would move by rail). From this point the Guards could move through Libuchora to open the Verecke road or join Szurmay in an attack toward Turka.

Although this effort to secure Uzsok Pass was undoubtedly correct from South Army's viewpoint, the transfer of 7 ID meant that less strength would be available for the thrust toward Usztrzyki Dl., which was vital for the success of the entire operation.

Generals Boroevic and Linsingen, accompanied by their Chiefs of Staff, met on the 20th at Satoralja-Ujhely to coordinate the movements of the wings of their respective Armies. Since FML Szurmay would have brought his troops closer to the Uzsok Pass by the 22nd and wished to send his main body south to launch an outflanking attack, Linsingen agreed to let the column on his left wing advance toward Vezerszallas on 21 January. This would pin down the enemy and ensure that they didn't menace Szurmay's right flank as it made its assault. A similar conference had already taken place on the 15th at Huszt between the South Army's commander and his neighbor on the right, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin.

Before the offensive began, the episode which had separated Hindenburg from his illustrious co-worker came to an end. Ludendorff returned to Posen, replaced as Chief of staff to South Army by GM von Stolzmann. 98

The role of Pflanzer-Baltin

The AOK gave Pflanzer-Baltin the task of taking the Nadworna area with his left wing. His right would first repulse any enemy attack through Kirlibaba-Jacobeny and later join the general advance. After crossing the Forest Carpathians, the Armeegruppe should scout ahead far toward the north, destroy the railroads leading to Stryj and Lemberg from the north and east, and generally wreak havoc on enemy's lines of communication.

Several circumstances combined to delay the implementation of Pflanzer-Baltin's plan of operations. Originally his Group was to be reinforced only by 6 ID, 5 Hon CD and 10 CD; 99 later,

---

98 Translator's Note - For the political bickering that lay behind Ludendorff's posting, and which led Hindenburg to call Falkenhayn's bluff by threatening to resign, see D.J. Goodspeed, "Ludendorff" (Boston, 1966), pp. 150-153

99 10 CD and 5 Hon CD didn't actually move to the east Carpathians until the
however, XIII Corps (36 ID and 42 Hon ID) was added from the
Balkan forces. There were both political and military factors
behind this additional reinforcement. Count Tisza feared that
the evacuation of most of the Bukovina in December, after which
the local Romanian population came under Russian occupation,
would influence the attitude of the government at Bucharest and
increase its covetousness. The Hungarian Minister President
expressed his concerns both at Teschen and Vienna. In response,
Count Berchtold also pointed out these dangers to the AOK shortly
before he left the position of Foreign Minister. Since it was
at least possible that Romania might join the Entente, the Army's
southern flank couldn't be left uncovered. There were also
rumors that the Russians were reinforcing their forces in the
Bukovina, although this was never substantiated. Finally, GdK
Pflanzer-Baltin himself requested another division for his right
wing.

Additional forces had begun to arrive on Pflanzer's left wing.
Parts of 6 ID, which had already detrained south of Körösmezö,
were sent west toward the Pantyr Pass. At this point, while
Armeegruppe HQ at Maramaros-Sziget was planning its offensive
toward the north, the Russians pushed back Schultheisz' Group as
described above. This caused concern that when Pflanzer-Baltin's
units moved north they might be threatened from their right flank
and rear if the Russians continued to advance from Kirlibaba.
Therefore the AOK empowered the Armeegruppe commander to use XIII
Corps to prevent such a development. In this case 6 ID on the
left would have to carry out the offensive through Körösmezö and
Rafailowa by itself. However, Schultheisz' subsequent victory
(on 22 January) ended the danger in the Kirlibaba area.

The high command left the details of planing up to Pflanzer, but
emphasized that he should attack the Russians in the Bukovina as
soon as possible. This would cover the flank of his thrust
toward the north and ensure Romanian neutrality. Since the
arrival of XIII Corps was delayed, however, the Armeegruppe's
offensive couldn't possibly begin before the end of the month.

---
100 Berchtold was succeeded on 13 January 1915 by Baron Burian (Musulin, "Das
101 In these busy days, serious differences of opinion developed between
Pflanzer-Baltin and his Chief of Staff, which were escalated to the AOK.
The high command, naturally, ruled that in disputes of this nature the
wishes of the commanding general must be honored.
Overall plans of the AOK

This critical period of troop movements and other preparations along the entire Carpathian front had passed smoothly because the Russians made no major attempt to disrupt their opponents' deployment. On 22 January, as Szurmay's Group had already begun its movement toward the Uzsok Pass, the AOK combined all of the directives it had issued to individual headquarters into an overall order. It stated (abridged):

On 23 January the east wing of 3rd Army and the South Army will begin to attack along the Uzsok and Verecke crests. Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe will join this attack in echelon on the east, toward Delatyn-Nadworna and with parts into the Bukovina.

As the offensive progresses, the west wing of 3rd Army will attack through Zmigrod and Dukla; 4th Army will advance with its south wing (Arz' Group) through Jaslo. At this point it will be essential that III Corps cooperate with the south wing of 4th Army.

Eventually Ljubicic's and Roth's Groups will join Arz' attack. Kritek's Group will move over the lower Dunajec and down the Vistula to prevent the enemy from intervening from the north bank of the latter river. At some point Kritek will cross the Vistula to support the advance of 1st Army over the Nida.

1st Army and Woyrsch's Army Detachment should be ready to attack if any enemy units leave their sector; if the enemy withdraws they should immediately pursue. It is probable in that case that the Russians would offer new resistance, at least with rear guards, from their secondary positions on the Pilica and through Opoczno-Kielce and farther southeast. The main body of 1st Army should move to the area at and immediately southeast of Kielce. Woyrsch's south wing (Bredow's Division and the Landwehr Corps) would take Cminsk; the north wing (the main body of 2nd Army) would attack toward Nowemiasto-Drzewica. On the rest of Woyrsch's line only weak units should follow the enemy along a broad front.

The k.u.k. high command asked the German Eastern HQ to have 9th Army continue its offensive if possible. Otherwise Mackensen should at least pin down Russian units and prevent their transfer to the sector south of the Pilica or to the Carpathians.
The deployment of the attacking forces behind the Carpathians on a front nearly 400 km long was dependent in large measure upon the railroad net and the capacity of the various lines. Even if additional divisions had been available to reinforce those already committed to the operation, the limitations of the transportation system would have made it impossible to bring them to the area prior to 23 January, the date chosen to open the offensive. Anyway, there was no large reserve force at hand, a factor that would soon become a problem; the units that began the offensive were not large enough to cover such a long front.

The supply situation at Przemysl

The AOK intended to break out of the mountains with an enveloping attack that could decide the war. As part of this large operation, however, part of 3rd Army would push north on the shortest possible line to relieve the fortress of Przemysl. The deployment reflected the larger goal. The thrust to the north, however, would have been more effective if the South Army was massed, as originally suggested by the Germans, directly next to 3rd Army in the sector between FZM Puhallo's Group and the Uzsok Pass. Instead, the units which GdI Boroevic was sending toward Przemysl wouldn't receive any immediate support from the forces to their right. South Army and Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe (the latter of which couldn't be ready to advance until later) would have to first cross the mountains and break the enemy's resistance before shifting toward the north (and probably meeting yet more resistance) to work together closely with 3rd Army. The AOK believed that they would have to renounce a simultaneous attack by all units against the flank of the Russian hordes and a close deployment of forces, although these were serious disadvantages, in order to relieve Przemysl as soon as possible. Thus the fate of the gallant garrison was weighing on the soul of the commanders, just as the political situation was also impelling them to hurry.

The length of time that Przemysl could hold out was mainly dependent on its available rations. Just before the second siege, a substantial amount of food had been dispersed to the field forces, and most of it hadn't been replaced before the lines of communication were once again broken. Unfortunately it took a considerable time for the supply services in the fortress to determine just how many rations they had left. On New Year's Day, the AOK received a report that the garrison would be able to hold out only until 18 February, even after eating all

102Much of this material is from Stuckheil, "Der Kampf um Przemysl 1914/15"
their horses. Although the high command believed this alarming report was overly pessimistic, it still had the effect of bringing the need to quickly relieve Przemysl to their attention. A few days later the fortress HQ revised their estimate to show that they would have food until 7 March if they started to slaughter horses on a large scale and reduced the number of surviving animals to a bare minimum. This of course would considerably reduce the mobility of the garrison and their defensive capabilities.

On 4 January, the fortress HQ asked the AOK whether they should attempt to break out around 1 February or just hold out until 7 March. A pilot was sent to Przemysl on 14 January with an order to form five detachments from the garrison troops. In February, at the latest, these detachments could either intervene to help a relief attempt or break out to join the field army, leaving just a minimal garrison at Przemysl. It was not until 11 March that the fortress HQ reported that after slaughtering the horses and carefully combing the fortress area for food it would be possible to prolong their resistance until 24 March. However, at the time when the Carpathian offensive was being planned - the middle of January - the AOK reckoned that Przemysl had much less time.

The main body of Russian 11th Army was responsible for blockading Przemysl, but its troops also occupied the entire Carpathian sector east of Lisko. Therefore the Russians frequently changed the composition of the two Corps that surrounded the fortress. Otherwise, however, neither side undertook any major operations at the start of the year. The Russians made their presence known only by occasional bombardment of the city and its fortifications. The garrison was saving its strength for the eventual final battle. Its activity was also limited because the reduction in rations impaired the strength and health of the troops. At the start of January there were 127,800 troops and 14,540 horses in the fortress; the HQ was also responsible for feeding 18,000 civilians and 1,000 prisoners of war.

4. Orders of battle on the East front, January-April 1915

(Translator's Note - The original information has been considerably expanded by addition of data from the Hungarian official history and various German sources. The section on the Russian armies is based on the Hungarian official history.)

A. The k.u.k. forces on 23 January 1915

Woyrsch's Combined Army
**Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918**

Vol 2

Commander = Prussian GO von Woyrsch  
Chief of Staff = Prussian Lt Col Heye  
Had 113 1/2 bns, 81 sqdns, 91 batties; 83,045 foot, 9606 horse, 486 guns

### a) 2nd k.u.k. Army

**Commander** = GdK von Böhm-Ermolli  
**Chief of Staff** = Col Dr. Bardolff

**Corps Gallwitz**  
**Commander** = Prussian GdA von Gallwitz  
**Chief of Staff** = Prussian Col von Bartenwerffer

| Corps Gallwitz | k.u.k. 35th ID (FML Fox) | 12 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 8080 foot, 246 horse, 52 guns  
|               | 69 Inf Bde (GM von Baitz) = IR 50, 51; III Bn/IR 19 |  
|               | 70 Inf Bde (Col Edler von Salmon) = IR 62, 63 |  
|               | Artillery = FKR 35, II Bn/FHR 12 |  
|               | k.u.k. 27th ID (FML Kosak) | 11 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 7 batties; 9470 foot, 256 horse, 42 guns  
|               | 53 Inf Bde (GM Urbarz) = IR 25, 34 |  
|               | 54 Inf Bde (Col von Watterich) = IR 67, 85 |  
|               | Artillery = II Bn/FHR 6 |  

### IV k.u.k. Corps

**Commander** = GdK von Tersztyanszky  
**Chief of Staff** = Lt Col Freiherr von Salis-Samaden

| IV k.u.k. Corps | 31st ID (FML Freiherr von Lütgendorf) | 12 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 11,468 foot, 294 horse, 56 guns  
|                | 61 Inf Bde (GM von Felix) = IR 32, 69 |  
|                | 62 Inf Bde (GM Blasius von Dani) = IR 44; BH IR 3 |  
|                | Artillery = FKR 10, I Bn/FHR 4 |  
|                | 32nd ID (GM Ludwig Goiginger) | 13 bns, 4 sqdns, 7 batties; 8613 foot, 370 horse, 42 guns  
|                | 63 Inf Bde (GM von Podhoranszky) = IR 23, 70 |  
|                | 64 Inf Bde (GM Grallert) = IR 6, 86 |  
|                | Artillery = FKR 11, II Bn/FHR 4 |  

### XII k.u.k. Corps

**Commander** = GdI von Kövess  
**Chief of Staff** = Col Freiherr von Zeidler-Sterneck

| XII k.u.k. Corps | 16th ID (FML von Schariczzer) | 14 bns, 3 sqdns, 10 batties; 10,705 foot, 366 horse, 56 guns  
|                 | 31 Inf Bde (GM von Szende) = IR 2, 82 |  
|                 | 32 Inf Bde (GM Goldbach) = IR 5, 64 |  
|                 | Artillery = FKR 36, I Bn/FHR 12 |  
|                 | GERMAN 35 Reserve ID (GLt von Schmettau) |
13 bns, 3 sqdns, 6 1/2 batties; 8992 foot, 348 horse, 34 guns
  . 5 LW Inf Bde (Mülmann) = LW IR 2, 9
  . 20 LW Inf Bde (Hertzberg) = LW IR 19, 107
. 13 k.k. Landsturm Territorial Bde (In rear, non-combat role)

Directly under 2nd Army HQ
. 3 CD (FML Ritter von Brudermann)
  1 foot bn, 20 sqdns, 3 batties; 789 foot, 2364 horse, 12 guns
  . 10 Cav Bde (Col Freiherr von Cnobloch) = DR 3, UR 7, HR 4
  . 17 Cav Bde (GM Ritter von Pruszynski) = HR 1, UR 4
. 7 CD (FML Edler von Korda)
  1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 4 batties; 400 foot, 1907 horse, 12 guns
  . 11 Cav Bde (Col Count Lasocki) = DR 10, UR 2
  . 20 Cav Bde (GM von Le Gay) = DR 12, UR 3
. 9 CD (GdK Freiherr von Hauer)
  1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 3 batties; 545 foot, 1903 horse, 12 guns
  . 1 Cav Bde (Col Dienstl) = DR 4, 13
  . 9 Cav Bde (GM Ritter von Micewski) = DR 1, UR 6

b) Woyrsch's GERMAN Army Detachment
Commander = Prussian GO von Woyrsch
Chief of Staff = Prussian Lt Col Heye

Landwehr Corps
Commander = GLt Freiherr von König
Chief of Staff = Steuer

. 3 LW ID (GLt von Riess)
  12 bns, 4 sqdns, 8 batties; 8185 foot, 312 horse, 44 guns
  . 17 LW Inf Bde (Chelius) = LW IR 6, 7
  . 18 LW Inf Bde (Trierenberg) = LW IR 3, 46
. 4 LW ID (GLt von Wegerer)
  9 bns, 7 sqdns, 10 1/2 batties; 6244 foot, 1052 horse, 56 guns
  . 22 LW Inf Bde (Sachs) = LW IR 11, 51 (One Regt detached to Bredow)
  . 23 LW Inf Bde (Rudolph) = LW IR 22, 23
  . 4 LW Cavalry Bde = LW Cav Regt 2, Ersatz Cav Regt 6
. Bredow's LW ID (GLt Graf von Bredow)
  13 bns, 2 sqdns, 13 batties; 9554 foot, 188 horse, 64 guns
  . 19 LW Inf Bde = LW IR 47, 72
  . Other units temporarily attached

1st Army
Commander = GdK Dankl
Chief of Staff = GM Edler von Kochanowski
Had 86 bns, 41 sqdns, 64 batties; 68,003 rifles, 4256 foot, 323
guns

II Corps
Commander = FML Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach
Chief of Staff = Col Graf Szeptycki
. 25 ID (Archduke Peter Ferdinand)
  11 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 9266 foot, 208 horse, 44 guns
  . 49 Inf Bde (Col Edler von Severus) = IR 84, BH IR 1; FJB 25
  . 50 Inf Bde (GM Ritter von Bolberitz) = IR 4; FJB 10, 17, 31
  . Artillery = FKR 6, II Bn/FHR 2
. 4 ID (FML Edler von Stöger-Steiner)
  10 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 8381 foot, 217 horse, 49 guns
  . 7 Inf Bde (Col Schaible) = IR 8, 99
  . (8 Inf Bde in reserve = IR 3, 49)
  . Artillery = I Bn/FHR 2 (FKR 5 detached)
. Under II Corps HQ - 1 bn, 1 sqdn; 540 foot, 98 horse

Ist Corps
Commander = GdK Karl Freiherr von Kirchbach
Chief of Staff = Col Demus
. 5 ID (FML Edler von Habermann)
  12 bns, 4 sqdns, 9 1/2 batties; 9318 foot, 357 horse, 50 guns
  . 9 Inf Bde (Col Wossala) = IR 54, 93
  . 10 Inf Bde (Col Adalbert von Kaltenborn) = IR 1, 13
  . Artillery = FKR 3, I Bn/FHR 1
. 46 LW ID (GM Edler von Brandner)
  18 bns, 3 sqdns, 16 1/4 batties; 14,505 foot, 342 horse,
  70 guns
  . 92 LW Inf Bde (Col Haas) = LW IR 13, 15
  . kk 110 Lst Inf Bde (Col Freisinger) = Lst IR 6, 16, 32
  . Artillery = FKR 2; FK Bn 46, FH Bn 46

Group Martiny
Commander = FML Martiny
Chief of Staff = Captain Hans Ritter von Wittas
. 14 ID (GM Ritter von Willerding, acting for Martiny)
  15 bns, 2 sqdns, 7 1/4 batties; 12,147 foot, 194 horse,
  43 guns
  . 27 Inf Bde (GM Horvath) = IR 71, 72; FJB 11
  . 28 Inf Bde (Col Jenisch) = IR 48, 76; FJB 19
  . Artillery = FKR 14; I Bn/FHR 5
. 106 Landsturm ID (FML Kletter)
  12 bns, 4 sqdns, 7 batties; 7171 foot, 406 horse, 36 guns
  . kk 1 Lst Inf Bde (Col Brauner) = Lst IR 1, 2, 22
  . Col Köckh's Lst Inf Bde = Lst IR 13, 15, 25, 31, 38
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

. Independent 91 LW Inf Bde (GM von Urbanski), with 6 bns, 3 batties; 5835 rifles, 18 guns = LW IR 16, 31, 32
  . 2 Cav Div (FML Ritter von Ziegler)
    1 foot bn, 23 sqdns, 3 batties; 840 foot, 243 horse, 12 guns
    . 3 Cav Bde (GM Freiherr von Abele) = HR 6, 16
    . 16 Cav Bde (GM Freiherr von Diller) = HR 3, 5

4th Army
Commander = GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
Chief of Staff = FML Rudolf Krauss
Had 168 bns, 1 bike bn, 72 sqdns, 160 batties. 106,713 foot, 6513 horse, 798 guns

XVII Corps
Commander = GdI Kritek
Chief of Staff = Col Edler von Lerch
. 121 Inf Bde (Col Edler von Lüftner), with 5 1/2 bns, 1 sqdn, 2 batties; 2600 foot, 100 horse, 28 guns. KJR 1, FJB 27
  . 41 Hon ID (FML Schay)
    12 bns, 2 sqdns, 6 batties; 9300 foot, 195 horse, 27 guns
    . 40 Hon Inf Bde (GM Foglar) = Hon IR 12, 32
    . 82 Hon Inf Bde (GM Schamschula) = Hon IR 20, 31
    . Artillery = Hon FKR 7; attached II Bn/FHR 8

XIV Corps
Commander = FML Roth
Chief of Staff = Col Göttlicher
. 3 ID (FML Edler von Horsetzky)
  14 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 1/2 batties; 8503 foot, 139 horse, 49 guns
    . 5 Inf Bde (Col Edler von Merten) = IR 28, 59
    . 15 Inf Bde (Col Fischer) = IR 14, KJR 2
    . Artillery = FKR 42, II Bn/FHR 14
  . 8 ID (FML von Fabini)
    8 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties; 4827 foot, 224 horse, 64 guns
      . 96 Inf Bde (GM Ritter von Rziha) = KJR 3, 4
      . Artillery = FKR 41, I Bn/FHR 14
  . GERMAN 47 Reserve ID (GLt von Besser)
    13 bns, 1 sqdn, 13 batties; 11,197 foot, 93 horse, 52 guns
      . 97 Res Inf Bde (von Thiesenhausen) = RIR 217, 218
      . 98 Res Inf Bde (von der Heyde) = RIR 219, 220
      . Also - Res Jaeger Bn 19; Res FAR 47
    . Col. Grzesicki's kk Lst Group, with 3 bns from the Cracow garrison; 2108 foot
    . Under XIV Corps HQ - 1 sqdn, 4 1/2 batties; 80 horse, 13 guns

134
XI Corps
Commander = FZM Ljubicic
Chief of Staff = Col Riml
. 11 ID (FML Anton von Bellmond)
   10 1/4 bns, 2 sqdns, 15 batties; 6621 foot, 151 horse, 87 guns
   . 21 Inf Bde (Col Schöナーer) = IR 15, 55
   . 22 Inf Bde (GM Alexander Ritter von Wasserthal) = IR 58, 95
   . Artillery = FKR 33, I Bn/FHR 11
. 15 ID (FML Edler von Schenk)
   9 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 5175 foot, 204 horse, 47 guns
   . 29 Inf Bde (Col von Stanoilovic) = IR 5, 66
   . 30 Inf Bde (Col Leide) = IR 60, 65
   . Artillery = FKR 17, I Bn/FHR 6
. 30 ID (FML Kaiser)
   8 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties; 5330 foot, 227 horse, 54 guns
   . 60 Inf Bde (Col Ritter von Gruber) = IR 30, 80; FJB 24, 30
   . 88 L-Sch Bde (Col von Eckhardt) = L-Sch Regts II, III
   . Artillery = FKR 32, II Bn/FHR 11
. 6 Cav Div (GM Edler von Schwer)
   1 foot bn, 8 sqdns, 3 batties; 1005 foot, 947 horse, 12 guns
   . 14 Cav Bde (Col Leiter) = DR 11, HR 11
   . Lt Col Freiherr von Vever's Detachment, which had 1 foot
detachment, 6 sqdns; 258 foot, 371 guns. Tyrol Mounted Rifle Bn
plus three reserve Uhlan sqdns
Arz's Group (with three sub-commands)...

a) VI Corps
Commander = FML von Arz (his direct command)
Chief of Staff = Col Huber
. 39 Hon ID (FML Hadfy)
   12 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 6713 foot, 280 horse, 57 guns
   . 77 Hon Inf Bde (GM von Molnar) = Hon IR 9, 11
   . 78 Hon Inf Bde (Col Daubner) = Hon IR 10, 16
   . Artillery = FKR 18, Hon FKR 3
. 12 ID (FML Kestranek)
   12 1/4 bns, 2 sqdns, 8 1/2 batties; 9313 foot, 210 horse
   48 guns
   . 23 Inf Bde (Col Ritter von Metz) = IR 56, 100
   . 24 Inf Bde (GM von Puchalski) = IR 3, 20, 57
   . Artillery = FKR 1, II Bn/FHR 1
. 45 LW ID (FML Smekal)
   6 bns, 3 sqdns, 2 batties; 3311 foot, 281 horse, 12 guns
   . 89 LW Inf Bde (Col Gasiecki) = LW IR 18, 33
   . 90 LW Inf Bde (Col Edler von Pattay) = LW IR 17, 34
   . Artillery = FKR 28; FK Bn 45, FH Bn 45
Under VI Corps HQ - 1 sqdn, 1 batty; 73 horse, 4 guns

b) Bartheldy's Group
- 38 Hon ID (FML Bartheldy)
  7 bns, 2 sqdns, 6 1/2 batties; 3520 foot, 172 horse, 32 guns
  - 76 Hon Inf Bde (Lt Col Krusina) = Hon IR 22, 23, 24
  - Artillery = FKR 34, Hon FKR 5
- Combined Hon ID (FML von Kornhaber)
  9 1/2 bns, 1 sqdn, 1 batty; 2778 foot, 86 horse, 6 guns
  - 200 Hon Inf Bde (GM Tanarky) = Hon IR 300, 301, 302

c) IX Corps
Commander = FML Kralicek
Chief of Staff = Col von Krammer
- 10 ID (GM von Mecenseffy)
  10 1/4 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 7713 foot, 237 horse, 55 guns
  - 19 Inf Bde (GM von Iwanski) = IR 36, 98
  - 20 Inf Bde (GM Reymann) = IR 18, 21; FJB 12
  - Artillery = FKR 25, I Bn/FHR 9
- 13 LW ID (FML Edler von Kreysa)
  8 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 6132 foot, 170 horse, 52 guns
  - 25 LW Inf Bde (Col Mader) = LW IR 1, 24
  - 26 LW Inf Bde (GM von Szekely) = LW IR 14, 25
  - Artillery = FKR 4, FK Bn 13, FH Bn 13
- 26 LW ID (FML Lischka)
  9 bns, 3 sqdns, 10 1/2 batties; 7853 foot, 190 horse, 58 guns
  - 51 LW Inf Bde (Col Spielvogel) = LW IR 11, 12
  - 52 LW Inf Bde (Col Meisel) = LW IR 9, 10, 30
  - Artillery = FKR 26, FK Bn 26, FH Bn 26
- 11 Hon Cav Div (GM Graf Bissingen)
  1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 3 1/2 batties; 640 foot, 1200 horse, 14 guns
  - 22 Hon Cav Bde (GM Czito) = Hon HR 2, 3
  - 24 Hon Cav Bde (Col Flohr) = Hon HR 5, 9
- 5 Cav Bde (Col Adler), which had 1 bike bn, 8 sqdns; 160 foot, 883 horse. DR 6, 8

Directly under 4 Army
- IR 88 (2 bns; 1656 foot), FKR 5 (5 batties; 27 guns; moving back to 1st Army)
- Col Pilsudski's Polish Legion, which had 6 bns, 1 sqdn, 1 battery (rebuilding)

3rd Army
Commander = GdI von Boroevic
Chief of Staff = GM von Boog
Had 174 bns, 90 1/2 sqdns, 151 batties. 130,709 foot, 8716
horse, 742 guns

III Corps
Commander = GdI von Colerus
Chief of Staff = Col Richard Müller
. 28 ID (GM Edler von Hinke)
  11 bns, 2 sqdns, 7 batties; 8259 foot, 252 horse, 44 guns
    . 55 Inf Bde (Col Gheri) = IR 87, 97; FJB 20
    . 56 Inf Bde (GM von Haustein) = IR 27, 47; FJB 7
    . Artillery = FKR 8, II Bn/FHR 3
. 22 LW ID (GM Schmidt, Edler von Fussina)
  12 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 8775 foot, 258 horse, 54 guns
    . 43 LW Inf Bde (GM Nemeczek) = LW IR 3, 26
    . 44 LW Inf Bde (Col Zahradniczek) = LW IR 4, 27
    . Artillery = FKR 7; FK Bn 22, FH Bn 22
. 4 Cav Div (GM Berndt)
  1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 3 batties; 410 foot, 1592 horse, 14 guns
    . 18 Cav Bde (Col Kopecek) = DR 9, UR 13
    . 21 Cav Bde (GM Graf Marenzi) = DR 15, UR 1
. Under III Corps HQ - 1 sqdn, 1 batty; 126 horse, 4 guns

VII Corps
Commander = GdK Archduke Joseph
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Eisner-Bubna
. 17 ID (GM von le Beau)
  10 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 7650 foot, 187 horse, 52 guns
    . 34 Inf Bde (Col Freiherr von Henneberg) = Wreckage of IR
      37, 39, 43, 46, 61, 96
    . Artillery = FKR 19, I Bn/FHR 7
. 20 Hon ID (GM von Nagy)
  10 bns, 1 sqdn, 7 batties; 5600 foot, 133 horse, 40 guns
    . 81 Hon Inf Bde (GM Perneczky) = Hon IR 1, 17
    . (39 Hon Inf Bde in reserve = Hon IR 3, 4)
    . Artillery = Hon FKR 8
. 1 Cav Div (GM Freiherr von Peteani)
  1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 4 batties; 357 foot, 1320 horse, 20 guns
    . 6 Cav Bde (GM Mouillard) = HR 7, 14
    . 7 Cav Bde (GM Chevalier de Ruiz) = HR 12 (HR 4 detached)
. Under VII Corps HQ - 2 batties; 8 guns

X Corps
Commander = FML Ritter von Krautwald
Chief of Staff = Col von Kralowetz
. 2 ID (GM Edler von Langer)
  11 1/2 bns, 4 sqdns, 7 batties; 8150 foot, 330 horse, 42 guns
    . 3 Inf Bde (Col Klein) = IR 40; BH IR 4; FJB 4
    . 4 Inf Bde (Col Prusenowsky) = IR 89, 90

137
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

. Artillery = FKR 29, I Bn/FHR 10
. 24 ID (GM Schneider, Edler von Manns-Au)
  7 bns, 3 sqdns, 8 batties; 5587 foot, 163 horse, 46 guns
  . 47 Inf Bde (GM von Unschuld) = IR 9, 45
  . 48 Inf Bde (Col Elder von Vidulovic) = IR 10, 77
  . Artillery = FKR 30, II Bn/FH 10
. 34 ID (GM Ritter von Birkenhain)
  10 bns, 3 sqdns, 2 batties; 6950 foot, 274 horse, 8 guns
  . 67 Inf Bde (GM von Lauingen) = IR 29, 33, 101
  . Artillery = FKR 21
. 43 LW ID (FML Schmidt von Georgenegg)
  13 bns, 2 sqdns; 10,650 foot, 240 horse, 50 guns
  . 59 Inf Bde (GM Kroupa) = IR 24, 41
  . 86 LW Inf Bde (GM Jesser) = LW IR LW IR 20, 22, 36
  . Artillery = FKR 31, FK Bn 43, FH Bn 43
. Under X Corps HQ - 4 batties; 14 guns

Puhallo's Group (with two sub-groups...)

a) XVIII Corps (HQ of 44 LW ID)
Commander = FML von Tschurtschenthaler
Chief of Staff = Major Ritter von Ehrlich
Had 13 bns, 3 sqdns, 11 batties; 8763 foot, 264 horse, 52 guns
  . 122 LW Inf Bde (Col Hentke) = LW IR 2, 21; L-Sch Regt I
  . ku 101 Lst Inf Bde (Col Biffl) = ku Lst IR 20, 31
  . Artillery = FKR 40, FK Bn 44, FH Bn 44

V Corps
Commander = FZM von Puhallo (his immediate command)
Chief of Staff = Col Sallagar
. 33 ID (FML Goglia)
  9 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 6800 foot, 231 horse, 52 guns
  . 65 Inf Bde (GM Czapp) = IR 19, 26
  . 66 Inf Bde (GM Lieb) = IR 12, 83
  . Artillery = FKR 15, II Bn/FHR 5
. 37 Hon ID (FML Wieber)
  13 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 1/2 batties; 10,833 foot, 207 horse, 57 guns
  . 73 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Pogany) = Hon IR 13, 18
  . 74 Hon Inf Bde (GM Hunke) = Hon IR 14, 15
  . Artillery = FKR 13
. Under V Corps HQ - 1 sqdn, 2 batties; 126 horse, 8 guns

Group Szurmay
Commander = FML Szurmay
Chief of Staff = Major Röder
. 7 ID (GM Letovsky)
  14 bns, 3 sqdns, 10 batties; 13,033 foot, 314 horse, 36 guns
14 Inf Bde (GM Baumgartner) = IR 38, 79; FJB 21
71 Inf Bde (Col Plivelic) = IR 37, 68
Artillery = FKR 38
40 Hon ID (FML Plank)
10 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 9392 foot, 210 horse, 40 guns
79 Hon Inf Bde (Col Lengerer) = Hon IR 29 (# 30 detached)
80 Hon Inf Bde (GM Haber) = Hon IR 6, 19
Artillery = 1 Hon FKR
75 Hon Inf Bde (Col Mina), had 7 bns, 1/2 sqdn, 8 batties; 4158 foot, 35 horse, 32 guns = Hon IR 21, 304
ku 128 Lst Inf Bde (Lt Col von Artner), had 6 bns, 1 sqdn, 3 batties; 3900 foot, 82 horse, 15 guns = Hon IR 30 (from 40 Div), ku Lst IR 102
8 Cav Div (FML Edler von Lehmann)
1 foot bn, 12 sqdns, 2 batties; 502 foot, 980 horse, 8 guns
13 Cav Bde (GM Freiherr von Leonhardi) = DR 7, UR 8
15 Cav Bde (Col Freiherr von Klingspor) = DR 2, UR 11
ku 1st Lst Hussar Bde (Col Freiherr von Bothmer), had 6 sqdns, 1/2 batty; 924 horse, 2 guns = ku Lst HR 1, 2

XIX Corps (in Army reserve, with just one division)
Commander = FML Trollmann
Chief of Staff = Col Günste
29 ID (GM Zanantoni)
14 bns, 4 sqdns, 11 batties; 10,940 foot, 48 horse, 44 guns
57 Inf Bde (Col Wöllner) = IR 42, 92; FJB 28
58 Inf Bde (GM Poleschensky) = IR 74, 94; FJB 23
Artillery = FKR 27, II Bn/FHR 9

German South Army
Commander = GdI von Linsingen
Chief of Staff = GM von Stolzmann
Had 81 bns, 47 sqdns, 67 batties. 48,565 foot, 4854 horse, 325 guns

k.u.k. Corps Hofmann
Commander = FML Hofmann
Chief of Staff = Col Graf Lamezan
55 ID (GM Fleischmann)
13 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties; 8650 foot, 254 horse, 44 guns
129 Inf Bde (GM Drda) = Combined Hon March IR 1, 2; Ist Ukraine Volunteer Bn
130 Inf Bde (Col Witoszynski) = Combined LW March IR 35; II Ukraine Volunteer Bn
Artillery = Miscellaneous batteries
GERMAN 1 ID (GLt von Conta)
12 bns, 1 sqdn, 14 batties; 7500 foot, 96 horse, 80 guns
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

1 Inf Bde (Wedel) = IR 1, 41
2 Inf Bde (Paschen) = IR 3, 43
Also = UR 8; FAR 16, 52
k.u.k. 131 Inf Bde (Col Andreas Berger), had 7 bns, 4 1/2 batties; 5180 foot, 18 guns = FJB 32; Hon March IR 17, 19; LW March IR 19

GERMAN XXIV Reserve Corps
Commander = GdI von Gerok
Chief of Staff = GM von Mutius
k.u.k. 19 ID (GM Richard Mayer)
14 bns, 2 sqdns, 8 batties; 9340 foot, 180 horse, 44 guns
37 Inf Bde (GM von Richard) = IR 35, 75; LW IR 29
38 Inf Bde (Col Steiger) = BH IR 1; FJB 5, 6, 22
Artillery = FKR 22, II Bn/FHR 8
GERMAN 48 Res ID (GLt von Hahn)
13 bns, 1 sqdns, 11 batties; 6380 foot, 146 horse, 62 guns
95 Res Inf Bde (Puttkamer) = RIR 221, 222
96 Res Inf Bde (Stehr) = RIR 223, 224
Also = Res Jaeger Bn 48, Res FAR 48
k.k. 12 Lst Territorial Bde (Col Burggasser), had 11 bns, 3 1/2 batties; 4680 foot, 15 guns (units unknown)

Divisions directly under Army HQ...
PRUSSIAN 3 Guard ID (GdK Freiherr Marschall)
9 bns, 1 sqdn, 8 batties; 5520 foot, 78 horse, 38 guns
Gd Fusilier, Gd Lehr Regts; attached IR 9; Gd FAR 5, 6
k.u.k. 10 Cav Div (GM Graf Herberstein)
1 foot bn, 16 sqdns, 3 batties; 475 foot, 1600 horse, 12 guns
4 Cav Bde (Col von Horthy) = HR 10, 13
8 Cav Bde (GM Viktor von Bauer) = HR 9, UR 12
GERMAN 5 Cav Div (GLt von Heydebreck)
1 foot bn, 24 sqdns, 3 batties; 840 foot, 2500 horse, 12 guns
9 Cav Bde (Bredow) = DR 4, UR 10
11 Cav Bde (Wentzky) = CR 1, DR 8 (CR = Cuirassiers)
12 Cav Bde (Lepel) = HR 4, 6

Armeegruppe Pflanzer
Commander = GdK Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin
Chief of Staff = Col von Soos
Had 72 1/2 bns, 23 1/2 sqdns, 44 batties. 52,259 foot, 2501 horse, 191 guns

Immediately available...
6 ID (FML Fürst Schönburg)
9 bns, 3 sqdns, 9 batties, 8132 foot, 3137 horse, 49 guns
11 Inf Bde (Col Hubinger) = IR 7, 17
. 12 Inf Bde (Col Rudolf Müller) = BH IR 2; FJB 8, 9
. Artillery = FKR 9, I Bn/FHR 3
. 54 ID (FML von Schultheisz)
  14 bns, 3 sqdns, 8 1/2 batties; 5366 foot, 269 horse, 36 guns
  . k.u. 126 Lt Inf Bde (GM von Salomon) = ku Lst IR 29, one
    bn of Hon IR 29; four Lst bns
  . FML Ritter von Durski's Polish Legion = Legion IR 2, 3
    plus its own artillery
  . Artillery = Miscellaneous batteries
. FML Ritter von Schreitter's Group (composition uncertain)
  14 bns, 4 sqdns, 3 1/2 batties; 9050 foot, 436 horse, 14 guns
  . GM von Lilienhoff's Bde
  . And ??
. 123 Inf Bde (Col Latzin), had 4 bns (three LW, one Etappen),
  1/2 sqdn; 2100 foot, 35 horse
. Lt Col Bekesi's Group (remnants of k.u. 7 Lst Etappen Bde), had
  1 1/2 bns (717 foot)

Approaching...

a) XIII Corps
Commander = GdI Freiherr von Rhemen
Chief of Staff = Col Alfred von Zeidler
. 36 ID (FML Czibulka)
  15 bns, 2 sqdns, 9 batties; 11,070 foot, 240 horse, 36 guns
  . 13 Inf Bde (GM Stracker) = IR 52, 78
  . 72 Inf Bde (Col Edler von Luxardo) = IR 16, 53
  . Artillery = FKR 39, II Bn/FHR 13
. 42 Hon ID (GM Graf Salis-Seewis)
  14 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties; 14,930 foot, 252 horse, 40 guns
  . 83 Hon Inf Bde (Col Mihaljevic) = Hon IR 25, 26
  . 84 Hon Inf Bde (Col Petrovic) = Hon IR 27, 28
  . Artillery = FKR 37, I Bn/FHR 13
. Under XIII Corps HQ - 1 sqdn, 2 batties; 100 horse, 8 guns

b) 5 Hon Cav Div (GM Freiherr von Apor)
  1 foot bn, 7 sqdns, 2 batties; 894 foot, 652 horse, 8 guns
  . 19 Hon Cav Bde (Col von Jony) = Hon HR 1, 8
  . (23 Hon Cav Bde in reserve; had Hon HR 6, 7)
c) Rittmeister Freiherr von Vivenot's Streifkorps, of 200 horse

Fortress garrisons

a) Przemysl (under siege)
Commander = GdI von Kusmanek
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Hubert
Had 42 bns 6 sqdns, 18 mobile batties, 8 fort arty bns. About
50,000 foot, 800 horse and 108 mobile guns
  . 23 Hon ID (FML Arpad von Tamasy)
    . 45 Hon Inf Bde (GM Seide) = Hon IR 2, 5
    . 46 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Letay) = Hon IR 7, 8
    . Artillery = Hon FKR 2
  . Independent brigades
    . 85 LW Inf Bde (GM Komma) = LW IR 19, 35
    . k.k. 93 Lst Inf Bde (GM Kaltneker) = kk Lst IR 19, 35
    . k.u. 97 Lst Inf Bde (GM Weeber) = ku Lst IR 9, 10, 11, 16
    . k.k. 108 Lst Inf Bde (Col Martinek) = kk Lst IR 21, Tyrol
    Lst IR II
    . k.k. 111 Lst Inf Bde (GM Waitzendorfer) = kk Lst IR 17,
    18, 33, 34

b) Cracow
Commander = FML Kuk
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Edler von Haller
Had 20 bns, 7 mobile batties, 9 1/2 fort arty bns. 13,950 foot,
42 mobile guns. (Details lacking)

Strength totals

a) The field armies - 695 bns, 1 bike bn, 355 sqdns, 577 batties.
489,294 foot, 36,446 horse, 2865 guns
b) Fortress garrisons - 62 bns, 6 sqdn, 25 mobile batties, 17 1/2
fort arty bns. 63,950 foot, 800 horse, 150 mobile guns
c) Grand total - 757 bns, 1 bike bn, 361 sqdns, 602 batties,
17 1/2 fort arty bns. 553,244 foot, 37,246 horse, 3015 mobile
guns

B. Changes through 30 April 1915

. 31 Jan-1 Feb - Bde Phleps (soon = Bde Bolzano) created from IR
81 and 88 of 4 Army, and joined 3 Army
. 1 Feb - 1 Lst Inf Bde left 106 ID (of 1 Army)
. 4 Feb - 1 Lst Inf Bde joined 3 Army
. 5 Feb - VIII Corps HQ with 9 & 21 ID joined 3 Army from the
Balkans
. 6 Feb - 2 Army HQ and 27 ID left Woyrsch AG (AG Kövess took
over from 2 Army); XVII Corps HQ with 11 & 45 ID left 4 Army
. 7 Feb - Lst Hussar Bn # 7 joined 1 Army; XVII Corps HQ with 11
and 45 ID joined 3 Army
. 10 Feb - 10 CD left GERMAN South Army for Group Pflanzer
. 10-16 Feb - Six Landsturm bns joined 4 Army (as Group
Morgenstern)
. 11 Feb - 41 ID left 4 Army
. 12 Feb - 32 ID left Woyrsch's Group
. 15 Feb -
  . 5 ID left 1 Army to join Group Pflanzer; all the following
  left 3 Army - XIX Cps HQ (29 & 34 ID), V, VIII & XVIII Cps
  HQ, Szurmay Group, 9 ID
  . 2 Army HQ entered line in Carpathians with following OB:
    XIX Corps (29, 34, 41 ID), IV Corps (31, 32, 43 ID), XVIII
    Corps (9, 44 ID), VIII Corps (no troops), V Corps (27, 33,
    37 ID), Group Szurmay (7, 40 ID; 8 CD, 1 Lst Hussar Bde)
  . Around 15 Feb (?) the 13 ID left 4 Army to join 2 Army
. 16 Feb - IV Corps and 31 ID left Woyrsch's Group; 38 ID left 4
Army
. 17 Feb - 5 CD left Group Pflanzer to join GERMAN South Army
  (but soon returned to Pflanzer)
. 18 Feb - 106 ID left 1 Army
. 20 Feb - 106 ID joined 4 Army; 5 CD left GERMAN South Army to
  rejoin Group Pflanzer
. 21 Feb - 38 ID joined 2 Army
. 22 Feb - XI Corps HQ with 15 & 30 ID left 4 Army to join Group
  Pflanzer
. 24 Feb - 1 Polish Legion Bde joined 1 Army
. 25 Feb - 4 GERMAN CD joined South Army
. 28 Feb - 5 GERMAN CD left South Army to join Group Pflanzer

. 1 March - 6 CD left 4 Army to join Group Pflanzer
. 3 March - 14 ID left 1 Army; 41 ID joined 2 Army
. 22 March - 26 ID left 4 Army & joined 3 Army
. 23 March - 8 CD left 2 Army to join Group Pflanzer
. 25 March - IR # 28 and Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 4 joined 3 Army
. 27 March - 1 Lst Hussar Bde left 2 Army to join 3 Army
. 30 March - 35 GERMAN Res ID left Woyrsch AG; 4 GERMAN CD joined
  South Army
. 31 March - GERMAN Beskid Cps (4 ID, 35 Res ID) joined 3 Army

. 2 April - Szurmay Group (7, 38, 40 ID; 128 Bde) left 2 Army to
  join GERMAN South Army
. 7 April - 51 ID left 4 Army to join 2 Army
. 25 April - Components of new Szende Bde (IR # 62 and 82 plus 8
  Sqdn/UR # 2) left Woyrsch's Group and joined 4 Army
. 29 April - Components of new ID Stöger-Steiner left 1 Army
. 30 April - New ID Stöger-Steiner joined 4 Army

C. Summary of German Units in the East

For each major formation, the first entry shows the units as of
late January 1915, followed by gains and losses during the rest
of the period through the end of April. Units are arranged roughly from the left (north) to right (south) flanks.

a) Under German OHL

10th Army
- Tilsit Group (of 4 bns, 3 sqdns and 4 1/2 batteries); 5 Gd Inf Bde, 1 Cav Div, 16 (Königsberg) LW ID; XXI (31 & 42 ID), XXXIX Res (77 & 78 Res ID) and XXXVIII Res Corps (75 & 76 Res ID)
  - GAINS
    - In Feb - I Corps (just 2 ID), XL Res Corps (79 & 80 Res ID)
    - In March - 6 Cav Div
    - In April - Bavarian Cav Div
  - LOSSES
    - In Feb - XXXVIII Res Corps (75 & 76 Res ID), half of 2 ID
    - In March - I Corps HQ, 78 Res ID, 5 Gd Inf Bde, half of 2 ID

8th Army
- 10 LW ID, 3 Res ID, 1 LW ID, I Corps (2 ID, 11 LW ID), XL Res Corps (79 & 80 Res ID), 4 Cav Div, 3 Cav Div; some Landwehr (3 1/2 bns, 1 sqdn and 2 batteries)
  - GAINS (in Feb) - XX Corps (just 41 ID), XXXVIII Res Corps (just 75 Res ID)
  - LOSSES
    - In Feb - XX Corps (just 41 ID), I Corps (just 2 ID), 4 Cav Div, 9 LW Inf Bde
    - In March - XXXVIII Res Corps, 3 Cav Div

Group Gallwitz
- Initial organization....
  - Group Scholtz - XX Corps (37 & 41 ID), Corps Zastrow (Divs Wernitz & Breugel, plus Bde Pfeil), 2 Cav Div
  - Other - Ist Gd Reserve Corps, Corps Dickhuth
  - GAINS
    - In Feb - I Res Corps (1 & 36 Res ID), 21 LW Inf Bde; 3 & 6 6 Cav Divs; 9 LW Inf Bde
    - In March - XIII Corps (just 26 ID), I Corps (2 ID plus 5 Gd Inf Bde), 76 & 78 Res ID; 11 Res Inf Bde
  - LOSSES
    - In Feb - XX Corps (just 41 ID)
    - In March - 76 Res ID, 6 Cav Div
    - In April - 78 Res ID; 11 & 70 Res Inf Bdes

9th Army
- Group Beseler (21 LW Inf Bde, Group Westernhagen, and III Res Corps [over 5 & 6 Res ID]), XIII Corps (or Group Fabeck - over 26 ID & 25 Res ID), XVII Corps (35 & 36 ID), Group Morgan (was HQ of
I Res Corps, over 4 Cav Div and 49, 1 & 36 Res ID), Group Scheffer (led XI Corps [22 & 38 ID] and XXV Corps [50 Res ID, 8 Cav Div]), Group Frommel (led Posen Corps, Div Menges, and Richthofen's Cav Corps [latter had 6 & 9 Cav Divs])

GAINS
- In late Jan - 3 A-H Cav Div
- In April - VIII Res Corps (15 & 16 Res ID)

LOSSES
- In Feb - 3 A-H Cav Div, I Res Corps (1 & 36 Res ID), 21 LW Inf Bde, 11 Res Inf Bde; 3, 4 & 6 (German) Cav Divs
- In March - XIII Corps (just 26 ID), 25 Res ID
- In April - 6 Res ID

b) Under the Austrian A.O.K.

Army Detachment Woyrsch, over...
- 2nd A-H Army - The only Germans it contained were the Gallwitz Corps HQ, which actually commanded A-H units (their 27 & 35 ID)
- Group Woyrsch - 3 & 4 LW ID; Bredow's LW ID; 35 Res ID (On 30 March, 35 Res ID transferred to the Beskid Corps, below)

1st A-H Army - All Austrian troops
4th A-H Army - Mostly A-H troops, plus 47 German Res ID
3rd A-H Army - Originally had all A-H troops; on 31 March gained the German "Beskid" Corps (4 ID; 25 & 35 Res ID)

2nd A-H Army - All Austrian troops

German Army of the South
- GAINS (on 25 Feb) - 4 (German) Cav Div
- LOSSES (on 30 March) - 4 (German) Cav Div

Pflanzer-Baltin's AH Army - All Austrian troops

D. Summary of Russian Units

This is derived from the Hungarian Official History; the list of units at the end of January is followed by the "gains and losses" of each command through the end of April. (Most material is from the Hungarian official history, and at a couple points was untranslatable).

NORTHWEST FRONT (Ruszky)
10 Army (Sievers)
  . III [56 & 73], XX [27, 28, 29, 53], XXVI [64, 84], III Sib [7 & 8 Sib; 57 ID], XXII [1, 2, 3, 4 Finn Bdes]; 68 ID, 1 & 3 CD; 1st Indep Cav Bde
  . Gains - II [26 & 43 ID; from 1 Army], Gd Cav Corps [1 & 2 Gd CD, from 4 Army]
  . Losses - XX (to the rear to rebuild), XXII (to 8, then 11 Armies); 57 ID (to 12 Army)

12 Army (Plehve)
  . I Turk [11 Sib Div; 1 & 2 Turk Bdes], IV Sib [9 & 10 Sib]; 77 ID, 5 CD, half of 2 CD; I Cav [6, 8 & 15 CD]; Erdeli Cav Corps [14 CD, 4 Don Coss]; 4 CD; 4 Indep Cav Bde
  . Gains - I [2 & 24; from 5 Army], Guard [1 & 2 Gd ID, from 2 Army], V [7 & 10; from 5 Army]; 3 Turk Bde (from 1 Army); III Cauc [21 & 52; from 4 Army]; XV [6 & 8; from Stavka reserves]; 57 ID (from 10 Army)
  . Losses (all to 1st Army) - I Turk, I Cav, Erdeli Cav Corps; 77 ID

1 Army (Litvinov)
  . V Sib [6 Sib; 50 & 79], II [26 & 43], II Cauc [Cauc Gren, 51, 1 Cauc Rifle Bde], I Sib [1 & 2 Sib]; 3 Turk Bde, Cauc Cav Div, Gd Coss Div
  . Gains - I Turk [11 Sib Div; 1 & 2 Turk Bdes; from 12 Army], XXIII [3 Gd & 62; from 5 Army], II Sib [4 & 5 Sib; from 2 Army]; XIX [17 & 38; from 5 Army], XXVII [63 & 76; from 2 Army]; 77 ID (from 12 Army); I Cav [6, 8 & 15 CD; from 12 Army]; 14 CD and 4 Don Coss Div (both from 12 Army)
  . Losses - II Corps (to 10 Army)

2 Army (Smirnov)
  . Combined VI & VI Sib Corps [25, 55 & 59 ID; 3 & 14 Sib], II Sib [4 & 5 Sib], XXVII [63 & 76], Guard [1 & 2 Gd ID; Gd Rifle Bde]; independent - 4, 16, 67 ID; 13 Sib; also a combined Inf Div; probably also 2 & 5 Cav Divs
  . Gains - None
  . Losses - Guard (to 12 Army), II Sib (to 1 Army), XXVII (to 1 Army)

5 Army (Churin)
  . I [22 & 24 ID], IV [30 & 40 ID], XXIII [3 Gd; half of 2 ID; 62 ID, 1 Rifle Bde (however, latter is listed twice)]; XIX [17 & 38 ID], V [7 & 10 ID]; 5 Don Coss Div
  . Gains - None
  . Losses - I (to 12 Army), V (to 12 Army), XXIII (to 1 Army), XIX (to 1 Army)
SOUTHWEST FRONT (Ivanov)

4 Army (Evert)
. XIV [18 & 45], XIV [41 & 47], Gren [1 & 2 Gren], III Cauc [21 & 52]; 1 & 2 Rifle Bdes (but 1 R.B. listed twice?); Gd Cav [1 & 2 Gd CD]; 13 CD; Ural Coss Div; 1 Transbaikal Coss Bde
. Gains - None
. Losses - 2 Rifle Bde (to 9 Army), III Cauc (to 12 Army), Gd Cav Corps (to 10 Army)

9 Army (Letschitzky)
. XXV [3 Gren & 46], XVIII [23 & 37], XVII [3 & 35]; 75 & 80 ID; Gd Rifle Bde; 1 CD (doubtful!); 1 Don Coss Div, Gd Cav Bde
. Gains - None
. Losses - 9 Army HQ transferred from sector; XVII (to 8 Army); XVIII (departed with 9 Army HQ; Corps then commanded 37 & 80 ID)

3 Army (Dimitriev)
. IX [5 & 42], XXI [33 & 40], X [9 & 31], XI [32 & 74]; 61 & 70 ID; 7 & 16 Cav Divs
. Gains - XXIV [48 & 49; from 8 Army], XII [12 & 19; 12 Sib; from 8 Army]; 3 Rifle Bde (from 8 Army); Maradvanyai Combined Corps, which became XXIX [had just 81 ID; from 11 Army]; 2 Comb Coss Div (from 8 Army)
. Losses (all to 8 Army) - XI Corps; 33, 42, 44, 70 & 74 ID

8 Army (Brussilov)
. XXIV [48 & 49], XII [12 & 19; 12 Sib Div, 3 Rifle Bde], VII [11, 13, 14, 15], VII [34, 65, 69; 4 Rifle Bde]; 60 ID; 10, 11 & 12 CD; Tuzemnaya (?) Coss Div; 2 Comb Coss Div; also XXIX & XXX Corps ??
. Gains - XI [32 ID only; from 3 Army], XVII [3 & 35 ID; from 9 Army]; XXII [1, 2, 3, 4 Finn Bdes; from 11 Army]; 33, 42, 44, 70 & 74 ID (all from 3 Army); XXVIII [58 ID only; from 11 Army]
. Losses - XXIV (to 3 Army), XII (to 3 Army), 2 Comb Coss Div (to 3 Army), XI [with 11, 32 & 74 ID; to 9 Army], Tuzemnaya Coss Div (to 9 Army), 12 CD (to 9 Army), VII (to 11 Army), XXII (to 11 Army)

11 Army (Selivanov)
. Przemysl Group - XXVIII & Maradvanyai (XXIX) Corps, over 58, 81 & 82 ID plus 9 CD and some opolcheniye
. Dniester Group - XXX [71 & 78], 2 Kuban Coss & 1 Terek Coss Divs
. Gains - XXII [1, 2, 3 & 4 Finn Rifle Bdes; from 10 Army], VII (from 8 Army), XXII (from 8 Army)
Losses - XXX (to 9 Army), XXII (to 8 Army); 1 Terek Coss (to 9 Army); XXVIII [just 58 ID; to 8 Army], XXIX [just 81 ID; to 3 Army]; 82 ID (to 9 Army)

New OB of 9 Army (after it moved to the left flank)
  XI [11, 32, 74], XXX [71 ID only], XVIII [37 & 80; 2 Rifle Bde], XXXII [over opolcheniye bdes], II Cav [12 CD, Tuzenmaya Coss Div], III Cav [1 Terek Coss, 11 CD, 1 Kuban Coss, 1 Don Coss]

5. The Russian plans

Since the conference of Russian commanders at Siedlec on 29 November, the Tsar's forces had suffered further major losses. In an evaluation prepared in mid-January, the General-Quartermaster of the Stavka, Danilov, stated that a half million soldiers would be needed to bring the diminished units back to their authorized size. The ammunition columns needed 200,000 shells to achieve their normal allocation.

However, Danilov believed that a defeat at the front wouldn't happen. Moreover, he even thought that decisive operations were possible before the deficiencies mentioned above were made good (hopefully this would begin to happen in the second half of February, but wouldn't be complete until April). He said that it was now important to make a firm decision regarding the goals of the next operations. The Russians could either:
  1. exploit the successes they had won in Galicia in the second half of Galicia, at the expense of the Aus-Hung. Army, or
  2. devote all their efforts to an offensive toward Berlin in accordance with the over-all Entente plans.

Danilov felt that it was impossible to pursue both goals at once, and in his analysis he listed the disadvantages of concentrating against Austria. Although an advance toward Vienna or Budapest looked tempting, it would have to significantly weaken the Russian center; then any units which penetrated deep into the interior of the Danube Monarchy couldn't be recalled in time to fend off a German thrust toward the east. Anyway, was it possible to quickly destroy the Austrians and Hungarians? Danilov doubted this; a campaign toward Vienna would take months. When it was concluded the task of winning the war with Germany

---

103This section is based on Danilov (Chapter XIII) and on Nesnamov (Vol. III, pp. 35-51)
would still be unfinished. The General's conclusion, therefore, was that the Russians should concentrate their strength against their primary opponent. The best way to do this, as he had pointed out earlier, was to mount a new attack against East Prussia before opening the great offensive to Breslau and Berlin.

After receiving this analysis, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch asked Danilov to discuss it with the commander of the Northwest Front. Their meeting took place at Siedlec on 17 January. After a long exchange of views, General Ruszky and his staff adopted Danilov's ideas. A new 12th Army, with ten divisions, would attack into East Prussia from Pultusk-Ostrolenka toward Soldau-Ortelsburg; 10th Army would support the operation. The Russian units west of the Vistula, of course, would pin down the Germans on their front. The Grand Duke approved the plan. On the next day orders were issued to create 12th Army, which was placed under General Plehve.

The HQ of the Southwest Front had different ideas. General Ivanov held stubbornly to his conviction that the success already won against the Aus-Hung. forces in Galicia should be exploited until the enemy army was completely destroyed. He even dreamed of concluding a separate peace with Hungary, and reckoned that this would bring Romania into the war on the side of the Entente. Based on his evaluation of the enemy deployment along the entire Carpathian front from the Dukla road to the vicinity of Dorna Watra, he disdained remaining on the defensive. Instead, on 20 January he had already told his subordinates that he intended to break through the mountain wall into the Hungarian plain. His Chief of Staff, Alexeiev, didn't fully share Ivanov's convictions. He believed that an attack in the Tomaszow-Piotrkow-Noworadomsk area of west Poland promised greater success because the allied line there was thin and could be broken through. However, the unfavorable condition of the Russian Armies in the Tomaszow sector, especially their lack of artillery ammunition, caused the Stavka to turn down Alexiev's plan.

Ivanov was alert to the danger that threatened the left wing of his 8th Army from the direction of Ungvar and Munkacs. Along the 250 kilometer front between the Uzsok Pass and the point where Austria, Russia and Romania came together there were just four Russian divisions plus some militia troops. Ivanov therefore asked to be reinforced by four more divisions in the area Sambor-Stryj-Dolina. In response, on 26 January the Stavka reluctantly ordered the XXII (Finnish) Corps to be sent from 10th Army to the Southwest Front.
It seems that the energy which the Grand Duke had displayed in late autumn had begun to wane after the failure of his much-touted "steamroller." Instead of forcefully using his authority as supreme commander, he now seemed to regard his role as that of a mediator between the disparate views of his two Front commanders. In his memoirs, Danilov later sought to excuse the hesitancy of his boss on the grounds that the responsibilities of the Stavka had been inadequately defined by the government. At any rate, the conflict between the Northwest and Southwest Fronts now became a factor that had a negative affect on all operations.

Ivanov continued to implement his own plans without reference to the Stavka. He entrusted General Brussilov with preparing an offensive toward Eperjes-Kaschau-Csap. The 3rd Army would extend its own left wing to support the 8th; similarly the 11th Army would spread its troops out as far as the Romanian border. The components of the latter Army in the Carpathians (unlike those around Przemysl) were under Brussilov's control for operational purposes. Meanwhile all the mountain batteries on the Polish front were ordered to transfer to the Carpathians; these were the only batteries that still had a full supply of ammunition.

Since the offensive into East Prussia was also still on the agenda, Ivanov's attack toward Budapest presented the very danger that Danilov had warned against in his analysis: Russian strength was being split between two objectives. Perhaps this was due in part to some advice offered by French General Joffre. He told the Russians that if they couldn't advance in Poland due to shortage of ammunition they should at least continue to pursue the enemy in Galicia, because lack of artillery support was less important in mountain terrain.\footnote{Joffre's suggestion to the Russian military attaché Ignatiev is mentioned in Danilov, "Grossfürst Nikolai Nikolajewitsch. Sein Leben und Wirken" (Berlin, 1929), p. 133}

When the 8th Army began to implement Ivanov's latest plans on 25 and 26 January, however, the offensive of their opponents had already begun.

6. The offensive begins and breaks down

a. The attack of 3rd and South Armies, 23-26 January

The Carpathians as a battleground

Hitherto military theorists had taught that mountain zones like...
the Carpathians were areas to march through, but not to fight in. When the k.u.k. high command decided to undertake the tremendous task of an offensive here, they were certain that their units would quickly gain ground, overcome all obstacles, and soon reach the maneuver area of Galicia. However, the attempt to move forward the 3rd and South Armies (more than 20 infantry divisions - 175,000 riflemen and almost 1000 guns) involved great problems; fighting in the mountains in winter proved to be a much more questionable prospect than had been anticipated. The demands on the troops were extraordinarily great, almost unprecedented in military history. The offensive was to be carried out by a people's army whose striking force had already been drastically impaired, as described earlier. Its soldiers, who came from the most diverse social classes and professions (and included only a relatively small contingent of men from mountainous districts) were expected to fight day and night through heavy snow on icy, almost impassable heights; they were engaged without any prospect of any prolonged rest periods. The majority of the troops lacked the physical stamina needed for this trial.

It soon became evident that the debilitating effects of the weather and the rapid exhaustion of the men during the strenuous advance up mountains and down valleys took a greater toll than the fire of the Russians. The removal of the sick and wounded, in particular, was an almost insuperable problem. These conditions made the operation a ghastly folly. Attempts were made to mitigate the miserable condition of the Carpathian fighters by providing a great amount of winter gear of all types and well-organized routes for bringing up supplies and fresh troops.\textsuperscript{105} Despite all these efforts, however, the material preparation of the Army for a winter campaign remained a hasty improvisation. Unlike the Russians, our artillery at last had a complete supply of ammunition; however, the snow made it very difficult to move and deploy the guns. Thus the infantry was once more insufficiently supported by its sister weapon. Many batteries were simply left behind during the initial deployment and only later were hauled up to the front. Because of great differences in elevation and deep snow that in some places was impassable, troops marching overland and on the back roads could cover only 3 to 4 km per day, even when not engaged. Their unavoidable snail's pace gave the Russian commanders time to move reinforcements through the more accessible Galician foothills to plug holes in the line and quickly construct new defensive lines.

\textsuperscript{105}The front was provided with a great number of sheep's wool overcoats, fur wrappings, snow caps, mittens, warm under clothing, knee-length stockings, and rubber boots.
Moreover, since the northern side of the Carpathian water shed was relatively more thickly settled, the Russian troops could more easily find shelter than their opponents on the other side of the mountains. When our troops began to advance on 23 January, their physical condition was already weakened during their long stay in an area that was totally devoid of resources.

The first actions

In the first days of the campaign, FZM Puhallo's Group of 3rd Army thrust northeast toward Usztrzyki Dl., in the gap between Brussilov's east wing - which was hanging back - and the Russian units around the Uzsok Pass. Initially they were opposed almost solely by the cavalry of General Khan Narchiczewanski, and therefore gained ground rather quickly. However, Puhallo's right wing didn't reach its objectives, which was due more to the difficult terrain than to the enemy, who at the outset was heavily outnumbered. FML Szurmay's Group, his neighbor on the right, was ordered to attack the Uzsok Pass from the southwest and west; after capturing the heights around the Pass they would send forces through Tiha and Libuchora to support the South Army's attempt to open the Verecke Pass. It was not until the 26th that Szurmay was able to drive away the Russian 34 ID and parts of 65 ID, and to advance some distance through Uzsok Pass; on this day, however, he was still unable to take the heights at Borynia as instructed by the AOK. This initial success was considerably assisted by support on both flanks:

1. On the right the 40 Hon ID made an enveloping movement through Tiha and N. Rosztoka; because these towns are a considerable distance south of the Pass, it took some time for the maneuver to take effect; and
2. On the left the 66 Inf Bde from Puhallo's Group thrust through Wolosate, as ordered by 3rd Army, toward the heights at the Pass. The 66 Bde was placed under Szurmay, who in return gave up 71 Inf Bde to Army HQ, which deployed it as a reserve at Wolosate.

Since a gap had now developed between Szurmay's and Puhallo's Groups, on the 25th the HQ of 3rd Army briefly halted 33 ID (minus its detached 66 Bde) and 37 Hon ID. The 71 Inf Bde was sent to Puhallo's right wing and replaced 66 Bde under 33 ID. The 33rd then continued to advance, driving away weak enemy units. The enemy still refused for a while to give up Lutowiska to 37 Hon ID. The 44 LW ID on Puhallo's left had already reached the Chrewt area on the 23rd; from this point it sent a strong detachment to the west bank of the Solinka to assist the attack of Krautwald's 43 LW ID toward Baligrod by enveloping the defenders. Since this operation made it necessary to coordinate
the activity of the two divisions, on the 25th the 43 LW ID was placed in Puhallo's group; they entered Baligrod the next day without encountering any further resistance. FML Krautwald had been instructed to begin a decisive attack with a strong left wing as soon as Puhallo's advance became effective; thus he attacked the main enemy position with his remaining three divisions (34, 24 and 2 ID). The 34 ID exhausted itself in a vain attack on both sides of the Beskid road. Its troops had to halt just a few kilometers from their starting point to await a favorable turn in the fighting in other sectors; day and night they were exposed to the snow with only cold tinned food to eat. The two divisions on their left had the task of pushing back the Russians east of Czeremcha to secure the western flank of the assault group. Despite an initial success, the 2 ID had heavy losses and was forced to pull its left wing back to the crest on the border. (The Division had 8150 riflemen when the attack started, but by the 25th was reduced to just 6130.) 24 ID was able only to hold its ground in actions which surged back and forth. Krautwald seemed to have little prospect of continuing his attack without reinforcements. GdI Boroevic, however, wanted to commit the Army's reserve (29 ID) to the more important east wing; therefore on the 25th he ordered Krautwald to just stay in place, while avoiding frontal attacks. Despite his original instructions, he should only seek success if he had an opportunity to do easily.

The original task of the Groups of Archduke Joseph (VII Corps plus 1 CD) and Colerus (22 LW ID, 28 ID and 4 CD) was merely to pin down the enemy; 3rd Army HQ would decide when they should join the attack. In the Archduke's Group, 20 Hon ID was engaged in support of the actions of 2 ID from the 23rd, but couldn't break through to Czeremcha. On the 26th, the Russians themselves attacked energetically west of the Dukla road. Initially they drove 17 ID back, but the Division then held on gallantly to a position farther back and prevented any further enemy advance. 3rd Army HQ asked GdI Colerus to relieve the Archduke by thrusting against the west flank of the Russians who were besetting him. This idea soon had to be abandoned, however, because on the 26th the Russians also fell upon the right wing of III Corps; they took the Pilipinski vrch from 22 LW ID and these important heights could not be recovered.

3rd Army's neighbors

As the offensive was beginning, 4th Army HQ proposed to 3rd Army that the inner wings of their two forces should work together to evict the Russians from the area around Banica; this maneuver,
which had failed in early January, would now be helpful in support of the larger offensive. However, Boroevic naturally believed that the attack by his east wing and center was more important, and that any advance by the west wing was a minor concern. Therefore, he responded that III Corps would merely block any enemy movement from Zmigrod. As the offensive progressed, the Russians would have to evacuate Banica anyway. The AOK made a similar decision on 24 January.

On the right of 3rd Army, the German South army opened the offensive of its western group - Hofmann's Corps - on both sides of the roads to Tucholka and Tuchla on 23 January. By the 26th, the area around Vezerszallas had been secured, and progress was also made in the direction of Volovec. The Russians launched powerful counterattacks, but were unable to recover these positions from Hofmann's gallant soldiers.

As noted earlier, Linsingen's eastern group - XXIV Res Corps - postponed its initial attack by 24 hours. Then the enemy was assaulted in a pincers operation:

1. The German 48 Res ID and k.k. 12 Lst Terr Bde moved toward the north and northeast on both sides of the road leading to the Wyszkow Pass but particularly on the left (western) side; and
2. The k.u.k. 19 ID advanced toward the northwest in the direction of the road (while a detachment was sent northeast toward the Beskid defile and Ludwikowka).

The Russians were very active in opposing XXIV Res Corps, but here also their counterattacks were shattered.

The turning point of the offensive

The commander of the Russian Southwest Front, as always, was convinced that a thrust was the best parry. He decided to exploit the current situation by having the main body of his 8th Army attack the center and west wing of Boroevic's Army; if successful, this would also force all the allied units stationed farther east in the Carpathians to fall back. A Russian radio broadcast several days later made it clear that Brussilov would carry out this decision by sending his VIII Corps to the line Mezőlaborcz-Lupkow-Cisna-Luch (north of Kalnica); meanwhile his left wing would take the area Chrewt-Smolnik-Lutowiska, which had been reached by Puhallo's Group. If Boroevic's east wing had been stronger, he would have been able to counter this move by enverting Brussilov's flank. However, this was not be.

106 For operations of the South Army, see also the German military archive's study, "Die deutsche Südamee. Anfang Januar bis Anfang Juli 1915"
26 January may be regarded as the turning point in the allied offensive which had only just started. The prospects for its success had already greatly diminished. Szurmay, who was supposed to have reached the Borynia heights by this time, was running behind schedule. This caused Puhallo to worry about his eastern wing, so he had to hold back the two divisions on his right; this in turn deprived his thrust to the north of most of its impetus. Krautwald had exhausted all of his strength and was only able to hold onto the line he had reached with difficulty. Behind this extensive front the Army had just the 29 ID in reserve, hardly a large enough force to bring fresh weight to the offensive. The German South Army hadn't been able to win as much ground as had been optimistically expected at the start. Several days would still have to elapse before Pflanzer-Baltin could attack through the Tartar Pass. Casualties were mounting quickly, as were cases of sickness from lung and intestinal illnesses and from frostbite. Thus it was already dubious that the offensive of 3rd Army, which had been undertaken despite the fact that the allied right wing was hanging back, would succeed.

b. Changeable actions by South Army and at the Uzsok Pass, 27 January-5 February

The advance of South Army

At this point Linsingen experienced a promising change in fortune.

On 27 January the XXIV Res Corps won a complete success. Its right wing and center drove the Russians back along the Wyszkow road, despite their gallant resistance at Toronya. Several detachments followed the enemy northwest into the mountains. Then the Corps swung quickly to the northeast and initiated new actions around the Wyszkow Pass. The easternmost column sought to take the smaller Beskid defile, where the Russians tried to block the way to Ludwikowka.107 GM Stehr's 209 German Inf Bde (of 48 Res ID) was diverted toward Lawoczne to assist Hofmann's advance against Tuchla.

After this hopeful development, however, good fortune once again abandoned the commanders and troops in this sector. The eastern

107Translator's Note - Confusingly, there was both a Beskid Pass (opposite Group Hofmann) and a small Beskid "defile" (in German "Beskid-claus"), which was a minor crossing through the mountains just east of the Wyszkow Pass opposite XXIV Res Corps.
column of 19 ID was able to take the Beskid defile on 1 February, but then found themselves up against a new enemy position. The fighting around Wyszkow Pass was heavier, but didn't bring the hoped-for decision. The AOK at Teschen called in vain for an energetic advance to Dolina; the enemy was literally fighting for every foot of ground.

Hofmann's Group of March battalions and Landsturm units followed on the heels of the withdrawing enemy and on 28 January had already occupied the towns of Volovec, F.- and Al.- Verecke. The Russians pulled back toward the Verecke and Beskid Passes, and now stood opposite the west wing of South Army in a line from Smorze to the Beskid Rail Station. Despite their great exhaustion, Hofmann's troops continued to drive back the enemy; on 3 February they took the Rail Station. They maintained their pursuit on the next two days, as the German 209 Inf Bde arrived on their right wing.

**Szurmay's Group at the Uzsok Pass**

The actions of South Army described above were inter-related with those of Group Szurmay from 3rd Army. The Group had taken the Uzsok Pass on 26 January, but would also need to take the heights west of Borynia to ensure the security of this important crossing point. The Russians would have to be driven from this naturally strong position. Therefore on the next day most of Szurmay's units advanced on both sides of the railroad and highway toward Turk; meanwhile 75 Hon Inf Bde, on his right wing, reached Libuchora. It was planned that as soon as Szurmay had taken the Borynia Heights, 3 Gd ID would be diverted to the southeast toward Tucholka to assist 1st German ID, which had been directed to take that town. Boroevic, however, wished to have 75 Hon Bde carry out the mission rather than the Guards; to him it seemed more advisable to have 3 Gd ID first assist Szurmay's attack and then later help the South Army by advancing through Skole and out of the mountains. After some hesitation, the high command decided to go along with counter-proposals which it had meanwhile received from Linsingen, who wanted his Division brought back to him as soon as possible. Therefore 3 Gd ID reached Libuchora on the 29th. Meanwhile 75 Hon Inf Bde, based on Boroevic's planning, had advanced as far as Matkow while the Guards came up behind them.

---

108Originally it was intended to create a Corps under FML Hofmann to command 55 ID, 131 Inf Bde and the German 1st ID. However, it turned out that GLt vonConta, the commander of 1st ID, had seniority over Hofmann. Therefore the Corps wasn't formed; as 1st ID moved up the road toward Tucholka it was placed directly under South Army HQ.
The further advance of Szurmay's Group toward Turka and beyond was of great importance for two reasons: it would give fresh impetus to the already faltering thrust to Przemysl, and it would protect the flank and rear of 3 Gd ID. Therefore the high command kept intervening between 28 and 31 January with further orders. On the 31st Linsingen was also asked to send a strong column toward Swidnik. This would aid Szurmay, who in turn would later be able to intervene effectively on South Army's left flank.

A few fruitless assaults soon made it evident that the Borynia Heights couldn't be taken frontally. FML Szurmay redeployed his units and rather early on the 31st attempted a surprise envelopment on both wings. His skirmishing lines advanced through deep snow with great difficulty, but the Russians were able to extend their lines in both directions and made decisive success impossible. The exhaustion of the k.u.k. troops was reaching an alarming level amidst the bitter cold. Szurmay broke off the unpromising action and on the night of 1-2 February pulled his Group back to a position just northeast of the Uzsok Pass. Here he wanted to give his over-taxed soldiers a short rest break.

On the 30th, 75 Hon Inf Bde and 3 Gd ID fought together east of Matkow against the Russians who were opposing Linsingen's west wing. On the next day, however, in accordance with the AOK's decision to send support to Szurmay the Honveds pulled back in the direction of his right wing. They also would pause for a short rest, unfortunately on the western rather than the eastern bank of the Stryj. The problem with this deployment was that it left the flank and rear of 3 Gd ID exposed to an enemy counterattack.

Linsingen demands reinforcements

Linsingen's HQ at Munkacs followed this development with great concern; then they asked for relief from both the German Eastern HQ and the OHL. For this reason, 3 February became a day of complications and misunderstandings which had a negative effect on the mood of the responsible commanders, already laboring with so many other problems. The bickering was carried out over the Hughes apparatus and mostly involved the 3 Gd ID. At the request of the German Eastern Command, Capt. Fleischmann asked the AOK for a briefing regarding the situation. At the same time,

---

109 This prompted the AOK on 4 and 8 February to insist that the South Army should communicate with German HQ only through the proper chain of command, i.e. the Aus-Hung. high command.
Ludendorff telegraphed Conrad that all of the successes won to date by the South Army were being placed in question by Szurmay's voluntary pullback. Finally, Falkenhayn instructed the German plenipotentiary at Teschen, GM von Cramon, to raise the same issues.\textsuperscript{110}

Around noon the situation report of 3rd Army HQ arrived at Teschen, and the AOK saw for the first time that in fact no measures had been taken to ensure the safety of 3 Gd ID, east of the Stryj. Szurmay's withdrawal was all the more troublesome because meanwhile a crisis had developed at the center of 3rd Army (as will be narrated in the next section). Now at least the Army's east wing must stand its ground, and any setback to the Guards must be avoided. The AOK ordered 3rd Army HQ to immediately move Szurmay's right wing east of the Stryj.

However, by now the time when 3 Gd ID was endangered was long in the past. The Guards' advance during continuous actions through Smorze had helped the 1st German ID to take the heights overlooking the road at Lysa. On 3 February the two divisions, deployed closely together, drove the enemy out of Tucholka. Thus it was unnecessary for Szurmay to send reinforcements; moreover, this would contradict the basic premise of the whole operation, which was to place the greatest emphasis on the right wing of 3rd Army.

Still unaware of the developments at Tucholka, the AOK ordered the Guards to turn back and then to advance north together with Szurmay.

Since South Army HQ was dissatisfied with the course of the offensive, on 4 February they proposed a new plan to the k.u.k. high command. They stated that GdK Pflanzer-Baltin was opposed only by numerically weak second-line enemy units, while the Russians opposite 3rd and South Armies were being reinforced. Boroevic's advance had stalled, and Linsingen hadn't moved forward as much as necessary. It was therefore necessary that Szurmay's right wing should be strengthened not only by 3 Gd ID, but also by further units. Moreover, Linsingen also needed reinforcements for both wings of his Army to break quickly out of the mountains: on the right he wanted 6 ID from Pflanzer-Baltin, on the left he wanted troops from 3rd Army. All were to be placed under his command. The AOK's response was that they agreed on the need to reinforce Szurmay, but felt that the Guards would be a sufficiently large force to get his offensive moving.

\textsuperscript{110}Cramon had taken the place of GLt Freytag-Loringhoven at Teschen at the end of January.
They had no intention of changing the command structure.

Before 3 Gd ID could join Szurmay, the enemy would have to be driven from the new position they occupied north of Tucholka. The Guards accomplished this by working together with 1st German ID. Thereafter they fought shoulder to shoulder with 75 Hon Inf Bde west of the Stryj.

c. Brussilov's counterattack against the k.u.k. 3rd Army, 27 January-5 February

Meanwhile the enemy increased their pressure against Boroevic's Army.

The Russians gain ground

Since the Russians felt threatened by the gains of Puhallo's group - V Corps (33 ID and 37 Hon ID) and XVIII Corps (44 and 43 LW ID) - on the heights west of Borynia, they thrust back against the group's right wing. In turn the part of V Corps which had been bent back to face east counterattacked and threw the Russians back again on 29 January. FML Szurmay was asked to also move against the enemy forces which had appeared in the gap between his line and Puhallo's, and thus catch them in a pincers attack; however, he was unable to do so. Therefore V Corps pulled back its right wing to its original position, in a defensive line facing east. This was all the more necessary because 37 Hon ID's attack through Lutowiska had gained ground, and Corps HQ had to ensure that the Honveds maintained an unbroken line with 33 ID. The east wing of XVIII Corps was driven back about 5 km by the enemy on the 28th. 43 LW ID on the Corps' west wing was hard pressed by the Russians south of Baligrod, and used up almost all of its strength in unsuccessful counterattacks; several of its combat groups were already falling back.

If the Russians couldn't be stopped, they would soon threaten the important area around Cisna. The nearest - and indeed the only - possible reinforcement was 29 ID, in the Army's reserve, which had reached Wola Michowa. Originally Boroevic had planned to commit this Division to his east wing to exploit the initial success won by 44 LW ID. On 26 January the 29 ID had started to march to the right, but was soon halted because of a setback on the Army's west wing (to be narrated shortly). Now the Army commander was forced to use the Division to relieve the burnt out
When 29 ID arrived behind its newly allotted sector on 30 January, however, the commander of XIX Corps - FML Trollmann - declared that the remnants of 43 LW ID would have to also stay at the front to ensure that the ground that had been won with so much difficulty was retained.\[72\] Boroevic's HQ agreed to this request, but this destroyed their hopes that 43 LW ID would provide a new reserve force for the Army.

The offensive capability of the troops was now used up, and Boroevic had no other fresh units to commit. Therefore the Russian storm against Krautwald's, Archduke Joseph's and Colerus' Groups created a critical situation. In the next few days bad tidings flooded into Army HQ at Kaschau, first from VII Corps and then from X and also III Corps. Although there were many instances of bravery reported, both in defensive fighting and in counterattacks, the two right wing Corps of Brussilov's Army were steadily driving our own front toward the south. There was no hope that Boroevic's already faltering right wing could resume the offensive to retrieve the situation. As the troops suffered unspeakable hardships day and night in the inclement weather of an icy winter, they were tested beyond their strength. Apathy and indifference were spreading. The problem varied from unit to unit; the worst affected were the regiments of Slavic nationality, which were fighting against their blood brothers. And the defense of the vital Mezölaborcz area had been entrusted to two Galician divisions (2 and 24 ID). Although these units were still fighting bravely, this was due more to their instilled sense of duty than to any conviction that they were serving a just cause.

**Boroevic seeks aid from 4th Army**

When the Russian offensive began near Dukla Pass, Boroevic at first didn't believe the enemy had any wide-reaching goals; he thought they were only trying to distract attention from a withdrawal of units from Dimitriev's Army. To prevent this from happening, Boroevic now made a personal request to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand for an offensive by his Army.

As has been noted, based on the AOK directives of 22 January the 4th Army HQ was prepared to open an offensive with a strong south wing in cooperation with 3rd Army. This offensive, however, wouldn't happen until the enemy began to evacuate their positions due to the effects of Boroevic's attack farther east. On the other hand, if the Russians threw themselves upon III Corps in full strength, parts of Arz' Group would form the left wing of a

\[72\]At this point Trollmann's XIX Corps consisted solely of 29 ID.
pincers movement which would drive the Russians out of the area where the two Armies came together. Several battalions of 45 LW ID and the 11 Hon CD were kept in readiness for this purpose after the Russians began to fight III Corps on 26 January. 4th Army also had an agreement with 1st Army, under which the latter's artillery on the north bank of the Vistula would support any attempt to force passage over the lower Dunajec; 1st Army would also send troops over the bridge at Jagodniki to lend direct support to this operation if it were attempted.

On the 30th the situation became ever more critical for X Corps and also for VII Corps, which was stretched over a front of 24 km; therefore GdI Boroevic asked the AOK to immediately send him another division on the rail line to Mezőlaborcz. His appeal for help contained a veiled reproach because the AOK had sent 7 ID, originally intended to serve as his Army's reserve, to Group Szurmay. This had left him with only 29 ID in reserve, and that unit had already been sent to the front.112

Later in the day, the staff at Teschen considered whether it might be advisable to address the crisis of 3rd Army by immediately having the Archduke's Army attack. Still later on the 30th, the 4th Army HQ was requested by telephone to either open a general offensive or to send an infantry division to Boroevic. Army HQ at Okocim felt that a frontal assault on Dimitriev's strongly fortified positions would be pointless.113 At this time the commanders hadn't developed a technique for breaking through trenches with concentrated artillery fire. Therefore the staff decided it would be preferable to send a division to reinforce 3rd Army. The AOK, however, decided to pull just two infantry regiments (IR # 81 and 88) from the Archduke's lines. They created a combined Brigade on 31 January, and were transported on 1 February from Brzesko to Mezőlaborcz.

Attempts to shore up Boroevic's front

On the 31st the X and VII Corps again fell back somewhat to the rear. 3rd Army HQ demanded that they stay in place, which would give the Combined Brigade time to detrain at Mezőlaborcz. VII Corps, however, continued to lose ground in the direction of Sztropko. Boroevic learned from intercepted radio traffic that the Russians intended to continue their offensive. In response,

112Because of the emergency situation, the AOK had given 3rd Army one other small unit. Boroevic received authority to use the foot detachment of 5 Hon CD which at this time was still at Eperjes, waiting to be sent by rail to Pflanzer-Baltin's Armee-gruppe.

113For a detailed explanation for the attitude of 4th Army HQ, see the letter from GM von Paic quoted in the appendix to this section.
he now planned a two-pronged attack against the Russians who were pressing back the front of VII Corps. On the right of VII Corps, the Combined Brigade would complete its deployment and thrust through Havaj. On the left, 28 ID of III Corps – along with the units which Arz' Group was holding for an offensive – would thrust from the west. X Corps, holding a sector of 28 km with just 15,800 riflemen, also needed immediate assistance. Boroevic was greatly concerned that the thin line of his burnt-out units could be ripped asunder before the arrival of reinforcements. Therefore he proposed that unarmed Ersatz troops should be gathered at rail stations right behind the line; they could take arms and equipment from sick and wounded men who were pulling back to the rear, and then immediately join the fighting divisions. The AOK, however, wouldn't approve this idea.

Instead, the staff at Teschen was preparing a major counter-thrust. A strong attacking group would assemble on the south wing of 4th Army: five infantry (10, 11, 13, 26 and 45) and one cavalry division (11). Under the command of GdI Kritek, it would thrust into the area south of the Magora Heights to relieve the hard-pressed west wing of 3rd Army. The attack would start on 7 February. The parts of the Archduke's Army on both sides of the Ropa-Gorlice-Biecz road would join the offensive later.

For the direct reinforcement of 3rd Army, the offer of Archduke Eugene at the end of January to release some units had arrived at the right hour. The Archduke stated that the VIII Corps (9 ID and 21 LW ID, totalling 23,000 riflemen) could temporarily transfer from the Balkans to the northern theater of operations. This offer was gladly accepted at Teschen. The first transports from the south began to roll on 3 February on two rail lines toward 3rd Army: 21 LW ID with VIII Corps HQ headed for the Mezőlaborcz area, 9 ID for the Uzsok Pass. 1st Army, moreover, had offered the 1st Lst Inf Bde; on the evening of 2 February that Brigade entrained at Brzesko for the trip to Mezőlaborcz.

The AOK wrote 3rd Army HQ that the new units should be deployed to ensure the security of Mezőlaborcz, while the reinforced east wing attacked decisively toward Sanok and Chyrow. Whether the forces sent to the Carpathians would be sufficient to renew the offensive remained questionable; they would certainly suffice, however, to erect a firm dam that would keep the Russian tide from entering the Hungarian plains.

Teschen wasn't satisfied with the leadership of 3rd Army. The AOK telegraphed Kaschau that the constant withdrawals by VII and X Corps were increasingly placing the entire front in danger, as
the battle line grew ever longer, thinner, and less capable of resistance. The letter also included criticism that was hardly concealed:

"This situation cannot be improved by using the arriving reinforcements to plug gaps in the line and building purely defensive positions. The new units must be concentrated as much as possible and used with the troops already at the front to open an offensive in the direction which Army HQ believes is the most promising or essential."

This was followed by a suggestion that the Army commander himself should personally intervene in operations.

As always in critical situations, friction and ill-feeling between the two headquarters began to assume sharper forms. GdI Boroevic responded on the same day that he recognized the truth of the principles which the AOK had just enunciated, but had been forced by circumstances to ignore them.

Because of the high command's plan for an offensive by Kritek's Group, Boroevic postponed his own counterattack from the west, which anyway would have involved units attached to him from 4th Army. However, he still wished to have the Combined Brigade thrust through Havaj, because of his concern that the Russians would otherwise continue to push back the right wing of VII Corps and take the town of Mezőlaborcz from this sector.

Negotiations between the headquarters continue

On 3 February, while the high command at Teschen was squabbling with the Germans over the deployment of 3 Gd ID, they were also carrying on a lively discussion by wire with Kaschau. The views of the AOK and 3rd Army HQ still didn't fully coincide. Fully in accordance with his earlier orders, Boroevic wanted to commit all available forces on his eastern wing, where XVIII Corps and Krautwald's right were bogged down in constant defensive fighting and even losing ground, so that it could move forward again. The Army commander wanted to do more in this regard than the AOK: he wished to send both divisions of VIII Corps to the Uzsok Pass, while the high command preferred to employ 21 LW ID at Mezőlaborcz. Boroevic, on the other hand, believed that the counterattack by the Combined Brigade would be sufficient to give VII Corps a breathing spell, while 1st Lst Inf Bde (approaching by train) could provide direct support to X Corps.

In Boroevic's planning the west wing temporarily was in the background, although a wide gap had now opened between III and VII Corps. The future role of VII, X and part of III Corps was
dependent not only on whether the Russians continued to attack, but also on the condition of the troops, who'd been forced onto the defensive and were suffering heavy strain. This consideration and the exact date when the reinforcements arrived would substantially influence the course of the next round of fighting. In some sectors, resistance should be carried out to the utmost, even to the point of sacrificing several divisions. In other sectors a more elastic defense, even at the cost of giving up conquered territory, would be advisable in order to avoid unnecessary casualties and gain time for the approaching reinforcements to prepare the new offensive.

It seems that the AOK had drawn the conclusion from a situation report that 3rd Army HQ didn't intend to hold onto even the lines it now held firmly for an indefinite period. At Teschen they were afraid that the Russians would occupy further parcels of Hungarian territory, which should be avoided if at all possible because of internal political considerations. Therefore the high command demanded that 3rd Army should not pull back another step, since its 15 divisions were opposed by only 12 enemy formations.  

Meanwhile the gap between the inner wings of III and VII Corps had widened into a large hole, and it was even possible that the enemy might break through the front. Therefore 3rd Army HQ decided to divert the trains carrying 1st Lst Bde from Mezőlaborcz to the line leading north from Eperjes; the Bde would deploy north of that town and together with 4 CD would ensure the security of this hitherto empty sector. After receiving this reinforcement the commander of the Cavalry Division, GM Berndt, would relieve VII Corps by mounting a counterattack.

The loss of Mezőlaborcz

On the evening of 3 February, 3rd Army HQ received its response to GdI Boroevic's request that he be allowed to deploy all of VIII Corps at the Uzsok Pass. The AOK agreed, under the condition that the Mezőlaborcz area would be made secure with the help of the two Brigades being sent to that sector (Combined Inf and 1st Lst Inf Bdes). As this message arrived, however, it was becoming apparent that X Corps would need more extensive support.

During the day the enemy's pressure on VII and X Corps kept

114Because of the great difference in rifle strength between the Russian and Aus-Hung. divisions, this comparison of strength isn't an accurate reflection of the real size of the two forces. It was included in the order only to strengthen 3rd Army's will to resist.
intensifying. Shortly before midnight the Russians broke into Miko, thus threatening Mezölaborcz from the northwest. III Corps also was in trouble and wanted to pull its troops back to the Zboro sector. According to aerial reports, strong Russian columns were moving toward Sanok. Although Boroevic, as ordered, exhorted his corps to resist to the bitter end, and stated that the important stretch of railroad from Mezölaborcz to Lupkow must be held, the strength of the troops was finally collapsing under burdens that were beyond their strength. Fortunately the locomotives and railroad cars on the endangered tracks were evacuated in time to the south. Then the crisis reached its high point.

Beginning in the early afternoon of 4 February, the Russians opened heavy artillery fire on the rail station at Mezölaborcz and the neighboring houses, where X Corps HQ had been stationed since the start of the year. The staff stayed in place until late evening to prepare orders for a retreat, which would apparently be necessary. The front of 2 ID was broken in several places, despite heroic counterattacks by several bold detachments, and the Division fell back to the immediate vicinity of the town. Farther northeast, 24 ID was still covering the rail line to Lupkow in a position that was increasingly isolated.

The Russians broke into Mezölaborcz shortly after 11:00 PM, but hand-to-hand fighting in the streets continued until long past midnight, among heavy drifts of snow. At 3:00 AM of the 5th our last detachment pulled out of town. The remnants of 2 ID, reduced to barely 1000 riflemen, withdrew into the Laborcza Valley, leaving rear guards in temporary intermediate positions. No supply wagons fell into the enemy's hands.

During the last 14 days of combat, 3rd Army alone had lost almost 89,000 men - over 50% of its strength. The number of soldiers incapacitated by illness was much greater than the number of dead, wounded or prisoners. Casualties of the individual components were: 14,500 from Group Szurmay, 16,660 from V Corps, 8010 from XVIII Corps, 5440 from XIX Corps, 22,220 from X Corps, 13,080 from VII Corps, and 9000 from III Corps.\(^{115}\)

Appendix - some other views of the Carpathian offensive

i) THE VIEW FROM 4th ARMY HEADQUARTERS

\(^{115}\)These statistics are based on data provided to the Military Archive by GM Anton Pitreich on 20 September 1929. At this point it can no longer be determined whether they refer to the units' "combat" or "rifle" strength.
As noted above, 4th Army HQ at Okocim felt it was inadvisable to attack the Russian positions opposite their lines, and instead opted to help Boroevic by releasing reinforcements to him. An explanation of their attitude was provided by GM von Paic, at that time Chief of the General Staff Detachment in Okocim, in a paper to the Military Archive on 5 January 1929.

"After the victory at Limanowa-Lapanow, 4th Army pursued the enemy to the Dunajec-Biala line in mid-December 1914. We soon recognized that the original plan to continue the offensive couldn't be carried out, because the Russians - now on a shorter line well protected by the terrain - were able to concentrate strong forces and initiated attacks of their own. These enemy thrusts finally ended on 5 January 1915. The next few days were used to strengthen our new position, to bring up supplies, and to reorder our units, which had become badly intermingled during the recent actions. Before Army HQ could decide whether and under what conditions it could resume the offensive, we received orders from the AOK which indicated that the Carpathian campaign would have priority. V Corps, which had been approaching us by rail from 1st Army, was now diverted to Boroevic's east wing. 4th Army itself would transfer three infantry divisions to the right wing of the front.

Under these circumstances, we gave up any plans for an independent west-to-east offensive by 4th Army with wide-ranging goals. Although in the next few weeks and months the size of the opposing Army, General Dimitriev's, was gradually weakened, this had no effect on the situation because 4th Army was also sending further units away to the Carpathians. It was inconceivable that with the limited resources at our disposal we could win such a great success that we would assist the situation in the eastern part of the Carpathian front. It was certain, however, that such an offensive would be very costly and might even put into question our continued holding of the Dunajec-Biala line.

In the various discussions of an offensive the 4th Army HQ therefore took a negative stance. However, in Okocim we were aware of our duty to take advantage of any weakening of the enemy in our front by immediately attacking. We would also attack if the neighboring III Corps launched an offensive or if it was in serious danger. 4th Army HQ knew that the goals of the AOK could only be attained with casualties.

The result of these developments was that we weakened our own front as much as possible, without objecting. We were ready to seize any opportunity to support operations of the neighboring
III Corps with a limited offensive, or to prevent the withdrawal of enemy units from our front."

ii) THE VIEW FROM X CORPS HEADQUARTERS

The following is a summary of the Carpathian battle of 23 January-5 February prepared by FML von Kralowetz, who at the time was Chief of Staff to X Corps. It is an abbreviated and excerpted version of an unpublished study by the General.

"The attacking units remained many kilometers away from the goals which had been set by 3rd Army HQ. After the first six days of the operation, the south wing of V Corps had advanced just 18 km. 43 LW ID had advanced somewhat past Baligrod, but its strength was totally exhausted and it was forced to give up 12 km of the area it had captured. The left wing of X Corps was falling back under overwhelming Russian pressure and it seemed likely that the entire Corps would have to fall back to its starting point. 17 ID of VII Corps, which wasn't part of the offensive group, had been driven back from the position it had occupied on 23 January.

Therefore the fruits of the offensive were very small despite the very heavy sacrifices of our units, which had used up their last reserves of physical and moral strength. We were defeated less by the enemy than by the destructive effects of the harsh mountain winter.

The enemy hadn't suffered nearly so much. They held back their troops until the attackers were already exhausted, and then chose the right moment to counterattack our already decimated, worn out, freezing and helpless units....

Under these circumstances, a campaign of movement with wide-reaching goals would have been feasible only if the tired troops could be relieved every two or three days by fresh forces. To avoid completely destroying our troops, this winter offensive could reach its objectives only in a step-by-step advance by units "working in shifts." However, because of the enormous length of the front there were hardly any men available for use as replacements, and certainly no full-strength units. Since reinforcements weren't available, it would have been preferable to cancel the offensive.

The attack which started in the Carpathians in January 1915 could not possibly have gained more than the small amount of ground that was won at the outset..."
In evaluating this judgment, weight must also be given to the firm conviction of the high command that they couldn't afford to just pin down the overwhelmingly larger Russian army until German units could be freed from the French theater of war. For reasons outlined already, the AOK wanted to seize and keep the initiative and secure a victory that would win the war.

However, whether the area chosen to launch the offensive was the only possible option, and whether it was an appropriate one, are two other questions. They will be discussed further in this narrative.

iii) THE VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINE

The limitations of this work, which concentrates on the overall aspects of the operations without going into detail about individual actions, may be misleading to the reader because it doesn't give a full picture of events. To understand what happened, one must understand what the troops endured - their pains and difficulties. To remedy this deficiency somewhat, we will insert in some parts of the text excerpts from a narrative by Colonel Dr. Georg Veith. The Colonel has the following to say about the first phase of the Carpathian fighting:

"On 23 January we moved forward into the icy hell of the Carpathian battle. We stormed through the Uzsok, Verecke and Wyszkow Passes, but the troops encountered a snowstorm on the northern side of the mountain crests. On 25 January GM Lieb's 66 Inf Bde, which had been victoriously advancing, once more drove back the enemy, but then was itself pushed back to its starting position by the icy northeast wind. The weather broke up our offensive.

It is shattering to read reports from those days. Hundreds died from exposure each day; any wounded man who couldn't drag himself to safety was doomed to die. Riding was impossible. Entire skirmishing lines surrendered while crying to escape their terrible pain. A group of soldiers from LW IR # 21 went out as sentries one evening and was found the next morning frozen to death."

Veith, "Werdegang und Schicksal der öst-ung. Armee im Weltkrieg" (in manuscript; Vienna, 1922). Col. Veith was born in 1875 near Pilgram in Bohemia and became an Aus-Hung. artillery officer in 1895. He was most prominent as a student of Julius Caesar's military campaigns, but also made a name for himself as a coin collector and music critic. He was very distinguished as a soldier in the World War. On 9 September 1925 he was on an exploratory expedition near Zela [Zile] in Asia Minor when he was murdered by two shepherds.
death to the last man. No cart or beast of burden could move forward through the mass of snow. For days the soldiers had nothing to eat in the cold of minus 25 degrees Celsius because the emergency rations which each man carried had frozen solid and were inedible. For seven days the 43 LW ID was engaged in heavy action against the enemy and the snow without any warm food; for 30 days not a man from this Division slept under shelter!

Conditions were similar all along the front. It was impossible to relieve the combatants for even a short period of recuperation because the effective strengths of the units were so small; this problem worsened every day as the frightful losses piled up. For example, LW IR # 20 (with an authorized strength of 60 officers and 3400 men) was reduced to 9 officers and 250 men. There was hardly a battalion at the front with even 200 men. As the lines grew ever thinner, there were more instances when exhausted men were pulled from an area to be committed to a sector which was in even greater danger. Rear area personnel and lightly wounded or slightly sick troops were sent to fight. Men from many units became intermingled, further complicating both the chain of command and the supply situation.

Despite some partial successes, the mood of the men was depressed, even desperate. The realization that they were fighting the very elements robbed them of any hope. The higher commands did everything possible to buoy up morale and the will to resist, and at least were able to ward off the ever-present danger of panic. However, they couldn't prevent apathy and indifference from spreading throughout the front lines.

At the end of January there was a sudden thaw and rain began to fall. The men were soaked to the skin; since they had no way to dry off, their wet clothing froze in the night into icy armor. Only the troops who had iron constitutions could still hold on. Then the Russians began to counterattack. Our soldiers, half mad and dull-witted from their suffering, pulled back to the positions where the offensive had started. The enemy also soon had their fill of this fighting, and some of their detachments surrendered. Finally the battle died out. We were back where we had stood in the middle of January, but in the meantime an entire army had been ruined....

That was the first battle in the central Carpathians."

This accurate description, a painful summary of the self-sacrificing action by our troops, obliges the authors of this history to analyze the reasoning behind the offensive and the
causes of the defeat, and to candidly evaluate the results. This will be attempted in the following pages.

7. Measures taken to recapture the Mezölaborcz area

The Homonna-Mezölaborcz-Lupkow railroad, and the small spur which led into the mountains east of Lupkow, were the most important supply route for the units on the east wing of 3rd Army. The main line was broken in the night of 4-5 February by the Russians' thrust to Mezölaborcz-Vidrany; this of course made the smaller line east of Lupkow also inoperable (although it remained in Austrian hands). This was an enormous setback to the planned offensive toward Przemysl, and meant that the high command would have to make recovery of Mezölaborcz its first priority.

It was certainly fortunate that the Russians failed to take advantage of their opportunity. Until noon on the 5th they remained inactive in Mezölaborcz, and then started to slowly occupy the terrain farther east (where the railroad made a wide curve), rather than pushing south immediately to pursue 2 ID down the Laborcza Valley.

Recrimination between the higher headquarters

The AOK was once more dissatisfied with the deployment of 3rd Army. They criticized the Army commander because he was sending the two brigades arriving as reinforcements (the Combined Inf and 1st Lst Inf Bdes) to different parts of the front rather than concentrating them together. They wanted Boroevic to intervene directly and personally in the situation at Mezölaborcz. Apparently the staff at Teschen believed that if the Army commander had a firm will he could accomplish the impossible by driving his troops forward relentlessly through the snow- and ice-covered mountains. Instead he had suffered a setback that upset all the plans of the high command! The terrain and the season, however, had proven themselves to be stronger than the commander's will, as was also the case in South Army's sector.

Boroevic was deeply offended by these allegations, and replied that the defeat at Mezölaborcz was due to the fact that he didn't have any reserve units left behind the 160 km front of his Army. This was the fault of the AOK, which had interfered with his operational plans by moving 7 ID to the Uzsok Pass. In the course of the fighting over the past few days, none of his corps had any reserve troops to commit. The deployment of the two new
brigades had been forced upon him by circumstances. Only the first echelon of the Combined Inf Bde had arrived at Mezöloborcz; most of the men were detraining in stations farther to the rear. These troops had to be held in readiness to relieve VII Corps. Even if 1st Landsturm Bde had been sent to the area south of Mezöloborcz, it wouldn't have arrived until the evening of 6 February. Anyway, a frontal attack in this sector didn't seem very promising. Therefore 3rd Army HQ had instead opted to have the Landsturm Bde join 4 CD for a counterattack farther west that would relieve the situation in the Mezöloborcz area. Nothing had been overlooked in an effort to get the troops to hold out until the attack by Kritek's Group could become effective. "Because of the nature of the terrain and the length of the front, if [Army HQ] went to the front it would at best be able to intervene only in the operations of individual battalions, while unable to control the Army as a whole." Finally, Boroevic raised strong objections to the AOK's plan for an immediate attack by VII and X Corps; the condition of the troops would certainly preclude such an undertaking.

The question remains open as to whether both VII and X Corps should have avoided the defensive fighting of the last few days by withdrawing from the enemy in one bound to a line where the vital rail line could still have been protected. The men would have had time to rest, to prepare their new position for stubborn defense, and to await the arrival of reinforcements. The Russians, who could quickly sense when they were confronting a well-prepared defensive position, might have immediately slowed the tempo of their advance. On the other hand, nothing did more damage to troop morale than improper issuance of an order to "resist to the last man" to carry out the wishes of the high command.

GdI Boroevic's objection to making a personal intervention at the front was based on a misunderstanding. What the AOK meant was that he should have made regular trips to the front to directly exchange views with the officers there; this is one of the most important ways in which a commander can gain information. Boroevic, however, hardly ever left his headquarters because he didn't want to be missing when a decision was needed to change troop deployments.

117 See Steinitz, "Ausharren oder Ausweichen", in the Militär-Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen (Vienna, Jan-Feb 1930)
118 In his paper of 20 September 1929, GM Pitreich remarks that GdI Boroevic avoided "oral exchanges of views" with his subordinate commanders in critical situations and also avoided giving "oral commands" to his staff. He didn't want to be opposed in conversation or to be influenced by local conditions in one sector. Everything had to be in "black on white" on a
Planning for the next round

On 5 February the AOK received a report from 4th Army HQ which, along with the events at Mezõlaborcz, caused them to revisit earlier decisions. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had personally viewed the terrain which had been chosen for the advance of Kritek's Group. He had also spoken with several commanders in the area, and they had all agreed that the proposed storm of the strong Russian fortifications would result in extraordinary casualties. The commander of 4th Army felt that the attack should only take place if absolutely necessary because of the situation of 3rd Army; moreover, it shouldn't start on 7 February, and indeed couldn't prior to the 9th. Because of the situation at Mezõlaborcz, this would be rather late.

Therefore the high command cancelled the planned offensive. It was hardly to be expected that Kritek's Group, with its weak artillery, would gain enough ground to influence the situation of X Corps. Therefore the AOK ordered that GdI Kritek on the 6th should just take over the newly reorganized XVII Corps (11 ID and 45 LW ID), which would go to the rear behind 4th Army's lines and march through Komlospatak and Zboro to join 3rd Army. Boroevic's HQ intended to place Berndt's Group (4 CD and 1 Lst Inf Bde) under XVII Corps, which would deploy in the gap between III and VII Corps. It would thrust forward through Felsõ-vizköz toward the Dukla Pass. VII Corps would join this attack, while III Corps covered the left flank of the XVIIth. Kritek's advance would begin on either the 9th or 10th.

The issue of the deployment of VIII Corps still hadn't been settled. The headquarters at Teschen and Kaschau had a lively discussion about this by wire on the 5th. The AOK had enunciated their viewpoint in connection with the plans for XVII Corps: the offensive through Turka and Lisko couldn't take place until the Russian advance toward Sztropko and through Mezõlaborcz had been stopped, and the enemy driven from this area. Therefore Boroevic - who had originally wanted to use both divisions of VIII Corps at Uzsok Pass - now asked Teschen whether he could use them instead for a thrust through Sztropko. Together with XVII Corps, Berndt's Group and parts of VII Corps, they would create a force of about six division which should certainly win a victory written order. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Although there was merit in the AOK's admonition to Boroevic, its impact was certainly diminished by the fact that Conrad himself came to the front only a handful of times during the war. For a variety of reasons (including those mentioned by Pitreich), this unfortunate custom was prevalent among commanders on both sides in 1914-18 and probably had much to do with their relative ineffectiveness.
in the area of Dukla Pass. This was "apparently the weakest part" of the enemy's front. Moreover, the weather had meanwhile grown worse around the Uzsok Pass, making it necessary to postpone operations there. Presumably the enemy was moving reserves through Stary Sambor toward Uzsok Pass, but "would have to concede success to us if we had a larger force immediately available" at Dukla Pass.

The AOK responded that the basic premise of the entire Carpathian operation - an advance by the strong east wing of 3rd Army along with South Army - remained the same. Moreover, the relief of Przemysl was also an objective. If the Russians really did send strong forces through Stary Sambor, there was a danger that this most important portion of the entire Carpathian battlefield would be lost if part of VIII Corps wasn't available to oppose them.

It is obvious from the foregoing that 3rd Army faced a number of demanding tasks.

Meanwhile Army HQ had brought 41 LW Inf Bde of 21 LW ID into the Laborcza Valley. This diversion was approved at Teschen, but the high command still wanted the rest of VIII Corps to proceed to the Uzsok Pass. 41 Bde could rejoin the Corps after the recovery of Mezölaborcz. XVII Corps, the Combined Inf Bde, 1st Lst Inf Bde and 41 LW Inf Bde, along with the units of III, VII and X Corps, would certainly be a large enough force to win, "especially since 3rd Army HQ itself has indicated that despite the recent misfortune this is relatively the weakest part of the enemy's front."

The question of the best use of the available forces was certainly a difficult one. The east wing of 3rd Army could be strengthened and its offensive resumed only if the Russian thrust against the west wing was contained. If the outcome on the west wing was still in doubt, as seemed to be the case, it was necessary to first commit all available units to the Mezölaborcz area to regain the railroad. Otherwise the Army would never be able to attack toward Usztrzyki Dl. and the Russians would continue to threaten the Hungarian plains.

8. Re-arrangement of the command structure in the central Carpathians and simultaneous events, 6-15 February

It is understandable that the high command and 3rd Army HQ had to constantly change their decisions and that they couldn't agree on
a common plan, because as the fighting went on first one sector of the front and then another was being constantly pushed back.

In Teschen, however, the staff had come to the important conclusion that it wasn't practical to leave one commander responsible for the numerous and somewhat contradictory tasks assigned to 3rd Army. Moreover, the Army had grown to 18 infantry and 3 1/2 cavalry divisions, so that its size alone indicated a partition was necessary. It is possible that psychological factors also influenced this decision, since relations were strained between the high command and their most important subordinate. Therefore, the AOK decided on the 6th to recall 2nd Army HQ from west Poland and to place it over the units currently on GdI Boroievic's east wing. The "new" 2nd Army would be reinforced by several divisions pulled from quiet parts of the fronts.

Before the change in command, however, on 7 February a letter from FML Krautwald to the Chief of Staff of 3rd Army – GM Boog -- renewed the debate over the proper deployment of VIII Corps. The commander of X Corps, who was not known as a pessimist, painted the condition of his troops in the darkest colors as a result of their 16 days of action in the most frightful conditions. Particularly because of the heavy casualties among the officers, he was losing trust in the Corps' ability to remain effective. He stated that the 41 LW Inf Bde was an insufficient reinforcement; he needed an entire division. By this time the other parts of 21 LW ID were being shipped toward the Uzsok Pass, which was also the destination of 9 ID. 3rd Army HQ therefore ordered all the trains carrying the Landwehr Division to be diverted into the Laborcza Valley. They reported to Teschen that after the Division arrived it would be used to drive the enemy out of the Mezolaborcz area.

The impact of fresh setbacks

Meanwhile, however, more bad news was arriving at Kaschau. The Russians had driven 34 ID through Lupkow; parts of the Division had been cut off in severe night fighting, and it was reduced to barely 3500 riflemen. 29 ID and XVIII Corps had also been forced to give up some ground and to complete the misfortunes of 7 February the 20 Hon ID of VII Corps had pulled back a little.

These unfortunate events lowered the spirits of Army HQ at Kaschau. GM Boog, the Chief of Staff, called the AOK to report

119Nonetheless, these troops continued to fight in the Carpathians for three more months.
some frightening casualty statistics (summarized by Corps and given above). Since the Army was in danger of being totally destroyed, it seemed advisable to postpone the planned offensive until a more favorable season. Teschen asked Gdi Boroevic for his opinion, and he concurred with Boog. He indicated, though, that he had no intention of pulling the Army back from the enemy and was still determined to recover Mezőlaborcz using XVII Corps, Berndt's reinforced Group, VII Corps and 21 LW ID. other Corps, however, would have to be content with holding their current positions. Szurmay in particular should not be ordered All to attack, since he had already lost one third of his men. The units now arriving as reinforcements, and any others that might become available, shouldn't open an offensive until the cold weather was over, especially since there was a lack of winter equipment. Any other course would be a useless loss of troops. "It is my difficult duty to report that continuing the offensive under the present weather conditions will fail due to a lack of manpower."

The staff at Teschen had to make some fateful decisions. Should they admit that all sacrifices to date had been in vain? Must they abandon the relief of Przemysl? Neither course was acceptable to the AOK, which held to its plans for an offensive.

Boroevic was advised on the 8th that delay was ruled out because it would allow the Russians to bring up reinforcements and thus make enemy resistance even more formidable. The Army commander received authority to deploy all of VIII Corps as he chose, but with the proviso that 9 ID should assemble at Takcsany-Csontos. There it could later be sent against Cisna or Mezőlaborcz through the Uzsok Pass, as the situation warranted. Boroevic' was dissatisfied with this restriction, and still wanted to send 9 ID immediately toward Mezőlaborcz; at the least, he wanted it close enough so that it could immediately support the impending attack. Nevertheless the AOK still expected a Russian thrust through Cisna to Czirokaofalu, which could bring an end to all chances of an offensive on our side, and denied Boroevic's latest request.

Thereupon 3rd Army's Chief of Staff travelled to Teschen on 9 February; in Gdi Boroevic's name, he stated that:

- an offensive by the east wing had no chance of tactical success, and
- the reinforcement of this wing would be very difficult because of supply line considerations.

Therefore the only offensive should take place between the Laborcza and Ondava Rivers. This attempt to change the mind of the high command also failed 120.

120This is based on the testimony of GM Pitreich in the study cited earlier.
The weather gods bestowed a dubious gift on the hard-pressed combatants. Beginning on 8 February the temperature rose considerably. This caused melting snow which flooded all the valleys and other low ground.

Also on 8 February, a command was issued to divide 3rd Army; it stated further that until 2nd Army HQ arrived at Ungvar the earlier operational instructions were still in effect. As soon as the west wing had its units ready it should attack to throw back the Russians who'd broken through the Dukla Pass, Czeremcha Ridge, and Lupkow. The east wing would at first maintain its current positions. After the approaching reinforcements had assembled, presumably in mid-February, it would attack in the direction Lisko-Stary Sambor. Szurmay had authority to open his offensive sooner, if he believed that he could take the Borynia Heights with the aid of 3 Prussian Gd ID.

Actions of 9-14 February

Therefore on the 9th GdI Boroevic ordered his west wing to attack on the next day. Kritek's Group (XVII Corps, 4 CD and 1 Lst Inf Bde) would thrust through the Ondava Valley on both sides of Felső-vízköz to Ladomermező. VII Corps would join this attack, heading through Makos toward Nagyderencz but only after receiving further orders from 3rd Army HQ. III Corps would cover Kritek's west flank; X Corps would pin down the enemy on its front and later join the general attack through Mezőlaborcz; XIX Corps would stay on the defensive. 9 ID assembled in the area Szinna-Takcsany-Czirokaofalu as the Army's reserve.

Kritek's attack already met stubborn resistance on the 10th; some of the heights which our divisions took were immediately lost again to Russian counterattacks. Thus the Group gained only a little ground, although it closed the gap between III and VII Corps. Before Archduke Joseph could attack in the direction he had been ordered, he would have to first move the main body of his VII Corps through the Hocsanka [or Hoczanka] valley toward 2 the east; he was not prepared to do this until Kritek had crossed the Ondava to cover his left wing. Moreover, on the 11th he also demanded that X Corps cooperate with him west of the This in turn wouldn't be possible until 21 LW ID was deployed, Laborcza. and that Division was still moving up from the rail stations. For the next few days the only activity in X Corps' sector was that some Russian outposts were pushed back on both sides of the highway to Mezőlaborcz while 21 LW ID deployed on the heights west of the Laborcza. On the 13th the Combined Inf Bde was also ready, so a
combined operation by all available units was possible.

At this point the AOK said it would approve 3rd Army HQ's plans for using 9 ID in the Laborcza Valley if they would guarantee that the Army's east wing would hold its ground. However, the Russians were storming this position without interruption, and now V, XVIII and XIX Corps were all falling back. In V Corps, which was pushed from the Odryt Ridge on the 11th, 33 ID had 4500 riflemen and 37 Hon ID had just 3200. Under these circumstances, GdI Boroevic couldn't give the required guarantee, and therefore the AOK ordered that 9 ID be sent to Cisna. There it would later take part in the offensive under 2nd Army.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli arrived at Ungvar at noon on the 12th. His 2nd Army consisted of V, XVIII and XIX Corps. Until 2nd Army HQ could take over full command of the sector, the high command had Boroevic continue to issue orders to his former east wing with the approval of Böhm-Ermolli. The first issue involved 9 ID. 2nd Army HQ believed it would be simplest and quickest to insert the unit between 34 and 29 ID of XIX Corps.

Meanwhile fighting continued on the west wing of 3rd Army. After heavy fighting, and with the cooperation of 22 LW ID of III Corps, Kritek's Group was able on the 14th to push the enemy some distance back toward the Ondava. Boroevic therefore ordered VII Corps to begin its attack the next day, and X Corps to also join in with a strong left wing on the 16th.

Further discussions between 4th and 3rd Armies

After an inquiry from the AOK, 4th Army HQ had already on 8 February declared its willingness to give up two more infantry divisions (38 and 41 Hon ID) for the Carpathian front. (Actually the 75 Hon Inf Bde of 38 Division was already under 3rd Army.) The Archduke's front was relatively secure, and he wanted to intervene directly to help his neighbor. Therefore on the 10th he proposed to support the offensive of 3rd Army by having his south wing advance through Banica to zmigrod. For this purpose, 13 LW ID and the main body of 26 LW ID would leave the front, then on the 15th would begin to advance from the area west of Gladyszow under FML Kralicek. 4th Army HQ said it would carry out this operation if III Corps made a simultaneous attack toward Zmigrod.

Boroevic welcomed this plan and also agreed with Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand's proposal that Kralicek's Group be placed under GdI Colerus. However, this attempt at a joint operation by the inner wings of the two armies, like all the others, failed to materialize. According to the original agreement, the first goal would be the Jasionka Heights; Kralicek and parts of III Corps would launch an enveloping attack against the position. Colerus believed that since his front was too long, and since his right wing had meanwhile become engaged in support of Kritek's offensive, he didn't have enough strength to cooperate in the operation against the Jasionka. Kralicek's Group alone was not large enough to carry out the original plan, and success seemed doubtful. Boroevic therefore agreed with 4th Army HQ to put off the attack until III Corps became available, as soon as Kritek reached the Ondava Valley.

Meanwhile the situation on the west wing of 3rd Army was unsatisfactory. Based on the course of the fighting to date, there was no hope for a decisive breakthrough. The striking power of the over-taxed troops was already declining, and it wasn't possible to deploy in depth. It was urgently necessary to add new men to the units, but this wouldn't happen before the end of February (when the next series of March units arrived).

With the approval of GdI Boroevic, his Chief of Staff phoned Teschen with a new proposal. Since 4th Army HQ had repeatedly said it would be too difficult to attack with its south wing, the 13 and 26 LW ID should be moved from that Army to the sector of XVII Corps. With this reinforcement the 3rd Army could attack in echelon beginning with its left wing. GdI Conrad, however, responded that the proposed deployment would only result in further frontal attacks. Moreover, it would be a waste of resources to allow the III, VII and X Corps to do nothing while waiting for XVII Corps to first defeat the enemy. It would surrender the initiative to the Russians in other sectors and allow them to deploy their reserves as they saw fit. All the corps of Boroevic's west wing should move forward together, while Kralicek's Group of 4th Army cooperated. It had been necessary to transfer XVII Corps to Boroevic earlier because at the time the enemy advance to Sztropko and through Mezőlaborcz was at high tide, X and VII Corps had lost most of their strength due to heavy casualties, and a wide gap had opened between III and VII Corps. Now the situation of both 3rd and 4th Armies had changed. The former had established a firm front, and the latter could not now spare two further divisions.

---

1224th Army HQ asked FML Arz his opinion about this issue. He said that if his south wing attacked without the cooperation of III Corps it certainly couldn't advance at Banica. Therefore he was willing to transfer 13 LW ID...
After this refusal, 3rd Army HQ asked for the support they had earlier been discussing with their neighbor, and this was granted. The combined action of the two Armies would begin on the 17th.

3rd Army HQ held fast to its theory that only a succession of attacks in echelon could alter the situation. GdI Kritek, who had fought alone from the 10th to 14th and suffered heavy with casualties, declared that he would once more be able to switch from the defensive to the offensive on the 17th. Meanwhile, on the 15th the VII Corps attacked by itself. Although it encountered strong resistance, hopefully it would succeed on the next day when 21 LW ID entered the action on its right flank. The Bohemian Landwehr troops were climbing through the heights west of the Laborcza Valley, and were scheduled to take the village of Szuko from the enemy on the 16th. Thus the roles of the various corps had been reversed again; now the right echelon was supposed to help its neighbors forward.

Actions farther east

In the last ten days, no significant success had been won in the Uzsok Pass sector. FML Szurmay had decided to resume the offensive on the 6th; this time a sharp assault by his right wing would precede the difficult frontal attack by the center. The Russians, however, were on the alert. Neither the reinforced 75 Hon Inf Bde nor 3 Gd ID (which was under Linsingen's control) were able to make any noteworthy gains. On the 10th the Honveds attempted a surprise night attack, but it was shattered by the vigilant enemy. Thereupon Boroevic ordered Szurmay not to attack any further, since he might jeopardize the security of the Uzsok Pass.

Meanwhile the actions of V Corps had taken an unfavorable turn. The Russians attacked the Corps on both wings and ripped apart its connections with its neighbors, neither of whom came to its assistance. Therefore on the 13th the Corps HQ decided to pull back to its initial positions of 23 January. The center and left wing still had to endure heavy fighting during the withdrawal. This left 3rd Army HQ no other course than to send 9 ID whose deployment had for so long been a bone of contention to shore up the crumbling front. Orders to this effect were issued on the 13th, with the approval of GdK Böhm-Ermolli: 9 ID was split up, with its main body under XVIII Corps and the remainder under XIX Corps. Thus all components of VIII Corps had finally come up to

---

...to XVII Corps, but strongly objected to giving up a second division.
Meanwhile Russian resistance had also substantially increased against the German South Army. Only the west wing of the Army continued to advance: Hofmann's Group worked its way forward toward Tuchla, while 1st German ID on its left was fighting for possession of Zwinin. On the east wing, the Russians had turned the Wyszkow Pass into a latter day Plevna; the defenders' resistance shattered all the attacks of XXIV Res Corps. On the 12th, the German 209 Inf Bde left Hofmann's command and attempted to envelop the enemy on the heights by Wyszkow, but won just a temporary success. The Russians were then ordered to counterattack along the entire front; although they were turned back with heavy losses, this operation further reduced the offensive capability of the allied troops.

Through the AOK, GdI Linsingen asked to be reinforced by another German division. Falkenhayn merely replied that the German Eastern Command might be able to part with a division in the near future after their current actions had ended. Therefore Conrad considered sending the k.u.k. 5 ID to South Army. On the night of 13-14 February this Division was pulled from the front of 1st Army; however, its destination was soon to be changed.

9. Pflanzer-Baltin's offensive to Kolomea-Nadworna (31 January to 16 February)

In addition, Appendix 6 and sketches 5 and 6

Meanwhile the offensive of Pflanzer-Baltin had finally started, unfortunately after the attack through the central Carpathians had already completely lost its momentum on 26 January.

---

Following is a summary of reinforcements which reached 3rd and 2nd Armies during this period, showing the dates and places where they left the railroad trains. (In the original, the material appears on Beilage 7.)

- Combined Inf Bde -- In and near Izbugyaradvany (2-4 February)
- 1st Lst Inf Bde -- At Bartfeld (4-7 Feb)
- 21 LW ID (main body) -- In and near Izbugyaradvany (6-10 Feb)
- 9 ID (main body) -- In and near Nagybereza (6-10 Feb)
- 27 ID -- In and near Fenyvesvölgy (12-20 Feb)
- 41 Hon ID (main body) -- In and near Szinna (13-18 Feb)

At Tuchla on the 13th a Russian battalion wearing Austrian uniforms attacked Hofmann's lines.

The description of Pflanzer-Baltin's operations from the start of the offensive through 2 March is based in part on a study by Lt Col. Rodic; he prepared it before the pertinent documents were mostly destroyed by a large
The delay in the advance of the Armeegruppe was caused by the slow approach of 42 Hon ID on the secondary railroad to Körösmező, which was simultaneously clogged by other transports. Although the Division's first echelon detrained south of Körösmező on the 24th, the regular arrival of the remaining components didn't begin until the 28th. Therefore Pflanzer Baltin was not able to go along with Linsingen's demand on the 27th that he attack immediately. However, on the 30th he did send the main body of 6 ID from his western group through the Pantyr Pass to Rafailowa, where it prepared to attack toward Zielona. Smaller columns of the Division established firm control of the Douha Heights, the Sewola, and the area around Osmoloda.

As planned, the eastern group began to advance on 31 January; this group made up a corps led by FML Czibulka, with 36 ID plus two commands under FML Schultheisz and Schreitter (each command was around a brigade in strength, and consisted respectively of the remnants of 54 and 52 ID). Czibulka's men advanced in three columns out of the valley of the Golden Bistritz at Kirlibaba and the area downstream, and through the chain of hills to the northeast toward Breaza, Moldawa and Izwor. A detachment at Jacobeny would first guard the right flank against the enemy units at Kimpolung. After taking the Moldawa Valley, Czibulka intended to send his main body against Fundul Moldovi and drive the enemy from south Bukovina as instructed 126.

During continuous fighting, the western column reached Izwor on 5 February; the center had already reached Moldawa on the 3rd. Also on the 3rd the Corps commander ordered substantial forces diverted toward the right in the direction of Fundul Moldovi. On the 6th the Russians opposite GM Lilienhoff evacuated Pozoritta and Kimpolung.

The advance through the mountains

On 1 February the main body of 42 Hon ID and parts of 52 ID broke through the Tartar Pass toward the Pruth Valley at Worochta Tatarow 127. On this first day, a detached column under Mihaljevic already reached Zbie with 3 battalions, a quarter squadron and a fire in the offices of the Military Archives.

126 There was a major change in the organization of the various columns in the next few days; after the reorganization FML Benigni led the western column, FML Schreitter the center (which was moving toward Moldawa) and GM Lilienhoff the eastern column.
127 This sector was under XIII Corps HQ; during the crossing of the mountains it was temporarily led by the commander of 6 ID, FML Schönburg-Hartenstein, instead of GdI Rhemen who was on leave.
mountain battery. On 2 and 3 February, the main body of the Croatian division took both Worochta and Tatarow in the Pruth Valley; then, however, its advance stalled; one of its regiments fell into an ambush at Tatarow and paid for its lack of caution with heavy casualties. The personnel, mostly inhabitants of the lowlands, were not accustomed to the harsh mountain climate; insufficiently clothed, their limbs suffered from frostbite. In the first four days of the operation, 42 Hon ID had already lost 26 officers and 1800 men. The units rested and closed ranks on 5 February.

Meanwhile 6 ID was engaged in heavy fighting. Its main column advanced in the valley of the Bystrzyca Nadwornianska along with Haller's Polish legionnaires. At Zielona they collided with a Russian force which was receiving reinforcements; after a very hot and costly fight that lasted for several days, they took the town on the 5th. Since 42 Hon ID was lagging behind, 6 ID lacked support on its right. The smaller columns which the Alpine division had sent down the valleys the Bystrzyca Solotwinska and the Lomnica were engaged in fighting that surged back and forth. As in all other sectors, the gallant troops here had to deal with all the horrors of winter in the mountains.

Concerned about the isolation of 6 ID, the Armeegruppe commander intervened energetically and spurred the 42 Hon ID to move faster. Certain that he could defeat the smaller Russian forces opposing him, he asked the AOK to let him use 10 CD (which was supposed to join South Army) rather than 5 Hon CD, because the latter's rail transport was being held up. Pflanzer-Baltin believed that horsemen could give him valuable support in the more level Carpathian foothills which his troops were entering. However, the high command refused his request because they hoped that Linsingen also would soon be leaving the high mountains and would need cavalry.

The advance of 42 Hon ID was again delayed by the need to take wide-ranging security measures on the heights which ran along the Pruth valley; they were difficult to cross and heavily covered with snow. On the 11th the Domobranen reached the area south of Delatyn. To their left the 6 ID was fighting at Pasieczna, but wasn't able to drive the Russians from their last position on the

---

128Mihaljevic's Column fought successfully on the 5th and 6th west of Uście Putilla. Lt Russ' volunteer detachment, responsible for scouting, was particularly distinguished. During these days Mihaljevic was reinforced by some Landsturm, artillery and cavalry.

129Lt Col. Haller commanded 3 Polish battalions plus a quarter squadron and a mountain battery. Before the advance started, he had repulsed a Russian attack at Rafailowa on the night of 23-24 January.
edge of the mountains south of Nadworna. Now, however, the entire XIII Corps was able to launch a combined attack on the 12th and won a complete success, while the Carinthian IR # 7 stormed a key height. On the next day the main body of the Croats entered Delatyn and on the 14th followed the enemy who were falling back to Nadworna. The principal column of 6 ID." deployed behind 42 Hon ID; the Division's side columns were > gaining ground in the smaller valleys farther west. Mihaljevic's Detachment marched through Krzyworownia and pushed back Russian groups at Jaworow; on the 14th they were at Lanczyn, thus keeping up with the rest of XIII Corps on its right flank.

According to an intercepted order, the Russians had begun to retreat to Stanislau on the afternoon of the 13th. After the successes of the right wing of the eastern corps at Kimpolung, it now seemed possible that Czibulka's main body could shift to the north and there link up with XIII Corps. Pflanzer-Baltin had already ordered on the 6th that Benigni should advance through Seletin, Uscie Putilla and Kuty-Wiznitz, in echelon to the southeast of Mihaljevic's Detachment. Schreitter would march from Moldawa through Seletin to Berhometh on the upper Sereth. The pursuit of the enemy into southern Bukovina therefore would be entrusted solely to GM Lilienhoff. He would thrust through Gurahumora-Radautz and drive the Russians over the Suczawa and the Sereth.

On 7 February, Benigni was at Seletin and Izwor, Schreitter at Moldawa and Fundul Moldovi; both groups rested on the next day in these areas, while Lilienhoff was at Kimpolung and Wama. As ordered by Pflanzer-Baltin, the columns of Schreitter and Benigni threw back the enemy south of Berhometh and Kuty-Wiznitz. On the 12th they launched an envelopment attack Kuty and Wiznitz on (these were sister towns situated on opposite banks of the Czeremosz); they broke the Russian resistance, and then rested on the 13th. Meanwhile Lilienhoff was not opposed as he advanced through Gurahumora and Radautz toward Czernowitz.

130 The actions of the eastern corps to date had shown that some of the older Landsturm troops lacked the physical strength to participate in the offensive. Moreover, some of the Gendarmerie detachments would soon be needed to perform their normal security functions in Bukovina as the crownland was recovered. Therefore the columns of the eastern corps were reorganized as follows:

- FML Benigni had 126 Lst Inf Bde and 72 Inf Bde (12 battalions, 2 squadrons and 9 batteries)
- FML Schreitter had 13 Inf Bde and three Polish Legion battalions (10 battalions, 1 3/4 squadrons and 4 1/2 batteries)
- GM Lilienhoff had 2 Army, 6 Gendarme, 3 Landsturm and 2 Volunteer battalions (13 battalions, 3 1/4 squadrons and 1 1/2 batteries).
The advance to Kolomea

Already on the 8th the AOK sent a wire to Pflanzer-Baltin's HQ at Maramaros-Sziget with instructions for the next phase. After taking Nadworna-Delatyn he was to immediately send most of his western group (XIII Corps) to Dolina help Linsingen get out of the mountains. Most of FML Czibulka's eastern group was directed through Kuty-Wiznitz to Kolomea, while the rest would pursue the enemy in the Bukovina over the Sereth.

As our narrative has demonstrated, the Armeegruppe commander had already taken measures to implement these orders, but it seemed His to him that his available forces wouldn't be sufficiently large; the enemy would certainly receive reinforcements. Therefore he asked the AOK for at least two more infantry divisions. request couldn't be honored because of the unfavorable situation of 3rd Army. Pflanzer-Baltin planned to give XIII Corps a short but urgently needed rest at Nadworna; then on the 16th it would advance in two columns through Lachowce (south of Bohorodczany) and Solotwina toward Dolina. The eastern corps would send its main body through Kolomea, Ottynia and Stanislau; a smaller column would advance through Jablonow, Peczenizyn, and Bohorodczany to Kalusz; GM Lilienhoff would capture the capital of the Bukovina.

It was learned from intercepted broadcasts that the Russian units falling back over the Sereth to Czernowitz had been ordered to march west through Sniatyn. Apparently they were planning to thrust against the east flank and rear of the Armeegruppe. Nevertheless Pflanzer-Baltin allowed the main body of the eastern corps (under FML Benigni) to continue the advance toward Kolomea; Lilienhoff and parts of Schreitter's Group would thrust north to locate and defeat the Russians south of the Pruth. These orders were already being implemented when it was learned that the area south of the Pruth as far as the mouth of the Czeremosz was free of the enemy. Without hesitation the main body of the eastern corps pushed on to Kolomea. On the 14th Benigni threw the enemy back at Jablonow. On the next day he was reinforced by Schreitter and fought his way to the southern edge of Kolomea, where the Russians offered stubborn resistance. Lilienhoff was in position west and south of Czernowitz.

The enemy commanders, who were aware of the danger of an advance by XIII Corps to Dolina, anticipated the operation by striking first. On the 15th they threw back both of the western columns of

131 on the 14th Pflanzer-Baltin also received a direct request from the commander of the German South Army that he immediately advance to Dolina.
6 ID; then they prepared a line of resistance just south of Solotwina.

Now it was necessary to quickly win success at Kolomea, so that the eastern corps could thereafter close up with the XIIIth. Pflanzer-Baltin ordered that the parts of Mihaljevic's Group at Lanczyn should fall upon the rear of the Russians who were defending themselves south of the city. By this point the AOK had transferred 10 CD from South Army to Pflanzer and it was detraining at Delatyn. It would advance toward Stanislau while 5 Hon CD advanced toward Dolina. Finally, a flying column of volunteers would destroy the enemy's rail connections between Stanislau and Kolomea.

The events of the 16th rewarded the commander's carefully prepared plans. The double envelopment attack of the eastern corps on Kolomea was effectively supported by the threat to the enemy's rear from Lanczyn. The Russians soon fled through the city, with our troops on their heels; the enemy didn't have time to destroy the bridges over the Pruth as they had planned. On the western wing the main body of 6 ID drove the enemy out of Solotwina and its western columns also renewed their advance. 42 Hon ID thrust toward the north between the rail line leading to Stanislau and the Bystrzyca Solotwinska.

Thus Pflanzer-Baltin's masterful operation was succeeding, and forces were concentrating as ordered toward the decisive point, the western wing. Time would soon show whether the Armeegruppe would be able to provide direct support to Linsingen. Nevertheless, the reports from the right wing of the k.u.k. forces were the only gleam of light for the high command during a succession of gloomy days and weeks.

10. The Winter Battle in Masuria and its results

As always, the commander of the Russian Southwest Front General Ivanov - remained the leading spokesman for an offensive over the Carpathians into the Hungarian plains; there he hoped to find a suitable battlefield for his large force of cavalry. The Russians were also suffering from the rigors of the Carpathian winter; their units were shrinking, although it was much easier for them than for their opponents to find replacements because of the inexhaustible human resources of the Tsar's empire. Thus Ivanov wanted to put an end to his intolerable halt in the mountains. He went so far as to warn the Stavka that he would be forced to pull
his units back north out of the inhospitable highlands if he didn't receive enough reinforcements to launch a decisive attack. He constantly demanded new units, since he believed -- or wished to believe that -- 150,000 Germans had joined the Aus-Hung. armies.

The Grand Duke wavered. If he went along with Ivanov, what would happen to the planned offensive against East Prussia? Developments were unfolding as Danilov had always feared: the high command was failing adhere to one strategic goal as it strove to achieve two widely separated objectives. Therefore Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch didn't approve all of Ivanov's ideas. He criticized the commander of the Southwest Front for exhausting his corps in costly frontal attacks against the enemy's center instead of seeking a decision against the allies' eastern flank. Another reason for striking the enemy a heavy blow in the Bukovina was the possible effect on Romania. Thus the Grand Duke's gaze was wandering to the south, where at this time the British and French were preparing their Dardanelles expedition. It seemed to the Russian commander-in-chief that the Balkans were the place where the Central Powers' front could most easily be broken.

The German attack in East Prussia caused the Stavka to initiate further deliberations.

The Germans' victory and their further plans

While the AOK at Teschen was anxiously watching the situation in the Carpathians, GFM Hindenburg's offensive of 7-21 February resulted in the victorious "Winter Battle in Masuria." The successful thrust of 10th and 8th Armies completely freed East Prussia from the Russians. Meanwhile, on 11 February GdA Gallwitz had begun to advance with his Armeegruppe, made up of a mixture of first line, garrison and border security troops. First his right wing moved through Plock and soon afterwards his left advanced from Willenberg to Przasnysz. Two days later the k.u.k. 3rd CD -- which had left 2nd Army on 26 January -- joined Gallwitz' forces. After its victory in the Winter Battle, on 17 February the German 8th Army was ordered to break through the Bobr-Narew line between Lomza and Ossowiec.

GdI Conrad sent a congratulatory message to Ludendorff and asked

132Translator's Note While under German command, the 3 CD was engaged at Radzanowo-Bromierz (19-21 Feb) and Plock (1-9 March); thereafter the sector it held was quiet until it finally rejoined the k.u.k. forces in summer 1915. (Actions listed in the Prussian General Staff summary.)

133Schwarte, Der deutsche Landkrieg, Vol. I, pp. 526 and 529
him to continue the offensive of the German eastern armies against the flank and rear of the Russian units assembled in the Vistula sector. This thrust could be decisive for the front in Poland and for the future prospects of the allies; it might also impress the wavering neutrals. Falkenhayn, however, had already made this plan impossible. On the 19th he informed Hindenburg that substantial parts of the German Army Group would have to be moved to the West in the second half of March to fill the gaps in the ranks caused by the offensives of the French and British in the last few months.\footnote{Falkenhayn, pp. 51 ff.}

Ludendorff now bemoaned the fact that the Winter Battle hadn't decisively changed the strategic situation; this had been foreseen by Conrad during the New Year's conference at Berlin when he had raised objections against a flank attack in the most northerly sector of the front.\footnote{Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1919), p. 99}

The reinforced left wing of Gallwitz' Armeegruppe was able to fight its way into Przasnysz on the 24th; however, on the 27th the Germans beset on all sides by the Russians had to evacuate the city and pull back to the border. On the other hand, the German 8th Army held its ground in front of Ostroleka-Lomza, and bombarded the Ossowiec fortress. (Two Aus-Hung. 305 mm mortar batteries took part in the firing.) The enemy was massing large forces south of the fortified river line, which forced Falkenhayn to renounce his intention of bringing units from the Eastern to the Western Front.

As in September 1914, there was still an enormous distance between the northern and southern pincers of the allied forces; they lacked the strength to bring the pincers together.

The Russians' reaction

To analyze the impact of Hindenburg's glorious victory on the situation of the allied forces in the East, it is necessary to observe the Russian countermeasures.\footnote{Danilov, pp. 420 ff. and 452 ff. Nesnamov, Vol. III, Boncz-Bruyevitch, Vol. I, pp. 38-70}

Both of the corps in the Stavka reserve (Guard and XV), which had been coveted by Ivanov, now had to hurry to the assistance of Ruszky's Northwest Front. On 13 February the Stavka definitely refused Ivanov's plea for reinforcements, despite the serious danger to the Russian eastern wing posed by Pflanzer-Baltin's.
advance. The Southwest Front was advised to rely on its own resources by moving troops from its two Armies west of the Vistula or from 3rd Army. Moreover, the Front was directed to give up the III Caucasian Corps.

On the 14th and the following days, Ivanov issued orders for the planned reorganization of his Front at the end of February, along with each Army's goals for the next offensive. 8th Army would advance through Bartfeld and the Uzsok Pass to capture the Varanno-Homonna area; its east wing would hold off the allied units which were advancing from Ungvar, Munkacs and Huszt. 3rd Army would thrust its left wing forward to Neusandez and Alt Lublau; for this purpose, Brussilov's XXIV and XII Corps were transferred to 3rd Army. An infantry division and a rifle brigade from west Poland would also be provided as reinforcements.

A "new" 9th Army would be created for General Letschitzky on the extreme left wing of the Front; it would consist of XI, XVII and XXX Corps plus II Cavalry Corps. The remaining parts of his "old" 9th Army in west Poland would come under 4th Army. Letschitzky's mission was to advance through Nadworna and throw Pflanzer-Baltin back. Finally, 11th Army would operate actively against the Przemysl fortress and build a reserve force for the Grand Duke-Generalissimo at Chyrow.

Ivanov declared that he didn't understand why III Caucasian Corps was being taken from him; he had intended to send the Corps toward Halicz-Zurawno to prevent the anticipated envelopment of his eastern wing by Pflanzer-Baltin. As consolation, the Stavka replied that it would soon send XXXIII Corps to reinforce 9th Army.

A meeting of the commanders of the two Fronts was held on the 17th, with the Grand Duke once again presiding. Ruszky proposed to attack the south borders of East Prussia with the twelve corps of his 10th, 12th and 1st Armies. This was approved, but Ivanov resisted Ruszky's attempt to obtain further units on the ground that this would necessitate a retreat west of the Vistula. The rivalry between the two commanders came again to the fore. Each of them wanted to reinforce his own offensive at the expense of the other. There was a lively debate on the question of whether to retain the current positions in west Poland or to pull back into a large bridgehead over the Vistula. For some time Nicholas Nikolaievitch hesitated to make a final decision. Indeed, the Stavka briefly considered a plan to break through the thin allied lines in west Poland; this was abandoned because the high command lacked confidence in the offensive capabilities of its Armies in
that sector.

The Grand Duke became dejected because of the surrender of large parts of the 10th Russian Army in the Augustow forests. On the 23rd he told his subordinates that the lack of ammunition and the poor condition of the armies made it impossible to seize the initiative from the enemy at this time. He intended to denude the sector west of the Vistula of troops to the greatest possible extent; he would counterattack north of Warsaw and in the Carpathians to at least win some small successes.

Ivanov did not approve of this decision. When Ruszky began his offensive on 2 March, Ivanov reported to the Stavka that the enemy had assembled strong forces for an attack toward Sanok-Lisko. They intended to relieve Przemysl and to mount a dangerous envelopment operation through Stanislau against the Russian left wing; this might force the evacuation of Galicia. On the other hand, if the enemy's plan failed the Army and peoples of Austria-Hungary would collapse. For this reason, a decision must be sought in the south, the area west of the Vistula must be held, and the German army in the north should merely be kept in check. Ivanov's report this time affected the attitude of the Stavka at Baranowicze because of the political benefits that would stem from the appearance of the Russians in the heart of Hungary. At this point the situation in the Balkans was becoming favorable due to the Dardanelles expedition and the was attitude of Romania. Both Russia and the Western powers also win hoped to win Italy to their side. Therefore Ruszky was ordered not to undertake any large-scale offensive against East Prussia, and on 19 March Ivanov was instructed to advance with his left wing toward Budapest "which will outflank the entire Cracow-Posen-Thorn line. Ivanov had thus triumphed in the dispute of the two Fronts. When the Stavka moreover demanded that units be removed from the Northwest Front, Ruszky resigned his post, unnerved by these fatal changes in planning. He was succeeded as Front commander by General Alexeiev, Ivanov's Chief of Staff.

The reinforcements for the left wing of the Southwest Front could only gradually reach their allotted deployment areas. Only XXII Corps was already thrusting over the Stryj against the German South Army in the first half of February; the Finnish riflemen of this Corps soon proved themselves to be tough defensive fighters.

137Boncz-Bruyevitch, Vol. I, p. 78. Danilov states that this operational order of 19 March was the only one of the entire war which was personally written by General Yanushkevitch, the Grand Duke's Chief of Staff. Danilov himself, whose views were not consulted during this episode, asked to be relieved. His request, however, was refused by the Grand Duke. (Danilov, "Grossfürst Nikolai Nikolajewitsch", p. 134)
in the forested mountains. The southern group of XXX Corps, which had been unsuccessfully opposing Pflazner-Baltin, was ordered on 12 February to withdraw over the Pruth and to delay the advance of the k.u.k. Armeegruppe by counter-thrusts from the east. Czernowitz, however, was to be evacuated. The 74 ID plus 3 and 2 Rifle Bdes from 4th Army were hurriedly sent through Bolechow to Stanislau to protect 8th Army's threatened flank. On the 27th, General Letschitzky set up headquarters at Tarnopol and took over the new 9th Army, formed from units moving to the scene from the north and northwest.

A review of all this activity by the Russians indicates that the primary benefit of Hindenburg's offensive was that it prevented the Russian Guards and XV Corps from being sent to the Carpathians to join the heavy fighting against the Aus-Hung. Army. It is also certain that if it hadn't been for the powerful German attack the Stavka would have given in to Ivanov's demands for further reinforcements, thus increasing his chances for a successful offensive to Budapest. On the other hand, the Russians' pain over their fearful defeat in Masuria turned into a resolution to compensate with successes on their Southwest Front. The pressure against the Aus-Hung. Army increased, and the fall of Przemysl became increasingly likely.

11. The basis for new decisions by the AOK

In addition, Appendix 7 and sketches 6 and 9

The Przemysl garrison impatiently awaited the arrival of their deliverers. After a long lull, on 9 February the Russian siege artillery resumed its bombardment of the defenses. The days of relative quiet had ended for good. The bombardment continued without interruption, although the city itself suffered very little. On the other hand, the fighting around the outer works was energetically carried on by both sides; the defenders, in particular, strove to prevent the enemy from carrying out their plan of tightening the encircling lines.

On the 10th, the fortress HQ reported to Teschen that if they immediately slaughtered 3500 horses they would have enough rations to hold out until 14 March (there would be enough fodder for the remaining animals until 12 March). This measure, however, would limit offensive operations by the garrison and preclude any possibility that they could break out. After a short delay, the AOK agreed on the 16th that the horses should be slaughtered.

The Przemysl fortifications were 70 km as the crow flies from the
nearest Aus-Hung. field forces. At Teschen hope was disappearing that the intervening distance could be quickly covered. On 12 February the AOK had already reported to the Emperor's Military Chancellery that it was becoming doubtful that they could relieve the fortress in time. Nonetheless, everything possible would be done to prevent its fall. Three days later the Monarch emphatically ordered the Archduke-Supreme Commander to avoid losing Przemysl.

Political and psychological demands were thus hampering the commanders' freedom to make decisions. The resumption of the interrupted offensive was becoming ever more urgent. The operation which opened on 23 January was designed to quickly relieve Przemysl by an advance along the shortest possible route. Therefore, as in December of the preceding year, the attack was to proceed in echelon beginning with the east wing of 3rd Army. Before the time arrived for III Corps on the west wing to advance, however, Brussilov's counterattack forced that Corps back behind the Ondava.

Therefore the situation seemed to call for intervention by the k.u.k. 4th Army; there were indications that the AOK favored such an operation. The attitude of the higher level commanders of 4th Army toward a frontal attack on Dimitriev's strong line has already been narrated they believed that without cooperation from III Corps the attack would fail with heavy casualties and should not be initiated. Army HQ therefore preferred to do their part by transferring divisions to other sectors. Also they were always ready to assist their neighbors on the right with a limited action by their southern wing. As noted previously, when the HQ at Okocim cancelled the attack by Kritek's Group on 5 February it was because they had little trust in the ability of 3rd Army to participate after the setbacks which it had recently suffered. Correctly, they were not willing to launch an isolated attack of their own.

As soon as Boroevic's situation improved, however, the 4th Army HQ renewed their offer to help out with their south wing; they even placed the two divisions allotted for this purpose (13 and 26 LW ID) under the commander of III Corps. For the main body of 4th Army, the AOK's order of 22 January remained in effect: they would join the offensive after 3rd Army had begun to make progress. However, if Dimitriev began to abandon his lines the 4th Army would attack immediately. Any casualties would be justified if they could thus interfere with his retreat. Even though the Army had given up the equivalent of seven divisions (6, 11 and 19 ID; 45 LW ID; 38 and 41 Hon ID; 43 and 86 LW Inf
Bdes), it still had more than 100,000 riflemen. At a time when there was a shortage of manpower in all sectors, this was a fairly substantial force. However, Army HQ also had to anticipate an attack by the 3rd Russian Army. If successful, such an attack would bring the entire Carpathian operation into question. Therefore the HQ of 4th Army observed the activities of their opponents with great attention and concern. When intelligence reports made it certain that the 32 Russian ID had left the front, HQ began immediately to plan for an offensive between the Dunajec and Biala Rivers.

**Political pressure on the AOK**

While the AOK was busily preparing to renew the Carpathian offensive -- in general by thrusting in the same direction as in the original plan -- politics began to influence the decisions of the leadership. The Germans were once more urgently proposing to the Ballhausplatz that Serbia should be overthrown to open the lines of communication to Turkey. Constantinople seemed to be gravely menaced by the Dardanelles expedition which was, prepared by the English and French. The Wilhelstrasse was of the opinion that Bulgaria and Romania must be won over; above all, Italy should be bought off by Austrian territorial of sacrifices. On 9 February Falkenhayn wired Conrad that for the time being he didn't think a victory in the Carpathians was possible; on the other hand, solution of the Romanian-Italian question couldn't be postponed. Austria's southwestern neighbor should be induced to enter the war as part of a renewed Triple Alliance by an offer of territory. The k.u.k. Chief of Staff didn't share these hopes. At best, Romania might be brought over to the side of the Central Powers; this possibility should be seriously pursued. Falkenhayn did all he could to win Conrad (over to his position at his request the k.u.k plenipotentiary at German general HQ, FML Stürgkh, went to Teschen on the 12th to restate the German position. They needed raw materials from Italy and grain from Romania; therefore the interrupted negotiations with states Conrad however held fast to his own idea, he demanded that Burian await the result of the current series of military actions.

To add to the pressing concerns of the Habsburg Monarchy, there were distressing signs that an anti-dynastic movement was developing in Bohemia and the southern Slav territories; inevitably this would have a harmful effect on the armed forces. There was an increasing number of reports that certain units were unreliable for nationalistic reasons. Thus politics as well as the ration situation of Przemysl made it necessary to quickly

---

138Translator's note The Ballhausplatz and Wilhelstrasse
seek a decisive victory.

12. Carpathian actions through 26 February

a. The right wing and its attack toward Dolina (16-26 February)

Since mid-February, on the entire Eastern front only the extreme wings were still free of the chains of positional warfare and able to sustain powerful offensives. While the Germans advanced in East Prussia, Pflanzer-Baltin advanced in southeast Galicia and the Bukovina.

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin now experienced a series of extraordinarily tense days. His difficult task was to divert his main effort toward the northwest to bring South Army some badly needed help. However, this operation would have to be conducted while guarding against a probable counterattack by Russian reinforcements from the direction of Stanislau; units would have to be carefully allotted to fulfill both of these important roles. Because it had initially been necessary to advance in echelon, the Armeegruppe's right wing was hanging behind, which now would have to be remedied.

After the capture of Kolomea on the 16th, the enemy pulled back to Ottynia, pursued by only weak forces; FML Czibulka had to give most of his troops some necessary rest at Kolomea. The Russians, however, had not left the routes to Stanislau completely open. On the 17th - while Pflanzer-Baltin and his staff were moving forward from Maramaros-Sziget to Delatyn - the main body of 42 Hon ID was heavily engaged north of Nadworna. Without delay, the Armeegruppe commander issued orders to bring help to the Division. 6 ID, already advancing on Dolina, would intervene on the Croatians' left wing; Czibulka's main force (parts of 36 ID and 10 CD plus Mihaljevic's Detachment) would intervene on their right. Only Czibulka's eastern column would continue to advance on Ottynia. These movements were carried out on the 18th. The Russians, however, pulled out of the trap and retreated north in front of 42 Hon ID; the k.u.k. 10 CD followed on their heels in the direction of Stanislau.

Now Pflanzer-Baltin could send his main body toward Dolina. Under XIII Corps, 6 ID used empty supply wagons to move troops quickly through Rozniatow; the leading elements were supposed to reach Dolina on the 20th. 42 Hon ID should reach Rozniatow on the same day. 5 Hon CD and Benigni's Group would follow the 6th
and 42nd; the rest of the eastern corps would continue the pursuit to Stanislau.

On the extreme right wing, GM Lilienhoff's cavalry entered Czernowitz on the 17th; it had just been evacuated by the enemy. On the next day his eastern group also entered the city; the western group halted at Waschkoutz. According to an intercepted radio message, the parts of Russian XXX Corps farther up the Pruth were going to cross back to the south side of the river at Zablotow; then they would thrust against the Armeegruppe's east flank and halt its advance. Therefore Lilienhoff was ordered to advance from Waschkoutz to Sniatyn on the 19th; then he would move through Horodenka and Tlumacz to close up with Czibulka's Corps. Only Major Papp's Detachment would stay in Czernowitz to hold in check the small Russian group which had retreated toward Nowosielica.

Hopes for South Army's advance out of the mountains

It seemed that in all probability the Russians in front of the German South Army would soon be forced to withdraw because of the threat to their rear; thus the routes out of the mountains would become open for Linsingen. Meanwhile the units of the German commander were defending themselves in very heavy fighting against Russian counterattacks. The main burden was borne by XXIV Reserve Corps and by Hofmann's Group. Unfortunately the right wing of 19 ID gave way on the 18th and fell back about one kilometer. Hofmann's three brigades now totalled little more than 6,000 riflemen\textsuperscript{139}; these troops, who'd been in continuous combat since 23 January and only under shelter for three nights in that period, had reached the limits of their endurance. The German 1st ID and 3 Gd ID were also lying motionless in front of the strong enemy positions.

However, the 5 k.u.k. ID was already moving by rail to this sector and also - after the successful result of the Winter Battle in Masuria - the German 4 ID. On the other hand, the German 5 CD was sitting behind the Army's front with nothing to do. With the consent of the k.u.k. high command, Linsingen decided to send these three units through Delatyn to the left wing of Pflanzer-Baltin, as he had already sent 10 CD; thus they wouldn't be tied down in indecisive actions in the mountains.

\textsuperscript{139}FML Hofmann had just half of a mountain cannon battery and one mountain howitzer battery, because at the start of the offensive he had to give up most of his mountain artillery to the XXIV Reserve Corps and to 3 Gd ID. There was just one staff officer and eight captains with the three brigades. The group commander had therefore asked the AOK to be reinforced by a first-line brigade.
First he sent 5 ID through Maramaros-Sziget toward Delatyn, where the first elements arrived on the 20th.

Under these circumstances, the commander of the German South Army wished also to exert control over the conduct of operations on the other side of the Carpathians. His Chief of Staff (GM Stolzmann) had received orientation about the situation from the Armeegruppe HQ at Maramaros-Sziget on the 16th. Then GdK Freiherr Marschall, hitherto commander of 3 Gd ID, was ordered to take over the units which had originally belonged to South Army - 10 CD, 5 ID and later also the German 5 CD. With these units he was to thrust as quickly as possible through Dolina into the rear of the enemy. This should double the offensive capability of XXIV Res Corps. On the left wing, Linsingen gave GLt von Conta overall control of German 1 ID and 3 Gd ID on the Zwinin. Marschall reached Delatyn on the 19th and took over the left wing of Pflanzer's Armeegruppe; however, because of changes in the situation he wasn't given the units originally envisioned by Linsingen.

South Army HQ at Munkacs followed every step of Pflanzer-Baltin. When he diverted 6 ID on the 18th from the direction of Dolina to support 42 Hon ID, Linsingen's staff immediately complained to Teschen. They stated that it was unnecessary and unproductive to send so many units toward Stanislau; Pflanzer-Baltin should be ordered to immediately send two divisions toward Dolina-Bolechow-Stryj and continue with this operation until South Army could advance. The commander of the Armeegruppe had meanwhile come to the same conclusion as the situation became clearer, and the AOK had approved his proposed maneuver. The high command didn't believe it was advisable to interfere with a general whose capability and energy they fully trusted. They couldn't go along with Linsingen's desire to have 4 German ID sent through Delatyn because the rail line didn't have sufficient capacity. The AOK stated that the Division would have to detrain at Munkacs and march through the mountains on the roads which Pflanzer-Baltin had cleared. Anyway, the XI Corps had already been ordered to be transported to Delatyn from 4th Army. XXIV Res Corps now needed to attack at Wyszkow and drive the Russians back.

The Russians strike back

On the 19th the situation north of the Carpathians seemed to be developing very favorably and Pflanzer-Baltin was about to launch the final decisive offensive to Dolina; however, the South Army suffered a severe setback. The Russians redoubled their efforts against XXIV Res Corps; they enveloped both wings of the allied
force at Wyszkow in a pincers movement. The right wing (19 ID) was particularly hard hit, and both fell back. It was still uncertain whether this attack was designed to cover an enemy retreat or whether they intended to stand their ground. Hofmann was also now compelled to pull back his east wing; only 1st ID was able to stay in place by exerting all its strength.

After their success on the 19th, the Russians halted their attacks on XXIV Res Corps for a while; on the 21st the Corps' left wing was again able to begin an advance. When the whole Corps was sent forward for a major attack on the 26th, however, they encountered stubborn resistance in all sectors. Hofmann's Group was engaged every day in heavy defensive fighting, but inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, especially on the 26th. The German 1st ID gained ground toward the Ostry Heights on the 22nd, but 3 Gd ID was unable to capture the hotly contested Klewa and even had to fall back a bit. South Army didn't have enough striking power for direct cooperation with Pflanzer-Baltin. Its strength was melting away; about 500 men were lost daily. On 24 February the Army had 20,000 Aus-Hung. riflemen (not counting 5 ID and 10 CD) and 21,800 Germans.

Linsingen was still trying to extend his authority to the left wing of the neighboring group. On the 22nd he proposed that the AOK place XIII Corps under his command; in exchange, he would give Pflanzer-Baltin control of 5 ID. Moreover he suggested that the German OHL be asked to send him their 3 ID (which already had Gren Regt # 9 fighting under 3 Gd ID). The AOK at Teschen weren't inclined to agree to the first proposal because they wanted a united command structure for the area between the Dniester and Lomnica. Linsingen's idea of sending 5 CD by rail to Delatyn also had to be turned down because of the inadequate rail line (just as it had been impossible to move German 4 ID in that direction). Thus the German cavalry had to ride through the Tartar Pass into the Pruth valley. GM Stoltzmann himself came to Teschen to urge that 3 German ID be sent as reinforcements, but Falkenhayn wasn't willing to send further units into the wasteful fighting in the mountains. His decision would have been different if South Army was already engaged north of the Carpathians.

The tension increased for Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe. On the morning of the 20th the enemy evacuated the city of Stanislau and 10 CD rode in amidst the celebrating citizenry. XIII Corps - now under GdK Marschall - and Benigni's column were pushing toward Dolina: 42 Hon ID and 5 Hon CD fought during the day at Krasna, 6 ID at Perehinsko. Pflanzer-Baltin's plans were ripening: the
Russians had been thrown back through Stanislau, the line of the Dniester below Nizniow seemed secure, and Czernowitz was firmly in the hands of the k.u.k. troops. In all probability the line of retreat for the enemy units facing the South Army through Dolina and Skole would soon be cut.

However, in the afternoon of the 20th there were developments that seriously threatened to undo everything that had been accomplished to date. The units of the reorganized 9th Russian Army had gradually moved by rail and roads to their new deployment areas. The first reinforcements – probably 2 Rifle Bde – were sent to help the parts of 71 ID which had been driven out of Stanislau. The enemy advanced back toward the city from three sides. Meanwhile a brigade of the k.u.k. 36 ID had arrived on the scene; thanks only to the firmness of the local commanders and the bravery of the troops the larger Russian force was held in check.

Pflanzer-Baltin parries the Russian thrust

Pflanzer-Baltin parried the Russian thrust with his usual energy. First he reassigned Benigni's column (moving as ordered from Bohorodczany to the northwest) back to the eastern corps and diverted it toward the heights north of Stanislau. Then he took measures to move Lilienhoff's Group as quickly as possible to the right wing of the eastern corps. The outcome stood on the razor's edge. Fortunately the first troops of 5 ID arrived at this time in Delatyn. Originally the AOK had wanted to assign this Division to XIII Corps, so that Marschall could quickly gain ground toward Dolina. Now, however, the high command gave the Armeegruppe HQ a free hand because the retention of Stanislau was a necessary precondition for the success of Marschall's offensive. Pflanzer-Baltin ordered 5 ID to assemble at Nadworna, without yet deciding which way to send it. On the 21st the defenders of Stanislau again held off the Russians' encirclement attempts; they were already receiving some help from the arriving reinforcements. Lilienhoff reached Horodenka. Under the western corps, 42 Hon ID drove the enemy back to Rozniatow and 6 ID took Perehinsko. Pflanzer-Baltin was everywhere; in his auto he hurried throughout the extended battlefield to make his subordinates aware of his goals.

FML Czibulka attacked on the 22nd. His right wing, which had held off a Russian thrust at Tysmienica, took the heights south of that town; a mixed detachment moved from Tlumacz to Nizniow to

140Some parts of 42 Hon ID which had been serving in Benigni's column, however, marched away to join their own Division.
guard the right flank. Benigni also advanced in the area directly west of Stanislau, along the road leading to Kalusz. On the next day, however, the Russians fell upon his Landsturm troops from the northwest and encircled them; they fled to the rear. It was possible to surmount this serious crisis because both Benigni and Czibulka had available the first battalions of 5 ID; they had been sent ahead in several places to support the eastern corps. Now they entered the battle on the corps' left wing. Pflanzer-Baltin had to approve this maneuver, although a substantial part of his reserve was thus diverted from its original mission.

XIII Corps fought on the 22nd and 23rd with varying success. 42 Hon ID and 5 Hon CD weren't able to break through at Rozniatow. To the left of the Croatian Honveds, 6 ID crossed the Czeczwa, but then was compelled to pull back to the eastern bank. It seemed possible that the enemy was beginning to pull back from their positions in front of the right wing of South Army, and therefore was fighting fiercely on the Czeczwa to hold open the line of retreat. Therefore Pflanzer-Baltin asked GdI Linsingen to have XXIV Res Corps immediately advance. This theory, however, soon proved erroneous; the Russians held onto the Wyszkow Pass with undiminished strength.

After GM Lilienhoff's Group came closer, FML Czibulka was able on the 24th to once more have his east wing attack under FML Schreitter's command, while guarding in the direction of Nizniow. The Russian were pushed back a considerable distance on the heights northeast of Stanislau.

On the next day the Armeegruppe was to attack on the entire front. Its commander had decided to commit the next contingent of 5 ID to arrive to the sector between his two corps in the direction of Kalusz. The rest of the Division would go to Bohorodczany. After winning success near Stanislau, he would then send 5 ID farther west to XIII Corps. On the 25th, GdK Marschall relinquished command of that Corps to GdI Rhemen, who had returned from sick leave. The eastern corps made a substantial advance on the same day. On its extreme right, Nizniow was taken. Lilienhoff and Schreitter gained further ground on the heights northeast of Stanislau, and Benigni was also able to advance on the road to Kalusz. On the other hand, the group from 5 ID which was sent to Nowica was unable to cross the swollen waters of the Lomnica. A night attack on Kalusz was repulsed by the reinforced Russian defenders. Under XIII Corps, 42 Hon ID fought successfully at Rozniatow, but 6 ID was thrown
back with heavy losses.\textsuperscript{141} Therefore Pflanzer-Baltin ordered FML Habermann, the commander of 5 ID, to assemble the parts of his Division at Kalusz and hurry them to the assistance of XIII Corps. 5 Hon CD was ordered to pin down the enemy at Kalusz.

On the next day - the 26th - Czibulka won a substantial victory at Stanislau. Lilienhoff and Schreitter drove the enemy over the Bystrzyca to Jezupol; Benigni and the battalions from 5 ID which had deployed to his left on the 23rd attacked successfully to the Stanislau-Halicz road. Pflanzer-Baltin immediately ordered that this great triumph should be exploited by an energetic pursuit of the Russians to Halicz; the bridgehead on the Dniester there should be taken by a \textit{coup de main}. Furthermore, the last echelon of 5 ID would advance from Bohorodczany to capture the small market town of Kalusz. 10 CD would prevent the Russians at Wistowa from retreating to Halicz.

However, when the Armeegruppe commander travelled by car to XIII Corps, he received unpleasant news - the Corps' exhausted and hard-pressed troops had been defeated by superior Russian forces and were falling back to the Lomnica. The main body of 5 ID had arrived to help and fought with success at Holyn, but they were too late to save the day. To repair the damage caused by XIII Corps' setback, Pflanzer-Baltin ordered Czibulka to entrain four battalions of 36 ID that night and send them from Stanislau to Nadworna; from Nadworna they would proceed on foot to Krasna. Furthermore, three under-strength battalions of the Polish Legion would take trains from Kolomea to Delatyn.

The AOK at Teschen directed Pflanzer-Baltin to seek a decision in the Dolina-Bolechow area as soon as possible; it would be sufficient to stay on the defensive toward Halicz. However, the unfavorable outcome of the fighting on the Armeegruppe's left wing meant that there would be no success there in the near future, especially since XI Corps had still not arrived. The AOK was requested to speed up its movement by rail to Delatyn.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{b. Activities of 3rd and 4th Armies (15-26 February)}

\textsuperscript{141}According to one report, under 6 ID the Slovene IR # 17 had just 320 riflemen and BH IR # 2 had no more than 60.

\textsuperscript{142}Translator's Note - At this point the original contains a rather lengthy footnote explaining how the rail movement of XI Corps to Delatyn was supposed to be carried out by "echelon transport." Because of the very technical nature of the description of this railroad operation, it is omitted here.
3rd Army sector

The attempts of 3rd Army to recover the Mezőlaborcz area had led on the 15th merely to an isolated and unsuccessful attack by VII Corps (described previously). Army HQ expected, however, that the intervention of 21 LW ID would have a favorable effect on the operation. On the 18th, this Division gained some ground at the village of Szuko and in the area east of the Laborcza. The right wing of VII Corps also advanced. This, however, was the end of any progress. In the next few days the Landwehr Division had to defend the territory it had won in difficult fighting against Russian counterattacks.

Since all operations by his VII Corps had been shattered by the enemy's powerful counter-thrusts, on the 20th Archduke Joseph asked Army HQ whether he should continue the offensive regardless of casualties or postpone it until the arrival of fresh replacement troops, who were expected shortly. In the latter case, he wanted to pull his front back from contact with the enemy so that the majority of his fully exhausted troops could finally rest under some shelter. GdI Boroevic had to agree to the proposal to let VII Corps disengage, and thus the entire offensive came to an end. The decision was justified, since XVII Corps had also reverted to the defensive after gaining a little ground. The intervention of the south wing of 4th Army, shortly to be described, had not lived up to expectations. Moreover, the forthcoming offensive of 2nd Army would make it necessary to strengthen the right wing of 3rd Army, and thus curtail operations by the left. For this reason Boroevic took 45 LW ID away from XVII Corps and ordered it to move farther east.

4th Army sector

As noted previously, 4th Army had prepared an attacking group under FML Kralicek west of Gladyszow; it would envelop the Jasionka Heights from two sides - on the right by 13 LW ID and on the left by half of 26 LW ID. 13 LW ID would coordinate its activities with the left wing of III Corps, whose commander (GdI Colerus) was entrusted with overall control of the thrust. As ordered, the attack began on 17 February. After some setbacks on the northern wing, on the next day the skirmishing lines were able to encircle the Jasionka Heights from the west and southwest. However, the 26 LW ID was unable to carry out the envelopment from the north because the Russians were being constantly reinforced and mounted counterattacks. The troops engaged in the offensive were now spread over a long front, and didn't have the strength to deliver a final decisive stroke. For
several days thereafter there was a continuous discussion between Kaschau, Okocim and Teschen as to whether the men should be left in their forward position or brought back to their starting points. Finally, however, the AOK recognized that the right wing of the whole group was exposed to the Russians and could easily be rolled up; therefore on the 22nd they decided to pull everyone back. The high command also wished to make 13 LW ID available to be transported to 2nd Army. The group pulled back from the enemy without incident on the night of 22-23 February; this at least gave the inner wings of 4th and 3rd Armies an opportunity to establish a firm, uninterrupted connection.

At this time the HQ at Teschen believed that the Russians west of the Vistula intended to pull back to a large bridgehead covering the river crossings at Warsaw and Ivangorod; this would also cause Dimitriev to retreat to the Wisłoka. The lack of enemy activity opposite 4th and 1st Armies, as well as opposite Woyrsch's forces, strengthened this belief of the k.u.k. high command. Therefore it seemed necessary for the Archduke's Army to be prepared to immediately follow Dimitriev's Russians as they withdrew. This was another consideration leading to the cancellation of further fighting on the Jasionka. 4th Army HQ was ordered to assemble strong forces south and west of Tarnow in preparation for the anticipated advance. If the Russians didn't withdraw, the assembled units could then be sent to the Carpathians. 4th Army HQ at Okocim, however, knew that the enemy was still deployed in strength opposite their lines, and was skeptical about the AOK's theory.

When the Archduke learned that 32 Russian ID had left Dimitriev's front, he ordered an exploratory thrust against the enemy line. On 18 February, a day after the action started on the Jasionka Heights, 3 ID captured the enemy's forward position near Wojnicz and was preparing to attack the main line; the left wing of 15 ID, its neighbor on the south, also successfully advanced. However, at this point the high command felt obliged to further weaken 4th Army to provide reinforcements for Pflanzer-Baltin's operation toward Dolina. Originally they wanted to send XIV Corps. The Archduke, however, didn't want to part with this Corps, which was his personal command at the start of the war. The AOK deferred to his wishes, and instead asked for XI Corps (15 and 30 ID). This compelled Joseph Ferdinand to pull both 3 and 15 ID back to their original positions.

In this period the actions along the Archduke's front were not limited to the right wing. North of the battlefield of 3 and 15 ID, the KJR # 4 made a thrust on the Dunajec River and won a
brilliant success; farther south the Russians attacked 51 Hon ID (the former Combined Hon ID of Kornhaber) and 39 Hon ID, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. Finally, on 24 February the 12 ID stormed the cemetery heights west of Gorlice; they adroitly evaded an enemy counterattack and returned to their old position with about 500 prisoners and several captured machine guns. Information gleaned from these reconnaissance actions strengthened the HQ at Okocim in their conviction that the Russians didn't intend to retreat. When XI Corps and 13 LW ID left 4th Army, any prospects for further offensives were curtailed. 106 Lst ID arrived from 1st Army to take over part of the line hitherto held by XI Corps.

The high command, however, still didn't doubt that the Russians intended to withdraw from west Galicia. They ordered 2nd and 3rd Armies to be ready to quickly intervene when this happened, while the Archduke was to concentrate for a thrust south of the Tarnow-Pilzno highway. On 21 February the XIV and VI Corps did report that the enemy seemed to be preparing to dismantle their positions. Thereupon 4th Army issued orders for a possible pursuit.

Thus the Russians had been able to admirably disguise their true intentions; despite intercepted radio broadcasts, they had left the opposing commanders in the dark. At this point in the war, it was extremely difficult to determine the right point at which to initiate the pursuit of a wavering enemy. In earlier struggles it had been feasible to attack along the entire front, but now that trench warfare had set in this was no longer advisable without careful preparation. Operations since August 1914 had proven that improvised frontal attacks caused enormous casualties. In early 1915 the generals had still not learned how to determine enemy intentions by raiding trenches with storm troops. Like other tactics (e.g. concentrated artillery and mortar fire, use of gas to neutralize enemy batteries, etc.), this technique would evolve as the war progressed.

**Conditions at the front in late winter**

To fully understand the actions in the Carpathians, with their alternating victories and defeats, it is necessary to consider the outlook of the most important actors, the front-line troops, and the conditions in which they had to work. Col. Veith describes this period of severe difficulty in the following passage.

"During the winter fighting in the Carpathians, it was impossible
to rest even after a battle had come to an end. Minor actions continued, and the miserable conditions persisted.

Today it is incomprehensible how the troops were so helpless against the winter cold and accompanying illnesses in a land that probably contained more trees that could have provided wood for fires and shelters than any other part of Europe. However, no preparations had been taken to cut and move large amounts of lumber, and there was a lack of manpower.\textsuperscript{143} The combat troops themselves couldn't be used to haul wood; because they were heavily outnumbered by the enemy and further diminished by record casualties from combat and sickness, it was necessary to keep every available rifleman at the front. When the soldiers did get a short break, they could at best dig a few trenches; they didn't have time to cut trees and saw wood. There were detachments of laborers behind the front, but they were fully employed in maintaining the roads and paths, which were sometimes covered with a meter of snow, sometimes icy, and other times turned into bottomless mud after a sudden thaw. Finally it became necessary to bring combat troops back from the front to help with road maintenance; otherwise units would have collapsed from hunger and lack of ammunition. This was another reason why men received no shelter or rest even when they were briefly in reserve.

Thus the Army was caught in a vicious circle. At the front the troops were in almost constant combat, prevented by mounting losses from receiving relief and rest; there was no time for rehabilitation behind the front due to the need to keep the roads in service. Another factor was the miserable state of the lines of communication. There were few railroads on the Galician-Hungarian border, mostly with one track apiece; they couldn't provide support to the large number of units now assembled in the sector. The road network was no better. There were few major thoroughfares; even the few paths through the sparsely inhabited woods and forests were very primitive. Thus there were occasions when entire corps were suddenly deprived of adequate access to the rear areas for several days. One doesn't need a military education to understand the consequences.

It isn't surprising that all this physical misery led to declining morale. This was no longer the old Army, but a hastily improvised "Ersatz Army." As new March formations came up, it

\textsuperscript{143}Even in an area rich in timber, a steady supply of wood can't be improvised in a short time along a precarious front in the mountains. The main stumbling block is transportation; in the Carpathians this is exacerbated by the poor road network and the lack of laborers. Cable-railways, which were later used to overcome this problem on the Alpine front, had not yet been developed.
was often impossible to incorporate the men as intended into their parent regiments; emergencies forced commanders to send them as independent tactical units into the fighting. The most ominous consequence was that these March units were the first to be affected by the defeatism and political unreliability which was growing behind the front. This was especially true of the Czechs; it was in the Carpathian winter that the Prague IR # 28 "abandoned its position without having received a single shot from an enemy battalion." Treacherous tendencies were also observed among the Romanians; some had sworn oaths to their "popes" (priests) back in Transylvania that they would go over to the enemy at the first opportunity.

Enemy propaganda also bred defeatism. It pointed out that the Russian soldiers enjoyed better conditions, which was undeniably true. Since they had significantly more men, they were able to offer them rest and rehabilitation; they were also better fed and clothed, since their supply services were performing flawlessly... We had hoped that Russian logistics would collapse because of their well-known inefficiency and corruption, but were completely mistaken. Their effective and widespread propaganda won over almost all of the local peasantry, who engaged in espionage against our troops. The only exception were the Jews, who spied indiscriminately for both sides."

**Translator's Note - comments on Veith's narrative**

Some aspects of the preceding narrative require comment, since the views expressed by Col. Veith were basic to the picture of the war painted by German-Austrians ever since.

1) **NUMERICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE RUSSIANS**

The assertion that the Austrians were heavily outnumbered is rather surprising at first to anyone who glances at the opposing orders of battle or at the situation maps. The two sides committed roughly equal numbers of units to the winter campaign. However, the Austrians assert that - unlike the Russians - they were never able to bring their divisions to anywhere near authorized strength.

The rifle strength of the k.u.k. forces on January 22 were given previously. The Hungarian official history gives the strengths of individual divisions at various other dates through the end of winter. These figures do support the contention that there was never any real increase in available manpower; even units which arrived in the Carpathians with adequate rifle strength soon
melted away. The ranks were finally replenished in April after the fighting ended due to mutual exhaustion of the combatants. The following are figures for a few representative units from various parts of the front:

- 2 ID - Had 400 (!) on 5 Feb, 5570 on 6 March, 3900 on 30 March
- 6 ID - Had 6400 on 26 Jan, 600 on 17 Feb, 4800 on 7 March
- 17 ID - Had 3200 on 5 Feb, 3700 on 19 Feb, 4400 on 6 March, 8085 on 27 March
- 19 ID - Had 9970 on entering the line on 30 Jan; 6800 on 19 Feb, 6000 on 10 March
- 24 ID - Had 500 on 12 Feb, 6719 on 7 March, 2700 on 30 March, 1200 on 7 April
- 34 ID - Had 3300 on 6 Feb, 7479 on 1 March, 8349 on 3 April
- 41 Hon ID - Had 11,200 on entering the line (15 Feb); 7100 on 3 March, 2110 on 11 March, 3000 on 3 April
- 45 LW ID - Had 4000 on 23 Feb, 5800 on 3 March, 4500 on 1 April

Since comparable statistics aren't available for the Russians, it isn't possible to make a definitive statement regarding relative strength of the two sides. Due to Russia's much larger manpower pool, there is no reason not to accept Col. Veith's assertion.

The statement that the Russian supply services in the Carpathians operated "flawlessly" is as much as a surprise to later students as to Veith and his colleagues. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to the contrary for the Russian Army in general; prevailing corruption was of course one of the reasons for the eventual revolution. It is possible that General Brussilov, superior to the other Russian commanders in so many other fields, also ran a better logistical system, but in the absence of documentation from the Russian side this is mere speculation.

2) TREACHERY AMONG HABSBURG UNITS

As noted several times previously, this is a contentious issue; Veith's statements must be evaluated cautiously. The famous incident involving the Czech IR # 28 (which in fact is one of the few specific cases of widespread treason cited in accounts dating from 1915) will be covered below. For now, it must be noted that the facts as cited by Veith (in the un-attributed quotation) are in dispute. The narrative of operations between 22 January and 26 February doesn't show any significant differences between performance of divisions from different area (with the exception of the Galician 2 and 24 ID prior to the fall of Mezőlaborcz).

The origins of the story of the Romanian soldiers who'd promised
their "popes" to desert is unknown; I haven't found it elsewhere. During 1915 the Romanians of XII Corps were found wanting on several occasions, but this can be adequately explained by incompetence and cowardice without resorting to conspiracy theories.

3) THE ATTITUDE OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS

Col. Veith is not the only author to complain that the Carpathian peasantry was constantly spying for the Russians, and there is no reason to believe that some such espionage didn't take place. To assert that "almost all" of the population was disloyal is a considerable exaggeration. 500,000 people fled west to avoid the Russian occupying forces and those who stayed behind often suffered robbery, rape or murder.\(^\text{144}\) Even among the peasantry, who for sentimental reasons had more pro-Russian sentiment than the Ukrainians (Ruthenes) of the towns and cities, this sentiment was seldom translated into anti-Habsburg activity. The espionage rumors were fanned by the Hungarian government, which used them as a pretext to oppress the Slavic population along the border with Galicia. In fact the peasants of this area were politically indifferent; according to an English historian, "many of them found it impossible to distinguish between the Russki Tsar in Petersburg and the other Tsar in Vienna."\(^\text{145}\) Finally, Veith's comment regarding Jews who spied for both sides is a rather cruel swipe at the national group in Galicia who were the most loyal partisans of the Habsburg Monarchy.

D. The Second Carpathian Offensive

1. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies make new preparations to thrust over the mountains

The high command was sending further reinforcements to Böhm-

\(^{144}\)A summary of Russian "policy" in Galicia and the local reaction is in Herwig, "First World War" (pp. 128-129). Based on a Ballhausplatz report, he also noted that the vast majority of the Jewish population was loyal despite a few individuals who "conducted magnificent business" with the occupation forces.

\(^{145}\)C.A. Macartney, "The Habsburg Monarchy 1790-1918" (New York, 1969), p. 803. He also records an anecdote about a Ruthenian peasant in the Bukovina who was asked about the behavior of the Russian troops while they were in his village. The peasant replied that they weren't too bad at first, but "when the Tsar got angry and sent the Honveds it was terrible."
Ermolli's Army, since it was now responsible for the primary attack: coming from the former 2nd Army in west Poland were the 27, 31 and 32 ID; from 4 Army the 41 Hon ID, the main body of 38 Hon ID, and 13 LW ID. Including 9 ID, this was a total of almost seven divisions. At nearly the same time, Pflanzer-Baltin’s Armeegruppe was receiving an additional three infantry and two cavalry divisions.

2nd Army HQ took over its new responsibilities amid extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Except for Szurmay, all of the Corps commanders reported that the troops were totally exhausted after more than three weeks of fighting. The lack of mountain artillery was another problem. Due to the lack of suitable mountain transport, many field batteries were standing unused behind the front; therefore the infantry was almost without any support from its sister weapon on the barely accessible high ground.

Before the offensive could be resumed, the Army's front - which had been crumbling because the units were suffering a bitter shortage of riflemen - would have to be solidified. GdK Böhm-Ermolli also had to be alive to the possibility that a heavy Russian attack on the center and left wing of his Army might cause it fall back even further. Therefore as the first elements of 27 ID and 41 Hon ID left their trains, he sent them to block the most important routes leading out of the mountains. Finally, he proposed to the AOK that the Ersatz replacements for the units already in line should be given priority in movement ahead of the reinforcing divisions, because the very low effective strength of the units at the front would have to improve if they were to hold their ground.

For 16 February, the Army commander ordered V and XVII Corps to recover their lost positions; Szurmay and the XIX Corps just had to hold their lines.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli's operational plan

The plans of the Army HQ at Ungvar to carry out their mission took firm form on 19 February, when they were presented to Teschen. GdK Böhm-Ermolli intended to have his main force attack on both sides of the Cisna-Baligrod road toward Lisko. Here a striking force of 50,000 riflemen on a 12 km front would be assembled under GdK Tersztyanszky. Since V, XVIII and XIX Corps were now dependent on a single line of supply - the Takcsany-Cisna road - it was essential to restore traffic on the minor railroad running from Lupkow to Cisna. In cooperation with
3rd Army, whose goal was to capture the Mezőlaborcz area, the left wing of XIX Corps would strike twenty four hours before the start of the main offensive; it would move through Lupkow to the chord of the large arc made by the railroad as it swung to the south.

2nd Army HQ studied in detail the reasons behind the choice of direction for the offensive. The quickness with which it was to be mounted was a disadvantage. Without regard to geographical barriers, the Army was to advance in the shortest direction against the enemy communications in the San and Strwiaz valleys. Terszytanszky's right wing would find a measure of security by advancing down the Solinka, while the left could guard its flank by taking the heights between Dzial and Sulita. Almost all of the units of the attacking group had by now reached their starting points, drawing supplies from the only serviceable road. 2nd Army HQ didn't hide the considerable disadvantages that would accompany the operation. The offensive was a purely frontal assault, and would not be coordinated with any actions by either South Army or Pflanzer-Baltin's forces. Moreover, the proposed direction wasn't fully in accord with the thinking of the AOK, which had wanted Böhm-Ermolli's east wing to move toward Stary Sambor. Army HQ believed that in this sector between XVIII Corps and Szurmay's Group, any attack would be hampered by the highly swollen waters of the San and by steep interconnecting ridges which afforded ideal defensive positions for the Russians; the enemy could also easily send reinforcements to this area from Turka. The other drawbacks were the need to divert considerable forces for flank protection and finally the fact that the only lines of communication, which led through Smolnik, were completely inadequate.

In Ungvar the staff had no illusions about the great difficulties they faced, even aside from the choice of direction for the attack. Army HQ didn't hesitate to point out to the AOK that prospects were brighter for a continuation of Pflanzer-Baltin's offensive with larger forces; for this reason they proposed that 31 and 32 ID should be sent to his Armeegruppe rather than to their sector. The report to the AOK closed with the sentence, "Army HQ requests that the rationale for our exposition be carefully evaluated."

This operational plan was perhaps influenced by a telephone conversation on the 18th between GM Metzger and Col. Dr. Bardolíff, the Army's Chief of Staff. Metzger asserted that the AOK didn't want to exert pressure, but that the imminent fall of fortress Przemysl made quick action necessary. There wasn't time
to await the arrival of 31 ID; when the Division was available it could be used as the Army's reserve.

Bardolff responded that the beginning of the offensive was contingent on the success of the thrust to Lupkow. It wasn't advisable for 2nd Army to make its main effort farther east, because it couldn't count on South Army advancing to guard its flank. A frontal assault on Turka by Szurmay would be extraordinarily difficult.

The AOK was understanding, and asked only that the attack should be widened; thus the center and right wing of XVII Corps and if possible also V Corps could join in. It didn't intend to take away 31 and 32 ID since the forces east of Böhm-Ermolli were already receiving other reinforcements. If 2nd Army didn't advance to Lisko-Ustrzyki Dl., as required by the situation at Przemysl, the enemy would be able to turn his whole force against South Army and Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe.

The thrust through Lupkow was originally scheduled to open on the 19th, before 3rd Army started its offensive to Mezöloborcz. However, because the main body of X Corps had been ordered to concentrate west of the Laborcza and therefore wouldn't be prepared to support the Lupkow operation with sufficient forces east of the river, this prelude to the larger operation was postponed to 22 February. The new date couldn't be achieved either, this time for different reasons. In an exchange of views with 2nd Army HQ, Boroevic stated on the 20th that his chances of reaching his objective - Mezöloborcz - were "minimal." Therefore the staff at Ungvar questioned whether there was any point to the thrust on Lupkow, because the stretch of railroad to Cisna could be used to bring up supplies only if Mezöloborcz was also secure. Under these circumstances, the enthusiasm of 2nd Army HQ for the entire offensive continued to wane. Moreover, it was constantly raining; high waters destroyed both road- and foot-bridges, while turning roads into bottomless mud. The most serious damage was done to the road leading to Cisna, the lifeline of the Army, which was rendered virtually impassable. Army HQ therefore believed it would be preferable to wait for better weather before opening the offensive, while conserving the strength of the assembled units.

The high command sticks to its decisions

The AOK felt otherwise. All of their thinking was influenced by the plight of the besieged fortress of Przemysl, whose relief couldn't be postponed. The high command intervened and decreed
that the frontal assault on Lupkow wasn't absolutely necessary. If the left wing of 2nd Army could send a strong group northwest over the Chrysztuczata to take the stretch of railroad to the north of Lupkow, the Russians stationed along the curve in the line would be threatened from the rear and forced to withdraw. Because 3rd Army HQ was also being ordered to cooperate completely with a powerful attack, the staff at Ungvar should hesitate no longer to begin the relief of Przemysl. The two Army commanders would begin the combined action of their inner wings on 26 February; by this time GdI Boroevic hoped to have finished shifting his 45 LW ID to the east. On the next day Terszytanszky's shock group would begin to move; eventually its operation would be supported by a sortie from all the mobile elements of the Przemysl fortress. The west wing of Szurmay's Group would begin feint attacks on the 25th (later postponed to the 26th), followed by V Corps and the east wing of XVIII Corps.

On 23 February GdI Boroevic gave his troops the following objectives:
. 24 ID would move toward Vidrany and Mezőlaborcz, while its right wing advanced toward Lupkow in close cooperation with the left-wing division of 2nd Army (34 ID);
. FML Krautwald would advance on both sides of the Laborcza Valley, with his main body in the direction of Laborczfő (he had 2 ID and 21 LW ID; 45 LW ID was expected to arrive on the evening of the 25th behind the Group's left wing); and
. Archduke Joseph would move through Havaj toward Miko.
On the left wing, GdI Kritek (11 ID plus GM Berndt's Group) and III Corps would just hold their positions.

As 2nd Army HQ issued its final orders on the evening of the 24th, however, new obstacles blocked the pending operations, and they were natural forces beyond human control. Rain and melting snow rendered the supply line on the road between Takcsany and the Hungarian-Galician border completely impassable. Horses, carts and guns bogged down in deep mud. Thus 2nd Army had lost its vital artery. The officer responsible for the construction crews demanded that all traffic should be halted for at least 48 hours. It seemed that this serious crisis would postpone the start of the offensive for several days. A half hour before midnight messages were sent by wire from Ungvar in all directions with the unwelcome news.

The high command was bitterly disappointed by this information. Conrad, however, had no intention of bowing even to elementary forces of nature. He let 2nd Army HQ know that the postponement must be cut as short as possible; the important railroad through
Mezőlaborcz must be recovered, and above all the Russian blockade of Przemysl must be broken by 12 March. Otherwise, if the whole Carpathian front west of Wyszkow was inactive the enemy would have full freedom to fall upon Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, which was still advancing victoriously even though confronted by superior forces. It was impossible to send timely reinforcements to Pflanzer because of the limited capacity of the railroad through Körösméző. "The crisis can only be overcome by cutting a path through the enemy."

2nd Army strives to strengthen its front

With commendable energy, 2nd Army HQ was attempting to restore the vital stretch of road; with the greatest possible speed, 7000 civilian workers were brought up to help the military work parties. It was expected that traffic could be resumed on the evening of the 27th. Despite all the difficulties described above, the offensive was delayed by just about 24 hours, and could begin on the 27th with the attack on Lupkow.

However, of the six and a half divisions shifted to the new sector, four and a half were already worn out; moreover, the components of various commands had become badly intermingled. This was because of the variable fortunes of the fighting on the wide front and because the mountain positions which we already possessed had to be defended to ensure that there was a solid base for the planned offensive. Thus it was necessary to commit substantial forces to block the holes that were occasionally torn in our lines, or to improve parts of the position.

On 2nd Army's extreme right wing, the neighboring unit of the South Army was 3 Gd ID, which on the 22nd lost its advanced position on the Klewa. To solidify the front here, 2nd Army HQ decided to bring up the main body of 38 Hon ID through Munkacs, rather than on the railroad to Uzsok as originally intended. The first troops of the Honved Division left their trains and marched on foot to the Libuchora area on Szurmay's right wing, then took over the positions hitherto held by the left wing of 3 Gd ID in front of the Klewa. Four battalions were immediately placed under components of South Army. The rest of the Division was placed under FML Szurmay on the 23rd.

The HQ of 2nd Army intended to have Szurmay's reinforced east

146Two battalions joined 3 Gd ID; two battalions of the first echelon had been taken over by Hofmann on the 20th after they detrained at Volovec. They were moved by wagon to his battlefield. This very talented commander had exceeded his authority, but his action was subsequently approved by the AOK because his pleas for reinforcement had hitherto gone unheeded.
wing break through the Russian front on the Klewa. This plan had to be abandoned because the group commander had a second and more important assignment: to stretch out his left (west) wing and make reserves available behind the line. This was necessary because gaps had developed between V Corps (beset on both flanks by the Russians) and its neighbor on the left; the enemy was driving into these openings. The situation of V Corps compelled 2nd Army HQ to split up 27 ID as it arrived, and to send a brigade to back up the areas where the gaps had developed; the main body of the Division, however, was sent toward Cisna. XVIII Corps had stormed the Stoly Heights on the 16th with the help of the main body of 9 ID, and by the 20th had advanced far enough to restore its connection with the left wing of V Corps. On the other hand, the Russians were threatening to break through between V Corps' right and Szurmay's Group. The brigade from 27 ID was relieved by the leading brigade of 31 ID, and ordered to rejoin its Division. In XIX Corps' sector, the enemy captured part of the line of 29 ID on the 17th, but it was recovered on the 19th. 41 Hon ID had to be sent to this area to ensure its security prior to the impending offensive.

And so, 2nd Army had been forced despite its intentions to prematurely commit fresh divisions to the front and to mix up units from different commands. However, this measure was necessary because of the diminished troop strength. Between February 4 and 17, the XVIII and XIX Corps had lost 196 officers and 10,095 men due to illness or wounds.

Under these extremely difficult conditions, Tersztyanszky's attack group finished its preparations by the evening of 26 February; it consisted of XIX Corps and FML Schmidt von Georgenegg's Corps. The units of both corps had been greatly redistributed and intermingled. During the day, 41 Hon ID had already made substantial gains in an attack against the Maguryczne.

In 3rd Army's sector, X Corps was still engaged in unbroken defensive fighting; III and XVII Corps also had to fend off Russian thrusts. 45 LW ID moved by rail from Bartfeld into the Laborcza Valley, and then was ordered to the front on foot. Its lead brigade didn't arrive behind Krautwald's left wing until the 26th, which delayed the advance of his group.

The offensive opened on 27 February amid snow squalls and thick fog with the thrust of the inner wings of the Armies of Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic on Lupkow.
2. Events on the flanks of the allied forces, through 22 March

a. Pflanzer-Baltin's actions against increasingly superior Russian forces (27 Feb-22 March)

At the very time when Böhm-Ermolli's Army was preparing to strike toward the north, the victorious progress of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe suffered a reverse.

Brussilov's plan of attack

The Russians had changed their cipher system a few days earlier; so for a considerable period we couldn't use intercepted radio messages as our most reliable guide to their plans. The new system had just been decoded at Teschen on the evening of the 27th, when the AOK sent Pflanzer's HQ at Delatyn a Russian message that once more cast light on Brussilov's intentions. From the General's intercepted orders it was learned that the setback to the k.u.k. XIII Corps had been inflicted by a concentration of overwhelmingly larger enemy forces. Until Letschitzky took over the left wing of the Russian forces sector on 27 February with 9th Army HQ, Brussilov defended the area by offensive operations. On the 27th he ordered all the reinforcements which he'd brought up through Stryj-Dolina and through Halicz to attack toward Nadworna-Delatyn; they would cut Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe off from the Carpathians. Brussilov emphasized that the Austrians were to be "trapped and destroyed." General Sakharov, commander of XI Corps, would direct the operation. XVII Corps (3 and 35 ID) plus the parts of XXX Corps which already engaged in the sector were to make their main attack from the west toward Bohorodczany. Farther south XI Corps would send 32 ID against Solotwina; its 11 ID would follow as a reserve and guard the right flank by sending one regiment apiece into the valleys of the Lomnica and the Bystrzyca Solotwinska. On the left of XVII Corps, II Cavalry Corps was deployed at Kalusz and in the area farther north; its main body would operate against the flank and rear of Czibulka's Corps. The parts of XXX Corps which had been driven out of Stanislau were ordered to renew their attack in cooperation with the cavalry. Finally the group from XXX Corps which had been driven out of Nizniow would again cross the Dniester and thrust ahead toward Tysmienica. Since the Russians' preparations for the offensive were slow, however, these orders weren't yet carried out on the 27th.
GdK Pflanzer-Baltin meanwhile hadn't given up his hope of breaking through to Dolina. He created a central group south of Kalusz out of 5 Hon CD, 10 CD, parts of 5 ID and later also of 36 ID. It would be led by GdK Marschall, who momentarily didn't have a command. Marschall would defeat the Russian II Cavalry Corps in this area, then advance toward Dolina-Bolechow. He would interrupt traffic on the railroad between Stryj and Dolina and generally disrupt the Russians' lines of communication.

Czibulka's Corps, substantially weakened by the earlier fighting, was ordered to have Benigni's group stay north of Stanislau; Lilienhoff should prevent the Russians from crossing the Dniester at Nizniow. On the opposite (right) wing, Rhemen's hard-pressed Corps - supported by parts of 5 ID - would hold the line on the Lomnica while its north wing joined Marschall's attack.

The assembly of Marschall's group was delayed, and hadn't progressed very far on the 27th. Meanwhile, however, the advance of some parts of the group through Wistowa toward Kalusz at least alleviated the danger to the north wing of XIII Corps; thus the Corps was able to hold onto the Lomnica, aided by other parts of Marschall's forces in the area. On the other hand, Benigni was heavily assaulted by the enemy north of Stanislau; his right wing, after fighting which swayed back and forth, was forced back. Moreover, a Russian column which had crossed the Lomnica at Medynia thrust into the junction between Czibulka's and Marschall's sectors and on the 28th broke through toward Stanislau. The situation became quite critical during the day.

Lilienhoff thwarted enemy attempts to cross the Dniester below Nizniow. Benigni was able not only to hold off the Russians storming ahead from the north, but also to bring his right wing forward again with the help of reinforcements; however, his flank and rear were still menaced. Marschall, himself under attack from the front, wasn't able to assist his hard-pressed neighbor on the right.

Although the weakened 6 ID on the Armeegruppe's south wing was once again thrown back, Pflanzer-Baltin decided to offer resistance on the Bystrzyca south of Jezupol, and farther north.

147 On the 28th, Capt. Georg Petricevic of IR # 16 (in 36 ID) achieved a brilliant feat of arms for which he won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order. The Russians had completely encircled his Regiment at Sielec (west of Jezupol). Petricevic thrust ahead with a handful of men and saved the unit from its dangerous situation; he also recovered ten guns which had earlier been lost. Then he took over command of the part of his Regiment at Sielec, threw the much larger Russian force out of the village, and held it against all further enemy attempts to seize it.
at Stanislau and on the Lomnica above Wistowa. He would hold on until the eagerly awaited reinforcements allowed him to resume the offensive. The first echelon of XI Corps was coming into Delatyn;\textsuperscript{148} the German 5 CD arrived there next. The high command was also sending 6 CD from 4\textsuperscript{th} Army; it would detrain at O Radna and Borgo Prund.

On 1 March the Russians continued to attack and the crisis intensified. The enemy pushed against the elements of 5 ID fighting on the right wing of XIII Corps and pushed them back to the east. This quickly caused the adjacent parts of Marschall's front to waver; at this time he was also commanding the eastern Corps as well as 10 CD, 5 CD and parts of 16 Inf Bde (the latter were arriving as the first contingent of XI Corps). The resultant gap in the line was about 8 km wide; some Russian troops pushed forward into the hole, although just cautiously. In response to this threat, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin sent four Feld Jaeger Battalions of 16 Inf Bde to Bohorodczany on trucks and empty supply wagons. He also sent parts of Lilienhoff's Group in this direction and hoped that these additional forces would suffice to allow the inner wings of Marschall and Rhemen to master the situation.

**Pflanzer-Baltin falls back**

Defeat was fended off until the morning of 2 March. In the next few hours, however, the defensive fighting of XIII Corps took an unfavorable turn. The lines of 42 Hon ID at Krasna were broken through and the Division gave up ground; GdI Rhemen had to order his troops to retreat to the Bystrzyca Solotwinska. His 6 ID had only 2000 riflemen; 42 Hon ID still had 4500. This caused Rhemen's neighbors on the right to also fall back. The result was that the front now faced toward the northwest; its right wing, which could be rolled up by the enemy, was in an untenable position. Therefore Pflanzer-Baltin quickly decided to pull back the line toward the south on the night of 2-3 March, while the west wing stayed in place as a pivot. The troops weren't disturbed by the Russians as they reached a new position which had recently been technically enhanced. It ran west from Ottynia to the Bystrzyca Solotwinska.

Thus the Russian commanders had fended off the threat to the east wing of their armies at the eleventh hour. They had ignored the threat that Pflanzer-Baltin's quick advance could bring

\textsuperscript{148}The XI Corps consisted of 15 and 30 ID; the 30 ID had 16 Inf and 88 L-Sch Bdes. 60 Inf Bde was left behind under 4\textsuperscript{th} Army, where it joined 106 Lst ID.
catastrophe to the troops opposing the German South Army, and had not pulled back this sector of their Front. All of the units which came up to constitute 9th Army were committed to an offensive toward the southeast, with the intention of cutting the k.u.k. Armeegruppe off from the Carpathians. The powerful Russian blow against Pflanzer-Baltin's left wing frustrated his attempt to support Linsingen, which had been going so well, at the last moment. The enemy, whose force was visibly increasing, had also been in a position to encircle the parts of the Armeegruppe which were fighting by the mouth of the Lomnica by thrusting through Stanislau and Nizniow. This prospect was thwarted by the quick response of the Armeegruppe commander and by the slowness of the Russian troop movements. The outcome would have been quite different if Pflanzer-Baltin had received large reinforcements by 20 February (at the latest); they would have enabled him to reach Dolina in time, before the Russian masses slammed shut the half-opened door. If Linsingen had then been able to burst through the blocked mountain valleys for a combined advance with his neighbor on the right, thus helping 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies in turn to press energetically against the enemy, this united operation could still have saved Przemysl.

There was no shortage of attempts to restore impetus to the right wing of the Eastern front. On 27 February the Armeegruppe's Chief of Staff had proposed to HQ of South Army that they send the 4 German ID through Huszt and by foot marches through the Taracz and Lomnica valleys to Jasien on Pflanzer-Baltin's left wing. Linsingen turned down this idea because the Division couldn't reach Jasien until 9 March, too late to do any good. Also a plan of the k.u.k. high command to send a battle group from Linsingen's right wing through Osmoloda to Jasien couldn't be implemented because of the severe struggle of 19 ID for possession of the Wyszkow Pass; not one rifleman could be spared from that area.

When the enemy didn't pursue Czibulka's troops as they withdrew, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin believed he could still pursue an offensive strategy. He wanted to send Czibulka's group on the 4th against the flank of the Russians who were fighting XIII Corps. However, the condition of the exhausted troops prevented the implementation of this idea.

The arrival of XI Corps

All of 30 ID from the approaching XI Corps was already available on the 5th to support the left wing. They relieved 42 Hon ID, who could now provide Pflanzer-Baltin with a reserve. During the
next few days, GM Lilienhoff and 10 CD fought at Tlumacz and held the enemy in check. On the 6th it was learned from an intercepted broadcast that the II Russian Cavalry Corps had been ordered to shift east and to capture the city of Kolomea. In response, a cavalry Corps was to be assembled under Marschall’s command and sent toward Tlumacz; it consisted of 10 CD, 5 Hon CD, 5 German CD, and Lilienhoff's Group. Also on the 6th, Lilienhoff's battalions and the squadrons of 10 CD were already throwing the enemy back toward this town.

The Armeegruppe with its 28,000 riflemen was now opposed by a Russian force with twice as many infantry and three times as many cavalry. This disparity in strength compelled Pflanzer-Baltin to ask the AOK to hasten the movement of the second component of XI Corps: the 15 ID. He also wanted to bring 6 CD ahead through Kuty-Wiznitz. It was now impossible to maintain the original deployment, which had been weighted on the left wing for the thrust to Dolina, because the Russians were preparing to attack the right wing of the Armeegruppe's main body with superior forces. The group's ability to maintain itself on the plains in front of the narrow mountain defiles at Delatyn now depended on the wing's success in holding its ground. Pflanzer-Baltin wished to also solve this problem with an offensive solution.

The several echelons of the 15 ID were sent on through Delatyn and Kolomea toward Ottynia. Despite some delays, the Division deployed on the right wing of the Armeegruppe. In the actions which raged between 6 and 10 March, neither side gained the upper hand. Czibulka's left wing gained considerable ground on the 9th, and a thrust by 5 ID on the next day was also successful. The Russians countered with every method they could think of. Suddenly, for example, they sent a proposal under a flag of truce that they should be allowed to send 1500 Jewish families through the Aus-Hung. lines; this, naturally, was turned down by the Armeegruppe HQ.

A snowstorm broke out on the 10th and 11th. Large drifts of snow at first hindered the implementation of the plans of both sides for offensives. On the 13th, however, the Russians attacked Marschall with four cavalry divisions and a rifle brigade, and drove him back. On the next day Czibulka mounted a counterattack which flattened the bulge made on the right wing by the enemy. Pflanzer-Baltin sent reinforcements to the endangered places from all sides - some moved by truck, others by rail through Delatyn. Finally the Russian attack broke down, with heavy losses. Nonetheless, the enemy stormed forward along the entire front on the 17th and 18th, especially against Ottynia; their thrusts were
repulsed everywhere except in 10 CD's sector, where some ground was lost. The eleven days of combat finally ended on the afternoon of the 18\textsuperscript{th}; Pflanzer-Baltin used the pause in action to reorder his units. He created four groups:

. GdK Marschall had 19 Hon Cav Bde (containing all personnel of the badly depleted 5 Hon CD), 10 CD, and 5 German CD

. FML Czibulka had 36 ID, Col. Wossala's Combined Inf Bde, and 15 ID\textsuperscript{149}

. GdI Rhemen had 5 and 6 ID, plus 16 Inf Bde of 30 ID as his Corps reserve

. The Armeegruppe had 42 Hon ID in reserve.

(The 54 ID was dissolved.)

Now, however, special measures were necessary to protect the Armeegruppe's east flank and rear in the area between the Dniester and Pruth, since the enemy had become more active near Zaleszczyski and Czernowitz in the last few days. Hitherto the sector had been entrusted to two detachments: Lt Col. Papp was at Czernowitz, where he had held off a Russian thrust on the 16\textsuperscript{th}, and Lt Col. Bekesi was at Horodenka. They were now joined by 6 CD, which on the 19\textsuperscript{th} thrust toward the east and drove the Russians out of Kotzman. To keep the area secure, the commander of XI Corps (FZM Ljubicic) was ordered to capture the bridgehead over the Dniester at Zaleszczyski. For this purpose Pflanzer-Baltin gave him control of the units listed above, reinforced on the 20\textsuperscript{th} by 88 L-Sch Bde and the HQ of 30 ID, which came up on the railroad. The Armeegruppe commander wanted to quickly take this Russian position, which gave them a dangerous sally port over the river. Therefore the leader of 30 ID, FML Kaiser, was sent against Zaleszczyski on the 22nd, even though all of the troops allotted for the operation hadn't been assembled. Only a few important points were taken in the approaches to the bridgehead. Farther south, however, the Russians were pushed back to the east by 6 CD along with Papp's Detachment, which had forced its way over the Pruth.

b. South Army fights with varying fortunes (27 Feb-23 March)

The German South Army was constantly trying to conquer the Wyszkow Pass and thus reach out its hand to Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe by the shortest possible route. Here the XXIV Res Corps pushed forward anew on 27 and 28 February. On 1 March both wings of the Corps made progress; however, any movement on the mountains, deeply covered with snow, was condemned to consume a

\textsuperscript{149}Translator's Note - The original doesn't explain who Col. Wossala was or where his Bde came from. This is the only reference to the unit, which apparently was ephemeral.
length of time that was intolerable to the commanders and always gave the Russians time to initiate countermeasures. Hofmann supported his neighbor with a simultaneous advance that won considerable success, but farther to the left the German 1st ID couldn't move forward. A short rest period was initiated on 2 March. However, on the very next day the high command intervened; they told Army HQ to thrust ahead with all possible energy and to reach the Dolina-Stryj-Synowodsko area; then they could either move through Drohobycz toward Sambor, or east to support their neighbors on the right; if conditions were right they could also send the west wing on an envelopment maneuver toward Turka. Under the present circumstances, all this sounded like a pipe dream to the HQ at Munkacs. Linsingen reported back to Teschen that he would renew his attacks on 7 March, and once again requested that the parts of South Army which had been detached north of the Carpathians to fight under Pflanzer-Baltin should be placed under his control. On the 5th, the high command responded that despite the intervention of 5 ID and 10 CD the arrival of substantial Russian reinforcements had made it impossible for the Armeegruppe to open the road through the mountains for South Army, which had itself been unable to break through for six weeks. The proposed reassignment of units was not approved. After the deployment of 4 German ID the HQ of South Army was to carry out the offensive planned for the 7th with all its strength; its western group should advance to Skole. Szurmay's eastern wing would join this attack in the direction of Swidnik (on the Stryj River).

The staff at Munkacs, however, felt that an offensive to Skole - which would involve capturing the strong position of Zwinin - was not promising. Instead they sent 4 German ID farther right to join Hofmann's Group, intending to break through the Russian front at this point. Szurmay wouldn't have been able to cooperate anyway, since his forces were committed to an attack which he'd been ordered to mount with his other (western) wing. 3 Gd ID had asked him for troops to take over part of its front, but there were none available. Linsingen had now divided his forces into three groups: XXIV Res Corps (GdI von Gerok), Hofmann's Group (joined by 4 German ID), and a combined Corps (over German 1 ID and 3 Gd ID).

Fighting continued meanwhile in XXIV Res Corps' sector; on the 6th some Russian counterattacks pushed 19 ID back far to the east. Neither the Swica nor (little) Beskid defiles could be taken, so here the situation was actually less favorable than before 19 February. On the other hand, the left wing of the Corps gained some ground on this day; Hofmann was also able to
take part in its actions.

**Linsingen's general offensive**

On the 7th the Army opened what it hoped would be a decisive attack, amid thick fog and 23 degrees of cold. The offensive of XXIV Res Corps immediately came to a halt in front of the enemy's fully-manned defenses, which were additionally guarded by the snow. In further actions through the 18th, Gerok's left wing was able to work its way forward slightly and to hold the ground they had gained against violent Russian attacks. In Hofmann's sector, the 4 German ID drove the Russians back a little at the start of its advance, but in the following days the Corps made only moderate progress; soon it had to be content to hold its ground against enemy counterattacks. But the most formidable enemy was the deep snow. On 9 March two companies had to be literally dug out of a white grave. Under the Combined Corps, 1st German ID briefly occupied the main Russian position, but was forced to relinquish it; and 3 Gd ID was engaged against the highest point of the Zwinin. On the 10th, Glt Conta's 1st ID captured the central Zwinin ridge and drove further to the east. To build on this success, Linsingen sent him a brigade from 4 ID of Hofmann's Corps; it reached 1st ID on March 14. Conta, however, had elected to continue his operation against the almost impregnable main position on the Zwinin with sapping trenches rather than further assaults.

The general offensive would next be resumed on the 20th; in the meantime it was necessary to repulse powerful Russian thrusts. There was a discussion as to where this new attack should be directed: Gerok proposed to launch a wide turning movement east of the Swica valley to get around the enemy's east wing; Hofmann wanted to begin by breaking through toward Tuchla. Both commanders agreed, however, that it was essential to receive reinforcements. Linsingen hadn't changed his opinion; on the 18th he reported to Emperor Wilhelm that to him it seemed that the allies could break out of the mountains only if strong forces thrust along the north edge of the Carpathians. He delivered the same message to the k.u.k. high command in a written summary on 23 March. The South Army commander proposed that his entire force - except for Hofmann's Group, which would be reinforced by fresh k.u.k. units - should assemble through Delatyn and Kimpolung behind Pflanzer-Baltin's right wing. Moreover, they should be reinforced by a k.u.k. corps from 2nd or 3rd Army as well as a German corps. With this force, along with Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe (to be placed under his command), Linsingen wanted to attack the flank of the Russian armies in east Galicia.
However, as will be related below, Ivanov had already opened a major offensive against Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic when this report arrived at Teschen. The central Carpathians were the decisive theater.

When the South Army renewed its general attack on 20 March, it won no success at all. Linsingen therefore decided that the strength of the allied troops was insufficient for further offensive operations. However, this wasn't completely true.

The weather suddenly improved. The white fields of snow glittered in the sunlight and the clear air aided artillery spotting. Thus it was possible to renew the offensive on the 22nd and at least gain several local successes. The XXIV Res Corps, fighting along with Hofmann's right wing, was able to gain ground on both sides of the Wyszkow road. 19 ID penetrated into the enemy main position and took a large number of Russian prisoners. The Combined Corps, commanded from the 23rd by the Bavarian GdI Graf von Bothmer, also made a substantial advance.

c. Events north of the Vistula through 22 March

While fighting continued in the Carpathians and on the borders of East Prussia, the units in west Poland served as a source of reinforcements to more important portions of the front, for both friend and foe. Around the end of January, the 9th German Army had supported Hindenburg's offensive toward the Narew by subsidiary attacks; Woyrsch and Dankl had helped out by threatening to also attack. Since that time, there had been no significant actions. The Russians were active in the areas in front of their positions only when trying to conceal the withdrawal of several corps to other sectors.

On 3 March, Conrad learned from the German plenipotentiary General Cramon that 9th Army would attempt to break through the Russian front just north of the Pilica on the 5th. Woyrsch, although subordinate to the k.u.k. high command, had already been ordered to attack Lopuszno in order to keep the enemy from transferring units to the Pilica.

The 9th German Army drove a deep bulge into the enemy lines. On the north wing of Woyrsch's Army, GdI Kövess had been given command of the parts of 2nd Army which had stayed in west Poland. So that his neighbors would have more troops available, he

150Since the middle of March, daily losses due to illness were running between 400 and 700 men. 6760 men reported sick between 11 and 23 March. (From the manuscript in the German Reichsarchiv)
lengthened his left wing to relieve the German garrison of the Inowlodz bridgehead and also sent 7 CD north of the Pilica. (The cavalry saw no significant action, and on the 21\textsuperscript{st} March returned to a position behind Kövess' Armeegruppe.) The German L\textsuperscript{W} Corps took the Russian advanced positions at Lopuszno, but couldn't master the main position. Bredow's Division and the 1\textsuperscript{st} Army supported Mackensen's attack by effective diversionary operations. The Russians were concerned about their front in west Poland, and therefore hesitated to shift further units to the Narew front, where major fighting had meanwhile erupted. Alexeiev's offensive threatened on the 5\textsuperscript{th} to break through the center of 8\textsuperscript{th} German Army, so the Germans had to halt their attack on Ossowiets. However, Gallwitz soon rallied with a counterattack and on the 9\textsuperscript{th} was once again in front of Przasnysz; the right wing of 8\textsuperscript{th} Army renewed its thrust toward Ostrołęka. Nevertheless, the Germans couldn't push through to the Narew due to the Russians' great superiority in numbers. Therefore Hindenburg pulled his Armies back closer to the East Prussian borders.

3. The final attempts to relieve Przemysl

a. Results of the first attacks by 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies, and the reaction at Teschen

By the will of the high command, the decision in this phase of the campaign against Russia would take place in the central Carpathians, where 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies had readied a powerful blow. Unlike similar major offensives which were undertaken later in more favorable seasons, and in which at the very least some ground was gained in the first attempt, this fateful contest in the mountains took place under severe handicaps. The already tired soldiers could only move slowly along the paths through the deep snow.

GdK Tersztyanszky's principal attacking group with its 52,000 riflemen had a numerical advantage over the 37,000 Russians on the other side. However the artillery support - with approximately one piece every 6 kilometers - was far less than the infantry wanted. Artillery was generally less effective in mountains because of the terrain, and their problems were compounded by the poor weather which limited spotting activity.

As related above, XIX Corps was to thrust through Lupkow toward
Baligrod about 24 hours before the other units attacked. This Corps gained only a little territory on 27 February, despite the fact that 41 Hon ID had paved the way by a determined attack on the Maguryczne the day before. The gains of XIX Corps in the next two days were also far less than had been expected by the commanders, who had reckoned on taking the Chryszczata, the Lupkow area, and the Maguryczne, thus covering the west flank of the shock group advancing on both sides of the Baligrod road. This group, led by FML Schmidt-Georgenegg, consisted of 27 and 32 ID plus parts of 43 LW ID; they struck north, but despite the initial commitment of all troops from the first two divisions they moved only slightly forward. East of the Solinka, the main body of XVIII Corps attacked toward Tworyline on the San and took several outlying enemy positions. V Corps wanted to cross the San at Chmiel, but had only built a bridge half way over the river by 1 March.

Under 3rd Army, 24 ID on the extreme right wing took part in XIX Corps' attack on Lupkow on the 27th, but was soon pinned down in front of the strong Russian positions. Boroevic launched his general attack on the 28th. X Corps had now been reinforced by 45 LW ID; this new Division and parts of 21 LW ID made a determined assault on the Russians in cooperation with 20 Hon ID of VII Corps. The fighting was prolonged and bloody, and the attackers were frequently held up by enemy counter thrusts. By evening of 1 March the east wing of 3rd Army had at least been able to pin down the Russians, but without evicting them from their positions on the heights.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided to reinforce Tersztyanszky's attack on Baligrod with fresh forces: first 13 LW ID, then 31 ID. To replace them as the Army's reserve, Szurmay was ordered to shift 66 Inf Bde (which was behind his lines) to Usztrzyki Grn. behind V Corps by the 2nd. Furthermore, the AOK told 1st Army to send its 14 ID. This Division left the line in west Poland on 27 February and began to move along the Karl Ludwig Railroad on 4 March; its main body was heading for Homonna-Takcsany, and other parts to N.- and Kis Bereszna.

The reaction of the AOK

The opening of the offensive shattered all the hopes of the AOK. The high command clearly explained their evaluation of the situation in a phone conversation on 1 March between GM Metzger and the Chief of the General Staff Detachment of 4th Army, Col. Paic. The General stated that the extreme right wing, Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, was supported by one small rail line
through the mountains and therefore could only be reinforced slowly; thus the Armeegruppe couldn't be prepared in time to support 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army's operation toward Przemysl. To date the South Army hadn't made any considerable gains; perhaps the intervention of 4 German ID, arriving at that time, would improve its situation. Nor was there any prospect of success for the right wing of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army, where Szurmay's three divisions on both sides of the road to Turka were confronted by a naturally strong position along ridges which had also been fortified by the Russians. Thus all hopes had been pinned to the success of the offensive by Tersztyanszky's strong group through Lisko-Ustrzyki Dl. toward Przemysl. Perhaps the right wing and center of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army would also be able to advance toward Sanok-Rymanow. Metzger noted that the balance of forces was not unfavorable - the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies had 21 divisions (120,000 riflemen) against only 9 to 12 Russian divisions.

To win a decisive success, the AOK now decided to commit the 100,000 riflemen of 4\textsuperscript{th} Army in an attack from the west toward the east. However, they recognized that the prospects of success for 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies were no longer good after the initial setback. It was very difficult to sustain a coordinated operation by the 18 attacking divisions in the mountains with their limited lines of communication; these units would be able to reach the north edge of the mountains only if they could win a string of individual tactical successes. Perhaps it would have been better to make the main effort on both sides of the road to Turka (rather than the road to Baligrod). However, as noted previously the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army HQ had chosen the same route as the AOK and Boroevic in the January offensive; they wanted to reach Usztryzki Dl. because it was closer to Przemysl. Moreover, the most important precondition for a successful attack farther east was that South Army needed to break out of the mountains. Böhm-Ermolli's HQ at Ungvar doubted that this would happen.

b. The attack by 4\textsuperscript{th} Army (27 February-17 March)

The plans

4\textsuperscript{th} Army HQ was waiting tensely for some sign that would indicate Dimitriev was retreating. However, the Russians didn't move. Conrad intended that 4\textsuperscript{th} Army would nonetheless join the general offensive, under any circumstances. As related earlier, the AOK had first proposed the preparation of a strong attacking group in the hills south of Tarnow. 4\textsuperscript{th} Army HQ, on the other hand, would have preferred to advance toward Jaslo with three divisions, but
only after the enemy in fact was withdrawing. Otherwise they didn't believe that any frontal attack would succeed, but were prepared to give up units to Pflanzer-Baltin. This idea was turned down by Teschen because the railroad through Maramaros-Sziget could only handle twelve trains per day; anyway, an attack on the extreme eastern wing couldn't have a fast enough effect on the front as a whole.

In the course of further conversations, 4th Army HQ returned to its earlier proposals: a thrust along and south of the Gorlice-Jaslo road and a subsidiary attack on Staszkowka. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand stated he was willing to do his duty by carrying out this plan, but emphasized that the operation was very difficult and would no doubt cause large casualties. The high command, however, was more inclined toward repeating the February attempt against Banica, because the offensive of the neighboring 18 divisions toward the north would be endangered if the Russians' weren't driven out of the area between the inner wings of 4th and 3rd Armies. Otherwise too many units would have to be detached to cover the flank, robbing the thrust of impetus. Thus the enemy must be driven from the Banica area. This couldn't be done by the three divisions on the west wing of 3rd Army alone by making a frontal breakthrough over the Ondava; 4th Army would have to attack also south of the Magora, this time with three divisions. There was another advantage to this plan. If the Russians had to pull back under pressure from 2nd and 3rd Armies to the Jaslo-Krosno-Sanok line, Dimitriev would also be obliged to save his southern wing from being rolled up by a concentric advance of the inner wings of the Archduke's and Boroevic's Armies; therefore he would have to pull back his front to the Wisloka between Jaslo and the river's mouth. If the Archduke already had strong forces engaged south of the Magora and attacking Krosno, the new Russian line would be broken apart at its hinge. On the other hand, 4th Army's proposed frontal attack through Gorlice would encounter several strongly fortified Russian positions and would certainly never reach Jaslo.

4th Army HQ, however, adhered to their opinion. They said that:
. Four divisions would be needed for the attack through Banica in order to reach the road at Zmigrod; the HQ didn't have that many divisions available, and had no means of keeping them supplied in the Banica sector.
. Experience to date had shown that III Corps couldn't be counted on to cooperate.
. The terrain restricted the amount of artillery support.

151In the unsuccessful action in February, 4th Army had committed just one and a half divisions.
A repetition of the earlier assault would have a negative effect on non-commissioned officers and men. Finally, the Russian cavalry stationed in this area had proven to be much more steadfast in action than the enemy infantry. Therefore the attack through Gorlice was preferable despite all the tactical disadvantages; more troops could be made available than was the case on the south wing, and guns - especially medium artillery - were also more plentiful.

To force a decision, on 2 March the AOK announced to Okocim that if they had no faith in carrying out any kind of offensive they would have to give up 8 ID. Thereupon the Army HQ said it would attack through Gorlice. They still felt the operation would be very difficult and that under the best circumstances it would take a week to reach Zmigrod. Nonetheless they would set to work.

The operations

FML Arz was entrusted with leading the attack. He planned to attack on 6 March with 12 ID, half of 26 LW ID, and 8 and 10 ID toward Gorlice; 39 and 51 Hon ID would advance toward Staszkowka. The security of the area south of the Magora was left to the other half of 26 LW ID, in cooperation with the left wing of 3rd Army.

The offensive had to be postponed because of heavy snow storms; the high command became impatient and insisted that it had to start on the night of 7-8 March. Teschen felt that poor weather shouldn't be an obstacle. 4th Army's attack was urgently necessary, and the situation forbade any further delay.

After a heavy artillery preparation, the advance of the various battle groups began when it became dark on the 7th. On the first day, 8 ID with great bravery took the Sekowa area, 12 ID made substantial progress in the area toward Gorlice, and Hadfy's Group - although its left wing suffered a setback - advanced toward Staszkowka. 4th Army's north wing, facing a very strong opponent, restricted itself to diversionary demonstrations. However, the offensive through Sekowa and toward Gorlice couldn't maintain its momentum. Anyway, the activity of the troops was restricted by heavy snowstorms, while frostbite reduced the ranks of the attackers. Total casualties from 8 to 11 March were about 6000 men.

152The 8 ID [with KJR # 1 and 4, IR # 28, and FJB # 30] first had to shift from the Army's northern sector to the Grybow area.
4th Army HQ proposed to Teschen that the continuation of the attack should be postponed until better weather. Also they wanted to await the arrival of a combined Brigade made up of troops taken from FML Roth's sector; it would reinforce FML Arz west of Gorlice on the 15th. The AOK, however, vetoed any postponement because the Armies in the Carpathians were heavily engaged and had suffered much greater casualties without gaining any ground. If the men on the Carpathian front hadn't been facing a "solid wall" and had been able to move forward "without interruption", it would have been possible to refrain from engaging the portions of the front facing east (4th and 1st Armies plus Woyrsch's group). In present circumstances, however, it would be impossible to prevent a Russian east-west thrust by a rapid advance out of the Carpathians. The purpose of 4th Army's attack was to prevent the enemy from making any major transfer of their forces. If all went well, the enemy would be "worn down."

Since the all-out offensive apparently wasn't working, 4th Army decided to switch to a carefully planned step-by-step series of thrusts. Unfortunately the morale of the attackers was adversely affected by a heavy defeat to the Czech IR # 36 south of Sekowa. The Russians moreover resorted to constant counterattacks, although they were held off by our steadfast troops. The next thrust was now scheduled to take place on the 17th, when the combined brigade mentioned above would attempt to break through the line at Gorlice.

c. Climax of the actions by 2nd and 3rd Armies (2-10 March)

On 2 and 3 March, Brussilov's VII and XII Corps launched a counterattack that raged with great fury against the Aus-Hung. lines and continued during the night. Although the enemy was able to replenish their losses quickly with fresh troops, the thrust against Böhm-Ermolli's Army on both sides of the Baligrod Road was shattered by Tersztyanszky's troops. In Boroevic's Army, the X and VII Corps were hard hit by the storm, but sharp counterattacks by 45 LW ID and 20 Hon ID put a stop to the enemy's operation while it was still opening. However, before the k.u.k. 3rd Army could resume its own offensive it now needed a pause to reorder the units and prepare them for new efforts.

On the 3rd, the high command called upon all the Armies to finally drive the enemy from west and central Galicia and to relieve fortress Przemysl by mid-March.
However, despite the intervention of 13 LW ID on the 4th and of 31 ID on the 6th, and despite several tactical successes, Tersztyanszky couldn't gain significant ground in the direction of Baligrod. In his northern group, FML Lütgendorf's Corps was now east of the Baligrod Road (with 31 and 32 ID plus half of 43 LW ID); FML Schmidt-Georgenegg's Corps was west of the Road (with 13 LW ID and 27 ID).

The right wing of 2nd Army was instructed to make feint attacks to divert the enemy's attention from the Baligrod area and cause them concern for their line on the San. XVIII Corps therefore thrust against the San; however, they suffered some setbacks which even forced Tersztyanszky to bend back his right wing. V Corps sent some detachments over the bridge at Chmiel to the north bank, but they were unable to establish a firm footing; the commitment of the Army's reserve (66 Inf Bde) also failed to bring a successful turn to the bloody fighting. The Corps wasn't able to reach its objective, the long Odryt Ridge. Farther up the San River, several companies on the extreme right wing of V Corps, along with some from Szurmay's left, were able to establish themselves on the north bank.

On 5 March the hard-pressed troops of 3rd Army suffered a severe defeat. An attack by VII Corps and the left wing of X Corps was shattered with enormous casualties; the VII Corps had lost 60% of its combat strength since 1 March. Thereupon Boroevic canceled further thrusts and his Army fell back on the defensive.

Since this decision called the entire operation into question, 2nd Army HQ turned to Teschen for help. On the evening of the 6th the high command urged all the Armies to continue the Carpathian Battle without interruption. "On the entire front from the Vistula to east Galicia there should be no sector which is not active in these decisive days." In particular, 3rd Army was ordered to not only attack with its right wing, but also to pin down the enemy opposite its other troops, if only with heavy artillery fire and actions by strong detachments.

Conditions at the front

In the last few days the number of men actually in the front lines was shrinking alarmingly. The XIX Corps of 2nd Army lost 5000 men by 5 March; 32 ID was reduced from 11,871 riflemen to 5,971.

This is Col. Veith's description of the actions in early March:
"On 1 March there was fog and heavy snowfall; it was impossible to remain oriented, entire regiments got lost, and the result was catastrophic casualties. The weather changed on 6 March: the skies were clear, which caused melting during the day, while at night the cold reached minus 20 degrees. The result was that all slopes were totally covered with ice; even when the enemy didn't interfere, movement became an unpredictable Alpine adventure. Although the sunshine at least gave some warmth to the combatants, icy northwest winds still could chill them to the marrow. Along the entire front there were no shelters; for days and weeks the soldiers couldn't change their clothes, which froze into icy armor. The ground was frozen hard as stone, which hindered the efforts of the attackers to build trenches as protection against hostile fire; this enormously increased casualties. Since it was difficult to evacuate the wounded, they died in droves. After weeks of fighting and privation the men couldn't even sleep easily at night for fear that they would freeze to death....

An especially heavy blizzard occurred on 10 March. It was impossible to move forward and impossible to evacuate the sick; entire skirmishing lines disappeared in the white storm. The terrain was impassable and entrenchments couldn't be dug; the infantry lay motionless without any protection in front of the enemy positions. Most of our artillery had been left three or four days' marches behind the front.153 The troops, however, held on; despite all the reports of their commanders that they had been totally exhausted for weeks, despite agitation in the ranks and despite the spies all around them, they persevered in this hell.154"

In the next few days, several attacking groups pushed forward again. Szurmay's reinforced left wing fought its way forward to the strongly held enemy position on the heights north of the railroad. The attack stalled there, so IR # 76 from 14 ID went up to reinforce the group.155 The two corps farther west were engaged in only local actions; in this period, however, the enemy gave way to pressure from XVIII Corps and evacuated the west bank of the San.

2nd Army's Offensive at its High Point

153The mobile batteries weren't equipped to be transported in the mountains; they could be employed only in the valleys or in the immediate vicinity of the few roads; therefore many of them were left in the rear.
154At this time the Russians created a scouting detachment from Czech prisoners and deserters; it operated in front of 4th Army.
155This regiment was one of the components of 14 ID which had been sent to the Uzsok Pass on the mountain railroad.
While Tersztyanszky's northern group won just a little ground, XIX Corps scored a major success. 41 Hon ID took the Maguryczne Heights on the 8th, along with a large number of Russian prisoners. Since 29 ID had also pushed the enemy back, FML Trollmann initiated a pursuit which on the 9th had almost reached the curve in the rail line at Lupkow. The Honveds also drove the enemy from the Chryszczata on the next day. Thus the flank of the northern group (Lütgendorf's and Schmidt's Corps) was fully secure so that they could press on with their thrust toward Baligrod.

Meanwhile the main body of 14 ID had arrived at Cisna. There was a difference of opinion as to where they should be deployed (which afterwards was regarded as a momentous decision). Tersztyanszky wanted to reinforce Trollmann, thus building on the success of XIX Corps by continuing its thrust to Radoszyce; this would provide direct assistance to the northern group's advance. 2nd Army HQ, however, ordered the division to deploy on Lütgendorf's right wing, which was more in accordance with the original guidelines of the high command. There was still hope that Przemysl could be relieved, since Lütgendorf and Schmidt-Georgenegg were believed to have twice as many riflemen as their Russian opponents. Army HQ emphasized to Tersztyanszky that never before had they possessed a similar favorable ratio of forces in a decisive sector. The problem was that the wing of the attacking group was hanging behind, and thus the frontal attack lacked support on its flanks; moreover, artillery support was still insufficient. The defenders had the advantage because of the weather and terrain. And yet the outcome could still have gone either way, for the commander of VIII Russian Corps reported to Brussilov that he intended to withdraw to Sanok. The reply was a sharp order that the troops, though worn out, were not to move one step toward the rear.

2nd Army wasn't getting much support from 3rd Army, which was badly depleted, morally shaken by defeat, and not receiving any fresh units. The Russian commanders at this time were still driving their men - with great ruthlessness and without regard to fearsome casualties - against X and VII Corps. Although the enemy wasn't achieving any noteworthy success, the strength of the Aus-Hung. divisions was wasting away in defensive fighting. The high command intervened once again and demanded increased activity by the left wing of Boroevic's Army. In this sector,

---

156A few troops from 41 Hon ID had already briefly occupied the Chryszczata on the 7th, but had been unable to maintain themselves there.
157Brussilov, pp. 110 ff.
however, the thin lines of XVII and III Corps were stretched out along 35 km of front: an attack through the Ondava Valley against the strong and well-manned Russian positions offered little chance of success. Anyway, 3rd Army HQ at Kaschau was receiving reports that the enemy was supposedly going to mount an all-out offensive against their units on the 10th. Therefore they remained on the defensive. X Corps assembled its 2 ID as a reserve in the Laborcza Valley.

At this point, however, the Russians pulled back several advanced battle groups to their main position. This may have been due to orders issued by Ivanov on 7 March to the commander of 3rd Russian Army: Dimitriev was supposed to contain Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army and the west wing of Boroevic's Army with a minimum number of troops. However, strong forces were to be assembled in the Mezolaborcz-Lupkow-Sanok area for an offensive to Homonna. The commander of the Russian Southwest Front intended "to threaten the rear of the enemy units which wanted to break through to Przemysl." The rearward movement of the Russians in front of the 3rd k.u.k. Army, which the staff at Kaschau didn't know how to interpret, may have been the first preparation for this planned attack.

On 10 March the mass attack by 2nd Army had reached its high point. Nonetheless, the foremost lines had only advanced a small distance toward the north since the operation began.

d. The relief attempt is finally shattered (11-20 March)

The nerves of the commanders and staffs at Teschen and Ungvar were on edge because of their concern for the fate of the isolated fortress, whose time was running out. They sent repeated wire messages to Terszyanszky to urge him on. Then, on 11 March, the enemy launched a blow that threatened to put an end to the Aus-Hung. offensive.

The advance of the k.u.k. XIX Corps toward the curve in the railroad at Lupkow had caused Brussilov to fear that the Russian front opposite Boroevic's Army might be rolled up. Therefore on the 11th he struck the 29 ID, which had been following up his troops, and drove it back to its original position. The same fate befell its neighbor on the left (34 ID) on the next day. Only 41 Hon ID (with its 2100 riflemen) was able to hold onto the ground it had won.

158Bonch-Bruyevitch, Vol. I, p. 72
Böhm-Ermolli decided to send all available reserves to XIX Corps to keep the enemy from breaking through to Wola Michowa; after this sector was secure he would resume the operation toward Lisko, even though Tersztyanszky believed it had very little chance of success. To restore the situation, 2nd Army HQ asked for support from its neighbors to the west; the right wing unit of 3rd Army (24 ID) firmly held the crest on the Hungarian border and was firing toward Lupkow with its artillery, but didn't have enough strength to mount a relief attack with its infantry.

Although many battalions had to be released to help Trollmann, Schmidt-Georgenegg's Corps of Tersztyanszky's northern group was finally able to take two hotly contested points - the village of Rabe and the Manilowa Heights - after major actions on the 11th and 12th; both locations were held against Russian counterattacks.

After the arrival of 14 ID, its commander FML Martiny took charge of Tersztyanszky's right wing corps (14 ID and the bulk of 43 LW ID); however, neither this group nor Lütgendorf's Corps was able to break through. XVIII Corps captured only some insignificant positions; V Corps used up the detachments which it had sent over the San in some fruitless actions and then pulled them back to the southwest bank of the river.

The advance had stalled on Szurmay's west wing; an attempt to move forward by building sap trenches failed because the ground was frozen solid. Therefore 2nd Army HQ approved Szurmay's request to pull back the troops that were stuck in front of the Russian lines to their old positions; he was also instructed to assemble strong reserves behind his left wing (IR # 76 and half of 7 ID), which could be diverted to Tersztyanszky's hard-pressed western group. The Russians took advantage of the situation and assaulted the center and right (east) wing of Szurmay's Group. On the 14th, however, 38 Hon ID parried the heavy enemy attack and itself launched a counterattack which threw the Russians back; the Transylvanian division took a substantial number of prisoners.

**Tersztyanszky's last attempt is thwarted**

The rifle strength of Tersztyanszky's Armeegruppe was sinking alarmingly. Its commander therefore decided to try a more methodical approach in place of a general assault. The northern group would shift toward its left; Schmidt's Corps would exert the most pressure on the enemy by advancing anew along the Dzial
Ridge. GdK Terszyanszky ignored the opinion of 2nd Army HQ, which didn't want him to lose time by redeployment and still wanted the main effort directed straight toward the north; he began to prepare for the new operation.

Brussilov, however, destroyed this final plan for the relief of Przemysl. On the afternoon of the 13th he broke through the front of XIX Corps and pushed ahead toward Wola Michowa.

The severe damage to the west flank made it unthinkable to continue the offensive toward Baligrod. Fortunately the Russians once again failed to quickly follow up their advantage, so Wola Michowa remained in our hands. On the next day, however, the Maguryczne was lost, which forced the evacuation of the Chryszczata even though it hadn't been attacked. Instead of opening an offensive, FML Schmidt had to hurry to the assistance of 41 Hon ID, while staving off heavy Russian attacks on the Manilowa.

At this point 3rd Army HQ helped out somewhat by extending its right wing on the 15th to the vicinity of Lupkow; this strengthened the resistance of Trollmann's Corps, which was now responsible for a considerably shorter stretch of the front. However, there was no hope for a significant change in fortune. On 14 March the 2nd Army HQ ordered GdK Terszyanszky as well as XVIII and V Corps to cancel their offensive. All available reserves of the northern group - a total of eleven battalions - were sent to XIX Corps.

Discussions with the Germans

While the fate of 2nd Army's offensive was being decided, there was a significant exchange of views between the allied high commands. On the 13th the Chief of the German General Staff sent a letter to Teschen that was primarily concerned with Austria-Hungary's policy toward Italy. At this point, however, GdI Conrad felt that the continuation of the fight against Russia was the most urgent priority. Since he was aware that new Army Corps were being raised in Germany, he responded with a request that two or three German divisions be sent to the k.u.k. Armies, even if they couldn't arrive in time to relieve Przemysl. He intended to continue the offensive out of the Carpathians in east Galicia, for which purpose German reinforcements would provide necessary additional strength for either Linsingen or Pflanzer-Baltin. Conrad made the same request to the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces in the East.
Falkenhayn responded that he was considering sending reinforcements directly to the South Army; however, the German troops weren't accustomed to mountain warfare and not equipped for it. Linsingen had reported to him on the 13th that South Army could possibly advance in March, if the Austro-Hungarians continued to attack energetically and if the cold and snow subsided. The German Chief of Staff also opined that Linsingen could perhaps open the way for his neighbor on the left; however, Böhm-Ermolli would at least have to send him some weak reinforcements, or at least cooperate by advancing his right wing. This was "simply an expression of opinion", not "presumptuous advice."

Conrad stated that he wasn't considering the use of new German formations for a frontal assault by South Army. The units would first go to Pflanzer-Baltin, and come under Linsingen's command later after he'd gotten out of the mountains. Thus the German troops wouldn't need any special mountain equipment. He added that at the moment the military operations in east Galicia were the most important because victories there and in the Bukovina would affect the conduct of Romania.

Falkenhayn concluded these discussions by pointing out that the formations Conrad was referring to weren't made up of "new" troops, but rather of men pulled from divisions at the front. Regarding the central issue, Falkenhayn declared that he agreed with Conrad that the proposed operation could have a great influence on decisions by the government at Bucharest. However, for the moment it was impossible to transfer units from the western to the eastern front; it was also impossible to move them from Hindenburg's command to eastern Galicia as had originally been contemplated.

On the western front the Germans were defending themselves against heavy French attacks in Champagne and southeast of Verdun, as well as against the British at Lille; the Western allies had a considerable numerical superiority.

The situation at Przemysl becomes critical

After XIX Corps' line was broken by the Russians, and after the staff at Teschen reviewed the extent of Böhm-Ermolli's casualties, even the most optimistic officers gave up hope for

---

159 From the manuscript in the German Reichsarchiv
160 TRANSLATOR’S NOTE - At this point the Germans were beginning to reduce some of their existing infantry divisions from a four-regiment to a three-regiment organization; the regiments thus released were forming new divisions.
the relief of Przemyśl.\textsuperscript{161}

During the second siege of the fortress, the effective strength of the garrison had by now been reduced by almost 24,000 men due to deaths, wounds and illnesses. On 8 March the Przemyśl command HQ reported that it was planning a sortie by 24 to 26 battalions, each of 800 men, in the direction of Bircza. However, the weakened condition of the personnel meant that the chances of success were not as good as the large number of units seemed to indicate. The AOK informed GdI Kusmanek on the 13\textsuperscript{th} that he could no longer expect Böhm-Ermolli's Army to advance through Ustrzyki Dl.-Lisko by the 18\textsuperscript{th}. If by the 17\textsuperscript{th} it seemed that relief was no longer possible, Kusmanek should make a decision about the sortie. He should consider the condition of the troops in the fortress, as well as the demands of military honor and the glorious reputation which the garrison had won during the siege; if he broke out, he should do with as much strength as possible and join the field armies. The possible routes led through Lisko, Stary Sambor-Turka, or Sambor. It would be useful if he could seriously damage the railroads in the Sambor area. If the sortie occurred, the men left in the fortress should hold out as long as possible before trying to fight their way out.

GdI Kusmanek replied to Teschen by radio the next day. If the fortress was still to be held, he would restrict the attacking forces to 12 to 15 battalions of 700 men. He would strike toward Bircza, but only if he would be able to make contact with 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army in that area. Otherwise, he planned to start the breakout at the latest in the early morning hours of the 19\textsuperscript{th} in the direction of Sambor. The garrison now had only enough supplies to hold out until 24 March. The units chosen for the breakout would therefore leave the fortress early on the 19\textsuperscript{th} with four days of rations. The minimal group left behind would follow at the latest on the evening of the 20\textsuperscript{th}, also with four days' rations. Hopefully supplies could be replenished by taking the Russian depots at Sambor.

The high command asked GdK Böhm-Ermolli whether it would be possible for 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army to renew its attack and reach the line Ustrzyki Dl.-Lisko by the 23\textsuperscript{rd} at the latest. He replied that it was completely impossible; thus there was no reason for the Przemyśl garrison to sortie toward Bircza. Both the AOK and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army HQ believed that they would be able to help the garrison

\textsuperscript{161}On 1 March, GdK Böhm-Ermolli had 148,848 riflemen (including 14 and 31 ID). In the following 14 days he lost 23,891 dead and wounded (including 450 officers), 10,465 prisoners and missing (60 officers), and 16,730 sick (110 officers). Total losses were thus 51,086. This was 33\% of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army's strength; Tersztyanszky's Group had lost 73\%.
most quickly if it did break out toward Sambor. Teschen recommended that the main effort in the proposed supporting attack should be made by Szurmay; his Group could coordinate their efforts with those of the South Army, which at the time was making the best progress in its offensive. However, Böhm-Ermolli decided for tactical reasons to entrust V Corps with the thrust toward the northeast; the Corps would be reinforced by any units which Tersztyanszky didn't need in his efforts to hold onto the positions he had won after so much bloodshed. Tersztyanszky reckoned that he needed at least 40,000 riflemen for this purpose, so only FML Lütgendorf's combined 31 ID was available; its main body began to march east toward V Corps on 16 March. However, on the same day the Russians made a heavy attack on XIX Corps; they were held off, but the action made it necessary to leave IR # 69 of 31 ID with Tersztyanszky.

V Corps fended off a Russian attack on the 19th; therefore its own attack, which had been scheduled for the 20th, had to be postponed until the 21st to give the artillery time for preparation. This was pretty late to be of any use to the troops at Przemysl, who wanted to break through the encircling Russian forces on the 19th. Moreover, Szurmay raised objections to having his left wing take part in the attack because according to all reports which he'd received in the last few days the tactical conditions were unfavorable. On the 17th, 18th and 19th the Russians stormed in vain against the center and right wing of his Group. 2nd Army HQ now decided that Szurmay's participation would be restricted to a feint attack, and that he would give up IR # 68 to V Corps. Tersztyanszky would make lively demonstrations on his front at noon on the 19th to pretend that he was resuming his offensive. On this day Szurmay's Corps fought well and staved off an enemy attack against the Manilowa.

4th Army had planned to resume its offensive on the 17th, but had to postpone it for about 24 hours. At 3:30 AM on the 18th, FML Arz led his storm group against Gorlice and Sekowa; however, he failed to take the Russians by surprise. Farther north the 39 Hon ID - after winning an initial success near Staszkowka - couldn't break through either. On the next day, parts of 10 ID were thrown back by a Russian counterattack, although the enemy had less luck on other parts of the front. III Corps wasn't in a position to support the extreme right wing of 4th Army. Dimitriev focused his attention on the sectors on both sides of Gorlice. The Russians threatened 45 LW ID of 3rd Army on the 17th and 18th with some unsuccessful thrusts; however, as will be narrated shortly, these actions were a successful feint operation.
On the 19th, there was an artillery action along the entire front of 3rd Army; the positions of XVII Corps and 22 LW ID were soon covered in dust and smoke. In the night of 20-21 March they were hit by a major Russian assault.

4. The fall of fortress Przemysl

General Ivanov had ordered 11th Russian Army to initiate "energetic activity" against Przemysl. The Russians, however, hadn't forgotten the bloody and fruitless storm of the fortress in October. They hoped that the moment was not far away when the large garrison would have used up all its rations; then the fortified town would fall without fighting. Therefore the enemy restricted their activity to artillery fire on the forward positions and the main belt of forts; after 9 February their guns were seldom silent. Also they attempted to draw the blockading ring tighter in the northwest and southwest, but were opposed in bitter actions by the very active fortress troops, who were always available to contest any important points in no-man's-land.

Around midnight on 14 March the Russians won their only significant success in front of Przemysl, when they took the forward position of Na Gorach-Batycze opposite the northern fortified line; the sector, hitherto stubbornly defended, fell to a surprise thrust. The fortress HQ immediately sent several battalions to counterattack, but their preparations were delayed for too long. The attempt was finally considered hopeless and called off.

As noted above, Kusmanek had planned to break through toward Sambor. He changed his mind when he received further information from Teschen regarding the deployment of Russian units in Galicia. He believed that a movement to Sambor would encounter obstacles that could hardly be overcome. Therefore on the 16th he sent a radio message to the high command that he would attack east toward Mosciska, Grodek and Lemberg "so that he could still perform some service to the Army." On the same day the AOK replied that they preferred the original concept; the east wing of 2nd Army was already preparing to help out with an attack on both sides of the Turka Road if the garrison broke through toward Sambor. If Kusmanek chose the Lemberg direction, however, he should try to reach Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, which was attacking toward Stanislau with its right wing southeast of Tlumacz.
Early on the 19th the high command received another radio message from Przemysl: the fortress command still wanted to attack toward Lemberg, and this action was already in motion.

Several factors determined this decision. GdI Kusmanek was surely correct in his opinion that his weakened troops were no longer capable of advancing and fighting in the difficult mountainous terrain south of the fortress.\textsuperscript{162} Except toward the east, all routes out of town led across numerous streams, whose banks would provide excellent defensive positions for the Russians. An attack toward the east, however, would supposedly strike the weakest part of the blockading line, guarded only by second-rate troops.\textsuperscript{163} The more level ground would aid the mobility of the attackers. Finally, a thrust in this unexpected direction might surprise the Russians.

However, Kusmanek didn't have any illusions. A long string of good luck would be needed for the operation to succeed. After breaking through, the troops would have to capture the enemy supply depots at Mosciska and Sadowa Wisznia; then they would have a long distance to march to link up with Pflanzer-Baltin. Even if the enemy didn't interfere, the weakened condition of the soldiers would make the long marches extremely difficult. The defender of Przemyśl wanted mainly to maintain the honor of his garrison by a final heroic act, regardless of whether it ended in a gallant defeat or in an unexpected victory. At the very least some damage could be done to the enemy and some confusion caused in his ranks; this would assist the armies in the Carpathians.

The encircling lines would be broken on the 19th; then the rest of the garrison would destroy the fortifications and heavy artillery as well as all other equipment before following the units which had already moved out.

GdI Kusmanek sent a message to his Supreme Warlord:\textsuperscript{164}

"Your Majesty!

\textsuperscript{162}For example, according to Kusmanek's reports only 25 to 30% of the personnel of k.u. Lst IR # 16 were still in good health; 70% of k.u. Lst IR # 9 were not fit for an attack. Only about half of the k.k. Lst IR # 33 were present and fit for duty.

\textsuperscript{163}In reality, however, the Russian positions here consisted of several parallel lines that had been strongly fortified.

\textsuperscript{164}For many years Kusmanek had been in charge of the presidial office of the War Ministry. Under the direction of the Emperor he had conducted personnel business regarding the Army's generals, and thus was personally acquainted with his sovereign.
Undefeated by the enemy after six months of unbroken action, the garrison of Przemysl is compelled by hunger to break through the iron ring of the enemy tomorrow (on 19 March). Although the troops have lost most of their strength after long ordeals of all kinds, we will begin this attempt so that before our probable downfall we will perhaps still render assistance to the field armies.

In these fateful moments we raise our hearts in continued love and loyalty to Your Majesty.

Kusmanek, GdI"

The Emperor responded:

"The report of the heroic sortie that the hitherto undefeated garrison of Przemysl is determined to make has moved me deeply. From the bottom of my heart I send my best wishes to the heroes who are undertaking this great deed for the honor of the fatherland and the glory of our arms. The accomplishments of the garrison of Przemysl will be memorable forever; each is a leaf in the laurel crown which I and the fatherland offer to the brave, self-sacrificing troops.

May the Almighty's merciful protection be with you.

Franz Joseph"

The breakthrough attempt

As this message arrived in the fortress by radio, the troops were already in action.\textsuperscript{165}

There was wet snow falling as the units chosen for the attack assembled on the night of 18-19 March on the roads nearest to the east front of the fortress, which were turned into puddles. The advance through our own fortified lines began while it was still dark. The fortress command had made every effort from the beginning to keep all their plans secret. However, the Russians

\textsuperscript{165}TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The units sent into the attack were 23 Hon ID, a combined Division led by FML Waitzendorfer, the 97 and 108 Lst Inf Bdes, and a combined Brigade under GM Kloiber (see Franz Forstner, "Przemysl" (Vienna, 1987 - p. 226). For some reason, the official history only shows the positions of the Honed Div, Waitzendorfer, and 97 Bde (see Beilage 11 of the original). The Russians engaged were mainly from 58 ID plus some opolcheniye (militia) brigades.
had no doubt learned about the intended breakout and its chosen direction by intercepting and deciphering radio traffic between Przemysl and Teschen. They had immediately reinforced the encircling lines east of the city, where their troops were now lurking, waiting for their prey to appear. Unfortunately, the advance also was hampered by some delays. While the troops were assembling, their physical condition, weakened by insufficient rations, already caused the movement to fall behind schedule. Several men broke down from exhaustion just after leaving their barracks. It also took longer than expected to proceed along the narrow paths between the barriers and around the minefields.

Morning was already dawning when the action against the alert and richly supplied Russians began. The enemy had deployed their batteries with their usual skill; a rain of steel soon fell upon the attackers and put a limit to their progress. Only a little ground was gained in the sector from Pleszowice north to the San. The regiments of 23 Hon ID, spurred on by their spirited and brave commanders, didn't coordinate their advance. The day soon turned against the Division; it was struck in the right flank by the Russian 58 ID and almost encircled, suffering 68% casualties. When the Honveds fell back, the units to their north had to do likewise. Thus the breakthrough attempt, which used up the remaining strength of the troops, collapsed with heavy losses. At 2:00 PM the last units completed their retreat through the fortified zone. The enemy's attempt to pursue was checked by fire from the works.

GdI Kusmanek sent a report to Schönbrunn:

"Your Majesty!

In the name of the Przemysl garrison, I wish to thank Your Majesty for Your most gracious message to us. I also wish to report that the garrison attempted to break out today. Since in true obedience I must be accurate, unfortunately I must tell Your Majesty that the attempt wasn't successful. In seven hours of desperate combat, amid a powerful snowstorm, the troops used up their last strength while trying to overcome the powerful enemy. After heavy losses we had to pull back behind the ring of forts. As far as can be determined so far, the always gallant Royal Hungarian 23rd Landwehr Infantry Division lost about half of its strength, and the other units also suffered severely. Because of the total exhaustion of the soldiers, any further breakthrough attempt would be completely fruitless. Therefore I will hold the fortress for as long as possible; by continuing to pin down enemy units we can still be of use to the field armies."
True to our oath, and with boundless love and loyalty for Your Majesty, we will persevere to the end.

Kusmanek, GdI"

The surrender

At this point all necessary measures were still being taken to fend off a storming attack at the last hour. The end, however, was inexorably approaching. Russian assaults on the northwest, north and east fronts were bravely turned back on the 20th and 21st. On the 21st the high-ranking commanders convened and decided, in response to a suggestion made 24 hours previously by the fortress HQ, that the city would be surrendered on the next day. The physical strength of the garrison had wasted away through hunger; there were rations available only until the 24th, and they had to be conserved during the period while negotiations about the fate of the garrison were going on with the enemy.166

On the 19th the paper money in the fortress (600,000 to 700,000 crowns) was burnt; on the 20th and 21st the slaughter of horses was intensified. The railroad station facilities and rolling stock and any equipment that might have military use for the enemy was destroyed or rendered inoperable. On the same two days the officers of the air service left town in balloons, but all of them went off course and landed in enemy territory.167

During the night of 21-22 March the fortifications fired their last artillery ammunition. Then the guns (with the exception of the older models of cannon) were blown up by firing them with too much powder, or by explosive charges. Disturbed by the spectacular rumbling and crackling, the Russians cowered behind their entrenchments.

The next day dawned with a touch of the coming spring. The sun

166 Ten years earlier, when the Russians surrendered the fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese, they still had the following rations available (in tons): wheat (700), wheat flour (150), corn flour (40), legumes (700), barley (2), rice (1), salted meat (40), hardtack (60), and sugar (20). There was also enough horse fodder for two months. Moreover, the naval personnel in the fortress had additional rations. (See Beilage 19, Volume III of the papers on the Russo-Japanese War published in Vienna, 1909.)

167 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - There were also six planes based at Przemysl; on the day they were supposed to flee (19 March) there was a snow storm. Only one plane took off, and it crashed; the other five were destroyed. A plane from outside the fort flew into town just before the capitulation and was able to return to the Austrian lines on the 22nd with final messages from Kusmanek to his family. (Forstner, "Przemysl", pp. 233-234)
shone brightly on the fortress on the San at 6:00 AM as the destruction of the defenses began. Powerful detonations blew apart the forts and bridges amidst flashes of fire and smoke. All of the works were turned into heaps of rubble. The garrison sent out a final message to its comrades-in-arms: "Knowing our difficult fate, we wish the field armies glory and victory!"

White flags fluttered over the Austrian lines. Around 9:00 AM the first Russian detachments entered the city; a staff captain demanded that the fortress commander surrender his sword. Two hours earlier an auto had rolled out of Przemysl on the main highway to Lemberg. Col. Martinek (commander of 108 Lst Inf Bde) and Lt Col. Hubert (Chief of Staff to the fortress command) drove to Mosciska, the HQ of 11th Russian Army. They were authorized by Kusmanek to negotiate over the fate of the garrison (not over the surrender of the fortress itself). They received an unpleasant reception from General Selivanov. The Russian commander had hoped to take the fortress by storm, but had been thwarted. Then he and his staff heard the enormous explosions in which the fortifications of Przemysl had been destroyed. He had thus been deprived of the trophies of victory, which disappeared right before his eyes. When he heard several more isolated explosions somewhat later, he believed that they were traps laid for his troops. Therefore he refused to speak with Martinek and Hubert, confiscated their weapons, and contrary to international law he treated them as prisoners. It was not until the morning of the 23rd that he changed his mind – allegedly at the behest of the Tsar. He completed the negotiations and allowed the emissaries to return to Przemysl. In all, 9 generals, 93 staff officers, 2500 other officers, and 117,000 men marched off to captivity. In recognition of their bravery, the officers were permitted to retain their swords. This concession, however, was revoked just three weeks later because of a baseless rumor that a Russian prisoner had been brutally mutilated by the Austrians.

The defender of Przemysl - GdI Kusmanek - later was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order. On 20 March he received a final message from Emperor Franz Joseph:

"It saddens me greatly that the bold breakout attempt by the Przemysl garrison was shattered yesterday by the enemy's larger force. Yet I gaze with a sad pride upon the incomparable self-sacrifice of the brave men whose efforts weren't crowned with success. I wholeheartedly thank everyone who fought for their
heroic deed. I make the sign of the cross over every one of them who gave their lives on the field of honor.

Even in the distant future, history will record what Austria-Hungary's warriors achieved during the stubborn defense of Przemysl. They were unflinching and brave until the end.

Franz Joseph"

5. Analysis of the Przemysl campaign

When looking back at the events of the first three months of 1915, one gets the impression that the high command's plans for seeking a final decision to the war had turned into a prolonged attempt to relieve the besieged fortress of Przemysl. Despite heavy casualties suffered by the troops, the effort was a failure from the beginning.

Should Przemysl have been abandoned?

One of the theoretical laws of war is that operations should never become dependent on fortified places, which should be constructed only for certain limited purposes. Nonetheless, in recent wars the activities of field armies had been determined to a certain extent by fortresses -
. By the upper Italian fortified quadrilateral in 1848, 1859 and 1866,
. By Sevastopol during the campaign of the Western powers in the Crimea,
. By Strassburg, Metz, Paris and Belfort in the Franco-Prussian War,
. By Port Arthur in 1904-05, and
In no instance was a garrison of several divisions able to break through to regain contact with its own field armies.

Based on our current knowledge of events, it seems that the fate of Przemysl was sealed at the start of November 1914, when the k.u.k. high command decided to break off the campaign along the middle San, lead the Aus-Hung. armies back to west Galicia, and seek another way to bar the advance of the Russian steamroller. It has often been asserted that this was the point at which the garrison should have been evacuated and the city abandoned to the Russians after destruction of the fortifications.

However, there were many arguments against this course. Evacuation of the fortification, the strength of which was
considerably exaggerated by the enemy, would have increased the confidence of the opposing coalition. It would have a depressing effect on our own population, and on the German allies. The population of the two capitals - Vienna and Budapest - were anyway more inclined to react to bad news than to reports of successes; abandonment of the fort would have caused them shock and panic. Moreover the portion of the East Slavic population which was still inclined to the Danube Monarchy would be shaken in their allegiance.

There were military considerations in addition to these political ones. Conrad was constantly pushing the German OHL to switch its main effort to the eastern theater of operations. If this happened, the offensive would be resumed, the San would soon be reached, and Przemyśl would again become an important strong point. Another factor was surely the belief that the fort would tie down substantial enemy forces and prevent them from appearing in the open field. The Russians in fact gave Przemyśl an exaggerated importance during both of their advances through central and west Galicia. Both in September and November, they kept an excessive number of troops nearby prior to the initiation of a regular blockade; this greatly assisted the Aus-Hung. armies during their retreat. The Russians had learned a lesson when their storming attacks in October had ended in a bloody setback; in the second blockade they had no intention of attacking but were content to isolate the city.

Full use of the tightly-woven and efficient railroad network of Galicia was denied to the Russians during the six months prior to 22 March, because the fortress blocked an important junction of the main line. They were forced therefore to a lengthy and expensive effort to build small rail lines around the north side of Przemyśl in order to keep their Galician front supplied. They initiated a larger project, a railroad that would pass north of Lemberg, and also intended to upgrade the minor line through Lemberg-Rawa Russka-Jaroslau. The Russians were hard at work extending track into Galicia from the north: they started a 40 km line from Vladimir-Volynsky to Sokal, an 86 km line from Lublin to Rozwadow (which would include a bridge over the San), and finally a 40 km line from Ostrowiec to Nadbrzezie (with a bridge over the Vistula). These projects weren't completed during their nine month occupation of Galicia. Since the rail net was interrupted at Przemyśl, many troop movements involved marching on foot. Finally, the supply of the units fighting south of the Vistula was considerably hampered.

Despite these advantages of leaving a garrison in Przemyśl in
November 1914, the disadvantage was that the Aus-Hung leadership was thereafter forced to tailor all of its planning to address the relief of the fortress. Even in mid-March, when there could be no further doubt about the outcome of the frightful campaign in the Carpathians, the high command couldn't bring themselves to authorize the surrender of the city and cut short the useless suffering of the garrison. On the contrary, the AOK finally demanded a breakout, even though no one really believed it could succeed. Although this attitude is scarcely explicable on rational utilitarian grounds, it is understandable in light of the soldierly ethic.\footnote{Major Dr. Stuckheil published a series of significant articles on the defense and fall of Przemysl in the 1923, 1924 and 1925 editions of the "Militärwissenschaftlichen und Technischen Mitteilungen." Also useful is a manuscript of Ministerial Counselor Dr. Smolik, who took part in the defense of Przemysl as a reserve officer.}

The fortress had thus become a symbol to the k.u.k. armed forces. To give it up without a fight would have undermined the warlike spirit of the Army and the people. It could have led to a reaction in the country such as happened in Prussia after Emperor Napoleon effortlessly seized a series of fortresses after Jena and Auerstadt. Przemysl had been surrounded once by the enemy and bravely held by its self-sacrificing garrison. Its relief was a duty.

The strategy behind the relief attempts

But time was pressing, both because of the limited rations of the fortress and the general diplomatic situation, which could change based on the attitude of Italy and the still neutral Balkan states. After Boroevic's Army reached the Galician foothills in late December, it was hurled back by Brussilov's charging Russians and withdrew into the Carpathians. It was then reinforced to limit the Russian incursion on Hungarian soil. Also, it seemed obvious that units should concentrate in the mountains to thrust ahead along the shortest route to Przemysl. It is still not certain whether the high command recognized all the consequences of this decision, which sent large bodies of troops to fight in the Carpathians during winter without sufficient special equipment, or whether they considered that the majority of the soldiers might lack the necessary physical conditioning. Apparently they felt that this was the only possible course and certainly they hoped that a rapid advance would ensure that only a short time would be spent in the mountains. However, when this hope wasn't fulfilled the consequences of their decision became shockingly apparent. The leadership recognized that the route they had chosen to Przemysl...
was only apparently the shortest, and that it would exact a heavy
toll. Undaunted, the Chief of Staff continued the undertaking
through several months and varying changes of fortune.

The enemy's plans were also affected by Przemysl. This is
strikingly illustrated by a telegram which General Alexeiev sent
on 15 April 1915 to the Stavka (although some other parts of the
wire are of questionable accuracy). At this time Alexeiev was no
longer Ivanov's Chief of Staff, but had become commander of the
Northwest Front. He declared that a Russian offensive in the
Carpathians could only be justified as long as the unconquered
fortress lay behind the front of 8th Army. Brussilov asserted
that he was often annoyed at how the threatening danger from the
fortress limited his Army's freedom of action. Later he
congratulated himself because the fall of Przemysl was due solely
to the persistence and self-sacrifice of his troops, especially
those of VIII Corps.

With hindsight it is easy to assert that there were other
possible strategies that could have won the campaign, and which
would have reaped other benefits besides the relief of Przemysl.
Since the fortress had enough rations to hold out until 22 March,
there was time to take a longer route by a large scale
envelopment of the left wing of the Russian armies; for this
purpose, Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe could have been
considerably reinforced. Pflanzer already had the mountains
behind him, and was in a position to quickly help the South Army
to also reach the plains. Together these two commands could have
carried out the envelopment, while guarding their open eastern
flank with reserve units following up in echelon. The Russians'
eastern wing, until this point treated by their high command as a
stepchild, would have been outflanked and beaten. This would
have fulfilled all our objectives.

Implementation of this plan, however, would have been hampered by
the limited capacity of the railroad through Maramaros-Sziget to
Körösmező and Delatyn, which was barely adequate to meet all the
requirements of the units which actually fought under the
Armeegruppe north of the mountains. Therefore reinforcements

170Brussilov, pp. 74, 77 ff., 90 and 112
171Not only was this railroad through the Carpathians inadequate; its position
also made it vulnerable to enemy action. A break, or even a threat, to the
stretch between Huszt and Kiralyhaza, which was just 60 km from the front
at the Wyszkow Pass, would have slowed the flow of supplies to Pflanzer-
Baltin's Armeegruppe. This situation couldn't be quickly remedied. The
railroad had just been recovered from the enemy after Pflanzer's offensive
at the end of 1914, and beyond Raho it was in very bad condition. The
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

couldn't be sent to Pflanzer-Baltin quickly enough. Moreover, the line of communication was constantly threatened from the open eastern flank. It is true, however, that some units could have been sent along other lines that at least reached into the southern slopes of the Carpathians; they could then have proceeded forward on foot. Although the high command was uncomfortable with the idea of having a large army north of the mountains dependent on a single railroad, they had accepted the fact that the main body of 2nd Army was based on just a single road (from Takcsany to Cisna).

A safer approach than the envelopment attack in east Galicia would have been an offensive along the Galician foothills, from west to east. However the HQ of 4th Army never warmed to the idea of a battle involving a frontal assault in west Galicia. Several months would pass before plans for an operational breakthrough from the lines held by 4th Army became a reality.

One thing is certain: if the main effort had been made through Stanislau or over the Dunajec the armies could have hardly suffered greater casualties than they actually did in the central Carpathians.

Obstacles to success in the Carpathians

There were many obstacles to the plan actually adopted by the high command. In both the offensive which started on 23 January and the one that started on 27 February, from the beginning it was difficult to bring the right wing, which was hanging back, into effective coordination with the rest of the attackers. Since this disadvantage couldn't be remedied, it was hardly possible to keep the line straight. In both instances there was no plan for coordination with the operations of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe and of the South Army, and therefore the main effort was a thrust directly north toward Przemysl. Here again the fortress had a fateful influence upon the campaign. The units in this sector had to seek a decision in the mountains without waiting for the right wing group to come up, because the relief of Przemysl was considered a goal that should be quickly attained.

The operational plan actually consisted of two parallel

tracks and rail stations on the stretch that climbed to 1000 meters could only be provisionally restored after hard work by the railroad companies; therefore trains covering the last 86 km to Delatyn were subject to difficult conditions. It was impossible to proceed further through Nadworna and Stanislau because of a demolished viaduct; the stretch to Kolomea could only handle half its normal capacity.
undertakings: to thrust north to relieve Przemysl, and to envelop the wing of the enemy's 8th Army while cutting off their line of retreat. This muddied the goals of the campaign, as the AOK itself came to realize. They couldn't let the center pause, for fear that the enemy would have an opportunity to hurl forces against the refused right wing. However, it is possible that if the Russians had in fact diverted stronger forces toward the southeast their resistance on the shortest route to the fortress would have been weaker. The uncertainty about the objectives became apparent in continuing debates about the deployment of fresh forces (especially VIII Corps), and also affected the lower-ranking commanders. It was to our advantage at the start of the first offensive that Brussilov's continuous front extended only a little past the Lisko-Baligrod-Cisna road. Thus Puhallo's group gained ground relatively quickly at the outset. However, their outflanking maneuver didn't develop into a deep envelopment because they lacked enough strength in reserve to follow the front lines in echelon.

Moreover, the German South Army had to be assisted out of the mountains, on its left by Szurmay and on its right by Pflanzer-Baltin. Because it was so hard to fight in the mountains in winter, it would have been preferable if Pflanzer alone had been responsible for rendering assistance. However, because of the need to reach Przemysl the South Army demanded that Szurmay, their neighbor on the left, should also help out. Thus the idea of a simple, united thrust toward the north was further weakened. The Russians, never in serious danger, themselves went over to the attack and broke through in the important area around Mezőlaborcz.

Although the forces available for the January offensive were insufficient, some superiority of numbers was attained for the February-March offensive. However, by that time the need to relieve Przemysl had unfortunately become so urgent that a thrust along the shortest route was again chosen. The situation meanwhile had become worse in one sense, and better in another. On the negative side, Brussilov had recognized the gap in his line and had extended his continuous front as far as the Wyszkow Pass. On the positive side, Pflanzer-Baltin was advancing victoriously east of the Carpathians. If he could be reinforced in time, the South Army and Szurmay's Group could join the advance. Concern for Przemysl, however, dominated all planning. In both operations, 3rd Army attacked in echelon, despite Conrad's warnings against this method; since each of the contingents waited for a success by its neighbor, freedom of decision was hampered. Threatened only in isolated sections of
the front, the Russians were able to shift their reserves to the threatened areas. 3rd Army HQ, however, feared that if they committed all their units to a simultaneous assault they would be left powerless when they tried to fend off the inevitable heavy Russian counterattacks with worn-out formations. 172

The combat strength of the attackers was considerably diminished because under the existing conditions it wasn't possible to provide adequate artillery support. Aside from the fact that the frontal thrust of 2nd Army lacked any support on its flanks, this was the main reason why Tersztyanszky's tightly massed and numerically superior shock group was unable to break through the Russian front toward Baligrod. Only batteries of mountain artillery could have kept up with a large-scale offensive in this terrain; however, in peacetime no one had felt it advisable to spend large sums of money on this type of artillery for such an unforeseen contingency. This was yet another argument against making the Carpathians the decisive theater of operations. Thus the infantry, as it moved slowly and with difficulty over mountains and through valleys, didn't have the moral advantage of hearing their artillery firing or the practical assistance of a heavy bombardment.

Perhaps a more methodical "step-by-step" approach - as advocated by Col. Veith in the excerpts quoted earlier - would have had more success. However, in January there were insufficient forces for this option, and afterwards the situation of fortress Przemysl forced the attackers to the greatest possible hurry.

The demands on the troops considerably exceeded their capabilities. The result was that orders were often avoided by shammed compliance; this impaired the Army's sense of discipline. The commanders at the front didn't always have the courage to voice clear and compelling arguments against the chosen strategy; when they did, they were too often ignored. In no other period of the war were there so many instances of disobedience of orders by units of Slavic nationality than while these super-human demands were being made of the soldiers.

Thus Przemysl fell on 22 March, despite all the efforts to save it. 119,600 men of the garrison marched off to imprisonment in Siberia. Moreover, the relief attempts had greatly harmed the overall conduct of military operations.

Although the Russians had proved tougher and more able to withstand the Carpathian hardships, they too had suffered heavy

172 From a written report by GM Pitreich (20 September 1929)
casualties. Undoubtedly their losses were higher than those of the Habsburg Army, since their commanders pressed forward without any regard for lost lives. This heavy toll significantly offset the setback to the k.u.k. forces. Although the relief attempts had failed, Russian military writers afterwards noted that this campaign was another stage in the wearing down of the Tsarist regime. They called Ivanov's decision to attack over the Carpathians "the beginning of the end."

**E. Ivanov's Counter-Offensive**

1. **Decisions of the Russian and allied commanders**

   **The Russians**

   On 19 March the Grand Duke-Generalissimo decided to call off the offensive against the Germans and to throw all his strength against the opposing armies in the Carpathians. He reported this to Tsarskoye Selo, where the Tsar added a remark, "This is also what I would have done."

   We can make some observations on the Russian objectives based on Ivanov's deployment for his main attack. They wanted to strike a death blow to the defenders of the Carpathians by seizing the railroad junction at Homonna. The position of Terszytanszky's Group, in a salient jutting forward from the rest of the line, was conducive to this plan. Therefore Brussilov and Dimitriev concentrated their strongest forces opposite Terszytanszky as well as against the inner wings of Böhm-Ermolli's and Boroevic's Armies. The Russians also intended to thrust through Bartfeld toward Eperjes, although this is less obvious from their dispositions.

   The fall of Przemysl didn't have any major effect on these plans. Meanwhile there were many differences of opinion between the Stavka and Ivanov, in which the supreme command bowed to the latter's strong will. As he desired, the center of Ivanov's force would seek to win the line Zboro-Varanno-Csap-Szatmar Nemeti; 3rd Army would advance its left wing to the Sztopko area. The Generalissimo had wanted Letschitzky's Army, opposite Pflanzer-Baltin, to attack directly toward the Delatyn-Nadworna-Kolomea area; instead they were sent on an envelopment maneuver farther east. Of the units made available by the fall of Przemysl, some went to Mezőlaborcz, others to oppose the German South Army; they began to make an effective contribution at the
end of March and beginning of April.\textsuperscript{173}

The Austrians

When there was no longer any doubt about the fate of Przemysl, the Aus-Hung. high command had to decide whether it would stick to its current plans for the war against Russia. In his message to Falkenhayn of 14 March, Conrad had already declared that he wanted to continue the offensive through the Carpathians and in east Galicia without pausing. Although the fall of the fortress now finally offered an opportunity to seek a decision by strengthening the eastern wing of the Armies, the moment was not propitious for major, time-consuming unit transfers. This was because the Russians could soon find new employment for the two corps which had been blockading Przemysl; all reports indicated that they would move further units to their front in the central Carpathians. It was therefore necessary to keep the enemy occupied here, to prevent them from making undisturbed preparations for a blow in some unexpected direction.

On 17, 19 and 20 March the AOK therefore sent out in quick succession a series of orders as a guideline for the next period of operations. To continue the offensive, Pflanzer-Baltin would be reinforced "if possible", so that he could open the road out of the mountains for his neighbors farther west. Therefore 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army HQ was ordered on the 20\textsuperscript{th} to send 4 CD from Eperjes to O Radna, and the Combined Inf Bde and 1 Lst Inf Bde to Delatyn. Pflanzer-Baltin should have his left wing hold its ground while the right continued to attack (while guarding toward the east and retaining control of Czernowitz).

After the next March battalions arrived in the operational zone (which began on the 17\textsuperscript{th}), the South, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Armies should also go over to the offensive. This would prevent the enemy from shifting units by rail to the west to attack the sector west of the Vistula, which was weakly held by the allies. The high command emphasized that our offensive should no longer be conducted under time constraints, as had been necessary during the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Przemysl. It should proceed "systematically and with perseverance." The initiative must be

\textsuperscript{173}Danilov, pp. 458 ff.; Brussilov, p. 121; Bonch-Brueyevitch, Vol. I, pp. 79 ff and Vol. II, pp. 9 ff. The disputes between the higher Russian commanders can be reasonably reconstructed from the sources. The fact that Ivanov had no inkling of any danger in the Gorlice area is strikingly illustrated by an instruction which he gave General Dimitriev around this time: "Remember that the western front of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army today has further lost its importance, because here the enemy had no really important operational goal."
seized from the enemy, and no sector of the front should remain inactive for long. 2nd Army was instructed to strengthen the positions on their west wing and then with a reinforced east wing to hurl the enemy back in cooperation with the South Army. After replenishing the ranks with fresh troops, IV Corps should either be shifted within the Army or prepared for shipment elsewhere. 3rd Army should concentrate for a renewed offensive by its east wing. Finally, 4th Army should resume its thrust on both sides of the line Gorlice-Jaslo with a reinforced south wing.

The Germans

Falkenhayn came forward with other plans. On the 22nd he urged the k.u.k. high command to stay strictly on the defensive in the Carpathians, and to launch a surprise attack on Serbia with the forces thus made available. As noted, he had already made this suggestion at the start of the year; now he expected to thus "assure the security of the flank and rear of the front which will have to be built against Italy in the near future." Moreover he advocated this undertaking "to bring aid to the hard-pressed Turks on the Dardanelles."\textsuperscript{174}

Conrad believed 8 or 10 German divisions would be needed for this campaign, while Falkenhayn estimated that they could achieve the necessary numerical superiority over the Serbian Army with just 3 or 4 divisions. He intended to use the German divisions of the South Army for this purpose (they would be relieved by Aus-Hung. divisions taken from the sector north of the Vistula).

Meanwhile, however, the Russians had anticipated the AOK's plans for an offensive. On 20 March they fell with full fury on the 3rd Army and soon afterward (as narrated below) on the 2nd Army. Therefore Conrad replied to Falkenhayn on the 23rd: "In my opinion, even if we went over solely to the defensive in the Carpathians and the Bukovina we wouldn't be able to weaken the allied forces in the area. Moreover, it wouldn't be feasible to divert units from the German eastern armies. Despite their great success at the Masurian Lakes, they are not in any position to launch a decisive offensive but are tied down in difficult actions against stubborn Russian attacks." Conrad intended to resume his offensive with a strengthened eastern wing as soon as the attacks against Boroevic's and Böhm-Ermolli's Armies had been fended off. A campaign against Serbia should only be authorized if the commitment of overwhelming forces would make it "absolutely certain" that the enemy would be quickly and completely overthrown. If such a wide-reaching battle of

\textsuperscript{174}Falkenhayn, p. 53
annihilation wasn't won, the prestige of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans would be finally "ruined." If the fighting in the Carpathians was to be purely defensive, the front would have to be pulled back to the mountain crests; this would entail the evacuation of the Bukovina, which by all estimates would encourage Romania to attack. Conrad had learned from reliable sources that the Entente had urged the Stavka to quickly reoccupy the Bukovina; therefore he wanted to reinforce Pflanzer-Baltin as soon as units from the Carpathian front became available.

During these negotiations, which ended with postponement of the Serbian project, Przemyśl fell. Falkenhayn added the following to his message of the 22nd: "The Russians have announced the surrender of Przemyśl to the world. If this report is true, remembrance of the gallant defense by the garrison will only strengthen the resolve in every German heart to bring down Austria-Hungary's enemies as well as our own under any circumstances."

Conrad assured him: "The fall of Przemyśl, although disturbing, doesn't alter my resolve and the firm will of the k.u.k. Army, which wishes to hold on to the end in faithfulness with the German Army."

2. Increasing pressure on 2nd and 3rd Armies

The Russians' decision to make their main effort against the Aus-Hung. Carpathian front was already becoming apparent to the k.u.k. 3rd Army on the night of 19-20 March. The enemy pushed hard against XVII Corps (1 Lst Inf Bde and 11 ID) and against 22 LW ID of III Corps; after a bitter struggle, in which the Viennese Landsturm and Styrian Landwehr fought bravely, the front was pushed back. By the 24th there was a large bulge in the line where the Russians had advanced. However, 28 ID of III Corps - on the Army's extreme left wing - still held its original positions, which the Russians began to attack on the 22nd. VII Corps was also heavily engaged; parts of the Corps counterattacked on the 21st but couldn't break through despite significant casualties. X Corps repulsed all of the repeated Russian attacks; its 2 ID counterattacked the enemy on the 21st and won some local successes, but on the next day their advance came to a halt. Only 21 LW ID gave up a little ground.

At the very start of the enemy offensive, they unfortunately succeeded in preventing the transfer of units which had been
ordered to reinforce Pflanzer-Baltin (4 CD, the Combined Inf Bde, and 1 Lst Inf Bde). 3rd Army HQ already requested on the morning of the 20th that they be allowed to retain these units, so that the shaken front wouldn't give way in the direction of Sztropko. The AOK approved the request. Parts of 4 CD had already taken trains out of Eperjes, and other parts had reached the station. Meanwhile 11 ID, after being taken by surprise by the enemy, abandoned its trenches after very little fighting; therefore 4 CD was ordered to return to XVII Corps. The cavalry arrived in time to fill the large gap in the line and stabilize the situation. The Combined Inf Bde (IR # 81 and 88) sent one regiment apiece to the west and east of the Laborcza in support of X Corps. 1 Lst Inf Bde hadn't yet left the line when its movement was canceled. On the 20th the high command ordered Böhm-Ermolli to assist Boroevic. Therefore 2nd Army HQ intended to pull 27 and 14 ID out of the line after their latest March units arrived, and to assemble them at Cisna. Once they had absorbed their new personnel, these divisions could then go to the assistance of their neighbors to the west.

Meanwhile, however, the Russians also fell upon 2nd Army and won success in several sectors. Before V Corps could open the planned attack by FML Lütgendorf's Combined 31 ID, the 37 Hon ID was thrown back on the 21st and XVIII Corps lost several important positions. In Tersztyanszky's northern group, the inner wings of 13 LW ID and 27 ID were pushed in, although the Chryszczata was taken and held in an extended action.

The helpers were thus in distress themselves.

Tersztyanszky could make only a few battalions available for 3rd Army. Boroevic asked that they serve with 34 ID on the left wing of 2nd Army, so that it could help 24 ID defend the Beskid crest.

The Russians attack both Armies

The Russians' great offensive, which was intended to win a decisive success, was now in full swing. It is a testimony to

175 Instead of these reinforcements, Pflanzer-Baltin did receive 8 CD from 2nd Army.
176 From the original documents it cannot be determined when 2nd Army HQ learned that the garrison of fortress Przemsyl had abandoned its plan of breaking through toward Sambor. It seems that the AOK didn't think it was urgent to pass this information along, since the planned supporting attack by the east wing of Böhm-Ermolli's Army would be useful anyway as part of the intended general offensive. However, it is also possible that the postponement of the attack by V Corps had something to do with knowledge about Kusmanek's change of direction.
Conrad's never-flagging confidence that he welcomed the fact that the enemy had moved out of the protection of their strong positions. Now he thought he had an opportunity to wear down the Russians' capacity for attacking. In an order issued on the evening of the 21st, the AOK asserted that the brave troops of 2nd and 3rd Armies, who had survived the snowstorms of winter through hardiness and perseverance, would hold on until total victory. 2nd Army HQ was instructed to move the units taken from Terszyanszyk's northern group to its west wing, to ensure that the area around Wola Michowa was held; 14 ID could be sent to V Corps to make up for the setback to 37 Hon ID. Böhm-Ermolli was given a free hand to either continue Lütgendorf's attack or to move some of the units to "actively intervene" in another sector. 4th Army was ordered to respond to any Russian thrust against its south wing with a counterattack; however, it was to transfer 26 LW ID to 3rd Army. This Division sent one Brigade by foot through Zboro to support 22 LW ID of III Corps; the other Brigade moved by rail from Grybow through Neusandez and Eperjes to Bartfeld and joined XVII Corps, where its two regiments were split up. 

On the morning of the 22nd, Böhm-Ermolli learned from the AOK for the first time that the attempt to break out by the Przemysl garrison had been shattered on the 19th. The tragic news of the fall of the fortress reached his HQ at Ungvar that afternoon. Because of the general situation and the heavy damage inflicted on 37 Hon ID, 2nd Army HQ decided to halt Lütgendorf's advance, even though he was making good progress. Instead the Army would solidify the wavering front of V Corps. The reinforced 37 Hon ID, as well as 33 ID, were able to withstand new Russian assaults on the 22nd, although XVIII Corps had to pull back a bit. Under Terszyanszyk's Group - Schmidt's Corps (13 LW ID, 32 and 27 ID) and Trollmann's Corps (41 Hon ID, 29 and 34 ID) - the 27 and 34 ID were pushed back to the positions they had held prior to their offensive; in the other sectors the Russians attacked in vain.

On the 23rd there was tolerable quiet for the middle corps of Boroecic's Army (XVII and VII). Action intensified, however, on the wings and led to heavy casualties for both sides. Under III Corps on the left, the 22 LW ID held on stubbornly to the Kastelik vrch, while LW IR # 10 from 26 LW ID hurried to their assistance. On the right, X Corps opposed the Russian storm with glorious steadfastness. Its 21 LW ID did lose some ground on the

177TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The 26 LW ID sent LW IR # 10 and 11 to III Corps, and LW IR # 9 and 12 to XVII Corps. The Division had a fifth regiment (# 30) which stayed under 4th Army as part of a Combined Inf Bde under Col. Fischer.
23rd, as it had on the 21st. Nonetheless, the heroic resistance by the "Eger" LW IR # 6 was one of the most brilliant episodes of the Carpathian battles; the Regiment's strength dwindled from 3000 to just 800 riflemen. Then the Russians directed their attention against 24 ID on the right wing of X Corps. Here they concentrated strong forces, apparently in an attempt to rip apart the inner wings of Böhm-Ermolli's and Boroevic's Armies along the Beskid ridge. 2nd Army HQ again asked its neighbor to guard against the loss of this important strategic position by having 24 and 34 ID launch a combined attack.

The difficult position of 2nd Army

In general, Böhm-Ermolli was making admirable attempts to support 3rd Army as much as possible; however, the blows directed against his own front continued to thwart his efforts. On the night of 22-23 March the Russians made a successful surprise attack on 9 ID of XVIII Corps, which considerably weakened the power of resistance of the troops. During these actions, in both 2nd and 3rd Armies the majority of units composed of Czech personnel were the first whose will to resist faltered; this considerably aided the enemy efforts. Such failures always had a negative impact on neighboring units which were trying to hold on bravely, and doubled their problems. The result was that they suffered shockingly high casualties. This was a notable success for political agitators in the Czech homelands.178

The leadership of 2nd Army was confronted with a multitude of difficult tasks. For the moment, the XVIII Corps was the most seriously afflicted by a decline in its ability to defend itself; its plight affected Tersztyanszky's neighboring 14 ID which, although not even attacked, was forced to bend back its wing. Eleven and a half battalions were assembled to restore the situation of XVIII Corps; some came from Tersztyanszky's Group, which was enjoying a brief pause in the fighting, and others from V Corps (whose 33 ID had bravely held off the Russian thrusts). The reinforcements helped to recover the Stoly Heights and to stabilize the line. 2nd Army also heeded the cries for help from 3rd Army, whose eastern wing was nearing a crisis; 34 ID was

178TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - As usual, the charges against the Czechs are somewhat exaggerated here. By this point in the war it was undoubtedly true that large numbers of Czechs were disaffected, reluctant warriors. However, it's not clear that they were much more so than other nationalities. Moreover, the text itself doesn't bear out the claim made in this paragraph. The most notable collapses narrated in this section involved 11 and 28 ID, neither of which contained Czech regiments. In the case of the latter Division, the text goes on to excuse the soldiers involved, no doubt because they came from the mainly German IR # 47 (footnote 18).
ready to counterattack as soon as the Russian units assembled in front of 24 ID began to attack the Beskid crest. Moreover, at Szinna in the rear areas of 2nd Army a detachment of five March battalions and three cannon batteries was created under Col. Biffl; it was then held in reserve behind the right wing of 3rd Army, along with 1st Lst Hussar Bde from Szurmay's Group.

The same concern caused the AOK to order 4th Army to send all available forces by rail to the east wing of 3rd Army. The offensive toward Gorlice had already been completely stalled for a long time. Now 4th Army would restrict its activity to diversions designed to make the Russians believe the Gorlice operation would be resumed, while fending off occasional enemy thrusts. At this time the AOK thought that the Russians intended to break out of their bridgehead on the lower Dunajec against the weak north wing of 4th Army. It seems the high command was mistaken about the enemy's intentions, or perhaps the bombardment of their bridges by one of our 24 cm mortars nipped their plan in the bud. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand now sent two regiments he had in reserve (IR # 28 and KJR # 4) to 3rd Army.

Meanwhile, on the west wing of Boroevic's Army an attempt by 22 LW ID to recover the Kastelik vrch was shattered on 24 March. The Division fell back to its rearmost line, and the commander of III Corps planned to pull his whole front back from the enemy to a position on both sides of Zboro. The result of this setback was that the next reinforcements weren't sent to X Corps on the Army's right - as the AOK had originally desired - but to the left wing of III Corps.

Under XVII Corps the gallant 1 Lst Inf Bde, strengthened by two battalions from 26 LW ID, repulsed all the Russians' efforts to break into their positions. Equally gallant was the 4 CD, whose ranks had been reinforced by LW IR # 12. On the 24th the enemy was inactive in front of VII Corps. 21 LW ID fended off a Russian thrust.

**Continuing Russian attacks**

In the night of 23-24 March, however, a storm broke against 24 ID. After a hot action and very heavy casualties on both sides, the Division was thrown off of the heights on the mountain crest during the morning hours; its remnants reassembled in the area southeast of Virava. The counterattack by 34 ID wasn't able to make good this setback; however, the left wing of the 34th was able to hang onto position on the Beskid ridge east of the Russian breakthrough.
The precautionary measures of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army HQ now bore good fruit, as Col. Biffl's detachment came up just in time to seal the hole which the enemy had torn in the line between 24 and 34 ID.

Böhm-Ermolli now wanted to pull back Tersztyanszky's north front, which had been holding off the enemy like a bastion in its forward position, to a new and shorter arc-shaped line. This would make it easier to relieve 14 and 27 ID from the front lines. However, the General canceled this plan when the enemy didn't exploit the success they had won on the Beskid crest. 24 March passed quietly on the other sectors of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army; the enemy sought to advance only against the positions of 33 ID and of Schmidt's Corps.

Because of the increasingly tense situation caused by the loss of part of the Beskid crest, the high command ordered 4\textsuperscript{th} Army to send further help to Boroevic. The Archduke gathered the main body of 8 ID in the Grybow area, ready to be sent by rail into the Laborcza valley. At this point, however, an unforeseen incident occurred which threatened to upset the carefully-nurtured plans of the leadership. In the night of 24-25 March the Russians fell upon 28 ID, broke through its front near Konieczna, and ripped the inner wings of 4\textsuperscript{th} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies wide asunder. Thereupon the entire III Corps, per the order of its commander, went back to Zboro. Greatly astonished, the AOK ordered the Army commander to go personally to Bartfeld to review the situation and to direct the deployment of the reinforcements which had already been sent by 4\textsuperscript{th} Army.\textsuperscript{179}

These regrettable events now influenced the deployment of 8 ID, whose transport had been delayed by 4\textsuperscript{th} Army HQ. As this HQ proposed, the Division assembled on the 26\textsuperscript{th} at Uscie Ruskie, so that on the next day it could attack toward Regetow and thus close the gaping hole between 4\textsuperscript{th} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies.

On the 25\textsuperscript{th} the Russian masses attacked almost all the positions of 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies, but without gaining any success such as they had won against III Corps. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army voluntarily pulled back

\textsuperscript{179}Boroevic reported to Teschen that at dawn on the 25\textsuperscript{th} the Russians suddenly appeared before the trenches of IR # 47 (of 28 ID) and took advantage of the resulting confusion by driving back the hitherto reliable Regiment. The unnecessarily great loss of ground was the fault of the Corps HQ, which had implemented its plans for an emergency retreat even though the actual situation wasn't that serious. The abandoned position, anyway, was too long and thinly held. The troops were very tired and had suffered heavy casualties. See also Schwarzleitner, "Das III Korps in den Karpathen" (Austrian Wehrzeitung, Vienna, 1923 - Issues 2, 5, 6 and 7).
FML Lütgendorf's attacking group so that it was in line with its neighbors; 33 ID held off Russian thrusts, while the right wing of XVIII Corps prepared to recapture the Stoly Heights. Enemy attacks on the left wing of this Corps, and against the entire front of Schmidt's Corps, were held in check. The most important actions of Boroevic's Army involved 45 LW ID and 20 Hon ID; their troops, although assaulted by the Russians day and night, wouldn't budge from their positions. 1 Lst Inf Bde, reinforced by LW IR # 9 from 26 LW ID, also knew how to withstand the enemy's storming columns.

The gallant defenders, however, were approaching the limits of their endurance. Böhm-Ermolli warned the AOK about this, and especially emphasized the weakened condition of V and XVIII Corps. Because of these circumstances, reserves could only slowly be accumulated behind the front; Tersztyanszky reported that it was not yet possible to relieve 14 and 27 ID from the line.

Creation of the German Beskid Corps

At Teschen the AOK had no doubt that the danger of a Russian breakthrough against the Aus-Hung. mountain positions in the direction of Budapest would be greatly increased once the bulk of 11th Army, released by the fall of Przemysl, joined the assault. If the enemy plan was successful, the west Galician and Polish fronts of the allies would also become untenable. Therefore on 24 March Conrad asked GdI Falkenhayn whether two or three German divisions could be made available for the Carpathians.

On the German western front, by this time the attempt by the English to break through at Lille - which started on 13 March - had apparently been shattered. Also the French, who opened their "Winter Battle in Champagne" on the 20th, had been unable to push through the German lines. However, it was not until the end of March that the German OHL was convinced "that our opponents in the West wouldn't be able to force a decision in the foreseeable future." Falkenhayn hesitated to send substantial assistance to the Carpathians because:
. The reorganization of much of the German western armies into divisions of three regiments apiece wouldn't be complete until April, when the new units would be ready for action;
. Hindenburg was engaged against superior Russian forces not far from the southern border of East Prussia; and

180Falkenhayn, p. 56
181By Falkenhayn's reckoning, the 38 ½ divisions of the German eastern Armies were facing 53 ½ Russian divisions.
The German Chief of Staff was still opposed to committing his troops, who weren't accustomed to mountain warfare, to Carpathian actions which he considered fruitless. Instead he demanded on the 25th that Conrad should make every effort to have the k.u.k. Foreign Ministry conclude its negotiations with their counterparts at Rome. If the Italians became aware of the situation of 2nd and 3rd Armies, it would be impossible to reach an agreement. He added that the eventual intervention of two German divisions wouldn't suffice to change this situation.

However, on the 26th and 27th the very tense situation forced the two high commands to reach an agreement. It was decided to create a German "Beskid Corps" under GdK von der Marwitz; it would consist of 35 Res ID (from General Woyrsch's force), 4 German ID (from South Army) and 25 Res ID (from Hindenburg's 9th Army). 25 Res ID would be the first to set off for its new assignment; it began to move on the rails on the 27th (but initially with just two infantry regiments and three artillery battalions). The other two divisions entrained on 29 March. In addition, Böhm-Ermolli should send substantial forces to the eastern wing of 3rd Army. The high command also proposed a relief attack by the left wing of 2nd Army; since its commander considered such an undertaking to be hopeless, he instead would help GdI Boroevic with 1 Lst Huss Bde (which was already moving to Homonna) and with a combined Division under FML Martiny. The latter consisted of:

- Infantry from a combined brigade (parts of 14 and 27 ID), later reduced to three and a half battalions, which was marching by foot through Telepocz, and
- The 128 Hon Inf Bde from Szurmay's Group, which entrained at Fenyvesvölgy on 28 March. 182

3. The Crisis of 26-31 March

The Russians continued to hammer away at 2nd and 3rd Armies, and on 26 and 27 March they took many pieces of ground from the Austro-Hungarians. Under these circumstances, Böhm-Ermolli's XVIII Corps was unable to capture the Stoly Heights; 32 ID (of Schmidt's Corps) was forced back on the 27th despite a gallant defense. In Boroevic's sector, an attack directed on the 26th against 2 ID of X Corps broke down, and the Russians suffered heavy casualties. 45 LW ID was also heavily engaged at this time in defensive actions, in which the right wing of 20 Hon ID took

---

182To replace 128 Hon Inf Bde (the former 128 Lst Inf Bde), 2nd Army HQ demanded the return of the two battalions of 38 Hon ID which had been attached to Hofmann's Corps since the last week of February.
The enemy assault was equally fierce against the other units of VII Corps; 17 ID stood its ground, but 1 CD was pushed back somewhat. Under XVII Corps, 1 Lst Inf Bde lost its position after a brave defense and LW IR # 9, attached to the Brigade, also had to pull back; the attacking Russians, however, were unable to make 4 CD waver. All trenches were also held in the sector farther west.

The condition of X Corps, however, was causing great concern. Because its neighbor on the right, XIX Corps on the wing of 2nd Army, had enjoyed several days of relative quiet, FML Trollmann wanted to launch a relief attack toward Lupkow-Palota; this was something the AOK also wanted. 2nd Army HQ, however, wouldn't agree because the situation was too uncertain; it restricted its activity to preparing a reserve force. GdK Tersztyanszky, who commanded 52,000 riflemen after the arrival of the March formations, was ordered to assemble most of 27 ID for this purpose at Cisna. Army HQ was correct to reject XIX Corps' planned offensive, since it was soon to experience days full of crisis. On the 28th, Tersztyanszky's Group lost the blood-soaked Manilowa Heights; 32 ID could no longer keep its position, and 13 LW ID also fell back. Only 43 LW ID was successful. Several battalions which had been intended for FML Martiny's Combined ID had to be held back.

Because of this unfavorable turn of events, 2nd Army HQ decided to no longer postpone the withdrawal of all of Tersztyanszky's northern group, which had first been considered on the 24th. On the 28th the Group took over its new fortified position, which was in the shape of an arc. It abandoned its former bastion and about 3 ½ km of ground.

FML Kralicek, the commander of IX Corps, took over the battle groups that had been assembled in the border sector of 4th and 3rd Armies. He led them in a concentric attack through Regetow. FML Fabini with the main body of 8 ID and Col. Fischer's Combined Inf Bde (IR # 59 and LW IR # 30) pushed southeast, accompanied on the right by half of 11 Hon CD; GM von Haustein's detachment (IR # 87 plus a field cannon battery) pushed northeast, along with the two regiments sent from 4th Army (IR # 28 and KJR # 4). The attacking troops, dispersed over a large area and making their way with great toil through deep snow, were unable to overcome the Russians' strong resistance east of Regetow. The two Army commanders couldn't agree on the question of how best to prevent an enemy breakthrough at the Armies' junction point. Finally on 261

183 The 45 LW ID was placed under VII Corps on 28 March.
184 Biffl's Detachment was dissolved, and replaced by units of 34 ID.
the 29th the high command approved the suggestion of 4th Army HQ at Okocim that the gap shouldn't be closed. Instead the attacking troops would be redeployed. The south wing of 4th Army, with a strong reserve of six battalions at Hanczowa, would be ready at any time to mount a flank attack in case the Russians thrust against the left wing of Boroevic's Army. This was the best way to avoid splitting up our forces. Although the action at Regetow won no tactical success, from this point on the enemy made no further push against the sensitive junction between the two armies.

Russian pressure continued on the next few days against X and XVII Corps of 3rd Army. On the 28th the 4 CD fought a difficult but very gallant defensive action, which won it the warm recognition of Field Marshal Archduke Friedrich. On the next day, however, the Division lost some ground with substantial losses that tore great holes in the ranks. This happened because detachments of the Czech LW IR # 12, stationed in the line with the cavalry, totally collapsed. Under X Corps, the 2 ID (with the attached Moravian IR # 81) maintained a stubborn defense despite enemy attacks by day and night. The Russians did manage to momentarily break through between 2 and 24 ID, but the front between the two units was soon restored.

The situation of 2nd Army deteriorates

The parts of Martiny's Division which Böhm-Ermolli had made available to 3rd Army were already marching west when at this time the situation of 2nd Army became considerably more serious than that of its neighbor. After a long pause, the enemy resumed their offensive against all three divisions of XIX Corps on the 29th. The fighting raged heavily back and forth, but on this day the Russians were repulsed. The right wing of 41 Hon ID was bent back, but this was only a result of the withdrawal of Tersztyanszky's northern group, which in the course of the night and morning deployed in their rear position. For the same reason, the XVIII Corps had to pull back its left wing. Under V Corps, the situation of 37 Hon ID, which was thrown back by the Russians, was bad; 33 ID, however, was able to hold its ground. The enemy now sent substantial forces into the gap caused by the setback to XVIII Corps. Its new commander, FML Ziegler, prepared to recover the area just vacated with four regiments (partly from

185TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - While careful to note that LW IR # 12, which was Czech, had failed, the author doesn't mention that IR # 81, which was successful, was also a mainly Czech unit. This unfortunately is a typical oversight.
186At this point the following made up the northern group (from right to left) - 43 LW ID, 32 ID and 13 LW ID. The bulk of 27 ID, as Tersztyanszky's reserve, was at Cisna.
Tersztyanszky, partly from V Corps); then he would once more reach the southern bank of the San.

Böhm-Ermolli was trying to strengthen his Army with fresh forces. He asked the high command if Szurmay's 38 Hon ID could be relieved by the South Army, but they refused. 38 and 40 Hon ID had to fend off Russian attacks in the night of 28-29 March; 38 Hon ID alone was repeatedly attacked by the enemy on the 30th and 31st, but held them off.

On these two days, however, the Russians made their main effort against the center and west wing of 2nd Army, and broke through the front of XIX Corps. 41 Hon ID, after losing 60% of its strength, evacuated its position; Trollmann's and Schmidt's Corps had to go back to a line running from the south end of Jablonki to Tousty Dil (on the Beskid crest). The enemy pushed exceptionally hard against 13 LW ID, which was engaged in costly actions on both days. The Russians were prevented from breaking through 32 ID only when its commander, GM Ludwig Goiginger, personally led the Division's reserve into the action. Although XVIII Corps had momentarily been successful in its defensive action, it now had to pull back its left wing so that it could send some detachments to Tersztyanszky's aid. On the 31st, however, it paid for its generosity with a substantial loss of ground on its right wing. At noon on the 30th, FML Ziegler had already issued orders to his four regiments for their advance, when 2nd Army HQ halted the operation because V Corps could no longer maintain its position. Moreover, 37 Hon ID (with 2000 riflemen) again gave way toward the southeast. FML Scheuchenstuel, the V Corps commander, asked if he could retreat to the heights just north of the Wolosate and Wetlinka valleys. Because of the increasingly perilous situation, GdK Böhm-Ermolli had to agree.

**Plans for deploying the Beskid Corps**

Meanwhile the AOK had told 3rd Army HQ about the impending arrival of the German Beskid Corps and of Martiny's Combined ID. The Russian offensive should be finally stopped by a strong, concentrated and united counter thrust, in which X and VII Corps would participate; if the reinforcements were committed piecemeal, they wouldn't succeed. Contrary to the orders of the preceding months, which prescribed holding onto every piece of ground, the high command now stated that if III and XVII Corps were compelled to pull back before the Army's new units were fully ready they could take up a line facing northeast and later
counterattack against the enemy's flank as they advanced.\textsuperscript{187}

The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army commander, under the impact of the serious crisis in his defensive battle, asked the high command on the 29\textsuperscript{th} whether the prohibition on deploying the reinforcements would also apply if X Corps - and perhaps VII Corps - was compelled to retreat before the German units had assembled in strength; shouldn't fresh troops be used to help them hold their sectors? The AOK responded that it would of course be necessary to ensure that the new arrivals should be covered as they deployed in the next week or so; however, the objective must be to use the German Beskid Corps as a complete, undivided unit.

GdI Boroevic proposed to assemble this Corps at Homonna and farther north, on both sides of the railroad leading to Mezőlaborcz and then to attack on both sides of the Laborcza valley. Forty eight hours after making this suggestion, however, the Army commander changed his mind and doubted that the attack could succeed. He reported to Teschen that the strength of the attackers (50,000 rifles) wasn't sufficiently greater than the 40,000 Russians in the area; moreover, the terrain was unfavorable and artillery support insufficient. The ability of the troops had declined since the start of the war, and the Germans weren't used to the mountains. All prior experience indicated that the offensive would gain only a little ground. It would be preferable to postpone the thrust until the Russians were weakened by their own attacks and the relative balance of strength shifted further in our favor. Boroevic suggested that the Beskid Corps should be concentrated by the railroad more tightly than originally planned, so that they would have greater freedom of mobility as the situation developed; the other reinforcements would be used immediately to shore up the front line, since other reserves were lacking.

The answer arrived early on the morning of 30 March. The AOK declared that it had always wanted the attack to begin at the moment when the enemy was exhausted. The troops engaged in the hard fighting on the eastern wing of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army deserved the

\textsuperscript{187}In a similar vein, the high command discussed another tactical deficiency in a message to 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army HQ on 29 March. The enemy, with roughly equal strength, deployed relatively weak forces over a lengthy front. They must be hindered from any further advance until their exhaustion permitted us to resume the offensive. This goal couldn't be reached by purely passive defense along a line that was held in equal strength at all points. In the last few days the Russians had succeeded in breaking through our thin lines by concentrating in a few areas. The result was loss of ground along the front. It would be preferable to "knowingly" leave a gap in the line, and then fall upon any enemy units which entered the gap with concentrated reserve forces.
highest credit for their efforts in the last week to achieve this goal. By the time the Germans deployed it should be clear whether the Russians were making their main effort toward Bartfeld and the area farther north, or toward Giralt, Sztropko and the Olyka and Laborcza valleys. In the latter instance a systematic build-up of the front wouldn't be necessary. If, however, the enemy pushed further to the southwest against III and XVII Corps, it would be necessary to commit all the German units in a direction to be determined later. Any men needed to maintain the front line should be drawn from Martiny's Group rather than from the Beskid Corps.

Meanwhile, however, the crisis of 2nd Army had become more acute. On the evening of 30 March, GdK Böhm-Ermolli telegraphed to Teschen that up until now he had always made forces available "to carry out the intentions of the AOK" and had never issued "pessimistic reports", so they should now heed his analysis of the current situation. In the last few days he had willingly sent as many units as possible to the hard-pressed 3rd Army. Now, however, the east wing of GdI Boroevic was getting three German divisions, which should be sufficient for defensive purposes. Because of the overall situation south of the Vistula, it was impossible to consider an offensive. Therefore he repeated his earlier request to receive a division as reinforcements, and asked that Martiny's Group should be returned to him. His troops were completely exhausted and shouldn't be strained any further. For this reason, and because of the terrain, the east wing of V Corps couldn't be left on the San as the high command demanded. The Army had just 1500 riflemen available as its last reserve.

Thereupon the high command released back to 2nd Army the parts of Martiny's Group which had marched on foot to Boroevic. 128 Hon Inf Bde would be sent back to Fenyesvölgy.

Since all the guns and most of the supply wagons of XVIII Corps used the only road through Cisna, the prompt and orderly flow of supply was a pressing problem in this area of few transportation lines. Therefore on the 31st Tersztyanszky was ordered to hold his position for at least two to three more days. In another attempt to improve the situation, Boroevic was asked to extend his east wing once more to the Beskid crest. The commander of 3rd Army, however, denied this request because Martiny's Group

---

188On the evening of the 30th, FML Martiny had the following units behind the east wing of 3rd Army - 3 ½ battalions, 1 squadron and 6 batteries from Tersztyanszky's Group plus Hon IR # 30 (of 128 Hon Inf Bde in Szurmay's Group).
had been taken away from him.

On the afternoon of the 31st, the HQ of 2nd Army issued contingency orders for a retreat. If necessary, the Army would pull back behind the Carpathian crest to take up a line that was around 16 km shorter.

**The AOK's estimate of the opposing forces**

In the same hours, the high command was compelled to issue amended orders to address the deepening crisis of the 2nd Army. The new directives were issued with an estimate of the relative strength of the opposing forces in the various sectors. This indicated that:
- The 75,000 riflemen of Pflanzer-Baltin faced 100,000 to 120,000 Russians
- The 47,000 riflemen of South Army faced 44,000 Russians
- The 110,000 riflemen of 2nd Army faced 156,000 Russians
- The 70,000 riflemen of 3rd Army, being reinforced by 16,000 from the Beskid Corps, faced 50,000 Russians; and
- The 100,000 riflemen of 4th Army faced 90,000 Russians.

Thus only Planzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe and 2nd Army were confronting substantially larger Russian forces. Apparently, however, these calculations at Teschen didn't take the assembled replacements behind the enemy front into account.

In the general orders of the evening of 31 March these figures led to the conclusion that the Russian offensive against 3rd Army could be considered shattered, but the 2nd Army would still have to contend against a larger enemy group. To either relieve Böhm-Ermolli with an offensive thrust or - if necessary - by direct reinforcement, strong Aus-Hung. reserves should be quickly assembled behind the eastern wing of Boroevic's Army. After the German Beskid Corps arrived, it would enter the line in the sector of either VII or X Corps\(^{189}\); this would permit at least three Aus-Hung. divisions to leave their positions. If the enemy broke through the right wing of 2nd Army at Berehy-Grn. and Ustrzyki-Grn. they might threaten the Uzsok Pass and thus all of the territory which South Army had fought so hard to win. Therefore Linsingen should stay on the defensive so that he could lengthen his western wing; if possible he could then place large parts of 38 Hon ID at the disposal of 2nd Army.

The creation of a reserve by relieving an Aus-Hung. corps by a

---

\(^{189}\)On the 27th, GdI Hugo Meixner had resumed command of X Corps; FML Krautwald took over III Corps.
German corps seems surprising at first glance. However, by agreement between the two high commands the Beskid Corps couldn't be broken up (which otherwise might have been the optimum solution). This would also avoid further complications to the already overloaded lines of communication. Anyway, the reserve couldn't be created as quickly as intended, since some time would pass before the German divisions were fully deployed.

4. Last actions of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe and the South Army during March

Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin's hope for plentiful reinforcements, which seemed to be on their way based on the high command's orders of 17 and 19 March, evaporated when the Russians began to storm the lines of Boroevic's Army on the 20th; this prevented the departure of the Combined and 1 Lst Inf Bdes and of 4 CD. The Armeegruppe received only 8 CD from 2nd Army; its first transports left Nagymihaly on the 23rd. This did little to improve the unfavorable balance of forces vis a vis Letschitzky's 9th Army. For the foreseeable future, Pflanzer-Baltin would have to fight a difficult defensive action against a larger enemy force on three sides. Although this assignment was admirably executed, the Armeegruppe didn't have an opportunity to carry out its original mission of helping the South Army out of the Carpathians. Its activities had even less effect on the battles raging in the Beskids in the next three weeks.

As ordered by the commander of the Southwest Front, General Letschitzky was trying to break into the Bukovina from the east between the Dniester and Pruth Rivers, to capture its capital at Czernowicz, and to thus influence the attitude of Romania by a politically significant success. Therefore for the time being he held back somewhat opposite the northern group of his opponent; he was content to push back the Aus-Hung. lines in the upper Lomnica valley a little on the 23rd, and to launch several unimportant thrusts against the fronts of Generals Rhemen and Czibulka.

Pflanzer-Baltin was therefore obliged to reinforce his eastern group at the expense of the northern group. In the night of 22-23 March, he took the German 5 CD and k.u.k. 10 CD out of Marschall's front and sent them toward Horodenka; he intended to deploy them both on the northern bank of the Dniester. Above
all, however, he intended to attack the extreme left wing of the enemy Army.

Lt Col. Papp's Detachment brought a Russian attack to a halt on 23 March north of the Pruth. On the 26th, the south wing of XXXII Russian Corps was pushed back by GM von Schwer's group (6 CD, 19 Hon Cav Bde and Papp's Detachment).

When the main body of 8 CD detrained at Horodenka, on the 26th Pflanzer-Baltin ordered 42 Hon ID to move by rail to reinforce the eastern group. Thus 15,000 combat troops were assembling in the area from the Pruth at Czernowitz to the Dniester at Niezwiska. The German GdK Marschall was given command of these forces, which consisted on the 27th of Ljubicic's Group (Combined 30 ID, which was stationed around the Russian bridgehead at Zaleszczyki, and 42 Hon ID; 6, 8 and 10 CD; 19 Hon Cav Bde) plus 5 German CD.

The Armeegruppe commander however had to abandon his idea of winning the northern bank of the Dniester with some of his cavalry, because an attempt by several Landsturm companies to cross the river upstream from Zaleszczyki failed on 24 March; moreover, all our forces were needed to counter enemy attempts to cross to the south bank. Some Russian detachments crossed over at the bend in the Dniester next to Uscie Biskupie, but on the 27th and 28th they were thrown back over the river after successful fighting at Okna.

Pflanzer-Baltin and his staff moved on the 20th from Delatyn to Kolomea. On the same day he ordered 42 Hon ID to thrust southeast against the enemy's Pruth group. However, the Russian III Cavalry Corps crossed the Dniester at Chotin, threw back 19 Hon Cav Bde on the 30th, and took the northern wing of the Croatian Division by surprise; therefore the troops suffered substantial losses and had to pull back to the Austro-Russian frontier.

This ominous development caused the Armeegruppe commander to move four Feld Jaeger Battalions from 16 Inf Bde and two Polish Legion battalions to the area. At this time, Czibulka's and Rhemen's groups had only one rifleman for every three meters of front; therefore Pflanzer-Baltin asked the AOK for an infantry brigade as reinforcements. Because of the heavy fighting by 2nd and 3rd Armies, his request wasn't granted. To Pflanzer-Baltin's satisfaction, Russian thrusts against the right wing of his newly strengthened eastern group collapsed on 31 March and 1 April. Nonetheless the situation became critical on 2 April when the
Russian 12 CD came over the Dniester at Uscie Biskupie. HQ at Kolomea didn't hesitate to take another unit, 9 Inf Bde, from the northern group, moving it partly by rail; IR # 13 went to Obertyn as the Armeegruppe reserve, while IR # 93 went to Okna. The Russians were also shifting troops toward the east. On the 4th they fell upon FML Korda's right wing, went around it, and pushed it back. Just in time, the trusty north Moravian IR # 93 intervened in this action at Okna; their determined counterattack recovered the lost positions on the evening of the same day. Thereafter fighting in this sector waned for a long time.

Among the accomplishments for which GdK Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin was awarded the Commander's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order, his cool leadership during this mobile, ever-changing campaign holds an honorable place.

The undertaking of the combined 30 ID against the Zaleszczyki bridgehead proved extremely difficult. It soon became apparent that an all-out assault couldn't succeed, because the Russians fully realized the importance of this river crossing-point; they clung to it fiercely because it could serve as a base for a thrust between Pflanzer-Baltin's two main groups. In heavy and costly actions from 22 to 26 March and from 2 to 9 April, the attackers succeeded only in tightening their half circle around the Russian positions, and in establishing a foothold in the outer works. It seemed, however, that the main Russian lines would be taken only by siege operations supported by powerful artillery fire.

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin was concerned that the enemy would violate the neutrality of Romania by attacking south of the Pruth toward Czernowitz. Parts of 6 CD were stationed at Modolia to guard against this threat. Moreover, the AOK had the Aus-Hung. Military Attaché at Bucharest warn King Ferdinand's government that if the Romanian authorities didn't respond to a violation of neutrality by disarming any Russian intruders, Habsburg troops would have to intervene without regard to Romanian sovereignty. Otherwise, however, the Aus-Hung. troops would avoid crossing the borders.

**South Army**

After the successes of 22 March, the German South Army paused in its offensive. Russian thrusts, directed mainly against XXIV Res Corps, were repulsed.

---

190FML Korda had taken over XI Corps from FZM Ljubicic.
On the 23rd, Linsingen wired the German OHL at Mézières. He said that 2nd Army had given up its attack and it seemed that Pflanzer-Baltin also was no longer moving forward; therefore his Army wouldn't be able to get out of the Carpathians this month. Linsingen proposed to Teschen, as he had already to Emperor Wilhelm on the 18th, that the main effort should be made by the troops north of the mountain wall. On the next day the AOK asked whether he could give up some men if he went over to the defensive, and he replied in the negative. On the other hand, Linsingen asked GdK Pflanzer-Baltin to give 5 ID or another infantry division to GdK Marschall to permit this German general to finally open the route out of the mountains for South Army. Because of the current situation of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, his request couldn't be honored.

The orders of the high command on 17 and 19 March, as well as their response to Linsingen's inquiry on the 23rd, indicated that the AOK was planning to reinforce the right wing. They consoled the German Army commander by stating that after Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic had defeated the Russian attacks, the battle group in the Pruth-Dniester area would be strengthened; there would also be replacements available for South Army. Until then Linsingen should continue to attack on both flanks to at least tie down the opposing enemy units.

Meanwhile it was decided to form the German Beskid Corps. It took a special order from Emperor Wilhelm to force the commander of the German South Army to reverse his earlier refusal to shift units at the behest of the k.u.k. high command. Linsingen now agreed to send 4 German ID to the new Corps; it was replaced in Hofmann's Corps by 12 Lst Terr Bde (which in turn transferred from Gerok's Corps).

5. The Easter Battle in the Carpathians, 1-6 April

a. 2nd Army pulls back behind the Carpathian crest

In the central Carpathians, the situation of 2nd Army had meanwhile become untenable. The Russians had driven back or broken the Aus-Hung. lines in several places. They now pushed especially against the right wing of XVIII Corps, finally forcing it to fall back into the Wetlinka valley in the morning of 1
April. This caused a deep bulge in the line at the point where the XVIII and V Corps came together. Schmidt's Corps and 41 Hon ID also lost important mountain heights. GdK Böhm-Ermolli asked his neighbor Linsingen whether the South Army could stretch its left wing to the Stryj, thus permitting 2nd Army to draw units from that sector. Since the HQ at Munkacs replied that this couldn't be carried out until the night of 6-7 April, and speed was of the essence, the high command then turned to 3rd Army in its search for assistance.

In response to the order he received on the evening of the 31st, GdI Boroevic had replied that he would use the Beskid Corps to gradually relieve 2 ID, 24 ID, and 21 LW ID of X Corps; these three divisions would be available behind the left wing of 3rd Army on 10 April. The AOK, however, demanded that at least one division should be ready on the 4th to be sent by rail from the Laborcza valley to the east. Even this measure wouldn't be in time, for 2nd Army HQ doubted that it could hold its present position for that long. The last hope was a counterattack by Schmidt's Corps, which might succeed in shoring up the crumbling line. When this hope also was in vain, Böhm-Ermolli decided shortly after 2:00 PM on 1 April to move his Army in echelon back behind the main crest of the mountains. His extreme right wing would be anchored on the Magura Height # 1013 (east of the Stryj); he would give up the Uzsok Pass but block the Ung valley southwest of Fenyvesvölgy. The rest of the Army would hold the line Harczos-Kistopolya-Nagypolany-Telepocz. The first orders were issued to Tersztyanszky's Group (Schmidt's and Trollmann's Corps) and to XVIII Corps. Tersztyanszky should hold on until at least the morning of the 3rd, to allow an orderly withdrawal of his Group's supply trains and those of XVIII Corps through Cisna. Then he would take up an intermediate position. Trollmann's left wing would be the last to pull back, and would be careful to maintain its link with the front of the neighboring X Corps. Martiny's Group was placed under GdK Tersztyanszky.

The debate regarding the withdrawal

Objections were raised against these orders. From one side, Tersztyanszky reported that 32 ID could at best hold onto the heights north of Cisna only through the night of 1-2 April. From the other side, the high command said it couldn't agree to abandoning the Uzsok Pass; they ordered that 2nd Army shouldn't pull back farther than absolutely necessary. The west wing, at least, could go back to the line Nagypolany-Telepocz-Vilag. Because of the situation of South Army, however, Szurmay must stay in place north of the Uzsok Pass until the arrival of
reinforcements from 3rd Army. For this purpose he had available substantial forces in his Group, plus 128 Hon Inf Bde, which was being sent back to Fenyvesvölgy.

Because of Böhm-Ermolli's critical situation the AOK ordered GdI Boroevic to relieve four rather than three Aus-Hung. divisions by using the Beskid Corps. Having learned in this exchange how far his neighbor wished to retreat, the commander of 3rd Army lodged a protest; he wanted the left wing of 2nd Army to stay on the Beskid crest.

On his eastern wing, Böhm-Ermolli ordered V Corps to begin to retreat on the 2nd with its left, and 37 Hon ID to move back to Revhely-N. berezna for rehabilitation. The Corps' 33 ID should keep the enemy from pushing ahead in the most dangerous direction, toward the railroad at Fenyvesvölgy; therefore it should block the route through the valley at Wolosate, with its front facing north. For this rear guard action the Division was placed under FML Szurmay, who had given up his 38 Hon ID (based on Volovec) to the South Army per an agreement with the AOK.

Regarding the contentious issue of the Uzsok Pass, 2nd Army HQ wired to Teschen that the abandonment of this door through the mountains was inevitable, since the Russians were continuing to advance toward the Wolosate area in its rear. Because of the condition of the troops, especially the reduced rifle strength of the units, there was no way to keep the enemy from breaking into the Ung Valley. Thus they would cut Szurmay's vital lines of communication, both rail routes and roads. The eastern portion of his Group would be in an extremely dangerous predicament. The promised reinforcements wouldn't arrive in time to ward off this danger.

Throughout 2 April the HQ at Teschen, Kaschau, Ungvar and Munkacs continued to wrestle with the measures made necessary by the retreat of 2nd Army. Early in the morning, GdI Boroevic asserted to the AOK that based on his five months of experience in the area it didn't seem practical for 2nd Army to pull back so far; the new defensive line which had been selected was much less promising than the Beskid crest. The Russians would probably disengage from his neighbor, shift units behind the abandoned Beskid crest, and then attack 3rd Army in the Laborcza valley toward Homonna. Boroevic asked whether under these circumstances he should still send the four divisions to be relieved from his front (2 and 24 ID, 21 and 45 LW ID) to 2nd Army. It might be more important for his neighbor if he kept the units to ensure the security of the area south of Mezőlaborcz.
With some sharpness the AOK refuted the opinions of 3rd Army HQ, which were designed to prevent the withdrawal of units from the Army. They pointed out that because of the clear importance of the sector south of Mezőlaborcz some strong German forces were deploying there. This would both ensure that the area was held and enable the high command to free k.u.k. divisions for use elsewhere. The developing situation would determine whether these units would partly or wholly provide direct support to 2nd Army, or would launch an offensive under 3rd Army or stay on the defensive.

Linsingen joins the debate

Now GdI Linsingen also strongly protested against the proposed withdrawal of Szurmay's Group. He asked the AOK to overrule 2nd Army and prevent the evacuation of the Uzsok Pass, which would keep South Army from continuing its offensive and might cause the loss of the terrain it had conquered with so much bloodshed. The enemy's superiority was not so great that the strong 2nd Army would be unable to hold onto the almost impregnable Carpathian positions, whose northern sides were still covered with snow. If Böhm-Ermolli's left wing and center had to pull back, the right wing should still hold the line Szczawinka-Kinczyk Bukowski-Pliska-Ceremcha-Kicera, or the units in this area should be placed under South Army. Moreover, the HQ of South Army communicated in a very odd fashion directly with 2nd Army HQ, to whom they sent the following uncoded message:

"Until now [1:43 PM on 2 April], no order has been issued from the AOK at Teschen regarding the assignment of 38 Hon ID to South Army, despite our request. The South Army, which considers the entire retreat of 2nd Army unnecessary, has no reason to take over a retreating division from another Army, and thus make itself equally guilty of the withdrawal."

However, on this day the 38 Hon ID had repulsed a Russian thrust, and then launched a counterattack.

The AOK went along with Linsingen's proposal. Szurmay's Group (7 ID, 38 and 40 Hon ID, and also 128 Hon Inf Bde which was gradually assembling once again at Fenyvesvölgy) was placed under the German commander. They would hold on stubbornly to the area on both sides of the Uzsok Pass, and if necessary only their left wing would fall back in conjunction with South Army to the line suggested by South Army HQ. The high command also announced that a division from 3rd Army would be sent to Böhm-Ermolli's eastern
wing. However, this message had just been sent from Teschen when 3rd Army HQ reported that it would be difficult to make the intended unit, 24 ID, available.

GdI Linsingen now placed 38 Hon ID under Bothmer's Corps; however, on the 4th he pulled a combined Brigade out of Bothmer's front and sent it toward the endangered new west wing of South Army. All of this caused the other three corps to alter their boundaries, each stretching out their left wings.

Linsingen's telegram quoted above aroused strong hostility at 2nd Army HQ. This was compounded when Szurmay's Group was taken away, indicating a diminished trust in the Army's leadership. GdK Böhm-Ermolli and GM Doctor Bardolff offered their resignations. The Archduke-Field Marshal refused to accept, and told them that the removal of Szurmay from their Army was due entirely to objective considerations. Moreover, GdI Linsingen apologized to his neighbor.

Course of the withdrawal

It was doubtless necessary for 2nd Army to disengage from the enemy, because its units were badly intermingled and could no longer withstand strong enemy pressure. After three months of mountain warfare, the troops were completely exhausted and their ranks depleted. There was no time left to delay implementing the new plan, because the Cisna-Czirokaofalu road was the only route to the rear for all of the artillery and for the large supply trains of Tersztyanszky's Group and XVIII Corps. If the retreat had been carried out later under pressure, there could have been serious complications. 2nd Army HQ had chosen a new line of resistance that was considerably in the rear because they wished to at least offer the hard-pressed troops adequate shelter, which wasn't available closer to the original front in the thinly settled part of the mountains. The lack of accommodations for reserve units had been one of the principal reasons why the units' combat strength had melted away, and for the enormous losses due to sickness.

Since 2nd Army's withdrawal had been planned for days, the disputes described above could perhaps have been avoided if Teschen had earlier addressed the question of the impact on the flanking Armies. Apparently the high command was still hoping to avoid a retreat altogether with assistance from the divisions to be taken from 3rd Army. There is no doubt that retention of the Uzsok Pass, which was ordered by the AOK and emphatically supported by South Army HQ, was a desirable goal.
In general, the retreat of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army was carried out according to orders. Even when enemy pressure forced Schmidt's Corps to withdraw prematurely to an intermediate position, there were no damaging results despite heavy attacks in several places. In these days the din of battle constantly filled the hills and valleys.\textsuperscript{192}

The east wing and center of Böhm-Ermolli's Army were on the new line on 4 April. Rear guards who'd been left behind covered the position until the 5\textsuperscript{th}, then pulled back to the main defenses when enemy pressure intensified. There were difficulties in establishing a firm link with South Army. 33 ID, which had been temporarily detached by 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army to the now separated Group Szurmay, held a line from the Halicz heights to the area north of Wolosate, covering the Ung valley; however, there was a gap between 33 ID and Böhm-Ermolli's right wing, which was only provisionally filled by troops from V Corps. Szurmay wanted to hold this sector with 128 Hon Inf Bde, but only parts of the Brigade had arrived; the rest were being held back by 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army.

2\textsuperscript{nd} Army was holding a 53 km front with just over 53,000 riflemen. However, the combat value of the troops had been reduced by the enormous demands of the recent past, and therefore the 33 ID was sorely missed. Upon Böhm-Ermolli's request, the high command therefore ordered South Army to return this Division to 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army as soon as possible, and to provide its own reserve behind Szurmay's left wing. The combined Brigade of 38 Hon ID would serve this purpose, but it wouldn't reach the scene until 8 April.

The 29 and 34 ID, fighting on Böhm-Ermolli's left wing, had stayed on the heights along the Hungarian border in accordance with the wishes of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army. Thus they were drawn into the heavy fighting which engulfed that Army in Easter week.

\textbf{b. 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army holds off the Russian attack (1-5 April)}

The AOK's orders of 31 March indicate that the staff at Teschen were hoping, based on the current balance of forces, that the

\textsuperscript{192}Under 33 ID, 1\textsuperscript{st} Lt Karl von Ungar of IR # 83 carried out a boldly-conceived counterattack in an action on the Bukove Berdo (east of Wolosate). He won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order for this feat as well as for his earlier activity on 3 October 1914 (at the Wisloka bridges).
Russian offensive against Boroevic's Army had already been shattered. Although since 28 March the enemy had continued to attack the Army's eastern wing, which gallantly stood its ground, this seemed to be just the last gasp of the battle. Soon, however, the relentless pressure of the Russians proved the Aust-Hung. leadership incorrect; in this sector the enemy was reinforced by units which had come up from Przemysl, apparently 81 and 82 ID.

In the quiet sectors of the front - west of the Vistula and opposite 4th Army - the Russians observed the customs of the holy Eastern season. Without weapons they left their trenches and wanted to approach our troops with gifts. On the other hand, in the area north of Bartfeld and around the Laborcza valley they were engaged in a vicious battle.

On Holy Saturday (3 April) the Russians threw themselves upon 28 ID at Zboro; because almost all of the attached Prague IR # 28 threw down their weapons without fighting, the Division was driven back from its position. Only the advance of 8 ID from the south wing of 4th Army prevented the enemy from further exploiting this success. Under these circumstances, the request of 4th Army HQ for the return of both the regiments it had transferred to the west wing of 3rd Army - IR # 28 and KJR # 4 – couldn't be honored. In fact, at the suggestion of 3rd Army the IR # 28 was dissolved and its remnants divided among the units of III Corps. In fact, KJR # 4 would be sent back to 4th Army after the arrival of the next replacement troops.

XVII Corps also suffered a setback on the 5th. The enemy pushed 1 Lst Inf Bde a considerable distance toward the south. However, Col Graf Spannocchi launched a gallant counterattack out of Sosfüred with parts of 4 CD (UR # 13) plus LW IR # 9; they hit the pursuing Russians in the flank and prevented their further advance. On the same day the 20 Hon ID of VII Corps repulsed an enemy thrust. 22 LW ID of III Corps was equally successful on the following night. However, because of XVII Corps' crisis, Archduke Joseph pulled the left wing and center of his VII Corps quite a way to the south even though all the Russian attacks on

193TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - To this date there has been no agreement regarding the details of the collapse of IR # 28. There is no doubt, however, that as the text states the majority of these Czech soldiers were taken prisoner by the Russians after trifling resistance. Although the active portion of the Regiment had been dissolved, the depot and March units continued to exist; after creditable performance on the Italian front, they later re-created the active battalions. IR # 28 thus continued to exist until the war ended.
his own front had broken down with great slaughter. Sztropko was evacuated.

The enemy now concentrated so many units in front of 28 ID that 3rd Army HQ was concerned that continuing Russian thrusts against the west wing would break through at the junction with 4th Army. The high command ordered both Armies to move all available forces to this point. However, 28 ID held off all Russian attacks on 5 and 6 April; they were substantially assisted by the advance of 8 ID toward the heights east of Regetow Wz.

X Corps in jeopardy

Thus the Army's west wing had at least avoided the worst possible scenario, the total collapse of the front; meanwhile the situation of the east wing was for a short time even more critical. Here the Russian offensive had already waxed to terrifying proportions by Good Friday (2 April). Early in the morning the enemy attacked in vain against 34 ID of 2nd Army on the Beskid crest. Farther southwest, however, they were able to push back the 2 ID (whose power of resistance was fading), as well as the main body of 24 ID and the parts of 21 LW ID fighting east of the Laborcza valley; all the defenders fell back to a line south of Virava-Ökröskö. The front was about to collapse; there were wide gaps in the undulating, tree-covered terrain where visibility was difficult.

Then, in the afternoon the commander of the German Beskid Corps, GdK von der Marwitz, arrived at X Corps HQ in Laborczber. Fortunately the first part of 25 Res ID - the two regiments of 50 Res Inf Bde - which was scheduled to relieve the k.u.k. 24 ID, had already reached Ujbanya (a third regiment wouldn't arrive until 9 April). By agreement between the two corps commanders, the Germans were ordered forward. Also three battalions of 128 Hon Inf Bde, which were in the Laborcza valley ready to entrain for their return journey to Fenyvesvölgy, were sent back to the battlefield.

GdI Boroevic placed GdK Marwitz in charge of the counterattack,

194In 17 ID, Col. Silvio Spiess von Braccioforte, the commander of IR # 39, personally led a small reserve force against some Russians who'd broken into his position by Erfalu (east of Sztropko), and drove them out. He died a hero's death in this gallant action. For this deed and for his gallant conduct the year before at Suloszowa he was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.

195In 34 ID, Lt Zoltan Laczegyi of IR # 101 was distinguished on 5 April in an attack that led to the recapture of the Gusina Heights (east of Virava); he won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
so X Corps came under his command. The Prussian general ordered Meixner's divisions to hold their present positions on 3 April. The German 25 Res ID would first deploy between 2 and 24 ID; however it would seize any opportunity to attack the enemy in cooperation with its new neighbors. The German 35 Res ID and 4 ID, parts of which were still on the railroads, were ordered to prepare for action in Laborcza valley.

Despite the success which the Russians had won east of the Laborcza on the 2nd, the main body of the Bohemian 21 LW ID was still holding its positions just west of the valley; the eastern flank, however, had pulled back about 5 km because of the forced withdrawal of the Division's eastern wing. The Russians could easily take advantage of this situation by engaging the 21st in an unfavorable action before the advent of the main body of the Beskid Corps. Since all available information indicated that the enemy was readying strong forces for this purpose on both sides of the Laborcza, the commander of X Corps ordered the main body of the Landwehr Division back to maintain a continuous line with the battle group in the valley. This retreat, which took place on the night of 2-3 April, also involved the next unit on the left, the 45 LW ID.

The picture changed on Holy Saturday. The Russians again sought to throw 34 ID off of the Beskid crest, but failed. The right wing of 24 ID was also able to hang on south of Virava. From a position behind the left wing of the 24th, the German 25 Res ID struck north on the principal ridge leading to the Kobila. Their attack quickly gained ground; this was beneficial to 2 ID, whose right wing (Hon IR # 30, attached from 128 Hon Inf Bde) stormed the Uhlsisko Heights. The left wing of 2 ID, along with parts of 21 LW ID, advanced to the ridge east of Hegyescsaba. West of the Laborcza, 21 and 45 LW ID won back part of the ground they had just given up.

The actions continue into Easter Week

On the next day the sun rose over fields that were free of snow

196This led to a sharp order from Teschen, which probably wasn't sufficiently informed about the situation of X Corps: local setbacks shouldn't lead to the retreat of a substantial part of the front. The commander of X Corps was replaced. The Aus-Hung. Army, like the others, frequently changed its high-ranking officers. Sometimes this was unjust, as in the current case. It seems that the charge that GdI Meixner was insufficiently steadfast in defensive fighting was incorrect. The high command was often unclear about the actual course of events; their favorite phrase - "Hold out until the last man" - was unfortunately overused. They reverted only in a later phase of the war to the doctrine that an elastic defense was many times preferable to continuing an action under unfavorable circumstances.
for the first time this year. It shone upon the retreat of the Russians, who lost a considerable number of men as prisoners.

On Easter Sunday GdK Marwitz deployed 35 Res ID east of the Laborcza. This considerably shortened the line of 2 ID, which was to advance on Kobila and Javirska. The attack of 2 ID - which had only about 3000 riflemen, including Hon IR # 30 - should begin as soon as 35 Res ID was in line next to it, which was supposed to happen at noon. However, the Germans' deployment was delayed by the rugged, forest-covered terrain. The allied troops weren't able to work their way up to the strongly occupied enemy lines until evening. The final blow was postponed until the next day.

However, there were also many obstacles on Easter Monday, 5 April. 25 Res ID didn't take an outlying hilltop south of the Kobila until around noon, while 35 Res ID took the ridge running southwest of the Javirska. Between the two German divisions, the k.u.k. 2 ID was suddenly attacked by the enemy. However they drove the Russians back and followed them up with a counterattack around 4:00 PM. Despite flanking fire from the Russian artillery, but with powerful support from its neighbors, the Galician division stormed the Javirska and Kobila Heights. Even these worn out troops proved that they still possessed an astonishing will to fight.

On the same day, Böhm-Ermolli's left wing was also the target of heavy attacks. The Russians won some successes against 29 ID, but their storming lines were all broken by 34 ID.

West of the Laborcza valley, the German 4 ID entered the sector of 21 LW ID on 5 April. In the next two days the 4 ID, 21 LW ID and 35 Res ID gained a substantial amount of ground which was needed for the new defensive front being established. The k.u.k. IR # 81 and 88 fought in these actions under 35 Res ID.

Reaction of the Austrian commanders

It would be several days before the various layers of the Aus-Hung. command structure could recognize the significance of the victory won by the counterattack of the Beskid Corps and associated k.u.k. units. Soon the result would have an effect on the entire Carpathian front. Immediately, however, the AOK at Teschen was still concerned because of the withdrawal of VII Corps in the Sztopko area, which seemed to threaten a new calamity. Boroevic justified what had happened by hinting that he was following his orders. Specifically, he reported that
Marwitz' Group with 34,000 riflemen had attacked on a front of just 16 km. On the 5th they had indeed been able to take the heights west of Virava with 25 Res ID, the k.u.k. 2 ID, and parts of 35 Res ID. On the left and right of this attacking group, however, the Battle hadn't moved forward. He didn't believe it would be advisable to continue the offensive because:

. The AOK's command that he relieve four Aus-Hung. divisions from the front hadn't been rescinded,
. The strength of his units continued to sink, and
. 2nd Army had pulled back.

Archduke Joseph's group - 14,000 riflemen on a 17 km front - had repulsed the Russian attacks; however, their line was jutting ahead of their neighbors, so that the flanks were in danger of envelopment; this was particularly true of the west wing, which abutted the completely exhausted 1 Lst Inf Bde. In particular, the artillery of VII Corps would be exposed if the Landsturm brigade and 4 CD pulled back a considerable distance. Unfortunately the German 4 ID couldn't be used to shore up the front in the Ondava valley because it had been ordered that the Beskid Corps should be kept together. Boroevic hadn't wanted to abandon VII Corps to the uncertainties of a forced retreat, especially since its reduced strength forbade taking any chances. Therefore he had permitted the Corps commander to pull his left wing back 8 km, and his center 4 to 5 km; the right wing was staying in place. There were no suitable defensive positions in the intervening terrain.

To be sure, the orders issued by the AOK on 27 March had also mentioned another solution. Instead of maintaining a thin line throughout the Sztropko sector, a gap could have been left between the inner wings of VII and XVII Corps as they bent back. If the enemy entered the gap, they could have been taken in a pincers movement on both flanks, especially from the east by substantial parts of Marwitz' Group. Boroevic, however, had been concerned for his west wing (28 ID), and anyway wasn't permitted to split up the Beskid Corps. He had little faith in such a maneuver, and decided it wasn't feasible.

Despite the obvious disarray of the enemy forces, GdK Marwitz felt that he should continue his offensive only if the neighboring groups could join in. An isolated thrust would only begin to worsen the situation instead of continuing its improvement. Since it wasn't possible for the moment to help the commander of the Beskid Corps, 3rd Army HQ ordered him to just hold the positions he had won. 2 and 24 ID, along with 21 and 45

197 On 7 April the 21 LW ID had 2700 riflemen; 24 ID and 45 LW ID each had 2000; 2 ID had just 1200.
LW ID, would leave the front.

The relief of the four divisions began soon, and was completed on the 10th. The Beskid Corps took over the entire front they had once held. On the 11th and 13th the Russians attempted to attack, but were easily stopped by the Germans; on the 11th the 20 Hon ID and XVII Corps also fended off the enemy. The Russians had lost 40,000 combatants, including 8500 prisoners, during the Easter Battle; this would have further consequences for them. The enemy's offensive power had suffered a severe setback, which forced their leadership to draw some unwelcome conclusions.

Reaction of the Russian commanders

Anyway, several days passed before Ivanov and the Grand Duke-Generalissimo also were aware of the outcome of the Battle. On April 6 the new commander of the Russian Northwest Front, General Alexeiev, suggested that he could best prevent German forces from being transferred from the Vistula and East Prussia by an offensive toward Berlin, but the idea was turned down. The Chief of Staff of the supreme command responded on the 8th that an attack west of the Vistula couldn't be prepared without the approval of the Grand Duke.  

On the day before, the commander of the Southwest Front had been greatly encouraged when Stavka gave him control of III Caucasian Corps, which had moved to Lemberg. However, Ivanov's mood changed considerably in the next three days, apparently due to growing awareness of the course of the Easter Battle. In mid-March he had urged the high command to seek a decision in the Carpathians by a vigorous offensive; now he decided, against his will, to halt the attacks of 3rd and 8th Armies, and to go over to the defensive. He justified this decision to the high command by stating that enemy reinforcements had arrived and driven back parts of his Carpathian front. He would postpone the resumption of the offensive temporarily until the arrival of III Caucasian Corps. Other factors influencing his change of plans were:

- Setbacks at the hands of the German South Army and of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe,
- Casualties and exhaustion of the troops,
- The poor condition of lines of communication,
- The delay of all movement because of snow in the higher elevations, and
- Bottlenecks in the logistical system.

Bonch-Bruyevitch, Vol. I; pp. 82, 84 and 89
Not only had the Russians been forever barred from entering Hungary through the Laborcza valley; until May they also believed that the allies might launch another offensive in this sector. At one time the Russians had high hopes for their thrust into Hungary. They would encourage the Serbs to new activity and bring Romania into the war. The collapse of the old Habsburg Monarchy had seemed attainable.

These hopes had been reduced to nothing on the heights south of Mezőlaborcz. Such was the world historical significance of the Easter Battle in the Carpathians.

F. The Carpathian Fighting Winds Down

1. Brussilov's attacks after Easter week; the Germans capture the Zwinin (6-14 April)

After Böhm-Ermolli's left wing had already pulled back during the Easter Battle, beginning on 6 April the middle of 2nd Army as well as Szurmay's Group endured heavy Russian assaults. Although an attack was expected in the sector between the Halicz Heights and the village of Patakofalu, 33 ID of V Corps (except for one regiment) was instructed to leave its position blocking the Wolosate valley. It moved into the Ung valley, where it constituted a welcome reserve for 2nd Army. The isolated portions of 128 Hon Inf Bde, intermingled detachments from V Corps, and Szurmay's Group were unable to keep up their resistance to the larger enemy forces. Szurmay had to pull his left wing back to the heights on the line Szczawinka-Fliska-Ceremcha.

At this point Pflanzer-Baltin asked whether South Army could stretch its units on the right as far as the Mszana valley to better secure the always weakly held junction point between their two commands; because of Szurmay's situation, the HQ at Munkacs couldn't agree.

The fighting in the center of 2nd Army also turned unfavorable. The Russians broke into the lines of 44 LW ID (XVIII Corps) at Kistopolya; this forced Army HQ to send 37 Hon ID – which had just reached its rehabilitation quarters in the Ung valley – back to the threatened sector. Schmidt's Corps was also under heavy enemy pressure, which pushed 43 LW ID back by Nagypolany. Brussilov could thus congratulate himself for inflicting heavy
blows on the Aus-Hung. front in three places on the 6th.

Teschen asked 3rd Army to provide help to its neighbor. Army HQ responded that Marwitz' Group was still itself engaged in combat; also they wanted to use the first units that became available for a planned offensive in the Ondava valley. On the other hand, 4th Army was able to provide 51 Hon ID (9400 riflemen). On the afternoon of the 7th this Division began its rail journey via Homonna, Szinna and Takcsany, which lasted until the 13th. Although the Archduke's Army had thus been dangerously depleted, it was subject to new demands. When the AOK learned that III Caucasian Corps was being moved from the Northwest Front to a point south of the Vistula, they ordered 4th Army to pull another division from the front. It would be held ready as a reserve in the event of an always possible attack. At this point, however, it was impossible to withdraw any more troops from the already weakened positions. Army HQ at Okocim was anxious about the immediate future, because it seemed that the thin lines of 4th Army couldn't withstand a strong Russian offensive (although the Army still had over 98,600 riflemen and 2,780 cavalry). The Stavka, however, failed to exploit their favorable opportunity to strike a blow in west Galicia because of their fixation on the Carpathian front. Later they would bitterly rue this omission.

On the front of the Archduke's Army, the Russians evacuated the western bank of the Dunajec at Wolka. On 3 April they were also driven out of their bridgehead at Pasieka. On the 14th the Russians were able to break into the position at Ciezkowice by surprise; however, they were immediately expelled by a counterattack.

With his whole strength the enemy continued the actions in the mountains, where winter was still in command. As expected, the Russians tried to break into the Ung valley, and thrust toward the Ceremcha Heights, the strong point at the junction of Szurmay's Group with V Corps. Because of the premature relief of 33 ID, Szurmay wasn't in a position to bring this attack to a halt and asked the AOK for help from Böhm-Ermolli. Therefore 2nd Army assembled strong forces from V Corps at Patakofalu on the 7th; Szurmay's detachments in the area were subordinated to this force. Also the 65 Inf Bde of 33 ID, whose troops had arrived exhausted in the Ung Valley, was preparing to move by rail from Soslak to Malomret. (This was only a journey of 11.1 km; the need to use the railroad shows how much the troops were in need of rest.) The Russians advanced again toward the Ceremcha on the 7th and 8th, but couldn't take the position. On the other hand,

199To replace 51 Hon ID, Arz' Group received IR # 80 from XIV Corps.
they took the Kiczera sokilska from 7 ID farther east.

The threat to Szurmay's west wing seemed to have been parried when the combined Brigade from 38 Hon ID and the three battalions of 128 Hon Inf Bde which had been held back by 3rd Army finally deployed in this area. However, on the 11th the Russians broke into the Aus-Hung. lines southwest of the upper portion of the Ceremcha. 65 Inf Bde (Col. Freiherr von Dürfeld) was already in place behind the broken lines and ready to counterattack. Strengthened by the detachments from Szurmay and from V Corps, this group blocked the further advance of the enemy through the deep snow, and in two days of battle drove the Russian back from the sectors where they had penetrated the Aus-Hung. defenses. On the morning of the 14th, Dürfeld's mixed group gained control of the entire Ceremcha area.

On the day before, Linsingen had wired Teschen that the AOK should ask the German OHL to reinforce South Army with German troops, since the resistance of Szurmay's soldiers was considerably diminished due to the weather. At this point the k.u.k. high command was already negotiating with Mézières, although no agreement had been reached regarding the deployment of German reinforcements.

Since 9 April the HQ of 2nd and South Armies had been addressing the question of where to draw their respective boundaries; this was necessary because groups drawn from both commands were badly intermingled on the Ceremcha. Each HQ wanted to include these important heights in its own zone. Linsingen insisted that since he needed the rail line in the Ung valley to supply his left wing, he should have responsibility for defending the lines covering the valley. The AOK, however, decided in favor of 2nd Army.

While V Corps foiled a Russian attempt to capture the Stinka Heights on the 9th, the center and west wing of 2nd Army were hotly engaged all day to ensure they had control of all parts of their new positions. 37 Hon ID reinforced XVIII Corps with one of its regiments, and sent a brigade to Schmidt's Corps; its fourth regiment was kept in the rear as a reserve.

After several changes of fortune, by the 10th the XVII Corps and Schmidt's Corps had straightened the lines by Kistopolya and Nagypolany, and repulsed all attacks. Under XIX Corps, 41 Hon ID and 29 ID were hard pressed by the Russians; 29 ID had to give up the Beskid crest on the 8th. On the 11th its right wing also gave way, because 41 Hon ID was pushed back to the church at Telepocz.
While this fighting went on, 34 ID wasn't disturbed. The main body of 51 Hon ID (from 4th Army) was used on the 13th to relieve the left wing 41 Hon ID on the heights; one regiment replaced 13 LW ID, which left the front.

Böhm-Ermolli had prevailed despite a considerable numerical disadvantage. The 55,000 riflemen of 2nd Army were facing 70,000 to 72,000 Russians (according to HQ estimates).  

The German South Army didn't allow themselves to be upset by Szurmay's difficult situation; after the successful outcome of the defensive fighting, on 9 April their main body went over to the offensive. XXIV Res Corps wasn't able to take the Czyrak Heights from the stubborn defenders on 10 and 11 April; however the left wing of Hofmann's Corps moved closer to the Ostry Heights. The 1st German ID of Bothmer's Corps won a greater success. On the 9th they stormed the last parts of the Zwinin Heights still in the hands of the Russians, ending eight weeks of action on this position; they pushed the wavering enemy back toward Skole through the 11th. This advance, however, was held in check when the Russians launched determined attacks against 3 Gd ID.

Linsingen's intention of having Bothmer's Corps thrust ahead to the northwest couldn't be carried out because the main body of 38 Hon ID were driven from their lines by the Russians on the 11th. A counterattack on the next day was unsuccessful. The Honved Division finally recovered several of the lost heights on the 14th, with help from detachments of 1st German ID and 3 Gd ID.

2. Fighting ebbs in the second half of April

The situation in the Carpathians in the second half of April forced friend and foe to evaluate their earlier efforts and to devise new plans.

Now that the immediate crisis had passed, the burning question for the Aus-Hung. high command was whether they should continue to let the Russians have the initiative, as had been the case since the end of March. Conrad's first inclination after the Easter Battle was to quickly open a general offensive south of the Vistula with the troops on hand around the 20th. Meanwhile, however, negotiations with the German General Staff and the

200In Tersztyanszky's Group (Schmidt's and Trollmann's Corps), there was an average daily loss of 2,000 riflemen.
political crisis with Italy caused him to gladly abandon this plan and to move to new decisions. Before a new strategy could be carried out, all of April would be over; in the meantime the Carpathian front must be held.

The Russian high command faced a similar situation, in that decisions in their own theater of operations were influenced above all by the attack of their Western allies on the Dardanelles. By coincidence, they were also forced to postpone major operations until the beginning of May; this pause, however, didn't keep lower echelon commanders from carrying out local actions.

Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe

Both sides naturally did their best to keep their plans secret. Therefore the reports received about the enemy by the AOK at Teschen didn't permit them yet to discern the general outline of the Russian plans. However, intelligence information and aerial scouting did indicate that Letschitzky was about to attack Pflanzer-Baltin. All the signs moreover seemed to show that the Russian target was the left wing of Pflanzer's Armeegruppe, which later proved to be incorrect. Based on this assumption, and contrary to his earlier practice, the Armeegruppe commander began to shift more forces toward his left wing. On 19 April the high command received a report that III Caucasian Corps was to be placed under Letschitzky. Pilots also said that large bodies of troops were concentrating in the valleys of the Lomnica and the Czeczwa. This concerned GdK Pflanzer all the more because of the importance of maintaining contact with the German South Army, and because as the snow melted the terrain would be favorable for the Russians to attack the junction point.

Immediate measures were taken to strengthen the defenses of the Lomnica and Bystrzyca Solotwinska valleys: the units here were reinforced, the most important gaps in the lines were fortified, and the transportation routes were improved. On the 20th, the AOK told GdK Pflanzer that since he was about to be reinforced by some of the IX March Battalions (for his Armeegruppe, this would be about 20,000 men), he should be able to keep the enemy away from the rail line running from Huszt through Maramaros Sziget to Körösmesző and Kolomea; the Armeegruppe should keep a strong reserve behind its left wing. This was the only way to guard the routes into the mountains leading directly to the Armeegruppe's flank, since the South Army was too heavily engaged itself to provide assistance.
Four days later the Armeegruppe commander was informed that a major offensive was being prepared in west Galicia and that his troops should pin down the enemy with as much activity as possible. To deceive the Russians, moreover, two German companies were to be sent from South Army to Czernowitz; their movement would not be kept secret, and was supposed to indicate that they were the vanguard of a much larger force. Pflanzer himself decided not to rely only on deception measures, but also to anticipate the threatened Russian offensive with a counter thrust of his own. This would be consistent with the high command's wish that he tie down the enemy. Therefore, by 1 May he had concentrated 21 battalions and 7 batteries under the command of FZM Ljubicic (parts of 5, 6 and 15 ID and the entire 16 Inf Bde). They made up two groups and were deployed between the Bystrzyca Solotwinska and the Czeczwa, with their main body west of the Lomnica; they would thrust toward the northeast. Pflanzer hoped that the entire left wing of the Armeegruppe (Rhemen's Group) could reach the line Chlebowka-Perehinsko-Suchodol.

As the days passed, the enemy also seemed to become more active opposite the wing in the mountains. Already on 1 May they attacked the heights northwest of Osmoloda; they were easily repulsed, even though South Army was unable to send help as had been requested. In the same period, Rhemen's and Czibulka's Groups launched energetic but low-scale thrusts designed to confuse the enemy as to the location of the intended offensive. FML Czibulka was also planning to send a mixed detachment to the north bank of the Dniester.

All of these measures considerably strengthened Ljubicic's Group at the expense of the eastern group. Beginning on the 26th, however, there were signs that the Russians might attack in the east, between the Dniester and Pruth. Therefore Pflanzer-Baltin placed the Armeegruppe's reserve - 8 CD - at the disposal of GdK Marschall. The German general was instructed to continue the siege-like operation against Zaleszczyki and eventually to take the stubbornly held bridgehead away from the enemy.

South Army

Meanwhile the German South Army continued their attacks and thus pinned down the enemy units along their front. Gerok's Corps, which made up the right wing and was dug in along a wide sector on both sides of the Wyszkow road, was unable to advance. Hofmann's Corps generally was able to gain ground by moving their trenches ahead toward the Ostry Heights, east of the road to
Skole; finally the hotly-contested heights were stormed by gallant troops from 55 ID and 1st German ID on 24 April. For the Aus-Hung. and German units on the inner wings of Hofmann's and Bothmer's Corps, this was the signal for a general assault on the chain of heights leading from Ostry to the road. Bothmer's Corps had already been engaged on the previous days. After the Russians had driven 38 Hon ID from its lines on both sides of the Stryj on the 11th, a counterattack on the 14th had only recovered parts of the lost high ground. The Honved Division, which had to give up a brigade to Szurmay's Group, repeated its counterattacks on 15, 16 and 22 April, supported by neighboring German troops. Finally the original positions, including those held by the right wing of 40 Hon ID until it also had been defeated on the 11th, were almost all back in our hands. The 1st German ID took an important height on the 18th and held it against counterattacks that night. After the capture of the Ostry on the 24th, the inner wings of Hofmann's and Bothmer's Corps continued to advance, and were able to hold the ground they had won against continual Russian attacks by day and night.

Szurmay's Group was also engaged in heavy fighting. The Russians once again were tempted to break into the Ung valley. Their XXVIII Corps attacked on the 21st and took part of our position southeast of Wolosate. An immediate counterattack took place with meager forces, but failed. Szurmay asked for help from Munkacs and Ungvar. In turn, on the morning of the 22nd Linsingen asked the AOK to order 2nd Army HQ to either send the half of 37 Hon ID now in reserve at Fenyvesvölgy to help Szurmay, or to have the entire V Corps attack toward Ustrzyki-Grn. Böhm-Ermolli hesitated, however, to give up his last reserve in the Ung valley; only the artillery of V Corps took part in the actions southeast of Wolosate. The clear-headed calculations of the commander of 2nd Army proved to be correct. Although Szurmay's counterattacks on the 22nd collapsed with enormous casualties, the Russians didn't exploit their initial advantage and didn't push any further beyond the area they had taken.

The episode demonstrated that it was disadvantageous to have Szurmay's left wing placed under South Army. It would have been preferable to have one HQ responsible for the defense of the Ung valley; even the exchange of detachments between V Corps and Szurmay during these days, intended to rationalize the order of battle, was prolonged and troublesome. After the Russian breakthrough proved to be insubstantial, Szurmay was able to fend off a series of further enemy assaults through the 26th. 2nd Army

201For the successful actions of his Corps in the Carpathians, GdI Hofmann received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
sent him just one regiment of 37 Hon ID on a temporary basis, and it was only to be sent into the line in case of a dire emergency. From the 24\textsuperscript{th} the Russians also attacked Szurmay's center and right wing; however, the defenders were not only able to hold their lines but also launched counterattacks.\textsuperscript{202}

There is no doubt that the South Army had fulfilled its mission during these actions; moreover, they probably also succeeded in distracting the enemy from the growing danger in west Galicia. Linsingen, like all the other Army commanders, was notified of the planned offensive in west Galicia. He responded on the 30\textsuperscript{th} by proposing that the high command give him two divisions which he could deploy on his right wing for a thrust toward Dolina. Thus he continued to advocate his plans for a flank attack by his Army. This idea was turned down, however, as was a scheme proposed on the next day for sending German units behind the left wing of Pflanzer-Baltin's neighboring Armeegruppe; the latter proposal was intended to fool the enemy into thinking a large German force was moving to the sector (similar to the deception plan involving Czernowitz). Pflanzer-Baltin, however, objected that he didn't want further Russian units drawn into the area prior to the pending attack by Ljubicic's Group.

\textit{2\textsuperscript{nd} Army}

Under 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army, actions continued for several days after mid-April, but involved only Tersztyanszky's Group. The HQ at Ungvar and Teschen expected a larger Russian attack against V Corps in the area of Ceremcha Heights and Patakofalu. Although the enemy had thrust into Szurmay's front near Wolosate, they however had left the Corps on Böhm-Ermolli's right wing alone. Except for some help to their neighbors on the left, the XVIII Corps also enjoyed relative quiet; the Russians made some minor attacks against the Corps on 15 and 22 April, but were easily driven off.

On the other hand, Schmidt's Corps of Tersztyanszky's Group endured continuous Russian attacks, which culminated on the 17\textsuperscript{th} when they took the important Koziolata Heights from 43 LW ID. Apparently the enemy wanted this position to secure the useful lines of communication in the valley from Zemplenoroszi. All attempts to regain the heights failed. On the 20\textsuperscript{th}, Schmidt made a more carefully prepared and larger counterattack, but he couldn't break through despite heavy losses. In the next few days a concentrated artillery barrage was launched against the Koziolata, again without any noteworthy success. On the 26\textsuperscript{th}

\vspace{1em}\textsuperscript{202}For the successful defense of the Uzsok Pass in April 1915, FML Szurmay won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.

289
Schmidt decided he would just have to accept the setback for the time being.

Until the 25th, the right wing of XIX Corps was continuously engaged around the heights by Telepocz. On the 18th, the 41 Hon ID was able to recover parts of the positions they had earlier lost; then the Honveds sought to advance further into the Ondava valley, but their attacks were fruitless. The two divisions on the left wing – 29 and 34 ID – weren't disturbed except for a Russian attack against 34 ID on the night of 21-22 April; it was defeated.

During these two weeks, besides the troop movements mentioned above (made necessary by tactical considerations), 2nd Army HQ was working to simplify its order of battle. Within its own lines, and in those of Group Szurmay, the units had become mixed up. In mid-April, only half of the Army's fourteen divisions commanded their own organic units; the other half were made up of mixed detachments. After the incorporation of March formations, 2nd Army's strength increased on the 15th to 79,000 riflemen. However, it had already lost 12,000 in the next four days. The troops were constantly in motion; on the 27th, after the fighting died out, orders were issued to regroup all of the mixed formations. This process took more than a week. The HQ of Tersztyanszky's Group was dissolved in the night of 30 April-1 May.

In front of Tersztyanszky's lines there were many Russian corpses, especially in front of 13 LW ID. The stench they made as they decomposed was so great that it was almost unbearable to occupy the nearby trenches. Therefore it seemed desirable to negotiate a brief truce with the enemy so the bodies could be buried. Even though this involved only a small stretch of the front, the AOK ordered the negotiations to be halted. They didn't want the enemy to have the slightest opportunity to transfer troops to the west Galician front.

Other parts of the front

Boroevic's 3rd Army, unlike the 2nd, enjoyed a pause in fighting after the Easter Battle. The Russians feared that he was preparing an offensive, and worked feverishly to strengthen their positions.

Opposite the k.u.k. 4th Army, the Russians had carried on lively reconnaissance operations since the start of April; these intensified in mid-month. There were also smaller actions
involving 3 ID (on the 7th and 8th) and parts of 39 Hon ID (at Ciezkowice on the 14th). Beginning on the 19th the Russians increased the number of their air patrols, but after a few days again reduced the number. This was particularly welcome to the allies since it happened in the same hours when the first German troops were arriving in front of Gorlice.

For several weeks there had been no actions involving Dankl's 1st Army or the XII Corps. Their units considerably increased in size because they received a continuous stream of replacements but had negligible casualties; some of the infantry regiments had five or six battalions. This would enable the high command to bring units in the strength of about two divisions to the south bank of the Vistula for the upcoming offensive in west Galicia.

3. Results of the Carpathian Winter

With the end of the "Carpathian winter", an important phase of the Great War of 1914-18 was coming to a close. The theory that the Carpathian Mountains could only be an area for armies to pass through was proven incorrect by the power of circumstances. The Carpathians became a major battlefield for several weeks - not just in the more open western portions, but also in the forested heights stretching toward the Bukovina. The fate of entire Armies was decided here. Moreover, this occurred at the worst possible season, when winter held mountains and valleys in its grasp. On one day entire lines of trenches lay literally covered with ice and snow; on the next day, rain and thaws could turn entire stretches of the terrain into swamps and morasses. In these months the weather and terrain were often more dangerous than human enemies to the troops who gave their lives on the forested heights or in the lonely, God-forsaken valleys. This was equally true for both sides.

General Ivanov, the commander of the Russian Southwest Front, had long been of the opinion that Austria-Hungary must be the first of the central European empires to collapse. However, prior to the start of 1915 he had been more interested in advancing victoriously through Cracow to Moravia than in attacking over the Carpathians toward Budapest. Many of the Russians' actions in late fall of 1914 indicate how much they were trying to avoid the mountains. The first person who decided to risk the horrors of the Carpathian winter in an attempt to gain a great victory was undoubtedly the Chief of the Aus-Hung. General Staff. Around new year he developed the plan of driving the enemy out of the
Carpathians by advancing his left wing. This was just another example of his great, unshaken will; he forced his allies to support him, though with heavy hearts.

Because Conrad's plans placed the Russians in great danger, they could no longer avoid committing troops to the mountains during winter. After actively holding off the Aus-Hung. and German attacks, the Russians proceeded to launch their own grand offensive toward Budapest after the fall of Przemysl. The Grand Duke-Generalissimo, although reluctant, agreed to this plan.

Thus large masses of troops fought for four difficult months as they converged on the Carpathians from north and south. At the start of the year, the Austro-Hungarians had about 18 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions in the sector between the Bukovina and Gorlice. This force increased by 24 April to about 46 infantry and 8 ½ cavalry divisions (including German units). During the buildup in the Carpathians, the Aus-Hung. railroads transported two army HQ, 10 corps HQ and 42 divisions in 116 days, which required over 2500 trains. When the first allied offensive started on 23 January the Russians had 20 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions in the same sector (this figure includes the opolcheniye brigades). On 24 April the Russian forces in the Carpathians (not counting strategic reserves) consisted of 38 infantry and 14 cavalry division. Although the Russians had fewer divisions than the allies, this was offset because they had more battalions per division and especially because they had received larger numbers of replacement troops.

The fate of Conrad's offensive was sealed when Przemysl fell. However, the great Russian offensive soon also failed. Against the wishes of the Stavka, which wanted to envelop their opponents' eastern wing, Ivanov sought to break through in the center toward Eperjes and Homonna. However, the onrushing Russian masses had no better fortune than theAus-Hung. and German divisions had previously; they couldn't break through. The Russians never concentrated a really large force in any one sector. Because the allies were fighting on "interior lines" (with a shorter distance to cover between their defensive sectors), the results of the Russian setback were more serious to their side than the defeats suffered by the allies in the

---

203 One army HQ, five corps HQ, 21 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division came from west Galicia and Poland; 3 corps HQ and 7 infantry divisions came from the Balkan theater, and 1 army HQ, 2 corps HQ, 6 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division came from the German forces. 120,000 cars were needed to move these masses. See also Ratzenhofer, "Der Aufmarsch hinter den Karpathen" (Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, Vienna, July-Aug 1930)
previous months. Thus the defensive victory of the Aus-Hung. Army, loyally supported by German soldiers, was of substantially greater value than the Russian successes of January, February and March. By stopping the Austro-Hungarians, the Russians had managed to prevent the relief of Przemysl and the recovery of Galicia. The stakes however were much higher during the Russian thrust toward the Hungarian plains: they involved nothing more or less than the existence of the Danube Monarchy.

The physical and psychological condition of the two sides

The sacrifices by both sides are a testimony to the unparalleled difficulty of the fighting which thundered for four months in the Carpathian valleys. There are no definitive casualty statistics for either side for this portion of the war. For Austria-Hungary the total loss (dead, wounded, sick, prisoners and missing) was between 600,000 and 800,000 men; this includes the entire garrison of Przemysl. About 10% of the men were killed, 40 to 50% were wounded or sick; the rest were taken prisoner (while either wounded, sick or well).²⁰⁴

Russian casualties are even more difficult to estimate. According to official Russian sources, in the first nine months of the war the total losses of the Russian Army were 1,200,000 (dead, wounded, prisoners and missing).²⁰⁵ The actual figures were at least 60 to 70% higher (i.e. totaling 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 men), if not more.²⁰⁶

Russian losses in the Carpathian actions couldn't have been substantially more than ours, but also - despite the prisoners we lost at Przemysl - not substantially less. Anyway, more harmful to the Russians than human casualties was their consumption of equipment and munitions. Russian war industry and the civilian bureaucracy failed completely to keep pace with consumption.

In evaluating the psychological condition of the Aus-Hung. Army, it should be remembered that after the heavy casualties of the 1914 campaign it had become an army of Landsturm and militia. Its condition didn't improve during the Carpathian winter, when there was a lack of manpower every hour of every day. On the

²⁰⁴See the appendix to this section for further details on Aus-Hung. casualties.
²⁰⁵"Soviet Russian Overview of the Casualties of the Russian Army 1914-1918" (Moscow, 1925)
²⁰⁶The English General Knox, who was at that time the principal liaison officer with the Russian Army, came up with casualty figures about 25 to 30% higher, based on official reports from St Petersburg. (Knox, "With the Russian Army 1914-1917"; New York, 1921 - Vol. I, pp. 297 ff.)
contrary, the already slender supply of experienced officers and trained men continued to decrease. The new troops were less hardy physically and were not adept in the various facets of combat because of their shortened training; their casualties mounted to an alarming degree. Although Austria-Hungary had many troops from mountainous areas (those from the III and XIV Corps, and some of those from II, XII, XV and XVI Corps), only a relatively small portion of these units were employed in the Carpathians. This was unfortunate, because these soldiers, thanks to their experience and mountain equipment, would surely have had an easier time than the units from the Banat, the Bohemian basin, and the plains of Galicia.

The troops were adjusting to the ever stronger impression that the war would last for a long time. This led to war-weariness, which wouldn't be overcome until conditions had improved. The political consequences have already been discussed in another context. All these factors reduced the Army's capacity to fight. Moreover, it shouldn't be overlooked that the tasks which the leadership gave the men were often of superhuman dimensions. This is demonstrated by the fact that Linsingen's better disposed and - above all - better equipped German divisions were no more able to achieve noteworthy success on the offensive than were their Austrian and Hungarian comrades. Only Pflanzer's Armeegruppe gained significant ground, due in part to the fact that at the outset they met significantly little resistance as they crossed the mountains.

Anyway, the picture of the Russian Army at this time wasn't substantially different from that of their opponents. The physical and spiritual demands of the war in the Carpathians had also compelled the Muzhiks to call on their last reserves of strength. The only difference, perhaps, is that the Russians were more accustomed to inclement winters than their enemies who were brought up in milder climates. However, the demands which commanders at all levels made of their men in these weeks and months were no different from those in other armies. The Tsar's Army also suffered from the often mentioned lack of military equipment - especially ammunition - which became worse from day to day. The need to pay in blood for the deficiencies of the home front depressed every combatant. And so the legend of betrayal, which later would have such profound consequences, began to spread among both the Muzhiks and their officers; the suspicion was extended to the ruling dynasty. Most reports indicated that when the Tsar visited "liberated" Galicia in the last half of April at the request of the Pan-Slavs, he was met with surprising coolness. Already some of the officers said that
after all he was only a "German." Thus the most important pillar of the Tsar's military establishment, faith in authority, was already significantly crumbling and would never be repaired. The ruthless attempt of the Russian leadership to reach the plains of Hungary regardless of casualties had failed. This sowed seeds of discontent among the Russian soldiers that would bear its first fruit in the next few weeks; in two more years the results would be profoundly dangerous to the regime.

Appendix - estimates of Austro-Hungarian casualties

Major Dr. Czegka, using material collected by General Ratzenhofer, came to the following statistical conclusions.

Combat troops available on 1 January (including both mounted and dismounted cavalry, but not artillery)........................287,660
Replacements, 1 January-30 April.............................737,460
Reinforcements from the Balkans............................. 71,700
TOTAL AVAILABLE 1,096,820

Total present on 1 May.................................535,000

Losses from infantry and cavalry.........................561,820
An (estimated) additional 10% losses from officers, artillery, machine gun units, etc........ 56,180
Losses from death and illness to combat troops in the rear areas.................................. 55,000
The Przemysl garrison........................................ 120,000
TOTAL LOSSES, 1 January-30 April 1915 793,000

In these four months, the sick and wounded soldiers transferred to the interior were........435,000

Permanently lost (dead, missing and prisoners) were 358,000 (of whom 120,000 were from the Przemysl garrison).

Through 1 May 1915 a total of 20,000 officers, 930,000 men, 100,000 horses and 17,000 wagons were transported from the interior to the area of operations.

See also Ratzenhofer, "Verluste im Karpathenwinter 1915" (Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, Vienna, September-October 1930)

G. The Transition from a Two- to a Three-Front War

1. Austria-Hungary's political-military situation in April 1915

a. The pause in operations in the Balkans

Before continuing the narrative of the war against Russia, it is necessary to glance at the political and military developments along the southeastern and southwestern borders of the Habsburg Monarchy since the start of the year 1915. Above all, we must follow the impact upon Austria-Hungary of the transition from a two-front to a three-front war.

After the Battle of Arangjelovac, the Aus-Hung. forces in the Balkans reached the territory of the fatherland behind the sheltering river barriers of the Drina, Sava and Danube. The principal goals of the high command and of the HQ of the Balkan Forces (which was again subordinate to the high command) were to replenish the greatly diminished ranks of the units, to replace the lost military equipment, and to give the worn out troops the rest and rehabilitation they so badly needed. The new commander against Serbia, GdK Archduke Eugene, placed all his units under 5th Army (the HQ of 6th Army was dissolved). His minimal operational objective was to prevent Serbian incursions onto the territory of the Monarchy, especially in the direction of Vienna or Budapest.

The total strength of the troops facing Serbia (including security forces on the rivers, the fortress garrisons and mobile units in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was 260 battalions, 33 squadrons and 140 field batteries. However, the only infantry fit for offensive operations were 160 battalions (the others were all Landsturm), or 91,000 riflemen. In the course of January the arrival of replacements brought their strength up to 133,000 rifles. Nonetheless, from the beginning the Archduke and his Chief of Staff – FML Alfred Krauss – were resolved to respond to any Serbian incursion with a counterattack. Therefore the bulk of 5th Army was deployed in a central position north of the lower Sava; four corps (XIII, XV, XVI and Combined) were placed between Alt-Pazua and Sid. VIII Corps had quarters in a wide area on the northern bank of the Danube, northwest of Neusatz. If the Serbs thrust toward Bosnia while leaving substantial forces to secure their northern borders, the Archduke planned to fall upon them.
with a powerful thrust south into their flank on both sides of the Drina. On the other hand, if the enemy attacked over the lower Sava, the bulk of 5th Army would throw them back with a frontal assault. It seemed less probable that the Serbs would cross the Danube, although a report from Rome said that such an operation was being considered; if so, strong forces would be shifted by rail and foot to the Banat. For this reason additional bridges were constructed over the Tisza at Titel and west of Gross-Becskerek, and protected by fortifications.

Besides these defensive measures, a renewal of the offensive against Serbia was naturally also pondered. For a time Conrad thought that after the Balkan forces were fully ready for action, hopefully at the end of January, he could again call on them to attack. Falkenhayn's principal concern was still to finally open a passage over the Danube for supplies to Turkey that wouldn't be dependent on Romania. By his reckoning, it would be sufficient to conquer the northeast corner of Serbia, the Negotin district, as he had proposed in November 1914. Conrad, however, was convinced that such a solution would be insufficient because of the activity of the Serbs. A secure land route to Turkey could be won only by completely subjugating Serbia and simultaneously achieving an alliance with Bulgaria. The Germans' ambassador at Constantinople, Freiherr von Wangenheim, and one of their senior officers in the area, GFM von der Goltz, agreed with the Chief of the k.u.k. General Staff; they believed that a victory of the Central Powers over the Serbs was the only way to counteract the negative impressions among the neutral Balkan states left by the defeat at Arangjevelovac. Under their influence, Falkenhayn began to give more serious consideration to a joint allied offensive against Serbia, which he preferred to Conrad's proposals at the start of the year for the offensive in the Carpathians. In early January, however, the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff's opinion prevailed: for the moment a decision against Russia was even more desirable than the complete overthrow of Serbia. As has been mentioned earlier, this plan also decided the fate of the Balkan forces for the following months. Their principal role would be as a large pool of reserve units for the northern

208A momentarily favorable opportunity to increase the amount of military equipment sent down the Danube to the Turks was missed during the height of Potiorek's offensive. Subsequently an attempt was made at the end of December, supported by the Danube Flotilla; it was shattered by the watchful Serbs. On the night of 30-31 March 1915, after the first Entente attacks at the Dardanelles, a Danube steamer with 40 wagon-loads of ammunition attempted the passage, but was hit by Serb artillery just 15 km southeast of Belgrade and sunk. On the latter occasion Bulgaria had agreed to the shipment. However, in many cases the Bulgarians had also objected to transporting arms to Turkey; they needed supplies themselves, and mistrusted the Turks.
armies; they would send division after division to the Carpathians, while themselves avoiding significant operations.

**Troop transfers from the Balkans to the Carpathians**

The first call for troops came from Teschen on 6 January, at a time when the Balkan command was momentarily concerned about the uncertain attitude of Romania, while still taking defensive measures against Serbia. Their local operational situation soon proved to be more favorable than they had initially feared. Above all, the troops of XV and XVI Corps were quickly recovering, and made an astonishingly good impression. Also there was high water in the border rivers, which made a Serbian attack practically impossible. Although the Emperor had left the final decision to the Archduke, he and his Chief of Staff didn't hesitate for a second to make the requested troops available for the fight against Russia. Beginning on 10 January the XIX (ex Combined) Corps began to move on the rails to the Carpathians; it included 40 Hon ID as well as its 7 and 29 ID.

The second call from Teschen for troops came on 16 January. Meanwhile the strength of the units in the Balkans was recovering quite well. Thus XIII Corps, after incorporating ersatz troops plus men from the dissolved 104 Lst Inf Bde, had more than its authorized personnel. Only VIII Corps was suffering from a shortage of replacements, even after getting troops from the dissolved 6 Lst Terr Bde. Nonetheless, on 14 January after losing XIX Corps the 5th Army still had 161,000 riflemen (not counting the fortress garrisons). Thus the Balkan HQ had to agree with the wish of the high command, and on the 20th sent XIII Corps (36 ID and 42 Hon ID) to join Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe. Archduke Eugene even voluntarily offered on 31 January to make VIII Corps available for his brother, the commander-in-chief. Archduke Frederick was highly pleased to accept this offer. VIII Corps had just been shifted to the area of Gross-Becskerek because of a Serbian threat to the Banat which hadn't materialized. On 3 February it began to move by rail to the north with its two divisions (9 ID and 21 LW ID).

Despite these departures, Archduke Eugene's Army now had more than 200,000 riflemen, almost 2400 cavalry and 1161 field guns. There were only 70 first-line battalions, however. There were still concerns about Romania, and in mid-February Italy warned Austria-Hungary to forego any new offensive operations in the Balkans. Therefore the Balkan HQ remained almost entirely on the

---

209 See also Krauss, "Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage" (3rd edition, Munich, 1923), p. 170
defensive behind the border rivers, which were still swollen.

At this point, XV Corps (1 and 48 ID) was deployed over a wide area between Alt-Pazua and Ruma; XVI Corps (18, 50 and 57 - the ex Combined - ID) had its quarters between Sid and Brcko. In Bosnia, the 4 and 5 Mtn Bdes formed 58 ID while 6 Mtn Bde and 18 Lst Mtn Bde formed 59 ID. Energetic work improved the technical features of the defensive zone. Bridges over the Bosut, Drava and Tisza Rivers, covered by fortified bridgeheads at Erdut and Titel, made it possible to rapidly shift troops. Syrmia was provided with an extended system of defenses so that XV and XVI Corps could leave it if necessary. New fortifications were erected on the Danube and Drina, while Sarajevo became a major garrison town. The Danube Flotilla, which had withdrawn to Budapest in January, returned to the zone of operations when the waters rose again. Beginning on 17 February, its vessels took part in retaliatory bombardments of Belgrade, made necessary when the Serbs fired on the open cities of Semlin and Mitrovica.

Besides the effort to make up for the departure of field units by improving the fortifications, small detachments from German regiments were ostentatiously stationed in various towns of south Hungary. They were supposed to convince the enemy that the departed corps had been replaced by German units. This deception measure was effective. Reports of the enemy's situation, obtained by spies despite great difficulties, enabled the leadership to judge the success of its deployment.

Situation of the Serbian and Montenegrin forces

When the Serbian and Montenegrin Armies had regained their territorial borders around Christmas of 1914, they had suffered heavy losses just like their opponents. The Serbian high command therefore gave priority to replenishing the strength of its units and securing the frontiers. They believed that Austria-Hungary would soon mount a new offensive, especially because they were deceived by the appearance of the small German detachments. The 1st Serbian Army, with four divisions, covered the approaches to Valjevo opposite the confluence of the Drina and Sava. The defense of Belgrade was entrusted to troops of the III Ban, supported by Sumadija Div I. South of the capital the 3rd Army was west of the Belgrade-Nish railroad with three divisions; 2nd Army was east of the railroad with two divisions. Detachments from both Armies were deployed in advance to watch the river lines. The Danube between the mouths of the Morava and Timok was guarded by the large Branicevo and Krajina Detachments, made up of III Ban troops; at the end of January the Dunav Div I from 1st Army marched to Pozarevac to back them up. The Uzice Armeegruppe
guarded the routes from east Bosnia to Uzice. The Cavalry Division was stationed around Palanka.

The Montenegrin Army had 52,900 men, 140 guns and 105 machine guns. Its Sanjak Group was on the Drina front between the Lim and Tara, with about 30 battalions. The Herzegovina Detachment was in the border territories east of Bileca and Trebinje with 20 battalions. The Lovcen Detachment was east and south of the Bocche di Cattaro. The Old Serbian Detachment guarded the country's southern border with Albania as well as the coast; it had 20 battalions. This deployment remained essentially the same until autumn 1915.

Although the troops were well stationed to protect the country, the Serbian high command had several worries. In the first place, conditions in the newly acquired southern part of the Kingdom were still unsettled; incursions by bands of Bulgarians and Young Turks required the presence of troops. However the Serbian government also was interested in Albania, where Essad Pasha, the new pro-Serbian ruler, was losing ground in his struggle with rebels. The field army had to detach some units which were held in readiness to occupy strategically important points on the Albanian border in case the rebels took power; these were areas the Serbs had evacuated in 1913 at the demand of Austria-Hungary.

An outbreak of epidemics was a heavy setback for Serbia. Typhus and cholera claimed tens of thousands of military and civilian victims; insufficient sanitary arrangements made it impossible to control the diseases. The Combined ID of 3rd Army was particularly infected; to maintain its strength it was necessary to move the unit to healthier quarters just north of Kragujevac.

These illnesses were a major reason why Serbia was militarily inactive during the first nine months of 1915.

Another concern was the insufficient supply of military supplies, which were sent from Russia through Romania to the town of Prahovo (on the Danube north of Negotin). To alleviate this crisis, a new supply route from Salonika was needed. The goal was to create an unbroken rail line from Russia through Romania to the Aegean Sea; this was also of interest to the Russians.
because of the shortage of munitions in the Tsar's army. As a first step, tracks were built south of Prahovo. To guard this important line of communications, the Serbian high command sent the Combined ID into the Timok district in mid-March. As a counter-measure, Archduke Eugene shifted 109 Lst Inf Bde to Orsova on the 19th. The Serbian armies also suffered from a lack of food. In mid-March this made it necessary to remove the bulk of the Montenegrin Lim Division from the Uzice Armeegruppe; it was sent to the Sanjak of Novibazar.\footnote{Serbian official history, Vol. VIII, p. 78. The Western Entente powers were also interested in opening a route from Salonika through Serbia to Russia. However, their attempt to bring Greece out of neutrality with the help of Venizelos was thwarted by the resistance of King Constantine.}

The situation of the two sides in April

As spring approached, it became possible to plan larger scale military operations in the Balkans. While the Russians were attacking in the Carpathians, agents reported that the Serbs were contemplating a joint thrust with Romania in the direction of Temesvar.\footnote{These intelligence reports were accurate. However, the Serbs planned to attack only if Romania joined in.} At the start of April there was a mounting series of reports that the Serbs were concentrating opposite Bazias to invade the Banat; therefore Archduke Eugene sent 10 Mtn Bde of 48 ID to Ung.-Weisskirchen. Other measures were taken to ensure that troops could be quickly shifted to this area; thus a canal was dug between the Danube and Temes so that it would be possible to reach Pancsova by water without going past Belgrade.

On 10 April the k.u.k. Balkan forces contained 234,000 riflemen, 350 field guns and 352 fortress guns; the Archduke believed that he could repulse any attack by the Serbs, who had about 210,000 rifles. If Romania intervened, however, success would be more than doubtful. Fortunately the border rivers, swollen anew due to melting snow, made it impossible for the Serbs to attack simultaneously with the Russians. When the waters began to sink on 19 April, the Russian offensive had been broken in the Easter Battle. The Serbian Army now remained inactive because of its supply problems, although Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaeivitch told the Serbian Crown Prince Alexander on 20 April that he should take the offensive. The Russian commander also blamed the Serbs for failing to prevent strong Aus-Hung. forces (VIII, XIII and XIX Corps) from transferring to the Carpathian front from the Balkans.

b. Italy abandons the Triple Alliance
If there was any doubt about the kind of "compensation" which Italy would demand of Austria-Hungary, it vanished on 11 January 1915 when the Italian government officially sent its demands to Vienna. Italy would not be content with territorial gains in the Balkans, as envisioned by Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty; promises of such territory were worthless anyway considering the current military situation. Regardless of the outcome of the war, the Italians wanted old Austrian territory: "Trent and Trieste" was the slogan which appeared in all the publications of the increasingly vocal Irredentists.\(^{215}\) There was a debate on the Ballhausplatz in Vienna as to whether immediate discussions should be initiated with Italy based on these demands; this led in mid-January to the resignation of Count Berchtold. His successor was Baron Burian, who agreed with Tisza that negotiations should be dragged out so long that hopefully a change in the military situation would moderate the greediness of Italy.\(^{216}\)

This hope, also shared by the AOK, was shattered along with the Carpathian offensive. At the same time, Germany began to exert considerable pressure on Austria-Hungary to make it more accommodating to the Italian demands. Since the start of the war, the Wilhelmstrasse believed that the Italians could be fought off relatively cheaply. Until the spring of 1915 they still hoped that the cession of the Trentino or an even smaller territory would suffice to ensure Italy's benevolent neutrality. Around Christmas, the Germans sent Prince Bülow as a "special ambassador" to Rome, where he had close connections to leading Italian personalities. He strengthened the government at Berlin in its conviction that appeasement could be successful. The emphasis which Bülow placed on Habsburg concessions to Italy, and the openness with which he expressed this opinion to the Italians, made a bad impression in Vienna.

The attitude of the Berlin government was shared by Falkenhayn; in his constant efforts to open a way to Constantinople through Serbia, he felt that the Austro-Italian dispute was hampering his freedom of action in the Balkans. In mid-February Italy had warned the Aus-Hung. government that if it again attacked Serbia it would be responsible for any unfavorable consequences! Moreover, a conflict between Italy and the Monarchy might also bring Romania into the war. In January 1915, Falkenhayn informed the Italian military attaché to Berlin, Lt Col. Bongiovanni, that

he supported the cession of Austrian territory to Italy.\textsuperscript{217} He subsequently used every opportunity to urge his Aus-Hung. colleague to agree with his position. He went so far as to assure his ally that after the war was won it would be easy to force the Italians to disgorge their booty. Such assurances had no effect on Conrad. He bitterly remarked that if peace had to be gained by giving up territory, it would be possible to attain a more comprehensive settlement by giving up Alsace-Lorraine.

In the negotiations which took place shortly thereafter – on 20 February at Teschen – Bethmann-Hollweg and Falkenhayn exerted great pressure on Burian and Conrad. On 9 March Burian had to offer the Italians Trentino as the price of their friendship (he had been authorized to make this concession at a Crown council the day before).\textsuperscript{218} On 10 April, Sonnino responded to the offer with a formidable list of demands. His Austrian "allies" should:

1. Cede not just Trent, but also Bozen, Görz and Gradisca as well as the most important Adriatic islands to Italy;
2. Make Trieste, with an extensive surrounding territory, an independent free city;
3. Recognize Italy's claims on Valona and Saseno; and
4. Declare that they had no interest in Albania.\textsuperscript{219}

There was no longer any doubt that a decision was at hand.

Actually, the Italians had already on 9 March sent a message to the Entente powers at London, outlining the terms under which they would enter the war against Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{220} Winning this new ally was advocated principally by England and by the Russian military high command, while the civilian circles at St Petersburg were more hesitant to concede territory on the east coast of the Adriatic because of the disapproval of the Serbs. A request from French President Poincaré to the Tsar was necessary to overcome this obstacle. On 26 April, Italy and the Entente Powers signed the Treaty of London. If the Italians entered the war within one month, after the war they would win southern Tyrol (as far as the Brenner Pass), Trieste, Görz and Gradisca, Istria as far as the Quarnero, Volosca, north and central Dalmatia (along with Trebinje), the major Adriatic islands, and Valona and Saseno. They would also receive an appropriate share of any booty that was won in Asia Minor or North Africa. The Pope would be excluded from any negotiations involving the outcome of the

\textsuperscript{218}At this Crown Council, the Emperor had emphatically ordered that the only territory to be offered was the "Welsh" (i.e. Italian-speaking) Tyrol.
\textsuperscript{219}Austrian Red Book of 1915, pp. 128 ff.
\textsuperscript{220}Glaise-Horstenau, "Die Katastrophe – Die Zertrümmerung Österreich-Ungarns und das Werden der Nachfolgestaaten" (Vienna, 1929), pp. 42 ff.
war or the subsequent peace treaties. Within a month the Italians would have to also sign the treaty which France, England and Russia had drawn up on 4 September 1914, forbidding any of the partners from concluding a separate peace.

1) Italy's military forces and plans

The extended negotiations at Vienna and London were not unwelcome to the Italians on military grounds. They were gaining an opportunity to complete their preparations, which had made little progress by the end of 1914.

When the European war burst into flame at the end of July 1914, the offices of the Italian General Staff were very busy. The Staff had been left without a chief for four weeks after the sudden death of General Pollio, when Count Luigi Cadorna received this post on 27 July. Although for a long time he hadn't been as friendly to the Triple Alliance as his predecessors Saletta and Pollio, nonetheless Cadorna's first concern was to ensure that Italy was ready to fulfill its responsibilities to its allies, which had been pledged anew in 1913 despite disruptions caused by the hostilities in Libya. These duties consisted of sending an Army of three corps and two cavalry divisions to fight the French in the Vosges, and in deploying the Italian Navy alongside the Austro-Hungarian, under the overall command of an Austrian Admiral.\textsuperscript{221} Cadorna even suggested to the King that the forces sent to support the Germans should be reinforced by an additional corps.\textsuperscript{222} Significantly, on 2 August the General had received the King's approval. However, the ministers' council had already decided on neutrality the evening before. Based on this decision, the King turned down Emperor Franz Josef's request for military help; Cadorna did the same to a wire from Conrad requesting joint discussions by the respective General Staffs. The Italian Chief of Staff added this note to his reply to Conrad: "If Austria-Hungary doesn't occupy Mt Lovcen and doesn't disturb the balance of power in the Adriatic, Italy will never attack."\textsuperscript{223} General Cadorna would not be in a position to keep his word.

The French were very grateful to their "Latin sister" for the

\textsuperscript{221}Kriegsarchiv (Marinearchiv), Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914-1918 (Vienna, 1929-31), pp. 43 ff.
\textsuperscript{222}Cadorna, "Altre pagine sulla grande guerra" (Milan, 1926), pp. 15 ff. See also Gatti, "L'ultimo atto militare italiano della triplice allianza" (in Rassegna italiana of December 1923, Rome), pp. 764 ff.
\textsuperscript{223}Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 176
neutrality decision, which enabled them to completely denude their Alpine frontier of troops. Germany, on the other hand, had to make up for the missing Italian Army of the Vosges by withholding units from its own Eastern Army; thus Italy also won the thanks of Russia.\footnote{224}{German official history, Vol. I, pp. 181 ff.}

The Italian General Staff immediately began to also serve the cause of its future allies by preparing their Army to change sides. On 2 August a "light" mobilization was ordered, involving two and a half of the yearly recruit contingents.\footnote{225}{Ministero della guerra, L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915-1918) - hereafter abbreviated as "Italian official history" - (Rome, 1927), Vol. I, Document collection, p. 69} At the same time Cadorna initiated studies for an offensive against Austria-Hungary. As he explained later in his memoirs, this had never been attempted before because Italy had felt itself too weak to attack the Habsburg Monarchy and therefore restricted its planning to defensive preparations.\footnote{226}{Cadorna, La guerra alla fronte italiana (Milan, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 24 ff and 134; see also the Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, pp. 1 ff., and sketches # 1 to 5} The defensive plan called for the larger part of the ground forces (two armies with 14 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions) to deploy on the Piave between Vittorio Veneto and the sea. Two other armies (12 divisions) would hold the mountain borders between the Stilfser Joch and Monte Peralba. Six divisions would assemble between Mantua and Padua as the strategic reserve. Three divisions would be detached to guard the coast of south Italy and Rome.\footnote{227}{Italian official history, Vol. I, Text, pp. 154 ff.}

Now General Cadorna had to provide a plan for an offensive. Because of the small size of his army (14 corps HQ over 20 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions of the first line, plus 10 reserve divisions), he could choose only one of two possible objectives: south Tyrol with Trent, or the coastal lands with Trieste. An attack on south Tyrol didn't seem promising because it was guarded by Austrian defensive positions, particularly the fortress of Trent; the Italian siege artillery was too weak to quickly subdue these works. Therefore Cadorna decided to attack over the Isonzo. This would lead to the capture of the more valuable of the two goals (Trieste), and also might lead to combined operations with the Serbian army (which would be impossible during a thrust toward Trent). The drawback was that an Italian advance toward Trieste and Laibach would be vulnerable to an Austrian counterattack from Tyrol into its left flank. However, Cadorna felt he had enough strength to cover his main offensive against any interference from the mountains. For this
purpose he would deploy two armies (or 12 infantry divisions) in purely defensive positions; covered by border fortifications, they would encircle Tyrol on three sides (the west, south and east). The eastern army facing Tyrol would also carry out an attack from the Cadore to Toblach; from Toblach it could advance into the Drava and Gail Valley, and enable a relatively small force on the Carinthian border (the Carnic Group of two divisions plus some mountain troops) to break into the basin of Tarvis and Villach. Cadorna's main body (14 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions) was likewise to be divided into two armies; they would assemble on both sides of the Tagliamento for a thrust between the Julian Alps and the sea. The Carnic Group, descending through the valley of the Wurzner Sava from Tarvis, would support this effort. There would be a strong central reserve at Verona and Padua; if it wasn't needed to fend off an Austrian thrust from the Tyrol, it would reinforce the main offensive. The immediate goal of the offensive on the Isonzo was Laibach, from which it could either advance to the Drava between Klagenfurt and Völkermarkt, or through Marburg and Varasdin to the gates of Hungary, depending on the strategic situation. Cadorna correctly reckoned that he didn't have to worry about any threat to south Italy, or about an Austrian effort to reach Milan by violating Swiss neutrality.

These guidelines prepared on 1 September 1914 were the basis for the actual operations which began in spring 1915.\footnote{Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, pp. 95 ff. Italian official history, Vol. I, Documents, Document # 50}

While General Cadorna was completing all the details of his plan for an offensive, he demanded on 24 September that the government recognize the army's desperate shortage of uniforms, caused by the war in Libya. There was also a lack of heavy artillery, machine guns, and trucks; moreover, many regiments suffered from disciplinary infractions. Because of these problems, Cadorna believed it would be impossible to lead the army into the field prior to the approaching winter. Instead, he and the War Minister initiated a program of reorganization and rebuilding which would last for 5 ½ months.

During these months of preparation, the Chief of the Italian General Staff was constantly worried that Austria-Hungary's already mobilized army would be able to remove troops from the Russian and Serbian fronts to attack Italy while it wasn't yet ready for war. Despite the extremely critical situation of the k.u.k. forces in both of its theaters of operation, which Cadorna certainly should have recognized, he couldn't ban this phantom
danger from his thoughts. To guard against a thrust from Tyrol or the coastal lands, at the start of the war he established an "advanced garrison" (occupazione avanzata) near the Austrian border; it consisted of mountain units (including some previously stationed on the French border) plus troops from units already quartered in the area. These border forces in Friauli were reinforced at the end of August. Around the start of November further reservists were called up to garrison the border fortifications.\textsuperscript{229}

Measures were also taken to improve the process of mobilization and initial deployment. Previously these two operations, which would take about a month, were to be carried out simultaneously. Because recruitment was only partly on a territorial basis, the units wouldn't be brought to full strength until after they had deployed. Under the new plan, issued on 1 March 1915, the regiments would be completed during mobilization at their peacetime garrisons; then they would proceed to their deployment areas, where they would assemble under divisions and higher HQ. The intent was to maintain secrecy about the assembly areas for as long as possible. This would give the diplomats more freedom of maneuver and prevent the enemy from declaring war before Italy was ready. At the moment when the political situation was most favorable, the deployment would take place in three large movements to the front (the first with six corps plus the cavalry, the next two with four corps apiece). Meanwhile the reinforced "advanced garrison" would provide a valuable shield for the assembly of the armies.\textsuperscript{230}

Around the start of 1915, Italian preparations received a fresh impetus. Despite Cadorna's objections, the occupation of Saseno island was followed on 25 December by the landing of Italian troops at Valona.\textsuperscript{231} On 4 January the creation of mobile militia regiments was ordered.

As diplomatic activity increased, so did the preparations of the Italian Army. At the start of March further reinforcements were sent to the "advanced garrison", bringing its strength up to 142,000 men by mid-April.\textsuperscript{232} Three days before signature of the Treaty of London, a "secret mobilization" began; this brought the units of the first echelon to be deployed - now increased to eight corps - up to their full wartime strength. Thus in the military as well as the political game the die had been cast.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{229}Italian official history, Vol. I, Text, p. 156
\bibitem{230}Ibid., Vol., I, Text, p. 157
\bibitem{231}See also Kiszling, "Italiens Neutralität und geheime Aufrüstung zum Kriege" in Berlin Monatshefte for 1929, pp. 1101 ff.
\bibitem{232}Italian official history, Vol. I, Text, p. 161
\end{thebibliography}

307
against Italy's former allies.

2) The Monarchy's defensive measures against Italy

Before the AOK left Vienna in mid-August 1914, it had taken measures in case the already highly unreliable Italian ally might attack. GdI Conrad, who had greatly mistrusted Italy for a long time, judged that "it was entirely consistent with the Italian mentality" that they would "unscrupulously fall upon the rear of their cleverly-deceived ally now, while Austria-Hungary was seriously endangered in the northeast and in the Balkans." Therefore on 13 August the supreme commander, Archduke Frederick, ordered GdK Franz Rohr "to study the defenses of the Monarchy on our southwestern border and to set up an organization that accounts for current conditions." Because the "general situation makes it impossible to provide substantial forces against eventual Italian hostility", the high command felt obliged two days later to suggest that fortified bridgeheads be constructed on the Danube at Krems, Tulln, Vienna, Pressburg, Komorn and Budapest. Emperor Franz Joseph approved this project on the 22nd.

According to intelligence reports received in mid-August, it was conceivable that the Italians would use inroads by irregular bands (in the Garibaldi tradition) or irredentist unrest on Austrian soil as pretexts for intervention against the Danube Monarchy. The HQ of GdK Rohr's Group, established at Vienna on 16 August, should energetically prevent such a development. If war broke out with Italy, Rohr would delay the advancing enemy in the Tyrol and on the routes from the Tagliamento toward Vienna until sufficient forces could be diverted from other fronts.

Initial composition of Rohr's Group

To fulfill his mission, GdK Rohr was given a very heterogenous and disorganized collection of troops. First of all, he relied on the units left behind when the field armies had moved to the front. These consisted of March battalions, ersatz cadres, railroad security troops, coastal and border finance watch detachments, gendarmerie posts (reinforced by Landsturm), and naval signal stations and cable guard groups. Also available were Landsturm men not yet mobilized and in Tyrol and Vorarlberg

---

233 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 377
234 Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 378 ff.
235 Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 399 and 477
The core of the defenders of the Tyrolean bastion was the "Security Garrison under War Plan R" - the Tyrolean Landsturm infantry regiments. In the coastal lands this role was filled by k.k. Lst IR # 27 from Laibach plus 5 border guard companies. At the start of September the south Tyrolean border was divided into five sectors, commanded by FML von Koennen-Horak, head of the Innsbruck [XIV] Military District. He had 17 battalions, 1 1/4 squadrons and 12 guns; the personnel were mobile militia troops. At this time the units in Carinthia and the coastal lands were led by FML von Mattanovich of the Graz [III] Military District. His units had a similar composition, and totalled 23 1/4 battalions, 1 ½ squadrons and 8 guns. Mattanovich also had available the infantry, artillery and technical assets of the border fortresses, but their personnel and armaments were at minimum strength in accordance with War Plan "R." The Pola military harbor, placed directly under the high command, was garrisoned by 112 Lst Inf Bde and LW IR # 5. If GdK Rohr's Group needed more troops in an emergency, the high command intended to provide him with numerous March and Landsturm battalions from the Vienna [II], Prague [VIII] and Leitmeritz [IX] Districts, and also a Honved March Brigade. With these additional forces, the Group commander would have a respectable force of about 200 battalions. The Emperor and high command also rightly counted on the well-known loyalty of the German, Slovene and Croatian population of the threatened territories, and knew that they would rally to help the defenders.

Because this initial conglomeration of troops, despite its size, had limited capabilities, it was intended to use them mostly in defensive roles. This was the basis of the plan prepared by the Group commander on 18 August. If confronted by an Italian attack on the crownland of Tyrol, he would hold out as long as possible, basing his defense on the fortifications and the levee en masse. He would block the transportation line leading from Villach through the upper Mur valley to Semmering by using the fortifications of Malborghet, Predil and Flitsch. He would delay the advance of the enemy into the Karst mountains east of the line Görz-Trieste; since the main body of the Italians would be engaged here, he couldn't count on fighting a decisive action until they reached the Sava. Moreover, even a battle on the Sava would be impossible unless he had meanwhile received substantial reinforcements.

Rohr's Group has to give up troops

Anyway, GdK Rohr was soon obliged to count on a much smaller
number of troops than he had available in the first weeks of the war. The Italians remained inactive through 20 September, which was considered a likely date for their attack because it was the anniversary of their capture of Rome in 1870. Thereafter the March battalions of the military districts listed above went off to join the field armies. They were followed by several of the Landsturm units, which were used to help build the Danube bridgeheads. Rohr's Group HQ could still count on March battalions which were raised each month in the Innsbruck [XIV] and Graz [III] Districts, but controlled them only temporarily and provisionally.

March battalions were not the only units summoned to other theaters. On 25 September the high command sent Lst IR # 27 (from Carniola) to Bosnia. When the enemy threatened Sarajevo, on 10 October they were followed by Col von Wieden's Brigade; it was made up of the best available troops (including Tyrol Lst IR # I and the border guard companies), and totaled 8 ½ battalions, 1 ¼ squadrons and 3 field batteries. 18 immobile batteries, scraped together from old guns, also went to Bosnia. At the start of December, 2nd Lst March Bde (6 battalions) plus 21 Ersatz detachments and several newly-formed batteries were sent to the Carpathians. 5th Lst Terr Bde (from Znaim), which was sent to Rohr's Group at the start of October, was an inadequate replacement for all these departing units.

The high command didn't underestimate the difficulties which Rohr would face because of the constantly fluctuating size of his force. On 20 September they reduced their expectations for his Group; it would defend the border itself only against incursions by irregular bands. If confronted by regular Italian troops the defenders would pull back to the line of the fortifications before offering determined resistance. At the end of September, GdK Rohr pulled his mobile troops back to winter quarters. The southern tip of the Tyrolean bastion would be defended on the line of the Etsch-Arsa fortifications (running from Riva through Rovereto to Folgaria). This redeployment was possible because the Italians were also pulling back their troops from the border, and in some areas even reducing their strength.

Finding more men for the Italian border

Rohr's Group HQ was always trying, with the energetic help of the Innsbruck and Graz Districts, to fill the many gaps in his line with newly-raised units, despite the constant demands of the field armies. They combined Landsturm ersatz companies and railroad security detachments to create Landsturm battalions,
formed March companies out of cavalry, artillery and sapper ersatz units, and created new batteries out of somewhat mobile guns from the fortifications. The Group received an important addition in March with the creation of Reserve Battalions of IR # 29 and 37 from some detachments of military laborers which those regiments had sent to the Tyrol. Even though the personnel were from the south Hungarian plains, they would serve usefully among the glaciers of west Tyrol.

Besides new formations of drafted men, some volunteer units were raised; the Austrian Alpine lands had traditionally been a rich source of volunteers. Carinthia contributed the most men (10,000 troop in four regiments); local political figures were very active in promoting recruitment of units to guard the frontiers of the land. Salzburg created 6 battalions, and Upper Austria 4 more; they had young soldiers aged 17, 18 and 19 who were as courageous as older men. The Trieste Young Rifle Battalion also entered the service of the fatherland. There were fewer volunteers in Styria, and fewer yet in Carniola because the high command wouldn't consent to the creation of units in which Slovenian would be the language of command. Nonetheless, by the end of April GdK Rohr's Group included 25,600 volunteer riflemen, of whom only a fourth could be employed as combat troops.

As already noted, Tyrol and Vorarlberg could also rely on the age-old "Standschützen" organizations, which dated back to the 16th and 17th centuries. Based on legislation enacted in 1913, which declared that the Tyrolean riflemen had the same obligations as Landsturm, all of the Standschützen in Tyrol and Vorarlberg were organized first into platoons, then into companies and battalions. At the last minute they would also be issued military uniforms and thus function as a sort of militia. The task of preparing the units was extremely difficult. Every rifle, bullet, or piece of clothing had to be literally begged or stolen by a ruse from the depots...Moreover, the avaricious high command even contemplated using the Standschützen outside of Tyrol, although they were the land's final line of defense. The units themselves couldn't legally be forced to serve outside of their home province. Nonetheless, the last of the men who met the medical requirements for service at the front were combed from the units during the winter of 1914-15. In the critical month of May 1915, therefore, Tyrol had already been bled white of its physically fit men. The Standschützen consisted of old men and children, sick men and invalids, organized in 44

236In fact, the local government had even questioned the legal authority under which the Tyrol Lst IR # 1 had been sent to Bosnia. There had also been resistance to the notion that the riflemen were a type of popular militia.
battalions and 23 independent companies. In their homes they awaited the Emperor's call to arms."^{237}

Given the complexity of its history, it's not surprising that the strength of GdK Rohr's Group varied greatly during the ten months of its existence. The following chart shows its size at various dates (including the March battalions of the Graz and Innsbruck Districts which were ready to go to the front, as well as the Reserve Battalions of IR # 29 and 37):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1914</td>
<td>30 ½</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September 1914</td>
<td>53 ½</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1914</td>
<td>36 ½</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1914</td>
<td>29 ½</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 February 1915</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1915</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naturally the supply of personnel wasn't the only difficulty. The description of conditions in the Tyrol has indicated that there were also shortages of weapons, uniforms and other equipment. During the quiet winter months the Group HQ tried to bring order out of the chaos of the different types of weapons at hand. Initially the units had as many as five different types of rifles (Werndl, Mannlicher, Mauser, Mexican M.13 and Mexican M.14). Finally the Landsturm battalions of each Military Command had just one model of the Mexican rifles. The volunteer rifle units still had substantial numbers of old Werndl single-shot weapons. Later some Russian rifles were issued in the Pola coastal district.

The ammunition supply increased for the soldiers on the Italian border after the New Year in 1915, as the most severe crisis in the field armies was mastered. More guns became available, mostly old field cannon (M.75/96), but also some pieces captured by the Germans from the Belgians. The fortifications had lost their Schwarzlose machine guns, replaced mostly by Greek machine guns.

The fortifications

For purely defensive purposes, the fortifications were of course a great asset to Rohr's Group. At the start of the war with Italy they served as the backbone of the front in the mountains.

---

^{237}Pfersmann, "Vom stillen Heldentum eines Volkes", in the III Volume (by Kerchnawe) of "Im Felde unbesiegt" (Munich, 1923), pp. 282 ff. At exercises held in April 1915 the total strength of the Standschützen of Tyrol and Vorarlberg was 32,400 men.
by providing strong support to the largely militia troops of the defensive sectors; this was due in great measure to the quality of their garrisons, which were small but well-trained Alpine detachments from the Landes-Schützen Regiments. Another reason for their success was that the Italians greatly overestimated the strength of the works, which were largely obsolete.

The groups of fortifications on Tyrol's western front were at Gomagoi and Tonale; some of them dated from prior to 1866, but they were expanded in the decade before the World War with casemates and armored works. At the southern end of Tyrol the works at Lardaro and the fortress of Riva protected the Judicarien depression. In the last 8 years before the war, GdI Conrad built bases on the Folgaria-Lavarone plateau that were more suitable for supporting an offensive. On Tyrol's eastern front, positions were constructed in the 1880's at Landro and Sexten, and later (through 1905) at Tenna, Paneveggio, Moenna, Buchenstein, Tre Sassi (the latter two are east of Arabba), and Plätzwiese (west of Landro); these fortifications blocked the Italians from advancing into the Val Sugana and the Dolomite passages. Farther back from the borders was the fortress of Trent; it consisted of a ring of modern armored works which were expanded around 1900 toward the south to cover the routes to the city in the Etsch [Adige] Valley. Because of its position, Trent was the key to the defense of south Tyrol. The casemate work at Nauders, on the Swiss border, wasn't important. The old "Franzen" forts were used only as depots.

The invasion routes into Carinthia was blocked by the old forts at Malborghet and Flitsch, updated with armored works while Conrad was Chief of the General Staff, and by a position at Raibl equipped with a casemate.

Fortification of the border area on the Isonzo had been neglected. After the danger of a three-front war first became apparent during the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908, the area west of Tolmein received several strong points with field fortifications.

In the 1880's the northern ring of forts around Pola, the principal military harbor, were modernized; however it soon became apparent that the defenses were too close to the town. After the war started some field works were constructed in front of the forts. The coastal part of the Pola defenses was improved around 1900 when the roadstead at Fassana and the island of

238Tenna was west of Levico; its two works served as a forward position of the Trent fortress
Lussin received modern forts.\textsuperscript{239}

From August 1914, when the authorities had to reckon with a possible Italian attack, they intended to base their defense upon the permanent works. These positions, however, only blocked the routes leading into the Tyrol and the sector between the Kanal and upper Isonzo Valleys. The small forces available hardly would suffice to protect the other boundaries for any extended period of time after the field forces left for Galicia. Therefore GdK Rohr felt it was urgently necessary to extend the existing fortified areas. However, on 26 August the Emperor personally warned the General to be cautious in this endeavor so as not to provoke his unreliable neighbors. Thus there was no noteworthy improvement to the works in August or September. The following months were devoted mainly to upgrading the positions farther to the rear: on the important line between Riva and Folgaria, in the uppermost part of the Isonzo valley, at the Mojstrovka Pass, on the crossing points of the Gail brook, on the Drava and Sava, and at the defiles of Zoll and Präwald.

As Italy's attitude became ever more threatening in 1915, it was finally possible to begin fortifying without any hesitation. Field works were built to block the crossing points through the Karst and in front of Trieste, but not much faith was placed in their strength. There was considerable construction activity in the valleys along the Carinthian and Tyrolean borders (Lardaro-Lake Garda, Riva-Folgaria, Fort Valmorbia in Vallarsa, Noyau in front of Trent, Plöcken Pass, and Predil). Based on lessons learned at Przemysl and at Cattaro (Fort Vermac), the guns were normally moved from the old, less sturdy permanent works into newly built field positions. In the mountains, which experienced larger than normal snowfall in the winter of 1914-15, covering positions were built from snow which was replaced in the spring by earth and stone.

The final developments before the Italian war

While upgrading their defenses, Rohr's troops were also organized into larger units. In February 1915 the original groups and brigades were placed under divisions, with HQ at Bozen, Trent, Villach and Laibach. Their permanent components were the Landsturm and Reserve Battalions; the March Battalions formed each month were under the divisions only briefly before departing to the fronts. Finally in May 1915 the X March Battalions of the common army and the IX Battalions of the cis-Leithanian Landwehr were retained by the divisions as independent units for front-

\textsuperscript{239}The Adriatic coastal defenses were described at the beginning of Volume I.
line service. When hostilities began the Standschützen and the volunteer battalions also joined. Because of the enhanced importance of the Isonzo front, a new division HQ was formed at Görz in May 1915, and the HQ at Laibach was moved up to Monfalcone (and later to Sesana). At this point the five division HQ were numbered 90 to 94. In Istria the coast defense forces were given a more coherent organization and reinforced. On 27 February, Rohr's Group had been upgraded to the equivalent of an Army; its new Chief of Staff from 12 May was FML Scotti, who for many years had been Chief of Staff to the Graz Corps. In the first half of May, prior to receiving reinforcements from other theaters, the Group had 112 battalions, 9 squadrons and 49 batteries. This total doesn't include security detachments, the garrisons of the fortifications, the coast defense detachments, or the troops in Pola (the latter were directly under the high command).

Meanwhile the negotiations regarding territorial demands on the Danube Monarchy had taken their course. Despite the increasing Italian demands, Baron Burian (the Foreign Minister) told GdK Rohr on 9 April that he still believed a peaceful settlement was possible; he was sure the situation wouldn't become critical in April. Nonetheless, as the snow melted in mid-April the Group HQ began to move its troops to new defensive positions closer to the border. In this measure GdK Rohr was supported by the AOK, which unlike the Ballhausplatz had scarcely any hope for a peaceful outcome. As will be discussed later, the high command at this point was planing to strengthen the covering troops and deploy further forces against Italy. On 16 April the AOK ordered that if the Italians attacked, the covering troops were to offer resistance in positions to be prepared on the Isonzo. After studying the terrain and bringing up laborers, on 27 April Rohr's men began to build the defensive line which would be used by troops from all lands of the Danube Monarchy for two and a half years of glorious combat, in which they fended off the attacks of always larger enemy armies.

2. The Central Powers decide to attack the Russians

a. Development of plans for the Gorlice offensive

We have already discussed the significant influence which the

240There were 29 Landsturm, 21 March, 7 Reserve, 1 Naval, 39 Standschützen and 15 Volunteer Battalions; 22 field, 10 ½ mountain, 4 heavy and 12 ½ Landsturm batteries (with older guns).
Italian danger exerted on Conrad's decisions at the start of January 1915. This danger played a part in causing the gamble of sending whole armies to attack through the snowy wastes of the Carpathians. However, the collapse of the offensive didn't convince the Chief of Staff that Italy's neutrality should be purchased by territorial concessions.

Thus at the Crown Council of 8 March he again expressed his fundamental disagreement against any accommodation with Italy. Conrad's attitude was based on his conviction that it was simply impossible to keep Italy from intervening throughout the entire length of the war by giving up land. If the Italians weren't serious about taking up arms, then it wasn't necessary to bribe them; if on the other hand they were resolved to fight, then the cession of Welsh Tyrol would only open the door for a subsequent invasion of the heart of Austria in search of more booty. These practical considerations were reinforced by a psychological factor, Conrad's fierce devotion to the Tyrol. He realized that there would be shattering repercussions in the Army if the Kaiser Jaeger and Landes-Schützen from Welsh Tyrol were suddenly pulled from the line in the middle of the battle and sent back to their homes, which had been handed over to a foreign power. For geopolitical reasons, he felt that giving the Italians territory on the Isonzo and Adriatic coast was even more unthinkable; he correctly believed it would be equivalent to suicide for the Monarchy. He would prefer rather to give up east Galicia and thus buy peace with the Tsar's empire. However, neither the Aus-Hung. nor German diplomats could find a way to make the suggestions of the k.u.k. Chief of Staff a reality.

In this desperate situation, GdI Conrad was left on his own, but didn't abandon the concept he had developed in the first week of January, prior to the decision to attack over the Carpathians: by striking a great blow against Russia he would not only shake up this enemy, but also force Italy, Romania and the other neutrals to be cautious. By the start of April 1915 this concept entered into the urgent question of how best to defend the Carpathian front. Regardless of the momentary tactical situation, the Chief of the General Staff adhered to his guiding principles, which were behind his suggestions to the German high command.

The birth of the Gorlice plan

The actual hour of birth of the Gorlice plan occurred in the evening of 1 April, when GM von Cramon - the German military plenipotentiary - was having a discussion with the Aus-Hung.
Chief of Staff. The immediate occasion was the critical situation of 2nd Army, which at that time was contemplating abandoning several kilometers of its battlefield to the advancing Russians. Cramon stated that the Germans didn't want to send any more troops to directly support the Carpathian front, as they were doing with the Beskid Corps; however "it would be somewhat different if the situation could be altered by an offensive." ²⁴¹

This remark of Cramon led Conrad to return to an idea he had entertained for quite a while, and had even tried to implement with insufficient forces. As the Russians pushed the Carpathian front further back, it was becoming possible to relieve this threatened sector by a counterattack on the Russians' flank from the west to the east, through Jaslo and Rymanow. By his recollection, Conrad had first mentioned this option to Falkenhayn on 11 January during their meeting at the Breslau railroad station. FML Arz, whose VI Corps was stationed near Gorlice during this entire period, reports that a similar suggestion was submitted to 4th Army HQ several weeks later, but wasn't developed any further. ²⁴² As related earlier, a thrust was made in the Gorlice area in March, but without sufficient force. The fact that it failed, however, didn't invalidate the concept itself. Since Pflanzer's similar attempt to hit the Russians in the opposite (eastern) flank was no longer feasible for various reasons, the thrust from the west was becoming the only option.

Based on his conversation with Conrad, on the evening of 1 April Cramon sent a report to his superiors at Mézières: "His Excellency Conrad desires more support, either by getting a German division to reinforce 2nd Army or by an offensive with strong forces in the direction of Gorlice, against the Russians' flank and lines of communication."

That same night GM Cramon discussed the situation with Falkenhayn by telephone, as was his custom. On the next morning, Cramon reported to the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff that the German OHL wouldn't reinforce the Carpathian front.

At the same time, Hindenburg's HQ was inquiring at Teschen through Capt. Fleischmann regarding prospects in the Carpathians. Conrad's response sketched in outline the Gorlice plan as it then existed in his mind. 2nd Army, reduced to 100,000 men, would have to give way before the opposing 13 to 14 Russian divisions. Immediate relief could be provided by a thrust by 3rd Army. However, greater results could be achieved if at least four new

---

²⁴¹Cramon, p. 12
²⁴²Arz, p. 55
divisions attacked from the Gorlice-Zboro area against the lines of supply leading to the Russians' Carpathian front.

On the same day (2 April), Falkenhayn invited Conrad to a conference at Berlin to discuss the ever-increasing danger from Italy. This took place on 4 April. It is reasonably certain that on this occasion Conrad didn't take as strong a line as he usually did against seeking a peaceful accommodation with Italy. According to notes kept by Colonel Tappen (the Chief of the Operational Office of the German OHL), another topic was the critical situation in the Carpathians, where the Easter Battle was raging. However, Falkenhayn subsequently denied that the Gorlice plan was discussed;\textsuperscript{243} the last paragraph of the written summary of the General's phone conversation with Cramon on the same day indicates that his assertion was correct. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Conrad didn't bring up his plan. Falkenhayn told Cramon that: "The question of launching a powerful thrust from the Gorlice area toward Sanok is one that I have considered for a long time. Whether it is feasible depends on the general situation and on availability of the necessary forces; four corps rather than four divisions should be sufficient. The limited capacity of the railroads to Tarnow and through Neusandez would probably cause great difficulties. Anyway, I would appreciate a summary of your appraisal of this operation. Please address the capacity of the railroads and the possibility of sending our rolling stock in this direction. For the time being, it is vitally important to keep this whole matter strictly secret from the Austrian high command."\textsuperscript{244}

Meanwhile Conrad, after returning to Teschen, had received new reports about the deepening conflict with Italy. It was known that the Italians were in close consultation with Russia,\textsuperscript{245} and that they wished to exploit the critical situation in the Carpathians in support of their "sacro egoismo." This caused the dangers that would flow from the cession of Welsh Tyrol to Italy, which was still determined on war, to again win the upper hand in Conrad's mind over any hopes of a peaceful solution.\textsuperscript{246} At the same time he was concerned about possible intervention by Romania. Therefore he was resolved to strengthen Rohr's Group with seven divisions, and send three more to Transylvania. The removal of ten divisions from other fronts would be possible only if they could be replaced by units from the more powerful German

\textsuperscript{243}Per publications of the German Military Archives on 24 January and 12 November 1929
\textsuperscript{244}Cramon, p. 12. His account is substantiated by the publication of the German Military Archive on 12 November 1929.
\textsuperscript{245}This is confirmed by "Tsarist Russia in the World War", pp. 263 ff.
\textsuperscript{246}See also Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, p. 111
ally, which at the time was raising a substantial number of new divisions. Falkenhayn, however, felt that the time had not yet come to send troops against Italy; any extra units should be used either in the West or the East to strike a blow that could change the course of the war. On 6 April he told Conrad that the first priority was to buy off Italy with territorial concessions; a reckoning with the former ally could be postponed until later. On the same day, Conrad's request for two German divisions to directly support 2nd Army, menaced by new Russian thrusts, was turned down by Falkenhayn, who was concerned about possible French attacks at Nancy and Verdun.

**Conrad's suggestions on 7 April**

The reports which arrived in the next hours from the Carpathians relieved the k.u.k. high command of its immediate concerns for that front. This caused Conrad to work even harder to ensure that the additional units momentarily available to Germany would relieve the Danube Monarchy from the heavy pressure facing it in either the northeast, southeast or southwest. Because of Falkenhayn's attitude to the Italian crisis, it would be possible to strike a combined blow only against Russia; by the reckoning of the k.u.k Chief of Staff, this would have the most beneficial effect anyway on the overall situation. Therefore Conrad made a new proposal to the German OHL on the 7th. Referring to the recent meeting at Berlin, Conrad stated that "even a significant German success in the West would have less influence on Italy than a success against Russia." Therefore the new German formations should be used for flank attacks from both East Prussia and East Galicia "to push the enemy behind the Vistula-San-Dniester line." This goal could be achieved relatively quickly. Afterwards, both high commands would have "their hands free for other projects", and perhaps would also be able "to come to an arrangement with Russia."

Most students of the World War believe that Conrad's suggestion was incorrect. Falkenhayn himself, in his response, said that the operation envisioned by Conrad couldn't achieve the desired "quick and certain success" because the "time and place" and also the "road and railroad" situation were unfavorable. The German Chief of Staff may have been correct in this instance. However, it must be remembered that by this time he no longer believed that any one battle could successfully decide the war; under any conditions he was inclined to try an "attrition strategy" with strictly limited goals.

---

247Among others, Kuhl in "Der Weltkrieg 1914-18" (Berlin, 1929), pp. 182 ff.
Strategic considerations of the Germans

At this point the German Eastern Command, informed of the concerns and desires of the AOK by Capt. Fleischmann, entered the discussion. They said that Falkenhayn should agree to send a corps from the West to the Aus-Hung. front, but only if a second German Army HQ was established on the Carpathian front or at least a large sector was given to the trustworthy GdK von der Marwitz, who would be placed directly under the k.u.k. high command. This would make the suggestion of "Ober Ost" more palatable to Falkenhayn. After some hesitation, Conrad said he was willing to approve the second idea (involving Marwitz) in order to obtain another German corps for the Carpathians. This approach, however, didn't bear fruit because Falkenhayn had meanwhile adopted more wide-ranging proposals.

As ordered on 4 April, GM Cramon had a confidential discussion on the 5th with the Chief of the k.u.k. Railroad Office, Col. Johann Straub.248 The latter reassured Cramon that it would be possible to send 100 trains, each of 108 cars, into the Gorlice-Tarnow area; about 40 trains would be available to haul supplies, while the other 60 would carry troops. Thereupon Cramon wrote to Mézières that four German corps, along with the k.u.k. troops already in the sector, should be strong enough to break through the 56,000 Russian riflemen between Gorlice and Tarnow. The deployment would take about eight days. After the Wisloka sector was taken, the right wing of the attacking group could move toward Dukla, and the center toward Krosno; the left wing could either advance to Przemysl or be held back to guard toward the north. The troops should be under German command, and equipped with as many howitzers as possible.249

During these weeks the pressure of carrying on a war using the "interior lines" was weighing as heavily on Falkenhayn as on his Aus-Hung. colleague. By the end of March he had come to the "firm conclusion" that the enemy in the West wouldn't be able to achieve anything for the foreseeable future.250 In the last month and a half the French had suffered a bloody repulse in the Winter Battle in Champagne, the English in fighting north of the La Bassée Canal. Despite the difficult actions, the Germans had been able to create 19 new divisions behind the front by reducing some older divisions to a three-regiment organization.251 Once they had received all their artillery and other equipment, they

248See Straub's narrative in the Vienna "Reichspost" of 1 January 1921
249Cramon, p. 13
250Falkenhayn, "Oberste Heeresleitung", p. 56
would represent a substantial addition to the Army. However, despite the end of the menace on the Western front, Falkenhayn had by no means yet decided where he could best utilize this new resource.

Falkenhayn soon had to give up any hope that the tense political and military situation would allow him to counterattack in the West with any prospect of success. As noted previously, however, he still believed that a reasonable settlement with Italy was possible. As late as 12 April he expressed this opinion to the Italian military attaché in Berlin.\(^{252}\) For the moment he was much more concerned that his Aus-Hung. ally might completely collapse in the Carpathians. At the end of March he had hoped for a lull in fighting against the Russians, but the Easter Battle soon posed a new and difficult test to his nerves. The reports he received about the condition of the Aus-Hung. troops were extraordinarily gloomy. Although the Easter Battle proceeded favorably, Falkenhayn still felt it was more than questionable whether Austria-Hungary's armed forces could survive a repetition of such critical days and hours.

Continuing concerns about Turkey

The Germans' concerns for one ally were perhaps exceeded by those for another, the Turks. On 18 March a British-French fleet sought to force their way into the Dardanelles. This attempt was shattered, but there was no doubt that it was just a prelude to a larger effort by the Western powers. A Russian expeditionary corps was already assembled at Odessa to lend them support. Because of this development, it was of great importance to Falkenhayn to simultaneously win over Bulgaria and overthrow Serbia, thus finally opening a land route to Constantinople.

Falkenhayn's first suggestion regarding the Balkans, dated 21 March, arrived at Teschen at the time when Przemysl was falling. Conrad naturally responded that although an offensive against Serbia was very desirable, it was out of the question if it would further weaken the Carpathian front. If the lines were weakened at the time when the Russians were being reinforced by the siege corps from Przemysl, it could easily bring the Romanians and Italians into the field as well as the Serbs. The result would be the ruin not only of Austria-Hungary, but also of Germany.

Falkenhayn's proposals were obviously influenced by GFM von der Goltz. While returning to Turkey, Goltz also visited Conrad on

29 March; he reported that an offensive against Serbia would likely be joined by the Bulgarians and Turks. This softened Conrad's opposition to the venture, but only if Germany would commit four divisions – not taken from the Carpathians. In the next few days he was annoyed when in another series of messages Falkenhayn asked that a German general, rather than Archduke Eugene, should command the forces in Serbia. Because of the negative fallout from Arangjelovac, the Bulgarians supported this position.

**Falkenhayn decides in favor of the Gorlice operation**

However, in the next few days the unfolding Easter Battle in the Carpathians once again drew Falkenhayn's attention to the situation of his Aus-Hung. ally. Conrad's assertions that a successful battle with Russia was necessary because of the threatening attitude of Italy, and that all available forces should be concentrated for this purpose, didn't have the desired effect on the Chief of the German General Staff. On the contrary, Falkenhayn feared that such a success would further diminish Austria-Hungary's already lagging inclination to satisfy Italy with territorial concessions. Soon afterwards, though, his doubts were overcome by concern that the ally on the Danube needed help even sooner than the ally on the Bosporus.

Falkenhayn had already delegated the question of how best to mount a relief attack in the East to his subordinates in mid-March.\(^{253}\) Under consideration were attacks in the Vistula valley, south of the Tatra Mountains, and in the Neusandez-Tarnow sector. On 31 March the Chief of the German Railroad Office, Col. Groener, was asked by Falkenhayn to study how to concentrate three corps in the latter sector. "All these efforts were merely contingency planning in case the German OHL was forced to undertake an operation that it still didn't favor."\(^{254}\)

Soon afterwards, however, the Germans received new and highly unfavorable reports about the condition of the Aus-Hung. Carpathian front, despite the successful outcome of the Easter Battle. At the same time, GM Cramon was suggesting how a determined attack in west Galicia could be the best way to reverse this unfavorable situation. Thus the Chief of the German General Staff finally decided, with great reluctance, to insert his new units into the ranks of his allies. He would do so in the very position that he had discussed with Col. Groener on 31

---

253See German official history, Vol. VII. The drafts of this work were consulted during preparation of the current section.
254Ibid.
March, which Conrad had independently suggested on 1 April to GM Cramon, and which Cramon now advocated: on the Dunajec. On 13 April the German commander prepared a summary of his plans. He once again rejected Conrad's suggestion of the 7th for an envelopment attack; without reference to the conversation between the Austrian Chief of Staff and Cramon on the 1st, he offered the k.u.k. high command the following "operational ideas" for their consideration: "An army of at least eight German divisions, well supplied with artillery, will be prepared here in the West and sent to Muszyna, Grybow and Bochnia. They will advance from the line Gorlice-Gromnik in the general direction of Sanok. Besser's division [47 German Res ID] must be relieved by k.u.k. troops so it can join this army, along with one k.u.k. cavalry division. This army and the k.u.k. 4th Army will be placed under one commander, who in this case will naturally be a German."

At the same time Falkenhayn suggested that the planned thrust would have a greater effect if Böhm-Ermolli's and Boroevic's Armies would first pull back farther south to the line Ungvar-Homonna-Varanno-Zboro.

The allies agree on a plan

In the same evening, Conrad telegraphed Falkenhayn with his concurrence, indicating that the proposed operation was one he had long desired but couldn't carry out because of insufficient forces. The only idea which he eventually turned down was the further withdrawal of 2nd and 3rd Armies. He was concerned that a retreat, like an avalanche, might be difficult to stop once it had started to roll.

Falkenhayn had also invited Conrad to Berlin for a conference to discuss the details of the planned attack. This took place in the evening of the 14th. A new 11th German Army would deploy near Gorlice on the south wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army; initially it would consist of 8 German and 2 Aus-Hung. infantry divisions plus an Aus-Hung. cavalry division. It would be reinforced by two more battle-worthy Aus-Hung. divisions, and would break through the Russian front. The allies' Carpathian armies would first pin down the enemy, then cross the mountains to join the offensive.

At the Berlin conference, much time was spent discussing the command structure. Only after referring to the will of the German Emperor was Falkenhayn able to ensure that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would be placed under the commander of 11th Army, GO Mackensen. As compensation, Mackensen would officially be under the orders of the k.u.k. high command. On 16 April, after
Falkenhayn returned to Mézières, he formalized the results of the conference in writing and sent them to Teschen. Thus the foundation was laid for one of the greatest military operations of world history, the victorious spring and summer campaign of 1915. It would bring the armies of the Central Powers from west Galicia through Lemberg to Brest-Litovsk.

Plans for the Balkans and Italy

At the Berlin conference of 14 April, Conrad had argued forcefully that the goal of the offensive should be the recovery of Lemberg, but Falkenhayn hadn't concurred. The latter had again insisted that the needs of the third ally - the critically endangered Ottoman Empire - shouldn't be forgotten. The 11th Army had a limited amount of time to provide relief to the Aus-Hung. forces, after which it would send at least a considerable portion of its units against Serbia. The Germans, together with the Aus-Hung. Balkan forces and six Bulgarian divisions (each of 24 battalions) and 100,000 Turks, would finally open a land route from Berlin through Vienna to Constantinople. Although not convinced that this project could be implemented in the near future, Conrad undertook to begin preparing the k.u.k. 5th Army to participate.

Regarding the Italians, in his last message of 13 April Falkenhayn had forcefully declared that in the present situation it was important to prevent them from intervening on the side of the Entente at least until the Gorlice offensive was completed, and hopefully for the duration of the war. Repeating earlier arguments, he stated that "Any sacrifice would in such a case be only temporary." He maintained this position even though he knew that on 10 April Italy had increased its demands to include the purely German-speaking area around Bozen, almost all of the coastal lands (including Trieste) and the Dalmatian islands.

The difficult Italian problem was again discussed on 21 April by Conrad, the Foreign Minister, and General Adjutant Bolfras in an audience with the 85-year old Emperor Franz Joseph, which lasted several hours. One of the principal topics was the extent to which serious resistance should be offered close to the borders. Already the troops of GdK Rohr had moved closer to the prospective front, and on the 16th were ordered by the high command to oppose any Italian advance against Inner Austria on

---

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The "coastal lands" in Austrian shorthand refers specifically to the territory around Görz and Trieste plus the Istrian peninsula. It doesn't refer to the rest of the Adriatic coast.
the Isonzo. However, the necessity of remaining strong against Russia meant that instead of seven additional divisions, Rohr could expect just three and a half. One division each would go to Tyrol and Pola, and the rest – made up as much as possible of mountain troops – would join the units already on the scene. "Supported by the fortifications in the Tarvis area and the field works at the Plöcken Pass and on the Isonzo, they would delay the enemy advance toward the Drava valley and the Laibach basin, covering the deployment of further forces in the rear areas." These "further forces" would after a certain point be pulled from the Russian front.

Despite the great demands on limited resources, all parties at the audience of 21 April, and the Emperor himself, didn't want to let the southwestern neighbor gain any booty without a struggle. It was vital to finally clarify whether Germany would help out if the Italians attacked. Because of the Germans' attitude toward the Italian question in all discussions to date, the Vienna leadership was by no means certain of their support. The Emperor was also very mistrustful. When Conrad stated that it was primarily the task of the diplomats to work this out with the ally, Burian immediately set up a meeting in Berlin. It took place on the 24th, with both Chiefs of Staff in attendance.

Much of the day was taken up by discussions between the two soldiers regarding the general military situation. Once again Conrad tried to convince his Imperial German colleague that it was impossible to concede all the Italian demands. It would be preferable if Germany, which held some pawns which could be exchanged with the Entente Great Powers, would reach an understanding with these enemies who were already in the field. On the strategic level, it would only be possible to offer successful resistance to the 36 Italian divisions if they were opposed by 20 allied divisions. For the moment, however, these units weren't available, since by agreement of the two Chiefs of Staff all available troops were next to be used against Russia. Thus the question of German assistance in the southwest remained open.

Regarding the Serbian front, Conrad told his German colleague about the operational plan which had been developed by 5th Army HQ. Archduke Eugene intended to launch an envelopment attack against the central part of Serbia (Kragujevac-Krusevac-Kraljevo). An Aus-Hung. corps (with 58 and 59 ID) should attack from Rogatica-Visegrad toward Kraljevo, while the main body of the Aus-Hung. and German forces advanced over the Sava and Danube. The Bulgarians would thrust through Zajecar, the Turks
along the Caribrod-Nish road. There was sufficient equipment available for crossing the rivers. The best time to begin the operation would be early May. Falkenhayn agreed with these suggestions. Although he felt that the inner wings of the Danube front and the Bulgarians would be too far apart, this was unavoidable because of the rugged terrain southwest of the Iron Gates. Nonetheless, at the moment when the two Chiefs of Staff were agreeing to this plan, one of its basic premises was falling apart. On the next day a British-French expeditionary corps was firmly in place on the southern tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, which meant that Turkey wouldn't be able to participate in an offensive against Serbia.

The more general discussions of the statesmen and soldiers involved similar issues. The German Chancellor promised unconditionally to support Austria-Hungary in its dealings with Italy. Falkenhayn, however, declared that there was nothing to say at present about any eventual military aid. Like Conrad, he demanded that the diplomats should prevent the intervention of Italy and Romania, or at least to postpone it for as long as possible. This task was more easily described than accomplished. In the gloomy mood around the conference table, the only ray of light was hope for military success in the hills and forests of west Galicia. Once again the sword would be the decisive factor.

b. The intentions of the Russians

On 6 April, a few hours after the German Beskid Corps, along with Aus-Hung. regiments, had brought the Russian advance to a halt on the heights around Mezőlaborcz, Ivanov was still in good spirits, and was issuing orders for continuing the attack. While holding the flanks on the Dunajec and Dniester Rivers, his armies would reach the line Zboro-Varanno-Csap-Huszt; the advance to Huszt would also lead to the collapse of Pflanzer's front on the Dniester. In the next few days, however, the outcome of the Easter Battle became clearer, and Brussilov's last efforts against the k.u.k. 2nd Army proved to be fruitless. On 10 April the commander of the Russian Southwest Front ordered the attack halted until reinforcements arrived, the ranks were replenished and - above all - the critical ammunition shortage was rectified.

Meanwhile General Alexeiev - formerly Ivanov's chief of Staff and since March the commander of Northwest Front as successor to Ruszky - again questioned the wisdom of the Carpathian offensive, of which he had once been the principal advocate. At the start
of April he prepared a memorandum proposing instead that an offensive should be mounted from Warsaw toward Berlin. The Carpathian actions, he stated, had already fulfilled their purpose, which was to protect the flank of the main blow against Germany. They shouldn't be expected to accomplish anything more.

Alexeiev's suggestions, however, were coldly received by the high command. The Grand Duke-Generalissimo and his Chief of Staff Yanushkevich, who once had opposed the Carpathian operation, now were its strong defenders. At any moment the Dardanelles expedition of the Western Powers might have a decisive effect upon the Balkan question by winning over Romania or even Bulgaria. The diplomats at London were working feverishly to secure the adherence of Italy. The Russian high command felt obliged to support these developments militarily by continuing the attack on Hungary.

The Stavka adhered to this line when in early April it received (for the second or third time) reports that German reinforcements were arriving in west Galicia. In his memorandum of 12 April, General Danilov did acknowledge the danger posed to the Carpathian operation if these reports proved accurate. However, he didn't believe them, and at the time he was right. Moreover, he felt that the appearance of the Russians in the Danube and Tisza valleys would set off such adverse political consequences in Austria-Hungary that any danger from west Galicia could be brushed off.256

Therefore Alexeiev was ordered not to initiate any offensive without the approval of the Stavka, and to give up strong forces he had been holding in reserve. The first of these, the III Caucasian Corps, was placed directly under the high command and sent to Chyrow in Galicia. Ivanov, however, was informed that the Grand Duke-Generalissimo was displeased about the pause in the Carpathian offensive.

Meanwhile, however, the outcome of the Easter Battle was further affecting the spirits of the generals on the Southwest Front. Above all, the commander of 3rd Army (Dimitriev) was under the impression that the arrival of the Germans near Mezölaborcz wasn't a defensive measure, but the first step in a major enemy offensive. Ivanov, moreover, suspected that danger was looming in the Sztrópko area. Naturally these concerns made the generals less eager to resume their own offensive. Matters finally

---

256Whether this assumption of the Russians was correct can never be proven. Falkenhayn didn't believe so; as already noted, he even wanted to lure the Russians further into the Carpathians.
reached a climax on 15 April when Ivanov misunderstood the results of the discussion between Alexeiev and the Stavka. He told his Armies that based on new decisions of the high command the advance into Upper Hungary was canceled; there would be no attacks except as a response to initiatives by the enemy.

A series of admonitions from the Stavka soon brought this typically Russian misunderstanding to an end. The Grand Duke wanted to finally learn about Ivanov's plans in more detail. The latter therefore decided to submit to the Stavka the orders he had issued to his Armies 20 days earlier (it was now already 27 April!). He also reported that he intended to make the principal attack along the line Turka-Nagy-Verecke. 11th Army HQ, inserted between 8th and 9th Army HQ, would command this thrust; however it wasn't given any particularly good units to serve as a shock group.

The Stavka didn't agree with the relatively passive role which Ivanov assigned to 9th Army. Nor were they pleased with the deployment of XXXIII Corps, which was arriving in Southwest Front but far to the east of Kamenets-Podolsk; the Corps should be brought nearer to the front so it would be available to support the envelopment attack of 9th Army against Pflanzer-Baltin.

Ivanov agreed to the changes proposed by his superiors, and scheduled the attack to start at 3 May; however, he didn't make any serious preparations. Apparently the leadership of Southwest Front had already lost hope for any success.

Significantly, the front on the Dunajec appears only sporadically in the correspondence of the Russian generals. A week earlier Dimitriev had even withdrawn one of the three corps in the sector (the XXIst), and moved it to the area of his particular concern near Mezőlaborcz. Even the reports which arrived on 26 April regarding the arrival of substantial enemy forces around Neusandez-Grybow-Ciezkowice didn't influence the decisions of Ivanov or the Stavka. In the last days of April, however, there was a change as further information came out of west Galicia. Dimitriev began to consider removing troops from his strong left wing (in the Carpathians) to reinforce his right. When 63 ID detrained at Debica, Ivanov sent it to the Jaslo-Brzostek area; he moved III Caucasian Corps - now placed under his command - from Chyrow to Krosno, which it reached on 2 May. However, it's not clear whether this second measure was intended as a response to Mackensen's buildup or dictated by ongoing concerns about the imaginary dangers in the Dukla area.
Thus the Russian Armies, already hampered by the poor condition of the troops and a critical ammunition shortage, were also bedeviled by confusion in the leadership. The egotism and passive resistance of the Front commanders was prevailing against the weak guidance of the Stavka at a time when the high commands of the Central Powers had overcome their own differences to combine for a large-scale operation. When Tsar Nicholas visited the "liberated" province of Galicia at the end of April, he gave his cousin the Grand Duke-Generalissimo a ceremonial sword, encrusted with jewels. This gift would soon appear to be a bad omen for the commander and his forces.

3. Orders of battle in spring 1915

(In the original, this material comprises Beilage 14. The translation includes material on the k.u.k. air forces that doesn't appear in the original, as well as orders of battle for the enemy which is culled from a variety of sources.)

The orders of battle pertain to the following dates: 1 May for the northeastern theater, 23 May for the "covering troops" on the Italian front (with notes to show the reinforcements that were arriving in each sector), and 15 June for the Balkan theater. The latter date was selected because it was the point at which all the units sent to the southwestern front had left.

The units on each front are shown roughly as they were deployed on the selected date: in the northeast from left to right, in the southwest from right to left, and in the Balkans according to the towns where their higher HQ were stationed.

Detailed strength figures are shown for units on the Russian front; only summaries are shown for the two other theaters because details aren't available for the dates chosen.

Air Units

- On Russian front - Companies # 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 (Company # 8 moved to Italy in June 1915)
- On Italian front - Companies # 2, 4, 12, 16 (of which # 2 and 4 arrived from the Balkans during May)
- On the Balkan front - Companies # 6, 9

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - However, much of the ammunition shortage was due to poor management and distribution, i.e. also the fault of the generals, rather than to a lack of supplies. For this issue, see Stone ("Eastern Front"), pp. 131-132.
The Russian Front

Woyrsch's GERMAN Army
Commander = GO von Woyrsch
Chief of Staff = Lt Col. Heye

Kövess' Armeegruppe (XII Corps HQ)
Strength = 34 bns, 46 sqdns, 28 batties, 3 technical comps; 33,129 foot, 6746 horse, 144 guns
Commander = GdI von Kövess
Chief of Staff = Col. Freiherr Zeidler-Daublebsky von Sterneck

. 35th ID (GM von Podhoranszky) = 12,927 foot, 309 horse, 56 guns
  . 69 Inf Bde (GM von Baitz) = IR 50 [3], 51 [4]
  . 70 Inf Bde (GM Edler von Salmon) = IR 63 [5] only
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of HR 2
  . 35 FA Bde (GM Gröschl) = FKR 35 [6], II Bn/FHR 12 [2], 3rd Batty of Heavy How Bn 4, Cannon Batty of Heavy How Bn 15
  . 6th Comp of Sapper Bn 4

. 69th ID (FML von Schariczer) = 10,671 foot, 387 horse, 56 guns
  . IR 2 [5], 31 [5]
  . Div Cavalry = 3, 4 & 7 Sqdns of HR 2
  . 16 FA Bde (FML von Dobler) = FKR 36 [6], Ist Bn/FHR 12 [2], Heavy FH Bn 12 [2]
  . 2nd Comp of Pioneer Bn 2

. Corps troops = 5th Comp of Sapper Bn 12

. 9th CD (GdK Freih. von Hauer) = 4285 foot, 2864 horse, 12 guns
  . 1 Cav Bde (GM Ostermuth) = DR 4 [4], 13 [5]
  . 9 Cav Bde (Col. Freih. von Sessler) = DR 1 [5], UR 6 [5]
  . Cav Rifle Bns 7 & 9; k.k. Lst Inf Bns I/33, 102, 103, 104
  . Horse Arty Bn 9 [3]

. GM Goldbach's Group (from 16 ID; HQ of 32 Inf Bde) = 5246 foot, 20 guns
  . IR 64 [5]
  . Horse Arty Bn 1 [4]; a German heavy howitzer battery

. 7th CD (GM Ritter von Micewski) = 3186 horse
  . 11 Cav Bde (GM von Mold) = DR 10 [6], UR 2 [6]
  . 20 Cav Bde (GM von Le Gay) = DR 12 [5], UR 3 [5]

GERMAN Landwehr Corps (also called Army Detachment Woyrsch)
Strength = 40 bns, 13 sqdns, 30 batties, 5 tech comps; 34,793 foot, 1219 horse, 158 guns
Commander = GO von Woyrsch
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Heye

. 4th LW ID (GM von Hofacker) = 16 ½ bns, 7 sqdns, 12 batties, 1 tech comp; 15,211 foot, 723 horse, 68 guns
  . 22 LW Inf Bde (von Sachsen-Meiningen) = LW IR 11, 51
  . 23 LW Inf Bde (von der Schulenburg) = LW IR 22, 23
. 4 LW Cavalry Bde = LW Cav Regt 2, Ersatz Cav Regt 6
. LW FAR 4
. 3rd LW ID (GM von Arnim) = 14 ½ bns, 4 sqdns, 8 batties, 2 tech comps; 11,341 foot, 293 horse, 42 guns
. 17 LW Inf Bde (Chelius) = LW IR 6, 7
. 18 LW Inf Bde (von Arnim) = LW IR 37, 46
. LW Cav Regt 1; LW FAR 3
. Bredow's LW ID (GLt Graf von Bredow) = 9 bns, 2 sqdns, 10 batties, 2 tech comps; 8241 foot, 203 horse, 48 guns
. 19 LW Inf Bde (von der Decken) = LW IR 47, 72, 133
. Attached (unknown) cavalry and artillery

TOTAL for Woyrsch's Army = 74 bns, 59 sqdns, 58 batties, 8 tech comps; 67,922 foot, 7965 horse, 302 guns

1st Army
Commander = GdK Dankl
Chief of Staff = GM Edler von Kochanowski

II Corps
Strength = 25 bns, 9 sqdns, 21 batties, 4 tech comps; 21,783 foot, 1050 horse, 110 guns
Commander = FML Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach
Chief of Staff = Col. Graf Szeptycki
. 25th ID (Archduke Peter Ferdinand) = 11,259 foot, 306 horse, 56 guns
. 49 Inf Bde (GM Edler von Severus) = IR 84 [4], FJB 25
. 50 Inf Bde (GM Ritt. von Bolberitz) = IR 4 [4]; FJB 10, 17
. Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 5
. 25 FA Bde (GM von Jemrich) = FKR 6 [5], II Bn/FHR 2 [2], Heavy FH Bn 2 [2]; 12 cm Can Batty 6, 20.5 cm Mor Batty 2
. 5th Comp/SB 2, half of 4th Comp/PB 2
. 4th ID (GM Karl Edler von Bellmond) = 10,090 foot, 649 horse, 54 guns
. 8 Inf Bde (Col. Mietzl) = IR 8 [3], 49 [3], IV Bn/IR 3
. Div Cavalry = 1, 2 & Res Sqdns of LW UR 5
. 4 FA Bde (Col. Machaczek) = FKR 5 [4], Ist Bn/FHR 2 [2], 3rd Batty/Turkey FH Bn II; 12 cm Can Batty 13, Heavy How Batty 13
. 6th Comp SB 2, half of 4th Comp/PB 2
. 1st Polish Legion Bde (Col. Pilsudski) = 6 bns, 3 sqdns, 1 batty, 1 sapper comp
. Corps troops = k.k. Lst March Bn 16; Res Sqdn/HR 1 (434 foot and 95 horse)

Ist Corps
Strength = 28 bns, 26 sqdns, 25 batties, 4 tech comps; 22,658 foot, 3748 horse, 120 guns
Commander = GdK Karl Freih. von Kirchbach
Chief of Staff = Col. Demus

. 92 LW Inf Bde (GM Haas) = IR 99 (from 4 ID) [3]; k.k. Lst IR 11 [2] and 12 [2]. 5 Sqdn/LW UR 4. FK Bn 46 [3], 3 Batty/FKR 5, 1 Res Batty/FKR 12, 4 Batties/I Turkey FH Bn; 12 cm Can Batty 25, 2 Batties/Heavy FH Bn 1; half of 30.5 cm Mor Batty 10. 5th Comp/PB 2. Bde strength was 9650 rifles, 166 horse, 40 guns
. 16 Cav Bde (from 2 CD) (Col von Kirsch) = HR 3 [6], UR 5 [4], 2 Res Sqdn/HR 5. Cav Rifle Bn 2. Horse Arty Bn 5 [2]. Bde had 994 foot, 1937 horse, 8 guns
. 46 LW ID (GM von Czapp) = 12,014 foot, 60 horse, 72 guns
. 91 LW Inf Bde (GM von Urbanski) = LW IR 15 [4], 31 [4], 32 [4]; Monzer's Etappen March Regt [4]
. Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/LW UR 3
. 46 FA Bde (Col Exner) = FKR 2 [4], FH Bn 46 [3], Turkey FH Bn I [2]; 3 Batties/Horse Arty Bn 5; 12 cm Can Batty 11, 1 Batties/Heavy FH Bn 1; a combined Heavy How Bn [2]; half of 15 cm Mor Batty 3
. 3 Comp/SB 1, 4 Comp/SB 2
. 2 CD (GM Ritter von Ursyn-Pruszynski) = 1424 horse
. 3 Cav Bde (GM Freih. von Abele) = HR 6 [6], 16 [6]
. Corps troops = 6 Sqdn/LW UR 4; 3 Comp/PB 10 (161 horse)

Directly under 1st Army = Lst Huss Bn 7 [1]; 1 Comp/SB 2; 3 Comp/SB 9; 4 Comp/PB 10 (140 horse)
TOTAL for 1st Army = 53 bns, 36 sqdns, 46 batties, 11 tech comps; 44,441 foot, 4798 horse, 230 guns

4th Army
Commander = GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
Chief of Staff = FML Rudolf Krauss
Directly under Army was...
. Combined ID (FML Edl. von Stöger-Steiner) = 16,078 foot, 561 horse, 56 guns
. 7 Inf Bde (GM Schaible) = LW IR 16 [4]; Bns IV/8, IV/49, III and VI/99; FJB 31; BH FJB
. 121 Inf Bde (Col Edl. von Merten) = k.k. Lst IR 13 [2 ½], 25 [2]; k.k. Lst Inf Bns I/7, II/28, 78, 88, 112, 116, 302
. Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/DR 11
. II Bn/FKR 12 [3], I Bn/FKR 25 [3]; Ma Batty/FKR 11; Ender's Ers Batty; 9 cm Can Bn Budapest [2]; Heavy How Batty 28
. 2 Comp/SB 1, 2 Comp/SB 2, 3 Comp/PB 2, 2 Comp/PB 3, 1 Comp of PB 10
. Lt Col Freih. von Vever's Detachment = Tyrol LW UR Bn [3],
plus Res Sqdns of UR 4, 7 and 13

XIV Corps
Strength = 46 bns, 6 sqdns, 50 batties, 8 tech comps; 35,271 foot; 495 horse, 224 guns
Commanded = FML Roth
Chief of Staff = Col Göttlicher

. 47th GERMAN Reserve ID (GLt von Besser) = 13 bns, 1 sqdn, 14 batties (incl. k.u.k. 12 cm Can Batty 27), 2 tech comps (incl. our 5 Comp/SB 14); 10,891 foot, 79 horse, 56 guns
  . 93 Res Inf Bde (Bressler) = RIR 217, 218
  . 94 Res Inf Bde (Feldtkeller) = RIR 219, 220
  . Res Jaeger Bn 19, Res Cav Sqdn 47, Res FAR 47
. Col. Morgenstern's Group = k.k. Lst Inf Bns 28, 34, 81, 86, 89, 300; k.k. Lst Ma Bns 21, 24. 3 Comp/SB 3 (3960 foot)
. 8th ID (FML von Fabini) = 8330 foot, 154 horse, 71 guns
  . 96 Inf Bde (GM Ritter von Rziha) = KJR 3 [3], 4 [3]
  . Indep = KJR 1 [3]; k.k. Lst Inf Bn 79, k.k. Lst Ma Bn 23
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns/LW UR 6
  . 8 FA Bde (Col Petersilka) = FKR 32 [5], II Bn/FHR 11 [2], Slavik's FK Bn [2]; 15 cm Can Batty 6; Heavy How Batties 2, 41, 42; ¼ 24 cm Mor Batty 3
  . 6 Comp/SB 6, 2 Comp/SB 14, 2 Comp/PB 10
. 3rd ID (FML Edl. von Horsetzky) = 12,090 foot, 223 horse, 69 guns
  . 5 Inf Bde (GM Richard Müller) = IR 59 [4] only
  . 15 Inf Bde (Col Gustav Fischer) = IR 14 [5]; KJR 2 [5]
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 6
  . 3 FA Bde (FML Edl. von Sellner) = I Bn/FKR 42 [3], I Bn/FHR 14 [2]; 6 Batty/FKR 32; ¼ of 12 cm Can Batty 7; 15 cm Can Batties 5, 7; 2 Batty/PH Bn 14, 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 15; Heavy How Batties 25, 40; ¼ 24 cm Mor Batty 3; ½ of 30.5 cm Bor Batty 16
  . 1 Comp/SB 14, 5 Comp/PB 9
. Corps troops = Res Sqdn/DR 2.  Col. Janecka's Arty Group (with II Bn/FKR 42 [3], 12 cm Can Batty 20, Heavy How Batty 20, 30.5 cm Mor Batty 12, a balloon flak batty, a 42 cm howitzer) (39 horse, 28 guns)

IX Corps
Strength = 32 bns, 7 sqdns, 30 batties, 2 tech comps; 25,771 foot, 845 horse, 149 guns
Commander = FML Kralicek
Chief of Staff = Col von Krammer

. 106th Lst ID (FML Kletter) = 13,923 foot, 485 horse, 62 guns
  . 60 Inf Bde (GM von Gruber) = IR 30 [4], 80 [3]; FJB 24, 30
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

. k.k. 110 Lst Inf Bde (GM Adolf Aust) = k.k. Lst IR 6 [3], 31 [3], 32 p3
  . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdns of DR 6, 10 & 12 and of UR 1
  . 106 FA Bde (Col Edl. von Portenschlag) = FKR 41 [5], FK Bn 106 [2]; three 9 cm Can Batties; 6 Batty/FHR 14; \( \frac{1}{2} \) 24 cm Mor Battie 2
  . 10th ID (GM von Mecenseffy) = 11,848 foot, 298 horse, 87 guns
  . 19 Inf Bde (GM von Iwanski) = IR 36 [3], 98 [3]; FJB 2
  . 20 Inf Bde (GM Reymann) = IR 18 [3], 21 [3]; FJB 12
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/LW UR 2
  . 10 FA Bde (Col Blaha) = II Bn/FKR 20 [3], II Bn/FKR 25 [3], I Bn/FHR 9 [3]; 5 Batty/FHR 14; two 9 cm Can Batties; a Belgian 12 cm Can Battie; \( \frac{1}{2} \) 12 cm Can Battie 7, 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 14, Heavy How Battie 4, 12/ 24 cm Mor Battie 2, \( \frac{1}{2} \) 30.5 cm Mor Battie 16
  . 4 Comp/SB 9
  . Corps troops = Res Sqdn/DR 1 (62 horse)

More units directly under 4th Army...
. 31 Inf Bde (GM von Szende) = IR 62 [5], 82 [6]; 8 Sqdn/HR 2; Bde totaled 9614 foot, 138 horse
  . 11th Hon CD (FML Graf Bissingen) = 600 foot, 2300 horse, 14 guns
  . 22 Hon Cav Bde (GM Czito) = HHR 2 [4], 3 [4]
  . 24 Hon Cav Bde (FML von Tallian) = HHR 5 [4], 9 [4]
  . Hon Horse Arty Bn 1 [3 ½]

TOTAL for 4th Army = 111 ½ bns, 37 sqdns, 94 ½ batties, 15 tech comps; 87,334 foot, 4339 horse, 443 guns

11th GERMAN Army
Commander = Prussian GO von Mackensen
Chief of Staff = Prussian Col von Seeckt

Prussian Guard Corps
Strength = 24 bns, 6 sqdns, 31 ½ batties, 4 tech comps; 20,622 foot, 618 horse 122 guns, 18 MW (Minenwerfer)
Commander = GdI Freih. von Pletternberg
Chief of Staff = Col. Graf von der Schulenburg
. 1st Gd ID (Col Eitel Friedrich, Prinz von Preussen) = 12 bns, 3 sqdns, 12 batties, 2 tech comps; 9810 foot, 312 horse, 48 guns
  . 1 Gd Inf Bde (Nostitz) = Foot Gd Regts 1 & 3
  . 2 Gd Inf Bde (Finck v. Finckenstein) = Foot Gd Regts 2 & 4
  . Leib Gd HR; 1 Gd Arty Bde (Gd FAR 1 & 3)
. 2nd Gd ID (GLt von Winckler) = 12 bns, 3 sqdns, 12 batties, 2 tech comps; 10,812 foot, 306 horse, 48 guns
  . 3 Gd Inf Bde (Petersdorf) = Gren Gd Regts 1 & 3

334
4 Gd Inf Bde (Lewinski) = Gren Gd Regts 2 & 4
  Schlotheim’s Cav Regt; 2 Gd Arty Bde (Gd FAR 2 & 4)
  Corps troops = 3 heavy batties; 1 heavy, 1 medium & 2 light MW
dets; also k.u.k. Heavy FH Bn 6 [1 ½], heavy How Batty 26, and
30.5 Mor Battles 8 & 15 (total 26 guns, 18 MW)

VI k.u.k. Corps
Strength = 28 bns, 1 bike bn, 6 sqdns, 26 ½ batties, 5 tech
comps; 30, 354 foot, 897 horse, 132 guns, 16 MW
Commander = FML von Arz
Chief of Staff = Col Joseph Huber
  39th Hon ID (FML von Hadfy) = 14, 455 foot, 345 horse, 64 guns,
and 6 MW
    77 Hon Inf Bde (GM von Molnar) = HIR 9 [3], 11 [3]
    78 Hon Inf Bde (Col Daubner) = HIR 10 [3], 16 [3]
    Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/HR 15
    39 FA Bde (Col Nowotny) = FKR 18 [4], Hon FKR 3 [4]; 30.5
cm Mor Batty 11; four GERMAN heavy batties and Lt MW Det 221
    3 Comp/SB 5
  12th ID (FML Kestranek) = 15,235 foot, 272 horse, 66 guns, 10
MW
    23 Inf Bde (GM Ritter von Metz) = IR 56 [4], 100 [3]
    24 Inf Bde (GM von Puchalski) = IR 3 [2], 20 [3], 57 [4]
    Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns/LW UR 4
    12 FA Bde (Col von Dobner) = FKR 1 [6], II Bn/FHR 1 [2],
Ma Batty/Horse Arty Bn 10, ½ 12 cm Can Batty 12, ½ 2
Batty/Heavy FH Bn 6; 30.5 cm Mor Batty 13; two GERMAN heavy
batties plus their Medium MW Det 12 & Lt MW Det 222
  Corps troops = A bike bn; Res Sqdns of HR 6 & 12; the Balloon
Flak Zug of GERMAN Gd Corps; 5 Comp/SB 6, 1 Comp/PB 3, 1 Comp/PB
4 (664 foot, 280 horse, 2 guns)

XLI GERMAN Reserve Corps
Strength = 18 bns, ½ bike bn, 4 sqdns, 31 ½ batties, 4 tech
comps; 17,157 foot, 412 horse, 126 guns, 18 MW
Commander = GdI von Francois
Chief of Staff = Col von Muller
  81 Res ID (GM von Stocken) = 9 bns, 1 bike comp, 2 sqdns, 12
batties, 2 tech comps, 8441 foot, 208 horse, 48 guns
    Res IR 267, 268, 269
    Res Cav Det 81; 81 Arty Bde (Res FAR 67, 68)
  82 Res ID (GM von Fabarius) = 9 bns, 1 bike comp, 2 sqdns, 12
batties, 2 tech comps; 8716 foot, 204 horse, 48 guns
    Res IR 270, 271, 272
    Res Cav Det 82; 82 Arty Bde (Res FAR 69, 70)
  Corps troops = 6 heavy batties; 1 heavy, 1 medium, 2 light MW
dets; also k.u.k. 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 9, ½ 12 cm Can Batty 12 (total was 30 guns, 18 MW)

GERMAN Combined Corps
Strength = 18 bns, 6 sqdns, 29 batties, 4 tech comps; 17,965 foot, 618 horse, 116 guns, 18 MW
Commander = Bavarian GM Ritter von Kneussl
(Chief of Staff not listed)
. 119 ID (GM von Behr) = 9 bns, 3 sqdns, 7 batties, 2 tech comps; 8497 foot, 310 horse, 28 guns
  . IR 46, 58; Res IR 46
  . 3 Sqdn/UR 1 (and another?): FAR 237
. 11 BAVARIAN ID (GM von Kneussl) = 9 bns, 3 sqdns, 7 batties, 2 tech comps; 9468 foot, 308 horse, 28 guns
  . IR 3, 22; Res IR 13
  . Savoye's Cav Regt; FAR 21
. Corps troops = 9 heavy batties; 1 heavy, 1 medium 2 light MW dets; also the k.u.k. 2 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 9, 1 Batty/China Mtn Can Bn I, 1 Batty/China Mtn Can Bn III, 1 How Batty/Mtn AR 11, Heavy How Batty 12, 12 cm Can Batty 21; total = 60 guns, 18 MW

X GERMAN Corps
Strength = 18 bns, 4 sqdns, 27 batties, 4 tech comps; 18,075 foot, 412 horse, 108 guns
Commander = GdI von Emmich
Chief of Staff = Col. Freiherr von der Wenge
. 19 ID (GLt Hofmann) = 9 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties; 2 tech comps; 8107 foot, 204 horse, 48 guns
  . IR 74, 78, 91
  . 2 & 3 Sqdns/HR 17; 19 FA Bde (FAR 26, 62)
. 20 ID (GLt Ritter und Edler von Oetinger) = 9 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties, 2 tech comps; 9968 foot, 208 horse, 48 guns
  . IR 77, 79, 92
  . 5 & 6 Sqdns/HR 17; 20 FA Bde (FAR 10, 46)
. Corps troops = 3 heavy batties (12 guns)

TOTAL for 11th GERMAN Army = 106 bns, 1 ½ bike bns, 26 sqdns, 145 ½ batties, 21 tech comps; 15 MW dets; 104,173 foot, 2957 horse, 604 guns, 70 MW

3rd Army
Commander = GdI von Boroevic
Chief of Staff = GM von Boog

X Corps
Strength = 41 bns, 13 sqdns, 33 ½ batties, 5 tech comps; 29,137 foot, 1130 horse, 164 guns
Commander = FML Martiny
Chief of Staff = Col. von Kralowetz

. 21 LW ID (GM Podhajsky) = 7793 foot, 210 horse, 19 guns
  . 41 LW Inf Bde (GM Keki) = LW IR 6 [3], 7 [3]
  . 42 LW Inf Bde (Col Hansmann) = LW IR 8 [1] 28 [3]; k.k. Lst Inf Bn 54
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Res Sqdns/DR 14
  . 21 FA Bde (Col Vollgruber) = FKR 23 [4]; 2 Can Batties/Mtn AR 4
  . 4 Comp/SB 8

. 45 LW ID (GM Nemeczek) = 5846 foot, 337 horse, 59 guns
  . 89 LW Inf Bde (Col Gasienski) = LW IR 18 [2], 33 [2]
  . 90 LW Inf Bde (Col Tuma) = LW IR 17 [2], 34 [2]
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 3; Res Sqdn/DR 9
  . 45 FA Bde (Col von Rosenzweig) = FKR 29 [5], FK Bn 45 [2], FH Bn 21 [2]; 2 & 4 Batties/FH Bn 10; one landing gun det.
  . 4 Comp/SB 10

. 2 ID (FML Liposckak) = 8800 foot, 333 horse, 52 guns
  . 3 Inf Bde (Col Barwik) = IR 40 [3]; BH IR 4 [2]; FJB 4
  . 4 Inf Bde (Col Phepls) = IR 89 [2], 90 [2]; LW IR 30 [4]
  . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/UR 3; 5 & 6 Sqdns/LW UR 3; 1 Sqdn/Lst Huss Bn 5
  . 2 FA Bde (Col von Polak) = FK Bn 21 [2], 26 [2]; Heavy FH Bn 10 [2]; 4 Batties/FKR 4, 1 Batties/FH Bn 10, 5 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6, 2 Batties/Heavy FH Bn 15
  . 5 Comp/PB 5

. 24 ID (GM Schneider Edler von Manns-Au) = 6698 foot, 250 horse, 34 guns
  . 47 Inf Bde (GM von Unschuld) = IR 9 [2], 45 [2]
  . 48 Inf Bde (Col Korzer) = IR 10 [2], 77 [2]
  . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/UR 6, 3 & 4 Sqdns/LW UR 3, 3 Sqdn/Lst Huss Bn 5
  . 24 FA Bde (Col Grandowski) = FKR 30 [4], 3 Batties/FH Bn 10, 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 3, ½ of 7 Can Batties/Mtn AR 14
  . 5 Comp/SB 10, 1 Comp/PB 9

. (No Corps troops)

III Corps
Strength = 36 ½ bns, 8 sqdns, 24 batties, 2 tech comps; 27,147 foot, 849 horse, 134 guns
Commander = FML Ritter von Krautwald
Chief of Staff = Col Edler von Trauttweiller

. 28 ID (GM Edl. von Hinke) = 11,672 foot, 292 horse, 63 guns
  . 55 Inf Bde (GM von Haustein) = IR 87 [3], 97 [3 ½]; FJB 7
  . 56 Inf Bde (GM Fernengel) = IR 27 [4], 47 [4]; FJB 20
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 3 Sqdns/DR 5
  . 28 FA Bde (GM Elmar) = FKR 8 [4], II Bn/FKR 26 [2], II Bn/
FKR 3 [2]; 1 Batty/FH Bn 26; 5 How Batty/Mtn AR 6; 2 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 3
. 26 LW ID (FML Lischka) = 9249 foot, 169 horse, 39 guns
. 44 LW Inf Bde (from 22 LW ID) (GM Zahradniczek) = (Mtн) LW IR 4 [3] only
. 51 LW Inf Bde (Col Spielvogel) = LW IR 11 [2 ½], 12 [2]
. 52 LW Inf Bde (Col Edl. von Lober) = LW IR 9 [2], 10 [2]
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 2
. 26 FA Bde (Col von Heimerich) = I Bn/FKR 26 [2], FK Bn 22 [2], 1 Batty/FH Bn 22, 2 Batty/FH Bn 26, 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 3
. 5 Comp/SB 9
. 22 LW ID (FML Schmidt Edl. von Fussina) = 6226 foot, 255 horse, 32 guns
. 43 LW Inf Bde (Col Vucinic) = LW IR 3 [3], 26 [2]
. Independent = LW IR 5 [1 ½], (Mtн) LW IR 27 [2]
. Div Cavalry = 2 & 4 Sqdns/DR 5
. 22 FA Bde (Col Gärtner) = FKR 7 [4], 2 & 3 Batties/FH Bn 22
. Corps troops = Res Sqdns of DR 3 & UR 5; 4 Comp/SB 14 (133 horse)

XVII Corps
Strength = 24 ½ bns, 27 sqdns, 15 batties, 2 tech comps; 20,535 foot, 3585 horse, 75 guns
Commander = GdI Kritek
Chief of Staff = Col Edler von Lerch
. 11 ID (FML Anton Edl. von Bellmond) = 10,550 foot, 150 horse, 41 guns
. 21 Inf Bde (GM Grubic) = IR 15 [3 ½], 55 [3 ½]
. 22 Inf Bde (GM Alexander Ritt. von Wasserthal) = IR 58 [2], 95 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 1
. 11 FA Bde (Col Steinhardt) = FKR 33 [5], I Bn/FHR 11 [2]; Heavy How Batty 34
. 4 Comp/SB 11
. 4 CD (or "Berndt's Group") (GM Berndt) = 9800 foot, 2565 horse, 34 guns
. 18 Cav Bde (GM Kopecek) = DR 9 [4], 15 [4]
. Col Weisz von Schleussenburg's Group (21 Cav Bde HQ) = UR 1 [4], 13 [4]; Cav Rifle Bn 4; I Bn/IR 58 (from 11 ID)
. k.k. 1st Lst Inf Bde (Col Brauner) = k.k. Lst IR 1 [2], 2 [1 ½]; Lst Inf Bn I/22
. GM Graf Marenzi's Group = IR 81 [2 ½], 88 [3]; Res Sqdn/DR 15
. Horse Arty Bn 11 [3], 3 Batties/Heavy FH Bn 3, Res Batties of FKR 31 and 42, Ma Batty of FKR 16

338
VII Corps
Strength = 25 bns, 20 sqdns, 22 batties, 3 tech comps; 18,190 foot, 2075 horse, 115 guns
Commander = GdK Archduke Joseph
Chief of Staff = Col Eisner-Bubna
  . 1 CD (GM Freih. von Leonhardi) = 2950 foot, 1645 horse, 26 guns
  . 6 Cav Bde (Col von Mouillard) = HR 7 [4], 14 [6]
  . 7 Cav Bde (GM Chevalier de Ruiz) = HR 12 [4]; 1st Res Sqdn of HR 5
  . Cav Rifle Bn 1; IR 96 [2] (latter from 17 ID)
  . 5 Comp/PB 7
  . 17 ID (GM von le Beau) = 9010 foot, 190 horse, 44 guns
    . 33 Inf Bde (Col von Pacor) = IR 43 [3], 61 [2]
    . 34 Inf Bde (Col Freih. von Henneberg) = IR 39 [2], 46 [2]; II Bn/IR 37
    . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/HR 7
    . 17 FA Bde (Col Zagar) = II Bn/FKR 19 [3], I Bn/FKR 21 [3]; 1/3 of 2 Batt/FHR 7; Heavy FH Bn 7 [2]
  . 20 Hon ID (GM von Nagy) = 6230 foot, 240 horse, 45 guns
    . 39 Hon Inf Bde (Col Stadler) = HIR 3 [3], 4 [3]
    . 81 Hon Inf Bde (GM Perneczky) = HIR 1 [3], 17 [3]
    . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/HR 16; 3 & 4 Sqdns/HHR 4
    . 20 FA Bde (Col Pohl) = HFKR 8 [4], I Bn/FKR 20 [2]; 1 Batt/FHR 7; Heavy How Batt 11
    . 3 Comp/SB 11

GERMAN Beskid Corps
Strength = 30 bns, 10 sqdns, 30 batties, 4 tech comps; 19,798 foot, 977 horse, 156 guns
Commander = GdK von der Marwitz
Chief of Staff = Lt Col von Lettow-Vorbeck
  . 4 ID (GM Fryer) = 12 bns, 4 sqdns, 11 batties, 1 tech comp; 8153 foot, 457 horse, 62 guns
    . 7 Inf Bde (Paris) = IR 14, 149
    . 8 Inf Bde (von Winterfeld) = IR 49, 140
    . DR 12; 4 FA Bde (FAR 17, 53)
  . 25 Res ID (GM von Jarotsky) = 9 bns, 3 sqdns, 12 batties, 2 tech comps; 58236 foot, 259 horse, 60 guns
    . IR 168; Res IR 83, 118
    . Res DR 4; Res FAR 25
  . 35 Res ID (GLt von Schmettau) = 9 bns, 3 sqdns, 4 batties, 1 tech comp; 5819 foot, 261 horse, 24 guns
    . 5 LW Bde (Krahmer) = LW IR 2, 9
20 LW Bde (Hertzberg) = LW IR 19, 107
. Res Heavy Cav Regt 3; Res FAR 35
. Attached to Div - k.u.k. FH Bn 45 [2] & 30.5 cm Mor Batty 12 (total of 12 guns)

TOTALS for 3rd Army = 157 bns, 78 sqdns, 124 ½ batties, 16 tech comps; 114,807 foot, 8616 horse, 644 guns

2nd Army
Commander = GdK von Böhm-Ermolli
Chief of Staff = GM Dr. Bardolff

XIX Corps
Strength = 19 ½ bns, 7 sqdns, 11 ½ batties, 3 tech comps; 13,960 foot, 463 horse, 57 guns
Commander = FML Trollmann
Chief of Staff = Col Günste
. 34 ID (GM Ritter von Birkenhain) = 5782 foot, 367 horse, 28 guns
  . 67 Inf Bde (Col Trojan Bacsila) = IR 29 [2 ½], 33 [3], 101 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 4 & 5 Sqdns/HR 12; Res Sqdn/HR 3
  . 34 FA Bde (Lt Col Köchert) = II Bn/FKR 4 [2], 1 Batty/FKR 19, 4 Batty/FKR 11, 4 Batty/FHR 7
  . 4 Comp/SB 7
. 29 ID (FML Zanantoni) = 8178 foot, 96 horse, 29 guns
  . 57 Inf Bde (Col Wöllner) = IR 42 [2], 92 [1]; FJB 28
  . 58 Inf Bde (GM Poeschensky) = IR 74 [1 ½], 94 [2 ½]; FJB 23
  . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/DR 7; 3 & 4 Sqdns/LW UR 2 (however, the latter two sqdns were detached to the Foot Cav Detachment in 43 LW ID)
  . 7 FA Bde (GM Soppe) = FKR 27 [2], II Bn/FKR 14 [2], 2 Batty/ FKR 19, 4 Batty/FHR 9, ½ of 2 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 4
  . 6 Comp/SB 8, 3 Comp/PB 9
. Corps troops = 3 Sqdn/Lst Huss Bn 8 (being rebuilt)

VIII Corps
Strength = 28 bns, 3 sqdns, 12 batties, 3 tech comps; 16,959 foot, 331 horse, 52 guns
Commander = FZM von Scheuchenstuel
Chief of Staff = Col Sündermann
. 51 Hon ID (FML von Kornhaber) = 6210 foot, 115 horse, 15 guns
  . 200 Hon Inf Bde (GM Tanarky) = Hon IR 301 [3] only
  . 201 Hon Inf Bde (Col Szotak) = Hon IR 302 [3], 305 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/HHR 4
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

IV Corps
Strength = 35 ¼ bns, ½ sqdn, 24 ½ batties, 3 tech comps; 23,068 foot, 75 horse, 115 guns
Commander = GdK von Tersztyanszky
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Freiherr von Salis-Samaden

13 LW ID (FML Edl. von Kreysa) = 5144 foot, 31 guns
  . 25 LW Inf Bde (Col Richter) = LW IR 1 [1], 24 [2]
  . 26 LW Inf Bde (GM Riml) = LW IR 14 [1], 25 [1 ½]; Hon IR 300 [3] (latter from 51 Hon ID)
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/LW UR 5 (detached to the Foot Cav Detachment in 43 LW ID)
  . 13 FA Bde (GM Tunk) = FK Bn 13 [2], FH Bn 13 [2], I Bn/FKR 4 [2]; 3 Can Batty/Mtn AR 14
  . 3 Comp/ SB 2, 5 Comp/SB 4

32 ID (GM Ritter von Willerding) = 5686 foot, 40 guns
  . 63 Inf Bde (GM Edl. von Obauer) = IR 23 [2], 70 [2]
  . 64 Inf Bde (GM Grallert) = IR 6 [2], 86 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns/HR 8 (detached to Foot Cav Detachment in 33 ID)
  . 32 FA Bde (GM Kreycy) = FKR 11 [4]; China FH Batties 31 and 32; 2 Can Batty/Mtn AR 11; ½ 2 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 4, 30.5 cm Mor Batty 17
  . 3 Comp/SB 4

31 ID (FML Freih. von Lütgendorf) = 4036 foot, 50 horse
  . 61 Inf Bde (GM von Felix) = IR 69 [3]; Bns IV/32, II/44
  . Div Cavalry = ½ 1 Sqdn/HR 8 (rest of 1 Sqdn and all of 2 Sqdn were with Foot Cav Detachment in 33 ID)
  . 31 FA Bde (Col Schirza) - All units detached to V Corps
43 LW ID (FML Schmidt von Georgenegg) = 8202 foot, 25 horse, 44 guns
   . 59 Inf Bde (GM Kroupa) = IR 24 [½], 41 [2]
   . 86 LW Inf Bde (Col Ritt. von Zygiadlowicz) = LW IR 20 [2], 22 [1], 36 [1 ½]
   . 54 Inf Bde (from 27 ID) (Col von Watterich) = IR 34 [2], 67 [1], 85 [2]
   . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/LW UR 1 (organized as a foot sqdn plus 25 horsemen)
   . 43 FA Bde (Col Michalek) = FKR 31 [4], FH Bn 43 [2]; 1 Batty/FHR 5; Heavy FH Bn 8 [2]
   . Major Tichy's Cav Foot Detachment = The combined divisional cavalry of 29 ID, 13 LW ID and 41 Hon ID
   . (No Corps troops)

XVIII Corps
Strength = 18 ¼ bns, 4 sqdns, 19 batties, 4 tech comps; 10,308 foot, 689 horse, 89 guns
Commander = GdK Ritter von Ziegler
Chief of Staff = Col Edler von Lunzer

. 44 LW ID (FML Ludwig Goiginger) = 4120 foot, 12 horse, 66 guns
   . 17 Inf Bde (from 9 ID) (Col Edl. von Dietrich) = IR 91 [2] only
   . 122 Inf Bde (Col Konstantin Ritter von Wasserthal) = LW IR 2 [1], 21 [3]; Land-Sch Regt I [2]
   . Div Cavalry (serving as a foot detachment) = Res Sqdn/HR 14; 5 & 6 Sqdns/LW UR 6
   . 44 FA Bde (Col Edl. von Ellenberger) = I Bn/FKR 16 [2], II Bn/FHR 6 [2], FH Bn 43 [2]; 1 Batty/FKR 20, 5 Batty/FKR 24, 3 Batty/FKR 40, 1 Batty/FK Bn 44, Res Batty/FKR 16, 2 Batty/FH Bn 44, 5 Can Batty/Mtn AR 12, ¼ 1 Batty Heavy FH Bn 4
   . 6 Comp/SB 14, 4 Comp/PB 4

. 9 ID (GM Schön) = 6188 foot, 677 horse, 23 guns
   . 18 Inf Bde (Col Edl. von Dokonal) = IR 73 [3], 102 [1]
   . 53 Inf Bde (from 27 ID) (GM Urbarz) = IR 25 [3], 76 [3] (latter attached from 14 ID)
   . Div Cavalry = 5 Sqdn/DR 14, Res Sqdn/UR 12; 3 & 4 Sqdns/HR 15 (latter two attached from 27 ID)
   . 9 FA Bde (Col Putsek) = 1 Batty/FKR 13, 4 Batty/FKR 40, 2 Batty/FK Bn 44, 1 Batty/FH Bn 44, 2 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 5, China Mtn Cannon Zug from Mtn AR 8
   . 2 Comp/SB 8, 5 Comp/PB 10
   . (No Corps troops)

V Corps
Strength = 26 ½ bns, ¼ sqdn, 18 batties, 4 tech comps; 17,272
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

foot, 40 horse, 94 guns
Commander = FZM von Puhallo
Chief of Staff = Col Sallagar

. 37 Hon ID (GM Tabajdi) = 7004 foot, 28 guns
   . 73 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Pogany) = HIR 13 [2], 18 [1 ½]
   . 74 Hon Inf Bde (GM Hunke) = HIR 14 [3], 15 [3]
   . Attached from 31 ID - BH IR 3 [3]
   . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/HR 5 (detached to Foot Cav
     Detachment in 33 ID)
   . 37 FA Bde (Col Wondre) = II Bn/FKR 13 [2], I Bn/FKR 15
     [2]; 2 Batties/HFKR 4; 6 China Mtn Can Batty/Mtn AR 11
   . 4 Comp/SB 4, 4 Comp/SB 5, 1 Comp/PB 2

. 33 ID (FML Goglia) = 10,268 foot, 40 horse, 66 guns
   . 65 Inf Bde (GM Freih. von Dürfeld) = IR 19 [3], 26 [2]
   . 66 Inf Bde (GM Lieb) = IR 12 [2], 83 [2]
   . Attached from 14 ID - Bn I/72; FJB 11, 19
   . Also - FJB 29 (from 27 ID); a Foot Cav Detachment (with
     divisional cavalry from V Corps, 31 ID and 32 ID)
   . 33 FA Bde (Col Kaufmann) = II Bn/FKR 15 [3], II Bn/FHR 5
     [2]; 3 & 5 Batties/FKR 10, 5 Batties/FKR 13, 4 Batties/FKR 16, 1
     Batties/HFKR 4, 1 Batties/FHR 4, 1 Batties/Heavy FH Bn 5
   . 5 Comp/SB 5

. 27 ID (FML Kosak) - All units detached to IV and XVIII Corps
   . (No Corps troops)

TOTALS for 2nd Army = 127 ½ bns, 12 sqdns, 85 batties, 17 tech
comps; 81,567 foot, 1598 horse, 407 guns

GERMAN South Army
Commander = Prussian GdI von Linsingen
Chief of Staff = Prussian GM von Stolzmann

Szurmay's k.u.k. Group
Strength = 37 bns, 6 sqdns, 19 ½ batties, 4 tech comps; 23,695
foot, 433 horse, 87 guns
Commander = FML Szurmay
Chief of Staff = Major Röder

. 7 ID (GM Blasius von Dani) = 12,315 foot, 251 horse, 48 guns
   . 128 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Sarkany) = IR 44 (from 31 ID)
   [3]; Hon IR 30 [2]; k.u. Lst IR 102 [2]; Hon Bns III/6,
   I/24, I/29; Comb Hon Ma Batty 1, Res Batties/HFKR 7
   . 14 Inf Bde (GM Baumgartner) = IR 38 [2], 79 [3]; FJB 21
   . 71 Inf Bde (Col Plivelic) = IR 37 [2], 68 [4]; k.u. Lst Bn
   III/102
   . Div Cavalry = Lst Huss Bn 10 [3]
   . Col Scheucher's FA Bde = I Bn/FKR 12 [2], I Bn/FKR 38 [3];
     Ma Batty/FKR 35, 4 Batties/FHR 8, 6 Batties/FHR 13, 1 Can

343
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918
Vol 2

Batty/Mtn AR 12, ½ of 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 4; Heavy How Batty 19
. 1 Comp/SB 8, 1 Comp/SB 13, 3 Comp/PB 7
. 40 Hon ID (FML Plank) = 11,380 foot, 124 horse, 39 guns
. 76 Hon Inf Bde (Col Joseph Huber) = HIR 22 [3], 24 [2]; Hon Bn III/304
. 79 Hon Inf Bde (Col Lengerer) = HIR 29 [2], 30 [1]
. 80 Hon Inf Bde (GM Haber) = HIR 6 [2], 19 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sdqns/HR 8
. 40 FA Bde (GM von Hellebronth) = FKR 1 [4]; 4 Batty/FKR 38, 3 Batty/FHR 8, 5 Batty/FHR 13
. 5 Comp/SB 13
. Group troops = 2 Sqn/Lst Huss Bn 5 (38 horse)

GERMAN Corps Bothmer
Strength = 29 bns, 4 sqdns, 36 batties, 5 tech comps; 15,985 foot, 294 horse, 178 guns
Commander = Bavarian GdI Graf von Bothmer
Chief of Staff = Bavarian Lt Col Hemmer
. 38 k.u. Hon ID (FML Bartheldy) = 4500 foot, 205 horse, 50 guns
. 75 Hon Inf Bde (Col Gombos) = HIR 21 [3], 23 [3], 304 [2]
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sdqns/HR 2
. 38 FA Bde (Col Werz) = FKR 34 [5], HFKR 5 [4]; 2 Can Batty/Mtn AR 12
. 5 Comp/SB 4
. PRUSSIAN 3 Gd ID (GM von Friedeburg) = 9 bns, 1 sqdn, 8 batties, 2 tech comps; also k.u.k. 2 & 8 Can Batties/Mtn AR 8, 2 How Batty/Mtn AR 4; total was 6285 foot, 29 horse, 47 guns
. Gd Fusilier Regt, Lehr IR, Gren Regt 9
. Gd Res UR, 3 Gd FA Bde (Gd FAR 5, 6)
. GERMAN 1 ID (GLt von Conta) = 12 bns, 1 sqdn, 15 batties, 2 tech comps; 5200 foot, 60 horse, 81 guns
. 1 Inf Bde (Wedel) = Gren Regt 1, IR 41
. 2 Inf Bde (Schönfeld) = Gren Regt 3, IR 43
. UR 8; 1 FA Bde (FAR 16, 52)

Hofmann's k.u.k. Corps
Strength = 29 bns, 2 sqdns, 18 batties, 2 tech comps; 13,557 foot, 280 horse, 69 guns
Commander = FML Hofmann
Chief of Staff = Col Graf Lamezan
. 55 ID (GM Fleischmann) = 6860 foot, 280 horse, 43 guns
. 129 Inf Bde (Col Matasic) = Hon Ma Regt 1 [2], Comb Hon Ma Regt [2 ½]; Capt Babka's Comb k.u. Lst Inf Bn, Capt Bondy's Sch Bn, Ist Ukrainian Vol Bn
. 130 Inf Bde (Col Witoszynski) = Lt Col Mayer's Comb k.u.k. Ma Regt [2], LW Ma Regt 35 [2]; Capt Drozd's Comb k.k. Lst

344
IR [1 ½], II Ukrainian Vol Bn
. Div Cavalry = Two combined squadrons
 . Hon Res Can Bn 2 [2], II How Bn/Mtn AR 14 [2]; Ers Can Batty 31, Ma Batty of Horse Arty Bn 5, 5 Can Batty/Mtn AR 8; Heavy How Batties 27, 36; GERMAN Mtn Can Batties 3, 4
 . 3 Comp/SB 12, 2 Comp/PB 4
 . 12 Lst Terr Bde (Col Burggasser; 2800 foot, 12 guns) = V Ma Bn of LW IR 35; k.k. Lst Inf Bns 20, 223; Major Linde's and Capt Bartlemus' Comb Lst Bns; Major Dresser's Comb Hon Bn; Major Vogel's Comb k.u. Lst Inf Bn; k.u. Lst Eta Bn I/12. 7 Batty/FKR 33, 1 Can Batty/Mtn AR 3, 1 Can Batty/Mtn AR 8
 . 131 Inf Bde (GM Blum; 3897 foot, 12 guns) = FJB 32; LW Ma Regt 19 [3], Hon Ma Regts 17 [1 ½] & 19 [1 ½]. 4 Can Batty/Mtn AR 8, 1 How Batty/Mtn AR; Lst Can Batty 9/11
 . Corps troops = 30.5 cm Mor Batty 1 (2 guns)

GERMAN XXIV Reserve Corps
Strength = 28 bns, 3 sqdns, 20 batties, 2 tech comps; 22,277 foot, 260 horse, 88 guns
Commander = Württemberg GdI von Gerok
Chief of Staff = Prussian GM von Mutius
 . 48 Res ID (GLt Hahn) = 13 bns, 1 sqdn, 11 batties, 1 tech comp; also k.u.k. 1 How Batty/Mtn AR 3; total 10,377 foot, 110 horse, 48 guns
 . 95 Res Inf Bde (von Puttkamer) = RIR 221, 222
 . 96 Res Inf Bde (Stehr) = RIR 223, 224
 . Res Jaeger Bn 20, Res Cav Sqn 48, Res FAR 48
 . k.u.k. 19 ID (FML Richard Mayer) = 11,900 foot, 150 horse, 40 guns
 . 37 Inf Bde (GM von Richard) = IR 35 [3], 75 [3]; LW IR 29 [3]
 . 38 Inf Bde (GM Steiger) = BH IR 1 [3]; FJB 5, 6, 22
 . Div Cavalry = 4 & 6 Sqdns/DR 14
 . 19 FA Bde (Col Regnier) = FKR 22 [5]; Res Batty/FKR 40; How Bn/Mtn AR 10 [2]
 . 6 Comp/SB 9

Directly under South Army = 2 medium, 4 light GERMAN MW dets; k.u.k. Lst Sapper Dets 1/21, 2/2, 3/2, 2 and 3/IV plus 1 Comp/PB 7
TOTALS for South Army = 123 bns, 15 sqdns, 93 ½ batties, 19 tech comps, 6 MW dets; 75,514 foot, 1267 horse, 44 guns, 32 MW

Armeegruppe Pflanzer-Baltin
On 8 May became the 7th Army
Commander = GdK Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Ritter von Zeynek
XIII Corps
Strength = 37 ¾ bns, 6 sqdns, 29 batties, 6 ½ tech comps; 34,362 foot, 794 horse, 142 guns
Commander = GdI Freiherr von Rhemen
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Stromfeld
. FZM Ljubicic's Group = 19,150 foot, 250 horse, 28 guns
   . 9 Inf Bde (GM Ritt. Weiss von Mainprugg) = IR 13 [4], 93 [4]; FJB 8, 9, 16; Streifkorps Russ, Streif Company Kodrebski
   . 16 Inf Bde (Col Köckh) = FJB 13, 14, 18, 27
   . Col Franz Kuhn's Inf Bde = IR 5 [4]; IV Bn/96; FJB 1
   . 5 Sqdn/DR 5
   . 6 cannon batties - 2/Mtn AR 3, 7/Mtn AR 8, 5/Mtn AR 11, 3 and 4/Mtn AR 2, 5/Mtn AR 13; also 2 How Batty/Mtn AR 3
   . 1 & 4 Comps/SB 12, 2 Comp/SB 13; ½ 5 Comp/SB 8; 5 Comp/PB 3
. 6 ID (FML Fürst Schönburg) = 7142 foot, 229 horse, 51 guns
   . 11 Inf Bde (GM von Stöhr) = IR 17 (2 ½) only
   . 12 Inf Bde (Col Rudolf Müller) = IR 7 [3], BH IR 2 [2]; Hon Ma Bn IV/32
   . Div Cavalry = 6 & Res Sqdns/DR 5
   . 6 FA Bde (GM Kratky) = FKR 9 [6], Res Batty/FKR 18, 1 Batty/FHR 3, a LW Ma How Batty; ½ 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 13
   . ½ of 5 Comp/SB 8
. 5 ID (FML Edl. von Habermann) = 8070 foot, 315 horse, 63 guns
   . 10 Inf Bde (Col Adalbert von Kaltenborn) = IR 1 [3], 54 [4]; k.u. Lst Ma Bn I/32
   . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 4
   . 5 FA Bde (Col Edl. von Senkowski) = FKR 3 [3], 28 [4]; a LW Ma Can Batty; Ist Bn/FHR 1 [2]; 12 cm Can Batty 26, ½ 1 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 13; 15 cm Mor Batty 1
   . 1 Comp/SB 1
. Corps troops = ½ 4 Comp/PB 9

Corps Czibulka
Strength = 30 ¼ bns, 5 sqdns, 25 ½ batties, 2 tech comps; 29,776 foot, 625 horse, 121 guns
Commander = FML von Czibulka
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Hermann Ritter von Langer
. 36 ID (FML Ritt. von Schreitter) = 17,202 foot, 309 horse, 59 guns
   . 13 Inf Bde (Col Boleslav Wolf) = IR 52 [3], 78 [3]; VII Ma Bn of HIR 11; k.u. Lst Eta Bns IV/25, III/32; 3 Ma Comp of k.k. Lst IR 28
   . 72 Inf Bde (GM Edl. von Luxardo) = IR 16 [4], 53 [3]; II Bn of IR 78
. Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/HR 2; 1 & 2 Sqdns/HHR 10
. 36 FA Bde (Col Joseph Edl. von Müller) = FKR 39 [3 ¾], 2 & 3 Batties/FKR 3, 3 & 4 Batties/FKR 37, Hon Ma Can Batties 2 and 5; 1 Battie/FHR 13; 12 cm Can Battie 19, ½ Ma Battie/Heavy How Bn 12; Heavy How Batties 35 & 37
. 15 ID (FML Ritt. von Benigni) = 12,574 foot, 316 horse, 62 guns
. 29 Inf Bde (Col von Stanoilovic) = IR 66 [3 ½] only
. 30 Inf Bde (Col Leide) = IR 60 [4 ½], 65 [4]
. Independent - ½ k.k. Lst Ma Bn 15, ½ k.u. Lst Eta Bn II/23
. Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/HR 15
. 15 FA Bde (Col Latka) = FKR 17 [5]; 1, 5 & 6 Batties/FKR 37; I Bn/FHR 6 [½]; 12 cm Can Battie 1, 15 cm Mor Battie 2 Budapest
. 5 Comp/SB 11, 2 Comp/PB 9

Group (Corps) Marschall
Strength = 16 bns, 42 sqdns, 17 ½ batties, 3 tech comps; 11,825 foot, 4874 horse, 65 guns
Commander = Prussian GdK Freiherr Marschall
Chief of Staff = Prussian Col von Dommes

. GERMAN 5 CD (GLt von Heydebeck) = 1 bn, 24 sqdns, 3 batties; 1 tech comp; 944 foot, 2357 horse, 12 guns
. 9 Cav Bde (Bredow) = DR 4, UR 10
. 11 Cav Bde (Wentzy u. Petershyde) = CR 1, DR 8
. 12 Cav Bde (Lepel) = HR 4, 6
. Horse Bn/FAR 5, MG Detachment 1

. 30 k.u.k. ID (FML Kaiser) = 9681 foot, 317 horse, 41 guns
. 88 L-Sch Bde (GM von Eckhardt) = L-Sch Regts II [3], III [3]
. Lt Col Bekesi's Lst Inf Bde = k.k. Lst Bns 17, 18, 22, 23, 29; VII Ma Bn/HIR 10; also Hon Cav Rifle Bn 5 (from 5 Hon CD)
. Arty Bde (Prussian GM Graf von Schweinitz) = II Bn/FHR 13 [2], 2 Battie/FKR 37, 3 Battie/Horse Arty Bn 6 (from 8 CD); 9 cm Can Batties 1, 4, 5; 2 Battie/FHR 3; Heavy FH Bn 11 [2]; 2 Battie/Heavy FH Bn 13; ½ 30.5 cm Mor Battie 14
. 5 Comp/SB 3, 3 Comp/SB 13

. 10 k.u.k. CD (GM Graf Herberstein) = 1200 foot, 2200 horse, 12 guns
. 4 Cav Bde (Col von Horthy) = HR 10 [5], 13 [5]
. 8 Cav Bde (GM Viktor von Bauer) = HR 9 [3], UR 12 [3]
. Cav Rifle Bn 10, k.u. Lst Eta Bn IV/5
. Horse Arty Bn 4 [3]

XI Corps
Strength = 30 ¾ bns, 41 sqdns, 16 batties, 1 ½ tech comps; 18,744 foot, 5003 horse, 63 guns
Commander = FML Edler von Korda
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Freiherr von Senarclens

. 42 Hon ID (GM Stracker) = 7166 foot, 389 horse, 12 guns
. 83 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Pillepic) = HIR 25 [3], 26 [3]
. 84 Hon Inf Bde (Col von Petkovic) = HIR 27 [3], 28 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 3, 4 & 5 Sqdns/HHR 10
. 2 Battie/FHR 13, 4 Battie/Horse Arty Bn 6 (from 5 Hon CD),
plus an Polish cannon battery
. 5 Hon CD (or Apor's Group - GM Freih. von Apor) = 4100 foot,
2193 horse, 8 guns
. 19 Hon Cav Bde (Col von Jony) = HHR 1 [4], 8 [4]
. 23 Hon Cav Bde (Col Graf Lubieniski) = HHR 6 [4], 7 [4]
. 5 Can Battie/Mtn AR 3
. 2 Comp/SB 11
. 2 Polish Legion Bde (Col Küttner) = 6 bns, 2 sqdns, and
one 3.7 cm cannon batty
. Cav Rifle Bn 8 (from 8 CD)
. 6 CD (GM Edl. von Schwer) = 1284 foot, 1900 horse, 12 guns
. 5 Cav Bde (Col Leiter) = DR 8 [4], 11 [4]
. 14 Cav Bde (Col Edl. von Rettich) = DR 6 [3], HR 11 [4]
. Cav Rifle Bn 6, Gendarme Bn 3, Gendarme Bn Weikert
. 2 & 3 Batties/Horse Arty Bn 10; Ma Battie/FKR 34
. Lt Col Papp's Bde (4723 foot, 386 horse, 23 guns) = Gendarme
Bns 1, 2, 5; k.u. Lst Eta Bns V/17, IV/18; "Ruthene and Romanian
Vol. Bn". Lst Huss Bn 3 [3], one gendarme sqdn. 5 Battie/FKR 39,
1 & 2 Batties/Horse Arty Bn 6 (from 8 CD), 9 cm Can Battie 2, ½ 9
cm Can Battie 3, a combined battery, ½ of 30.5 cm Mor Battie 14
. Col Schnitzler's Bde (1471 foot, 135 horse, 8 guns) = Gendarme
Bn 4, ¼ k.u. Let Eta Bn 20, ¼ k.u. Lst Eta Bn 32; two German
mountain rifle comps (?); Huzule Volunteer Comp. 4 Sqdn/DR 6.
½ 2 Battie/FKR 39, 1 Battie/Horse Arty Bn 10 (from 6 CD), ½ 9 cm
Can Battie 3
. Corps troops = ¼ 4 Comp/PB 9

DIRECTLY under 7th Army...
. 8 CD (FML Edl. von Lehmann) = 2100 horse
. 13 Cav Bde (Col Freih. von Wolf) = DR 7 [4], UR 8 [4]
. 15 Cav Bde (GM Freih. von Klingspor) = DR 2 [4], UR 11 [5]
TOTAL strength of 7th Army = 114 ¾ bns, 111 sqdns, 88 batties, 13
tech comps; 94,707 foot, 13,396 horse, 391 guns

Cracow fortress garrison
Strength = 11 ¾ bns, 2 mobile batties, 28 fort Arty comps, 3 tech
comps; 7400 foot, 8 mobile guns
Commander = FML Kuk
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Edler von Haller
. k.k. Lst Bns 26, 27, 35, 36, 80, 87; k.k. Lst Ma Bns 5, 6, 7,
8, 22; ¼ Lst Ma Bn 10
. Scholz' Mobile Can Bn [2]; twenty-eight fort Arty comps
. 4 & 6 Comps/SB 1, 1 Comp/SB 4

Grand total of units on the Russian front, 1 May 1915...
. 879 bns, 274 sqdns, 737 batties, 28 fort arty comps, 123 tech
comps, 21 MW detachments
. 677,865 foot; 44,936 horse; 3451 guns; 102 MW

The Italian Front

Southwest Front Command
(Arrived at Marburg on 27 May)
Commander = GO. Archduke Eugene
Chief of Staff = FML Alfred Krauss

A. TYROL
Total strength = 44 ½ inf bns, 39 Stand-Sch bns, 3 ¼ sqdns, 25 ½
batties, 32 fort arty comps, 6 tech comps; about 67,000 foot, 314
horse, 111 guns

1. The covering troops
Total strength = 31 ½ bns, 39 Stand-Sch bns, 2 ¼ sqdns, 16 ½
batties, 2 tech comps. In various forts and other positions
there was a total of 11 detachments from L-Sch Regts I, II and
III plus 32 fort arty comps. There were about 54,000 foot, 314
horse and 75 guns

Land Defense Command Tyrol
(Until 22 May called "Tyrol Region", led by FML von Koennen-
Horak; from 22 May led by...)
Commander = GdK Dankl
Chief of Staff = GM Kletus Pichler

District I (Ortler, HQ of 53 Half Bde) (Lt Col Hradenzy)
. Ist Res Bn/29; SS Bns Prad, Schlanders; SS Comps Stilfs,
Taufers
. ¼ 3 Ma Sqdn/Tyrol Mounted L-Sch Bn
. Tyrol FK Batty 1
. Nauders & Gomagoi forts - One det each of L-Sch Regts I &
III; 2 Res Comp/Fort Arty Bn 4; 1 Detachment/Fort Arty Bn 7

District II (Tonale, HQ of 54 Half Bde) (Col Stiller)
. II Res Bn/29; IX Ma Bn/L-Sch Regt II; SS Bns Kaltern II,
Ulten, Bludenz; SS Comps Rabbi, Fondo
. ¼ of 3 Ma Sqdn/Tyrol Mounted L-Sch Bn
. Tyrol FK Batty 2, 5 Batt/FKR 40
. Tonale-Pejo fort - One det of L-Sch Regt II; 1 & 2 Comps
of Fort Arty Bn 7

District III (South Tyrol, HQ of 91 ID) (FML von Koennen-Horak)
. Judicarien Sector (HQ of 50 Half Bde) (Col Spiegel)
  . k.k. Lst Bn 163; SS Bns Klausen, Bezau. ¼ 3 Comp/SB 14
  . Lardaro fort - One det of L-Sch Regt II; 3 & 4 Comps/Fort Arty Bn 7
. Riva Sector (GM Schiesser)
  . Ist Res Bn/37; k.k. Lst Bns 164, 168; SS Bns Bozen, Lana, Riva-Arco
  . 3 How Batty/Mtn AR 14, one 9 cm FK batty, one M.75 mtn can batty. 1 Comp/SB 9
  . Riva Fortress - 2 & 3 Comps/Fort Arty Bn 4; two reserve comps apiece of Fort Arty Bns 1 and 4
. Etschtal Sector (181 Inf Bde, GM Englert) = X Ma Bns of KR 3 and 4; III Res Bn/37; SS Bns Brixen, Meran II
. Folgaria-Lavarone Sector (180 Inf Bde, GM Edl. von Verdross)
  . X Ma Bn/L-Sch Regt I; (Tyrol) k.k. Lst Bn I; SS Bns Reutte I, Kufstein, Kitzbühel, Glurns, Schwaz, Gries
  . ¼ of 2 Ma Sqn/LW UR 6
  . ¼ each of 7 Comp/SB 9 & of 3 Comp/SB 14
  . Lavaron-Folgarla & Tenna-Colle delle bene forts - One det from L-Sch Regt II; 2 Comp/Fort Arty Bn 1; 1 to 4 Comps/Fort Arty Bn 8
. Valsugana Sector (52 Half Bde, Col Edl. von Kreschel)
  . k.k. Lst Bn 169; SS Bns Kaltern I, Meran I, Reutte II, Rattenberg
  . 2 batties (1 x 9 cm can, 1 x M.75 mtn); ¼ of 3 Comp/SB 8

District IV (Fleimstal, HQ of 90 ID; FML Edl. von Scholz)
(This HQ took the place of 55 Mtn Bde HQ in charge of District)
. 55 Mtn Bde (Col Freiherr von Concini)
  . IV Res Bn/37; k.k. Lst Bn 166; ¼ of k.k. Lst Bn 39; SS Bns Auer, Rankweil, Feldkirch; ½ of SS Bn Welschnofen
  . ¼ of 3 Ma Sqn/Tyrol Mounted Rifle Bn; Tyrol FK Batty 3
  . Paneveggio fort - A det of L-Sch Regt III; 1 Comp/Fort Arty Bn 1
. 179 Inf Bde (Col Schiessler)
  . X Ma Bn/KJR 2; k.k. Lst Bns 38, 39; SS Bns Kastelruth, Gröden, Dornbirn, Bregenz; ¼ of SS Bn Welschnofen
  . 7 Batty/FKR 41, 8 Batty/FKR 42, 7 Can Batty/Mtn AR 8
  . Lst Sapper Bn 1/14
  . Moena fort - A det of L-Sch Regt III; a det of Fort Arty Bn 1

District V (Pustertal, or "Pustertal Combined Div") (FML Ludwig Goiginger)
(Organization shown as of 8 June 1915; prior to this date the HQ of 56 Mtn Bde was also HQ of District V)

. 51 Mtn Bde (Col Edler von Sparber)
  . X Ma Bn/59; III Res Bn/29; k.k. Lst Bn 165; SS Bns Silz, Passeier
  . ¼ of 3 Ma Sqn/Tyrol Mntd Rifle Bn; Tyrol FK Batty 4
  . Buchenstein (Corte & Ruaz), Tre Sassi, Plätzwiese, Landro and Sexten forts - Each with a det from L-Sch Regt III and from 4 Comp/Fort Arty Bn 1

. 56 Mtn Bde (GM Bankowski)
  . X Ma Bn/KJR 1, IX Ma Bn/L-Sch Regt II; Lst Bn 167; SS Bns Imst, Sillian, Innsbruck I, Innsbruck II, Welsberg
  . 6 Batty/FKR 40, 6 & 8 Batties/FKR 41, ¼ 7 Batty/FHR 14, 6 Can Batty/Mtn AR 8

Trient Fortress (FML Edler von Guseck)
  . 5 k.k. Lst March Bde (GM von Jonak) = II Res Bn/37; k.k. Lst Bns 160, 161, 162; Garrison Bns # II, III, IV; SS Bn St Leonhard
  . 3 Comp/EB 14, ¼ 3 Comp/EB 8
  . 3 Fort Arty Bde (Col Kleinschnitz) = 24 comps of Fort Arty Regt 1; 4 & 4 Ma Comps/Fort Arty Bn 4; 1 to 4 Res Comps/Fort Arty Bn 5
  . 4 How Batty/Mtn AR 14; 3 ½ x 9 cm FK batties, 1 x 15 cm Mor batty

2. Reinforcements to Tyrol
(Total = 13 bns, 1 sqdn, 9 batties, 4 tech comps; about 13,000 foot, 100 horse, 36 guns)

GERMAN Alpenkorps (a division, led by Bavarian GLt Krafft von Delmensingen); arrived at Brixen and Bruneck from 25 May
  . BAVARIAN 1st Jaeger Bde (GM von Tutschek) = (Bav) Jaeger Regt 1 and Leib IR
  . (GERMAN) 2nd Jaeger Bde (GM von Below) = Jaeger Regts 2, 3
  . 3 Sqdn/BAV Chevleg Regt 4; FAR 203

B. Carinthia
Total = 42 ½ inf bns, 1 bike bn, 1 SS bn, 15 volunteer rifle bns, 7 ¾ sqdns, 32 batties, 3 fort arty comp., 2 ½ tech comp.; about 40,000 foot, 900 horse, 204 guns

1. Covering troops
Had 12 ¼ inf bns, 1 SS bn, 15 vol rifle bns, 2 ¼ sqdns, 10 batties, 1 ¼ tech comp. In the forts there were 3 detachments from (Mtn) LW IR 4 & 27, plus 3 fort arty comp. 14,500 foot, 500 horse, 116 guns
Armeegruppe GdK Rohr
(Before the war was "Carinthia Region", under FML Edler von Langer)
Commander = GdK Rohr
Chief of Staff = FML Scotti

1. 92 ID (FML Karl Edler von Langer)
   . 183 Inf Bde (GM Gössmann) = X Ma Bn/IR 7, 10 Ma Comp/FJB 8, IX Ma Bn/LW IR 4, k.k. Lst Bns 40, 43, 150; k.k. Lst Ma Bn 10; Carinthia Vol Rifle Regt 2 [4]. ¾ 1 Ma Sqdn/DR 14. 5 Battys/FKR 28, 5 Battys/FHR 5, 6 & 7 batties/FHR 9. One zug apiece from SB 3 & PB 3
   . 184 Inf Bde (GM Jaschke) = X Ma Bn/IR 27, 10 Ma Comp/FJB 9, IX Ma Bn/LW IR 3; k.k. Lst Bns 41, 151, 153; Ist Bn of Carinthia Vol Rifle Regt 1. ¾ 1 Ma Sqdn/DR 14. 7 Battys/FKR 8, 7 Battys/FKR 42, 7 Can Battys/Mtn AR 3. One zug apiece from SB 3 and PB 3
   . Forts - Malborgeth (1 det from LW IR 4, 8 Comp/Fort Arty Bn 2, 1 Comp/Fort Arty Bn 4), Raibl-Predil (1 det from LW IR 4, ½ 1 Res Comp/Fort Arty Bn 4), Flitsch (1 det of LW IR 27, ½ 1 Res Comp/Fort Arty Bn 4)
   . 57 Half Bde (GM Lanzinger) = X Ma Bn/IR 14 (moved to Tyrol where it joined District V at end of May), SS Bn Lienz. ¾ 2 Ma Sqdn/LW UR 6. 6 Battys/FKR 40

2. Reinforcements
   30 inf bns, 1 bike bn, 5 sqdns, 22 batties, 1 ¼ tech comp; about 25,500 foot, 400 horse, 88 guns

59 Mtn Bde (GM Fernengel) – First elements arrived at Oberdrauburg on 24 May. Bns III/18, III/57; FJB 30; I Bn/Hon IR 13; one bike bn; 3 Battys/FHR 9, 2 Can Battys/Mtn AR 4; 5 Comp/SB 7, ¼ of 2 Comp/SB 3

VII Corps
Commander = GdK Archduke Joseph
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Eisner-Bubna

1. 17 ID (FML Edl. von Gelb) (First elements arrived at Oberdrauburg on 27 May)
   . 33 Inf Bde (Col von Pacor) = IR 43 [4], 61 [3]
   . 34 Inf Bde (Col Freih. von Henneberg) = IR 39 [3], 46 [3]; II Bn/37
   . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns/HR 7, Res Sqdn/HR 16
   . 17 FA Bde (Col Zagar) = FKR 19 [3], FKR 21 [5]; I Bn/FHR
7, Heavy How Bn 7 (# of batteries for how units not listed)
. 20 Hon ID (GM von Nagy) (First elements arrived at Arnoldstein on 24 May)
. 39 Hon Inf Bde (Col Stadler) = HIR 3 [3], 4 [3]
. 81 Hon Inf Bde (GM Perneczky) = HIR 1 [3], 17 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns/HHR 4
. 20 FA Bde (Col Pohl) = I Bn/FKR 20, 5 Batty/HFKR 8; Heavy How Batty 11

C. The Coastal Lands
Total = 98 bns, 2 bike comps, 17 ½ sqdns, 81 batties, 43 fort arty comps, 18 ½ tech comps; about 117,500 foot, 1750 horse, 330 guns

1. Covering troops
28 bns, 1 naval bn, 2 bike comps, 6 ¼ sqdns, 31 batties, 6 ½ tech comps; about 32,000 foot, 500 horse, 100 guns

5th Army
Army HQ took command at Laibach on 27 May; until then the commander of 57 ID, FML Heinrich Goiginger, was in charge of the "Coastal Land Region." The units of this Division (10 bns, 8 batties) were split up to support various groups at the front. Bns III/8 and V/BH 4 and 4 Can Batty of Mtn AR 13 were in Carinthia, and didn't join the Division until July. Commander = GdI von Boroевич
Chief of Staff = GM von le Beau

. 93 ID (GM von Boog)
. 58 Mtn Bde (Col Staufer) = X Ma Bn/IR 97, IX Ma Bn/LW IR 27, k.k. Lst Bn 155. ¼ 4 Ma Sqdn/LW UR 6. 6 Battie/FKR 8, 6 Battie/FKR 12, 3 Battie/FH Bn 43, 5 Can Battie/Mtn AR 7, 4 Battie/Heavy How Bn 3; 3 Lst Ers Battie. Ma Comp/SB 15
. 185 Inf Bde (Col Vidale) = X Ma Bn/IR 6, X Ma Bn/IR 47; k.k. Lst Bns 42, 156, 157; k.k. Lst Ma Bn 30; two vol bike comps. 1 Ma Sqdn/LW UR 6. 6 Battie/FKR 7, 3 Can Battie/Mtn AR 4, 5 Can Battie/Mtn AR 5, 2 How Battie/Mtn AR 13; FH Battie Turkey 6, Ma Battie/Heavy FH Bn 14. ¼ of 3 Comp/PB 1 and of 3 Comp/PB 2
. Under Div HQ = 4 x 9 cm cannon batties

. 94 ID (FML Kuczera)
. 187 Inf Bde (Kontre-Admiral Freih. von Koudelka) = X Ma Bn/IR 87, X Ma Bn/BH IR 2; k.k. Lst Bns 37, 154; Sea Bn 4; 1 Ma Sqdns of DR 5 & 15; 5 Battie/FKR 7, 4 Battie/Heavy FH Bn 14; ¼ Ers Comp/SB 3
. 60 Mtn Bde (Col Mitlacher) (The troops of this Bde were divided between 187 Inf and 2 Mtn Bdes) = X Ma Bn/IR 17, IX
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Ma Bn/LW IR 26; k.k. Lst Bn 152; 2 Ma Sqdn/DR 4; 7 Batty/FKR 7, 7 Batty/FKR 17, 4 Batty/Heavy FH Bn 2; 4 Comp/SB 1

. Under Div HQ = 30.5 cm Mor Battly 4; one 9 cm FK batty

. 57 ID (FML Heinrich Goiginger) (Arrived from the Balkans on 11 May; see note under 5th Army HQ for deployment)

. 2 Mtn Bde (GM von Lukachich) = Bns III/8, II/70, III/76, II/101, V/BH 4. ¼ 1 Sqdn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 4 Can Battly/Mtn AR 13, 3 Battly/China Mntd Can Bn 1

. 6 Mtn Bde (Col von Hellebronth) = Bns I/6, III/38, IV/42, IV/50, IV/81. ¼ 1 Sqdn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 3 Can Battly/Mtn AR 4, 5 Can Battly/Mtn AR 7

. Div Cavalry = 3 Sqdn/HR 4

. 57 FA Bde (GM Adolf Aust) = 1 & 2 Res Batties/FKR 38, 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 13

. Ma Comps of SB 5 & 6; ½ Ers Comp/SB 3, 3 Comp/PB 4

. Col Vogelhuber's Coastal Sector (from the south edge of Trieste up to and including Ciganuova) = Coastal, gendarme, border finance, and volunteer rifle detachments; one railroad security comp

. GM von Maric's Coastal Sector (from Monte Maggiore to the Croatian-Dalmatian border) = k.k. Lst Bns IV/19, 37; one 9 cm FK batty

2. Reinforcements
50 bns, 10 sqdns, 47 batties, 8 tech comps; 54,821 foot, 1098 horse, 213 guns

XV Corps
(Moving on the rails toward St Luzia)
Strength = 20 bns, 3 ¾ sqdns, 20 batties, 3 tech comps
Commander = GdI Fox
Chief of Staff = Col von Falkhausen

. 1 ID (FML Bogat)

. 7 Mtn Bde (GM Ströher) = Bns II/5, IV/25, III/86, III/86, V/BH 2. ¼ 1 Sqdn/UR 12. 4 Can Battly/Mtn AR 11, 6 Can Battly/Mtn AR 14

. 8 Mtn Bde (GM Felix Andrian) = Bns IV/24, III/35, IV/53, IV/58, V/BH 1. ¼ 1 Sqdn/UR 12. 4 Can Battly/Mtn AR 11, 6 Can Battly/Mtn AR 14

. Div Cavalry = Res Sqdn/HR 3

. 1 FA Bde (Lt Col Dvorak) = 1 & 2 Res Batties/FKR 39, 2 & 3 How Batties/Mtn AR 11

. 4 Comp/SB 13

. 50 ID (FML Edler von Kalser)

. 3 Mtn Bde (GM Gerabek) = Bns II/18, IV/30, IV/37, III/46, IV/80. ¼ 1 Sqdn/UR 5. 2 Can Battly/Mtn AR 13. 1 Battly/China Mntd Can Battly II
. 15 Mtn Bde (GM Edl. von Wieden) = Bns IV/33, II/34, I/61, II/66, I/91. 1 Ma Sqn/DR 5. 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 13, 2 Batties/China Mtn Can Batties II
. Div Cavalry = 1 Ma Sqn/Tyrol Mntd Rifle Bn
. 50 FA Bde (Col Rath) = 3 & 4 Batties/HFKR 6, 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 7
. Corps troops = 2 x FH batties, 2 x heavy how batties; Ma Comp/SB 2, 2 Comp/PB 8

XVI Corps
(Moving by rail toward Görz)
Strength = 20 bns, 5 sqdns, 18 batties, 4 tech comps
Commander = FZM Wurm
Chief of Staff = Col von Loefen
. 58 ID (GM Erwin Zeidler)
. 4 Mtn Bde (GM Konopicky) = Bns II/52, III/69; LW IR 37 [3]. ¼ 1 Sqn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 11, 1 Can Batties/Mtn AR 13
. 5 Mtn Bde (GM Nöhring) = Bn I/22; X Ma Bn/IR 22; LW IR 23 [3]. ¼ 2 Sqn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. An indep Mtn Can Bn [2 batties]
. Div Cavalry = 2 Sqdn/DR 14
. 58 FA Bde (Lt Col Nadherny) = 5 & 6 Batties/FKR 23; 5 Battie/FHR 4, 5 Battie/FHR 8
. Ma Comp/SB 9

. 18 ID (GM Böltz)
. 1 Mtn Bde (GM Novak von Arienti) = Bns I/1, IV/4, I/51, I/63, I/102. ¼ 1 Sqn/LW UR 5. 5 Can Batties/Mtn AR 4, 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 7
. 13 Mtn Bde (GM Graf Berchtold) = IR 22 [3]; Bns III/64, III/BH 4. ¼ 1 Sqn/LW UR 5. 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 7, 2 Can Battie/China Mtn Can Bn I
. Div Cavalry = 1 Res Sqdn/HR 10, 1 & 2 Sqdns/LW UR 6
. 18 FA Bde (Col Secullic) = 1 & 2 Batties/HFKR 6, 5 & 6 Batties/FHR 7
. Corps troops = Two heavy how batties; 6 Comp/SB 15, Lst Sapper Det 1/VI; 4 Comp/PB 7

48 ID (FML Gabriel) - Independent, moving by rail to Görz
. 11 Mtn Bde (GM Lawrowski) = Bns I/10, IV/20, I/21, IV/77, III/BH 3. ¼ 2 Sqn/HR 9. 1 & 2 Can Batties/Mtn AR 10
. 12 Mtn Bde (Col Prince Felix Schwarzenberg) = Bns I/3, II/57, I/93, II/100, III/BH 2. ¼ 1 Sqn/LW UR 5. 1 & 2 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6
. Div Cavalry = ¾ 2 Sqn/HR 9
. 48 FA Bde (Col von Smekal) = 7 Battie/FKR 20, 2 Battie/FHR 9, 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 4, 2 & 3 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6
D. The Pola Military Harbor and surrounding area
13 inf bns, 3 naval bns, 3 Lst Eta bns, 1 ¼ sqdns, 3 mobile batties, 43 fort arty comps, 4 tech comps. About 30,700 foot, 150 horse, 18 mobile guns
Commander = Vice Admiral Ritter von Chmelarz
Chief of Staff = Colonel Funk

THE GARRISON
. Indep - II Bn/LW IR 5; Sea Bns # 1-3; k.u. Lst Eta Bns IV/8, II/27, V/29. ¼ Sqdn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 6 Batty/FKR 14; one 8 cm Russian batty; 1 to 4 Comps/SB 6
. 4 Fort Arty Bde (GM Hlavacek) = 16 field, 10 reserve, 12 March and 3 Ersatz comps of Fort Arty Regt 4

MOBILE RESERVE - 14 Mtn Bde (Col Grossmann) = Bns II/45, II/60, II/72, I/98, V/BH 3
. "Rovigno and Albona" COASTAL SECTOR = 31 gendarme posts, 17 finance watches, 8 cable watches
. ON LUSSIN ISLAND - 1 infantry det, 1 marine Lst det, 4th Comp and 4th Res Comp/Fort Arty Regt 4. 2 gendarme posts, 5 finance watches, 10 cable watches

TOTALS on Italian front at end of May = 187 ¼ inf bns, 1 ½ bike bns, 40 SS bns, 15 vol rifle bns, 28 sqdns, 138 ½ batties, 78 fort arty comps, 27 tech comps. About 224,500 foot, 3000 horse, 640 mobile guns

The Balkan Front

Armeegruppe Terszytanszky
Commander = GdK von Terszytanszky (took over on 5 June)
Chief of Staff = Col Adalbert von Dani

Mobile troops = 29 bns, 5 sqdns, 28 batties, 3 tech comps; 30,994 foot, 680 horse, 97 guns. (There were also 8500 foot available in the March formations of 59 and 61 ID)
. 59 ID (FML Snjaric)
. 9 Mtn Bde (GM Edl. von Hrozny) = Bns IV/12, III/49, IV/84, IV/87. ¼ 1 Sqdn/UR 12. 3 Can Batty/Mtn AR 7, 1 Can Batty/Mtn AR 11
. 18 Mtn Bde (GM Skvor) = Bns III/31, IV/LW 37. FJB 3, 15, 26. ¼ 2 Sqdn/Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 6 Can Batty/Mtn AR 6, 6
Can Batty/Mtn AR 5
  . Div Cavalry = 6 Sqdn/HHR 10
  . 6 & 7 Batties/FKR 24; 3 & 4 How Batties/Mtn AR 7
  . Ma Comp/SB 13
  . 61 ID (FML Winkler)
    . 10 Mtn Bde (GM von Droffa) = Bns I/48, I/62, I/90, II/92, III/BH 1. ¼ 1 Sqdn/UR 12. 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6
    . 16 Hon Mtn Bde (GM Breit) = k.u. Lst IR 17 [3], 29 [2]. ¼ 1 Sqdn Dalm Mntd Rifle Bn. 2 Batties/China Mtn Can Bn III;
      4 Can Batty/Mtn AR 4
    . Div Cavalry = 6 Sqdn/HR 9
    . 6 Batties/FKR 20, 1 Res Batties/FKR 21, Res Batties/FHR 7, 1 How Batties/Mtn AR 6
    . Lst Sapper Det 1/II
  . GERMAN 103 ID (GM von Estorff) = 9 bns, 2 sqdns, 12 batties, 1 tech comp
    . IR 32, 71; Res IR 116
    . Cavalry unknown; FAR 205, Mtn Arty Bn 4
    . Attached k.u.k. 1, 2 & 3 Can Batties plus 2 How Batties from Mtn AR 12 (not included in above totals)

Border security troops = 42 ½ bns, 5 sqdns, 20 ½ batties, 5 ¼ tech comp
  . Banat District (under control of Temesvar [VII] District HQ, FML Hess) = 13 ½ bns, 2 sqdns, 12 ½ batties 2 tech comp.
    Consisted of 5 sectors - Pancsova (Col Szabo), Homokos (GM Mrazek), Ung.-Weisskirchen (Lt Col Sagai), Berszaszka (Lt Col Minnach), and Orsova (Col Franzi)
  . Syrmia District (FML Adalbert von Tamasy) = 29 bns, 3 sqdns, 8 batties, 3 ¼ tech comp
    Consisted of 5 sectors - Grk (Col Hodula), Mitrovica (Col von Ybl), Nikinci (Col Guha), Asanja (FML Viktor von Jozsa), Surcin (GM Fulöpp)

Fortress garrisons (11 bns, 1 sqdn 8 ½ mobile batties), 4 fort arty comps, 8 Lst arty dets, 3 ¼ tech comp
  . Peterwardein (GM Grzywinski) = 9 bns, ¼ sqdns, 5 mobile batties, 4 fort arty comps, 8 Lst arty dets, 3 tech comp
  . Titel-Szlankamen bridgehead (Col Franz) = 1 bn, ¼ sqdn, 1 mobile batty
  . Brcko bridgehead (Col Hroch) = 1 bn, 2 ½ mobile batties, ¼ tech comp

Directly under the Armeegruppe
  . 3 Comp/PB 15
  . Danube Flotilla (L-Schiffs-Capt Lucich)
    . Main body - 7 monitors, 6 armed steamers, 2 mine-laying
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

 ships, 2 patrol boats, 5 motor boats
 . Semlin Motor Boat Det - 7 motor boats
 . Neusatz Motor Boat Det - 33 motor boats

TOTAL for Terszyanszky's Armeegruppe = 82 ½ bns, 11 sqdns, 57 batties, 4 fort arty comps, 8 Lst arty dets, 11 ¼ tech comps

Dalmatia-Bosnia-Herzegovina Command
Commander = GdI Sarkotic
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Minnich

Security forces
 . Drina security group (33 bns, 1 sqdn, 12 batties)
Had 6 sectors = Foca (GM Vukadinovic), Gorazde (Col Karpellus), Visegrad (Lt Col Ritt. von Märkel), Srebrenica (GM Haubert), Zvornik (Col Edl. von Hausser), Bijeljina (Col Streith)
There were also reserves (under Col Fischer)
 . Coast defenses (6 ½ bns, 4 batties)
 . Castelnuovo District (FML Edler von Weber) = Two sectors (Castelnuovo & Ragusa) with varying commanders
 . Mostar District (GM Haala, but under the Mostar [XVI] Corps command of FML Freih. von Wucherer) = Two sectors (Slano & Makarska) with varying commanders
 . Sebenico District (Counter-Admiral Zaccaria, under Wucherer's Mostar [XVI] Corps command) = Three sectors: Spalato (Major Skorkowsky), Sebenico (Lt Col Zabert), Zara (Lt Col Noltsch)

Fortress garrisons (42 ¾ bns, 1 sqdn, 40 mobile batties, 46 fort arty comps, 12 ½ Lst arty dets, 3 tech comps)
 . Sarajevo (FML von Rollinger, with Lt Col Franz Ritt. von Husarek as Chief of Staff) = 12 ¼ bns, ½ sqdn, 9 ½ mobile batties, 4 Lst arty dets, ¼ tech comps
 . Mostar (FML Maudry) = 4 bns, 2 mobile batties, 3 fort arty comps, 2 Lst arty dets, ¼ tech comp
 . Bocche di Cattaro (FML von Weber, who was also commander of 47 ID; Major Schuppich was his Chief of Staff) = 12 ¼ bns, ¼ sqdn, 6 mobile batties, 30 fort arty comps, 1 tech comp
 . Bileca (GM Anton Andrian) = 3 bns, 5 mobile batties, 3 fort arty comps, 3 Lst arty dets, ¼ tech comp
 . Trebinje (FML Rudolf Braun) = 5 ½ bns, ¼ sqdn, 9 ½ mobile batties, 4 fort arty comps, 3 Lst arty dets, ¼ tech comp
 . Avtovac (Col Wanek; his command was actually a "defensive district" rather than a fort) = 4 ¼ bns, 5 mobile batties, 1 fort arty comp
 . Kalinovik (Major Antosch) = 1 ¼ bns, 1 mobile batty, 3 fort arty comps, ¼ Lst arty det, ¼ tech comp
TOTAL of troops under the BHD command = 82 ¼ bns, 2 sqdns, 56 mobile batties, 46 fort arty comps, 12 ½ Lst arty dets, 3 tech comps

TOTAL of troops in the Balkans (in mid-June 1915) = 164 ¾ bns (of which 135 ¾ were immobile Lst bns), 13 sqdns, 113 mobile batties, 50 fort arty comps, 10 ½ Lst arty dets, 14 ¾ tech comps. 162,179 foot, 1775 horse, 534 mobile guns

Troops not serving under the AOK on the three fronts

Danube fortified line  (FZM Benda)
. Krems bridgehead (GM Hauninger, 1215 foot) = k.k. Lst Bns 25, 83; Lst Watch Bn II; one fort arty comp, three Lst arty dets
. Tulln bridgehead (GM Krasel, 1577 foot) = k.k. Lst Bns 63, 82, 84; one fort arty comp, two Lst arty dets
. Vienna bridgehead (FML Fath, 6074 foot)
  . 3 k.k. Lst Terr Bde (GM Freih. von Hartlieb) = k.k. Lst Bns 21, 22, 23, 64, 65, 92, 93; Lst Watch Bns I, III, II/39
  . Five fort arty comps, ten Lst arty dets
. Pressburg bridgehead (GM Ritter von Gologorski, 2856 foot)
  . 8 k.k. Lst Terr Bde (GM Ritt. von Grasser) = k.k. Lst Bns 59, 60, 61, 62
  . One fort arty comp, two Lst Arty dets
. Komorn fortress/bridgehead (FML Meister, 1385 foot) = k.k. Lst Bns 50, 55, 56; four fort arty comps, two Lst arty dets
. Budapest bridgehead (FML von Sorsich; 5492 foot, 8 mobile guns)
  . 11 k.k. Lst Terr Bde (GM von Grimm) = k.k. Lst Bns 85, 90, 91, 94, 95; one mobile Mortar Bn [2]
  . k.u. Lst Eta Bns I/7, I & II/29; one fort arty comp, thirteen Lst arty dets

Serving on eastern front under the German Oberste Heeresleitung
3 CD (FML Ritt. von Brudermann) = 1200 foot, 3244 horse, 12 guns
. 10 Cav Bde (Col Freih. von Spiegelfeld) = DR 3 [4], HR 4 [5], UR 7 [6]
. 17 Cav Bde (GM Freih. von Schnehen) = HR 1 [4], UR 4 [5]
. Cav Rifle Bn 3
. Horse Arty Bn 2 [3]

Total of troops not under the AOK on the three fronts = 32 Lst bns, 24 sqdns, 5 batties, 13 fort arty comps, 32 Lst arty dets. 19,799 foot, 3244 horse, 20 guns
The enemy forces

**Russian Southwest Front**, as of 1 May 1915
Arranged in roughly north-south order
(To save space, the brigades within divisions have been omitted; each ID or CD had two Bde HQ, numbered 1 and 2; ID also had an Arty Bde with the same number as the Div. An IR had 4 bns; the regts within the independent Bdes had just 2 bns apiece.)

4 Army
- XIV Corps
  - 18 ID = IR Ryazan # 69, Ryask # 70, Belev # 71, Tula # 72
  - 45 ID = IR Izbov # 177, Venden # 178, Ust-Dvinsk # 179, Vindau # 180
- XVI Corps
  - 41 ID = IR Alexandropol # 161, Akhaltsykh # 162, Lenkovan-Nasheburg # 163, Zakatal # 164
  - 47 ID = IR Bash Kadiklaya # 185, Avlanduz # 186, Avars # 187, Kars # 188
- Grenadier Corps
  - 1 Gren Div = Regts Ekaterinsolav # 1, Rostov # 2, Pernau # 3, Nesvizh # 4
  - 2 Gren Div = Regts Kiev # 5, Tauride # 6, Samogitia # 7, Moscow # 8
- XXV Corps
  - 3 Gren Div = Regts Siberia # 9, Malorossia # 10, Fanagoria # 11, Astrakhan # 12
  - 46 ID = IR Ostrolenka # 181, Grokhov # 182, Pultusk # 183, Varchan # 184
- XXXI Corps
  - 75 ID = IR Kovel # 297, Mstislav # 298, Dubrin # 299, Zaslovsk # 300
  - 83 ID = IR Buzuluk # 329, Zlatoust # 330, Ora # 331, Oboyan # 332
- 13 CD = DR Military Order # 13, UR Vladimir # 13, HR Narva # 13, Orenburg Coss Regt # 2
- Ural Coss Div = Ural Coss Regts # 4, 5, 6, 7
- 1 Trans-Baikal Coss Bde = T-B Coss Regts Argun # 1, Chita # 1, Verkhne-Udin # 1
- Militia - 19, 22, 24 and 84 Opolcheniye Brigades

3 Army
- IX Corps
  - 5 ID = IR Archangel # 17, Vologda # 18, Kostrom # 19, Galicia # 20
  - 42 ID = IR Luck # 165, Rovno # 166, Ostroisk # 167,
Mirgorod # 168
  . 70 ID = IR Pereiaslav # 277, Krom # 278, Lochvitsk # 279, Sursk # 280
  
  X Corps
  . 9 ID = IR Yelets # 33, Sievsk # 34, Bryansk # 35, Orel # 36
  . 31 ID = IR Pensa # 121, Tambov # 122, Kozlov # 123, Voronezh # 124
  . 61 ID = IR Siedlec # 241, Lukov # 242, Cholm # 243, Krasnostaw # 244
  . 63 ID = IR Dunai # 249, Baltin # 250, Stavuchan # 251, Khotin # 252

XXIV Corps
  . 48 ID = IR Ismail # 189, Ochakov # 190, Largo-Kagul # 191, Rymnik # 192
  . 49 ID = IR Sviash # 193, Troitsk-Sergiev # 194, Orovais # 195, Insarsk # 196

XII Corps
  . 12 ID = IR Azov # 45, Dnieper # 46, Ukraine # 47, Odessa # 48
  . 19 ID = IR Crimea # 73, Stavropol # 74, Sevastopol # 75, Kuban # 76
  . 12 Siberian Rifle Div = Siberian Regts # 41, 42, 43, 44

XXI Corps
  . 33 ID = IR Bessarabia # 129, Cherson # 130, Tiraspol # 131, Bender # 132
  . 44 ID = IR Kamenets # 173, Romensk, # 174, Baturisk # 175, Perevolochesk # 176

XXIX Corps
  . 81 ID = IR Oksk # 321, Soligulitschk # 322, Inriefetsk # 323, Kliasiminsk # 324
  . 3 Rifle Bde = Rifle Regts # 9, 10, 11, 12 (2 bns each)

III Caucasian Corps (arriving)
  . 21 ID = IR Apsheron # 81, Dagestan # 82, Samara # 83, Shirvan # 84
  . 52 ID = IR Chemakhin # 205, Salyan # 206, Novohaya Zetsk # 207, Loris # 208

  7 CD = DR Kinburn # 7, UR Olviopol # 7, HR Belarus # 7, Don Coss Regt # 11
  . 16 CD = HR Chernigov # 17 and Nezhin # 18; UR New Arcanhgel # 17 and Novomirgorod # 18

  3 Cauc Coss Div = Ekaterinograd Coss Regt # 1, Ossetia Horse Regt, Kizlyar-Greben Coss Regt # 1, Dagestan Horse Regt # 1
  . 2 Combined Coss Div = Don Coss Regts # 16 and 17; Line (Kuban) Coss Regt # 1, Volga (Terek) Coss Regt # 1
  . 3 Don Coss Div = Don Coss Regts # 18, 20, 30, 32

  Militia - 21, 25, 26, 27, 81 Opolcheniye Brigades
8 Army
  . VIII Corps
    . 13 ID = IR Brest # 49, Bialystok # 50, Lithuania # 51, Vilna # 52
    . 15 ID = IR Modlin # 57, Praga # 58, Lublin # 59, Zamosc # 60
    . 35 ID = IR Nezhin # 137, Bolkhov # 138, Morshansk # 139, Sarai # 140
  . XVII Corps
    . 3 ID = IR Old Ingria # 9, New Ingria # 10, Pskov # 11, Velikiye Luki # 12
    . 14 ID = IR Volhynia # 53, Minsk # 54, Podolia # 55, Zhitomir # 56
  . XXVIII Corps
    . 23 ID = IR Belomorsk # 89, Onezhsk # 90, Dvina # 91, Pechersk # 92
    . 60 ID = IR Grazhvoron # 237, Vetluzh # 238, Konstantinograd # 239, Vavr # 240
  . VII Corps
    . 34 ID = IR Simferopol # 133, Feodosia # 134, Kertch-Enikol # 135, Taganrog # 136
    . 65 ID = IR Braclov # 257, Kishinev # 258, Olgopol # 259, Eupatoria # 260
    . 69 ID = IR Bogoduchev # 273, Izyum # 274, Lebedin # 275, Kupiyan # 276
    . 4 Rifle Bde = Rifle Regts # 13, 14, 15, 16 (2 bns each)
    . 9 CD = DR Kazan # 9, UR Bug # 9, HR Kiev # 9; Ural Coss Regt # 1
    . Orenburg Coss Div (units unknown)
    . Militia - 40 Opolcheniye Brigade

11 Army
  . XXII Corps (each regt had 2 bns)
    . 1 Finnish Rifle Bde = Regts # 1, 2, 3, 4
    . 2 Finnish Rifle Bde = Regts # 5, 6, 7, 8
    . 3 Finnish Rifle Bde = Regts # 9, 10, 11, 12
    . 4 Finnish Rifle Bde = Regts # 13, 14, 15, 16
  . XVIII Corps
    . 37 ID = IR Novocherkask # 145, Tsaritsyn # 146, Samara # 147, Caspian # 148
    . 58 ID = IR Skvir # 229, Novo Volynsk # 230, Drogitschin # 231, Radomysl # 232
    . 80 ID = IR Drissa # 317, Chernoyar # 318, Bugumil # 319, Chembarsk # 320

9 Army
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

XI Corps
- 11 ID = Seleguin # 41, Yakutsk # 42, Okhotsk # 43, Kamchatka # 44
- 32 ID = IR Kursk # 125, Rylsk # 126, Putivl # 127, Stary Oskol # 128
- 74 ID = IR Izhora # 293, Berezina # 294, Svirsk # 295, Grazovets # 296

XXX Corps
- 71 ID = IR New Moscow # 281, Alexandria # 282, Pavlograd # 283, Vengrov # 284
- 2 Rifle Bde = Rifle Regts # 5, 6, 7, 8 (2 bns each)

XXXIII Corps
- 82 ID = IR Tsarev Gurev # 325, Bielgerazh # 326, Korvan # 327
- Trans-Amur Border Watch Div = TABW Regts # 1, 2, 3, 4

XXXII Corps
- 78 ID = IR Ovrutschk # 309, Szatsk # 310, Kremieniec # 311, Valilkov # 312
- "Several" unidentified Opolcheniye Bdes

II Cavalry Corps
- 12 CD = DR Starodub # 12, UR Belgorod # 12, HR Akhtyrk # 12, Orenburg Coss Regt # 3
- Caucasian Native Horse Div = 2nd Dagestan, Kabardine Tartar, Chechsk, Circassian and Ingush Horse Regts (or perhaps just 4 of these 5 units)

III Cavalry Corps
- 10 CD = DR Novgorod # 10, UR Odessa # 10, HR Ingria # 10, Orenburg Coss Regt # 1
- 1 Don Coss Div = Don Regts # 9, 10, 13, 15
- 1 Kuban Coss Div = Regts Uman # 2, Poltava # 2, Taman # 2 (i.e. just 3 regts)
- 1 Terek Coss Div = Regts Gors-Mozdok # 2, Sunzha-Vladikavkaz # 2, Volga # 2, Kizlyar-Greben # 2
- ("Warsaw") Guard Cavalry Bde = Tsar's Gd UR, Grodno Gd HR
The Italian Army
TOTALS - 857,256 men; 2121 guns (including 132 heavy, 320 mountain), 613 MGs, 58 planes, 5 airships. 415 x bns, 116 x sqdns and 326 x batties

1st Army (facing Trentino)
  . III Corps (west of Lake Garda)
    . 5 ID = Bdes Cuneo [7, 8 IR], Palermo [67, 68 IR]; 27 AR
    . 6 ID = Bdes Sicilia [61, 62], Toscana [77, 78]; 16 AR
    . 35 ID = Bdes Novara [153, 154], Milano [159, 160]; 42 AR
  . Corps troops = 7 Bersag Regt, 27 Cav Regt, 6 Arty Regt

V Corps (SE of Trent, on line Arsiero-Feltre)
(Mobilization of 9 & 34 ID complete by 23 May, of 15 ID complete by 31 May)
  . 9 ID = Bdes Puglie [71, 72 IR], Roma [79, 80 IR]; 29 AR
  . 15 ID = Bdes Venezia [83, 84], Abruzzi [57, 58]; 19 AR; attached was 2 Bersag Regt plus two Alpini bns
  . 34 ID = Bdes Treviso [115, 116], Ivrea [161, 162]; 61 AR
  . 3rd Alpini Bde = Three bns
  . Corps troops = 4 Bersag Regt, 22 Cav Regt, 5 Arty Regt

4th Army (facing western part of Carinthian or Carnic crest)
  . IX Corps (near Caprile; complete by 31 May)
    . 17 ID = Bdes Reggio [45, 46 IR], Torino [81, 82 IR]; 13 AR; two attached Alpini bns
    . 18 ID = Bdes Alpi [51, 52], Calabria [59, 60]; 33 AR
  . Corps troops = 3 Bersag Regt, 9 Cav Regt, 1 Arty Regt

I Corps (headwaters of the Piave; ready by 24 May)
  . 1 ID = Bdes Parma [49, 50], Basilicata [91, 92]; 25 AR
  . 2 ID = IR Como [23, 24], Umbria [53, 54]; 17 AR
  . 10 ID = IR Marche [55, 56], Ancona [69, 70]; 20 AR; some attached Alpini and Finance bns
  . Corps troops = 8 Bersag Regt, 21 Cav Regt, 8 Arty Regt

Group Carnia (facing Carinthian crest to the headwaters of the Isonzo; complete by 24 May)
  . 23 ID = Bde Aosta [5, 6 IR]; its other Bde was detached under XII Corps; instead had 1st Alpini Bde [of 7 bns]
  . 24 ID = Bde Piemonte [3, 4 IR]; its other Bde was detached under XII Corps; instead had 2nd Alpini Bde [of 6 bns]

2nd Army (on the Isonzo from Caporetto to Gorizia)
  . IV Corps (down to Plava). Was complete on 24 May, except for 33 ID, which was complete on 31 May
    . Alpini Command HQ = Alp Groups A (8 bns) and B (6 bns)
    . Bersaglieri Div = 6, 9, 11 & 12 Bersag Regts; Mondovi Arty Group
. 7 ID = Bdes Bergamo [25, 26], Valtellina [65, 66]; 21 AR
. 8 ID = Bdes Modena [41, 42], Salerno [89, 90]; 28 AR
. 33 ID = Bdes Emilia [119, 120], Liguria [157, 158]; a Bersag Bn; 40 AR
. Corps troops = 5 Bersag Regt, 14 Cav Regt, 4 Arty Regt

XII Corps (in reserve at Udine; complete on 31 May)
(Remainder of 23 and 24 ID were with Carnic Group, above)
. Bde Verona from 23 ID = IR 85, 86
. Bde Napoli from 24 ID = IR 75, 76
. 22 AR (from 23 ID), 36 AR (from 24 ID)
. Corps troops = 10 Bersag Regt, 15 Cav Regt, 10 Arty Regt

II Corps (by Görz)
(3 & 4 ID were complete by 24 May; 32 ID was complete on 31 May, but in deep reserve at Spilimbergo)
. 3 ID = Bdes Ravenna [37, 38], Forli [43, 44]; 23 AR
. 4 ID = Bdes Livorno [33, 34], Lombardia [73, 74]; 26 AR
. 32 ID = Bdes Spezia [125, 126], Firenze [127, 128]; 48 AR
. Corps troops = 16 Cav Regt, 11 Arty Regt

3rd Army (on lower Isonzo, to the sea)
. VI Corps (covering front; ready 24 May)
. 11 ID = Bdes Re [1, 2 IR], Pistoia [35, 36 IR]; 14 AR
. 12 ID = Bdes Casale [11, 12], Pavia [27, 28]; 30 AR
. 1 Cav Div = 1 Bde [13, 20 CR], 2 Bde [4, 5 CR]; 1 Horse Arty Bn
. Corps troops = 17 Cav Regt, 3 Arty Regt

VII Corps (in reserve S of Campoformio; 31 May)
. 13 ID = Bdes Sardegna [1 & 2 Gren Regts], Messina [93, 94 IR]; 31 AR
. 14 ID = Bdes Pinerolo [13, 14], Acqui [17, 18]; 18 AR
. Corps troops = 29 Cav Regt, 2 Arty Regt

XI Corps (coming up to the front on the coast; the infantry were complete on 31 May, the cavalry on 12 June)
. 21 ID = Bdes Regina [9, 10], Pisa [29, 30]; 35 AR
. 22 ID = Bdes Brescia [19, 20], Ferrara [47, 48]; 15 AR
. 2 Cav Div = 3 Bde [7, 10 CR], 4 Bde [6, 25 CR]; 2 Horse Arty Bn
. Corps troops = 11 Cav Regt, 9 Arty Regt

General Reserve
. VIII Corps (16 ID was ready at Bassano on 31 May, 29 ID was ready at Sacile on 12 June)
. 16 ID = Bdes Cremona [21, 22], Friuli [87, 88]; 32 AR
. 29 ID = Bdes Perugia [129, 130], Lazio [131, 132]; 37 AR
. Corps troops = 4 Bersag Regt, 23 Cav Regt, 7 Arty Regt

X Corps (near Portogruaro; ready 12 June)
. 19 ID = Bdes Siena [31, 32], Bologna [39, 40]; 24 AR
. 20 ID = Bdes Savona [15, 16], Cagliari [63, 64]; 34 AR
. Corps troops = 18 Cav Regt, 12 Arty Regt
. XIII Corps (at Verona; ready 12 June)
. 25 ID = Bdes Macerata [121, 122], Sassari [151, 152]; 46 AR
. 30 ID = Bdes Piacenza [111, 112], Alessandria [155, 156]; 39 AR
. 31 ID = Bdes Chieti [123, 124], Barletta [137, 138]; 43 AR
. Corps troops = 13 "bis" Bersag Provisional Regt, 2 Cav REGT
. XIV Corps (at Vicenza; ready 12 June)
. 26 ID = Bdes Catania [145, 146], Caltanissetta [147, 148]; 49 AR
. 27 ID = Bdes Benevento [133, 134], Campania [135, 136]; 38 AR
. 28 ID = Bdes Bari [139, 140], Catanzaro [141, 142]; 45 AR
. Corps troops = Some Bersag Bns, one cavalry sqdn
. Independent Cav Divs (in reserve on Tagliamento)
. 3 CD = 5 Bde [12, 24 CR], 6 Bde [3, 8 CR]; 3 Horse Arty Bn
. 4 CD = 7 Bde [1, 26 CR], 8 Bde [19, 28 CR]; 4 Horse Arty Bn
Serbian and Montenegrin forces
Shown as of 1 May 1915 (only down to divisional/brigade level)

The Serbs
. 1st Army (guarded approaches to Valjevo from the Sava-Drina confluence) = Divs Drina I, Danube II, Morava II
. Belgrade defenses = Units of III Ban troops, supported by the Sumadija Div I
. Main body (S of Belgrade)
   . 3rd Army = Divs Drina II, Timok II
   . 2nd Army = Divs Morava I, Timok I
   . Cavalry Div (independent under supreme HQ)
. Danube defenses east of the Morava (under supreme HQ) = Combined Div, Div Danube I; Branicevo & Krajina Detachments (latter two composed of III Ban troops) (On 16 May the Combined Div moved from this area to join 3rd Army)
. Uzice Armeegruppe (guarded approaches to Uzice from east Bosnia) = Div Sumadija II, Uzice Bde, Lim Detachment; also an attached Montenegrin brigade
. There was also a large garrison of static and III Ban troops guarding the "New Territories" in south Serbia, away from the front

The Montenegrins
. Sanjak Armeegruppe (on the upper Drina) = about 30 bns
. Herzegovina Detachment (opposite Herzegovina) = about 20 bns
. Lovcen Detachment (opposite Bocche di Cattaro; size not indicated)
. Old-Serbia Detachment (not at the front; guarded Albanian and Serbian borders) = 20 bns
H. From Gorlice to Lemberg

1. The breakthrough battle at Gorlice, 2-8 May 1915

a. Deployment for the battle

The advent of spring in the west Galician hills at the end of April 1915 was a memorable time. Train after train rolled through Cracow and Teschen-Bielitz and also on lines from the south after a wide detour. Before the astonished eyes of the combat troops of the k.u.k. 4th Army, they disgorged thousands and thousands of soldiers wearing spiked helmets, along with their artillery and other equipment. Falkenhayn had selected especially skilled veteran units (including Prussian Guards, Hanoverians, Bavarians, and Lower Silesians) and given them the best available weapons along with well-proven commanders. Their plan was to accomplish something that hadn’t yet been done during the war: to break through a front on which the enemy had had months to prepare their defenses.

As much as possible was done to deceive the Russians. Feint attacks were made north of the Vistula, in the Carpathians and even on the western front to divert the enemy's attention from the real target. On the extreme left wing of the Eastern front, the German GLt von Lauenstein invaded Courland on 27 April with three infantry and three cavalry divisions; by the start of May he reached the Dubissa and the area around Mitau. A new and very frightful weapon, poison gas, had recently been used in the West for the first time. The German 9th Army was now to use it for a diversionary attack at Skiernewice (south of the Bzura); unfavorable wind conditions, however, forced the postponement of this operation until 2 May. The 11th Army was unable to make a similar effort at Gorlice because the gas didn’t arrive on time.

In west Galicia itself, further measures were taken to keep the attack a secret. Col. von Seeckt, Mackensen's Chief of Staff, would have gladly forced the entire civilian population of the deployment area from their homes. Instead, measures were taken to conceal troop movements from observation by the Russians. No large formations were on the roads in late morning or early afternoon, the times when enemy planes were in the air. Close to the front, all movement was restricted to the night hours. The first German officers who arrived to prepare the relief of the Aus-Hung. soldiers wore Austrian headgear instead of their own
helmets.

On 22 April the AOK, after consultation with the German OHL, had issued the basic orders. 11th Army was to break through in the Sekowa-Ciezkowice area and thrust ahead with a strong right wing toward Zmigrod-Dukla-Sanok. The two divisions of 4th Army still stationed south of 11th Army's zone (10 and 8 ID) were relieved by elements of 3rd Army, which would cover the Germans' attack south of the Magora (or Watkowa) Heights, which stretched toward Zmigrod. 4th Army would hold the line north as far as the Vistula, while attacking over the Biala and against the heights which lay between that river and the Dunajec. The units in the Carpathians and north of the Vistula would pin down the enemy and hinder the transfer of Russian troops to west Galicia.

Following the orders of the high command, GdI Boroevic moved his reserves - X Corps (24 and 2 ID, 45 LW ID) plus 21 LW ID - to the heights east of Uscie Ruskie. Here they relieved the two divisions from 4th Army and prepared to attack with a strong north wing. 3rd Army HQ also sent 22 LW ID to the Bartfeld area by 1 May, so that it could follow X Corps in the next few days. Thus Boroevic's troops would finally make the advance along the Magura Heights that had so often been discussed but never implemented.

Mackensen's troops began to arrive in west Galicia on 21 April. Movement of the first six infantry divisions (Guard Corps, XLI Reserve Corps, 119 ID, and 11 Bavarian ID) took eight days and 500 trains. X German Corps followed as the second echelon.258 The k.u.k. VI Corps gave up much of its line to its allies, and concentrated in the area on both sides of Luzna. South of Gorlice the Bavarians and 119 ID appeared at the front, north of the town the XLI Res Corps. The Guards marched into battle on Arz's left. The German X Corps was just arriving, with 20 ID at Grybow and 19 ID south of Zakliczyn. The AOK naturally placed great emphasis on a quick attack so that the enemy would be taken by surprise; they ordered the offensive to begin before X Corps entered the line. The opening was at first scheduled for 1 May, later postponed to the 2nd.

The commander of the k.u.k. 4th Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was placed unconditionally under the orders of German 11th Army. He deployed for battle in the following order:259

258Ratzenhofer, "Der Eisenbahnaufmarsch bei Gorlice" (Wehrzeitung for 1929, # 10 and 11)
259The description of the operations of the k.u.k. 4th Army are based also on a comprehensive report of General Staff 1st Lt a.D. Uriel, detailed to the Austrian Military Archives.
IX Corps had 32 battalions, 7 squadrons and 30 batteries; it consisted of 106 Lst ID and 10 ID, on both sides of Gromnik; FML Roth's Group had 46 battalions, 6 squadrons and 50 batteries; it had 3 and 8 ID northeast of Zakliczyn, with the left wing of the 8th on the Dunajec; it also had Col von Morgenstern's Landsturm Group and the German 47 Res ID farther north on the Dunajec, up to the Radlow area; FML Stöger-Steiner's newly-formed Group had about 23 battalions, 7 squadrons and 11 batteries; it held the Dunajec from Radlow to the point where the river joined the Vistula. The Group was made up partly of Landsturm that had already been stationed in the area (4 ½ battalions of Landsturm infantry and 7 ½ of Landsturm Etappen troops), and partly from troops that had been sent by 1st Army.

Initially 4th Army's reserves consisted of GM von Szende's combined brigade from XII Corps; its two infantry regiments (# 62 and 82) had eleven battalions, or about 10,000 riflemen. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand asked that 11 Hon CD, which had been relieved from the front, should be left in his Army; however, the request wasn't granted immediately, because according to the Berlin agreement the Division was supposed to join Mackensen. On the other hand, 1st Army was instructed to have a brigade from 2 CD ready to intervene on its south wing.

GO Mackensen and his staff took up quarters in Neusandez. At 6:00 PM on the 29th he issued the order for the attack. 11th Army was instructed to break through on the entire front and advance to the Wisloka between Zmigrod and Kolaczyce. On its left, the south wing of 4th Army would first capture Ryglice and the Gorskie Heights (Point # 403, south of Tarnow). They would also guard the north flank of 11th Army. A series of instructions governed preparations for the attack by artillery, infantry and technical troops. After reaching the Wisloka, 11th Army would shift its direction from northeast to east, and reach the line Dukla-Frysztak. On the first day of the offensive, the forward-storming troops would pause to make sure the units were all in

260 Szende had been commander of 31st Infantry Brigade.
261 The AOK at Teschen had promised to reinforce 4th Army by two infantry divisions; this was accomplished by moving units from 1st Army and from Kövess' Group.
262 "On 19 April, Col. von Seeckt had a meeting with Gen. von Conrad when he reported to the headquarters at Teschen; they reached full agreement about the plans of operations. Col. von Seeckt received several instructions regarding the preparations for the breakthrough battle. However, they were restricted to ideas regarding attacks in the immediate area of Gorlice. The Aus-Hung. high command hadn't made any large-scale plans for the pending offensive by 11th German Army." (From a draft copy of Volume VII of the German Official History.)
communication. On this day the German X Corps would follow the first wave up to the Dunajec.

For the offensive, there were 733 light, 175 medium and 24 heavy guns between the Carpathian crest and Tarnow; 11\textsuperscript{th} German Army also had 70 "Minenwerfer" (trench mortars). Special care was taken to ensure that these 1000 pieces were used properly, which would be decisive for the success of the breakthrough.\footnote{The number of guns is taken from a report by GM d.R. Hornung.}

The numerous aerial reports about the deployment of the opposing Russian forces turned out to be almost entirely correct.\footnote{Ronge, pp. 155 ff.} X Russian Corps was deployed between Gladyszow and Rzepiennik (with 5, 42 and 70 ID), and IX Corps from there to the mouth of the Dunajec (with 9, 31 and 61 ID). They were supported by five militia brigades. In reserve behind the Dunajec front were 2 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, facing toward the south; III Caucasian Corps was farther in the rear, arriving by rail. Thus on the first day of the battle the allies with about 22 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions confronted around 14 Russian infantry and 5 cavalry divisions (not counting the Caucasians). This was certainly a sufficient advantage, further enhanced by artillery superiority.

\textbf{b. The thrust to the Wisloka, 2-5 May}

Without alarming the Russians, some isolated actions had already flared up on 30 April and 1 May. Thus the Bavarians of 11 ID took the village of Ropica ruska from the enemy on the last day of April. The artillery opened fire as ordered at noon on the 1\textsuperscript{st}. The infantry moved up during the night, which again led to skirmishes at several points along the front. The great drama of the battle began to unfold early on the 2\textsuperscript{nd}. The commander of XLI Res Corps, GdI von Francois, was at Gorlice in the very center of the first day's operations. He described the outset in a fascinating account:

"It was five minutes to 6:00 AM. The cannoneers stood by their guns, ready to fire. The infantry had packed their gear and pushed against the breastwork to hear and see what was going on.

It became quiet at our command post on Height # 747; every man stood in place with his watch in hand. The sky was blue, the air was clear, and at our feet we could see our positions and those
of the Russians, coiling through the land. At the right, on the edge of the panorama, was Gorlice with its cemetery heights; in the center was the green mass of the Kamieniec Forest, and on the left was the cubical Pustki Hill, the objective of the Austrians.

It was 6:00 AM. The 12 cm gun on Height # 696 gave the signal shot, and all the batteries - from field cannon to the heavy mortars - fired a powerful salvo toward the Russian positions. There were enormous booming crashes, as 700 guns spit forth steel and iron which streaked through the air. As the missiles hit their targets, they raised masses of earth with splinters of wood and defensive works a meter high. Beyond the Russian lines, smoke and flames also consumed farms and villages. Here and there we saw Russians fleeing from their trenches and strong points, but they were unable to escape our death-dealing shrapnel. Heavy flat-trajectory fire covered the enemy's routes leading to the front. North of Gorlice a thick column of fire sprang up, as high as the houses; black masses of smoke swept up into the clouds. It was a gripping, unforgettable spectacle. The tanks of an oil refinery had been ignited, either by our fire or perhaps deliberately by the Russians.

In the entire area the response of the Russian artillery was tardy, and their fire remained weak. They didn't seem to have many guns.

The watches showed it was 9:00 AM. A new sound was mixed in with the rumble of the artillery, as the trench mortars began their destructive work. Large and small projectiles flew in a high arc, visible to the eye, over our front lines and into the enemy position. The detonations were sharp and nerve-shattering. Trees were broken like matches, mighty trunks were uprooted, the stone walls of houses fell in fragments, and fountains of soil sprung from the ground. The earth trembled, and it seemed that hell was being released....

It was 10:00 AM. The trench mortars and artillery ceased fire. We heard shrill whistles. The first wave of storm troops left their breastworks and moved toward the enemy.\textsuperscript{265}

At many points along the lengthy battle front this shattering prelude had already dealt a death-blow to the enemy's power of resistance. Scarcely supported by their artillery, which was suffering from a shortage of ammunition, some of the Russian infantry fled this hell, either toward the rear or by going over to the enemy. Others cowered in their trenches, fully aware that

\textsuperscript{265}Francois, "Gorlice 1915" (Leipzig, 1922); pp. 47 ff.
the outcome would be their death, wounding or imprisonment. FML Arz described this aspect of the fighting in his narrative of the capture of the forward lines on the Pustki Hill northeast of Luzna:

"...Our tension reached its height when the infantry moved forward at 10:00 sharp. Advancing quickly, they soon disappeared in the dust and smoke. Would they succeed? The question was on everyone's lips. Then on the southwest slope, where the smoke began to clear, we first saw several men and then entire lines hurrying back. It seemed that the attack had failed. However, the returning lines became ever thicker and concentrated into masses of men which were much larger than those who had initiated the attack. Now we could see clearly that the masses moving like lava over the slopes were - Russians. They were thousands of prisoners, who considered themselves lucky to have survived the hellish fire. The hill was ours, and the first break in the enemy's positions was complete." 266

Certainly, however, the collapse of the enemy didn't happen so quickly in every sector. Often enough they screwed up their courage to offer strong resistance in either the foremost lines or positions farther to the rear. They were assisted by reserve troops, although the latter hadn't been very well deployed. In these situations there was desperate fighting, in which both sides had heavy losses.

The advance on 2 May

The main weight of the battle was borne by 11th Army, which was seeking the breakthrough. In its center, the 82 Res ID of XLI Res Corps took the cemetery northwest of Gorlice from 61 Russian ID in the morning. In the afternoon the 82nd pushed through the little city - now reduced to a pile of rubble - whose name would henceforth be linked with that of one of the greatest battles in the history of the world. On the right of the Reserve Corps, 119 ID moved through the south end of Gorlice. The southern group of the 119th assisted 11 Bavarian ID, which stormed the Zamczysko Hill 3 km east of Sekowa with its usual elan. 267 Aus-Hung. mountain batteries successfully accompanied the Germans during the difficult attack. On this day the commander of the Combined

266Arz, p. 60
267Operations of Imperial German troops will be described in this work only in as much detail as needed to make the activities of the Aus-Hung. units understandable. This part of the narrative is based on documents in the Austrian Military Archives, on a draft copy of Volume VII of the German Official History, on Francois' "Gorlice", and finally on "Gorlice" (Vol. XXX of the series "Schlachten des Weltkrieges"), by Tile (Oldenburg, 1930).
Corps (119 German and 11 Bavarian ID) was the leader of the Bavarians, GM Ritter von Kneussl. In the evening, when 20 ID joined the command, Kneussl was succeeded by GdI von Emmich, the commander of X German Corps.

The 81 Res ID of XLI Res Corps fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the k.u.k VI Corps. FML Kestranek's west Galician-Sudeten 12 ID of VI Corps had already taken the village of Luzna from the Russians on the night of 30 April-1 May. On the 2nd, as noted above in von Francois' narrative, the Division's objective was the Pustki Hill, which the Russians had turned into a fortress. FML Arz, commander of VI Corps, bombarded the position with 72 guns, which seriously shook up the defenders. Toward noon the IR # 56 (a local unit from Wadowice) captured the summit of the important hill. Despite the success of the initial onslaught, the Russian 31 ID didn't fully evacuate its works until the early hours of the afternoon. Meanwhile, 81 Res ID was engaged in the stoutly defended Kamieniec Forest southeast of Luzna; on the other side of 12 ID, the Hungarian-Slovak 39 Hon ID (FML Hadfy) strove to take the Wiatrowki Heights despite the Russians' flanking fire from the north. After the Pustki Hill was secure, GM von Metz (commander of 23 Inf Bde, who was leading all of the infantry of 12 ID in the assault) didn't hesitate to send troops to help both neighboring divisions. Thus the Kamieniec Forest was taken toward 5:00 PM and the Wiatrowki Heights when darkness fell. At the same time the Prussian Guards were advancing steadily to Rzepiennik.

In IX Corps (the right wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army), 10 ID fought a stiff action with 70 Russian ID, in which it took the heights north of Rzepiennik; the gallant 106 Lst ID pushed ahead 2 km through Gromnik and also won some local successes southeast of Wal in see-saw fighting.

FML Roth's "Edelweiss" XIV Corps, whose components had been reunited, had as its objective strong points which the Russians had been preparing for four months. From south to north, these were:
- A steep cone southeast of Wal, called the "Sugar Lump",
- Heights # 481 northeast of Wal,
- The "Horseshoe" (a Russian salient), and
- Trigonometry Heights # 419 near the Dunajec.

The names of these positions became memorable to the people of the Alpine lands, many of whom lost young men on the blood-soaked ground before the Russians gave in.

---

268Riedl, "Der Gefechtstätigkeit des k.u.k. VI Corps in der Durchbruchschlacht bei Gorlice am 2. Mai 1915" (Budapest, 1928), pp. 20 ff.
Early on 2 May, the right wing of 3 ID from Linz (FML Horsetzky) stormed the "Sugar Lump" with KJR # 2 and one battalion of IR # 59. They took the hill and held it for hours against very heavy artillery fire and counterattacks by larger forces, but finally had to concede the position back to the enemy. During the day the rest of 3 ID remained pinned down in front of the Russian defenses. The Kaiser Jaeger of 8 ID took the "Horseshoe" at 7:00 AM, but couldn't make a decisive breakthrough of the enemy lines. This setback wasn't due to lack of self-sacrifice, which was proved by the casualties suffered by the attacking troops; in these days XIV Corps lost more men than any other sector of the battle front. Some companies lost all their officers and three fourths of their rank and file!

47 Res ID, opposite Tarnow, prepared on the first day of the battle to capture the extended bridgehead which the Russians had established there on the west bank of the Dunajec after the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow. It was now defended by two regiments of 5 Russian ID.

FML Stöger-Steiner's Group won a striking success on the lower Dunajec. With GM Schaible's 7 Inf Bde in the van, they crossed the river after midnight and built a military bridge in the first hours of the morning. The opposing militia brigades on the east bank fell back 4 to 5 km. FML Stöger-Steiner was given horsemen to assist his further advance into the enemy rear and to guard the Vistula toward the north:

- From 1st Army he got half of 2 CD (i.e. the 3 Cav Bde), and
- From 4th Army HQ he got 11 Hon CD, which at first was supposed to transfer to 11th Army.

The Russians also had to give up ground on the opposite end of the battle line, to the k.u.k. X Corps of 3rd Army. Engaged since early morning under the gaze of Army commander Boroevic, the 21 and 45 LW ID drove 9 Russian ID from the heights east of Malastow. The center and right wing of X Corps, as ordered, stayed in their positions.

Around noon, the Commander-in-Chief Archduke Frederick appeared on a hill west of Gorlice, along with the Archduke-Successor and Chief of Staff GdI Conrad, to witness the great success as it unfolded. Hundreds of prisoners, often accompanied solely by a few horsemen and obviously glad they were still alive, were led

269"Unsere Rainer im Weltkriege 1914-1918" (Salzburg, 1918), pp. 109 ff.
270See Schemfil, "Das k.u.k. 3. Regiment der Tiroler Kaiserjäger" (Bregenz, 1926), pp. 171 ff.
past the hill; this was evidence of the heavy shock which the enemy had suffered. The horrors of the battlefield took place on a gorgeous May day. In the next few days the weather gods continued to look kindly on the attackers.

The Russian reaction on 2 May

The Russian commanders were suddenly jarred out of their inactivity by the cannon thundering along the front in the early morning. Throughout the day General Dimitriev took measures to retrieve the situation, but they were totally ineffective. At Gorlice the main body of 63 ID, brought up from reserve, were at least in time to save the wavering remnants of 61 ID. A call for help by 3rd Army compelled the Chief of Staff of the Southwest Front to place III Caucasian Corps under the command of that Army. The Corps' first trains had reached Krosno, and were now sent ahead to Jaslo and Zmigrod.271

No less critical than at Gorlice was the situation north of Biecz, where a wide gap opened between the retreating wings of IX and X Russian Corps as Arz's Corps and the Guards continued to advance. Dimitriev assembled three infantry and seven cavalry regiments with great speed, placed them under General Volodtschenko, and threw them into the threatened area.

The Russians were also very disturbed by Stöger-Steiner's thrust on the lower Dunajec. Relief here would have to be provided from north of the Vistula by 75 ID, which sent a regiment to the south bank at Nowy Korczyn but wasn't able to check the enemy.

The fate of 3rd Russian Army was in the balance, and would now depend on the intervention of III Caucasian Corps in the battle. Therefore it was of great importance to the allies that Mackensen's offensive should not slacken on the next day. This shock group would ensure the operation's success by moving due east as soon as possible, thus placing the Russian Carpathian front in great danger.

3 May

Therefore, on 3 May GO Mackensen ordered his 11th Army to first take the heights west of Przegonina and Lipinki, as well as those south and northwest of Biecz and west of Olszyny. However, during the morning it was already apparent that the Russians holding the objectives of VI Corps and the Guard were voluntarily

evacuating the area. Around noon, Mackensen therefore added further objectives, after input from General Arz and from Freih. von Plettenberg (the commander of the Guards). By evening their divisions were supposed to reach the Wisloka between Zmigrod and Kolaczyce. However, they wouldn't be able to attain this goal on the 3rd.

Martiny's Corps of the k.u.k. 3rd Army continued to fight just to the south of Mackensen's left wing. Around noon, its 21 LW ID drove the 9 Russian ID off the heights south of Przegonina (Ostra Heights # 735 and 757) and also took the town of Przegonina. Then the Corps commander concentrated 2 ID and 45 LW ID on these heights as a shock group; in the next few days they were supposed to break free of the constraints of positional warfare, along with 24 ID.

Emmich's Combined Corps, north of Martiny, fought in cooperation with him. After a difficult action they advanced through Lipinki, even though the gallant 11 Bavarian ID suffered some substantial temporary setbacks. The divisions of Generals Francois and Arz had equal difficulty in capturing the heights southwest and northwest of Biecz (Wilczak and Dzial Krzemienny). Because of concern for the survival of his X Corps, General Dimitriev had made the rather risky decision of sending the Caucasian reinforcements into a counterattack on a 10 km stretch of front on the heights on both sides of Biecz. Therefore it was of great importance to retain the heights, which were assaulted in the evening by the k.u.k. VI Corps when it reached Biecz. Dimitriev brought up 63 ID and some other reinforcements from his Army's left wing to reinforce 31 ID, but they were not strong enough to prevail. As evening fell, the hotly-contested heights around Biecz were in the hands of the allies.

On Arz's left, the Guards reached Olpiny. However, none of Mackensen's corps were able to reach the objectives toward the Wisloka which they had been assigned by his second order.

The k.u.k. 4th Army was still operating under the orders received at the start of the battle. Its right wing was supposed to keep pace with 11th Army, its center to seize the Tarnow area (assisted by a flanking thrust from FML Roth's two Alpine divisions), and its left wing to push the enemy away from the lower Dunajec.

IX Corps was able to reach most of its objectives on 3 May. 10 ID was opposed by parts of Volodtschenko's Group, which it pushed from the heights southwest of Ryglice. 106 Lst ID drove 70
Russian ID back to the east bank of the Biala at Tuchow. Thus at noon the Corps had won the area that was necessary to cover 11th Army, when Mackensen set new goals farther to the east. In response to this changed situation, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand sent five battalions under GM Szende to assist 10 ID. In the evening, 10 ID was on the Doborlyn south of Ryglice, while 106 Lst ID had entered Tuchow.

3 ID had also played a significant role in weakening the Russian position west of Tuchow. It had permanently secured the "Sugar Lump" already in the early morning, and in the hours which followed it gained ground toward the Biala. While its right wing stayed on the heels of the enemy as they withdrew to Tuchow, the left wing moved onto the battlefield of 8 ID. The latter Division had worked its way through barbed wire in the morning and reached the main enemy position, although with heavy losses; however it was pinned down there for the rest of the day, even though like 3 ID it had been reinforced by two battalions from the Army's reserves. The Army commander had observed the actions of the Alpine regiments from a height near Wojnicz.

The difficult situation of XIV Corps was partly relieved when the Russians were driven from their bridgehead northwest of Tarnow. Here the 47 Res ID managed to bring two battalions to the east bank of the Dunajec below Radlow, which caused the enemy to evacuate all of their holdings on the west bank. Farther north of Radlow, however, Stöger-Steiner was unable to gain any further ground, and indeed had to fend off heavy counterattacks.

The Russians obtained a relatively clear picture of their opponents' deployment during the day. In the evening General Dragomirov, Ivanov's Chief of Staff, reported by telephone to the Stavka that GO Mackensen was attacking X Russian Corps with four corps, including the Prussian Guards. Dimitriev had already discussed with Ivanov the possibility of moving back the most seriously threatened part of the front behind the Wisloka, and asked to be reinforced by two corps (one each from the Narew front and from Bukovina). He also prescribed a relief attack by 4th Army, either to the west or over the Vistula to the south. Ivanov, however, still didn't agree that the situation on the Dunajec was that critical. He wanted Dimitriev merely to attempt to restore the situation by counterattacking with his Caucasians.

4 May

However, the Caucasians (whose commander Irmanov now also took control of X Corps) arrived on the battlefield much too late.
This was inevitable because they were deployed piecemeal.\(^{272}\) One of the two Caucasian divisions, 21 ID, entered the fighting on the morning of 4 May at Bednarka. They managed to temporarily delay the advance of Martiny's strengthened k.k. 21 LW ID and of Emmich's Corps. In the evening, however, they fled back with the remnants of 9 ID toward Dembowiec and Zmigrod. The k.k. 21 LW ID took Bartne and Watkowa Hill from the Russians. Martiny's Corps, which now included 22 LW ID which had come up to Uscie Ruskie, would next concentrate for a thrust toward Krempna; here they hoped to cut off part of the Russian Carpathian front if possible. In Emmich's Combined Corps, the Bavarians advanced from Bednarka half the way to Zmigrod; 119 ID drove the Russians from the heights southwest of Dembowiec. Farther north, GdI Francois' two divisions overcame substantial Russian resistance and worked their way forward to Osobnica.

The 52 ID of III Caucasian Corps hurried to help their hard-pressed comrades north of Ropa, but didn't arrive until evening. Nonetheless, the intermingled battalions of 61 and 63 ID in this area maintained a gallant defense against the advance of Arz's Corps and the Guards. Only after strenuous exertions was the k.u.k. 12 ID able to throw the enemy back through Biecz, while 39 Hon ID reached the low ground northeast of Biecz toward evening. On Arz's left, the Guards was able to keep pace with the k.u.k. VI Corps east of Olpiny, despite a flank attack by Volodtschenko's Group and a setback to the neighboring k.u.k. 10 ID on the Dobrolyn.

Early on the 4\(^\text{th}\), the Russians opposed the right wing of the k.u.k. 4\(^\text{th}\) Army with:

- 42 ID (reinforced by cavalry) in the strip of land between the Biala and Dunajec, and on the Gorskie Heights northwest of Tuchow;
- 70 ID between Tuchow and Ryglice, and
- Volodtschenko's Group southeast of Ryglice.

These units, along with the north wing of IX Russian Corps, were ordered to counterattack. However, they were hardly able to mount a coordinated operation.

On the Aus-Hung. side, detachments of 10 ID had taken Obszvar Hill (in front of the Dobrolyn) in the night of 3-4 May. Early on the 4\(^\text{th}\), the regiments of FML Horsetzky in the Wal area pushed deep into the Russian positions, which began to crumble. Under the rays of the morning sun, which as on the previous days rose into a cloudless sky, the 3 and 8 ID now advanced northeast over the blood-soaked battleground, toward the Biala. To their right,

\(^{272}\)Brussilov, p. 123
a brigade of 106 Lst ID reached the river and built a bridge and six footbridges, which were ready during the afternoon.

East of the Biala, where from left to right the other brigade of 106 Lst ID and the 10 ID were deployed, there was a setback in the morning, as noted above in connection with the operations of the Guards. The battalion of 10 ID which had taken the Obszar had to evacuate the position due to a counter-thrust by Volodtschenko. 4th Army HQ had long been aware of the great importance of the sector held by 10 ID. Now, at 10:00 AM, they decided to make the east bank of the Biala the principal theater of the entire shock group. 106 Lst ID should assemble all available men on the river bank, while 10 ID was reinforced by six battalions of Szende's former group (five others had already been sent to XIV Corps). Roth was also to send any men he could spare from the west bank of the Biala over to the east bank. Thus he should let Kralicke take the Gorskie Heights south of Tarnow by a flank attack east of the Biala. Then IX Corps would take the stretch of the Wisloka between Brzostek and Pilzno (this was also commanded by orders received later from Mackensen), and XIV Corps would advance on both sides of the main road and railroad leading from Tarnow to Rzeszow.

However, these instructions from Army HQ were strongly resisted by FML Roth, who had already prepared to cross the Biala himself northwest of Tuchow; he felt that a continuation of this movement would promise better success than the time-consuming redeployment envisioned by the Army. Therefore, after noon Szende's Group with detachments from 106 Lst ID attacked the heights southeast of Tuchow; soon thereafter 10 ID moved against the Obszar from the west and southwest. The latter division gained ground through the evening, and recaptured the Obszar in the night. The Russians launched counterattacks without regard for casualties, but were unsuccessful.

3 ID was able to cross the Biala northeast of Wal in the night of 4-5 May. At the point where the Biala flows into the Dunajec, the enemy was still able to hold onto a position east of Wojnicz, facing toward the south. Once again the Kaiser Jaeger had to pay for every foot of ground with their blood. To their left, 47 Res ID and Stöger-Steiner's Group were unable to widen their bridgeheads because they were fending off Russian counterattacks.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The original text actually says here that four of Szende's battalions had been sent to XIV Corps. However, in an earlier passage the number appears as five, and this is almost surely correct (since the grand total in Szende's force was eleven battalions).
Therefore the northern flank of the allied attack was hanging back considerably on the evening of 4 May, while 11th Army hadn't gained all of its objectives because of fierce Russian resistance. On the other hand, Mackensen's southern wing had pushed deep into the Russian lines, which were stretched to the breaking point.

5 May - Situation of the Russians

On the evening of the 4th, Dimitriev reported to his Front commander that the Caucasians were only able to stiffen the remnants of 70, 61 and 63 ID, and of Volodtschenko's Group. His entire front facing the west had only the equivalent of five divisions; the expected arrival of 13 Siberian Rifle Div and a combined division - whose movement was ordered at the same time - would still leave him with just seven. Only 4,000 to 5,000 combatants were left in X Corps; the average strength of its divisions was just 800 to 1000.

The retreat of Irmanov's group behind the Wisloka would naturally affect the neighboring segments of the front. In the Carpathians, XII Corps was called back to the Dukla Pass, and XXIV Corps to the area west and south of Zmigrod. On the north wing of Dimitriev's Army, IX Corps was to take up a position between the mouth of the Dunajec and Pilzno by the evening of the 5th. Volodtschenko's Group on its south wing would keep pace. Irmanov assembled the remnants of his corps (III Caucasian and X) between Brzostek and Zmigrod, still hoping to hold the heights west of the Wisloka.

The Army commander judged that the situation of IX Corps was even more dangerous than that of the troops on the Wisloka; the Corps was no better than a "thin curtain", and its militia troops were allowing themselves to be captured in droves. Under these circumstances he felt that the enemy would be able to break through between 3rd and 4th Russian Armies and destroy the communications between them.

5 May - Intervention of the rest of k.u.k. 3rd Army

On the allied side, Mackensen's advance to the Wisloka was the signal for the entire 3rd Army to enter the fray. The massive Russian concentration in the Carpathians provided an opportunity to cut off the retreat of these troops in the mountains. For this purpose, the high command ordered late on 4 May that Krautwald's Group should join the advance of the X k.u.k. Corps of 3rd Army, which was moving through Krempna toward Tylawa.
Moreover, the AOK ordered several hours later that the right wing of 3rd Army (the Beskid and VII Corps) should also advance. The Army's center (XVII Corps) would continue to just pin down the enemy. However, early in the morning of the 5th it was apparent that the Russians were also withdrawing in front of XVII Corps. Therefore Boroevic summoned his entire Army to attack out of the trenches they had held with so much difficulty around Easter. The high command was already instructing the left wing of 2nd Army to follow Boroevic's lead.

East of the Homonna-Mezőlaborcz railroad, the Beskid Corps found that the wing of 3rd Russian Army was still standing firm; therefore 25 and 35 Res ID only worked their way forward to the enemy's main position at Virava. West of the railroad, the 4 German ID pushed the west wing of XXI Russian Corps back to Mezőlaborcz. The k.u.k. VII Corps advanced into Sztropko without meeting opposition, but encountered fierce resistance on the heights northeast of the town from XII Russian Corps, which was withdrawing in phases toward the Dukla Pass. West of Archduke Joseph's troops, only GM Berndt's Group of XVII Corps was briefly engaged at Sosfüred; the Corps reached the Ondava on both sides of F.-Vizköz in the afternoon. III Corps, which commanded 24 ID (from X Corps) as well as its own 26 LW ID and 28 ID, advanced with the latter two divisions toward Krempna, on both sides of Alsopagony. 24 ID, coming through Rostajne, reached Zydowskie in a night march. The Army commander had hoped that 26 LW ID would be nearer to the decisive actions by day's end, but the Bohemian Landwehr had lost the ability to march quickly during their spell of trench warfare.

Meanwhile the opponents of the k.u.k. III Corps, the XXIV Russian Corps, had naturally retreated quickly to reach their allotted sector south and west of Zmigrod, because the danger to their right flank and rear was becoming critical. Actually only part of the Russian command was able to escape unscathed. The X k.u.k. Corps was advancing from the west; its 2 ID, along with 24 ID, reached the area northwest of Zydowskie. Meanwhile in the evening 21 LW ID, followed by 45 LW ID, struck detachments of the Russians' X Corps at Krempna, along with their 49 ID as it hastened to the northeast. Austrian artillery fire was already blocking the roads leading out of the Carpathians. To the north the Russians faced even greater danger, for there Mackensen's left wing had already moved a considerable distance past Zmigrod, the intended assembly point of XXIV Russian Corps!

5 May - Mackensen's thrust continues
For 5 May, the Aus-Hung. high command instructed 11th Army to continue its thrust with a strengthened south wing toward the line Dukla-Krosno-Strzyzow. The enemy was unable to maintain a continuous front on this day, a situation exploited primarily by Emmich's Corps. With 11 Bavarian and 20 ID in the first line and 119 ID in the second line, the Corps advanced through Zmigrod to the area north and west of Dukla, thus reaching the vital supply line of XXIV and XII Russian Corps. This was the prelude to a dramatic operation that would unfold in the next 48 hours in the valleys leading out of the mountains.

Despite the premature loss of Zmigrod, the gallant Caucasians refused to give up the heights southwest and northwest of Jaslo without a struggle. The German XLI Res Corps was engaged all day in bitter combat before they finally drove the enemy from the Osobnica area in the late night hours. 12 ID, advancing north of the Ropa as the first echelon of VI Corps, had a similar experience; they were able to make their way through the low ground northeast of Biecz without interference from the Russians, but then had great difficulty in advancing to within 5 or 6 km of Jaslo. The Guards had just as much trouble as the other two corps to reach the goals set by 11th Army for 5 May. The Caucasians stubbornly held onto the heights west of Kolaczycy until the evening.

To the displeasure of the high command, the k.u.k. 4th Army was still hanging farther back. Its lead division, the 10th, pushed ahead to the heights southwest of Jodlowa, in line with the Guards, and fulfilled its mission of guarding their north flank. Toward evening, Volodtschenko's Group pulled back over the Wisloka south of Brzostek; the remnants of 61 and 31 Russian ID concentrated north of Brzostek.

The main body of the k.u.k. IX Corps advanced in echelon through Ryglice toward Zalasowa. Since Kralicek's troops were considerably spread out, 4th Army HQ was concerned that they would lose contact with XIV Corps. 3 ID of that Corps had crossed the Biala, but 8 ID was still held up by 42 Russian ID at the confluence of the Biala and Dunajec. The left wing - 47 Res ID and Stöger-Steiner's Group - were equally unable to move forward. To finally break the stalemate in which the Army was stuck, on the afternoon of the 5th Archduke Joseph Ferdinand planned to move 8 ID from the west bank of the Biala and deploy it with 3 ID east of the river in a tightly concentrated shock group that would open the way to Tarnow. Late in the evening, however, word arrived that 3 ID had stormed the Gorskie Heights, without assistance from the planned envelopment attack by 106 Lst.
ID (GM Aust's Group). At the same time the Kaiser Jaeger reported they were making progress west of the Biala. Now 4th Army HQ relaxed. Just before midnight of the 6th, Mackensen asked whether it might not be advisable to move the cavalry assembled behind Stöger-Steiner to 11th Army; the Chief of the Operational Detachment at 4th Army HQ - Col Paic - replied that the enemy now seemed to be also giving way in front of 4th Army. Then the cavalry would soon find an appropriate area of operations on the plains south of the Vistula.

c. The capture of Tarnow and advance by Dukla, 6 May

Meanwhile the Russian top-level commanders had exchanged ideas on the morning of 5 May; there were some major differences of opinion. Although Ivanov was very disturbed about the course of events, he still expressed continued confidence in Dimitriev. The principal concern of the commander of 3rd Army was the danger of a breakthrough between the Vistula and the Carpathian foothills, but the Front commander believed that the approach of 13 Siberian Rifle Div made this prospect rather unlikely. On the other hand, Ivanov's Chief of Staff Dragomirov felt that future prospects were gloomy. He declared that the position in west Galicia was untenable, and suggested to the Stavka that the three Armies on the right (4th, 3rd and 8th) should retreat to the line Ilza-Jozefow-Przemysl-Turka; the new line would thus include the Przemysl defenses. At the same time, 9th Army would go over to the offensive. This suggestion received no consideration at supreme HQ, whose Chief of Staff wired Dragomirov that 3rd Army should hold out indefinitely on the Wisloka. Because of the situation west of the Vistula, the Stavka demanded that at least the right wing of 3rd Army shouldn't pull back further than the lower stretch of the Wisloka. The Grand Duke himself agreed, and on the evening of the 5th he told General Dimitriev: "The arrival of the celebrated III Caucasian Corps and other reinforcements guarantees that you will be able to do everything necessary to restore a favorable situation."

Worried about his extended northern wing, Dimitriev was mainly concerned that IX Corps should pull back from its exposed position to the line Szczucin-Pilzno. Orders to this effect were apparently issued in the morning of the 5th, but weren't received until night and then weren't carried out completely. Meanwhile 3rd Army HQ had received reports about recent events in the Jaslo-Dukla area. Although the data was incomplete (there were no tidings at all from 48 ID of XXIV Corps), it was clear that
the Zmigrod sector and the Dukla Pass would be lost, and that the
Corps in the area (XXIV and XII) needed to take up new positions.
Thus it was no longer possible to hold onto the heights west of
the Wisloka. Therefore Dimitriev ordered his hard-pressed center
to pull back behind the Wisloka and Jasiolka. The south wing of
IX Corps would retain a bridgehead west of the former river at
Pilzno. Farther south, X Corps would hold the area above
Brzostek; the Caucasians would hold the sector at Jedlicze and
XXIV Corps the one at Rymanow. XII Corps, on the right of the
XXIVth, would face due west, and hold the brigades of 12 Siberian
Rifle Div at Frysztak and Zarszyn (respectively) as a reserve.
XXI Corps would retain its position in the mountains east of
Mezőlaborcz. The HQ of XXIX Corps was ordered to the lower
Wisloka to take command of the reinforcements arriving there in
driblets (13 Siberian Rifle Div and 62 ID). Dimitriev
emphatically demanded that 8th Army should stay in place, because
he was determined that his own troops would fight to the last,
"no matter what it costs."

In these hours the k.u.k. high command at Teschen was
concentrating mainly on the chance to catch the enemy in a pocket
at Dukla. Orders were issued late in the evening of the 5th to
ensure that this operation would have the greatest possible
success. XLI Res Corps should cross the Wisloka south of Jasło,
Emmich's Corps should advance to the area south of Krosno, while
Martiny's Corps thrust through Tylawa to Jasliska. The right
wing of 3rd Army would secure the road from Radoszyce to Zagorz;
Böhm-Ermolli would secure the road from Wolosate through
Lutowiska to Kroscienko (southwest of Chyrow). The main body of
4th Army would attack south of the Tarnow-Pilzno highway; the two
rail lines leading into Debica would be rendered useless as soon
as possible by cavalry raids.

4th Army

The hopes of the high command that 4th Army would finally make a
major advance still weren't fulfilled on the Army's left wing.
At least the enemy had fully evacuated the eastern bank of the
Dunajec opposite 47 Res ID, and also Stöger-Steiner's Group had
needed to exert just a little pressure to compel the Russians to
give up some ground. However, the enemy had already rallied to
offer new resistance on the Heights of Dabrowa. Here the Honveds
of 11 CD, who had been ordered to advance toward Debica, instead
had to dismount to engage in a fire fight on the left wing of the
German reserve division. An intercepted Russian radio message

---

274X Corps had 31 and 61 ID, 16 CD and 3 Don Coss Div. General Volodtschenko
commanded a group on the right wing of the Corps.
clarified the situation. The commander of their IX Corps, apparently aware of the predominant opinion at the Stavka, had decided to only pull back his left wing; his right wing would tarry at the mouth of the Dunajec, where he could count on support from 4th Army just north of the Vistula.

On the other hand, the Russians were withdrawing in great haste opposite the center of the k.u.k. 4th Army. Without having to re-deploy as had been planned the day before, Roth's Corps advanced toward the northeast and east. The commemorative book of the Upper Austrian IR # 14 contains the following report: "The troops were completely exhausted physically from constant marching and fighting, and from insufficient rations because the supply trains couldn't keep up with their advance; men often collapsed from exhaustion...After almost 18 hours the Regiment, stumbling more than marching, reached Zwiernik275, where it paused for further orders as the Division's reserve. The orders arrived in the early morning."276

Detachments of 8 ID, along with Morgenstern's Landsturm troops (who then returned to service on the lines of communication), occupied the badly damaged city of Tarnow. Toward evening the main body of the Innsbruck Corps reached the hilly terrain west and northwest of the Pilzno bridgehead. Farther south the 106 Lst ID fought to seize some important heights; throughout the day they clashed several times with 3 Caucasian CD, and at night with the Russian 70 ID and part of 42 ID. 10 ID, with GM Szende's Group attached, had an easier day; they fired hardly a shot and advanced to the west bank of the Wisloka, where they camped for the night opposite Brzostek. Since the troops urgently needed a rest, Army HQ postponed the planned river crossing until the 7th.

11th Army

Despite urging from Teschen, GO Mackensen at first intended on 6 May to halt the right wing of his Army so that the center and left, lagging behind, could catch up. At noon, however, he ordered the right to push ahead toward Rymanow. On this day the Guard Corps, to which 19 ID was now attached, reached the Jaslo-Kolaczyce area; they captured Jaslo, but were unable to reach their day's objective, which lay 10 km further east. Under VI Corps, 12 ID came to Jaslo late in the evening. 39 Hon ID forded the Wisloka, which was full of burning oil, at the destroyed railroad bridge above Jaslo; they advanced south of the Wisloka

275A hamlet south of Debica.
276"Regts.-Gesch. des IR. 14: Ein Buch der Erinnerung an grosse Zeiten 1914-1918" (Linz, 1919), p. 38
to a point roughly where the Russians were preparing part of their new defensive line, a half day's march from the town. GdI Francois' 81 Res ID reached Zrecin, with 82 Res ID in the second line. On the right of his XLI Res Corps, the main body of Emmich's Corps took up a line facing south at Iwla and Dukla. Together with 3rd Army, they were instructed to complete the encirclement of the Russians attempting to flee north out of the Carpathians.

3rd Army

The two divisions of the most-imperilled Russian command, XXIV Corps, had managed during the night to break through into the hills east of Krempna by sacrificing their side detachments and rear guards. Although badly decimated, 49 ID reached its assigned station south of Krosno, where it held a long line from Jedicze to Rymanow, along with 11 CD. The 48 ID, following the 49th, suffered greater losses as it sought to break through from Mszana through Hyrowa. Fended off by the Bavarians, the Division fell back again to Mszana. Here, however, it came under rifle and artillery fire from the k.k. 45 LW ID, advancing from Krempna. Most of the Russian infantry fled into the forests east of Mszana; the artillery, with a suitable escort, sought to escape through Tylawa along the Dukla road. Here, however, it fell into the hands of GM Berndt's cavalry (from XVII Corps); the 18 Cav Bde and 1st Lst Hussar Bde were hurrying through the Dukla Pass while 21 Cav Bde rode to Czeremcha. The collision occurred at Tylawa. Although the Russians defended themselves desperately, whole detachments were forced to surrender. Other groups broke away into the area southeast of Dukla, where they would meet their fate the next day.

The k.u.k. X Corps lost 21 LW ID (which became the Army's reserve), but gained back 24 ID; after many days of marching and fighting, the Corps spent the night in the Mszana-Tylawa area, along with Berndt's horsemen. 21 Cav Bde reached Jasliska. Farther back, 11 ID of XVII Corps ended the day at Czeremcha, while Col von Bolzano's Group (IR # 81 and 88), 26 LW ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde were in the area north and south of the Dukla Pass. 28 ID stayed behind at F.-Odor. Along with 22 LW ID, which initially had followed X Corps through Malastow and Rostajne, the 28th was to return to III Corps; both divisions were normally components of this Corps, which would now transfer to the right wing of 3rd Army.

Farther east, the VII Corps followed XII Russian Corps, after 20 Hon ID fought some heavy actions southeast of Nagybułoch, and
reached the Mezőlaborcz–Czeremcha road. 1 CD camped for the night behind VII Corps' east wing. The Beskid Corps took Mezőlaborcz and advanced with its front facing to the northeast. Its opponents, XXI Russian Corps, gave little indication that they would withdraw any further.

2nd Army

For the last few days, the left wing of 2nd Army had busily sought to distract the enemy by increased artillery fire and feint attacks, while withstanding some isolated Russian attacks. On 6 May the 34 ID, which was on the right of 25 German Res ID (of the Beskid Corps), worked its way closer to the main position of the 3 Russian Rifle Div.\[^{277}\] The next division in line, the gallant north Bohemian 29 ID, stormed the heights on the Hungarian border south of Wola Michowa (Na Stobach), but then had to give them back to the enemy. Army HQ at Ungvar was meanwhile making all necessary preparations to bring its corps out of their positions at the first sign of a Russian retreat.

d. Continuing the attack over the Wislok, 7–8 May

Late in the evening of 6 May, Dimitriev had already advised Ivanov in a phone conversation that a further retreat from the enemy would probably be necessary. At the moment, the primary concern of the commander of 3rd Russian Army was the progress the allies were making at Jaslo. He felt compelled that night to order the inner wings of X and III Caucasian Corps to pull back toward Gogolow. In the same hours, Dimitriev received instructions from Ivanov that XXI Corps should leave the front and assemble around Sanok as a reserve. Because of the situation of XXIV Corps and the necessity of maintaining contact with 8th Army, Dimitriev asked that implementation of this order should be postponed until 8 May. Ivanov responded that at least the artillery of XXI Corps should be made available soon.

3rd k.u.k. Army

Because of these measures by the enemy, on 7 May the right wing and center of the Beskid Corps still met stiff resistance on the Beskid Ridge, and couldn't break through on this day. Only the

\[^{277}\]TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Although the original begins to refer to the Russian Rifle Bdes from this point as Divs, in fact the Bdes were converted gradually to Divs through late summer of 1915.
left wing made some progress forward, and took the heights on both sides of the bend in the railroad at Mezőlaborcz. However, the exertions of the attackers had an impact, as became evident when an intercepted Russian broadcast announced that Dimitriev had ordered the withdrawal of their opponents, XXI Corps, on the following night.

The other three corps of the k.u.k. 3rd Army (VII, XVII and X) were under orders to remain on the heels of the enemy units pulling back to the upper Wislok; for this purpose they pivoted to advance due east. On the right wing of VII Corps, 1 CD attacked the heights northwest of Vidrany, but in vain. On their left, 20 Hon ID stormed a strong Russian position in the mountains on the Galicia-Hungarian border (Weretyszow); the action raged until evening, when the enemy gave up the hotly-contested point.

On the morning of the 7th, the XII Russian Corps left substantial forces west and southwest of Surowica, apparently to cover the withdrawal of artillery and supply trains toward the north. These units on the heights southwest of Wislok Wk. and on the Wislok upstream from Surowica were finally pushed back after almost a full day of fighting, thanks to a well-coordinated effort by 17, 11 and 2 ID plus 26 LW ID. 17 ID of VII Corps reached the area west of Wislok Wk. Under XVII Corps, 11 ID advanced to Surowica, followed by 1 Lst Inf Bde; 26 LW ID, now assigned to the Corps, reached the area southeast of Krolik-Polski. Under X Corps, 2 ID halted for the night at Jasliska, while an advanced detachment ensured that contact was maintained with 11 ID and 26 LW ID to the south. As 45 LW ID marched to Krolik-Polski, they came upon the soldiers of 48 Russian ID who'd fled there the night before. Only remnants of the enemy division, totaling 8 weak battalions and 14 guns, managed to escape to the east bank of the Wislok. The Austrians captured more than 1300 men, 16 guns and 5 heavy howitzers. On 12 May the commander of the unfortunate unit, the ambitious General Kornilov, was spotted along with two colonels and five other officers by an ammunition column of the k.u.k. 17 ID at F.-Vizköz, and taken prisoner. Numerous stragglers held out for some time in the forests; pro-Russian elements of the local Ruthenian population protected them and helped some to return to the Russian Army. 24 ID followed 45 LW ID; 21 LW ID, which had rejoined X Corps, advanced to the Mszana area.

---

278Kornilov later escaped from captivity with the help of a Czech guard; he played a leading role during the Russian Revolution and the actions against Bolshevism. In spring 1918 he fell in action while commanding a White army in an attack on Ekaterinodar in the Caucasus.
GM Berndt's cavalry group (4 CD and 1 Lst Huss Bde) was now directly under Army HQ; shortly after noon on 7 May they arrived on the heights at Rymanow, where the 119 German ID at first mistook them for Russians and fired on them. Nonetheless the cavalry were able to inflict damage with artillery fire on the enemy's columns, marching directly to their front.

11th Army

Early on the 7th, the commander of 11th Army received a series of reports from pilots that the Russians were retreating in the area of Jaslo and Kolaszyce. The bulk of his Army would thrust forward to cross the Wislok between Hadczow and Frysztak and to secure the heights east of the river. The south wing would turn toward Besko and as on the previous days help block the retreat of the Russian units still in the Beskids.

119 ID of Emmich's Corps, the Army's southernmost unit, was gradually reinforced by parts of 20 German ID; it was engaged in heavy actions west and east of Iwonicz, principally with 12 Siberian Rifle Div. At Rymanow, as noted above, it made contact with GM Berndt's cavalry; at Besko it captured the crossing-point over the Wislok. On Emmich's left, Francois gained ground south of Krosno.

The divisions of Arz's Corps had already lost 4000 to 6000 men since the battle began. 39 Hon ID, along with German bicycle troops, took the city of Krosno; the Russians (from XXIV Corps) had pulled back to the heights farther east. The k.u.k. 12 ID, advancing in echelon left of the Honveds, collided near Jedicze with 9 Russian ID, fighting on the south wing of III Caucasian Corps. The Russians detected a gap in their opponents' line and launched a counterattack; finally, however, they had to pull back to avoid losing contact with XXIV Corps. They took up a position on the heights west of Odrzykon, one of which (# 326) was taken by the Austrians at 5:00 PM.

The Prussian Guard Corps, whose left wing was extended by 19 ID, were engaged once more with Irmanov's Caucasians, northeast and north of Jaslo. The enemy offered fierce resistance in accordance with Dimitriev's orders of the preceding evening, but finally were driven from Lubla back to the Wislok.

4th Army

For the 7th, Mackensen ordered 4th k.u.k. Army to cross the
Wisloka and to capture Frysztak with its right wing while the left advanced in echelon. The cavalry would spread out as soon as possible in the plains north of the railroad.

After Szende's Brigade had already thrust over the Wisloka below Brzostek during the night, 10 ID also gained the east bank above the town during the morning. However, despite strenuous exertions these units were unable to advance any further during the day; they were opposed by X Russian Corps, whose south wing was bent back toward Gogolow. Night had already fallen when the Russians finally abandoned Brzostek and fell back to the east. The other division of IX Corps - 106 Lst ID - also made just limited progress on this day; they won several local successes, but were still pinned down opposite the southern part of the enemy bridgehead at Pilzno. Therefore the Corps commander planned to have 10 ID thrust north on the next day to help the 106th.

Kralicek's concerns, however, were relieved by the advance of the Linz 3 ID of XIV Corps on his left. This unit attacked the Pilzno bridgehead from the west in the early morning; during the day and a good part of the night they fought the left wing of IX Russian Corps (70 ID and 2 Comb Coss Div) for every foot of ground. The Russians finally began to give way, and on the evening of the 7th some horsemen from 106 Lst ID entered the town of Pilzno. The enemy pulled back with great haste over the Wisloka at dawn on the 8th.

The enemy had been ordered to hold the Pilzno area as long as possible, because it was the pivot for the withdrawal of IX Corps as ordered by Dimitriev. However, farther west the k.u.k. 8 ID at Walki, the German 47 Res ID at Lisia Gora, and Stöger-Steiner's Group on the north also encountered very heavy resistance until evening, because the Russians received their orders to retreat to Radomysl and Szczucin belatedly.

Since the left wing of the Army continued to hang back, Army HQ wanted XIV Corps to swing to the north, just as IX Corps had temporarily planned to do with its 10 ID. Thus FML Roth wouldn't immediately follow the Russians to the east after their withdrawal over the Wisloka, but would first bring relief to the German 47 Res ID and FML Stöger-Steiner's Group on his left. Mackensen, however, opposed this plan because he felt that a continuation of the offensive toward the east was the best means to also compel the enemy to retreat from the area north of the Przemysl railroad. Therefore he vetoed Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's proposal. Meanwhile the Archduke obtained from the
AOK permission to place the units fighting in the plains under one HQ. For this purpose the commander of Ist Corps, GdK Karl Freih. von Kirchbach, was brought over from the north bank of the Vistula by the high command.

1) The Russians decide to retreat over the Wislok

Meanwhile the commander of the 3rd Russian Army was once again greatly concerned by the growing fragility of the front of III Caucasian Corps and the obvious threat that the allies would break through between XII and XXIV Corps in the Rymanow area; he addressed his laments in lively fashion to Ivanov and Brussilov. Dimitriev reported to the Front commander that his Army had used itself up in the last five days; it was absolutely necessary that he receive the support of two or three corps if he wasn't permitted to evade enemy pressure by a quick withdrawal.

This difficult situation of 3rd Army was the principal topic of a conference that took place on the morning of 7 May at the Cholm railroad station in the salon car of the Grand Duke. He had hurried to the town from his headquarters to meet General Ivanov and the Commander of Northwest Front, General Alexeiev. It appears that Ivanov's Chief of Staff once again brought up his suggestion of the 5th, that the front should be pulled back to the San. However, the Grand Duke rejected this idea as decisively as his General Quartermaster Danilov had done earlier. The Generalissimo issued a strict order that the 3rd Army could at most withdraw only to a line running "through the meridian of the lower Wisloka." Consequently, Ivanov - through his Chief of Staff Dragomirov - ordered 3rd Army to take up a position on the night of 7-8 May along the line Szczucin-Radomysl Wk.-Wielopole-Wojkowska-Haczow-Bukowica Ridge. Implementation of this command would obviously also compel at least the right wing of 8th Army to withdraw. Ivanov ordered this wing to deploy on the line Szczawne-Chryszczata. At the time this order was issued, it seems that the 8th Army had already been instructed to retreat to the upper San. This decision was evidently caused by concern that the allied thrust against XII and XXIV Corps could lead to their taking Brussilov's rear by surprise. 8th Army's rear guards were to hold onto Komancza, Jablonki, Berehy Grn. and Ustrzyki Grn.

Particular care was taken at Cholm to provide reserves for 3rd Army. The first available units were 13 Sib Rif Div and 63 ID, which would create a new XXIX Corps at Mielec. 8 ID was
transferring from the Narew along with XV Corps HQ, and XXI Corps was leaving the front and moving to a reserve position at Sanok. Although these reserves would be available to 3rd Army, no specific instructions were issued regarding their use. On the other hand, there was a discussion regarding whether XXXIII Corps, assembled on the east wing of 9th Army, should also be sent to central Galicia. In the last few days the Stavka had been watching the inactive 9th Army with growing impatience; when they prodded the Army commander, Letschitzky, he continued to complain about his crippling shortage of ammunition. Finally, on the 6th Ivanov issued a stinging order to Letschitzky to at last open his offensive. Hope for the success of this operation was surely a substantial reason why the Stavka continued to forbid 3rd Army to retreat to the San. The attempt to redeem the situation by an attack in east Galicia became more urgent on the 7th when reports were received that German troops had come to Stanislau and Czernowitz. In general orders issued at noon on 8 May, the Grand Duke let Ivanov decide what to do with XXXIII Corps. He also ordered that the second division of XV Corps should make ready to move to Rzeszow. Another corps would come from 4th Army, and the V Caucasian Corps - which had been stationed around Odessa for a projected expedition to the Bosporus - was sent to Lemberg.

On the same day, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch approached General Joffre with a request to immediately open a planned relief attack on the Western Front. The Grand Duke's appeal for help would not be in vain.

Meanwhile, toward evening on 7 May Dimitriev had issued new orders for the retreat of his Army, in accordance with the wishes of the Stavka and the guidelines of Ivanov. The Corps would occupy the following lines:
. IX - Szczucin to Laczki
. X - Laczki to Wielopole
. III Caucasian - Wielopole through Wisniowa to Odrzykon
. XXIV - Odrzykon to the Rymanow area (the Corps consisted of the 49 ID, remnants of 48 ID and a cavalry division, plus the 12 Sib Rif Div which had originally been in reserve)
. XII - South of XXIV Corps through the Bukowica Ridge to the heights west of Szczawne.

Behind the lines, XXI Corps was at Sanok as the Army's reserve. Shortly before midnight an additional order was sent to XXI Corps; after it completed its assembly it would attack toward Besko-Rymanow. No time frame was set for this attack, and the Corps wasn't able to finish concentrating until the evening of the 9th.
2) The allies break the Russian front at Krosno and Rymanow

On the allied side, the k.u.k. AOK gave the Armies their next goals at 7:00 PM on the 7th. The 4th Army would thrust ahead to the Rzeszow area; the 11th would force its way over the Wislok between Besko and Frysztak - its right wing would move through Zarszyn to Mrzyglod on the San, the left to Tyczyn (south of Rzeszow). The 3rd Army would break the enemy's resistance in the mountains up to the Lupkow Pass, and advance in the general direction of Sanok.

Mackensen was careful to stress to 4th Army that their primary task was to throw the enemy over the Wisloka; the main body should capture the Rzeszow-Sedziszow area, while cavalry took the Przeworsk-Rozwadow railroad. The best way to help Stöger-Steiner's Group was to push due east. 4th Army HQ naturally obeyed these orders. However, the Archduke was still concerned that the Russians, whose front north of the Vistula hadn't pulled back, could take advantage of the dispersion of 4th Army by mounting a counterattack. Therefore he advised his units, especially XIV Corps, to remember to deploy in echelon and in depth.

During 8 May, FML Stöger-Steiner's Group advanced to within 7 or 8 km of Szczucin. They had fought several actions with IX Russian Corps and perhaps also with detachments from 4th Russian Army, which appeared temporarily south of the Vistula before returning to the north bank. The security of the south bank of the Vistula, and of the batteries of 1st Army stationed there, was the responsibility of a regiment detached from 46 LW ID. Directly north of the river, the enemy evacuated several parts of their foremost positions on the lower Nida (including the strong point at Czarkow); this was in part due to pressure from the main body of 46 LW ID. However, the k.u.k. 1st Army - despite the understandable impatience of its commander - was in no position to initiate a decisive operation; it had just 50,000 riflemen to cover a front of 70 km.

South of Stöger-Steiner, the left wing of the German 47 Res ID pursued the enemy in some actions through Dabrowa and Radgoszcz; the main body of the Division pushed the Russian rear guards back to Lisia Gora and advanced to Zassow. To the displeasure of Army HQ, 11 Hon CD once more remained dismounted to fight as infantry, since their opponents still presented a solid front. FML Stöger-
Steiner's Group, the German 47 Res ID, and 11 Hon CD now made up a Combined Corps under GdK Kirchbach; the detached brigade from 2 CD was placed under FML Roth.

On the 8th the XIV Corps advanced on both sides of the railroad to the Debica area, without meeting serious opposition from the enemy.

To prevent the Russians from once more digging in, IX Corps strove to secure the Wielopole area. Despite the instructions from Army HQ to deploy in echelon, FML Kralicek wanted to increase his striking force. Therefore he brought 106 Lst ID into line right next to 10 ID. However, the Landsturm were unable to break through west of Wielopole, where the flanks of III Caucasian and X Russian Corps came together; nor could 10 ID break through north of Frysztak.

On the north wing of 11th Army, the Guard Corps (strengthened by 19 German ID) established a firm foothold on the east bank of the Wislok above Frysztak and at Odrzykon. The k.u.k. 12 ID, which had been holding back somewhat to secure the area between the Guards and 39 Hon ID, also arrived at Odrzykon toward evening; as darkness fell they captured the southern part of Korczyna and the ruins of Odrzykon from the Caucasians. This setback which Ivanov suffered at the hands of the inner wings of the Prussian Guard and the k.u.k. VI Corps made a deep impression on the Russian leadership. 39 Hon ID and the German 82 Res ID completed the latest defeat of the Caucasians by breaking their resistance on the heights east of Krosno. At Haczow, 81 Res ID of Francois' Corps made a significant dent in the Russian front along the Wislok.

The Russians were even more concerned about the Rymanow and Besko area, where Emmich's Corps along with Berndt's cavalry threatened to rupture the connection between their XXIV and XII Corps. The allies made progress southeast of Haczow, but their attempt to break through to Besko was a failure.

The divisions of 3rd Army, still moving due east, hurled themselves against XII Russian Corps on the upper Wislok. On the northern wing, X Corps advanced toward Odrzechowa with 24 ID and 45 LW ID. The 24th, in line next to Emmich's Corps, established themselves east of the Wislok in the evening, but still hadn't penetrated the main Russian positions. To their right, 45 LW ID brought a regiment to the eastern bank, but also failed to break through the principal Russian line. 21 LW ID, which was in the second line, was removed from X Corps by 3rd Army HQ; they were
ordered to assemble in the Jaslika-Czeremcha area on the 9th, and would soon leave the Army's sector for employment elsewhere.

XVII Corp fought southwest of Odrzechowa on the 8th; for this phase, the Corps commanded 2 ID as well as 26 LW ID and 11 ID. The latter two divisions stormed the western bulwark of the Bukowica (Zruban). While 26 LW ID pushed ahead to the hill by Odrzechowa, 11 ID attempted to capture the rest of the Bukowica but was defeated. This difficult task was then undertaken by VII Corps, which during the day had mopped up the western bank of the Wislok southwest of Surowica; as darkness fell, with 17 ID on the left and 20 Hon ID on the right, the Corps took the crest of the Bukowica despite desperate Russian resistance. The enemy was able to retain only the heights west of Szczawne (# 706), where Dimitriev's and Brussilov's Armies came together, against attacks by the k.u.k. 1 CD.

The Beskid Corps advanced to the area south of Szczawne, partly amid heavy fighting.

Allied pilots returning from the area east of the upper Wislok brought encouraging news. On all roads leading out of the sectors of XXI Russian Corps and of Brussilov's Army, countless wagons carrying supplies were moving north and northeast through Sanok, Zagorz and Lisko. Some of the columns had already crossed the San, and disappeared into the haze and dust. Also on the roads to Sanok were the infantry and artillery of XXI Corps. The railroad stations east of Sanok were full of men, and surrounded by hundreds of wagons. To the southeast was the glow of fires, set by the Russians in their usual fashion. It was clear that the Russians were retreating from west to east throughout the area. The task which the Central Powers' high commands had given to their armies - to destroy the enemy front up to the area of the Lupkow Pass - had been to a large extent completed.

e. Events in the forest Carpathians and in Pflanzer-Baltin's sector in the first week of May

However, the allies' successes didn't stop at the Lupkow Pass. Farther to the east, 2nd Army was also able to advance farther on 8 May. On Böhm-Ermolli's left wing, 34 and 29 ID of XIX Corps drove the enemy in the morning from the border heights southwest and south of Wola Michowa. The artillery hurriedly moved ahead, and substantial parts of the Corps spent the night in the

uppermost reaches of the Osława valley. Toward morning the entire 2nd Army climbed the heights along the border which Brussilov had abandoned. By evening, forward detachments were standing on the line Ustrzyki Grn.-Wetlina-Chryszczata.

Brussilov pulled back in front of the west wing of South Army as well as from Böhm-Ermolli. In the past few weeks, Linsingen's Army HQ had fretted because of their forced inactivity. On 2 May, the Honvéds and cis-Leithanian Landsturm of Hofmann's Corps had won a brilliant local success in a diversionary attack west of Tuchla; however, the Russians recovered their lost ground between the 4th and 6th due to the collapse of parts of 55 ID.\(^{280}\) Meanwhile Linsingen had approached the high command again with the plan he'd advocated at the end of April; he wanted to reinforce his right wing with two divisions, if necessary Szurmay's Corps (which had joined him from 2nd Army), and then to attack toward Dolina. The k.u.k. high command considered his ideas, but they were overtaken by events. At 3:00 AM on 8 May, Szurmay's troops noted that the enemy had evacuated the trenches to their front. The Russians hadn't yet pulled back very far. Nonetheless, Szurmay's Corps took Halicz Mountain and the village of Beniowa; a small part of the enemy's front was also taken by the left wing of Bothmer's Corps.

Under Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe on the allies' east wing, FZM Ljubicic had opened his diversionary attack at Osmaloda on 2 May. He had 21 battalions organized as follows:
- GM Weiss' Group = 9 Inf Bde (IR # 13, 93), FJB # 8, 9, 16
- Col. Kuhn's Group = IR # 5
- Col. Köckh's Group = IV Bn/96; 16 Inf Bde (FJB # 14 and 18)
- Corps reserves = FJB # 1, 13 and 27.

On this day, Ljubicic's corps-sized command captured the heights of Schlis from 74 ID, although they paid for their success with heavy casualties. On the next day, the right wing of XIII Corps fended off a Russian attack north of Nadworna. At the same time, the enemy sent reinforcements - totaling about two regiments in the next few days - to oppose Ljubicic's Group; this measure made it impossible for the Aus-Hung. troops to gain further ground. Meanwhile, reports were piling up in Pflanzer's HQ about an imminent attack by Letschitzky's Army of about 12 infantry divisions (including the opolchenyi brigades) and more than 9 cavalry divisions. An intercepted broadcast on 7 May finally confirmed that the goal of this enemy force was to break through

\(^{280}\) Hofmann's Corps had recently received some Ruthenian and Czech Ersatz troops who reduced the combat capability of his mostly-new units. At the start of May, six companies of Landwehr and Landsturm - composed of Ruthenes and Moravian Czechs - either surrendered without resistance or went over to the enemy.
toward Kolomea and Maramaros-Sziget in the next few days. The arrival of XXXIII Russian Corps in the Buczacz area made it clear that the main enemy thrust would come between Zaleszczyki and the bend in the Dniester north of Obertyn. Armeegruppe HQ, which on 8 May received the designation "7th Army" HQ, sent reinforcements to the most imperilled sectors. 19 Hon Cav Bde, two Landes-Schützen battalions and one Gendarme battalion went to Zastavna, while two battalions of Common Army infantry, two regiments from 42 Hon ID and the 8 CD were held in readiness at Horodenka. Moreover, FML Czibulka was instructed to have reserve troops in place behind his right wing. Command of the entire front between the Russian border and Czibulka's Group was given to GdK Marschall. The part of the front facing east between the Pruth and Dniester was given to the commander of XI Corps, FML Korda, who was directly under Army HQ.

The attack of Ljubicic's Group was halted by the Army commander on 8 May, because its future progress was doubtful and the general situation was threatening; the advance had lengthened the already thin front by another 28 km. Hopefully this would free some reserves to aid the Army's badly endangered center.

On the same day, the Landes-Schützen in front of Zaleszczyki reported a brilliant and unexpected success. On the previous night, Major Prochazka of L-Sch Regt I, on his own initiative, attacked the bridgehead covering the town on the south bank of the Dniester; this developed into a general advance by 30 ID, and the capture of the bridgehead.281 On the next morning parts of the Division crossed to the north bank of the Dniester to capture the city itself. 3500 prisoners were taken. Although this was a memorable victory, it came at an awkward time for Army HQ, which would have preferred to have as much of 30 ID as possible available to meet the anticipated Russian attack. The high command had already ordered on the 6th that III Corps, which had left the front of 3rd Army, should join Pflanzer-Baltin. However, its movement by railroad didn't begin until the 8th. Therefore the 7th Army would have to withstand the first Russian attack with the units it already had available.

f. The Aus-Hung. high command between 4 and 9 May

281Major Robert Prochazka received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order for this outstanding feat of arms. See Major Dr Czegka, "Der Kaiser-Schützen Handstreich auf Zaleszczyki am 8. Mai 1915" (Mil.-wiss. Mitt., Heft 1 of 2nd Series, 1931).
The fate of the Aus-Hung. high command was such that even a great success like it won at Gorlice could only be enjoyed for a few hours. Shortly after the leaders returned from the battlefield, early on 4 May, they received ominous news about the intentions of Italy. During the day the situation worsened, when a report arrived that our neighbor to the south had renounced the entire Triple Alliance. Falkenhayn sent a series of admonitions that Austria-Hungary should hesitate no longer, but should take desperate measures to fend off the crisis. The Chief of the Aus-Hung. General Staff fully agreed with this opinion and let the Foreign Minister know that it would be impossible for the Army to now bear the burden of war with Italy.

The tension was relieved in the next few days, when Burian was able to continue negotiations with Rome. The Ballhausplatz made some further proposals, and at the urging of Prince Bülow the k.u.k. ambassador, Freih. von Maccio, on his own responsibility offered the Italians more than his chief had authorized. However, Italy made no counter-proposal. Baron Burian reported the probable reason for this development on the evening of 7 May, when he met at Teschen with the German Imperial Chancellor, the two Chiefs of Staff (Conrad and Falkenhayn) and the two Minister Presidents (Stürgkh and Tisza). Through neutral channels he'd learned that on 26 April the Italians had made a more or less binding treaty with the Entente powers at London. The evidence was overwhelming that Italy would enter the war between 20 and 26 May.

An important political result of these meetings at Teschen was that the leading figures of Germany stated that they would stand unconditionally behind their Aus-Hung. ally in the event of an Italian war. However, the amount of military assistance couldn't be decided until the hour when it was needed, because of the tense situation on all the existing fronts. Diplomatic negotiations should continue, to postpone this hour of decision as long as possible.

Both Chiefs of Staff agreed that they shouldn't halt their offensive against Russia because of the threatening attitude of Italy; on the contrary, it was all the more desirable that the strength of the Central Powers should be prominently displayed before the eyes of the defecting allies. On 4 May, Falkenhayn had ordered that a new division (56 ID) should move from the West to the East. At the same time he asked Conrad to also send some of the k.u.k. units in the Balkans to Galicia. However, his Austrian colleague didn't concur. The transfer of 14 Mtn Bde from Syrmia to the Pola Military Harbor had already indicated
that the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff would use the troops of Archduke Eugene primarily as a reserve army for the creation of a front against Italy. Although at the same time Conrad spoke in a letter to Col. von Laxa (the Military Attaché in Sofia) regarding an offensive against Serbia by the end of May at the earliest, it is uncertain if he still believed in this operation. Orders issued to the Balkan forces on 8 May placed more emphasis on fending off a possible Serbian-Romanian attack than on taking the initiative ourselves. The danger that Italy's entry into the war would also bring Romania into action couldn't be underestimated because of the close relationship between Rome and Bucharest. On the other hand, the allied victory against Russia was again making the Romanians more cautious.

Meanwhile, the retreat of all the Russian units between the upper Vistula and the Lupkow Pass (and of some units even farther east) meant that the goals upon which the allies had agreed before the Gorlice operation had been literally met. However, the Chiefs of Staff were now fully convinced that pressure should be maintained on the Russians; this is proven by their face-to-face and written exchanges. On 9 May the German OHL moved from Mézières to the castle of Pless in Upper Silesia, just one hour's drive from Teschen. This was further proof that the German military leaders for the time being were making their major effort in the East, as Conrad, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had desired since October 1914.

Although full agreement had been reached on this issue, this wasn't true of the details of how the offensive was to be continued. Falkenhayn had no concept other than to seek a decision over the Russians by continuous pressure from Mackensen's Army. Despite the victory at Gorlice, however, Conrad hadn't abandoned the plan he had outlined in his memorandum of 7 April; he felt that the attack in the center and the subsequent operation to push the enemy back would never win as great a success as a wide-ranging envelopment. Significantly, in the first days after Gorlice he told his immediate subordinates that it would have been preferable to deploy the majority of Mackensen's units under Hindenburg. His desire to operate on the flanks made it easier for him to decide on 6 May to send III Corps, which Boroevic no longer needed, to help Pflanzer's Army which was threatened by a strong Russian attack. The Corps began to move by rail two days later. This

282Draft copy of the German Official History, Vol. VII
283The original intention of the high command was to send III Corps, made up of troops from the Alpine lands, to the Italian front. They changed its destination because of Pflanzer's situation. (This is based on a report by GM Kless, who at the time was a captain in the Operations Office of the
displeased Falkenhayn, who wanted all available units to join Mackensen's Army Group and believed that the victorious advance of this Group would be the best way to relieve Pflanzer.

Along with III Corps, Col. Bolzano's Brigade (IR # 81 and 88) left 3rd Army and was sent farther east; they would reinforce Corps Hofmann, which was engaged in the center of South Army.

Besides these matters, the k.u.k. high command was above all concerned with the question of how to finally get the enemy to withdraw from the area west of the Vistula. Since our own units there were too weak for a frontal attack, Conrad wanted to help them with a thrust from the south bank of the Vistula. For this reason, the AOK decided on the 9th to send 21 LW ID by rail to Tarnow on the 9th; it would be followed by two divisions from 2nd Army on the 10th. Conrad suggested to Falkenhayn that this operation should also be reinforced by divisions from the Western Front, but the latter refused. He was concerned about a possible Franco-British attack at Lille and in Flanders, which in fact began on 9 May.

Otherwise, for a variety of reasons it was impossible for the attacking Aus-Hung. and German armies to shift units around on a large scale. The menace from Italy forced them to avoid being choosy about where to seek success, but rather to seize opportunities as they arose. In general the armies would continue to remain on the enemy's heels in the sectors they already occupied.

2. The Russians retreat to the San, 9-13 May

a. The Battles of Sanok and Rzeszow, 9-10 May

On 8 May Mackensen's Army, gallantly supported on the left by FML Kralicek's k.u.k. IX Corps, had captured all the Russian positions on the heights between Besko and Frysztak in a sharp attack. This meant that the Grand Duke-Generalissimo's explicit desire that Dimitriev's weakened Army should continue to hold the heights on the lower Wisloka could hardly be carried out. Moreover, the threat to the Rzeszow area would make it difficult for the widely-extended IX Russian Corps to retreat to the San. The situation around Sanok was no better, and menaced 8th Army, which was still in the Carpathians.

Because of these developments, neither Dimitriev nor Dragomirov AOK.)
(Ivanov's Chief of Staff) wished to postpone the retreat to the San and into the blood-soaked hills south of Przemysl. However, the Stavka had decisively ordered that not a foot of Galician soil should be voluntarily abandoned, and this prevented the Russian commanders on the spot from implementing their plans. Therefore they hung their last hopes on the success of the counterattack which XXI Corps was to mount from the Sanok area on 10 May. 3rd Army was ordered on the 9th to stand its ground "no matter what the cost."

Continued difficulties of 4th Army

Of all the attacking allied armies, the situation of the Archduke's Army was no doubt the most relatively difficult. The attention of its leaders was focused mainly on the north flank, as had been true for days. On the 9th the enemy north of the Vistula had still not given any indication that they would abandon their positions on the Nida. On the contrary, an intercepted broadcast from Gen. Mishchenko, commanding on the south wing of 4th Russian Army, indicated that his XXXI Corps was supposed to counterattack from the north bank of the Vistula into the flank of Mackensen's Army Group. GdK Dankl, whose Army was reduced to just 2½ infantry divisions, was in no position to interfere with such plans. Meanwhile, however, the actions which FML Stöger-Steiner fought on this day at Medrzechow didn't seem to indicate that the Russians were preparing for a major offensive. Instead, they were destroying many of the Vistula bridges both at Medrzechow and at Szczucin. The main assignment of Kirchbach's Group was still to guard against a Russian attack from the north.

In the Debica-Zassow area, XIV Corps fought with 3 ID east of the Wisloka and 8 ID west of the river; on the left they were accompanied by the German 47 Res ID. In general these units advanced toward the northeast, but couldn't break the resistance of IX Russian Corps, which was still diligently digging in. The parts of 2 CD which had joined 4th Army were placed under Horsetzky's Division, while 11 Hon CD was with GLt Besser. If the enemy front wasn't broken in the next few hours, Army HQ planned to move the cavalry north to guard along the Vistula. The Army's reserve units southeast of Pilzno were moved closer to that town so that they also could be sent north if necessary.

The allied advance on 9 May

As in the previous days, the untiring IX Corps of 4th Army took part in the main offensive of the Army Group on 9 May. They
captured some important advanced positions at Wielopole in preparation for a major battlefield success. Farther south, 11th Army made another deep penetration into the already wavering Russian front. The Guard, reinforced by 19 German ID, took the heights on the east bank of the Wislok from Irmanov's Caucasians. The enemy saved themselves by pulling back behind the Slobnica Brook between Domaradz and Strzyzow. FML Arz's Corps, which had broken the Russian front at Krosno on the 7th and 8th, gained new successes on 9 May. Without waiting for the Guards, who were delayed for some time on the heights along the Wislok, the Corps advanced from the Krosno area with 12 ID on the left, 39 Hon ID on the right. They pushed through the Russian positions at Korczyna and beyond; this isolated the Russians holding out in that town and in the village of Kombornia 4 km to the southeast. The garrison of Korczyna was overwhelmed in a joint effort by the reserves of the two Divisions. A brief crisis on the left wing of the Honveds was soon overcome, and the defenders of Kombornia were encircled and forced to surrender. In these fateful hours about 3000 prisoners, including many officers, were sent back to Krosno. Although XXIV Russian Corps had been considerably reinforced, they couldn't avoid their fate.\textsuperscript{284} They sought to link up with the Caucasians behind the low ground stretching from Brzozow to Domaradz.\textsuperscript{285}

On 9 May the southern wing of Mackensen's Army was equally successful. Early in the morning, 82 Res ID cooperated with 39 Hon ID to capture a Russian battalion at Haczow. Emmich's Corps, reinforced by 11 Bav ID, threw the enemy off of the heights east and north of this town. The leading battalion of 81 Res ID reached Brzozow almost at the same time as the Russians.

While 20 ID assembled at Rymanow, the 119 ID of Emmich's Corps had to defend the town of Besko, which it had taken late in the evening of the preceding day, against heavy attacks by detachments from XII Russian Corps. The Germans received substantial assistance from 24 ID (on the north wing of X Corps of the 3rd k.u.k. Army) and from the artillery and dismounted riflemen of Berndt's cavalry division. Meanwhile, 45 LW ID took the western part of Odrzechowa from the Russians toward noon. In the afternoon, Generals Emmich and Martiny received reports that strong Russian forces were marching from Sanok toward Zarczyn; these were parts of XXI Russian Corps, which was deploying for its counterattack. Because of the chaotic marching back and forth, XXIV Corps was reinforced by parts of 58 ID and by two infantry regiments from the Przemysl garrison. One of the latter had to capitulate at Korczyna.

\textsuperscript{284} Apparently XXIV Corps was reinforced by parts of 58 ID and by two infantry regiments from the Przemysl garrison. One of the latter had to capitulate at Korczyna.

\textsuperscript{285} By 3:00 PM the 12 ID had taken 18 officers and 2250 men prisoner. However, the losses of Arz's Corps were also substantial again.
forth which was going on behind the enemy front, these reports didn't seem especially important to the allies.

Under XVII Corps the 2 ID, attached to the Corps at this time, reached the same level as 45 LW ID in the afternoon. The other two divisions were engaged in a continuous action farther to the southeast. VII Corps had spent the whole night in mopping up the Bukowica Heights. The Corps was exhausted, and insufficiently nourished because of difficulties on the supply line. In the morning they climbed up toward the Szczawne-Bukowsko Road, where they encountered another strong enemy position. They paused to prepare an attack on this line. 1 CD, except for some dismounted troops who were still in line at Wislok Wk., was in reserve awaiting the hour when it could begin to pursue into the Oslawa valley. This hope was to be disappointed. North of Komancza, the rear guards of VIII Russian Corps ensured that the Beskid Corps only advanced slowly toward Szczawne. The k.u.k. 3rd Army was unable to reach its objective, Sanok.

The advance of 2nd Army was also still limited by Russian resistance and extremely difficult terrain. Most of the units didn't quite reach their goal, a line running from Baligrod to the heights south of the uppermost San. XIX Corps followed VIII Russian Corps, which was pulling back toward Zagorz; the Russians left strong rear guards to block the way on the Sulita Mountain southeast of Szczawne and on the Garb and Szczob heights northeast of Baligrod. 29 and 34 ID were unable to break the resistance of these rear guards on 9 May. 43 LW ID advanced in echelon somewhat behind the right wing of 34 ID. VIII Corps (14 ID, 41 and 51 Hon ID) was no longer needed on the shortened front, and was in reserve in the Wola Michowa-Cisna area and farther south. Thus the immediate neighbor of XIX Corps on the south was now IV Corps, which was held up by Russian detachments several kilometers north of Cisna. A flanking operation by 43 LW ID east of the Chrysyczata forced these detachments to retreat, but failed to cut them off from escape.

The two corps on the right wing of 2nd Army were forced by the configuration of the mountains to advance toward the northeast (just as had happened to parts of 3rd Army in the January offensive). XVIII Corps - with 44 LW ID on the left and 9 ID on the right - fought with rear guards which XVII Russian Corps had left in the Kalnica area. 33 ID of V Corps stayed as close as possible on the heels of the enemy's XVIII Corps; in the evening they were engaged at Dwernik and farther east against Russian detachments which had been left on the south bank of the San. 37 Hon ID, following in the second echelon, hadn't moved very far.
past Usztrzyki Grn. by midnight, when it had to halt from exhaustion.

Böhm-Ermolli suggested that the right wing of his Army should move toward Stary Sambor rather than Kroscienko. The AOK agreed, especially since this would also assist the operations of the left wing of South Army.

b. The Russian counterattack

In the night of 9-10 May, heavy actions suddenly flared up in the area south of Sanok. The Russian XII Corps, which was still in pretty good order, attacked the divisions of VII and XVII Corps, but was able to push only 26 LW ID back somewhat. This Russian offensive was undoubtedly a prelude to the major counterattack by XXI Corps. General Dobrorolski, Dimitriev's Chief of Staff, recognized that this was a risky venture, but it "was the only means by which the Army could continue to hold its present position."

To secure the Jacmierz-Besko-Rymanow area as ordered, General Shkinsky arranged his XXI Corps in two attacking columns: 44 ID on the right struck toward Jacmierz, 33 ID on the left toward Zarszyn. 3 Rifle Div followed the left column as a reserve. The first attack seemed to offer some prospect of success, since a rather large gap had developed between 11 Bav ID (which had been drawn to the area south of Brzozow) and 119 ID (which was engaged at Besko). The forces covering the flank of the latter Division had to give way to the initial Russian onset. The German commanders, however, were equal to the occasion. While the Russians became engaged with the main body of 119 ID and some of the Bavarians, GdI Emmich brought 20 ID up from the second line, and hurled it into the battle at Jacmierz, between the other two combat groups. This maneuver received special attention in the Russians' post-war literature. In a coordinated attack, the 119 and 20 ID and 11 Bav ID hurled themselves on the Russians as they were laboriously working their way forward on the Besko-Gabonica-Starzenska front. The Bavarians flung back the south wing of XXIV Russian Corps near the last-named town, giving 20 ID room for its attack on Jacmierz. While the fighting here was progressing as planned, pressure from the south by the k.u.k. X Corps also began to have an effect. 24 ID was pinned down in fighting at Besko. However the 45 LW ID, supported by 2 ID, took all of the high ground by Odrzechowa from the enemy by afternoon. At the same time the main body of XVII Corps was making progress southeast of Odrzechowa. To assist the Germans, FML Martiny now
sent 45 LW ID toward Zarszyn, covered by the artillery which had moved up to Odrzechowa. Thus Emmich's planned encirclement of Shkinsky would be complete. 45 LW ID began its attack at 7:00 PM, but was held up an enemy group that was thrown together in great haste.

Meanwhile the Russian XXI Corps also found itself menaced by a flank attack at Jacmierz by the 20 German ID. This sealed the fate of the enemy's counterattack. As night fell, Shkinsky's regiments fell back quickly toward Sanok and Izdebki. The Russian relief thrust had failed.

The allied advance continues

The allies fighting north of the Sanok battlefield were as successful as their neighbors on the right. XLI Res Corps threw the Russians back at Brzozow and in the evening was southwest of Izdebki, while their advance guards were engaged with the parts of XXIV Corps which had been defeated by 11 Bav ID. Under the k.u.k. VI Corps, 39 Hon ID was again engaged in heavier fighting at Domaradz. The Honveds attacked through Barycz and up to the hamlet of Ujazdy, just east of the fork in the road; the defenders of Ujazdy were driven out the next morning. North of 39 Hon ID, the 12 ID was hanging back somewhat because of the bad roads; they moved through the trenches east of Lutcza, which the Russians abandoned without a struggle, and their advanced guards reached a point 6 km from Blazowa.

The north wing of Russian XXIV Corps and the main body of III Caucasian Corps were driven by the Guards (with the attached 19 German ID) through Niebleyc and Strzyzow. Two regiments from 13 Sib Rifle Div hastily came up and managed to delay the further retreat in the area southwest of Rzeszow, but not to halt it completely. The newly-arrived 56 German ID, following the Guards, reached the Frysztak area.

Kralicek's Corps of the k.u.k. 4th Army, which had been unable on the preceding day to defeat the inner wings of the Caucasians and X Russian Corps at Wielopole, accomplished this difficult task on the 10th. The proven 106 Lst ID first ripped open the enemy position south of the town. The break in the line was quickly widened by 5 km. Without pausing, the entire Corps pushed into the crumbling front of the enemy, who left 2800 prisoners in the hands of 106 Div alone.

The advance of IX Corps was assisted by the south wing of 3 ID, which attacked toward the heights east of Laczki and forced their
way into the position in heavy fighting that lasted into the afternoon. Opposite the center and left wing of 4th Army, the Russian IX Corps evacuated the positions northeast of Debica, at Zassow and Radomysl Wk., and near Szczucin. Although the main body of 3 ID won a local success at Debica, as did 8 ID east of Zassow and 47 Res ID near Radomysl, in general the fact that the Russians still held a strong line facing southwest was a serious concern for Army HQ. In the afternoon, HQ decided to reinforce 8 ID in the early morning of the 11th to finally break through along the western bank of the Wisloka. Then, however, they learned from an enemy broadcast that the IX Russian Corps would retreat behind the lower Wisloka to the line Mielec-Sediszow. This opened new possibilities for 4th Army.

On 10 May, Böhm-Ermolli's Army on the other wing of the central Galicia front encountered very heavy resistance. Brussilov was determined to retain control of the southern slope of Odryt Ridge and the sectors to its right and left because of the counterattack of XXI Corps and the dangerous situation of XII Corps. Also he wanted to give his supply trains time to escape the mountains before they were overtaken by disaster. Although GdK Böhm-Ermolli demanded that his troops should take the Magura Lomnianska and Zukow Ridge, they were unable to do so; nor did they reach the San at Lisko.

Under V Corps, 33 ID drove the Russian rearguard away from the uppermost stretch of the San, which was swollen with high water; the Hungarians themselves gained the river's north bank at Dwiernik. Only on the Czereszanka Heights east of Dwiernik were the Russians able to retain part of the south bank. In an effort to spare his troops a frontal assault, GdK Böhm-Ermolli asked the German South Army to have Szurmay's Group intervene from the flank. However, by the next day this assistance was no longer necessary.

To the left of V Corps, the XVIII Corps established itself with 9 ID and 44 LW ID on the slopes southwest of Height # 846. Still farther to the left, IV Corps (31 and 32 ID, 13 LW ID) fought on both sides of the Solinka and at Baligrod; its attack on the heights northeast of Baligrod was postponed to the 11th. Under XIX Corps, 29 ID was engaged during the 10th in actions against the Szczob and Garb heights. When the Bohemians stormed the Szczob after midnight, they found that the enemy had withdrawn. On the left wing of XIX Corps, 34 ID took part in the attack by the German Beskid Corps against Sulita Heights; the Russians abandoned this stubbornly defended position as the evening sun was sinking.
At this point GdK Böhm-Ermolli had substantial reserves available. The units in the second line were: 37 Hon ID on the right wing, VIII Corps (with three divisions) behind XVIII Corps, 27 ID behind IV Corps, and 43 LW ID behind XIX Corps. The Army commander intended on the 11th to send two of these divisions (43 LW and 51 Hon ID) against the rear of the enemy units which were still pulling back slowly from the Beskid Corps. Then, however, he received orders from the high command to get two divisions ready to join 4th Army. The counter-proposals of Army HQ were in vain, and 37 and 41 Hon ID were selected to transfer.

Szurmay's Group of the South Army had joined the advance of Böhm-Ermolli's Army on the 9th. 7 ID took the Kiczera sokolska heights (north of Beniowa) and 40 Hon ID took the Byczok heights. Then the Group pushed ahead toward the positions on and on both sides of the Ostry Heights. FML Szurmay devoted 10 May to the redeployment of the units on his front, because he didn't want to push too far forward while the neighboring V Corps was making only moderate progress.

b. The Russian counterattack on the Dniester, 9-12 May

Rather early in the morning of 9 May, the Russians unleashed the long-awaited storm against the k.u.k. 7th Army.

9 May

The Russian XXXIII Corps began to cross the Dniester at Kopaczynce at 4:00 AM, and overwhelmed the weak German 9 Cav Bde. Attacks undertaken elsewhere were clearly only diversions, and were repulsed easily. In the greatest hurry, 8 CD and half of 42 Hon ID came to the scene, but were too late to nip the enemy operation in the bud. The Russians established themselves firmly in bridgeheads south of the Dniester at the villages of Czernelica and Kopaczynce. They soon deployed in a shallow arc covering the crossing point, stretching from the Dniester southeast of Czernelica through Dabki and Korniow. Their opponents, besides the units listed above, included half of 5 Hon CD which had been brought up from Zastawna.

To enable XXXIII Corps to expand its holdings south of the Dniester, the Russians also needed to force back FML Czibulka's Group farther west. Therefore their 71 ID and 2 Rifle Div attacked the k.u.k. 15 ID and made a deep penetration into the
front north of Obertyn. The enemy also seemed to be preparing to attack 36 ID west of the Ottynia-Stanislau railroad. Moreover, Pflanzer-Baltin's eastern group between the Pruth and Dniester was also assaulted with full fury.

FML Korda, who defended here against III Cavalry Corps and XXXII Corps, lost three strong points in the southernmost sector in the afternoon.

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin scraped up reserves wherever he could; he energetically cobbled together stray companies from the Common Army, Landwehr, Gendarmerie and Landsturm to create new units and threw them into the defense of the most-threatened points. As a result, the 15 ID - reinforced by four battalions of the Army's reserve - pushed the enemy back from some of the ground they had gained. Five other battalions joined Marschall's group at Horodenka, and the German general was instructed to guard Czibulka's rear against the Russians who'd crossed the river at Czernelica.

On the portion of Rhemen's front up to the Bystrzyca Solotwiska, the lines of 5 and 6 ID were assaulted only by Russian artillery. Farther to the left, however, FZM Ljubicic fought a major action on the Jawornik and southwest of Lipowica. The Russians here had been reinforced; they enveloped the Group from the west and forced the evacuation of the left bank of the Czeczwa. This prevented the Army commander from drawing reserves out of this sector as he had planned. Since the Russians were threatening to break through between the 7th and South Armies, not a rifleman could be spared from the sector. Again Pflanzer-Baltin approached Linsingen and asked him to parry the threat with a relief attack north of the Mszana valley. The German army commander, however, was busy with plans for his own offensive and refused his assistance. Ljubicic had to pull his front back on the 10th; on the next day he was again heavily attacked by the enemy, whose strength was estimated at thirty battalions from 37 and 74 ID. At least the Russian attacks in the Mszana valley were contained.

The Russians' main attack, however, was directed against Marschall and Czibulka. In the night of 9-10 May the 15 ID was pushed back at Chocimierz; the gallant troops counterattacked, but once more lost the high ground north of the town.

10-11 May

286Parts of the Russian 11 and 32 ID were also identified here.
On the 10th, the Russian XXXIII Corps enlarged their bridgehead; despite the reinforcements he had received, Marschall was able to hold his ground only on a line running through Michalczew, Siemakowce and Olejowa Korolowka as far as the loop in the Dniester northeast of Obertyn. On Marschall's right wing, GLt von Heydebreck was in command (with German 5 CD and Lt Col Bekesi's Group); on the left was FML Kaiser (with half of 42 Hon ID, half of 5 Hon CD, 8 CD, and GM Eckhardt's Group; the latter consisted of 7 battalions - one from the Landes-Schützen, one from 42 Hon ID, three from the Landsturm, one from the Gendarmes, and a combined battalion from Rhemen's Group).

At Uscienko and farther downstream all enemy attempts to cross the Dniester were thwarted; if they had been successful they would have made Marschall's position untenable. The Russians continued to hammer at the exhausted defenders, but the brave troops stood fast.

The Russian commanders next tried a thrust from the western part of the bridgehead at Czernelica. At noon on the 11th they launched a sharp attack against the right wing of 15 ID, which forced Marschall to evacuate the line which was bottling up XXXIII Russian Corps in the bridgehead. The defenders fell back to a new position in the Horodenka-Okno-Obertyn sector and south of Chocimierz. Enemy cavalry made a mounted assault against Horodenka, but were immediately forced back when their ranks were hit by several artillery rounds.

The actions of Pflanzer's eastern group on the 10th and 11th were equally difficult. Here, however, the situation changed when two Landes-Schützen battalions came up from Zaleszczyki to reinforce the Polish legionnaires and Papp's Landsturm troops. In Korda's southern sector, the old lines were retaken by storm. Farther north GM Schwer (with 6 CD and half of 5 Hon CD) was not only able to fend off the Russian thrusts, but inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought in numerous prisoners.

On the other hand, the brigade of 42 Hon ID which had remained in the eastern sector suffered a setback on the 10th and was driven from their trenches. 10 CD distinguished itself in coming to the aid of the left wing of the Croatian Honveds as they fell back, and the lost positions were regained in a counterattack. The Russians made one more assault, but were defeated. Thus most of Korda's troops were still holding their original lines on the 11th.

Nonetheless, the position of 7th Army had become quite critical.
due to the enemy advances against Marschall and Czibulka. There was no longer any possibility of avoiding retreat before the III Corps could complete its arrival. On the 10th the first elements of 22 LW ID (two battalions and two batteries) had detrained at Horodenka and joined the fighting by Marschall's Group. Another battalion arrived there by rail on 11 May, but then a barrage of Russian artillery against the station buildings prevented the arrival of further transports. Anyway, the use of these troops was opposed by the Army commander, who didn't want to split up III Corps; he preferred to use all these fresh units to keep the Russians from breaking through from Czortkowiec toward Kolomea. For this reason, he now placed Marschall's left wing under the commander of 15 ID, FML Benigni. 287 He also ordered the occupation of the bridgehead north of the Pruth at Kolomea, for which purpose GdI Rhemen should send all available forces.

12 May

On the 12th, the Russians renewed their efforts against Czibulka's east wing and against Marschall's Group; as far as can be determined, they had three or four infantry and one and a half or two cavalry divisions. Before they could fully develop their overwhelming attack on Horodenka in the morning, the town was evacuated by Marschall's troops, who were exhausted after three days of fighting and had lost half of their strength. Benigni's Group also fell back soon afterwards.

Around noon, Pflanzer-Baltin decided with a heavy heart to pull his right wing back behind the fortified line of the Pruth. Korda's Group was hard pressed by the enemy as they fell back toward the river; by evening they had reached the line Mahala-Kuczurmik-Stawczan. The Russians, who'd been reinforced by 3 fresh battalions which arrived by rail at Bojan, followed up with about two cavalry divisions, which pushed back 10 CD. However, since they made no further advance, Korda stayed north of the Pruth; he was empowered by 7th Army HQ to continue the retreat later on his own initiative. Marschall's Group reached the line Stecowa-Kulaczkowce. The next sector, stretching west to Kamionka Wk., was placed under FML Krautwald, the commander of III Corps; he was given 8 CD, Eckhardt's Group, and parts of 15 ID. The units of his own Corps would enter the sector as they arrived. Czibulka pulled his right wing back from Ottnia toward Kamionka Wk.; otherwise he and Rhemen were instructed to hold their ground. Ljubicic would leave sufficient forces between the Bystrzyca Solotwinska and the Lomnica to prevent the enemy from

287FML Benigni thus was responsible for the ad hoc group under GM Eckhardt and 8 CD as well as for his own 15 ID.
breaking through at Osmoloda; his main body, however, would concentrate in the night of 12-13 May in the area by Nadworna.

c. The Russians decide to retreat to the San, 10 May

By the first hours of the afternoon of 10 May, it was already clear to Dimitriev that the counterattack of XXI Corps had failed. Moreover, bad news was coming in hourly from the battlefields of the Caucasians and XXIV Corps. Clearly the next danger was that the enemy would break through between XXIV and XXI Corps to cross the San at Bircza. Therefore, XXI Corps was ordered to occupy the San between Siedliska and Zagorz as soon as possible and to send advanced detachments to the heights east of Izdebki to ensure a connection with XXIV Corps. Around the same time (4:00 PM), Dimitriev assigned new sectors to the other parts of his Army. IX Corps would pull back to the lower Wisloka and the line Mielec-Sedziszow; as noted above, the k.u.k. 4th Army on the other side noted just two hours later that this movement had begun. X Corps, still unaware of the extent of the success of the Aus-Hung. troops at Wielopole, was assigned the relatively advanced position Sedziszow-Wisniowa. The Caucasians and XXIV Corps would assemble south of Strzyszow and Nefylec, as well as by Domaradz and Izdebki to maintain the connection with XXI Corps. The XII Corps, to ensure that the XXIst could disengage safely, would stay on the heights southwest and south of Sanok; its left wing extended to Tarnawa.

These orders had just been issued when reports from the Wielopole and Strzyszow area made it clear that a wider withdrawal from the enemy would be necessary in this sector. Per a second order which was sent out at 7:00 PM, the front line would run from Sedziszow through the heights directly southwest of Rzeszow and through Blazowa to Izdebki. The troops were told that on the 11th they were to hold the new positions "to the last man." At the same time, the higher-ranking officers were instructed not to commit "unnecessary artillery" to the defenses, since the upcoming fight would have "only the characteristics of a rear guard action."288

The withdrawal of the wings of 3rd Army behind the lower Wisloka and to Sanok naturally had a major impact on the situation of the neighboring armies. Southwest Front HQ had to order 4th Army, north of the Vistula, to pull back to the line Kielce-Lagow-Polaniec. The right wing of 8th Army was instructed to take up a position between Tarnawa and Rajskie; the Army's line would run from there through the Odryt ridge. General Dimitriev as well as

Dragomirov - Ivanov's Chief of Staff - were aware that 3rd Army wouldn't be able to maintain noteworthy resistance on the line it was assigned for 11 May. With Ivanov's concurrence, Dragomirov would report this very unwelcome news to the Stavka. This occurred in a phone conversation at 6:00 PM, which was followed by an explanatory letter from Dragomirov to Yanushkevich. Ivanov's Chief of Staff returned to the opinion he had been expressing for several days, that a retreat to the lower San would put an end to the dangers facing 3rd Army. Such a decision would naturally require corresponding actions by 4th and 8th Armies. The 4th must go back to the "Radom position" (from Wysmierzyce through Radom and Ilza toward Jozefow), the 8th to the line Przemysl-Turka-Zawadka. Only the eastern part of the Przemysl defenses would be held against the enemy. 11th and 9th Armies would be instructed to maintain pressure on the enemy's right wing, thus directly supporting the deployment on the San. Dragomirov had little confidence that these measures would redeem the situation; this was demonstrated by his letter to Yanushkevich, in which he advised that measures should be taken to enhance the fortifications of Brest-Litovsk, Kiev, Mogilev and other points in the Russian interior.

The Stavka was angered by Dragomirov's hopelessness; he was removed from his position due to "nervous over-excitement." However, the facts which had caused Dragomirov's pessimism could no longer be denied even in the entourage of the Grand Duke-Generalissimo. The situation of 3rd Army "was hopeless at this time. The divisions of X and XXIV Corps had a strength of 1000 men apiece; the divisions of III Caucasian Corps were in no better shape."289 Only the two corps farther south still were strong enough to offer serious resistance. Because of the state of his Army, Dimitriev felt that he would only be able to hold the lower San if he received two or three fresh corps. Dragomirov in his memorandum had even demanded that the training cadres and their officers should immediately be sent to the front.

For better or worse, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo now had to approve the retreat to the San. However, not a foot of Galician soils should be given up beyond the San and Dniester; behind these rivers everything possible should be done to ensure that the Southwest Front would again be able to attack as soon as possible. 4th Army, in line next to the 3rd, would hold the area between the Pilica and the mouth of the San; 11th and 9th Armies would for the time being pin down the enemy south of the Dniester. Przemysl would be part of the new line, but integrated

into the field works rather than as a fortress.

Ivanov responded to these orders that he was obliged to immediately withdraw 4th Army to the Radom position, with its left wing even behind the Vistula. The extension of this Army's front was fraught with great dangers, that could be avoided only by receiving reinforcements as quickly as possible. The right wing of 8th Army could take up its assigned positions between Tarnawa and the Odrty ridge already on the 11th; on the next day it would pull back to the lien Bircza-Rajskie. The two armies on the Front's east wing would continue their efforts to capture the Nadworna area; between the lines it was clear that there was no longer any question of an attack over the Carpathians.

The Grand Duke-Generalissimo's approval of the retreat behind the San seems to have already been received by General Dimitriev in the night of 10-11 May. Therefore, at 3:00 AM on the 11th he issued orders supplementing those of 4:00 and 7:00 PM of the day before, which would govern the withdrawal behind the San. The line to be held on the 11th would remain unchanged. On the 12th the main body of the Army should cross the line Baranow-Ranizow-Lancut-Kanczuga-Pruchnik-Krzywcza-Bircza. On the 13th they would be between Rozwadow and Sosnica and along the line of the Przemysl fortifications. The six cavalry divisions would form the rear guard and hold up the enemy's advance for as long as possible.

This order also sealed the fate of the positions the Russians had been holding west of the Vistula and in the forest Carpathians.

d. Pursuit actions on 11-12 May

4th k.u.k. Army

On the evening of the 10th, Dimitriev's Army began to march back toward its assigned objectives for the 11th. On the north wing, his IX Corps began to evacuate the west bank of the Wisloka at 9:00 PM. Thus the attack which the k.u.k. 4th Army HQ had planned to launch that night would have been a blow into thin air. Already aware of the Russians' intentions at 6:00 PM, the Archduke switched the main weight of the operation to the east.

290 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - In the original text, the date May 11 appears as [April] "the 28th", because it wasn't converted from the Old Style to New Style when the Russian text was translated to German. Also, in the next sentence the dates are shown as the 29th and 30th.
bank, where XIV Corps (reinforced by GM Szende's Bde) would intercept the Russian retreat from Przeclaw if possible. At the same time units of GdK Kirchbach's Group still fighting on the west bank would push directly east against the wavering enemy.

The fighting northeast of Debica intensified considerably during the night. Shortly before midnight 4th Army received orders from the high command which stated that they should use the arriving VIII Corps (21 LW ID, 37 and 41 Hon ID) to cross the Vistula and fall upon the rear of the 4th Russian Army. Army HQ was already prepared for this operation, so they let XIV Corps proceed with its attack, which was consistent with the intentions of the AOK.

The Russians, well aware of what was at stake, defended themselves stoutly against FML Roth's divisions. 3 ID, reinforced by 300 dismounted troopers from 2 CD, threw the enemy out of their trenches west and southwest of Ropczyce in a hot action, prevented them from making a stand at Sedziszow, and entered that town. 8 ID advanced down the Wislok with Szende's Brigade and KJR # 1 on the east bank and the other units on the west bank. Both groups were heavily engaged as they reached the Przeclaw area, where they fought throughout the 11th for the local villages and burning bridges. The Russians, who were masters of retreat, also managed to avoid being trapped in this sector.

Kirchbach's Corps reached the lower Wisloka. There the 47 Res ID and 11 Hon CD found that the bridge at Mielec had been destroyed; the other bank was so heavily defended that there was no attempt to force a passage of the river. FML Stöger-Steiner's Group came up to the Wisloka north of Mielec during the day. They were spurred on by news which arrived in the morning of the 11th: the Russians had also finally evacuated their positions on the Nida and apparently were pulling back toward the Czarna. For the time being, however, some line of communications troops and Lt Col. Vever's cavalry group continued to guard the Vistula between Szczucin and the mouth of the Wisloka.

The south wing of 4th Army advanced in close cooperation with Mackensen. Their opponent, X Russian Corps, took up a position as ordered on the heights southwest of Rzeszow early on the 11th. The k.u.k. IX Corps deployed to attack in late afternoon, but the enemy then withdrew through Rzeszow toward the northeast. The first troops of FML Kralicek entered the city that night. It was unimportant that IX Corps was now far in advance of the rest of 4th Army. It was known from intercepted radio messages that the enemy wouldn't offer any serious resistance west of the San. The
Archduke urged the cavalry to pursue the Russian infantry, but this was in vain. 11 Hon CD was unsuccessful in attempts to find a place to break through on the lower Wisloka. Finally they camped for the night south of Przeclaw.

11th German Army

The Russians opposite Mackensen's Army also had no intention of holding their prescribed line on the 11th for any longer than was necessary to cover the withdrawal farther to the rear. On the north wing of 11th Army, Plettenberg's Corps took the Tyczyn-Blazowa area from the Caucasians. Farther south, the left wing of Arz's Corps (12 ID) climbed the heights east of Blazowa; from this position they fired with heavy artillery on parts of XXIV Russian Corps which were being pushed back through Jawornik Polski. On the night of 10-11 May these Russian groups had already conceded Ujazdy to the quickly moving 39 Hon ID; badly disorganized, they were joined at Jawornik Polski by several battalions of 62 ID which had left their trains at Przeworsk. The Honveds spent the night in the area around Dynow.

Of the two German corps on the right wing of 11th Army, Francois' Corps thrust against other parts of XXIV Russian Corps at Izdebki; they inflicted damage on 12 Russian ID as well as on the remnants of the already hard-pressed 48 ID. While Francois reached the San upstream from Dynow, the 119 ID of Emmich's Corps crossed to the east bank of the river at Ulucz; 11 Bav ID camped for the night at Dydna. Under these circumstances the XXI Russian Corps, which was moving from Sanok to the northeast, wasn't able to occupy the position on the San which had been chosen on the evening of the 10th. Covered by a group at Mrzyglod, the XXIst sent its main body down the Zaluz-Bircza road; here the tired regiments were able to gain a brief period of rest at Tyrawa Woloska and farther northeast around midnight.

3rd k.u.k. Army

In their camps that night the troops of XXI Corps were mingled with those from XII Corps, coming up behind them. That morning the XIIith had fought rear guard actions against the left wing of k.u.k. 3rd Army on the heights southwest and south of Sanok, then abandoned these positions. Therefore XVII Corps, fighting south of Sanok, found that the heights which the enemy had held in the night were now empty; X Corps occupied Pisarowce in the morning. Dismounted troopers from Berndt's CD were able to fire upon the Russian supply trains as they moved away from Sanok, and caused confusion. In the afternoon, the lead regiments of X Corps and 2
ID (XVII Corps) marched into Sanok after a brief action. 4 CD now hurried forward, but had to fight before establishing a camp for the night at Zaluz. The Beskid Corps advanced through Tarnawa, engaging in several fights with rear guards of XII and VIII Russian Corps. VII Corps (17 ID and 20 Hon ID) was no longer needed on the shortened line, and assembled at Bukowsko as the Army's reserve.

Unlike Shcherbatchev, the commander of 11th Russian Army farther east, Brussilov seems to have already decided on the night of 10-11 May that his position in the Carpathians had become untenable because of the retreat of 3rd Army. Ivanov had intended that VIII Corps should pull back by 12 May to a long line between Bircza and Rajske, while the main body of 8th Army stayed on the line Odryt-Zawadka. Such a deployment would practically invite the enemy to strike from the middle San south of Przemysl into the rear of Brussilov's forces still in the Carpathians. Therefore the HQ of Southwest Front could hardly oppose Brussilov when he urged that 8th Army must go back to the line Przemysl-Chyrow, to the heights south of Stary Sambor, and to the Turka area. It seems, though, that VII Russian Corps was told to withdraw more slowly than the others, so that the neighboring 11th Army could stay in the Carpathians as long as possible.

2nd k.u.k. Army

Thus the entire 8th Russian Army was already in retreat on 11 May, and Böhm-Ermolli's divisions could make up for the delays in their pursuit on the day before. 2nd Army pursued the attractive goal of pushing from the south as quickly as possible into the Lisko-Chyrow area to catch the retreating VIII Russian Corps "en flagrant délit" (in Napoleon's phrase).

The lively advance of the Beskid Corps made it unnecessary for the k.u.k. XIX Corps (on the left wing of 2nd Army) to intervene with a flanking maneuver toward the northwest as had been planned the day before. Instead, its two divisions worked their way toward Lisko (34 ID on the left, 29 ID on the right). However, they had to stop on the Hoczew Heights on the south bank of the San because the Russians still very stubbornly opposed all the crossing attempts by the north Bohemian Division. IV Corps, now five divisions strong, was supposed to capture the stretch of road from Uherce to Ustrzyki D1; the left wing (27 and 32 ID) forced a crossing over the San on the night of 11-12 May and the center (13 ŁW ID) crossed in the next morning. All three divisions had to repulse heavy counterattacks. On the other hand, 31 ID on the right wing reached the north bank of the San.
near the mouth of the Solinka without encountering serious enemy resistance. 51 Hon ID followed the rest of IV Corps as a reserve.

XVIII Corps was to cut the road running east of Kroscienko. Both of its divisions crossed the San on the night of 10-11 May almost without support from the artillery, which was having trouble moving forward; at dawn they climbed the Odryt Ridge, which had unexpectedly been evacuated by the enemy. Then 44 LW ID fought its way toward the Zukow Mountain, while 9 ID was halted in front of the Ostre. On the Army's right wing, the lead division of V Corps - 33 ID - reached the Odryt Ridge and the heights southeast of Lutowiska. In place of 37 Hon ID (which was moving to 4th Army), 14 ID advanced in the second echelon to Berehy Grn.
With their always considerable skill, the Russians had understood how to fend off the great threat on the Chyrow road during these critical days. However, the morale of Brussilov's Army left much to be desired. The muzhik could say to his general: "While our artillery is almost silent and even our rifle fire is intermittent, the enemy bombardment is bringing us greater casualties from hour to hour. We are opposing them unnecessarily, since it is impossible to stop them. One cannot fight with empty hands."\textsuperscript{291}

On Brussilov's left wing, VII Corps began to demolish its positions in the mountains. Szurmay's Group took advantage of the moment and began to advance. 7 ID, on the left, crossed the uppermost reaches of the San, but had to be content with occupying the heights directly on the opposite side. 40 Hon ID took the Ostry Heights and the Jaslowiec position directly to the southeast. Linsingen didn't hesitate to order his whole Army to attack on the 11\textsuperscript{th}; in accordance with Pflanzer's wishes, he intended to make his main effort with his east wing. However, his plan had to be modified. On the 11\textsuperscript{th} the high command told him to open the general advance from his left (west) wing, which was more correct based on the current situation.

Bothmer's Corps was the first to move ahead. Shcherbatchev's right wing abandoned its positions opposite 1\textsuperscript{st} German ID on 12 May. Then the East Prussian division took the hotly contested, forested Height # 927 southeast of Koziowa, opening the first breach in the line of 11\textsuperscript{th} Russian Army. On the left of 1\textsuperscript{st} ID, the 3 Gd ID and 38 Hon ID gained 6 to 10 km from VII Russian Corps, along with numerous prisoners. However, there was still some bitter fighting, particularly east of the Stryj River. Szurmay pushed up the Uzsok road on 12 May to the area southwest of Turka. 7 ID took the chain of heights west of this place and advanced to Wolcze without seeing action. The enemy still held the heights south of Turka and the long ridges leading from Petrykow toward the northwest.

The Russian retreat continues

On the 11\textsuperscript{th}, the AOK instructed the k.u.k. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army to advance along the Chyrow road with a strong left wing and thus damage Brussilov's withdrawing columns as much as possible. To achieve this goal, the Army's center and left wing had to turn sharply to the right. As a result, by the end of the 12\textsuperscript{th} the three

\textsuperscript{291}Brussilov, p. 131
divisions of XIX Corps were no longer in the front line; 27 ID of IV Corps moved ahead of them northeast of Lisko. The main body of IV Corps reached Ustrzyki Dl. with the divisions of the first line on the evening of the 12th. XVIII Corps reached Bandrow, and V Corps climbed the heights northwest of Lomna. The objectives of the corps were met, although some had to overcome substantial difficulties on the way.

On 11 May, the front of 3rd Army was compressed to just 10 km around Sanok. The high command ordered GdI Boroevic to continue his advance to the Dobromil-Cisowa-Iskan area. The Army's opponents, XII and XXI Russian Corps, pulled back before dawn, on their way through Bircza toward the vicinity of Przemysl. To ensure the safe movement of these masses of troops, strong rear guards were left behind northeast of Tyrawa-Woloska. They were engaged by GM Berndt, who was in charge of 1 CD as well as his own 4 CD for the pursuit. However, only 4 CD was on hand; it sought in vain, with heavy casualties, to break the Russian resistance. Toward evening the enemy rear guards finally pulled back half the way to Bircza. In the main body of 3rd Army, the Beskid and X Corps reached the line Tyrawa-Woloska-Mrzyglod. XVII and VII Corps were behind the front, south and southwest of Sanok. 1 Lst Huss Bde was on the left wing to maintain connections with 11th Army.

The Russian units withdrawing before Mackensen's divisions didn't halt on the line they were supposed to reach on the 12th (Lancut-Kanczuga-Pruchnik-Krzywcza). Instead they continued their march to the San. Therefore 11th Army reached its objective for the day (the line Iskan-Lancut) without any serious actions with the enemy. In the morning, VI Corps prevented 12 Sib Rif Div and the remnants of 48 ID at Jawornik Polski from retreating toward the northeast; these troops had to turn aside toward Jawornik Polski, from which town they were driven near evening by German 82 Res ID. Farther northwest, meanwhile, 12 ID advanced at the head of VI Corps near Kanczuga; they fought parts of 62 Russian ID, which were covering the rear of the decimated 49 ID on the heights east of the town. By the end of the day, Emmich's Corps had reached Iskan and the area farther southwest, Francois' Corps the Pruchnik-Dubiecko sector; Arz's leading regiments were at Kanczuga, and the Guards at Tarnawka-Lancut.

e. The Russians start to pull back west of the Vistula

Beginning on 11 May, the development of the situation of 4th

420
k.u.k. Army was decisively influenced by the retreat of the Russians on the other side of the Vistula.

On 9 May the Russians were still pushing against the right wing of 9th German Army, without breaking through however. On the next day, it appeared probable from Russian broadcasts that Evert's army would pull back to the Czarna and to Kielce. In the night of 10-11 May, the XXXI and XXV Corps indeed began to leave their positions on the Nida.

GdK Dankl first sent 16 Cav Bde, the part of 2 CD which had stayed with his Army, to the Vistula at Szczucin. At the same time, mixed detachments from Ist Corps and from 4 ID of II Corps followed the retreating enemy. The Russians still held their original positions only in front of the left wing of 25 ID. The parts of the Army's two southern divisions, which were widely spread out, first had to concentrate; on 12 May they crossed to the east bank of the Nida on a hastily-built bridge. 1st Army advanced tentatively, due to its small size and to the fact that the troops' ability to march had been diminished during their long stay in the trenches. The principal advance was in the direction of Staszow. On the first day of their march, the troops weren't opposed as they reached a line from Szczucin (on the north bank of the Vistula) to Ostrow. Parts of Woyrsch's Army Detachment left their trenches at the same time; Bredow's Division was engaged on the heights of Kielce. To guard Bredow's south flank, 25 ID sent a mixed detachment toward Morawica. The German 3 LW ID was also able to follow the Russians as they withdrew in the morning; 4 LW ID took Lopuszno. The rest of the Army Detachment's front remained quiet.

Now there was no longer a need for the k.u.k. 4th Army to thrust over the Vistula. In the afternoon of the 11th the high command ordered the Army to continue to advance in its present deployment; the right wing's objective was the lower San. GO Mackensen added that IX and XIV Corps should follow the Russians through Rzeszow-Kolbuszowa to Zolynia-Ranizow; Kirchbach's Corps should move through Mielec. 4th Army would also guard the left wing of Mackensen's divisions - which were advancing toward Jaroslau - against any threat from the San-Vistula confluence. Since the Russians were pulling back through Sokolow and Majdan

292 Here a military bridge was constructed; on the 13th the LW IR "Teschen" # 31, which had been lent to 4th Army for several days, crossed the bridge to return to 46 LW ID.
293 The allies had learned from a radio broadcast that a division from XV Russian Corps had appeared in the area of Tarnobrzeg.
and along the south bank of the Vistula, on 12 May the k.u.k. 4th Army could reach the line Stobierna-Kolbuszowa-Chorzelow almost without fighting. Only 10 ID of IX Corps, advancing on the right wing, fought repeated actions with the enemy 2 Combined Coss Div north of Rzeszow.

By 12 May the Archduke's Army had captured 77 officers and 27,400 men; the booty also included 55 machine guns and 6 guns. The Army HQ moved up from Okocim to a castle by Tarnow.

3. The recovery of central Galicia, 12 May-5 June

a. Orders of both sides for continuing the campaign, 12-13 May

The Allies

Because of the Russians' retreat in Galicia and western Poland, the military leaders of the allied Central Powers had to make some new decisions. This was accomplished in the afternoon of 12 May at Pless, and placed in the form of written orders at Teschen that evening. Three sectors had been considered for the primary effort: south of Przemysl, Jaroslau, and the lower San. The central (Jaroslau) sector was chosen since it promised the quickest success.

This was the basis for the orders issued by the k.u.k. AOK on the evening of the 12th. Once again the 11th Army would deliver the main blow; while guarding strongly against a sortie from Przemysl it would attack on both sides of Jaroslau to hurl the enemy over the San. 4th Army was instructed to cross over to the east bank of the San to the north of the 11th; it should also guard its flank in the direction of the San-Vistula confluence. The north wing of 3rd Army would advance to the western and southern fortifications of Przemysl to take the town by a coup de main if possible; if this wasn't feasible, it would prepare a powerful attack. The Army's right (south) wing would move through Dobromil, Nowe Miasto and Mosciska into the left flank of the Russian defenders of the San. 2nd Army would pivot to the north through Chyrow, Sambor and Horodyszcze; strong forces would be held ready behind the right wing to eventually assist South Army. That Army would advance in echelon toward the right; its left wing would move through Drohobycz. 7th Army would defend the ground it already occupied. Finally, the divisions north of the Vistula would pursue the retreating enemy toward the northeast
and east.

Since the commanders wanted the Russians to have as little time as possible to recover, there was no opportunity for any large-scale redeployment of our forces. Anyway the poor condition of the railroads in the territories evacuated by the Russians would have made such maneuvers very difficult. When Conrad visited German HQ on 12 May, he correctly noted that the situation at the moment was similar to that of October 1914. At that time, however the enemy was at the height of their strength; now they had suffered bloody losses, while their morale was also badly shaken.

The Russians

On the Russian side, the decisions hammered out in the last few days, some of which were already being implemented, received their final form in orders which General Ivanov issued on 13 May after several discussions with the Stavka and his own subordinate HQ. By this time Dimitriev's Army had already reached its new positions on the San. The most important decision reflected in these orders was that the Russian leadership, despite contrary proposals, wouldn't pull the south wing of their 4th Army behind the Vistula to keep in line with 3rd Army. Instead, the wing would hold the line Opatow-Tarnobrzeg-Rozwadow, a position on the flank of the Central Powers' units which were advancing toward the San. Among the troops sent to occupy the San-Vistula confluence was XV Corps, which was coming from the Northwest Front. This deployment would not only bring relief to Dimitriev's Army, but also provide a springboard for the resumption of a Russian offensive.

The three northern corps of 3rd Army (IX, X and III Caucasian) had dug in on the higher eastern bank of the San between Rozwadow and the mouth of the Wislok. The three southern corps (XXIV, XXI and XII), largely because of the wishes of their commanders, were left on the west bank of the San: in the Jaroslau bridgehead and farther south as far as the defenses of Przemysl. To relieve part of the burden on the burnt out 3rd Army, Ivanov entrusted the defense of Przemysl - which would only be part of the line of the field forces - to VIII Corps of 8th Army. The main body of the latter Army was ordered to deploy next to Przemysl on a line facing almost entirely toward the south, along the high ground south of Mosciska and on the Dniester northeast of Sambor. They would stubbornly defend this position. 11th Army was assigned the sector on the Dniester from a point south of Komarno to Bukaczowce. 9th Army was to cover the Dniester from there.
through Zaleszczyki, and also to guard the pre-war border between
the Dniester and Pruth. Letschitzky, however, was instructed to
fulfill this mission in a position as far forward toward the
Carpathians as possible; he was also to attack if feasible. It
seems that General Shcherbatchev soon received similar
instructions, since the order of 13 May envisioned him operating
directly south of the Dniester on the 15th.

The orders given to the armies on the left wing were largely
dictated by political considerations regarding Romania. However,
the Stavka didn't place any great value on actual cooperation of
this country with Russia, and indeed had mixed feelings on the
subject. They would be satisfied if Romania would just remain
neutral. On the other hand, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo
indicated in a letter to the French commander-in-chief General
Joffre that the time had now come for Italy to enter the war. He
also wanted the Western powers to expand their attacks in
Flanders and north France into a broad general offensive. He
reproached his allies because of the number of German divisions
which had been moved from France to the Eastern theater of
operations, and congratulated himself that because of the
activity of the Russians none of these units had been able to
return to the West. If his Western allies could prevent further
movement of German troops to the Russian front, the Grand Duke
was still confident that the Tsar's Army in its new positions
could put a stop to the enemy advance.

b. The Battle of Jaroslau, 14-20 May

1) The allies thrust over the San

Although the allies were moving as hastily as possible, the
Russians' quick retreat to the San caused a momentary break in
contact between the two sides. Moreover, the Central Powers were
having trouble bringing up supplies as they moved farther from
the rear area services available behind their original lines and
from the railheads. Together with the necessity of giving the
troops a pause to rest and to replenish their greatly depleted
ranks, this led a pause in operations. Another problem developed
at this time - the allies were completely in the dark regarding
the Russians' intentions. Would the enemy seek to hold the San?
Would they want to retain a footing on the river's west bank?

294 "Das zaristische Russland im Weltkriege", p. 204
295 Danilov, p. 499 ff.
Would they dig in among the fortifications of Przemysl? These questions had not only been raised during the conferences at Pless on 12 May, but they also influenced the orders which were issued in the next few days by the various HQ.\footnote{Metzger, in Schwarte, Vol. V, p. 102. Francois, "Gorlice", pp. 111 ff.}

Regarding the main attack, the allied high commands had decided that Mackensen should first obtain secure control of the east bank of the San to drive a wedge into the Russians' planned defense lines on the San and Dniester.

13 May

As ordered, the 11\textsuperscript{th} Army continued its advance on 13 May between the San and the Wislok. By evening they reached the line Krzywcza-Pruchnik-Przeworsk. The Russian cavalry pulled back to the east. The only action had occurred back in the night of 12-13 May, when the Guard Corps engaged rear guards from III Caucasian Corps. 4\textsuperscript{th} Army, whose attention was directed toward the mouth of the San, also reached its objective - the line Zolynia-Sokolow-Majdan-Padew Narodowa - without fighting.

Boroevic's Army, advancing south of the San, began on the same day to spread out from its concentrated position at Sanok and turned toward the line Dobromil-Przemysl. XVII Corps entered the front between the Beskid and X Corps, while the VIIith stayed in the second echelon. Despite the heat and bad roads, the troops marched up to 32 km during the day. 1 CD, without meeting substantial resistance from Brussilov's retreating divisions, approached Dobromil, while X Corps moved through Bircza. The Beskid and XVII Corps were still about half a day's march behind, while the VIIith stayed at Sanok. GM Berndt was responsible for maintaining contact with Böhm-Ermolli's left wing.

On the afternoon of the 13\textsuperscript{th}, Mackensen issued an order setting out the tasks for the next phase. 11\textsuperscript{th} Army should cross the San at Jaroslau and on both sides of that city, while 4\textsuperscript{th} Army on the left provided necessary flank protection. Under 11\textsuperscript{th} Army, Arz's and Plettenberg's Corps would make the river crossing, with their inner wings advancing through the center of Jaroslau city. 56 German ID would come up behind the attacking group. North of this shock group of five divisions, the X German Corps was reassembled with its normal order of battle - 19 ID came back from the Guard and 20 ID marched up through Lancut. GdI Emmich left the Army's right wing to take over this Corps, which was responsible for guarding the left (north) wing. Francois' (XLI Res Corps) was ordered to thrust through Radymno, while Kneussl's
Corps (11 Bav and 119 ID) held the Russians at Przemysl in check. 11th Army HQ reckoned by now that the enemy intended to defend the San bitterly and decided to prepare a methodical attack. The distribution of the heavy artillery and several units was changed, and each phase of the operation carefully plotted. Thus the 14th would be devoted to scouting and the advance of the infantry up to the Russian positions, and the 15th to the establishment of the "artillery protection position", a line from Krzywcza through Mackowice, Kosienice, Chlopice, Cieszaczyn, Ujezna and Jagiela. The artillery would move up to this line on the night of 15-16 May; on the next afternoon the bombardment would begin, while the infantry again inched closer to the points from which they would launch the storm attack on the 17th.

These orders had just been issued when word arrived that an enemy column 20 km long was marching from Przemysl toward the east. Did this mean that the Russians wouldn't defend the San? Because of the condition of their 3rd Army, this was a possible scenario. Therefore GO Mackensen urged his subordinates not to hesitate if the Russians fell back, but to stay on their heels and to seize any opportunity to cross the San and establish bridgeheads on the other side.

However, the Russians had no intention of giving up the line of the San, nor did they intend to defend the river only from the east bank. On the contrary, they had constructed strong positions well covered with barbed wire: their XXIV Corps was at Jaroslau, the XXIst was west and southwest of Radymno, and XII Corps held a line farther south as far as the Przemysl fortifications. The 20 km long column which left Przemysl wasn't retreating, but apparently consisted of men from XXI and XII Corps who were leaving their original positions in the area of the city for new sectors because they had been relieved by Brussilov's VIII Corps.

Capture of the bridgehead at Jaroslau

The main body of 11th Army, pushing forward without a pause, already crossed the line of the intended "artillery protection position" on the 14th. The advance guards of Kneussl's Corps reached Mackowice and Rokietnica north of Przemysl, and Francois' Corps came into contact with XXI Russian Corps on the heights west of Radymno. The K.u.k. VI Corps (FML Arz) marched into battle south and southwest of Jaroslau against the enemy bridgehead; the Guards did the same west and northwest of the city, while part of their left wing took a position toward the
San. Emmich's 19 ID deployed to secure the flank at the point where the Wislok flows into the San; his 56 and 20 ID assembled in the area Markowa-Lancut, ready to attack.

The allies' pilots reported that the Russians were holding the Jaroslau bridgehead and had constructed especially strong positions southwest and south of the city. These were the cemetery and castle of Pawlosiow, Cupajowka Heights (# 264), and the village of Kidalowice. There were also reports of strong positions west and southwest of Radymno. As in all places where the Russians retreated, enormous fires were burning in Jaroslau; the railroad station was also in flames.

The fighting in the Jaroslau bridgehead began on the 14th and lasted throughout the 15th until late in the night. Arz's Corps, along with the right wing of 2 Gd ID, was given the difficult task of taking the strong entrenchments on the southern front. 12 ID was engaged on the Cupajowka and, in places mingled with parts of the Guard division, at the cemetery and castle of Pawlosiow. 39 Hon ID was engaged at the village of Kidalowice. The Honveds moreover had to guard the east flank toward Tuczepy, where the inner wings of XXIV and XXI Russian Corps came together. The garrison of Jaroslau (62 ID mixed with troops of other units) was reinforced during the action by battalions from Dimitriev's Army reserves. The attack by VI Corps was difficult due to flanking fire from the east bank of the San. The fate of Jaroslau was sealed, however, as the 15th was drawing to a close. Toward evening the Russians abandoned the bridgehead, and drew back as ordered through the city and to the opposite bank of the river. The impact of this event on General Dimitriev was so great that he wanted XXI and XII Corps to also abandon their positions west of the San. Ivanov, however, apparently influenced by the Stavka, had Dimitriev countermand his orders to these two corps to retreat. The XXIV Corps, which had suffered heavy losses and been thrown into confusion, was now supposed to hold the east bank of the San between Lubaczowka and the area north of Radymno. The Russians' decision to tarry on the west bank to the southwest of Jaroslau was dictated partly by the need to ensure the security of Przemysl, whose possession had become a question of prestige to the Tsar's Empire.

Mackensen crosses the San

On the afternoon of the 15th, GO Mackensen had already ordered the three center corps of his Army (XLI Res, VI k.u.k., and the

Guard) to cross the San as soon as thorough artillery preparation could be completed. North of the Guard, X German Corps would advance to the east bank of the river in the Sieniawa area. The next objective was to create a bridgehead running from Radymno through Laszki north to the Lubaczowka and then from the mouth of the Lubaczowka to include the old Austrian bridgehead fortifications at Sieniawa.

Starting at night, and finishing in the early morning, the k.u.k. 12 ID and 2 Gd ID drove the Russians through Jaroslaau. The former division reached the San southeast of the city, while the first battalions of the latter reached the fork in the road northeast of the destroyed highway bridge, and crossed to the east bank of the river around 5:00 PM. Soon thereafter parts of 12 ID were shipped over by the Guard Pioneers; by 10:00 PM there were five battalions of 24 Inf Bde on the other shore, deployed in echelon south of the Guards. Simultaneously, measures were being taken to build several bridges over the river.

Meanwhile 39 Hon ID had taken part in the assault by Francois' Corps against the Tuczepy positions on the evening of the 15th and early on the 16th. After the capture of this town they would be able to carry out their own crossing of the San farther north. On this day the main body of XLI Res Corps prepared to attack the Radymno positions. To the south, Kneussl's Combined Corps had to guard against intervention from Przemysl, which despite the severe damage it had suffered in earlier battles was still in Russian hands a major obstacle to the plans of the allies. On the 14th, Kneussl first brought 119 ID up from reserve and placed it in the line at Krzywcza, while he shifted his own 11 Bav ID somewhat to the north. On the next day, 11 Bav ID advanced on the south wing of 81 Res ID, without being hit by more than a few rounds of artillery as it marched past the edge of the Przemysl fortifications. Plans for a coup de main against the fortress had to be abandoned based on reports from officers sent ahead to reconnoiter. On the 16th the Bavarians, now suffering heavy crossfire from the fortress and from the front of XII Russian Corps, drove the enemy out of their forward positions at Batycze and Trojczyce. 119 ID meanwhile took up a position opposite the forts at Ujkowice. To the south a mixed detachment of the k.u.k. 24 ID (X Corps) at Letowina covered the connection to Boroevic's Army.

On the left wing of 11th Army, a gap developed between 1 Gd ID (deployed directly north of Jaroslaau) and 19 ID (which was facing north against the detachments of III Caucasian Corps still on the

298Kneussl, "Przemysl, Mai/Juni 1915" (Munich, 1925)
left bank of the San, between that river and the Wislok). The
gap was filled on the 16th by the German 20 ID. This Division
fought its way to the east bank of the San on the 17th at
Nielepokowice. This was the third foothold established by the
allies over the San (after those of the Guards and 12 k.u.k. ID),
a bitter enough development for the Russians.

k.u.k. 4th Army advances toward the San

Under 4th Army, each of the three corps had a cavalry brigade in
the van; on the 14th the Aus-Hung. horsemen forced the Russian
cavalry back to their supporting infantry. This led to several
actions, in some of which the leading elements of the k.u.k. foot
also took part. In general, however, this was purely a day of
marching for the Army. IX Corps reached the San on both sides of
Lezajsk. XIV Corps felt its way forward with 11 Hon CD and some
infantry toward the San between Sarzyna and Rudnik; most of the
Corps spent the night at and east of Jezow, an area with which it
was well familiar since fall 1914. The main body of GdK
Kirchbach's Corps advanced from the southwest to within half a
day's march of the strong position which the Russians had built
between Tarnobrzeg and Nisko. In this area were parts of 75 and
83 ID, which had come from Evert's Army through Sandomierz. 8 ID
from XV Russian Corps had come to the sector on the rail line
Lublin-Rozwadow, built during the war; it was now identified
south of Rozwadow. Upstream from Nisko, the Russians still held
bridgeheads west of the San at Rudnik and Sieniawa. However, HQ
of 4th k.u.k. Army had learned from the enemy's radio traffic
that they had no intention of offering strong resistance at these
two points on the river.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand planned for IX and half of XIV Corps to
force their way over the San, while GdK Kirchbach's Corps took
the bridgehead south of Sandomierz. Success of the latter
operation, however, was dependent upon the progress of Dankl's
Army north of the Vistula; his south wing, 46 LW ID, had just
reached the Osiek area in the evening of the 14th. Therefore the
immediate priority for 4th Army would be the attack over the San
farther south. They ordered IX Corps to make preparations along
the river between the mouths of the Wisloka and the Zlota. After
a successful crossing, the Corps would capture the Cieplice area;
from this point they would cooperate with German 19 ID, coming up
from the south, to drive the Russians from Sieniawa.

Early on 15 May the enemy opposite IX Corps evacuated their last
positions west of the San. The artillery of Kralicek's south
wing intervened in the actions of 19 German ID. Under XIV Corps,
on this day Horsetzky's Division was engaged in mopping up several Russian enclaves on the river bank, while FML Fabini's Kaiser Jaeger stormed the town of Rudnik. The enemy's main line of resistance ran in general along the edge of the woods between Sarzyna and Rudnik, then followed the railroad; its left wing ended at the town of Warcholy. Dismounted troopers from 11 Hon CD entered the line between the two infantry divisions. In part, the situation was a return to the trench warfare that had become so familiar on the Dunajec. Digging was unpleasant, particularly near Rudnik, because periodically the men discovered half decomposed bodies left from the fighting of October 1914. Because the local inhabitants were politically suspect, they were forced to leave their mostly ruined home villages.299

GdK Kirchbach's Corps deployed opposite the Russian positions between Nisko and Tarnobrzeg. 11 Hon CD, minus its dismounted men, was pulled behind the front. The half of 2 CD assembled at Jezowe.

Meanwhile 4th Army HQ had asked for and received further instructions from Mackensen. He stated that he didn't envision a simultaneous crossing of the San along the entire front. Rather, each Corps should seize opportunities and if successful should then assist their neighbors. Since there were no favorable opportunities on the long front occupied by IX Corps, the Archduke ordered FML Kralicek to cancel the river crossing he had planned for the 16th. The Corps commander decided now to assist 19 German ID by intervening over the lowest reaches of the Wislok. Then a report arrived that 20 German ID intended to cross the San. As noted above, this operation succeeded during 16 May. Therefore soon after midnight on the 17th the Landsturm troops of 106 ID also tried to reach the east bank. However, as soon as the first pontoons entered the water they were met by such heavy fire that Kralicek once again postponed the attempt to cross the San.

Meanwhile, under GdK Kirchbach's Corps the Combined ID of FML Stöger-Steiner took the trenches north of Grabow on the 16th. Since the heavy artillery still hadn't come up, however, continuation of the attack toward Sandomierz was postponed until the 19th. Only the right wing of 47 Res ID would take advantage of the obvious weakness of the Russian front at Przyszow Kameralny to drive a wedge in the line in the direction of Rozwadow, supported by the left wing of Fabini's Division. Before the main attack began, the Army would receive substantial

299IR # 14, Ein Buch der Erinnerung, pp. 40 ff. Also based on the personal recollections of GdI Horsetzky.
parts of the badly-needed reinforcements which it had been allotted. Of these troops, the 21 LW ID - the majority of which reached Debica on the 16th - would join Kirchbach's Corps. On this date the first elements of 37 Hon ID were at Radomysl, while those of 41 Hon ID were at Czarna. However, only two of these three divisions would actually join 4th Army. On the evening of the 16th the 41 Hon ID was ordered to immediately move to the area behind Opatow, where 1st Army had been struck by a Russian counterattack.

Mackensen expands his bridgehead over the San

The commander of 3rd Russian Army pulled back his XXIV Corps from Mackensen's pressure to a front between the mouth of the Lubaczowka and the village of Wietlin, where the units underwent necessary reorganization in the night of 16-17 May. XXI Corps refused its north wing on the San in the Tuczepy area. Dimitriev again suggested to Ivanov that the two southern corps of 3rd Army should also withdraw behind the river; it would only be advisable to deploy the left wing of the Army on the west bank once V Caucasian Corps, assembling at Lemberg, was within a 24 hour march of Jaroslau. The Stavka, however, still laid great emphasis on the retention of Przemysl. With their approval, Ivanov decided to reassign XXI and XII Corps from Dimitriev to 8th Army. At the same time he placed XV Corps, arriving at the San-Vistula confluence, under 3rd Army with instructions to hold its positions regardless of cost.

In reality, the next few days proved that Dimitriev's concerns about the two corps which he had lost to 8th Army were unfounded. Lack of ammunition forced the German XLI Res Corps on 18 May to postpone its attack. Instead, this Corps with its two divisions plus 11 Bav ID would merely be responsible for securing the right flank of 11th Army; they were authorized to pull back their south wing. Mackensen took 119 ID away from this sector and sent it to the area west of Jaroslau.

Arz's, Plettenberg's and Emmich's Corps were meanwhile instructed to expand their positions east and north of Jaroslau into a large bridgehead. According to Mackensen's orders of the 17th, the line would run from Wietlin through Makowisko, Cetula, Radawa and Mielniki on the heights east of Sieniawa. The task of the k.u.k. VI Corps was to advance down the road from Jaroslau to Wietlin. Early on the 17th, IR # 57 of 24 Inf Bde thrust into the village of Sobiecin, lying to the west of Wietlin. Then the Brigade shifted further to the left, because meanwhile the 39 Hon ID had
begun to cross the San with parts at Jaroslaw and others north of Tuczepy; the Honveds intervened in the fighting at Sobiecin. The Russians (12 Sib Rif Div) evacuated the town after midnight on the 18th. The Hungarians pushed on toward Wietlin, which they were supposed to take on the 19th. Simultaneously, 12 ID was also driving the enemy back through Surochow.

North of Arz, the 1 Gd ID entered the fighting on the left of 2 Gd ID at dawn on the 18th; both divisions repulsed repeated Russian counterattacks and by evening reached the line Makowisko-Cetula. On their left, the German 56 and 20 ID drove the left wing of XXIV Russian Corps over the Lubaczowka. The situation here began to grow critical for the Russians, because on the 17th the German 19 ID north of the Lubaczowka crossed the road leading from Sieniawa toward the northeast. On the next day they pushed the south wing of III Caucasian Corps back to the woods south of Dobra.

The progress of German X Corps enabled the neighboring k.u.k. IX Corps of 4th Army to send GM Reymann with a mixed detachment of 10 ID over the San south of Sieniawa on the evening of the 18th.

The thrust mounted by the inner wings of Roth's and Kirchbach's Corps at Przyszow Kameralny on the 17th broke down soon after it started. The HQ of 4th Army didn't object when the troops returned to their main positions. The main thing was that they held onto these lines. As a back-up for Roth and for 47 Res ID, Szende's Bde shifted to the Stany area in the night of 17-18 May. On the next day, four of its battalions marched to Nowosielec behind the front of 8 ID. The VII Corps (21 LW ID and 37 Hon ID) arrived on the 18th in the area Kolbuszowa-Majdan-Mielec. In the next few days, GdK Kirchbach was supposed to deploy this Corps to take the Sandomierz bridgehead from the Russians. On the Army's right wing, Kralicek's Corps was instructed to take the heights east and south of Sieniawa.

At 8:30 PM on the 18th, GO Mackensen ordered his three corps east of the San to content themselves with the ground they had won, and to dig in. Only XLI Res Corps, which had impeded Arz's advance by hanging back, should attack toward Radymno after it had replenished its ammunition and deployed its mortars.

Mackensen suspended his offensive mainly for the reasons already envisioned in the operational plans of the 15th. By creating a secure bridgehead, he would have an opportunity to assemble an attacking group which could thrust east of the San into the rear of Przemysl. However, reports received on the 18th about the
enemy also made such a suspension advisable. It had become certain that the enemy had assembled stronger forces east and northeast of Jaroslau, and that these forces would enter the fighting within hours.

2) The Russians counterattack

Operations against 11th Army

The Stavka didn't ignore Dimitriev's repeated cries for help, and on the 18th assembled a Combined Corps south of Lubaczow; it consisted of 3 Caucasian Rif Div (brought up from Lemberg) and 77 ID (taken from the Narew sector). This command was supposed to attack from Laszki through Wietlin, and then roll up Mackensen's units east of the San from the southeast. The entire 8th Army, including XII and XXI Corps south of Jaroslau, would join the attack to at least hinder the allies from transferring units to the more threatened sector.

With the greatest haste, the Combined Corps was already sent into battle late in the evening of the 18th, without waiting for the arrival of the second brigade of 77 ID. Thus 24 Russian battalions attacked 1 Gd ID and Arz's Corps between Makowisko and Wietlin. By dawn the Russian offensive had already been fended off. Arz's Corps, with 12 ID north of Sklo and 39 Hon ID south of the town, subsequently tried to take the village of Wietlin, which the Russians now held in much greater strength, but were unsuccessful on both the 19th and 20th.

The attack of Brussilov's north wing against Francois' Corps had no greater success than that of the Combined Corps. The onslaught of XII Russian Corps broke down immediately before the defensive fire of 11 Bav ID. It was somewhat more difficult to stop the Russians of XXI Corps west and northwest of Radymno. Especially by Tuczepy there was heavy fighting throughout the 19th, which kept one of Arz's badly-needed Honved regiments pinned down south of the San.

North of the k.u.k. VI Corps, the Guard Corps held off repeated uncoordinated enemy attacks against its positions between Makowisko and Cetula. To the left of the Guards, 56 ID ripped a substantial hole in the line between XXIV Russian and III Caucasian Corps; on the 19th they drove the right wing of the former Corps over the Lubaczowka back to Molodycz, where the enemy took up a new line facing west. At the same time, 20 ID thrust ahead to the Lubaczowka and 19 ID north of the Lubaczowka
crossed the road leading from Sieniawa to the southeast along a broad front. The Russians in this sector were thus in a serious predicament. Dimitriev anticipated that Mackensen would soon thrust into Brussilov's rear east of the San. He pulled III Caucasian Corps back to the edge of the woods north of the Lubaczowka and very quickly sent five cavalry divisions into the gap in the line west of Molodycz; they were to be followed as soon as possible by parts of 77 ID (apparently from the Division's second brigade as it came up). At the same time, the Combined Corps was instructed to leave just the minimum necessary force south of the Lubaczowka, and to send all its other troops to the area north of the river. On the evening of the 19th, Dimitriev demanded that the commander of Southwest Front should let him "pull back now without any conditions, and so avoid a decisive defeat and destruction." The answer, however, was: "Not a step back!" And on the next day General Dimitriev was replaced by General Letsch, who had distinguished himself as commander of XII Corps, particularly in the last 14 days.

The crisis on the inner wings of XXIV and III Caucasian Corps diminished anyway on the 20th, because the German 56 ID didn't wait for the Russian action, but pulled back again behind the Lubaczowka in accordance with Mackensen's guidelines. On this day the left wing of Emmich's Corps took several Russian positions on the heights east and southeast of Sieniawa.

Operations against 4th Army

Under IX k.u.k. Corps, GM Reymann's battle group thrust into Sieniawa early on the 19th. On the 20th, his eight exhausted battalions fought their way onto the Slawa Heights, the northeast bastion of the old Austrian bridgehead. North of Sieniawa the Jaeger Battalion guarding the flank was pushed back somewhat by a Russian counterattack.

In accordance with Dimitriev's orders, the three corps on the right wing of 3rd Russian Army had also gone over to the attack. In the night of 18-19 May, X Corps sent "half of its troops" over the San north of Lezajsk against the 13 km front held by 106 Lst ID. Although several detachments from the neighboring 3 ID hastened to the scene, the enemy managed to gain a foothold on the sand hills along the west bank opposite the left wing of Kletter's division. However, the gallant Landsturm troops launched a counterattack and drove the Russians back over the river; 10 officers and 2000 men, an entire Siberian rifle regiment, were taken captive.300 Similarly, the enemy who crossed

300While fending off this Russian offensive, 1st Lt Georg Dragicevic of

434
the San at Krzeszow were driven back by Horsetzky's 3 ID; in the morning of the 20th they had to withdraw to the eastern bank.

8 ID, on the left wing of XIV Corps' 30 km front, was attacked on the 19th by parts of IX Russian Corps, advancing through Nisko and Ulanow. All of XIV Corps' reserves were drawn into these heavy actions. In the evening the situation south of Ulanow was already considered secure. On the 20th, however, the Russians downstream from Rudnik struck foot detachments from 11 Hon CD which had been inserted between Horsetzky and Fabini, and which had been joined the day before by squadrons from 2 CD. The enemy captured Rudnik in the afternoon. Flank detachments from IR #14 came to the scene. At this time the Szekely IR #82 (from GM Szende's Bde) was also in the area as a reserve; it was now placed directly under XIV Corps, and its III Bn was sent to Rudnik. Soon afterwards the brave LW IR "Eger" #6 arrived on the battlefield; it was the leading contingent of 21 LW ID, which Army HQ had ordered to march to Jezowe. In a difficult action that lasted throughout the 21st, the Russians were again driven out of Rudnik and the area farther northwest and pushed back toward the San.

XV Russian Corps, temporarily reduced to just five regiments, attempted on the 19th and 20th to break into the positions of 47 Res ID at Krawce; from the beginning, all their efforts were unsuccessful. Other parts of XV Corps inched closer to the Austrian lines in front of Stöger-Steiner's Division, but without initiating action.

Meanwhile the possibility had arisen that both divisions of VIII Corps (21 LW and 37 Hon ID) might be diverted over the Vistula to join 1st Army, which was under heavy Russian pressure; this temporarily put the planned attack toward Sandomierz into question. On the evening of the 19th the situation was partly clarified: at least 37 Hon ID would be joining GdK Kirchbach's Corps, which was responsible for capturing Sandomierz. The attack could certainly begin on the 21st or 22nd. As noted above, the 21 LW ID - which was also supposed to join Kirchbach - had to be diverted to the Jezowe area behind XIV Corps. Then it was necessary to keep it in this area because during the 19th Mackensen ordered the k.u.K. IX Corps to relieve German 19 ID, fighting north of the Lubaczowka, and therefore GM Szende's Group

Fortress Arty Regt #1, commanding two 9 cm cannon batteries, won the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.

301 The Battalion commander, the dragoon Major Egon Freih. von Waldstätten, received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order. He had already distinguished himself on 7 May at the assault crossing of the Wislok.
had to be used to strengthen IX Corps. Moreover, the high command had told the k.u.k. 4th Army to hold three battalions and one battery ready for shipment to the new Italian front; together with two battalions and one battery from Arz's Corps they would form 59 Mtn Bde under GM Fernengel.

The troops' need to rest, and troop movements to prepare for new tasks, forced GO Mackensen to give his Army Group several days to catch its breath.

In this time period perhaps the fate of fortress Przemysl would be decided; its retention or evacuation by the Russians would influence Mackensen's further decisions. The hope that the matter would be settled, however, wasn't fulfilled.

c. The Battle of Opatow, 15-22 May

North of the Vistula, the retreat of the Russian 4th Army on 13 May allowed all of Woyrsch's Army Detachment - including Kövess' Armeegruppe - to leave the positions they had held for many months. Although the enemy's ultimate intentions remained unknown, various reports on the 14th made it possible to identify the first intermediate position they would occupy during their retreat. On their southern wing, the Russians' XXXI Corps deployed one division to cover the Sandomierz bridgehead and one at Opatow; XXV Corps pulled back to Ostrowiec and Ilza. Farther north the Grenadiers and XVI Corps were withdrawing toward Radom; XIV Corps retreated with its north wing along the Pilica.

By the evening of the 14th, Dankl's small Army reached the line Osiek-Rakow without any noteworthy fighting. On the next day, however, Ist Corps on the army's south wing (with 46 LW ID plus 16 Cav Bde) pushed its way to Koprzywnica and Klimontow only after heavy combat with parts of XXXI Russian Corps. II Corps (with 4 and 25 ID plus a brigade from the Polish Legion) reached the area southeast and northwest of Iwaniska. GdK Dankl intended to send Ist Corps against the left side of the Sandomierz bridgehead on the 16th; the heavy artillery would also move to this sector. On the same day, II Corps was supposed to advance to Lipnik, Opatow and Ostrowiec. Everywhere the landscape was still scarred from the actions which 1st Army had endured during the retreat from the Vistula in fall 1914: burnt-out buildings, collapsed trenches, and countless burial mounds.

Meanwhile Woyrsch's Army Detachment took Kielce on the 13th and
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

on the next day reached Chybice, Bzínek and Nieklan. Russian rear guards opposed Bredow's Division at Chybice on the 15th, while the Landwehr Corps gained ground on the upper Kamienna.

Kövess' Armeegruppe, which had swollen during the quiet months to 40,000 riflemen and 6000 horsemen, also advanced on the 13th. GM Goldbach's group (parts of 16 ID) on the south wing moved through Konsk without fighting; on the next morning they operated with Prussian Landwehr detachments to throw back the Russian rear guards north of this town. GdK Hauer's Cavalry Corps and the main body of FML Schariczer's 16 ID had to fight heavier actions at Stefanow and Gielniow on the 14th. The 16 ID was temporarily in a ticklish situation on the 15th because of a Russian counterattack at Gielniow; however, the enemy evacuated the battlefield early on the 16th. This retreat was mainly caused by the intervention of parts of GM Podhoranszky's 35 ID; his right wing had taken Drzewica from the Russians. His left wing advanced to Ossa, an operation made easier by assistance from Menges' Division, fighting on the south wing of 9th German Army.

The geography of the battlefield (specifically the course of the Vistula), and the conviction that the Russians didn't intend to stand their ground soon, now led the high command to demand that the units in west Poland should shift their advance more toward the northeast. On the other hand, Dankl's Army was tending to move more toward the right because their objective was Sandomierz. The result was that on 16 May a gap was already developing between Woyrsch's Army Detachment (moving toward Ilza) and Dankl. This gap was only inadequately covered by a detachment under Lt Col Wolff of IR # 84; II Corps gave him three battalions and a battery and sent him through Str. Slupia toward Kunow.

Trusting in their run of success, the allies disregarded the disadvantages of their position; however, they were underestimating the resourcefulness of the enemy. In the middle of their retreat, the Russians had decided to launch a counterattack with the south wing of 4th Army - perhaps only to divert their opponents' attention from the San, or perhaps also to radically change their fortune at the eleventh hour. 302

The Russian counterattack around Opatow

302 For the following operations, see mainly the article by Grischinsky, "The attack of XXV Corps in May 1915" (in Voyenno istoritscheski sbornik, Part II); also Hoen, Waldstätten-Zipperer and Seiffert, "Die Deutschmeister" (Vienna, 1928), pp. 380 ff. and Michel and Wohl, "Das Vierundachtzig Buch" (Vienna, 1919), pp. 87 ff.
The first unit affected by the new Russian plan was Bredow's LW Division, advancing toward Ilza. West of Kunow they were attacked by 46 ID of XXV Corps, thrusting over the Kamienna. Lt Col Wolff's detachment met a similar reception; beset by Cossacks and cut off from the rest of 1st Army, they were able to hold their ground only with difficulty.

However, on this day (16 May) the main target of the enemy was the k.u.k. 1st Army. Already around noon Ist Corps was under attack at Koprzywnica, and II Corps several kilometers from Opatow. Reports of Russian reinforcements moving against the Army's south wing didn't prevent its commander from taking further measures toward the capture of Sandomierz, in cooperation with the neighboring HQ of 4th Army. While 4 ID was still gaining ground, 25 ID - advancing along the Kobylny-Opatow road - was suddenly struck in the flank by 3 Russian Gren Div. Although the Viennese division immediately prepared a defensive front and fought heroically, it had to give way to the Russian thrust and fall back to Iwaniska. The Deutschmeister of IR # 4 alone lost almost 1200 men dead wounded and taken prisoner; some companies lost all their officers and were reduced to 200 men apiece. On this day of burning heat, one of the battalions of IR # 84 sent 984 men ahead, but only 104 returned from the fighting. According to official reports, 25 ID lost 121 officers and 5323 men in the second half of May, the majority of them on this one day at Opatow.

The retreat of 25 ID also compelled 4 ID to give back the area it had taken. On the other hand, 46 LW ID maintained itself on a line between Koprzywnica and Point # 232 north of Klimontow against all Russian attacks; one village was lost but immediately retaken.

While these events unfolded, the main body of the Landwehr Corps turned toward the line Mirzec-Szydlowiec; advance detachments had already reached Wierzbica. In Kövess' Group, GM Goldbach sent two battalions into the enemy rear at Russki Brod in the night of 15-16 May, and forced them to immediately retreat. GdI Kövess' divisions advanced to the line Przysucha-Ossa.

The first result of the day's fighting was that GO Woyrsch had to order Bredow's LW ID and Kövess' Group to halt; only GdK König's LW Corps was given permission to continue. 1st Army and Bredow's LW ID were supposed to just hold their lines. The former would concentrate reserves on its left wing to provide substantial reinforcements for the k.u.k. II Corps. König's Corps and Kövess' Group would advance to the east, the latter in the
direction of Radom. Finally, 41 Hon ID was sent through Szczucin to join 1st Army rather than proceeding to the 4th.

On the enemy side, General Ragosa (commander of XXV Corps) ordered 3 Gren Div to continue its attack on the k.u.k. 25 ID during the 17th; General Mishchenko (commander of XXXI Corps) sent 83 ID to attack Dankl's center.

To cover the Grenadiers, 46 Russian ID attacked Bredow's Division at Chybice during the night; Bredow's soldiers stood their ground, although they had to commit their last reserves. On the 17th the Grenadiers broke through 25 ID; its battalions, already shattered the day before, retreated to the area southeast of Lagow. Now the entire II Corps had to pull back to a line running from Klimontow to Point # 321 southwest of Iwaniska. Meanwhile the well-proven regiments of Urbanski's Landwehr Division, under his tough and uncompromising leadership, didn't surrender a foot of ground to the charging Russians.

If the Russians continued to exert pressure, the 1st Army might be torn from its line of communications and pushed back against the Vistula, where the first elements of 41 Hon ID were just getting off their trains at Szczucin. Dankl decided to pull his Army back behind the Czarna.

Meanwhile, on the 17th the Landwehr Corps, as instructed by Teschen, advanced to the line Tychow-Wierzbica while Kövess' Group moved toward Oronsk, Odrzywol and Rozanna. Both operations took place without any heavy actions; however, GO Woyrsch was now convinced that the Russians wanted to break through between his forces and 1st Army. In response, Bredow should turn toward Bodzentyn; this would give König's Corps an opportunity to attack the flank of XXV Russian Corps. Meanwhile the advance toward Radom was canceled.

For a moment the k.u.k. high command toyed with the idea of also sending 21 LW ID and 37 Hon ID to help 1st Army; because of the greater significance of the operations south of the Vistula, however, they gave up this idea. Due to the situation of 4th Army, they couldn't approve the withdrawal of 1st Army behind the Czarna. They told Dankl that instead he should seek to change his luck by having II Corps counterattack. Because of the poor condition of 25 ID, the Army commander didn't feel that such a solution was feasible at this time. He did, however, give up his plans for a retreat; until the arrival of 41 Hon ID, the troops would hold onto the positions they occupied on the evening of the 17th.
The AOK also didn't agree with the suspension of operations by Kövess' Armeegruppe. They believed that the continuation of the thrust toward Radom would have been a much better counter measure against the offensive by XXV Russian Corps. This option, however, could only be carried out if 9th German Army covered the flank of Kövess' group by attacking the Russian bridgehead on the Pilica at Nowe Miasto. The Germans didn't have sufficient forces to do this.

**Developments north of the Vistula from 18 to 22 May**

In the event, the Russians themselves relieved the allied commanders of further concern. Instead of continuing to attack the hard-pressed left wing of 1st Army, on the 18th Evert ordered General Ragosa to turn against Bredow's Division, which had been hastily reinforced by parts of the LW Corps. On this day and the next, the German defenders had to endure very hot and heavy hours. The high command urged GdK Dankl to aid Woyrsch's Army Detachment by attacking toward Lagow. However, his own long front was so strongly hit by thrusts of XXXI Russian Corps that he could only send Lt Col. Wolff's weak detachment from Str. Slupia to aid Bredow's right wing. Wolff captured 360 prisoners. On the 19th, aided by the k.u.k. 7 CD which had come to the area, and by a mixed German detachment, he restored the connection between the wings of 1st Army and of Bredow's Landwehr.

Otherwise, by the evening of the 19th the crisis north of the Vistula seemed to be over. In the afternoon of the 19th the enemy disengaged from 25 ID and pulled back toward Iwaniska. Two days later the Vienna Division followed the Russians, but after a short march encountered strong resistance once again. Meanwhile the Russians had again made heavy attacks on the 20th against Bredow's LW ID and the groups that connected him with the k.u.k. 1st Army. Wolff's group, together with detachments from 7 CD, finally established a cohesive front in the Lysa Gora, south of Str. Slupia.

On the 22nd, the Russians also pulled back from Bredow, to establish a defensive position on the heights of Wasniow. The enemy stayed in place opposite 46 LW ID and 4 ID, and on the 21st gained a substantial success against the inner wings of these divisions.303 The 46 LW ID, aided by a regiment from 41 Hon ID,

---

303 According to the testimony of a captured Russian officer, this misfortune occurred largely because substantial parts of IR # 8 (from Brünn) gave up without fighting. The Regiment was reduced to 250 riflemen, who fell back through the Koprzywianka west of Klimontow.
was able to recover most of the ground that had been lost. For the time being, however, 4 ID remained a little damaged.

After the arrival of the entire 41 Hon ID, that is on 24 or 25 May, 1st Army HQ intended to advance to the line Klimontow-Kobylany-Biskupice. GdK Dankl, however, would not be around to carry out this plan. He was about to be named commander of the defenses of Tyrol.

d. Start of the (III) Battle of Przemysl

To the south of Mackensen's Army Group, the fortress of Przemysl was a thorn in the flesh of the allies. The ring of forts had lost much of their combat value due to the destruction carried out by the Austrians before they surrendered the place in March. The casemates, however, were mostly intact and provided excellent shelter for the Russian defenders. The Russians had also energetically rebuilt and extended the intermediate positions. The permanent wire barriers were reinforced with additional field works. When the Austrians hastily destroyed the fortress artillery on the night of 20-21 March, they had concentrated on the largest and most-modern pieces; consequently a substantial part of the older guns had fallen intact into the hands of the Russians. They were reinforced by Russian guns of similar age, as well as by the field artillery of XII Corps. Nonetheless, the fortress commander (General Delwig) didn't feel he had sufficient heavy artillery.

The Russian high command never reached a consensus as to the proper role of the fortress in the upcoming fighting. At one point they intended to use the place merely as a type of field work, from which the heavy guns and most first-line infantry would be removed. However, subsequent orders insisted that the fortress had to be held under all circumstances because of its importance for morale. The fortress commander finally begged that these contradictory instructions should cease because of the harm they were doing to his garrison of mostly militia troops.

First actions to the west of Przemysl

On the south wing of Mackensen's Army, 11 Bav ID took the outlying Russian positions at Trojczyce and Batycze on 16 May, but then were hit by crossfire from the fortress ring and from XII Russian Corps which was dug in on the other side of the Rada

304Brussilov, pp. 130 ff.
Brook. On the day before, German 119 ID had advanced from the Babice and Sanem area, and without noteworthy interference from the fortress made progress toward the works at Ujkowice; however, based on scouting patrols by officers the Germans didn't attempt to carry out a coup de main as originally planned. Next to 119 ID, a detachment from the k.u.k. 24 ID (reinforced by dismounted troopers of 1 Lst Huss Bde) under Col. Eduard Edler von Wieden advanced through the low ground west of Letownia; it constituted the north wing of Boroevic's Army.

Boroevic's operations south of Przemysl

3rd Army had been ordered on 12 May to come up to the south front of Przemysl and to capture it either by a sudden assault or if necessary by a siege operation; at the same time its right wing was to advance through Dobromil and Nowe Miasto to Mosciska.

FML Martiny's k.u.k. X Corps, advancing on the Army's left wing, pushed back enemy covering troops south of the San on the 14th; very exhausted, they reached the outlying Russian positions at Pod Mazurami and Height # 418 (Helicha). On the afternoon of the 15th, lines of skirmishers from 24 ID climbed the Pod Mazurami heights, which the enemy had abandoned; from here they had a tempting view of Przemysl. 3rd Army HQ had reported that the garrison of the fortress consisted mostly of cavalry, which indicated that the Russians intended to retreat; therefore FML Martiny ordered that the advance should immediately continue through the city up to the Wiar River. On the same evening, 24 ID came right up to the line of fortresses, and 45 LW ID farther south stormed Height # 418. However, the Corps' attempt to break through the forts near Lipnik was shattered by the short-range fire of the defenders, who moreover were supported by flanking fire from Grochowce. The offensive attempt on the 16th was equally unsuccessful. Martiny's divisions remained on the forested hills southwest of Pralkowce and at Helicha, opposite several lines of Russian barbed wire. 4 CD covered their right wing in the direction of Grochowce; 2 ID, once more part of X Corps, had reached Olszany the day before.

On the right of 4 CD, XVII Corps made up the center of 3rd Army; it advanced to begin the blockade of the south front of Przemysl. This movement was hampered by difficult roads and consequent delays. FML Anton von Bellmond's 11 ID, on the Corps' left, reached the area around Nizankowice and Kormanice late on the evening of the 15th; from this point they were supposed to move closer to the fortified belt on the 17th.
On the right wing of 3rd Army, GM Freih. von Leonhardi's 1 CD advanced toward Nowe Miasto on the 14th. Their dismounted riflemen took the town, but then the Division immediately came up against stronger Russian units, against which it couldn't break through. On the next day, the German Beskid Corps came up from Dobromil and over the Wiar through the blood-soaked battlefield of Mizyniec; they found themselves up against strong Russian positions on the heights on both sides of Husakow toward Jaksmanice.

Under XVII Corps, the 26 LW ID reached Nizankowice on the 15th behind 11 ID. 1 Lst Inf Bde deployed west of Nizankowice, and was placed under 11 ID. VII Corps had to pause for a substantial time because of numerous supply trains on the road ahead; the Corps' leading troops only reached Tyrawa-Wolska.

2nd Army operates southeast of Przemysl

On Boroevic's right, Böhm-Ermolli advanced on the 12th from the line Lomna-Lisko toward Chyrow, Sambor and Horodyszcze; at the same time, he was prepared to intervene southeast of the Dniester to assist South Army by a flanking maneuver. In contact with the enemy, but without encountering any major actions, 2nd Army came on the 13th to within a half day's march of Stary Sambor and Chyrow. The Army commander expected that the Russians would resist along the road between Stary-Sambor and Chyrow; for the next day he therefore placed XIX Corps as well as IV Corps under GdK Tersztynszky in preparation for a breakthrough attack; the Beskid Corps was also asked to cooperate. However, the Russians abandoned the heights north of Felsztyn and Chyrow to Böhm-Ermolli's left wing without offering serious resistance. On the Army's right, XVIII Corps moved through Stary Sambor while V Corps (reinforced by 13 LW ID) occupied the strongly fortified ridge stretching to the southeast without any difficulty. On the evening of the 14th, the advance guards of 2nd Army camped for the night at Zwor, southwest of Sambor, and in the area of the Radycz Heights.

On this day the high command told Böhm-Ermolli to continue to advance - between South Army, which was moving with its left wing through Drohobycz, and 3rd Army - toward Rudki and Mosciska. In carrying out these orders, the main body of 2nd Army pushed ahead on the 15th through Sambor and in the area south of Krukeniec. 27 ID, advancing on the Army's left wing south of the Magiera Heights (a much-contested battlefield of 1914), intervened in an action between 25 Res ID of the Beskid Corps and Russian rear guards.
At this point 2nd Army HQ had left Ungvar; because of the effects of a storm which broke out on the evening of the 14th they were temporarily out of contact by road or wire with the front. Therefore they couldn't easily obtain a picture of the enemy's intentions. Reports made it seem most probable that the Russians were all retreating toward the Wereszyca; therefore orders issued to guide the marches of the individual corps on the 16th and 17th envisioned large-scale advances. However, when Army HQ after a nine hour journey reached their new station at Lisko at 4:00 PM on the 16th, they reappraised the situation considerably based on new information from the front. At the bend in the Strwiaz southwest of Rudki and at Krukienice the corps had come up against a strong Russian position, which ran from west to east and consisted of a thick belt of obstacles.

As ordered by the Stavka, Russian 8th Army had deployed about nine of their divisions on the rising ground between Przemysl and the Dniester. From this position they covered the defensive line being formed on the San, and could also prevent their opponents from moving out of the area southeast of Przemysl against the 11th and 9th Russian Armies, still fighting south of the Dniester.

Engagements against Brussilov's new position

Gdi Boroevic had also moved his headquarters forward, from Homonna to Sanok. On the 16th he wanted to take the heights by Husakow. The Beskid Corps did make some progress in this area, but couldn't break the enemy's resistance. XVII Corps was supposed to send 21 Inf Bde (of 11 ID) and 26 LW ID to fight on the left of the Beskid Corps; however, after these units crossed the Wiar they halted because of false rumors that the Russians were sortieing from the southern part of the fortress. Therefore they didn't complete their deployment on the left of Marwitz's Corps until night.

2nd Army now intended to strengthen their left wing for a joint effort with the Beskid Corps to break through the Russian positions. For this purpose, Böhm-Ermolli once again placed XIX Corps, coming up in the second line, under GdK Tersztyanszky, who would lead the main attack. However, the offensive didn't develop on the 17th, because well-aimed Russian fire substantially delayed the units crossing the marsh along the Blozewka. Major fighting developed only on the left, involving the flank group led by FML Kosak (51 Hon ID and 27 ID). To the right of the six divisions under Tersztyanszky, XVIII Corps made its way toward the low ground southeast of Krukienice, with 44 LW
ID (reinforced by 86 LW Inf Bde) on the left and 9 ID on the right. V Corps reached the lower Strwiaz; its flank was covered at Woloszcza by a mixed detachment of 14 ID under Col. Rehwald. Reports arrived that V Caucasian Corps had left Lemberg; 2nd Army HQ didn't know that the Caucasians were moving toward Jaroslau, and expected the arrival of these Russian reinforcements on their own front.

Meanwhile the Beskid Corps had continued to attack on the 17th; their tenacity, however, wasn't rewarded with success. For a while they suffered from flanking fire from several directions, including from the fortress. On their left, 26 LW ID occupied the "Baum Heights" southeast of Jakimanice, scene of memorable actions in October 1914; 21 Inf Bde on the lower Wiar held the line between the Bohemian Landwehr and the main body of 11 ID. The 11 ID and the k.u.k. X Corps established themselves firmly to the south and southwest of Przemysl. By stretching 45 LW ID farther to the east, it was possible to pull GM Berndt's 4 CD out of the line for several days of well-earned rest at Cisowa. The lead division of VII Corps reached Bircza.

During the day, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo appealed "with very great and well-founded trust" to the energetic Brussilov; he was not only supposed to hold Przemysl, but also "to solidify the situation by constant activity" on the other parts of the front. Brussilov responded that in the 60 km between Przemysl and the Dniester there were just 124 Russian battalions against 200 of the allies, and that reinforcements of about two corps were needed. Nevertheless, he carried out the instructions of the supreme commander. \(^{305}\)

On 18, 19 and 20 May the main body of 2nd Army and right wing of 3rd Army continued to attack Brussilov's positions. 2nd Army HQ wanted to first shatter the enemy lines with artillery fire, but this was impossible because their corps had only a small number of guns, and these were mostly light artillery. \(^{306}\) Meanwhile the high command was urging them to mount a powerful attack toward Mosciska without halting. Once again, therefore, the infantry had to bear the brunt of the fighting.

On the east wing of 2nd Army, parts of 33 ID (V Corps) were able to reach the north bank of the Strwiaz at Koniuszki-Siemianowskie in the night of 17–18 May; however, these gallant battalions were unable to hold their position against heavy fire from the Russian

\(^{305}\)Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 44

\(^{306}\)Tersztynszky's Group had just 17 guns per kilometer, XVIII Corps had 7, and V Corps had about 14 guns per kilometer.
artillery. XVIII Corps tried in vain to establish a firm foothold on the other side of the Blotna low lands.

In Tersztyanszky's eastern group (29, 34, 31 and 32 ID), on this day there was a series of very heavy and costly actions; only a few enemy strong points were taken and held against counter-attacks by the Russian XVII and XXVIII Corps. FML Kosak's western group (51 Hon and 27 ID) attacked in close cooperation with the Beskid Corps; on the 19th, with FML Kornhaber's 51 Hon ID in the lead, they stormed the stubbornly defended positions southwest of Prikut and brought in 5600 prisoners, 5 guns and 6 machine guns. Despite this defeat, the Russians were able to prevent any expansion of the breakthrough, thanks to the arrival of reinforcements. The Beskid Corps also won several glorious successes of only local significance. Along the entire front, the hoped-for destruction of the enemy wasn't attained.

XVII Corps, which held a very long front, stayed on the defensive. On the 19th the Army commander came to X Corps to personally study the possibility of mounting a "powerful attack" on the Przemysl fortress. There was no longer any belief that the garrison was, as hitherto supposed, made up solely of Cossack and militia units; first-line troops were also present. There could be no successful assault until the heavy mortars were brought up, and the condition of the road made their movement impossible at this time. Boroevic reported to the high command that if the railroads could be quickly restored they could expedite transportation of the mortars. If this was done, the attack on the fortress could start at the end of May.
e. Actions on the allied right wing

7th Army's engagements along the Pruth

Early on 13 May, the right wing of 7th Army was still standing north of the Pruth. However, it could only tarry in this position for a few more hours. General Letschitzky sent his Army forward in a new attack: XXXII Corps with two divisions against Czernowitz, III and II Cavalry Corps against Sniatyn, and XXXIII Corps against Kolomea. Thus it was high time for Pflanzer's troops to give way before this overwhelming assault by immediately withdrawing behind the Pruth.

Lt Col. Papp's group, fighting on the extreme right wing, was able to delay the Russian advance at Mahala and Sadagora by rear guard actions on the 13th, and didn't pull back beyond the Pruth at Czernowitz until early on the 14th. However, FML Korda with his main body (6 CD, Polish Legion, half of 5 Hon CD and half of 42 Hon ID) had already retreated as ordered to the south bank on the 13th. He occupied the sector between the pre-war border and the mouth of the Czeremosz, and also took Papp under his command. On Korda's left, GdK Marschall's Group guarded the river as far as the Lysa Gora, with 10 CD, German 5 CD, half of 5 Hon CD, most of the L-Sch Bde, LW IR # 3 from 22 LW ID, and the remnants of Lt Col. Bekesi's Group. A plan to oppose the Russian advance on Kolomea by sending German and Aus-Hung. cavalry into their flank had to be abandoned because of the menace from the enemy's much larger forces. The Russians followed Korda and Marschall up to the Pruth.

Meanwhile, the Russian XXXIII Corps east and northeast of Kolomea struck FML Krautwald's group (8 CD, GM Eckhardt's group, parts of 15 ID, and main body of 22 LW ID). Attacking in deep waves, the enemy drove Krautwald's fighters back to the Pruth, where most of them stood fast in the bridgehead which Pflanzer had prepared around Kolomea. Now the Army commander also had to order FML Czibulka's and GdI Rhemen's Groups back behind the Pruth and to the area south of Nadworna; prior to this withdrawal, Czibulka's 36 ID successfully opposed Russian attacks at Ottynia on the afternoon of the 13th.

The Russians renewed their attack soon after noon on 14 May. While the majority of XXXIII Corps stormed the Kolomea bridgehead, the Russian 12 CD sought to cross the Pruth downstream from this point. The cavalry were driven back by the artillery fire of the defenders. The fighting at Kolomea was
heavier, but the defenders received substantial help from the first units of the Inner Austrian III Corps as they arrived in 7th Army's sector. The repulse of the Russian storm was due in part to the contributions of LW IR "Klagenfurt" # 4 and of IR # 27 from Graz.

On the day before, Army HQ at Kolomea had been involved at first-hand in the actions of Krautwald's group. The impression of the fighting, and concern that the larger Russian forces might continue to advance, were both very strong. However, Pflanzer with his natural leadership talent and energy mastered the situation, especially since the Army's center and west wing had been able to take up their new positions without any friction. Also the advance by the entire South Army made it possible on the evening of the 13th for 7th Army HQ to not only plan to hold its current line, but also to resume the offensive as soon as possible.

This decision was consistent with orders which arrived in the early afternoon of the 14th from Teschen, and which were intended to regulate the next moves of both of the right-wing Armies. South Army would send its left ahead through Stryj and Drohobycz to secure the stretch of the Dniester between Zydaczow and the mouth of the Tysmienica. The right would move through Dolina and Bolechow to capture the Kalusz area; together with 7th Army they would strike Letschitzky's advancing west wing between the Czeczwa and the Bystrzyca Nadwornianska. Pflanzer's east wing would hold its ground and transfer all un-needed units to the west wing.

The advance of South Army

The enemy units opposite Gerok's and Hofmann's Corps of Linsingen's Army had finally withdrawn on 13 May. The Russians retreated here so quickly that it was only possible to keep up with them in a few areas. In the night of 13-14 May the German 1 ID and Hofmann's leading unit (131 Inf Bde) captured the town of Skole. By the next evening, Gerok's Corps was 10 km south of Dolina, 131 Inf Bde at Brzaza, Bothmer's Corps on the line Rozhurcze-Borysław, and Szurmay's Corps in the area around Podbuz, with its left wing in touch with 2nd Army. The main body of Hofmann's Corps - 129 and 130 Inf Bdes, 12 Lst Terr Bde and GM Bolzano's Combined Bde which had arrived from 3rd Army - was held as the Army's reserve between Skole and Tuchla.

On the next day Linsingen learned that Pflanzer planned to support the further advance of South Army on the 15th with a
thrust by his own left wing to Kalusz. In acknowledging this plan, the German general also indicated that he was ordering the k.u.k. 19 ID to advance through Perehinsko. On this day Linsingen intended to carry out the orders of the AOK by pivoting with his right wing and center toward the line Dolina-Stryj; the left wing would deploy in echelon northwest of Drohobycz to secure the movements of the main body and to ensure that contact was maintained with 2nd Army. 307

On the 15th, the advance of South Army was once again considerably hindered by the Russians' destruction of the roads. The k.u.k. 19 ID reached the Czeczwa at Luhy without seeing action. The main body of Gerok's Corps, most of whose artillery was far in the rear because of the difficult terrain, became engaged in a rather heavy action on the heights west and southwest of Dolina. 131 Inf Bde drove the Russians out of Bolechow after a brief fight in the streets. Bothmer, followed by the bulk of Hofmann's Corps, approached the city of Stryj. Szurmay's Corps advanced through the burning oil fields at Boryslaw and onto the heights farther northwest. Although these advances didn't fully meet the expectations of the Army's HQ, the day had been a success in that 5,000 prisoners and 8 machine guns had been taken in. The incoming reports made it clear that the Russians had no intention of retreating any further, and were prepared to offer new resistance at Perehinsko, in front of Dolina and Stryj, and on the heights east and north of Drohobycz.

South Army once more encountered a stubborn enemy in the next few days. The attacks of Szurmay's Corps between the 16th and 18th were almost entirely unsuccessful. Finally, on the 19th their left wing along with the mixed detachment of Col. Rehwald from 2nd Army made some progress by Litynia. On the 20th the inner wings of Szurmay and Bothmer stormed the strong Russian positions east of Drohobycz, and took 1800 prisoners. Bothmer's troops strove in vain to capture Stryj, while Hofmann's brigades had to fight for every foot of ground at Bolechow. Under Gerok's Corps, the k.u.k. 19 ID thrust ahead to the east bank of the Czeczwa at Spas. For the time being, however, this maneuver didn't aid the fighting in front of Dolina. There had been no decisive change in the position of the entire South Army between the 16th and 20th.

The fighting around Nadworna

Like the 11th Army, the right wing of Letschitzky's 9th Army had

307This statement is based on a manuscript submitted by the German military archives.
to give up some ground. They set up a new line in front of Perehinsko and Solotwina, and south of Nadworna. Therefore on the 14th parts of Ljubicic's Group were able to once more occupy the heights south and southwest of Jasien (Hrynkw and Jawornik), while the main body of the Group assembled in the area around Huta.

The attack of the left wing of 7th Army between Delatyn and the Lomnica began on the 15th. West of the Bystrzyca Solotwinska the weaker group, Ljubicic's, was supposed to capture the heights west of Stanislau; east of the valley a larger force - 50 battalions - would thrust through Ottnia and Tlumacz. Under GdI Rhemen's Group, 5 ID was pinned down in a fire fight from the start of the operation by a strong enemy counterattack southeast of Nadworna. To the southwest of Nadworna, 6 ID initially won some substantial successes, but then suffered a considerable setback due to a counter-thrust on its left wing. To overcome this crisis, FZM Ljubicic wanted to divert the main effort of his Group toward the right, thus intervening in the action of 6 ID. This maneuver however wasn't carried out, because the Feldzeugmeister's battalions encountered strong Russian resistance. The diversion of Ljubicic also harmed the cooperation of the inner wings of 7th and South Armies, which had been sought by the high command.

Fighting continued on the 16th. Southeast of Nadworna the Silesian and north Moravian troops of 5 ID along with Croatian battalions from 36 ID stormed the Russian positions. Once again, however, Pflanzer's units were unfortunate. The Russians attacked the inner wings of the two division and forced them to give ground toward the bridgeheads over the Pruth at Delatyn and Lanczyn. In a few hours the Silesian IR "Kaiser" # 1, fighting with its usual self-sacrificing spirit, lost 25 officers and ensigns, 8 of them company commanders, and about 1000 men.

The regiments of 6 ID southwest of Nadworna suffered under pressure from strong Russian attacks, which however were all hurled back; the enemy had heavy casualties. FZM Ljubicic's Group also had to endure some major Russian blows.

Around midnight (16-17 May) the Russians stormed the Delatyn bridgehead. The parts of 5 ID holding the outer works were forced back toward the main position. HQ of 7th Army, when they evacuated Kolomea, had moved to Delatyn rather than to Maramaros-Sziget so as not to alarm the troops; now they had to pull out of Delatyn during the night. They established themselves back at Körősmező, where they would not be right in the front lines of
the fighting. By daybreak the Russians had exhausted their strength, without reaching their objective. On the other hand, the right wing of Ljubicic's Group lost some ground to another enemy thrust.

Krautwald, who on the 15th was commanding 4000 riflemen of III Corps plus half of 15 ID, had been ordered to join the attack of the Army's left wing as soon as the latter reached the line Kolomea-Stanislau.308 Actually the Group was pinned down throughout the period 15-19 May in major defensive fighting. Although the Russian attacks were all repulsed, both sides suffered severe losses.

While Letschitzky's XXX Corps was launching its strong attack at Nadworna and Kolomea, he made diversionary thrusts farther east. On the 15th the Russians tried to cross the Pruth in Marschall's sector, and on the next day in FML Korda's sector. At dawn on the 19th the enemy 71 ID attacked the right wing of FML Czibulka's Group (15 ID) at Tlumaczyk. In all three cases the Russians abandoned their attempts soon after they began.

When the Battle of Nadworna-Kolomea died out on the 20th, the offensive of 7th Army had failed. However Letschitzky's advance, which was supposed to provided meaningful relief to the Russian front in central Galicia, had also faltered. Exhaustion on both sides led to a pause in this sector of the great battlefield; it would last for more than a week.

4. The decisions of the two sides before Italy declared war

a. Plans of the Central Powers for offensives in Italy and Serbia

Meanwhile the overall military situation facing the commanders of the allied Central Powers reached a state of very high tension due to the attitude of Italy. Reports received in the first week of May were followed by equally gloomy news around the 10th. This caused Emperor Franz Joseph on the 11th to approve the accelerated preparation of all fortifications in the south, as

308 The transport of III Corps was maddeningly slow. The trains had to use the line through Körösmező, which was also the link between the entire southeast Galician rail net and the rest of the Monarchy, carrying all the supplies sent to 7th Army. However, it could only handle 12 trains in each direction per day. The first elements of III Corps reached Horodenka at 11:00 AM on the 13th. On the 14th, the loss of the area north of Delatyn led to the evacuation of 57 trains to Hungary in the next two days; this interrupted the transport of III Corp, whose next troops couldn't detrain until the 16th. The movement was finally completed on the 29th.
the high command had requested. He also allowed 57 ID to be sent from Syrmia to reinforce the covering troops on the Isonzo, where the Division detrained between 15 and 21 May.

Conrad's ideas

On 11 May, Commander-in-Chief FM Archduke Frederick submitted to his Monarch the first written plans for the deployment against Italy, including the positions to be occupied. The factors which at this moment were decisive for the high command were explained in a memorandum which the Chief of the General Staff prepared 48 hours later for Falkenhayn, Burian and the Emperor's Military Chancellery. It considered two possibilities:

1. The very unlikely chance that Italy's neutrality could still be purchased at the final hour, and
2. The much more likely outcome, which was that the Italians would finally abandon the Triple Alliance and range themselves with its enemies.

In the first scenario, Conrad demanded above all "the continuation of an energetic united war against Russia...with the minimum goal of recovering the territory of the Monarchy as well as compensation for our [Austria-Hungary's] territorial concessions to Italy by receiving land on the other side of the Vistula."309

Once this goal was achieved, then Serbia and Montenegro could be overthrown by the Central Powers in union with Bulgaria and Turkey. Romania, from which better reports were now arriving, could be induced to join the central European alliance if it were offered Bessarabia; at least it could be induced to maintain a benevolent neutrality.

However, if Italy declared war - which seemed very much more likely - Conrad wanted the allies to hold the San-Dniester line against Russia and then to send all available units to the southwest. This "would prevent an Italian advance into Inner Austria as much as possible, and enable us to strike at least a limited blow against them. Meanwhile the troops already in Tyrol, reinforced if possible by Aus-Hung. and German (Bavarian) units, would defend the border with guerilla warfare."

In more detail, the Chief of Staff went on: "For this purpose we

309In a note to the Foreign Minister dated 15 May, Conrad also asserted that if Austrian territory was ceded to Italy the Germans should compensate the Danube Monarchy with the County of Glatz and a border adjustment in Silesia.
think that at least one Aus-Hung. division should be sent to Tyrol, and hope that it would be reinforced by Bavarian troops. To confront the main Italian force attacking through Carinthia, Carniola and the Coastlands, about 20 divisions must be assembled (10 Aus-Hung. and 10 German). Of this total, about 4 divisions would deploy on the line through Villach and the rest on the line Marburg-Laibach, as far forward as seems possible based on the progress of the Italian advance. Probably in the basin at Villach-Klagenfurt or the one at Laibach (7), or on the Sava or Drava. This deployment is to be covered by the stubborn resistance of the covering troops, who are to be substantially reinforced. They will fight initially on the line of the Isonzo and in the Kanal valley (by Malborgeth and Predil). Pola will be defended. The Navy will intervene where possible upon the initiative of its commander; we want our ships to hinder enemy landing operations, especially in the Trieste area..."

Conrad intended in the southeast "to leave substantial forces; they will be available for an offensive into Serbia with the proviso that sufficient German and Bulgarian units will also take part." However, an "absolute precondition" for such an offensive would be "that the war in Italy is conducted as outlined in the above sketch." In Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina the enemy should at least be harassed with small-scale fighting. As had already been indicated in a report to the Emperor, it was naturally possible that further units from the Balkan front would be moved to the Isonzo.

Regarding the chain of command, the AOK wished to give Archduke Eugene command of all armies in the south (i.e. in the southwest as well as the southeast). Under him, GdK Rohr would lead the covering troops and later take over the Carinthian group. The divisions which first arrived at Marburg and Laibach would make up a new 1st Army under GdK Dankl; the German and Aus-Hung. units which followed would come under Mackensen's command as the 11th Army. The 5th Army HQ in Syrmia would be taken over by GdI Boroevic, because his present command - 3rd Army - had been pressed into a narrow front by Przemysl and could be dissolved.

310The question mark appears in the original memorandum.
Falkenhayn's ideas

The memorandum which Conrad drafted on the 13th was directed primarily against the ideas which Falkenhayn had developed at a meeting in Pless the day before. The German Chief of Staff agreed completely with the concept of continuing the attack against Russia at least as far as the San, the Wisznia and the Dniester, but didn't agree with Conrad's plan to attack in the southwest. He believed that the situation in Turkey and the Balkans was incomparably more important, and wanted to first fall upon the Serbs, win over the Bulgarians, and with the latter and the Turks to open the road to Constantinople. During the Pless meeting Conrad wouldn't budge from his Italian plans. He also stated that an offensive against Serbia shouldn't even be contemplated until the Bulgarians had actually pledged by treaty that they would join in. Therefore it was decided to invite Sofia to send an officer for consultation with German headquarters.

The disagreement regarding whether to attack Italy or Serbia continued between the two Chiefs of Staff in the next few days. Falkenhayn emphasized the significance of a victory that could save the Turks and win over the neutral Balkan states. Conrad responded that such a victory would mean little if at the same time the Italians were able to strike a "blow at the heart" of the Danube Monarchy, while possibly the Russians counterattacked as well.311 There were also several disputes regarding the chain of command. If GO Mackensen was to be sent to the southwest, Falkenhayn didn't want him to be subordinated to Archduke Eugene; moreover, because of the importance of Tyrol for the security of Bavaria he wanted an Imperial German general placed in charge of its defense. For historical, political and military reasons Conrad couldn't agree with these proposals.

The Italians prepare to declare war

While these discussions continued at headquarters, the diplomats of the allied Empires still believed that they could detect some last rays of hope in relations with Italy. These, however, were mere phantoms. One false hope was raised when the survival of the Salandra-Sonnino cabinet was imperilled because of the intervention of Giolitti; the crisis ended within 24 hours, 311Tisza also, in a telegram to Teschen on 18 May, advocated an immediate attack on Italy; he felt this would strongly influence Romania and Bulgaria. Conrad, who generally resisted any advice from political leaders, responded curtly that everything was already being done "which was necessary of the defense of the Monarchy and militarily possible." (Tisza, "Briefe", # 216 and 218)
however, with the full victory of the government leaders advocating war. At around the same time, reports from Rome indicated it might be possible to save the situation at the last moment if the Austrians immediately evacuated as much as possible of the land coveted by the Italians and let their Army take possession. This course was endorsed by Conrad in a note he sent Burian on the 18th (after a special request from Falkenhayn), which shows how greatly the danger from Italy was affecting the Chief of Staff despite his determination. He did add, however, that any concession should be accompanied by explicit guarantees against further Italian "blackmail."

Early on the morning of the same day, Falkenhayn sent a summary of a report from Major von Schweinitz, the German Military Attaché at Rome; he had learned from Vatican circles that Italy would declare war on the 26th. Similar information appeared in the Entente newspapers. These alarming reports led the k.u.k. Chief of Staff to briefly contemplate taking the risk of halting the offensive against Russia immediately in order to transfer substantial forces from the northeast to the Italian border. In conversations with GM Metzger, however, he soon gave up this idea, since it was clear that the Russians - who were once again very active - would take advantage of such a weakening of their opponents' lines. Only VII Corps of 3rd Army, which was already behind the front, was sent immediately to Mezőlaborcz, where it would entrain on the 21st for Carinthia. Moreover, the Standschützen and the various volunteer units were called up, and the Graz (III) and Innsbruck (XIV) Military Districts put on the alert.

Conrad and Falkenhayn were now meeting almost every day. In the evening of 18 May their fundamental differences regarding operations against Italy and Serbia once again came to the fore. They disagreed substantially about how many units should finally be taken from the northeastern front. Conrad estimated that after reaching the San-Dniester line they could weaken the front by around 20 divisions, but Falkenhayn wanted to take away 27 or more. As usual, the dispute couldn't be resolved at this time nor in the next few days. At least, however, there was a consensus on the immediate measures to be taken regarding Italy. This decision was apparently influenced by a memorandum from Archduke Eugene which arrived at Teschen on the 17th. The prospective commander of the war against Italy felt that this new enemy was more dangerous than Serbia and Montenegro. He wanted to send 5th Army "with every last man of its field formations" to the new front, even the divisions stationed in Bosnia. The high command had immediately approved the Archduke's suggestion to
have all the railroads prepared for the troop movement.

The Archduke's idea was discussed at the meeting on the 18th, the day in which the Paris "Temps" published a report about the London Treaty between Italy and the Entente, destroying the last faint hope that the Italian war could be avoided. Since the campaign in Galicia was still in progress, it would be necessary to call upon the inactive Balkan units for assistance.

Falkenhayn was upset when he learned at this time that in the southeast the Danube Monarchy had 240,000 riflemen opposing 180,000 Serbs; he declared that if he had known this earlier he wouldn't have moved such a large body of troops from the West for the Gorlice offensive. Conrad assured his Imperial German colleague that the 240,000 Aus-Hung. troops included just 80,000 first line combatants. The idea of sending most of these first-line soldiers to the southwestern theater of operations fell upon fruitful soil. Decisions were taken which began to be implemented 24 hours later, when written orders were issued to Archduke Eugene and GdK Rohr.

The deployment against Italy and Serbia

Five divisions from 5th Army - XV and XVI Corps plus 48 ID - would move immediately to the area west of Zagreb, where they would be available in the first days of June. At the same time the k.u.k. VII Corps was on its way to Carinthia. Three more divisions from the Galician front (two German units from Mackensen's Army and an Aus-Hung. unit from 2nd Army) were to move to the southeast. These divisions were supposed to be ready in the Marburg area by 5 June, which meant that they would have to leave their current positions in the line by 26 May. A new 5th Army under GdI Boroevic would be created from the 5 divisions from the Balkans and the 3 sent to Marburg. Meanwhile the Bavarian GLt Krafft von Delmensingen's German Alpenkorps (13 battalions, 11 mountain MG detachments and 9 batteries) would move through Innsbruck and Brenner Pass to south Tyrol, where it would arrive at the end of May. The defense of Tyrol, which had been carefully prepared by FML von Koennen-Horak, was now taken over by GdK Dankl. As previously intended, GdK Rohr was in charge of the Carinthian front.

After the five Aus-Hung. divisions left for Italy only two would remain in the Balkan theater: 59 ID in east Bosnia and the new 61 ID, created in the Banat from 10 Mtn Bde and 16 Hon Mtn Bde. There were also Landsturm units guarding the rivers, and garrisons in numerous fortified places. This force of mainly

31216 Hon Mtn Bde had hitherto been known as k.u. 109 Lst Inf Bde.
third-line troops was to be quickly reinforced by German units.

Command of the allied troops in the Balkans, except for those in BHD under Gdi Sarkotic, was to be given to GO Mackensen. As demanded by Falkenhayn, neither Mackensen nor Sarkotic would be placed under Archduke Eugene, but directly under the AOK. Three German divisions would move to the southeast as soon as possible to hold Serbia and Romania in check.  

These arrangements were approved by the German Chief of Staff largely because they would make it possible to still mount an offensive against Serbia rather than Italy. Even if Falkenhayn accepted Conrad's calculation that only 20 allied divisions could be made available from the northeast, and 5 divisions were going to Italy (VII Corps plus the 3 units that would join 5th Army), 15 divisions could still go to the Balkans. Including the two Aus-Hung. units which had been left in the southeast, 17 divisions would thus be on hand to strike Serbia along with Bulgarian and Turkish troops. Falkenhayn still hoped to carry out this operation in the near future, even though Bulgaria, as Conrad forcefully pointed out on the 20th, had refused to send an officer for consultations and thus given evidence that it wished to remain neutral. Moreover, the uncertain situation in Galicia was already making it difficult to transfer the first three German divisions to the southeast. Conrad asked his ally to at least send several battalions to the Sava-Danube border to cover the departure of 5th Army against any interference from the Serbs. This was done, even though Falkenhayn didn't believe the Serbs had any intention of taking the offensive.

The actual deployment of the forces from the Balkans caused Conrad to modify his plans for the campaign against Italy; the starting point for his planned counteroffensive was moved from the Marburg-Laibach area and more toward the east. It would thus have more of the character of a flank attack. Falkenhayn wanted the forces to assemble directly east of the line Graz-Marburg-Zagreb, but the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff wouldn't agree. He preferred to move the units forward as far as possible toward the northern and eastern outlets from the mountains on the border, so that they could strike the enemy when they were most vulnerable. Also in opposition to Falkenhayn, who reckoned that the Italians wouldn't be able to cross the mountain zone until the first half of July, Conrad estimated they would do so between 14 and 20 June. In reality, Falkenhayn disagreed fundamentally with the entire concept of the Aus-Hung. plans for an offensive in the southwest, which became obvious as events continued to unfold in

313At this point it was planned to send XLI Res Corps plus 1st German ID.
the next 24 hours.

b. Decisions to defend the Isonzo and continue the attack against Russia

On the morning of 21 May the first troops of the two corps from the Balkans were arriving by rail in the area west of Zagreb, while VII Corps and GM Fernengel's 59 Mtn Bde were getting on their trains in the Carpathians. At this point the AOK received a telegram from their military attaché in Rome, Capt. Freih. von Seiller, which indicated that the Italian Army would need more time than originally anticipated to be ready for war. The German OHL also received reports that the new enemy wouldn't be able to strike a blow until around 1 June. Simultaneously it became apparent that in the northeast the actions at Przemysl would drag on longer than had originally been expected. The situation in Galicia was so uncertain that the removal of substantial forces would be irresponsible. In a meeting with his Aus-Hung. colleague on the 21st, Falkenhayn declared that for the moment he couldn't consider sending the two German divisions which were supposed to join 5th Army. The force available for Conrad's proposed thrust would therefore be considerably weakened. Falkenhayn asked whether it might be preferable to move Boroevic's Army ahead to the Isonzo to prepare a strong defensive front capable of sustained resistance.

It wasn't easy for the German chief of staff to win his partner's consent to this idea. However, Conrad had to concede that for the immediate future the Russian front couldn't be further weakened, which limited the possibilities for getting reinforcements to 5th Army. On the other hand, he questioned whether the five divisions from the Balkans could take up positions in the proposed defensive zone in time. If the enemy struck while they were getting off their trains, the defenders' strength would be wasted in fruitless piecemeal fighting. Even if this problem didn't materialize, Conrad doubted whether the solution proposed by Falkenhayn would seriously delay the Italian offensive toward Inner Austria. In the end, however, the denial of large-scale German assistance and the force of circumstances overcame the arguments of the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff.314

314Conrad's attempt to obtain at least one German division for the Isonzo defenses as evidence of solidarity between the Central Powers was also thwarted by Falkenhayn. Only a German 13 cm battery took part in the Isonzo actions between 5 July 1915 and spring 1916. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Moreover, the Alpenkorps in Tyrol was forbidden to cross the Italian frontier. Germany never declared war on Italy; the Italians finally declared war on the Germans on 28 August 1916.
On the evening of the 21st, Archduke Eugene was ordered to have 5th Army detrain as far toward the front as possible; GdK Rohr was instructed to send VII Corps ahead to the Villach area. The justification for these orders was that no decision could be expected around Przemysl before the end of May, and "in the meantime assembly of sufficient strength for an offensive [against Italy] is impossible." The general situation made it necessary "for now to undertake defensive measures...in the border area." Although the Italians were still hesitant, it was anticipated they would take the offensive later.

Following the orders of the high command, on the morning of the 22nd GdK Archduke Eugene instructed XV Corps (1 and 50 ID) to move ahead to the Tolmein area, and XVI Corps (18 and 58 ID) and the independent 48 ID to Görz and St Daniel.

On the same day, the chain of command in the south was finalized. Archduke Eugene was in charge of all units on the Italian and Balkan fronts. The Land defense commander of Tyrol, GdK Dankl, led the units already in the province (90 and 91 ID, 56 Mtn Bde) plus the arriving German Alpenkorps. GdK Rohr, who retained his original staff, would lead 92 ID on the Carinthian border plus the units moving toward the area (VII Corps and 59 Mtn Bde). GdI Boroevic had the new 5th Army in the coastal lands, with GM le Beau as his Chief of Staff; he commanded the five newly-arrived divisions plus three that were already on the Isonzo (93, 94 and 57 ID). In the northeast, the former commander of V Corps, FZM Puhallo, succeeded Boroevic in command of 3rd Army for the brief remaining period of its existence. The troops who stayed on the Sava and the lower Danube, as well as the new German units moving by rail to the Banat and Neusatz (101, 103 and 105 ID), were placed under a new Armeegruppe HQ led by GdK Tersztyanszky. This general arrived at Peterwardein on 26 May, whereupon Archduke Eugene moved his headquarters to Marburg. From 5 June, Tersztyanszky reported directly to the k.u.k. high command. At the same time, GM Goldbach was sent to Transylvania to prepare the local defenses as well as possible in conjunction with the Hermannstadt (XII) Military District command.

The decision to send 5th Army and VII Corps right up to the border area would shape the course of the war against Italy for an unexpectedly long time. Despite the lessons which the combatants had learned in the last nine months regarding the strength of defensive positions, it is hardly conceivable that when issuing these orders the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff believed that the new line could be held indefinitely. It was quite extraordinary to oppose over 40 fresh divisions from the army of
a great power with just 14 divisions, some of them made up of militia and others still arriving at the front. The plan of taking up a purely defense position didn't seem to offer much chance of success. On 23 May, the day when Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, Conrad shared his concerns with GdI Falkenhayn in the following troubled words:

"I have the duty to speak openly with the allies who will share the fate of the Monarchy. It will be equally fateful for both Empires if we have arbitrarily overestimated the strength and endurance of the units which at this time we are throwing against our new enemy at the border. They will face odds of at least 3:1, and probably 4:1 or 5:1. They may only be able to resist along the border for two or three weeks. As far as we can foretell, the time will then come when their resistance will be worn down and they will have to fall back. As the enemy then gains ground, their superior numbers will come into play more than ever. They should reach the Drava between Marburg and Klagenfurt in about four weeks, and will be 250 km from Vienna (which they can reach in another four weeks). Then the Monarchy will be defenseless, unless we can denude the other fronts to procure enough units to drive back the Italian army....Our earnest duty now is to clearly face this danger and prepare to meet it with our combined strength...."

Moreover, Conrad painfully realized that the danger from Italy was magnified by the fact that if the Italians won a great success the Romanians couldn't be expected to remain on the sidelines. Although these developments wouldn't threaten Germany directly, the purely military result would be as catastrophic for the Hohenzollern Empire as for Austria-Hungary. Conrad recognized that Russia would also have to be dealt with. Meanwhile, however, he couldn't abandon to Italy territories which were vital for the continuation of the Monarchy's war effort. Such would be the case if the Italian armies crossed the Sava and Drava. The temporary abandonment, for example, of East Prussia beyond the lower Vistula wouldn't have been as disastrous for the general situation. For all these reasons, any attack on Serbia would have to be given low priority. On the other hand, the concept of striking a heavy blow against the Italians should never be completely abandoned; such an operation could be of decisive significance for the entire war because of the Italian temperament.315

315 In these days Conrad often expressed the opinion that only a quick blow would be needed to force the Italians to again leave the camp of the Entente, because of their national psychology and lack of cohesiveness. He was remembering the lessons of Radetzky's wars.
Due to these concerns, Conrad was impatient to finally win the anticipated success at Przemysl. This is apparent in the orders which in these days of psychological stress were issued by the k.u.k. high command to the Armies fighting in central Galicia. Written by the Chief of Staff personally, they show his dissatisfaction with what had been achieved to date, but did concede that a short pause was needed because the troops urgently had to rest. The order issued on the afternoon of 21 May summarized all the ideas which had been developed in the preceding 48 hours for the attack which the striking group would launch on the 24th, after careful artillery preparation. 11th Army would attack from the area southeast of Jaroslau toward Bucow. The objective of the right wing of 3rd Army would be the heights west of Mosciska, while 2nd Army aimed toward the heights east of that town. After the arrival of heavy artillery and sufficient ammunition, Przemysl would be attacked by k.u.k. X Corps along with the parts of 11th Army on the north side of the fortress; the main body of the latter Army would push through Pralkowce and the heights farther south.

Thus the war in the north took its course without interruption, even though a new and powerful enemy was pounding on the door to the southwest of the Danube Monarchy. Because of the surprising course of the Italian war, it is now known that the decisions reached by the two Chiefs of Staff at this time were correct. With hindsight they also appear easy, but in fact they were a heavy burden. Although Falkenhayn bore a large share of the responsibility, the heavier burden of course was Conrad's because his forces were more directly involved. He faced some very hard choices on 21 and 22 May, which would affect the future of his fatherland and its armed forces. The test of his leadership talents was comparable in modern times only to those faced by Frederick II or Napoleon.

c. The Russian-Italian military convention and further plans of the Russian leadership

Russian statesmen had reacted to the Treaty of London on 26 April with mixed feelings because of Italian designs on the eastern coast of the Adriatic coast and its mainly Slavic inhabitants. Then the enthusiasm of the Stavka for its new allies was quickly dampened when the Italians insisted they couldn't attack prior to 26 May. The Russians never needed support more than they did during the bitter weeks when Mackensen's "phalanx" pushed Dimitriev's Army from Gorlice to the lower San, while the Russian
Carpathian front collapsed. The expected help from Italy, however, was still withheld.

The London Treaty was followed at the start of May by a military convention prepared at Paris between the Entente powers and Italy. The Grand Duke-Generalissimo, however, had asked that coordinated military operations involving Russian and Italian land forces should be discussed at his headquarters. His wishes were carried out on 16 May, when another military convention was signed at Baranowicze; the Italians were represented by Lt Col. Ropolo, with plenipotentiary authority.

In one of the first points of this agreement, Italy promised to enter the war by 26 May; the Entente powers promised that if the Central Powers were to launch a pre-emptive attack on Italy prior to that date they would help their new ally. The principal goal of combined operations would be a thrust into the Hungarian plains ("in the area between the Carpathians and the mountains along the Italian border"). The Russians and Italians agreed to pursue this objective with their primary forces, leaving only minimum groups to pursue other operations. The Serbian and Montenegrin armies were required to support this offensive. The most desirable solution would be for the Serbian army to attack to the northwest, in an attempt to make contact as soon as possible with the right wing of the Italians advancing on Laibach (Ljubljana).

Russia's disappointment with its allies

Naturally, then, the conclusion of the Russian-Italian military convention led to significant negotiations between Russia and Serbia. The Serbian General Staff - at least according to its own account - didn't learn until 20 April how much the Aus-Hung. Balkan front had been weakened since 1 January, and then got the information from Grand Duke Nicholas. This made it difficult for Voivode Putnik to refuse to consider opening an offensive in mid-May. And yet the interest of the Serbs, especially the political leaders, was at this time directed much more toward northern Albania than toward Austro-Hungarian territory; their interest was prompted largely by Montenegro's ambitions in the same direction. This was indicated by the reminder of the Serbian high command to the King of the Black Mountain that he was supposed to have two-thirds of his Army ready for an offensive into Bosnia rather than to be preparing an expedition to Scutari.

On 9 May the Stavka told the Serbs how they were expected to cooperate with the Italians. Italy, in turn, had promised to help meet their need for military supplies. Kitchener, the English War Minister, had also stated that to assist Italy when it entered the war on 26 May the Serbs should at least mount a feint attack. In their replies the Serbian General Staff alluded to the — actually unlikely — dangers which threatened them from Bulgaria. They also mentioned a danger from Albania, which made it necessary to prepare an expedition into the north part of that country. Nevertheless, they said they were willing to attack in the near future as envisioned in the Russian-Italian agreement if their allies would give their Army economic aid. On 21 May the Prince-Regent again announced that he was willing to take the offensive along with Italy and Romania. Ten days later, however, this offer was withdrawn on the grounds that the water level in the border rivers was too high. Despite the momentary weakness of the k.u.k. forces, the Serbs had no desire to cross the Sava and Drina, because of the lessons they had learned in 1914 and their continuing lack of equipment.

Anyway, the Russian-Italian military convention of 16 May was doomed to remain a piece of paper, because the Italians failed to cross the Isonzo while the Russians were pushed back ever deeper into the interior of their own country. General Danilov, the General Quartermaster of the Stavka, complained that "Despite the limited forces which Austria deployed against Italy, they were sufficient to shatter the offensive of the Italian troops." Russia's hopes for assistance from Romania also proved illusory. In public Bratianu said he was marking time; in secret negotiations with the Entente he was making territorial claims that clashed with Serbian interests in the Banat and with Russian interests in the Bukovina. "The events unfolding on the Galician front," writes Danilov, "were no encouragement to Romania to play an active role. It is correct to say that the stance of Romania had less to do with its ambitions on any of its borders than to the current military situation." On top of this, the attacks of the English and French in the West hadn't brought any noteworthy relief to the East; thus the badly-injured Russian Army once again had to rely on its own resources.

**Russian measures for the defense of east Galicia**

318 There had been efforts in the first months of the war to mount an uprising in Albania that would be favorable to Austria-Hungary. However, this project was given up as hopeless.

319 Danilov, pp. 482 ff.
Under the impact of events at Jaroslau, General Ivanov made some decisions on 19 and 20 May. On the 19th he said that the Przemysl fortress should be evacuated on the 21st, so that the troops there "wouldn't be trapped when it fell." On the 20th he prepared orders for a general retreat to the line Wysmierzyce-Jozefow-Krasnobrod-Narol-Magierow-Wereszyca-Dniester-Halicz-Stanislau-Ottyna-Kolomea-Sniatyn-Czernowiz; diligent work had already begun to fortify this position. The retreat would take about 14 days, during which the line Wysmierzyce-Sandomierz-Lubaczow-Mosciska-Koniuszki-Siemianowskie-Stryj-Kolomea would be held as an intermediate position. However, during 20 May Mackensen's pressure on Dimitriev's front slackened because the allies needed a rest period, so Ivanov canceled his orders in the evening. At the same time he rescinded instructions to evacuate Przemysl.

Meanwhile the Stavka also sought to intervene, although with their usual reticence. On the 19th they decided to assemble a reserve army in the Rawa Russka-Tomaszow area; it would be prepared to counter any further breakthrough by Mackensen in the direction of Lemberg. This new 12th Army would be commanded by General Plehve, who was familiar with the area from the first campaign of the war. It would initially consist of II Caucasian Corps, coming by rail from the Narew front, plus a division from the Caucasus which was also approaching the area of operations; later they would be joined by three more divisions from the Northwest Front.

Surprisingly, Ivanov opposed these plans of the Stavka; instead he self-confidently proposed to restore the situation by a general offensive to the line Baranow-Rzeszow-Dynow-Turka-Maramaros-Sziget. There was no need, in this scheme, for Plehve to deploy units at Tomaszow. Ivanov wanted to send the three divisions which were already on their way to reinforce 11th Army in the Mikolajow-Halicz area; other reinforcements would be sent through Krasnik to Sandomierz-Nisko, where there was still a substantial bridgehead west of the San. This alternative had some appeal to the Stavka, because Alexeiev had made the release of the further three divisions from his Front contingent on permission to withdraw behind the Narew and to a position at Grojec (west of Warsaw). The high command wanted to only send II Caucasian Corps ahead to Chodorow; the division coming from the Caucasus would stop at Lemberg, where it would join 3 Gd ID to create a new XXIII Corps.

At this point Alexeiev also suggested a major plan. Still unaware of Ivanov's proposals, Alexeiev stated that it wasn't advisable to waste time concentrating troops behind the center of Southwest Front, since the Italians were apparently about to intervene. Ivanov should stay on the defensive with the units he already had. Meanwhile, two armies totaling eight corps should concentrate between the Pilica and the upper Vistula; they would attack to the southwest with a strong left wing and thus threaten the lines of communication of Mackensen's "phalanx."

Besides Ivanov and Alexeiev, Brussilov also proposed a plan during this period. His goal was to redeem the Russian situation in Galicia. He wanted to use the two newly-arriving corps (II Caucasian and XXIII) to mount an attack from fortress Przemysl against the flank and rear of the allies' 11th Army.

However, Mackensen's further advance didn't allow the Russians time to carry out any of their ideas. On the 25th, while the suggestions of the clever Commander of Northwest Front were arriving at the Stavka, the 3rd Army was already reeling under a new and heavy blow.

5. The (III) Battle of Przemysl, 24 May-4 June

On 24 May the disposition of the allied forces under the AOK was as follows (roughly from northwest to southeast).321

. Armeegruppe Woyrsch = Group Kövess (XII Corps HQ: 35 ID, 16 ID, 9 CD), German LW Corps (3, 4 LW ID; Bredow's Div; 7 k.u.k. CD)
. Armeegruppe Kirchbach (under 4th Army) = Group Schay (main body of 41 ID; 25 ID), II Corps (Polish Legion, 4 ID), Group Czapp (parts of 41 ID; 46 ID; half of 2 CD)
. 4th Army = VIII Corps (Stöger-Steiner's Group; 37, 21 ID), XIV Corps (47 Res ID; 8, 3 ID), IX Corps (106, 10 ID; Bde Szende); half of 2 CD in reserve
. 11th Army = X Ger Corps (19, 56, 20 Ger ID), Gd Corps (1, 2 Gd ID), VI Corps (12, 39 ID), XLI Res Corps (81, 82 Res ID), 11 Bav ID, 4 k.u.k. CD; in reserve were 11 k.u. CD, 119 Ger ID
. 3rd Army = X (24, 45 ID), XVII (Group Bellmond [11 ID plus 1 Lst Bde], 26 ID), Ger Beskid Corps (35 and 25 Res ID, 4 Ger ID); in reserve were 1 Lst Huss Bde, 1 CD (latter moved on 25 May to 2nd Army)

321In the original, the dispositions of the two sides appear as part of Beilage 22 rather than in the text.
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

2nd Army = Group Schmidt (XIX [29, 34 ID] and IV [32, 51, 27, 31, 43 ID] Corps), XVIII Corps (44, 9 ID), V Corps (33, 14 ID); in reserve was 13 ID

South Army = Group Szurmay (7 ID, 128 Inf Bde, 40 ID), Group Bothmer (38 ID, Ger 3 Gd and 1 ID, half of 48 Res ID), Group Hofmann (55 ID, 131 and 121 Inf Bde, Bolzano's Bde), Group Gerok (half of 48 Res ID; 19 ID)

7th Army = Group Ljubicic (17 bns from various sources; Prince Schönburg took over the Group on 31 May), Group Rhemen (XIII Corps HQ: 5, 6 ID), Group Czibulka (36, 15 ID), Group Krautwald (III Corps HQ: 22, 28 ID), Group Marschall (30 Combined ID; 8 and 10 CD, 5 Ger CD), Group Korda (XI Corps HQ: 5 CD, 42 ID, 6 CD, Polish Legion, Group Papp)

They were opposed by the following Russian units:

4th Army = XVI, Grenadier, XXV, XXXI Corps

3rd Army = XV, IV Cavalry, IX, XIV, X, III Caucasian, XXIV, XIX Corps

8th Army = V Caucasian, XXI, XII, VIII, XVII, XXVIII, VII Corps; later reinforced by XXIII and II Caucasian Corps

11th Army = XXII, XVIII Corps

9th Army = XI, XXX, XXXIII, II Cavalry, III Cavalry, XXXII Corps

a. Unsuccessful fighting east of Husakow

Between 20 and 24 May there was a pause in the action north of Przemysl; meanwhile the fighting varied in intensity on the inner wings of 2nd and 3rd Armies. A telegraph detachment of 1 Lst Inf Bde was able to tap into the communications of the Przemysl fortress and overheard Ivanov's orders for its evacuation. This led Boroevic to approve a continuation of the offensive by the Beskid Corps on the 22nd, and to ask 2nd Army to cooperate. GdK Böhm-Ermolli did approve the immediate intervention of 27 ID (his left-wing division); because of lack of success on the 22nd, however, he adhered to his decision to postpone the main attack until the 24th, as desired by the high command.

Meanwhile, scouting detachments of the k.u.k. X Corps didn't discover any indication on the night of 21-22 May that the Russians were in fact leaving the fortress on the San. Ivanov's evacuation order had been rescinded. In the same night, VII Russian Corps attacked over the low ground along the Blotna at Koniuszki-Siemianowskie, Ostrow and Burczyce. 33 ID's line of riflemen was shaken, but they threw back the enemy at Ostrow and took 500 prisoners; however, they had to give up some ground at
Koniuszki-Siemianowskie. FZM Puhallo was able to parry the thrust by returning 14 ID from reserve to the line. 2nd Army HQ was concerned that only a few battalions were covering the link with Linsingen's left wing along the south edge of the Wielskie Bloto; several days later they asked if 1 CD could be transferred from 3rd Army to reinforce this sector. The high command approved the request, and 1 CD arrived southeast of Sambor on the 25th. The Russians here, however, remained inactive.

Developments were more unfavorable in the sector of the Bohemian 9 ID at Burczyce. On the 22nd, the Division - assisted by LW IR "Wien" # 24 which was called up from 13 LW ID, marching behind the front south of Kurkienice - hurled back the Russians who had crossed the Blotna valley. However, on the night of 23-24 May - while the 2nd Army's left wing was preparing for its attack - the enemy again attacked XVIII Corps and pushed 9 ID back through the Blozewka marshes by Burczyce. Initially the Army commander only sent several squadrons of divisional cavalry to the threatened sector; this was insufficient to solidify the new position south of the Blozewka because of the exhaustion of 9 ID and of a battalion of 44 LW ID which had been rushed to the scene. Finally GdK Böhm-Ermolli had to authorize the intervention of 13 LW ID, which as the Army's reserve had already started to move west. On the 25th this Division was able to drive the Russians out of Burczyce and to push them back over the Blotna valley. The Landwehr had to remain in this area for several more days.

Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Armies had completed preparations for the offensive by their inner wings. There were several changes in the chain of command in the last hours before the attack started. Gdi Boroevic left for the southwest front, so FZM Puhallo took over 3rd Army; FML Goglia, who had been in charge of artillery operations in the offensive, succeeded Puhallo at V Corps. GdK Tersztyanszky, who'd been in charge of the attacking group of 2nd Army, was named commander of the Serbian front; FML Schmidt-Georgenegg therefore took over IV Corps HQ and the attacking group.

The artillery preparation began on the afternoon of the 23rd. On the right, FML Schmidt-Georgenegg attacked toward the northeast: XIX Corps (29 and 34 ID) was engaged on both sides of Ostrozec, IV Corps (with 32 ID and 51 Hon ID in the front line, 31 ID and 34 LW ID in the second) was on both sides of Pnikut. The German Beskid Corps attacked on the left of IV Corps; it was accompanied by the k.u.k. 2 ID, which entered the line opposite Husakow. The key position in the Russian defenses was the heights of Gaj, northwest of Pnikut. They had been turned into a fortress, but
the entire Russian position was "strong, in some places reinforced with concrete, and consisting of several lines, often as many as seven."\textsuperscript{322}

Although they confronted a technically strong Russian position, the allies unfortunately had a shortage of high-trajectory guns. In the first two days, Böhm-Ermolli's Army anxiously awaited the arrival of the heavy howitzers and 30.5 cm mortar battery which they had been promised. First the transport of the heavy mortars was held up seriously on the scanty road network, which was disrupted by destroyed bridges. After the battery finally arrived south of Krukienice on the 27\textsuperscript{th}, some minor repairs to the guns caused their use to be postponed for several hours. At the same time the same misfortune plagued the mortars that were supporting the Beskid Corps. On top of everything else, reconnaissance of the enemy positions was insufficient because the few available aircraft suffered from mechanical breakdowns. From all sides there were cries for more ammunition; the high command responded by declaring that the factories behind the lines were already overworked and that there was no hope of receiving more shells in the immediate future. It was even necessary to overcome considerable difficulties to keep rations flowing to the front, especially for 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army which was dependent on the poor roads running through the Carpathians.

On the other hand, the enemy Army commander Brussilov had to deal with similar problems in at least equal measure. His Army fought with an even greater shortage of ammunition. Behind the infantry in the front line, long lines of unarmed replacement troops were waiting for rifles which they could take from their dead or wounded comrades. Despite these conditions, the Russians offered outstanding resistance to the attacks of Böhm-Ermolli's and Puhallo's regiments, delivered with self-sacrificing courage.

The Beskid Corps attacked at 4:00 AM on the 24\textsuperscript{th}, followed four hours later by the left wing of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army under FML Schmidt-Georgenegg. On this day the divisions were able to advance to points within 150 to 100 meters of the outlying enemy positions, but flanking fire from the Russians made further progress impossible. GM Ritter von Willerding, commander of the Hungarian 32 ID, reported that in the last few weeks his unit had been reduced from 5200 to 1900 riflemen. Most of the other attacking divisions were in no better condition.

Tunnels were dug in the next few days, and on the 26\textsuperscript{th} the Beskid

\textsuperscript{322}(Hoen), Österreichisch-ungarische Kriegsberichte, Heft 4 (Vienna, 1915), p. 30
Corps, along with parts of 2 ID fighting on their left, gained a success that under the circumstances at least was encouraging. However, they couldn't push on any further; on the next day even their energetic commander, GdK von der Marwitz, declared that he wouldn't be able to reach the road to Mosciska any time soon unless the number of his divisions was doubled. This request for reinforcements was denied. 44 LW ID, disappointed by the failure of the main offensive, suggested that they could attack from their trenches on the upper Blotna into the Russian positions on the other side, which might be more lightly held; this idea was also turned down. Only the news that parts of the opposing Russian Army were definitely pulling back to the north, along with constantly recurring reports that Przemyśl was about to be evacuated, gave 2nd Army hope that it would capture the line running from the mouth of the Strwiaż to Mosciska by the end of the eventful month of May.

b. Mackensen's thrust through Radmyno

Every day the AOK was bombarding Böhm-Ermolli and Puhallo with advice and exhortations so that they would finally break through to menace the rear of the fortress on the San. The stubborn fighting at Husakow and Pnikut was all the more trying to the patience of the high command because 11th Army was making progress to the southeast of Radymno; if 3rd and 2nd Armies could win equal success, it might be possible to completely encircle Przemyśl.

This operation by Mackensen demonstrated the significant role which Przemyśl was still playing in the enemy's hands. It was impossible for the attacking group of the allies to pursue their natural course toward the east and northeast as long as the fortress threatened their flank. Instead, the commanders of the Central Powers had to make their main effort more toward the southeast, into the rear of Przemyśl. Because of the nature of the front at the bend in the San and east of Jaroslau, this maneuver also had its dangers.

Mackensen had already completed the necessary deployments for the attack on the 19th; he instructed 4th Army to stretch the right wing of IX Corps as far as the mouth of the Lubaczówka, thus freeing parts of German 19 ID. Further orders were issued on the 20th for the preparations of the k.u.k. VI Corps and Prussian Guards in the Tuczepy-Makowisko area. XLI Res Corps would attack through Radymno toward Naklo and Bucow, VI Corps through Dunkowice toward Kalnikow, and the Guards south of the line.
Makowisko-Bobrowka-Mielniki; as the attack progressed, 2 Gd ID would cover the 1 Gd ID against enemy intervention from the north, in conjunction with X German Corps. Responsibility for guarding the left flank and rear of the breakthrough attempt at Radyumno was assigned to X Corps and - farther from the scene - to the 4th k.u.k. Army. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was told that he could best carry out his task by driving the enemy from their bridgehead at the mouth of the San. On the right, Mackensen's maneuver was covered by 11 Bav ID; its southern wing at Ujkowice was relieved by GM Berndt's 4 CD. The German 119 ID and 11 Hon CD were deployed west of Radymno in reserve.

24 May

The artillery began to fire on the afternoon of the 23rd. The infantry advanced out of its maze of trenches at 8:00 AM on the next morning after a two hour bombardment which reminded the enemy of Gorlice. First the bulge in the Russian line held by XXI Corps facing Tuczepy was hit by a pincers attack by Francois and Arz. Strong detachments of the enemy were soon in flight toward the San, where they were hit by cannon and machine gun fire from the allied troops already on the east bank. Hundreds of Russians died in the river, thousands gave up as prisoners. Around noon Francois took Radymno; however, his southern wing couldn't break through over the Rada which was stubbornly defended by Brussilov's XII Corps. Mackensen sent 119 ID to this sector toward evening.

North of Francois' XLI Res Corps, 39 Hon ID advanced through Ostrow, and encountered desperate resistance in front of the bridgehead at Zagrody. Meanwhile the Sudeten-Galician 12 ID, in some areas straying over into the sector of the Guards, took Wietlin; after several hours of fighting in difficult terrain with limited fields of fire, they also took the sprawling town of Wysocko. While 24 Inf Bde felt its way south of Wysocko, sending parts toward the San, 23 Inf Bde advanced to Lazy in the evening.323 The Russians had no better luck against the Prussian Guards, who broke through in the area north of Wietlin and as far as Bobrowka.

The new commander of 3rd Russian Army, General Letsch, had believed that the best way to counter the allied attack was with a counterattack into the rear of Mackensen's forces, with III

323The commander of 23 Inf Bde, GM Rudolf Ritter Metz von Spondalunga, received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order for his achievements in the May campaign. The same distinction was awarded the commander of 12 FA Bde, Col. Ludwig Riedl, for his activity in the Battle of Gorlice and the pursuit actions which took place through 17 May.
Caucasian and XXIV Corps plus a newly organized XXIX Corps (made up of the troops between the Lubaczowka and Olchowa). However, before the necessary orders could be issued the XXIX Corps, in line opposite 20 German ID, was outflanked in the south by the advancing Guards. Pursued by Emmich's regiments, the Russians fled in disorder behind the Lubaczowka. With great haste, Letsch sent several cavalry divisions and some infantry detachments scraped up from diverse sources into the gap which had developed between V Caucasian and XXIX Corps.

The losses which the already damaged 3rd Russian Army suffered on this new day of disaster were quite substantial. Several recently rebuilt regiments were again reduced to 200 or 300 men. The allies took 21,000 prisoners. One third of them were brought in by the k.u.k. VI Corps, which itself had substantial losses in dead and wounded, particularly in 12 ID. Although General Letsch's large-scale counterattack on the left flank had to be postponed for 48 hours, the enemy made several smaller thrusts during the day and night. This indicated that they were not planning to give way before Mackensen's new offensive.

25 May

For 25 May, GO Mackensen instructed his corps to continue advancing in their current sectors and "if possible to cut the enemy off from retreating through Mosciska." 11 Bav, 119 and 81 Res ID, however, were once again pretty much held in place by strong Russian resistance throughout the day; the Bavarians couldn't carry out their mission of covering against attacks out of the fortress. 82 Res ID gained some ground southeast of Radymno in the morning; however, its advance had to be limited until 39 Hon ID captured the Zagrody bridgehead. Meanwhile on the east bank of the San GM Metz's 23 Bde was the spearhead of the entire 11th Army; after heavy actions in the blazing midday sun they reached the eastern edge of Lazy. While the situation at Zagrody was still unclear, GM von Puchalski's 24 Bde on Metz's right hung back somewhat. Because 12 ID was extended so far ahead, and because a lack of airplanes limited reconnaissance activities, the Division was hit by the artillery of its neighbors as well as of the Russians.

To finally break Russian resistance at Zagrody, in the early afternoon FML Arz sent his Corps reserve (four Honved battalions) into battle between the San and 12 ID. The troops from Russian XXI Corps manning the trenches at Zagrody could no longer withstand the pressure. The first lines of 82 Res ID worked

their way forward to Swiete, while Molnar's 77 Hon Bde reached Michalowka. The right wing of 12 ID took Dunkowice and some rising ground nearby; however the capture of Nienowice, which was desired by the high command, had to be postponed until the next day.

GM Metz endured some difficult hours, because the Guards didn't attack until noon. The traditional elan of these excellent troops was hampered by their difficult mission; with every step they took toward the east they had to guard against increasing danger from the north against their left flank. Thus the Corps had to deploy in depth as it advanced; they moved through Laszki by evening. On their left, 20 ID maintained the connection with 56 ID of Emmich's Corps in the Zapalow area.

26 May

On 26 May, GO Mackensen's shock group drove even deeper into the positions of V Caucasian Corps. Intelligence reported that large groups of Russians, some of them disordered, were moving from Przemysl back toward Mosciska, apparently due to fear that the road between these two places would soon be cut. Nevertheless, neither 11 Bav ID nor 119 ID were able to improve their positions. Francois' Corps swung southeast toward Sosnica, and one of his groups reached the east bank of the San in the evening. 39 Hon ID had a difficult time in the early afternoon crossing numerous streams, but took the village of Nienowice. While Puchalski's 24 Bde was pulled back into the second line, Metz's 23 Bde further to the left was still storming ahead farther than any of Mackensen's other troops. They drove the Russians from the Horodysko Heights, and in the evening lit their campfires at Chotyniec and the area farther south. Parts of the Brigade had also assisted the Guard in their actions around Zaleska Wola. The German 20 ID advanced several kilometers on both sides of the rail line that led from Jaroslaw to Lubaczow. On the left wing of X Corps, by evening the German 19 ID was fully relieved by troops of the k.u.k. 4th Army at the mouth of the Lubaczowka. 19 ID then became the reserve unit of 11th Army.

1) The setback at Sieniawa

Meanwhile on 25 May the 4th Army opened its offensive toward the San-Vistula confluence, as instructed by Mackensen as well as the AOK.

Because GdK Dankl had left for Tyrol, his former 1st Army - about
four divisions strong - had become an Armeegruppe two days previously. It was led by GdK Karl Freih. von Kirchbach, and placed under 4th Army HQ. Ist Corps HQ was also dissolved, after which Kirchbach's force was organized as three groups:

- GM von Czapp had 16 Cav Bde, 46 LW ID and parts of 41 Hon ID;
- GdI Johann Freih. von Kirchbach (with II Corps HQ) had 4 ID, parts of 25 ID, and Pilsudski's Polish Brigade; and
- FML Schay had parts of 25 ID and the main body of 41 Hon ID.

The troops assembled between XIV Corps and the San, which had formerly been Karl Kirchbach's combined corps, were now placed under VIII Corps HQ (FZM Scheuchenstuel); they consisted of the German 47 Res ID, main body of 21 LW ID, 37 Hon ID and FML Stöger-Steiner's Group, plus 3 Cav Bde (from 2 CD) which had moved back from Rudnik to Baranow.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's 113,000 riflemen now held a front of 150 km. The only Army reserves were four battalions from the Szekely IR # 82 west of Lezajsk and all of LW IR "Eger" # 6 at Jezowe. In accordance with orders from Mackensen, 4th Army HQ completed its preparations on 22 and 23 May. The main effort was to be VIII Corps' attack on the outer line of the Sandomierz bridgehead, running from Tarnobrzeg to the east. It would start on the 25th. The units to the right of VIII Corps, as far as the Sieniawa heights and the lower Lubaczowka, would hold their ground and divert the enemy's attention by artillery attacks and raids. On both sides of Lezajsk they would also pretend to prepare to cross the San. North of the Vistula, Kirchbach's Armeegruppe was instructed to resume the offensive toward Opatow in cooperation with Woyrsch's Army Detachment. GM von Czapp's group on Kirchbach's right would do its best to support the thrust by VIII Corps on the other side of the river; if possible they would make a determined attack of their own, but at least would help out by firing their artillery onto the flank and rear of the Russians.

The situation north of the Vistula wasn't conducive to carrying out any large-scale offensive. This was learned by GdI Kövess' Armeegruppe on the 24th, when the Russians launched heavy attacks on the battalions of GM Goldbach and on 16 ID. 9 CD was brought up to Przysucha behind the threatened sector, but the attacks were fended out without the cavalry's assistance. However, the enemy's show of strength demonstrated that they had no intention of voluntarily retreating beyond the Vistula. These circumstances forced GdK Kirchbach to declare that his forces

---

325IR# 82 had six battalions altogether; one each had been attached to XIV and IX Corps.
were only sufficient to hold their extended positions.\textsuperscript{326}

VIII Corps began its attack on the 25\textsuperscript{th}. On this day they gained some ground along the entire front, but didn't score any decisive success. The enemy also gave way directly north of the Vistula; the k.u.k. troops in this sector - 16 Cav Bde and the south wing of 46 LW ID - remained in contact with the Russians. On the 26\textsuperscript{th}, the 21 LW ID was the only component of VIII Corps which made even a little progress. Thus the operation was not off to a very promising start when it was abruptly ended a few hours later because of a major setback on the right wing of 4\textsuperscript{th} Army.

On this wing of the Army, in the last two days the relief of German 19 ID below the mouth of the Lubaczowka had been carried out as ordered by Mackensen. For this purpose, the k.u.k. 10 ID placed its last regiment in line, while IX Corps assembled the four battalions of IR # 82 still in reserve in the area south of Glogowiec. The new deployment was in place late in the evening of the 26\textsuperscript{th}. On the right wing of the enlarged Sieniawa bridgehead, 4 km northeast of the mouth of the Lubaczowka, was one regiment of 10 ID; in the center were four Transylvanian battalions from Szende's Group under the command of that General; on the left wing were four and a half more battalions from 10 ID. This force of twelve and a half battalions, under GM Reymann, were the main target of the attack by 3\textsuperscript{rd} Russian Army. General Letsch had ordered the attack on the 25\textsuperscript{th}, but it didn't begin until the night of 26-27 May.

III Caucasian Corps was responsible for the thrust; they first hit IR # 36 from Jungbuiznlau, which was well entrenched on the heights north of Sieniawa. A subsequent investigation determined that the Russians didn't meet any serious resistance as they broke through the Regiment's trenches and pushed deep into the defenders' position. IR # 36 fled back through Sieniawa in complete disorder; this caused the neighboring detachments, also composed mainly of Czech troops, to join the retreat. The Transylvanians, however, didn't give up so easily; a battalion of the Corps reserve was brought up during the night and was able to recapture the Slawa Heights which had been evacuated by the Czechs. There, however, they were only able to wreck a heavy cannon which had been abandoned. IX Corps then tried to hold a smaller bridgehead south of Sieniawa that would cover the mouth of the Lubaczowka in a half circle; this attempt failed because of the exhaustion of the troops. FML Kralicek asked to take his badly battered units back over the San and Lubaczowka; in the

\textsuperscript{326}At this point Kirchbach's Armeegruppe was further reduced when they gave up two batteries for the Southwest front.
evening this was approved by 4th Army HQ, with the concurrence of Mackensen. The parts of 10 ID which had been engaged were assembled behind the San, while Szende's Group went behind the lower Lubaczowka and made contact with 56 German ID. In the next few days Szende was relieved by German units.

On the morning of the 27th, the Army commander Archduke Joseph Ferdinand suspended the attack of VIII Corps and the operations north of the Vistula so that he could prepare some reserves to support his Army's endangered right wing. Nonetheless, initially he could only provide a small force of about seven infantry battalions plus 3 Cav Bde and several squadrons of divisional cavalry. Fortunately for 4th Army, however, the III Caucasian Corps failed to exploit its advantage, as often was the case with the Russians. Although General Letsch reinforced the Caucasians with a division from his X Corps, they only advanced up to the San. If they enemy had been more determined they might have been able to take advantage of the allies' unfavorable situation and placed the entire line north of Przemysl in jeopardy.

The setback at Sieniawa made a deep impression on the Army's hierarchy. Several days later IR # 36, despite its age and rich history of honorable traditions, was stricken from the Army's lists by imperial command, just as IR # 28 had been stricken a few weeks earlier. Its behavior, and that of the units on its left, was attributed to the unfavorable attitude which had spread from its newly-absorbed Ersatz personnel to the other troops. After these unfortunate actions, 10 ID and Szende's Group together numbered only 7200 riflemen. 9120 men, 11 machine guns and 9 heavy guns had been lost. The Russians reported only 1000 prisoners, which is a strikingly small figure compared to the total losses; it indicates that there were no prior agreements between the attackers and the defenders. Although other units from the Czech areas undoubtedly did their duty, 4th Army HQ felt that it was dangerous to hold long stretches of the front with Czech soldiers. In a special order, the high command warned their subordinates not to entrust important sectors solely to Czech (or Ruthenian) regiments.

The crisis at Sieniawa forced Mackensen to call 19 German ID, which had been relieved, back to this battlefield; one of its regiments was deployed on the left wing of Emmich's Corps. This unit was heavily attacked in the early hours of the 27th, and

---

327TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - This sentence debunks any theory that there was some pre-arranged plot to betray the position. As was almost always the case, the breakdown was due to the Czech troops' lack of will to resist rather than to any treacherous communication with the enemy.
throughout the day had to withstand further Russian onslaughts. However, the enemy was unable to win any noteworthy success in this sector.

b) 11th Army continues its offensive

Mackensen's HQ had already begun on the 25th to reckon with the possibility that the Russians would use the vulnerable position of his corps, which were shifting from Jaroslaw toward the southeast, to mount a counterattack. However, the orders for the 27th remained unaltered. The task of thrusting toward the Medyka-Mosciska road was entrusted to XLI Res Corps; for this purpose, on the night of 26-27 May the 81 Res ID was brought up behind 82 Res ID, which was bogged down in front of Sosnica on the west bank of the San. Meanwhile the goals of the two center corps were limited. The VI k.u.k. Corps was to be content with capturing Kalnikow and the heights farther north; the Guards would occupy the area east and northeast of Chotyniec and at Korzenica. The attack of Francois' Corps on the 27th encountered exceptionally heavy Russian resistance. 82 Res ID still couldn't take Sosnica; in the afternoon, 81 Res ID attacked from the area south of Nienowice, and captured Stubno and its neighboring towns as dankness fell. Because XLI Res Corps was still hanging back, the 39 Hon ID, its neighbor on the left, encountered heavy flanking fire when they advanced on Kalnikow at 9:00 AM. Nonetheless, the Honveds took the town shortly after 12:00; during the afternoon the 12 ID occupied the heights north of Kalnikow. The Guards, working on their south wing in close cooperation with the Austrians, also reached their objectives. The Russians had tried to halt the allied advance with unsuccessful counterattacks.

328The original goals for VI Corps and the Guards, as outlined on the evening of the 26th, were somewhat farther east; they were restricted during the 27th because of the Russian counterattacks against the inner wings of the 11th and 4th Armies. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - There is an apparent error in the original text at this point. The sentence stating that the Guards were to hold the area by Korzenica goes on to read "and they would also maintain a connection with the k.u.k. IX Corps toward Heights # 241." This must be wrong, since an entire corps (X German) was in line between the Guards and the IX Austrian Corps. The reference in the passage should presumably be to X German Corps.
V Caucasian Corps was now placed under General Brussilov, just as XII and XXI Corps had come under his command 10 days earlier. He was now in charge of the entire sector of the central Galician battlefield where the fate of Przemysl would be decided. For three nights in a row (25-26, 26-27 and 27-28 May), Ivanov prepared orders for the immediate evacuation of the fortress, then rescinded them. The Stavka finally intervened with an explicit order that Przemysl couldn't be abandoned until "8th Army had exhausted all other possibilities." Brussilov had already decided that the best way to carry out his mission was to take units as needed from his south front and to throw them against Mackensen's shock group. By the end of May, this transfusion of strength to the right wing of 8th Army amounted to at least four divisions.

Letsch also didn't want to remain inactive while the fate of Przemysl was decided. After his successes at Sieniawa, on the evening of the 27th he ordered his shock group to continue the attack. Thus part of III Caucasian Corps would win a foothold over the San opposite Sieniawa and XXIV Corps would break into the German lines at Radawa. XXIX Corps would advance through Olchowa, and thus into the rear of both the allied front on the Lubaczowka and of Mackensen's attack group. However, this new attack wasn't scheduled to start until early on the 30th, which was especially fortunate for the k.u.k. IX Corps.

Meanwhile Mackensen's attacking troops had made further progress on the 28th. 11 Bav ID thrust its right wing forward on the heights south of Batycze while its left took the heights south and southeast of Drohojow. In the early morning hours the 82 Res ID finally wrested Sosnica from the enemy. Parts of the Division followed the Russians south toward Walawa; other parts moved to the east bank of the San, where 81 Res ID thrust through Naklo, with its left wing bent sharply back. At this point the V Caucasian Corps, which had been reinforced by fresh troops, launched a heavy counterattack from the Krakowiec-Starzawa area. The Russians were repulsed by 81 Res ID west and northwest of Starzawa, but they pushed the lines of k.u.k. 12 ID back somewhat east of Chotyniec. Between these two sectors, they caused a significant crisis for 39 Hon ID, but the Honveds overcame the danger toward evening with help from parts of 12 ID. Nonetheless, the situation of Arz's Corps was still worrisome because of the reduced strength of its units. 12 ID had 4600 riflemen, and 39 Hon ID had just 2600. The Corps HQ urgently

requested replacements.

The Guard was relatively undisturbed by the Russian counterattack, as was the German X Corps; the latter, however, had to fend off heavy attacks in the following night.

Mackensen's flanking thrust through Radymno culminated when his troops reached the Naklo area. It didn't seem advisable to continue because of the unfavorable tactical situation of the attacking units and especially because Russian troops had been observed getting off trains at Grodek Jag., Lubaczow and Zaklikow. The allied commanders were satisfied that heavy guns could now deploy east of Sosnica to bombard the road leading east from Przemysl at Medyka.

It was very advantageous to Mackensen's Army Group, including the k.u.k. 4th Army, that the mass attack which on the 27th General Letsch had planned for his left wing didn't amount to much. On the 29th the Russians tried to cross the San upstream from Rudnik, but were easily repulsed by Horsetzky's 3 ID. The German X Corps was attacked on the lower Lubaczowka on the same day, and more heavily on the following morning; however, the Russians were unable to break through. Russian prisoners taken on the 30th all agreed that an attack in grand style was planned for the next night; this seemed all the more likely because of the numerous troop concentrations behind the Russian front.

c. The capture of Przemysl

1) The strike against the works at Pralkowce

Despite the successes of 11th Army and the attempts by Puhallo and Böhm-Ermolli to capture the Lemberg highway from the south, the results of the major actions in central Galicia in the last few days were far below the expectations of the allies. The main objective, Przemysl, was still connected by a small and endangered but usable corridor to Ivanov's field armies. In Russian hands, it kept the Central Powers from either: establishing a defensive front in Galicia, which to the allied general staffs was the precondition for moving strong

330XXIII Corps detrained at Grodek Jag. II Caucasian Corps, which had originally been supposed to move to Chodorow, detrained at Lubaczow. One division of XIV Corps from the sector beyond the Vistula, along with the Corps HQ, detrained at Zaklikow.
reinforcements to either Italy or Serbia, or continuing the hitherto successful offensive on into east Galicia or Volhynia. Meanwhile reports that the fortress on the San was either to be defended or abandoned kept arriving, as the decisions of the Russian generals kept changing. Thus the high-level commanders of the allies watched with great impatience as the attack on Przemysl which they had ordered was being slowly prepared.

In the evening of the 26th, news arrived that the Russians were about to give up the fortress. 3rd Army HQ therefore ordered X Corps to attack the work at Pralkowce and the heights between that point and the town of Grochowce as soon as the artillery preparation was complete. FML Martiny intended to attack on the 30th. This date was unacceptable to the impatient high command, especially when they received an erroneous report on the 28th that 11 Bav ID intended to attack the northern works on the 29th. Therefore on the evening of the 28th Martiny's divisions (which were recruited in central Galicia around the fortress) received an exhortation from commander-in-chief Archduke Friedrich at the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff. It stated: "I am convinced that the X Corps won't hesitate to recover its fortress."

On this day GO Mackensen had in fact ordered 11 Bav ID to attack between Works # X and XI (near Orzechowce). However, this attack was to be preceded by thorough artillery preparation and wouldn't start until the 31st. HQ of X k.u.k. Corps learned this in time to postpone its own attack until the 30th.

The main body of 24 ID (GM Schneider von Manns-Au) was sent toward Pralkowce, and 45 LW ID (FML Smekal) toward Lipnik and the heights northwest of Grochowce. The artillery preparation was hampered by a rather short supply of ammunition, and anyway there was not a large number of guns. In all, X Corps had 80 field cannon, 28 field howitzers, 27 heavy howitzers, 2 mountain cannon, and 8 30.5 cm mortars. Because the counter-fire from the Russians was hardly diminished due to our bombardment, it seemed advisable to wait until dawn on the 31st for the infantry attack. At 2:00 PM on the 30th, however, Corps HQ decided to still strike in the evening. Soon thereafter 45 LW ID informed the attacking group of 24 ID that they wouldn't move against the work at Lipnik until their neighbor had taken Pralkowce. As the sun was sinking on the 30th, Col. Korzer's 48 Inf Bde sent IR "Joseph Ferdinand"

---

331At this point X Corps also commanded FML Anton Bellmond's Group, which consisted of the parts of 11 ID stationed west of the Wiar plus 1 Lst Inf Bde, in the same area.
# 45 and parts of "Clerfayt" # 9 against the Pralkowce work and the immediately adjacent Russian positions. The 45th and the sappers who took part in their operation captured 2 officers and 300 men of the garrison.

However, the brave troops under Lt Col Klinger (of IR 45) weren't destined to rejoice for long after the success they had won by their spirited advance. In the evening the Russians sent their reserves to the imperilled sector to recover the important work. At 3:00 AM on the 31st their artillery thundered down upon Pralkowce and its vicinity in a veritable hurricane. Columns of smoke from their shells were seen rising from the ruins of the work in the pale light of early morning. The men who'd conquered the position were now forced to defend the rubble against oncoming Russian infantry. At this critical point the main body of IR # 9, brought up from the brigade's reserve, was able to break through the field works which the Russians were holding between Pralkowce and the San. Thereafter, however, the position of the two regiments, which needed further reinforcements, deteriorated from minute to minute under the Russians' heavy artillery fire and infantry attacks. The Austrians outside the work were gradually overcome, although the garrison of the fortification itself maintained themselves with heroic self-sacrifice until broad daylight; until 8:00 AM they were still in communication by telephone with the outside world. Then, however, their fate was sealed. Only a small remnant were able to escape, along with the last detachments of the units engaged outside the work.

Thus the storm of Pralkowce was only an episode which didn't meet its objectives. However, in the history of the central Galician regiments involved, and those of the four attached technical companies (3 sapper and 1 pioneer units), it was a glorious chapter that was cherished until the dissolution of the old Imperial Army.

2) Ivanov's counterattack against 11th and 4th Armies

Meanwhile the Russians, with their usual fatalistic stubbornness, were preparing a counter stroke that could save the situation in central Galicia in the eleventh hour. On the 25th, Yanushkevich replied in the name of the Grand Duke to General Alexeiev regarding the latter's plans for an offensive. At this time the main task was to retain Galicia. For this purpose the Northwest Front would have to give up yet another corps to Ivanov in addition to II Caucasian; Alexeiev chose to surrender the XIV
Corps, fighting southwest of Warsaw. On the other hand, 4th Army west of the Vistula was transferred to Alexeiev's command.\textsuperscript{332}

At the same time, the Stavka devoted all their energy to inspiring Ivanov to take action that perhaps might redeem the situation. Danilov suggested to Ivanov's Chief of Staff that several corps taken from 3rd and 8th Armies should assemble at Lubaczow, where they would be joined by newly-arriving reinforcements; then they would thrust toward Radymno. Ivanov replied, however, that he didn't have enough time to prepare such a grandiose maneuver. The commander of Southwest Front, who was more realistic than Danilov, felt that the actions at Sieniawa proved that smaller-scale attacks were more promising. Therefore he decided that his entire Front would launch simultaneous thrusts from the sectors they already held as soon as the latest reinforcements arrived (i.e. in the night of 31 May-1 June). The immediate objective was the line Baranow-Rzeszow-Dubiecko-Wyszkow-Kimpolung. The main effort would take place in the area between the Lubaczowka and the Wisznia. For this purpose, and contrary to earlier decisions, the right wing of 8th Army (which already included V Caucasian Corps) would now also receive II Caucasian and the reorganized XXIII Corps. On the other hand, the XIV Corps (initially with just one division) and a combined Cavalry Corps were sent through Krasnik to the San-Vistula confluence to exert more pressure on the enemy in another sector which was very important.

The allies were by no means surprised by the Russian plans. At noon on 31 May the AOK informed the Armies under its command to expect a strong enemy attack "against the inner wings of the 11th and 4th Armies." These Armies were to strengthen their defenses and have reserves in readiness, while 3rd and 2nd Armies continued their attack.

In the same evening, good news arrived from 11 Bav ID, in whose ranks the dismounted troops of 11 Hon CD were still fighting. The Russian garrisons of the works # X.a, XI.a and XI on the north front of Przemysl, which had lost some of their artillery support when it was diverted against the attacking k.u.k. X Corps on the southwest front, could no longer stand up to the bombardment of the Germans' 42 cm mortars.\textsuperscript{333} They pulled back behind the road which connected the fortifications, and there prepared to offer new resistance. The Bavarians joyfully...

\textsuperscript{332}Zayonschovsky, pp. 302 ff.; Nesnamov, pp. 49 ff.
\textsuperscript{333}Bonch-Bruievitch, Vol. II, p. 256. The Bavarians, like German troops in most situations, had much stronger artillery than the k.u.k. troops (in this case the units of the k.u.k. X Corps).
advanced. On their left, the parts of 82 Res ID which had stayed west of the San moved closer to the main line of forts; here the enemy, concerned about maintaining Przemysl's connections with the outside world, offered especially stubborn resistance.

In the night of 31 May-1 June, the Russians counterattacked the entire front of 11th and 4th Armies. In vain they stormed Naklo. In the sector of 39 Hon ID, which had sunk to the size of a small regiment, the Russians captured the heights south of Kalnikow which had been hotly contested before; however, the Honveds won the area back in the morning. The enemy pressure was less heavy upon the Guards, who repulsed several attacks north of Szklo without any particular difficulty. On the other hand, the inner wings of Brussilov's and Letsch's Armies launched particularly heavy assaults on X German Corps at Zapalow and on the Lubaczowka, where the fighting lasted throughout the night and much of the following day. Although the enemy had a much larger force, they never were near success; at the end their badly battered regiments fled back, some of them in disorder.

The setback to k.u.k. XIV Corps

Opposite the k.u.k. 4th Army, at 2:00 AM on 1 June the Russian XIV Corps broke through LW IR "Pilsen" # 7, which was attached to the south wing of 8 ID. The next unit on the left, the Tyrolean KJR # 3, was attacked at the same time; they managed to gain a temporary respite with a counterattack, but then were pushed back to the edge of forest on the other side of the railroad. The defeat of the Bohemian Landwehr led to the loss of the town and castle of Rudnik. A gap developed between the Pilsen Regiment and the Kaiser Jaeger, which was only partially closed by the arrival of the 600 men of 3 Cav Bde on the battlefield in the evening. The enemy had expanded their bridgehead west of the San by a radius of 3 to 5 km. Army HQ didn't dare to move the Honved regiment stationed behind IX Corps to the aid of XIV Corps. However, in the night of 1-2 June they sent five battalions and one battery of VIII Corps toward Jezowe. Moreover, the Armeegruppe of GdK Kirchbach - whose right wing along with Stöger-Steiner's Group had repulsed the attacks on their front - was ordered to immediately pull a brigade from the

334The higher echelons wanted to blame the setback on politically unreliable Czechs of LW IR # 7; their brigade commander decisively refuted this charge. TRANSLATOR's NOTE - The truth of the brigadier's contention was confirmed the next day when a similar defeat was inflicted on the Tyrolean Kaiser Jaeger, who were never accused of any "political" activity. As the rest of this section makes clear, the Imperial German generals didn't single out the Czechs for blame, but were critical of the conduct of the (mostly German-speaking) XIV Corps in general.
front and to assemble it at Osiek to move to the Army's center. 40 Hon Bde, which was chosen for this mission, would be conveyed on empty supply wagons.

After their failure on the day before, the Russians opposite 11th Army made only weak attacks on the 2nd. Only the German X Corps saw major action, and they were as successful as they had been on the 1st.

Once again the situation of 4th Army was more critical. Here the Russians, driven ruthlessly by their commanders, had already sought to cross over to the west bank of the San upstream from Rudnik during the night. One of the two attempts was met by 106 Lst ID on both sides of Lezajsk; the Landsturm were reinforced by the Honved regiment which had been in reserve behind IX Corps, and were able to blunt the enemy thrust. However, they remained engaged with the Russians in this area for several more days. The IR # 59 and 14 of Horsetzky's 3 ID won a quicker victory over the Russian detachments which crossed the San from Krzeszow. The enemy were only able to establish a small bridgehead over the river in the Division's sector.

On this day fate was again unkind to Fabini's gallant 8 ID. Several Russian attacks were repulsed in the night and morning, but shortly before midnight the enemy launched a new and powerful stroke against the Tyrolean KJR # 3, already badly damaged from the fighting the day before. The scene of action was a sector called "The Coffin", an advanced position northeast of Stroza. A destructive rain of shrapnel descended on the defenders' line; their rifle fire was impeded by blowing sand. A report stated that "Those who weren't destroyed or injured by the artillery were shortly thereafter simply overrun and wiped out by the advancing Russian infantry; even the wounded were not spared. Only a few unwounded prisoners fell into the enemy's hands." The defeat of KJR # 3 also forced KJR # 2 on their left to pull back their front to a new position facing due east. Two Honved battalions which had arrived from VIII Corps were thrown into the battle at Nowosielki [Nowosielec]. Although the Russians were relatively cautious in following up their advantage, when the Corps commander FML Roth hurried to the scene he got the impression that the position of 8 ID had become untenable. As he had been empowered by the Army commander, he decided to pull his Corps back to another position that had already been prepared, and which tactically was much more advantageous; the new line ran from the area south of Tarnagora through Jezowe to the heights east of Stany. The retreat was carried out on the night of 2-3 June; the main body of the Corps wasn't seriously disturbed by
the Russians. The withdrawal of XIV Corps naturally forced the 47 Res ID to also pull back its right wing at Przyzow Kameralny.

Upstream from Tarnobrzeg, the Russians again attacked FML Stöger-Steiner's Group, but couldn't break through. Russian attacks on the right wing of Kirchbach's Armeegruppe were equally unsuccessful.

4th Army HQ awaited with great impatience the arrival of 40 Hon Inf Bde; its first battalions got on their wagons at Osiek in the evening of the 2nd; the main body would follow the next morning. HQ informed FML Kralicek that the Honved regiment which had been attached to his 106 Lst ID would have to immediately be withdrawn after its mission was accomplished. In reply, the commander of IX Corps had to tell the Archduke that his troops wouldn't be able to repel a stronger enemy attack. Greatly concerned, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand turned to GO Mackensen with a request that he would transfer 11 Hon CD, which at this time was deployed in the area of Przreworsk, to support the right wing of 4th Army. Mackensen concurred, but took the opportunity to express his displeasure about the long withdrawal by XIV Corps. It had permitted the enemy to reach a position only 20 to 30 km from the vital Cracow-Jaroslau railroad. The Army commander vigorously defended the actions of his Alpine troops and stated that all the officers and men were determined to hold their ground despite the long front they held and "the minimal rifle strength of the units."

Actually, 4th Army's most severe crisis had already passed by this time, because at 10:00 AM the joyful news arrived at HQ that Przemysl had been recovered. At the same time there was a report that the k.u.k. X Corps, now freed from the line by the fall of Przemysl, would be moving in three days behind 4th Army's south wing. The front was already more quiet on 3 June, which gave the troops time to catch their breath.

3) The fall of the fortress on the San, 3-4 June

Meanwhile the allied troops on the front southeast of Przemysl continued their efforts to finally come nearer to the Russians' main route of retreat. On the 30th, the 27 ID was able to push through the first row of obstacles on the Gaj Heights; however, its upper Hungarian regiments were still faced by a second line 60 meters ahead. 13 LW ID, after aiding 9 ID since 25 May, had assembled behind Schmidt-Georgenegg's Group. The high command again expressed its impatience at the slow pace of the attack.
Nonetheless, at a meeting on the 31st Generals Böhm-Ermolli, Schmidt-Georgenegg and Marwitz all agreed that the next blow wouldn't be struck until 2 June. This would give the troops time to work their way closer to the enemy positions.

11 Bav ID had once again encountered strong Russian resistance in front of Przemysl. Mackensen's HQ was concerned that the Bavarians could be decimated on the fortress walls, so they asked the HQ of k.u.k. 3rd Army whether the X k.u.k. Corps could be shifted from the south bank of the San to help exploit the breach in the defenses on the north side. FZM Puhallo turned down the request, however, since FML Martiny was preparing to launch a second attack of his own at Pralkowce, despite the check he had received there earlier.

Meanwhile however the Bavarians overwhelmed the garrison of Work # X at noon on the 2nd; in the evening they also took Works # X,b and XII, as well as Zurawice village. On their left the 82 Res ID had already taken Work # XIII; on their right the k.u.k. 4 CD had occupied Works # VIII, IX and IX.a while their artillery cooperated bravely in the actions of the Bavarians. Thus almost all the strong points northwest of the city had been secured.

On the same day, Brussilov made the difficult decision to evacuate the fortress on the night of 2-3 June; he would take up a new position farther east on the line Starzawa-Bucow-Medyka-Siedliska.

Light was beginning to spread early on the morning of the memorable 3rd of June (between 3:00 and 4:00 AM) when a battalion from a Prussian Guard Regiment which had recently come to G.Lt Kneussl as reinforcements entered the city. At the same time the Bavarians and k.u.k. 4 CD appeared on its northern edge. All the bridges over the San had been destroyed, but at 11:00 AM a civil engineer finished an emergency bridge using equipment left by the Russians and it was possible to cross the river. The first general to set foot in the city was the commander of the Austrian horsemen, GM Berndt.

A detachment of 4 CD set off in pursuit, and collided south of Medyka with enemy rear guards; guns which accompanied the cavalry bombarded the Russians. Meanwhile the k.u.k. X Corps had also entered the fortress from the southwest. 45 LW ID had received reports of the Russian withdrawal shortly after midnight, and began to move at 2:00 AM; they reached the Tartar Hill at 9:00 AM. 24 ID, which started somewhat later, marched through the city to Kromniki, where they came under fire from the east bank.
of the War. When FML Martiny arrived at 11:00 AM, a Corpus Christi procession was leaving the cathedral.

On the south side, the Viennese 1 Lst Inf Bde from FML Anton Bellmond's Group was the first unit to penetrate the line of fortifications, at Hermanowice. In the afternoon, GO Mackensen also appeared in the captured fortress on the San. He wrote a letter to Emperor-King Franz Josef, laying the recovered city at his feet. The satisfaction felt in Teschen over this great success, however, was dampened by the fact that German rather than Aus-Hung. troops had been the first to fight their way into Przemysl. On the other hand, the activity of the k.u.k. X Corps, by diverting enemy units and guns from the northern front, had fulfilled a useful function.

The XLI Res Corps advanced to the line Zurawica-Pozdziacz, and took the heights east of Naklo from the Russians in bitter fighting.

Southeast of Przemysl the allies attacked again on the 2nd. Schmidt-Georgenegg's Corps had 32, 31 and 27 ID plus 43 LW ID in the first line, with 51 Hon and 13 LW ID in the second line. The Beskid Corps, which was now also placed under GdK Böhm-Ermolli, had the German 4 ID and 25 Res ID plus k.u.k. 2 ID in the first line, German 25 Res ID in the second. 27 ID and parts of 59 Inf Bde - which on this day lost 24 officers and more than 1000 men - were able to advance deeper into the barbed wire defenses on the Gaj Heights; however, they kept encountering new Russian defenses, and the enemy was able to seal off every penetration. As the Army commander reported to the AOK with great agitation, the lack of heavy artillery and ammunition weighed heavily on the shoulders of the infantry, which were expected to perform superhuman tasks. Schmidt-Georgenegg's Group had only two and a half batteries of howitzers plus two 30.5 cm mortars.

On 3 June the 27 ID and 86 LW Inf Bde again advanced a little on the wooded Gaj Heights; however their heroic efforts to finally capture this key Russian position were once again in vain. In the afternoon they were aided by their comrades from 59 Inf Bde (recruited in east Galicia and the Bukovina) and from 201 Hon Inf Bde. The Beskid Corps was also able to gain only a little ground despite heavy casualties. On Schmidt-Georgenegg's right the XIX Corps was also engaged; it was now placed directly under 2nd Army HQ at the express instructions of the high command. The Corps' 34 ID suffered the same fate as the other attacking units.

The XVII Corps of 3rd Army had again taken over FML Anton
Bellmond's group (11 ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde); the Corps was instructed to attack toward the northeast, into the rear of the Russians who were opposing the Beskid Corps. The enemy in this sector, however, were still holding their positions in strength to cover the retreating garrison of Przemysl. Therefore in the beginning only 11 ID could make any progress; they crossed the Wiar toward Jaksmanice and Siedliska, where they again encountered the Russians. On their right, 26 LW ID joined the attack, and reached Popowice by evening; 2 ID reached the heights northeast of Husakow. The k.u.k. X Corps halted southeast of Przemysl, because it had been ordered to reinforce 4th Army.

Under 4th Army, the 106 Lst ID attempted on 3 June to drive the last Russians from the west bank of the San at Lezajsk; however, their attack was unsuccessful. The enemy continued to attack XIV Corps into the night of 4-5 June. 3 ID in particular was heavily engaged; as usual, however, the Russians were unable to overcome IR #14 and 59. During the same night the enemy also attacked 21 LW ID and GdK Kirchbach's Group in vain. Nonetheless, 4th Army HQ was concerned about the situation, since the k.u.k. X Corps wouldn't be arriving until the 7th. Therefore, on 4 June Army HQ asked Mackensen if the 22 German ID, arriving at Lancut, could temporarily move behind IX Corps as a reserve. Mackensen approved this request.

Already another large force of Germans was moving on the rails through west Galicia, just as in the days before the Battle of Gorlice. The allied high commands had decided to call upon their armies in central Galicia for new victories.

### d. The capture of Stryj

While the decision was being won at Przemysl, on the right wing of the front the German South Army also took a significant step forward after a long pause.

On 19 May, after four days of attacking hadn't led to a decisive result, the Army commander decided to abandon the strategy of having all his corps attack at various points; instead he would concentrate the strongest possible force in one sector to strike a heavy blow. For this purpose he reinforced Bothmer's Corps with 38 Hon ID from Szurmay's Group and Puttkamer's (95 Res) Brigade from 48 Res ID of Gerok's Corps; Bothmer would strike the main blow toward Stryj with these units plus his 1 ID and one regiment of 3 Gd ID. The k.u.k. 19 ID had gained some ground on

---

335This passage is based on manuscript information in the German archives.
the Army's extreme right wing on the 22nd in the hilly area between Perehinsko and Spas; however, these gains had to be abandoned because GdI Linsingen ordered 19 ID to pull back its front in order to free troops to replace those which 48 Res ID had given up for the Stryj operation.

South Army's first attacks fail

Linsingen renewed his attack on 26 May, but the results were unsatisfactory. Szurmay's 40 Hon ID moved forward somewhat at Gaje-Wz. West of Stryj the 38 Hon ID gained a little ground, but the attacking Germans gained almost nothing. No major points had been stormed. The results of further fighting on the 27th lagged even farther behind the expectation of the generals. When the infantry attacked they found that the abundant artillery preparation had done little damage to the enemy, who were partly concealed in forests and in most places covered by barriers and fortifications constructed in depth.

Hofmann's Corps had no more success in the forests east of Bolechow. The left wing of Gerok's weakened Corps stormed the strong positions southwest of Dolina. On the 26th they managed to break through the Russian trenches, despite suffering heavy casualties. On the next morning, however, the ground they had gained was lost to an especially strong counterattack.

The latest failure of the South Army in front of the Russian positions weighed heavily on Linsingen. On the 23rd Falkenhayn had clearly explained to him how important it would be if his Army could advance at this time, while events at Przemysl were developing so slowly. Protected in the west by this fortress, the Russians still possessed in east Galicia a base which was of even more importance now that the entry of Italy into the war might cause Romania to attack the Central Powers from the rear at any moment. The South Army could win glory by overrunning this Russian base area. This was also clear to the Army's commander. His intention after reaching the Dniester was to first turn to the right to relieve the heavy and dangerous pressure on Pflanzer's Army. The high command at Teschen was in complete agreement on this point. However, the relative balance of forces against the enemy was only favorable for the allied artillery. Not only did the Russians have fewer guns, but they were suffering from an extreme shortage of ammunition. On the other hand they had 100,000 riflemen to oppose Linsingen's 70,000. Nonetheless, the commander of the South Army was determined to resume his thrust toward Stryj on the 31st, after a brief pause.
Meanwhile the Russians didn't remain inactive. Although the Russian literature doesn't provide a definitive insight into the commanders' planning in this sector of the Eastern front, it is still certain that Letschitzky felt threatened by Linsingen's advance into his flank. Nevertheless, he sent only one Finnish brigade to help his neighbor Shcherbatchev; this was because he had his own plans for an offensive, which wouldn't permit him to greatly weaken his own front. Linsingen believed that a larger-scale transfer of troops from the 9th to the 11th Russian Army was taking place; therefore he continued to suggest to the AOK that he should have more influence over Pflanzer's operations, either by having all of 7th Army under his control or at least its left wing.

The Finnish riflemen were thrown into the fight against Hofmann's Corps; in this sector General Shcherbatchev urged his XVIII Corps to counterattack in order to relieve the heavy pressure on XXII Corps. Bolzano's reinforced Brigade on Hofmann's north wing was scheduled to attack on the morning of the 28th. Shortly before Bolzano could advance, three Russian regiments struck 131 Inf Bde in Hofmann's center and drove them back to the Swica. Here the Brigade's remnants plus units brought up from the Corps' reserve stood their ground in two days of heavy fighting. On the morning of the 30th, however, the Russians thrust over the river despite all the efforts of the defenders; they were finally brought to a stop in the evening on the railroad just in front of Bolechow. In these actions Hofmann's Corps lost more than 4000 men, leaving him just 6000 riflemen to hold a front of 12 km. Among the fallen officers were the best battalion commanders, which was an especially heavy loss because most of the units were new formations.

GdI Linsingen complained to Teschen with bitter words regarding Hofmann's defeat; again he urgently requested the intervention of 7th Army. The high command issued the necessary order on the evening of the 30th. Meanwhile, however, Pflanzer-Baltin had already instructed the two groups on his left wing to attack in order to prevent the diversion of further Russian units against the South Army. He was also impatiently awaiting the start of the offensive because he feared that it would be difficult to defend the line of the Pruth against a serious Russian attack; geographical circumstances made it impossible to quickly shift reserves behind this position.

Pflanzer's western group was now led by FML Prince Schönburg in place of FZM Ljubicic. On the morning of the 31st they opened

336Nesnamov, pp. 51 ff.
the relief attack and gained ground southwest of Solotwina and toward Majdan. The blow, however, was parried by a Russian counter-stroke, which threw Schönburg's jumbled-up battalions back to their starting points. To Schönburg's immediate right the 6 ID, temporarily led by GM Kratky, also attempted to advance. Instead it lost a little ground, although the area was immediately recovered.

Linsingen's victory at Stryj

Meanwhile on 31 May Linsingen finally saw the efforts of his Army rewarded by a long-sought success at Stryj. After a brief artillery preparation, in which several Aus-Hung. 30.5 cm mortars took part, 3 Gd ID of Bothmer's Corps - reinforced by parts of 1 ID and accompanied on its left by 38 Hon ID - thrust into the city. Over 9000 Russians and 8 guns fell into the hands of the victors. 40 Hon ID of Szurmay's Group also penetrated the enemy positions. While Bothmer's main body pushed the enemy back on both sides of the rail line toward Mikolajow, 38 Hon ID advanced through Königsau on 1 June. On its left, 40 Hon ID drove the Russians out of Gaje-Wz. and Slonsko, and stormed ahead to Letnia. On the other hand, the Russians opposite 7 ID held their ground throughout the day, even though GM Leonhardi's 1 CD and Col. Rehwald's Group intervened farther north, at Hruszow and Woloszczca.

To the Army commander GdI Linsingen, the stubborn defense of XXII Russian Corps opposite 7 ID was not unwelcome, since it offered an opportunity to cut off the retreat of this enemy unit over the Dniester. Since the Wielkie Bloto swamps couldn't be crossed by large bodies of troops, 38 and 40 Hon ID only had to advance as far as the exits from the swamps south of Mikolajow. Meanwhile 7 ID and Col. Rehwald's Group (which the high command now placed under South Army along with 1 CD) would pin down the enemy frontally. On the evening of 1 June, Linsingen confidently ordered 38 Hon ID to reach the area south of Mikolajow the next morning; then they would pivot southeast onto the battlefield of Bothmer's main body. After the area along the Dniester by Mikolajow and Kolodruby was cleared of the enemy, further units of Szurmay's Group would follow 38 Hon ID. Together with the bulk of South Army they would fall upon the flank and rear of Letschitzky's 9th Army.

The hopes which Linsingen pinned on the advance of his Army's left wing, however, were excessive in view of the general situation. Secure possession of Mikolajow was of such great significance for the fate of the massive parts of the Russian
Southwest Front farther west that Shcherbatchev could hardly be expected to give up the terrain he still held around the town. On the contrary, he decided to send VI Corps, which was arriving by rail from Warsaw, to this sector. This would not only be the most certain means of guarding the rear of 8th Army; it would also wrest the initiative back from Linsingen's main body. Shcherbatchev's plan, although not sufficient to save the Russian position in Galicia indefinitely, still was destined to win some temporary success.

In the night of 1-2 June the Russians opposite 7 ID finally evacuated the field. The Division immediately left its trenches and followed the enemy through Litynia. On the next morning, 40 Hon ID drove the Russians out of Horucko. The groups of GM Leonhardi and Col. Rehwald didn't become active until around noon, but then they were able to push the Russians back to the confluence of the Tysmienica and Dniester (west of Kolodruby) by evening. 38 Hon ID had cooperated with 40 Hon ID by advancing toward Rudniki early in the day; then, however, they turned into the area of operations north of Stryj, believing that thus they could best fulfill the expectations of the Army commander. In this area the 3 Gd ID pursued parts of XVIII Russian Corps as they withdrew to Lisiatycze.

On 3 June the Guards continued to advance to Tejsarow; then they pivoted to the southeast to cross the Stryj River at Ruda. On their right the 38 Hon ID arrived and took up a new front. In Szurmay's sector, 40 Hon ID took Horucko on 3 June. Then, however, Linsingen diverted the Honveds as well as 1 CD to the Derzow area. From here both units were supposed to follow Bothmer's Corps. The portion of Szurmay's Group which was to stay behind (7 ID, 128 Inf Bde and Col. Rehwald's Group) was responsible for covering the Dniester; they took up positions near Rudniki, Medenice and Litynia opposite the Russians who remained on the south bank of the Dniester. Rehwald's troops suffered a setback during the day.

The Russians' pressure against Hofmann's Corps meanwhile was considerably reduced. On the other hand, Letschitzky struck a new blow against Pflanzer-Baltin early on 2 June, following Ivanov's general orders of 28 May. At dawn the XXX Russian Corps attacked the positions of FML Czibulka, while XXXIII Corps struck in the Kolomea sector. The Russians crossed the Pruth below the Kolomea bridgehead and at Lanczyn, but were unable to maintain themselves on the south bank during the day. On 3 June, however, they broke through FML Schreitter's 36 ID south of Sadzawka. With the approval of the Army commander, FML Czibulka threw LW IR
"Klagenfurt" # 4 - which had been pulled from line to move to the Italian front - into the battle. Together with parts of LW IR "Pola" # 5, they managed to recapture Heights # 474 south of Sadzawka. These actions, however, were only the beginning of some further difficult days for 7th Army.

6. The Thrust into East Galicia

a. The allies decide to attack toward Lemberg

As described earlier, in the conferences that took place at Teschen and Pless directly before Italy entered the war, Conrad and Falkenhayn had agreed to carry on the campaign against Russia at least until they reached the San and the Dniester. After these river lines were secured, it would be possible to consider sending stronger forces to the Italian theater of operations. When Przemysl fell on 3 June, Mackensen's Army already had left the San behind them. However, the left wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army to the north hadn't reached the river, and the center of that Army had even been pushed back toward the west and southwest in the last few days. The left wing and center of the South Army had almost reached the Dniester. However, Linsingen's right wing was still hanging back substantially, while the k.u.k. 7th Army on the Pruth with its 85,000 riflemen was under pressure from the substantially larger force of 130,000 riflemen under Letschitzky's command. North of the Vistula the Russians still held considerable territory in front of Ivangorod and Warsaw, and thus posed a risk to the left flank of the Armies in central Galicia.

Both of the General Staffs had naturally already considered all the possibilities which this situation offered even before the capture of Przemysl was complete. Falkenhayn explained his reasoning during these days in his post-war writing. To halt the offensive and turn against another enemy didn't seem advisable because of his low estimate of the power of resistance of the Danube Monarchy and its Army. "We would either have to leave the entire German force in the sector where it was currently employed, or accept the probability of some heavy setbacks. In the first instance, the freedom of action of the

337 The commander of the Klagenfurt regiment, Major Joseph Troyer, received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order for this action. He fell in battle on 5 July 1916.

German leadership would be hampered; in the second, Austria-Hungary would most likely collapse in the near future. This reasoning led the German Chief of Staff to the conclusion that he had no alternative to maintaining pressure on the Russians with an offensive. He was strengthened in his conviction by reports from Mackensen's HQ regarding the condition of the Russian Army. The Russians' ability to resist was obviously declining, they lacked ammunition everywhere, and a determined blow against their over-taxed troops promised success!

Falkenhayn also decided that to continue the offensive on the scale suggested by GO Mackensen and Col. Seeckt (his Chief of staff) the necessary impetus could only come from the commitment of fresh troops. It wasn't easy to act upon this decision. In the West the spring battle at La Bassée and Arras had passed its high point and the enemy was defeated, but fighting dragged on until well into June. In Hindenburg's sector in the East, the German front was paper-thin in several areas. Nonetheless, the German OHL scraped together two and a half divisions from the Western front and two more from the Eastern front and new units. They also hoped that in the foreseeable future two of the three new divisions which had been sent to the Balkans would also become available for the East.

Some thought was briefly given to the option of reinforcing Hindenburg rather than the Armies on the Galician front. However, Hindenburg himself declared that in the current situation his German Eastern command could achieve merely a tactical success if reinforced by just two new corps. Then Falkenhayn considered sending the new "shock group" of four and a half divisions to GdK Kirchbach's Armeegruppe, to destroy the Russian front north of the Vistula. He raised this idea in a conference with Conrad, but the latter disagreed.

The Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff hadn't given up his principal conviction that Italy, the former ally, should be punished with the sword as soon as possible. However, he was convinced that in the current situation it wasn't wise to halt on the San-Dniester line and wanted to continue the offensive against the Russians. Conrad also had no doubt about the ideal direction for continuing the thrust: from Przemysl toward Lemberg. The plans which he had developed in October 1914 would thus be carried out in an altered form.

**Decisions and orders on 2-4 June**

Since Conrad's suggestion was in harmony with that of Mackensen's
HQ, on 2 June Falkenhayn ordered the latter to carry on the offensive east of the San "until we have substantially achieved our goals." On the 3rd, the two Chiefs of Staff met again at Pless to draft orders for all the Galician armies. On the next day the high command at Teschen issued the basic orders for continuing the offensive; they were followed by several more specific commands.

GO Mackensen would continue to attack south of the Tanew zone with 11th Army. They would be reinforced by the German troops which began to detrain at Rzeszow on 4 June as the "shock group": XXII Res Corps (43 and 44 Res ID, minus the former's 85 Res Inf Bde), 22 and 107 ID, and 8 Bavarian Res ID. This thrust would be covered on the right by 2nd Army, on the left by 4th Army. The South Army together with 7th Army would strike the enemy units tarrying south of the Dniester. 3rd Army, which had been squeezed out of line at Przemysl, was broken up. Its k.u.k. X Corps had already begun to march to the south wing of 4th Army. The XVIII Corps (with 2 and 11 ID plus 26 LW ID) would follow as soon as possible. The Beskid Corps, 1 Lst Inf Bde and Hungarian 1 Lst Huss Bde were assigned to 2nd Army; they were soon joined by 4 CD, which had briefly been held back for transfer to the Italian front. On the other hand, 44 LW ID was held in readiness to move to the southwest - two of its regiments would go to Carinthia, one to Tyrol. FZM Puhallo with the staff of 3rd Army took over GdK Kirchbach's Armeegruppe, which became independent of 4th Army and again designated "1st Army." Kirchbach, in turn, took over a rebuilt 1st Corps, which was composed of 46 LW ID, half of 2 CD and some other troops. 2nd Army would join the 4th under Mackensen's overall command after the new operation began.

Thus the allies were initiating a new battle designed to recover Lemberg. Only time would tell whether the attainment of this geographical goal would also lead to the paramount strategic goal of destroying or seriously damaging the enemy. Falkenhayn hoped that the loss of Lemberg would have a "depressing effect" upon the Russians, and thus the "final objective of securing a good peace" would be closer to attainment. Conrad believed that the capture of Lemberg could if necessary be followed by an offensive to the north between the Bug and Vistula, as he had envisioned in fall 1914. However, like Falkenhayn he hoped that the destructive blows which would be dealt to the Russian army during the liberation of Lemberg would make the Tsar willing to consider making peace.

340 Falkenhayn, p. 86
Naturally the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff also laid priority on the recovery of the Galician capital for political reasons. At the very least it would make the Romanians less confident in the Russians, and might even draw them to the side of the Central Powers. During this period Conrad was considering the possibility of seeking peace with the Serbs, despite persistent rumors that they were planning to attack Bosnia. The k.u.k. border detachments guarding the Drina could overhear Serbian officers and men alike complaining about their war-weariness and their economic distress. Reports that the Serbs were inclined to seek peace also arrived from other sources. The plans of the responsible military leaders of Austria-Hungary for winning over Romania and Serbia were outlined in exchanges of notes with the Foreign Minister. Serbia would be brought into the orbit of the Habsburg Monarchy after the latter had finally solved the South Slav question by establishing a third state alongside Cis- and Trans-Leithania. Romania would similarly be encouraged to become a component of the Danube Monarchy, in which its aspirations toward Transylvania could be realized peacefully. These ideas were similar to those developed two and a half years later by Smuts when he represented Lloyd George in discussions with the Aus-Hung. plenipotentiary Graf Mensdorff.  

However, Conrad's suggestions raised hardly an echo in the chancelleries at Vienna and Budapest.

The Russian counter-measures

The reports from Mackensen's HQ, confirmed by other sources, accurately pictured the condition of the Russian Southwest Front. Since the start of May, Ivanov's armies had been reinforced by 15 infantry divisions drawn from the Northwest Front and from the force assembled in the Odessa District for action against Turkey; these units had melted away in the battles like snow in the spring sunshine. Most of the divisions in Southwest Front had been reduced to the size of regiments or even farther. According to official Russian reports, Ivanov's armies lost 412,000 men in May (dead, wounded, taken prisoner or missing). Hastily trained recruits were sent without weapons to positions just behind the trenches, so that they could take up the rifles of dead or wounded soldiers. There was a shortage of 300,000 rifles between the Vistula and Czernowitz. As had been the case for a long time, the lack of ammunition was especially burdensome; it was practically catastrophic. Naturally these deficiencies and a string of defeats was having an increasing impact on the morale

of many units; at least an equal number of units was still fighting bravely. The commanders at higher levels were confronting developments with Russian fatalism; there were few attempts, as Danilov complained, to regain the initiative by well-planned maneuvers.\textsuperscript{343}

Thus the powerful counterattack which Ivanov had ordered along his entire Front on 28 May relied essentially on the fighting spirit and stubbornness of the muzhiks; considering the general situation, it had little prospect of success. By 4 June, at the latest, it was obvious that it had failed. Now that Przemysl had fallen the Russian leadership faced some difficult choices. Danilov doubted that Ivanov still had faith in the possibility of retaining eastern Galicia.\textsuperscript{344} On 5 June the commander of Southwest Front reported to the Stavka that the situation of his troops was dismal, but he added the following words as a summary:

"However, I believe that we must hang onto our positions with great tenacity; thus we can force the enemy to expend ammunition at a rate that they cannot continue to sustain. We are already receiving reports that the enemy's ammunition supply is being markedly depleted; many shells fail to explode. Moreover, some of the shells were just produced this year, indicating that there is not a large supply in reserve...Since the enemy owes their success to their enormous expenditure of ammunition; this confirms our belief that they will finally exhaust the resources which are necessary for achieving their goals in the Russian theater of operations."\textsuperscript{345}

The high command fully endorsed Ivanov's opinion. Based on their input, he issued new orders on 5 June.

3\textsuperscript{rd} and 8\textsuperscript{th} Armies on his right wing, each with six corps, would hold their current positions running from Tarnobrzeg on the Vistula through Zapalow to the Dniester south of Komarno. On their left was 11\textsuperscript{th} Army around Nizniow with four corps. 9\textsuperscript{th} Army, with the same strength, was to hold the lower Dniester as

\textsuperscript{343}Danilov, p. 507
\textsuperscript{344}Danilov, p. 577
\textsuperscript{345}Quoted in Bonch-Bruevitch, Vol. II, pp. 259 ff. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - However, Russian sources exaggerate the significance of the Germans' superior ammunition supply. Stone ("Eastern Front", p. 147) points out that the allies' edge in artillery on the Eastern front was in fact smaller than the edge enjoyed by the French and English on the Western front, "which got them nowhere." The Russians' problem was failure to develop a tactical response to the Germans' offensive methods, which the generals wouldn't admit at the time or later.
far as Chotin. However, the instructions were rather unclear, and encouraged Letschitzky to keep his left wing farther ahead on the Pruth if possible.\textsuperscript{346} No doubt at the express desire of the Stavka, Ivanov pulled several corps from the front to create reserves. XXIX, II Caucasian, V Caucasian and IV Cavalry Corps would assemble at Lubaczow, XXIII at Lemberg, and XXI Corps at Rohatyn. While the line was held, the ranks would be replenished and ammunition supplies restocked. All efforts would be devoted to restoring the Front to full fighting strength.

\textbf{b. Preparations for the attack toward Lemberg}

After receiving his instructions, GO Mackensen decided to send his 11\textsuperscript{th} Army, reinforced by the newly-arrived German units, in a thrust north of the Grodek ponds; the center would advance toward Magierow. The k.u.k. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army, while guarding the right flank of the 11\textsuperscript{th}, would strengthen its own left for an advance toward the line Komarno-Janow, thus outflanking Grodek from the north. The k.u.k. 4\textsuperscript{th} Army would guard the left flank of the main thrust; it would cross the San between Sieniawa and Ulanow with at least six divisions and then keep pace with 11\textsuperscript{th} Army by advancing in the direction of Rawa Russka and Narol-Miasto; a minimal but sufficient force would be left to guard against enemy activity from the Tanew sector. 13 June would be the first day of the offensive; however, the right wing of 4\textsuperscript{th} Army would cross the San 24 hours earlier so they would be in place to cooperate with the left wing of 11\textsuperscript{th} Army. Until then the reinforcements along with replacement troops and equipment would be brought up to the front; there would be a rest period while preparations were completed. In general, the starting line for the new attack would be the positions the three Armies had taken after the capture of Przemysl. Only the inner wings of 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 11\textsuperscript{th} Armies would first occupy the line of ponds running south of Mosciska, and reach the Wisznia by Czerniawa.

After a difficult attack, the IV and Beskid Corps of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army created an 8 km gap in the enemy defenses northwest of Krukieniece; Gaj Hill was finally taken. The Russians rallied on the heights south and west of Mosciska, where they put a halt to the allied advance. In the next few days the Austrians and Germans tried in vain to finally push the enemy back through the low ground around Mosciska, although they were assisted toward the south by the left wing of XIX Corps. The Russians were forced to relinquish some ground here and there, but there was no major success. On 9 June Mackensen therefore ordered that the fighting should be suspended until the start of the general

\textsuperscript{346}[Zayontschovsky, pp. 303 ff. Nesnamov, pp. 52 ff.]
The course of events was similar on the heights northwest of Mosciska. Here the k.u.k. XVII Corps was engaged until the night of 7-8 June, when it was relieved by German units so that it could move to 4th Army. XLI Res Corps was able to drive the enemy over the Wisznia at Czerniawa and Starzawa; they were assisted by parts of the k.u.k. 11 ID (especially IR # 55), which captured the height west of Czerniawa from the Russians before transferring to 4th Army.

The new order of battle

Meanwhile the Armies took up their allotted positions under the new order of battle prepared by Mackensen. 2nd Army stretched its line to the north as far as the Czerniawa area. At the beginning of the offensive it was deployed as follows (from left to right):

- The Beskid Corps was on the road leading to Mosciska, with 35 and 25 Res ID in the first line, 4 German ID in the second;
- IV Corps was southwest and south of Mosciska with 27, 43 LW and 31 ID at the front, 32 ID in reserve;
- XIX Corps was north and east of Krukienice with 13 LW, 34 and 29 ID;
- XVII Corps was southeast of Kupnowice Str.; it had 1 Lst Inf Bde (which had relieved 44 LW ID when the latter moved to Italy) and 9 ID; and
- V Corps was on both sides of the upper Strwiaz opposite Koniuszki-Siemianwskie with 33 ID and parts of 14 ID.

Initially Col. Rehwald's Group and 1 CD were responsible for watching the south edge of the Wielkie Bloto and the connection with South Army. The course of events here and in the area north of Rohatyn through 15 June will be described below; the result was that the covering troops were quickly involved in the difficult actions of South Army. They were first replaced between the Tysmienica and the Bystrzyca by 4 CD (reinforced by several infantry battalions), and then at Böhm-Ermolli's initiative by FML Kornhaber's 51 Hon ID. The connection between these units, which were engaged at Litynia, and the right wing of V Corps was taken over by the Hungarian Landsturm Hussars of 1st Brigade.

XLI Res Corps (81 and 82 Res ID) was in line next to 2nd Army at Czerniawa. From the Wisznia to a point north of Chotiniec was the k.u.k. VI Corps (12 ID and 39 Hon ID, now reinforced by the independent Transylvanian IR # 63. To their left the Guard

347The IR # 63, with 5 battalions, had been transferred from Kövess'
Corps (1 and 2 Gd ID) held the line as far as the area east of Laszki. Farther north was the newly arrived XXII Res Corps (43 Res ID and 107 ID); then came X German Corps (19 and 20 ID) and GM von Behr's combined Corps (56 and 119 ID) between Heights # 241 and a point east of Radawa. 11 Bav ID was placed behind 11th Army's right wing, 8 Bav Res ID behind its center, and 86 Res Inf Bde (of XXII Res Corps) behind its left. 11 Hon CD was placed directly under Mackensen's HQ, although for the time being it stayed behind the right wing of 4th Army. 22 German ID would first help 4th Army cross the San, then would come under 11th Army. In an order issued on the 10th, Mackensen designated the k.u.k. VI Corps, the Guards and the XXII Res Corps as the primary attack group; the other corps would move in conformity with this group.

On its right wing, 4th Army had XVII Corps (11 ID and 26 LW ID) deployed between the mouth of the Lubaczowka and the Sieniawa area; for the start of the offensive, 22 German ID was also attached to this Corps. Next in line on the San, as far as Staremiasto, was IX Corps; it had 10 ID (which was reinforced for a lengthy period by Szende's Brigade), 106 Lst ID, and one regiment apiece from 21 LW ID and 37 Hon ID. The k.u.k. X Corps held the river line as far as Ruda, with 24 ID in the first line, 2 ID in the second. XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID) held its old front on both sides of Jezowe; it was reinforced by some Landwehr, Honved and Landsturm detachments. Next in line was VIII Corps; it held positions as far as the Vistula upstream from Tarnobrzeg with the German 47 Res ID, half of 21 LW ID and of 37 Hon ID, and FML Stöger-Steiner's Group. Directly under Army HQ, and deployed behind the center, were 45 LW ID, 3 Cav Bde, and half of 41 Hon ID. The latter had returned to the sector south of the Vistula because the situation of 1st Army had again become quiet. The high command instructed Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, the Army commander, to ensure that as many of the units as possible of the two left wing corps (XIV and VIII) should be available if needed to reinforce the offensive; they could either strengthen the right wing as it followed 11th Army, or help a thrust up the east bank of the San, after the river was crossed, that could finally lead to the collapse of the Russian position at the San-Vistula confluence. The Archduke passed on this order to Generals Roth and Schuechenstuel. Meanwhile, as directed by Mackensen, he prepared to first commit six divisions to the assault over the San; the divisions of XVII Corps would reach the east bank on the 12th, those of IX Corps on the 13th, and those of X Corps on the 14th. Each of these commands, as they cooperated with the thrust of Behr's combined Corps over the lower Lubaczowka, would

_Armeegruppe._

499
intervene to help their neighbors on the left after they were over the San.

Apart from some isolated minor attacks, the Russians left the allies in peace during their preparations. They had enough on their hands in getting ready for the obviously-imminent defensive battle in accordance with the decisions their leaders had reached on 4 and 5 June.
c. The Russians are pushed from the south Dniester bank (5 to 15 June)

1) Letschitzky attacks; Pflanzer-Baltin counterattacks

To carry out earlier orders, and to provide relief for Shcherbatchev's 11th Army, General Letschitzky had meanwhile continued his attack along the Pruth. The main effort was now made by XXX Corps; with at least two and a half divisions, to be followed by additional units, it was to break through between Kolomea and Delatyn. While FML Benigni's k.u.k. 15 ID was able to hold its ground, at dawn on 4 June the enemy once again broke through the Croatian 36 ID south of Sadzawka. Two battalions of the Upper Styrian IR # 47 and three Landsturm battalions were sent to the threatened area and brought the Russians to a standstill. Four other battalions were to carry on the counter-attack as far as the Pruth. To improve the situation, and to carry out the newly-expressed wishes of South Army, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin planned to have Rhemen's and Schönburg's Groups thrust on the afternoon of 4 June to Krasna (northeast of Delatyn) and Bohorodczany. This offensive would be preceded several hours earlier by an attack by Rhemen's 5 ID; they would advance on both sides of the Delatyn-Lanczyn road into the flank of the enemy that was threatening Czibulka's Corps. This flank attack failed. However, the troops south of Sadzawka were able to push the Russians back, despite heavy counter-thrusts, to the edge of the nearby heights.

The advance of the Army's left wing made good progress. The Graz 6 ID gained ground west of Nadworna. On the evening of the 4th, Schönburg's Group stormed several positions on the heights; by the time night fell they had moved through Jablonka. However, Russian resistance increased the next day because of their concern for their flank. Heavy enemy counterattacks had to be fended off at Delatyn; the heights east of Perehinsko which had just been captured had to be relinquished again to the Russians.

At the same time 36 ID experienced another severe defeat, which couldn't be prevented by the intervention of new reserves scraped up from several sources, including the hastily-committed 8 CD. 36 ID fell back to the heights directly north of Mlodiatyn. There was a report that the whole of 15 ID had also been defeated and driven away from the Pruth, but fortunately for III Corps, engaged farther east at Kolomea, this report was false. FML Benigni had only pulled back his left wing slightly.
GdK Pflanzer was greatly concerned for the future. He feared that the pressure exerted by South Army as it swung toward the southeast wouldn't directly threaten Letschitzky quickly enough to keep him from breaking through between Delatyn and Kolomea. At the very least, such a development would place the right wing of 7th Army in a dangerous predicament, especially since the intentions of Romania remained unclear. Pflanzer was determined to overcome this menace. With his usual energy, he stamped a new force out of the ground behind III Corps; it consisted of seven battalions plus 10 CD, and was supposed to counterattack the Russian flank south of the Pruth early on the 7th; the neighboring divisions would then join the attack.

Then, as so often happens in war, there was an unforeseen change in the situation. Already on the night of 5-6 June the front where the Russians had broken through became quiet, as did the other sectors of 7th Army. During the next morning, FML Schönburg noted that the Russian XI Corps was falling back from his positions. Around noon he began to attack. At the same time Czibulka's Group, after repulsing some isolated attacks, reported that the enemy was definitely retreating. An intercepted Russian broadcast confirmed that the HQ of XXX Corps was moving back from Ottyinia to Tlumacz. GdK Pflanzer didn't hesitate to send his whole Army into the attack, beginning with the left wing. Schönburg's Group on the extreme left was instructed to advance through Ottyinia into the enemy's rear "without consideration of losses on the march."

The three groups on the left wing continued to advance on the afternoon of the 6th; Schönburg's battalions moved through Solotwina into the area southeast and east of Bohorodczany. Pflanzer's entire front moved forward the next day. Schönburg pressed the enemy back over the Bystrzyca Nadwornianska at Grabowiec. Rhenmen's 6 ID threw the Russians out of Majdan Srd., while his 5 ID stormed the heights north and east of Krasna. After heavy actions, Czibulka's 36 ID crossed the Pruth at Lanczyn and Sadzawka; the inner wings of his 15 ID and of Krautwald's Group took the heights northwest of Kolomea. Krautwald's right wing forced the Russians to give up their positions around Kolomea. Marschall's Corps crossed to the north bank of the Pruth at Zblotow and Wolczkowce; Korda's left wing (5 Hon CD and 6 CD) also crossed the river, southeast of Sniatyn.

348 At the start of June, Pflanzer's HQ for a time were planning to retreat if this was made necessary by Romania's intervention. At the same time, the Hermannstadt [XII] Military District was improving border security and fortifications in Transylvania.
42 Hon ID worked its way over the Pruth at Draczynetz. Russian radio messages and other information led to the correct inference that General Letschitzky was pulling his center back to Tysmienica and the heights northeast of Ottynia and Obertyn. However, he intended to cover the retreat at an intermediate position running from Ottynia through Kulaczowce to Sniatyn, while his XI Corps would oppose the right wing of South Army at Stanislau and Halicz.

On 8 June the 7th Army soon reached the intermediate Russian position described above. Schönburg's and Rhemen's Groups took Ottynia and the heights south of the town. Czibulka's Group drove the Russian rear guards from the heights running north of the Pruth, but at Korszow were again held up by the left wing of XXX Russian Corps. Krautwald made a fighting advance through Turka. Marschall's Group reached the heights at Zadubrowce toward evening. By this time GdK Marschall with 5 German CD had left to join South Army at Linsingen's request; the commander of 30 ID, FML Kaiser, took over Marschall's former group. The Russians opposite the left wing of FML Korda's XI Corps pulled back everywhere from the low ground along the Pruth to the heights rising toward the north. Korda transferred his 5 Hon CD to FML Kaiser's Group.

On 9 June, Pflanzer's troops were able to penetrate the enemy's Ottynia-Korszow-Zadubrowce position at several points. XXX Russian Corps pulled back to the Tysmienica-Obertyn area; XXXIII Corps fell back along with the XXXth, but seemed ready to offer new resistance on the heights south of Horodenka. II and III Cavalry Corps were led back to the area northeast of Stecowa. The right wing of XXXII Corps held the Kotzman sector, while its left was still on the Pruth opposite Czernowitz.

Opposite the new Russian front, on 9 June Schönburg's Group was on the heights northeast of Ottynia, while Rhemen's Corps to their right were engaged in the Zukow area. Czibulka's 36 ID was approaching Obertyn from the south, while his 15 ID advanced in the area northeast of Dzurkow. FML Krautwald's III Corps attacked the Russian positions south of Tyszkowce and at Horodenka. Southeast of Horodenka, FML Kaiser's Group pushed the enemy back over the railroad. In the afternoon, Korda threw back strong enemy forces southwest of Kotzman. His right wing (the Polish Legion and Lt Col. Papp's Group) was still south of the Pruth on both sides of Czernowitz. The cavalry divisions were deployed as follows - 8 CD with 15 ID, 10 CD in the center of III Corps, and 5 Hon CD in echelon behind the right wing of FML Kaiser's Group. (The Honved CD was responsible for maintaining a
link between Kaiser and XI Corps, which was hanging back).

GdK Pflanzer-Baltin planned to send the bulk of his Army in a concentric advance against the wide Russian bridgehead south of the Dniester between Chocimierz and Horodenka. However, on the evening of 9 June reports arrived from Teschen regarding a change in the situation of South Army, and they caused Pflanzer to substantially alter his plans.

2) The capture of Kalusz and Stanislau

The commander of South Army had begun to shift the center of the Army toward the southeast immediately after capturing Stryj. On 2 June he let FML Szurmay know that 128 Hon Inf Bde and half of 7 ID would be a sufficient force to watch the Dniester; therefore 40 Hon ID, the other half of 7 ID, and 1 CD should be ready to move toward the southeast. On the next day the Russians didn't withdraw any further at Horucko; they even extended their positions at Rudniki somewhat toward the east. However, Linsingen only modified his orders to Szurmay slightly by allowing the latter to keep all of 7 ID.

Thus the situation of the Army's left wing wasn't fully satisfactory; however, early in the morning of the 4th there was encouraging news from the right wing: the Russians had finally begun to evacuate their positions southeast of Stryj. GdI Linsingen, who was very impatient, told Gerok's and Hofmann's Corps to take Kalusz and Halicz on this day; Bothmer (also on the 4th) was supposed to capture the Zurawno bridgehead by a coup de main.

At this point Linsingen's time table was somewhat unrealistic. The two corps on the right were already suffering from adverse marching conditions. Blazing heat was interrupted by heavy thunder storms which turned the roads through the forests into morasses for several days, especially in the sector of Hofmann's Corps. Moreover, both corps encountered new Russian resistance at Holyn and Zawadka early on the 5th; although the enemy positions had been hastily assembled, they still had to be taken before the advance could continue. At Holyn this task was assigned to 48 Res ID, which was reinforced by some Aus-Hung. battalions. The enemy troops at Zawadka were defeated by Bolzano's Brigade, and those who had dug in farther south were defeated by GM Fleischmann's 55 ID. Hofmann's Corps took 2000 prisoners during these actions.

In the night of 7-8 June, 48 Res ID stormed the city of Kalusz;
they were supported south of the Lomnica by the three Feldjäger battalions (# 5, 6 and 22) of the k.u.k. 19 ID. Meanwhile Hofmann's Corps was able to gain a brief rest east and southeast of Wierzchnia (although some of the men couldn't rest until after midnight). On the next day Gerok advanced east from Kalusz toward Stanislau, while Hofmann again was engaged in a fierce action. To cover the retreat of their troops to Halicz, the enemy occupied the heights by Slobodka and Wojnilow, which were very suitable for defense. At 4:00 PM Bolzano's Brigade, made up mostly of Czech troops with excellent commanders, stormed the trenches at Wojnilow. Two hours later the 130 Inf Bde took Heights # 352 from the Russians, who then also evacuated Slobodka. Hofmann's Corps took 12 officers and 3200 men prisoners, as well as 11 machine guns.

Gerok's Corps was able to enter Stanislau on 8 June. On the same day Hofmann's Corps came up against the Halicz bridgehead at Ciezow and Komarow.

Meanwhile Bothmer's Corps, reinforced by 40 Hon ID and 1 CD, deployed on 4 June for the thrust against Zurawno, and had won substantial successes. On the 5th, while 1 ID advanced on the heights south of the Swica, 38 Hon ID and the right wing of 3 Gd ID thrust into the Zurawno bridgehead, defended by XVIII Russian Corps. The allies didn't give the enemy time to break up the bridges over the Dniester, but stormed ahead to the other side while the Russians were still pulling over the river; during the day they won the heights along the east bank. On the 7th, the 38 Hon ID and the Guards pushed the enemy back again at Nowoszyny; then the Honveds advanced toward Bukaczowce while the Germans turned against the heights west of Hrehorow. On the next day 40 Hon ID entered the line on the left of 3 Gd ID; 1 CD was following them, held in readiness for a thrust toward Rohatyn. 1 ID west of Halicz maintained the connection to Hofmann's Corps.

Szurmay's Group experiences difficult days

Szurmay's Group already had many weeks of unending combat behind them when they were instructed to watch the Dniester in the area of Mikolajow. With scarcely 20 battalions, they were already holding a front of 26 km when on 4 June they also had to take over the 16 km stretch between Rozdol and Zydaczow. Here 4 battalions from 128 Hon Inf Bde had been sent the day before to take the place of 40 Hon ID, which was moving to Bothmer's Corps. The positions were little better than outposts, and Szurmay was convinced that the enemy had no intention of giving up the south bank of the Dniester. However, the Army commander had become
confident due to the continuing Russian retreat, and wouldn't revoke his order of 4 June that Szurmay should thrust the enemy over the river. A local success just southwest of Zydaczow encouraged Szurmay on the evening of the 6th to begin the offensive requested by Linsingen. One attacking group from the south Hungarian 7 ID pushed ahead north of Derzow, while another moved toward Horucko. The groups on the wings (128 Hon Inf Bde and Col. Rehwald's command) were instructed to keep pace. Hopes that the enemy was evacuating the south bank, which had been raised by the local victory mentioned above, were immediately proven to be without foundation. Much effort and bloodshed was required just to move closer to the Russian positions. On top of everything, on the 7th Szurmay's Corps was also instructed to guard the stretch of the Dniester between Zydaczow and Holeszow. There had been 4 battalions of 40 Hon ID in this area, of which only 2 would stay behind. For Szurmay this was hardly an adequate increase in strength for his front, which now was 54 km long.

The Viennese FJB # 21 and a battery had just been ordered to also reinforce the new sector, when a report had arrived that the battalions of 40 Hon ID west of Holeszow - with only 1800 riflemen - had been attacked in the flank and rear and thrown back toward Ruda. On the next day FJB # 21 was able to recover the lost ground, but the allies had received yet another warning of impending peril.

A concentration of strong enemy forces at Zydaczow had also been noted in the last few days, and the arrival by rail of VI Russian Corps had been detected. The confident Army commander, however, placed less importance upon this unsettling news than upon aerial reports that the Russians were retreating on the Chodorow-Rohatyn road. This movement was apparently caused by the concentration of XXI Russian Corps in reserve behind 11th Army at Rohatyn.

Nonetheless, since the end of May the South Army had won great success, as proven by statistics. In this period of time the Army had taken over 40,000 prisoners and two dozen guns.

3) The Russian counterattack at Mikolajow and Zurawno

On the evening of 8 June, when Linsingen's Army HQ at Stryj learned that Stanislau had been taken without fighting, he decided to continue the operation by making his main effort on the north bank of the Dniester. This was consistent with the wishes of the AOK, which had told him the day before that it was
desirable to assemble a strong force north of the Dniester, and then "to roll up the enemy position downstream." Therefore Linsingen ordered that on 9 June Gerok should reach the north bank of the Dniester at Mariampol, and Hofmann at Halicz; the German 1 ID would cross the river west of Halicz and thrust toward Bursztyn. Thus the Army, which had been shifting to the southeast in the last few days, would now suddenly move north. The Army HQ looked forward to this new phase of the campaign with great and apparently justified hope.

The setback to Szurmay's Group

However, the god of battles wasn't willing to continue showing favor to Linsingen's Army. Already on the 8th there had been a change in the situation of Szurmay's and Bothmer's Corps, which led to a substantial crisis for the former. Szurmay had attempted to continue his offensive through swampy ground that didn't provide cover. He collided with an enemy counterattack. The Russians had recognized that this sector was the most vulnerable part of the allied front in Galicia, and opened an attack at Zydaczow and Mikolajow with the help of the fresh troops of their VI Corps. Since they felt particularly threatened by Bothmer's advance northeast of Zurawno, they soon extended the offensive to include the Bukaczowce sector. Although 71 Inf Bde of 7 ID was able to break into the Russian positions north of Derzow on the night of 7-8 June, the enemy afterwards drove it back. The same fate befell the Division's 14 Inf Bde on the morning of the 8th, after they won an initial success at Horucko. As our troops fell back, the Russians hit them with a deeply massed attacking group, which finally came to a halt on the rising ground north of Medenice.

On the same day, Bothmer's Corps also began to feel the newly awakened offensive spirit of the Russians. In the afternoon strong forces fell upon both the front and left flank of 3 Gd ID and 40 Hon ID on the line Hrehorow-Bortniki. The allies were pushed back to Nowoszyny, and 40 Hon ID lost 2000 men.

On the next day the Russians continued their attack from Mikolajow and Zydaczow. The first reports came in from Szurmay's Corps. After a bloody hand-to-hand action, 14 Inf Bde had already been forced to pull back through Königsau before dawn; it lost 50% of its personnel. Soon after noon the 128 Hon Inf Bde, dug in west of Zydaczow, was hit by an enemy force three times its size; the line was rolled up from the left and the Brigade finally lost the majority of its combat troops in a melee. A couple of March companies were brought hurriedly to the front,
and in the night were able to build a new front covering the artillery, which was gallantly standing its ground. This was possible because the Russians hadn't pushed ahead. Because of these setbacks, 71 Inf Bde of course also had to pull back toward Wolica.

Now it was easy for the Russians to push the outposts stationed southeast of Zydaczow back toward Ruda.

GdI Linsingen appeared at daybreak on the heights at Königsau. With great concern, he noted that the Russians were just 12 km from Stryj; the loss of this town would rob his Army of the fruits of its month-long fighting and sacrifices. Since Szurmay's Group wasn't strong enough to dispel this danger, the Army commander decided to relieve Gerok's Corps at Stanislau by the German 5 CD (which was being transferred from 7th Army); then Gerok would move northwest to launch a flank attack against the enemy opposite Szurmay. At this point Linsingen wanted Bothmer's Corps to hold its positions on the north bank of the Dniester as a sally port. However, events in the next few hours led him to reconsider this decision. After difficult fighting, on the evening of the 9th the lines of 38 Hon ID and of 1 CD on its left were broken at Bukaczowce. At the same time the outposts southeast of Zydaczow had to pull back, which seriously endangered the important crossing point at Zurawno. Therefore Bothmer told the Army commander that in view of the general situation his Corps should pull back behind the Dniester. Linsingen concurred, and resigned himself to rebuilding his plans on a new basis. The flank attack up the Dniester would now be carried out by GdI Bothmer with 3 Gd ID, 48 Res ID, 349 1 ID, 40 Hon ID, and the 1 k.u.k. CD. Meanwhile Gerok with 38 Hon ID (reduced to no more than 1100 riflemen) and half of k.u.k. 19 ID would guard the Dniester between Ostrow and Zurawno. GdK Marschall with the German 5 CD and Hofmann's Corps of 7000 men would hold the flank at Stanislau and opposite Jezupol and Halicz. Half of 19 ID was ordered to Wojnilow as the Army's reserve.

After receiving the morning report, the high command at Teschen had immediately placed GM Berndt's 4 CD at the disposal of South Army. Reinforced by three and a half infantry battalions and four batteries, the Division would intervene through Litynia in place of Col. Rehwald's Group, which in the last few days had mostly pulled back to the east bank of the Tysmienica. As soon as possible, Szurmay's troops were to join the attack which

349A brigade of 48 Res ID, which originally belonged to Gerok's Corps, had already been under Bothmer's Corps since 19 May.
Bothmer and Berndt would launch from the two flanks. The pending attack of 2nd Army (which would take place as part of Mackensen’s general offensive) was also expected to improve Szurmay’s situation.

The situation stabilizes

10 June brought Linsingen’s left wing some relief, since the enemy remained inactive after their exertions of the day before. West of the Tysmienica, GM Berndt pushed the Russians back toward Litynia. Southeast of Zydaczow, Bothmer had pulled his troops back over the Dniester and began to attack from the line Zurawno-Nowe Siolo. Gerok guarded the Dniester in Bothmer’s rear and down to Ostrow, where he linked up with Hofmann.

Bothmer worked his way closer to Zydaczow on the 11th. 1 ID stormed the bridgehead which the Russians had created over the Dniester opposite Holeszow. 3 Gd ID and 40 Hon ID, accompanied on the other side of the Stryj River by 1 ID, advanced through Ruda to the north. Farther to the left, the 128 Hon Inf Bde – though reduced in size to barely a battalion – gained some ground northeast of Tejsarow as Linsingen had ordered.

Bothmer fought at Zydaczow on the 12th and advanced as far as the railroad leading from the town toward the east. Parts of 48 Res ID and of the Guard turned toward the Dniester to guard the flank and rear. 1 CD was engaged west of Zydaczow; 40 Hon ID, reduced to 2000 combat troops, once again came under Szurmay’s command. His Corps went over to the offensive and captured Derzow as well as the heights south of Bilcze and of Medenice. On the extreme left wing, in the sector of GM Berndt’s Group, 51 Hon ID of 2nd Army thrust toward Mikolajow. Its commander FML Kornhaber (to whom GM Berndt was also subordinated) still took his orders from 2nd Army HQ. Berndt’s men pushed into Litynia, but couldn’t establish a firm foothold there.

On the 13th, Bothmer’s thrust stalled on the railroad east of Zydaczow. The enemy resumed heavy attacks against Szurmay’s right wing; they were held off by 128 Hon Inf Bde despite its casualties. Szurmay’s left wing took Bilcze and the heights on both sides of Letnia. The pressure of FML Kornhaber’s Group at Litynia was countered by strong enemy attacks; neither side gained a permanent advantage.

While the fighting raged north of Stryj, there were also actions on the right wing of South Army. The Russians attacked
Marschall's cavalry on 11 June with a combined force of foot and horse. Thanks to an intercepted radio broadcast, this attack wasn't a surprise, but Marschall was still driven back to the outskirts of Stanislau. However, he didn't hesitate to counter-attack. On the 12th he threw the Russians back over the lower Worona and on the next day reached the area south of Mariampol.

Hofmann's Corps made some progress in the direction of Halicz.

Despite the already tense situation, the fighting at Stanislau didn't cause any great concern to the commander of the South Army. This was because the k.u.k. 7th Army on his right - whose westernmost column worked closely with Marschall during the latter's advance to the Dniester - was at this time steadily advancing, thus providing completely reliable protection for the South Army.

4) Pflanzer-Baltin advances to the Dniester; South Army faces a new crisis

By the evening of 9 June, Pflanzer-Baltin had learned that Linsingen had been forced to shift the main axis of his operation more toward the west by pulling Gerok's Corps out of the front by Stanislau. Therefore the commander of 7th Army shifted the movement of his own left wing from the northeast to due north. While the ultimate goal of the right wing, covered in the direction of Bessarabia by XI Corps, was Buczacz, the left wing would advance through Tlumacz to the Dniester downstream from Mariampol. Army HQ arrived at this decision only reluctantly, since they would have preferred to make their major effort on the Army's right wing to keep an eye on Romania. For the foreseeable future this would no longer be possible.

FML Korda's XI Corps, in constant fighting under the blazing hot sun, advanced by the 12th to the line Bojan-Kalinkowcy. 5 Hon CD had been returned to Korda's command; along with 6 CD it made up a cavalry corps under GM Freih. von Apor, which thrust ahead to Rukszyn. Meanwhile the main body of XI Corps was ordered to advance with a strong left wing and if possible to push its opponents back against the Romanian border. On the 13th however, the attack of Korda's tired troops, who lacked adequate artillery support, was halted by the enemy XXXII Corps, parts of which were fighting on Russian soil. Finally the Russians fell back a little more; they evacuated Nowosielica and in the north pulled back in 6 CD's sector to Rukszyn. Pflanzer-Baltin had no intention of sending Korda's Corps further into Bessarabia. He
ordered them to be content with the gains they had made.

On the right wing of Pflanzer's main body, FML Kaiser's Group made a fighting advance through Horodenka. Four battalions crossed the Dniester on the 11th, and were reinforced the next day. Meanwhile GM Graf Herberstein with 10 CD took Zaleszczczyki. Pflanzer instructed Kaiser's Group to take the heights north of Uscieczko, which would make it possible to roll up most of Letschitzky's front on the Dniester. However the Russians recognized their danger in this sector and on the 12th offered heavy resistance to Kaiser's further advance (which was reinforced by 10 CD).

Meanwhile to the left of FML Kaiser, the Group of FML Krautwald fought successfully on the 11th as it advanced to the Russian bridgehead over the Dniester at Czernelica, which included Heights # 377. They began to attack the position that night. FML Czibulka's Group (15, 36 and 5 ID) stormed the heights west of Niezwiska and northeast of Chocimierz on the 11th, and crossed the Niezwiska-Jezierzany road in the afternoon. On the same day GdI Rhemen's Group (6 ID, FML Schönburg's Group, and 8 CD) forced the enemy to retreat from their positions west of Chocimierz and on both sides of Tarnowica Polna, and took the heights southwest and southeast of Tlumacz. On the 12th, Czibulka's and Rhemen's regiments drove the Russians before them as they reached the heights north of Olesza, Tlumacz and Tysmienica; the left wing of 8 CD linked up with Marschall's cavalry from South Army.

The Army commander issued further orders to his subordinates on 13 June. GdI Rhemen's Group would take the Nizniow bridgehead and then halt along the Dniester between this point and Mariampol. For the time being, Krautwald and Kaiser would stay in the positions they had already taken. FML Czibulka was instructed "to break through the enemy front in the direction of Koropiec and Potok Zloty with all available forces."

On 13 June the Russians sought to prevent the further advance of Rhemen (who was also commanding Czibulka for the duration of the attack on Nizniow); the enemy launched a heavy but unsuccessful counterattack out of the bridgehead. On the 14th, the left wing of Schönburg's Group reached the Dniester below Mariampol; his main body, along with 6, 5 and 36 ID, assaulted the trenches at Nizniow. On the next day the attackers took the bridgehead; all of XXX Russian Corps fell back to the north bank of the river.

Less successful during this period were the Aus-Hung. units fighting in front of Czernelica and at Zaleszczczyki; they were now
all commanded by FML Krautwald. Not only were they unable to advance; they were subjected to heavy Russian attacks, especially at Zaleszczyki, which were fended off only with considerable exertion and bloodshed. It was learned from an intercepted order that the Russians intended to break through downstream from Zaleszczyki. This sector seemed favorable for such an operation, because there was a 40 km gap in the line between Zaleszczyki and Korda's left wing, covered only by a thin cordon of cavalry outposts. In response, GdK Pflanzer hastened to pull Korda's widely dispersed XI Corps back to the line Bojan-Horoszowa. Lt Col. Papp's Group and the Polish Legion brigade dug in west and north of Bojan, while the Domobranen of 42 Hon ID did the same at Toporoutz. The cavalry (5 Hon CD and 6 CD) deployed farther north as far as the Dniester. The 8 CD, which was behind the lines of FML Krautwald's Group, was ordered to Zastawna; from there it would move north to guard the Dniester along with 10 CD at Zaleszczyki.

Continuing difficulties of South Army

While Pflanzer thus continued to pursue the enemy along the entire front near the Dniester, the South Army was still in a critical situation. On the 13th, Linsingen reported to both of the allied high commands that his Army, "which had been reduced to just 19,850 German and 24,681 Aus-Hung. infantry and cavalry," was facing its most difficult challenge to date: it was under attack by a much stronger enemy force while operating over a much larger area." Linsingen's call for help was not ignored. The AOK at Teschen took measures to replenish the ranks of the Aus-Hung. units in South Army as quickly as possible, and the two Chiefs of Staff agreed to transfer 101 and 105 German ID from south Hungary to Stryj.

Meanwhile the Russians launched a heavy attack against the left wing of South Army on the 14th and 15th, apparently as part of their desperate attempt to hold onto east Galicia. Bothmer's Corps was thrown back from the railroad east of Zydaczow to the heights at Holeszow on the 14th; part of the Russian Guard Corps was engaged in this action. The Germans counterattacked, but could only regain part of the ground they had lost. Szurmay's Group was able to repulse all Russian attacks until around noon, but then were pushed back at Derzow and Bilcze; nonetheless they

350 Neither of his two Honved divisions (38 and 40 Hon ID) had much more than 1,000 riflemen. The k.u.k. 7 ID, even after receiving reinforcements, had 3600; the 55 ID had 4000 riflemen. The strength of the German divisions varied between 5500 and 6000. Only the k.u.k. 19 ID could deploy more than 10,000 riflemen.

351 From a manuscript in the German military archives
held onto all the other parts of their front. FML Kornhaber's Group suffered a substantial setback at Hruszow, but were able to regain most of what they had lost by an immediate counterattack.

The Russians didn't attack Bothmer on the 15th. However, they intensified their pressure against Szurmay's divisions, by now reduced in size to little more than battalions. The enemy launched their main attack on both sides of the road to Stryj. In many places there was hand-to-hand combat as the Russians took parts of Szurmay's line from behind. The south Hungarian IR "Erzherzog Josef" # 37 was in the thick of the fighting; when finally relieved from the melee it had only 150 men left. By evening Szurmay's battered troops held a line from Tejsarow through Wolica to Letnia. As on the previous day, FML Kornhaber's Group held onto their positions opposite Litynia.

The commander of South Army was very concerned because the Russians were now within striking distance of Stryj. He immediately ordered the half of 19 ID in Army reserve to relieve 38 Hon ID, which was guarding the Dniester; the Honveds in turn would reinforce Szurmay. Moreover, Bothmer sent him several German battalions; they arrived on the 16th in time to help repulse a minor Russian attack against Wolica. Otherwise, however, the Russians were rather quiet on this day. The units of South Army, especially Szurmay's Corps, had endured a difficult period. Szurmay reported to the high command that even the fighting at the Uzsok Pass was easier than the battle north of Stryj. Now, however, the crisis was ending; pressure from the allies east of Przemysl would force the Russians to also evacuate the blood-soaked villages south of Mikolajow.

d. The breakthrough battle of Mosciska-Lubaczow (12-15 June)

The resumption of the great offensive into east Galicia began on 12 June when the inner wings of 11th and 4th Armies crossed the Lubaczowka and the San. The 119 ID of Behr's Corps and the German 22 ID on the right wing of k.u.k. XVII Corps struck the enemy on the river banks early in the morning; despite fierce resistance by III Caucasian Corps they forced their way into the Russian positions. Opposite Sieniawa, 26 LW ID didn't win as quick a success on the east bank of the San, which here was especially well fortified and guarded; this caused some concern in the higher command levels up to the AOK. In the afternoon, however, the Landwehr were able to cross the river and by evening their front lines ran through Sieniawa. 22 German ID was on their right, and further east the 119 ID had advanced to the edge of the woods northwest of Radawa. Two military bridges were
constructed in the XVII Corps sector.

13 June

At 4:00 AM on 13 June, the air shuddered from the thunder unleashed from the barrels of 700 cannon and howitzers. Many heavy and very heavy mortars joined in. Hundreds and thousands of explosions combined with the many tones of different kinds of projectiles hurtling through the air to create a deafening din. From Mosciska to the Lubaczowka thick columns of smoke billowed up from fields, meadows, woods and villages, and created dust clouds against the blue skies. A few hundred paces away from the zone of destruction, 120,000 men were waiting, ready to attack, in trenches that were deep enough to protect them completely. Some of the trenches had been busily constructed a few nights before so that they would be as near as possible to the Russian lines. In these quickly but carefully prepared shelters, soldiers from Hungary, Moravia, Silesia and Galicia stood between men from all the areas of the German Empire, from the slopes of the Alps to the North and Baltic Seas. Their leaders stood along the forward rims of the trenches with watches in hand while they watched the great spectacle of destruction which would open the way into the enemy lines. For 90 minutes, hundreds of shells each second pounded great holes in the sandy ground, destroyed trenches and other works, and blew barbed wire and scraps of wood into the air, which was full of smoke and dust. When the officers' watches showed that the hour to strike had come, all these thousands of men arose from the cover of their trenches and stormed ahead against the Russians.

Mackensen's HQ, now in command of all three Armies, received reports during the morning that the attack was proceeding according to expectations.

XLI Res Corps quickly crossed the broad, partly swampy Wisznia valley; in heavy fighting they afterwards pushed their way slowly onto the slopes on its eastern edge. The offensive also progressed vigorously in the sector of the k.u.k. VI Corps, where FML Arz arrived with his staff at Nienowice around 4:30 AM. In their first rush, IR # 3 and # 56 of 12 ID broke into the foremost Russian positions and thrust ahead to the east. They took 1200 prisoners. 39 Hon ID had a more difficult time because they faced a strong fortified clump of woods which hadn't been damaged by the artillery. The Honveds' advance was checked, and didn't get going until around noon. At the same time, the center and right wing of the Division was fighting all morning along the edge of the woods southeast of Kalnikow. In the afternoon,
however, both divisions were already attacking the second and third Russian lines. Part of these lines was stormed, and part was evacuated by the enemy after a short but powerful artillery bombardment; the two principal arms cooperated brilliantly.

The successes of the Prussian Guard Corps were even more encouraging. After the foremost trenches were taken, the inner wings of the two divisions broke the enemy's resistance during the morning, and then pushed energetically ahead. XII Res Corps similarly advanced into the thickly wooded area east of Miekisz Nw. after bitter local actions. The German X Corps crossed the Lubaczowka and moved toward the northeast.

There was hard fighting along the entire front in the late afternoon, as the enemy was pursued from position to position. Mackensen's victorious troops paused for a short night of rest on the line Czerniawa-Malnow-Lukowa-Kobylnica-Polanka.

Behr's Combined Corps on the left wing maintained close contact in the woods north of Radawa with Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army. Behr's 119 ID, which was supposed to be relieved by parts of the k.u.k. XVII Corps, had to be left in line for the time being because it was still engaged in heavy actions at the side of the k.u.k. 11 ID. In difficult fighting, the right wing of 4th Army was able to widen the area it had taken east of the San on the day before. Early in the morning, 26 LW ID had taken all of the old Sieniawa bridgehead, and around 10:00 AM also occupied the dominating heights south of Dobra (Jurowa Gora). Meanwhile a brigade of 10 ID came over the San behind XVII Corps. Reinforced by two battalions from 26 LW ID, this brigade thrust down the San through Piskorowice by evening. From Piskorowice the allied position extended through the heights south of Dora into the forests north of Radawa, which were still the scene of very heavy fighting. On the left wing, further parts of IX Corps (the 106 Lst ID) crossed the river.

2nd Army didn't win such striking success on the first day of the battle. Following the instructions of the Army commander, only the strong left wing of seven divisions (the Beskid and k.u.k. IV Corps) joined the offensive of 11th Army. XIX Corps, the next unit to the south, was only ordered to win a few points in front of its trenches.

On the left, the Beskid Corps quickly took the enemy's foremost position in the first onset; then it repulsed a counterattack north of the railroad. However, when the divisions worked their way up to the exceptionally well-fortified Russian main position,
they found that it hadn’t been weakened sufficiently to be taken by storm.

In general the allies could be satisfied with what they had accomplished on the 13th. Since the enemy’s center had been broken, it was anticipated that they would offer resistance in a new position. However, it remained to be determined where this resistance would develop. According to reports from aerial reconnaissance, the Russians had constructed one position just 15 to 20 km behind the line which had just been broken; it ran from Mokrzany Wk. through Krakowiec to Oleszyce. Further to the rear was a stronger line between Grodek and Magierow, directly covering Lemberg. Regardless of where the Russians planned to make their stand, the allies would need to continue their thrust with great energy along the entire front on the 14th.

14 June

As expected, the Russians began to pull back from their pursuers during the night. The pilots sent aloft early on the 14th spotted long columns of troops and supply trains heading to the rear, some in great confusion; the Russians were especially congregating on the road leading east through Jaworow. There were large numbers of wagons at Magierow and Niemirow. Large fires had broken out around the railroad station at Magierow, which was a sure sign that the Russians were retreating. However, the enemy did offer resistance in their next position.

Between Mosciska and the Wielkie Bloza, the main body of 2nd Army began a large-scale pursuit on the morning of the 14th. They found that the left wing of 8th Russian Army was pulling back a considerable distance at once. The pursuers didn’t encounter new resistance until noon and in the afternoon at Mokrzany Wk., west of Stojance, and west of Bonow.

Around 11:00 AM the XVIII Corps deployed to attack the line Kupnowice Str.-Mokrzany Wk. and the heights east of these towns. Soon thereafter, XIX Corps passed through Podliski and the low ground at Sanniki.

In the afternoon both these Corps were engaged in stubborn fighting that lasted deep into the night. The main body of 9 ID together with 1 Lst Inf Bde worked their way ahead from 4:00 PM to the Wiszenka Brook between Wiszenka (town) and Koscielniki; however, they were unable to drive the Russians from the ridges north and south of Mokrzany Wk. On the right wing, the Eger IR # 73, supported by artillery from V Corps (which was still in its
old position) took the heights east of Wankowice after an action that lasted from noon until 9:00 PM.

North of XVIII Corps, the 29 ID of XIX Corps carried on its attack into the night and penetrated several kilometers through Podliski; east of Sanniki they paused within 800 paces of the enemy. 13 LW ID had already reached the barbed wire barriers lying southwest of Stojance, which they wanted to storm during the night.

IV Corps gained considerable ground. The three divisions in the first line (31 ID, 43 LW ID, 27 ID) passed the line Lipniki-Laszki-Goscincowce soon after noon; their left wing moved over the Wisznia as far as the eastern edge of Wola Arlamowska, which they reached in the evening. Then 31 ID attacked the heights north of Stojance and the main body (27 ID and 43 LW ID) thrust toward the east on both sides of the railroad.

On the Army's left wing, the Beskid Corps crossed the Wisznia on a broad front in the morning and by 2:00 PM reached Sokola and the area farther south. The attack continued in the general direction of Bonow, but encountered such determined resistance west and south of the town that its capture had to be postponed until the next day.

Next to the Beskid Corps, the XLI Res Corps of 11th Army resumed their pursuit at 7:00 AM. They didn't encounter the enemy until noon. In the evening they were heavily engaged on the heights at Sarny, but couldn't break through.

The k.u.k. VI Corps ordered the attack on the Krakowiec area to begin at 5:00 AM. Reconnaissance indicated that new resistance would be encountered by the pond at Krakowiec and the area farther south. At 9:00 AM both divisions occupied the heights east of Gnojnice, which had been evacuated by the enemy; from this point they could see that the bridges at Krakowiec were on fire and the last wagons of a long supply column were leaving the town. However, 39 Hon ID soon encountered heavy fire from the direction of the Krakowiec-Sarny road. They were able to establish firm control of several points along the road after noon, but then the attack stalled; the Russians were in force on the edge of the swamps east of the pond.

North of Krakowiec and on the heights southwest and west of Wielkie Oczy, 12 ID and the Guard Corps came upon an entrenched enemy force around noon. At 3:30 PM they launched a combined attack which was completely successful. While 12 ID's left wing
was engaged in a difficult action to take the strong positions west of Swidnica, the Guards fought for an hour and took the stubbornly defended heights at Wk. Oczy from the Caucasian Grenadiers and 34 Russian ID. They had heavy casualties in this hot action. 1 Gd ID fought its way through the town; then both Guard divisions crossed the broad valley of the adjacent brook. They energetically repulsed Russian counterattacks and reached the level heights on the east bank of the brook.

Toward evening, 12 ID also advanced a battalion of its left wing to Swidnica; the bulk of the Division spent the night at Ruda Kochanowska. There were rumors that the Russians would seek to recover Krakowiec in a counterattack by at least a division. The necessary measures were undertaken to prevent this, but the attack never came. In the evening 39 Hon ID and the left wing of XLI Res Corps took another strong point west of Morance.

The events on both sides of the Lubaczowka were no less decisive. Here the XXII Res Corps thrust into the thick woods northwest of Wk. Oczy, in which paths were few and visibility was poor. Because it was impossible to provide registered artillery fire to support the attack, the fighting was difficult, but ultimately the Corps succeeded in pushing through the low ground at Lukawiec. The German X Corps faced equally difficult conditions, and was equally successful; they gained ground on both sides of the rail line and road leading to Oleszyce. In the evening of the 13th they were already heavily engaged in the villages and woods on the north bank of the middle Lubaczowka; they weren't able to overcome the bitter resistance of XXIX Russian and V Caucasian Corps - on the inner wings of 3rd and 8th Armies - until toward noon on the 14th. Then, however, 20 ID thrust forward between the Lubaczowka (which at this point turns toward the northeast) and the railroad to Lubaczow; they advanced as far as the neighboring XXII Res Corps. 19 ID, engaged next to 20 ID southwest of Sucha Wola, pushed through the wooded zone and captured the village of Lipnia on the highway to Oleszyce. Only the left wing of 19 ID was holding back in the woods northwest of the highway, because its neighbor - Behr's Corps - was still pinned down at Radawa.

Mackensen's HQ was under the impression around noon, based on reports received from its own corps and from 2nd Army, that the enemy's withdrawal would lead to a long retreat if the allies would be able to immediately and energetically thwart any attempts by the Russians to establish a new defensive line.

352Müller-Brandenburg, "Die Schlacht bei Grodek-Lemberg" (Der grosse Krieg in Einzel-darstellungen, Heft 34, Oldenburg 1918), p. 31
Therefore the Armies were ordered to maintain a vigorous pursuit. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army's next objective was the line Chlopy-Bruchnal (southeast of Jaworow). 11\textsuperscript{th} Army would advance to the broad and continuous forested zone which stretched in a great arc from the northernmost of the Grodek ponds toward Wierzbiany and Niemirow, then north of the Zawadowka toward Lubaczow. West of the hilly country around Oleszyce, the forest zone resumed as far as the road from Sieniawa to Tarnogrod, which was in the sector of 4\textsuperscript{th} Army. That Army was instructed to continue to cover the left flank of 11\textsuperscript{th} Army by advancing through Cewkow and Tarnogrod. The corps of 11\textsuperscript{th} Army were expected to reach the area at and west of Lubaczow, the Zawadowka, the road from Wierzbiany to Jazow Stary, and the area west of Jaworow by the evening of 14 June if possible. In the Army's reserve, 11 Bav ID would follow XLI Res Corps to Malnow, 8 Bav ID the k.u.k. VI Corps to Zaleska Wola, and Col. von Reuter's Brigade the Army's left wing to Ryszkowa Wola on the middle Lubaczowka. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army similarly gave its corps wide-ranging goals in accordance with GO Mackensen's orders. V Corps would head toward Grodek; the three corps farther north would head toward the north edge of the Grodek ponds, in the general direction of Janow.

Despite the bravery and perseverance of the troops, their actual accomplishments during the day, as already described above, were substantially less than these wide-ranging goals. The Russians, despite their substantial casualties, defended themselves skillfully. Their second line, which had been chosen and built up in a week of labor with their usual care, provided not only strong moral support, but also a strong defense. Only the k.u.k. VI Corps and the Guards had broken through this line; another part of it had been taken by XXII Res Corps, but otherwise the defenders had held their ground. Even in the sector where the breakthrough had occurred, the Russians had plugged the gap by immediately bringing up reinforcements. Thus one new division apiece had been identified in front of the Guards and VI Corps during the fighting. Reports indicated that yet another division had come up behind these units and was still in reserve.

The commander of the Russian Southwest Front had recognized from the lessons of the allies' May offensive, and their assembly of strong forces in the Sieniawa-Radymno area, that if they attacked toward Rawa Russka they might be able to separate 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 8\textsuperscript{th} Armies and defeat them in detail. This concern had led him to deploy reserve units around Lubaczow. The actions which started on the 12\textsuperscript{th} confirmed Ivanov's concern, as the allies were developing a double thrust toward the north and east. Therefore on the afternoon of the 14\textsuperscript{th} he ordered the creation of a new
army detachment in the Lubaczow sector. This group would be commanded by General Olochov and placed under 3rd Army; it consisted of the corps already nearest to Lubaczow (XXIX, II and V Caucasian) plus IV Cavalry and XXIII Corps.

Olochov's Group would guard the routes leading toward Lublin and Vladimir Volynsky as well as the connection to 8th Army. They would also be ready to strike the enemy in the flank if they attempted to turn the right wing of 8th Army.353

At the point when this order was issued the majority of the units involved were already engaged south of Lubaczow. The remaining units would soon also be drawn into the actions.

15 June

The allies encountered hard fighting again on the 15th, as they attempted to carry out the orders issued by Mackensen the day before.

The corps of 2nd Army advanced against the positions of the six Russian divisions which opposed them between Mokrzany Wk. and Bonow. In most places they found that the enemy was determined to offer spirited resistance. To aid the divisions engaged in a hard action at Mokrzany Wk., in the morning the Army HQ ordered V Corps to intervene by advancing through Ostrow and Wankowice toward the north. However, the attackers weren't successful until evening. Throughout the day, XVIII and XIX Corps were engaged around the stubbornly defended heights, villages and woods. When they finally took these positions, night was falling. IV Corps also fought in extremely heavy actions all day on both sides of the railroad and on the heights north of Stojance; they moved only a few kilometers to the east. The Beskid Corps had to overcome equal difficulty; late in the afternoon they stormed the heights of Bonow in cooperation with XLI Res Corps.

Most of 11th Army also endured tough combat. After fighting in the night and morning, XLI Res Corps thrust through Sarny. However, only its left wing was able to advance north of this town to the Szklo, where its attack came to a halt. 39 Hon ID had similar experiences; its Hon IR # 6, supported by most of IR # 63, attacked north of the Krakowiec pond toward Przedborze on its eastern shore, but couldn't take this village.

On the other hand, the k.u.k. 12 ID and the Guards won

353Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 53; Zayontschovsky, p. 306
significant successes at the easternmost tip of the attacking wedge. In the morning 12 ID had to struggle with 20 and 34 Russian ID for every foot of ground southeast of Wk. Oczy. In the blazing sun of mid-day, IR # 57 stormed the strong positions west of Nahaczow, but couldn't take them from the enemy. It even seemed that the Russians wanted to make this point the center of their resistance; columns of their infantry were reported to be approaching Nahaczow from Jaworow between 10:00 AM and noon. Parts of two fresh divisions were identified here in the afternoon fighting. However, 12 ID continued its attack with great determination despite the danger to its right flank caused by the uncertain situation of 39 Hon ID at Przedborze. The Russian trenches on the heights west of Nahaczow were finally stormed in the evening, and the enemy regiments were thrown back through the town. Parts of 39 Hon ID caught up with 12 ID, and maintained a line which linked up with the troops who were still pinned down in front of Przedborze.

After numerous actions in the morning, the Guard Corps pushed into the Russian positions at Lipowiec and farther south in the afternoon. Late in the night the 2 Gd ID reached the edge of the woods south of Hruszow, while its right wing - in continuing combat on the heights north of Nahaczow - was in touch with the k.u.k. VI Corps.

The XXII Res and X German Corps also won significant successes. The former, after a day of steady fighting in broken terrain where visibility was limited, reached the low ground between Hruszow and Lubaczow in the evening. Its weakened divisions were already considerably spread out. This was even more the case in the X German Corps; its front leading to the northeast had to stretch ever more to the east to keep pace with the simultaneous advance of Mackensen's main body. During 15 June the 20 ID fought its way ahead to south edge of Lubaczow, with its right wing adjacent to XXII Res Corps. Meanwhile 19 ID drove the enemy out of Oleszyce; because a gap had developed between the Division and Behr's Corps, it had to keep its left wing deployed in depth and in echelon. To solve this problem, 8 Bav Res ID was ordered to enter the line west of Oleszyce and on the left of 19 ID. On the 16th, the Bavarians, along with 56 ID which was already engaged in heavy fighting at Molodycz, would form a new combined corps under G.Lt Freih. von Stein on the Army's left wing.

1) The thrust east and northeast of Sieniawa

The major task of 4th Army was to guard the advance of 11th Army
toward the north, against possible enemy intervention from Rawa Russka and Narol-Miasto. For this purpose, HQ of 4th Army set the earliest possible capture of the area Dzikow-Cewkow-Tarnogrod as its objective. When the events of 13 June demonstrated that the hard-fighting IX Corps could move ahead only slowly, the XVII Corps was ordered to win ground toward the northeast in cooperation with the left wing of 11th Army. Thus Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's HQ deliberately suppressed the concerns they had felt since the beginning of the new operation that by advancing from the San to the Tanew they would increase the length of their front from 34 to 66 km in a few days. Their Army had no prospect of receiving additional strength; because the summer was dry, the sometimes swampy Tanew area wouldn't prevent the Russians from conducting a stubborn defense or from launching a large counterattack. The thrust of 11th Army toward Lemberg practically invited the enemy to strike from this sector against the left wing of the advancing troops. Although 4th Army would attempt to accompany and protect this wing, the maneuver would soon come to an end if it wasn't possible to hold some forces in reserve while carrying on the actions anticipated to develop during the advance to the Tanew.

On 14 June there were few changes in 4th Army's sector. In the woods north of Radawa, 11 ID advanced only with difficulty along with its neighbor on the right, 119 German ID. On the Jurowa Gora and farther northwest, they defended the ground they had gained against heavy Russian attacks. The tide of battle swayed back and forth in the sector of IX Corps, which moved its line forward a little. Meanwhile X Corps switched two divisions to the east bank of the San behind IX Corps.

Under XVII Corps, 22 German ID was relieved by parts of 26 LW ID so that it could transfer to 11th Army. However, the situation in this rugged, forested sector was still uncertain, so 22 ID was temporarily retained by XVII Corps. On the 15th it was supposed to break through along with 26 LW ID at Dobra and the heights farther southeast; from there the enemy position could be rolled up both to the south and north. While 11 and 119 ID pushed the Russians to the east, IX Corps would take the area east and northeast of Cieplice as quickly as possible. The k.u.k. X Corps would expand its holdings on the east bank of the San.

When these orders were implemented on the 15th, the fighting was strenuous but rewarded with significant success. 11 ID fought its way step by step through the Bubnowa Gora and by evening reached the valley of the Radawka. The main body of XVII Corps (German 22 ID and k.u.k. 26 LW ID) opened a powerful attack in
the morning after a short but concentrated artillery bombardment; by evening they had advanced through Dobra.

To give additional impetus to the advance of XVII Corps, it was given control of 45 LW ID which had just come up through Sieniawa. This also made it possible for 119 ID to finally leave the front. At first it was placed in reserve at Radawa behind G.Lt Behr's newly-formed corps (which was taking the place of Behr's combined Corps). 11 Hon CD moved from the area east of Jaroslau to follow X German Corps. IX Corps had more difficulty in breaking determined enemy resistance west of Cieplice, although it had been reinforced by a 30.5 cm mortar battery, LW IR # 7, and the HQ of 41 LW Inf Bde. Also X Corps won only a little ground with its 2 ID on the east bank of the San. In the night of 15-16 June the Corps' 24 ID crossed over the San at Piskorowice.

2) Decisions and plans of the two sides

There had been heavy fighting along the entire front on 15 June. As Mackensen's gallant troops, in their diminished ranks, seized a brief rest along the line from the Dniester to the San, they were aware that they had already accomplished a difficult task. However, they couldn't pause, because they would be given another significant goal for the next few days.

Mackensen's HQ hadn't anticipated the sustained resistance which the Russians had offered in the last two days. The 11th Army alone had taken 34,000 prisoners since 13 June, and the enemy must have also suffered substantial casualties killed and wounded. A wide gap had been created in their second position and the attacking wedge was making a deep penetration. However, the allies had also suffered losses, and the Russians had thrown a considerable number of fresh units into the fray. Would they attempt to fight in the open field now that their defenses had been broken? If so, it might be to the advantage of the allies. Perhaps this would enable the Germans and Austrians to overrun the Russians' next prepared position, which had been described by aerial reports, before it could be occupied in sufficient strength. Thus a powerful offensive and ruthless pursuit were the necessities of the hour. 2nd Army especially would have to do everything possible to arrive at the position on the Wereszyca at the same time as the enemy.

General Brussilov, however, had no intention of fighting a battle of maneuver with his badly damaged corps. Many divisions had no
more than 2000 to 3000 riflemen; regiments had been reduced in the last few days to battalion or even company strength.\textsuperscript{354} The command of Southwest Front had ordered 8\textsuperscript{th} Army "to stop the enemy on the roads leading from Wk. Oczny to Rawa Russka and from Rudki to Lemberg." Brussilov could only hope to carry out this order and to retain Lemberg by establishing a firm defensive line. Therefore he instructed his corps to withdraw to the long-prepared position southwest of Rawa Russka and running from Magierow through Grodek and along the Wereszyca.

At the same time the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Russian Army was ordered to pull X, III Caucasian and XXIV Corps back to the line Dzikow-Cewkow-Tarnogrod-Dabrowica. General Olochov's Group would assemble on the Army's left wing.

\textbf{7. The Battle of Grodek and Magierow}

\textbf{a. The capture of Niemirow and Lubaczow (16-19 June)}

In the early morning hours of 16 June, reports arrived from all parts of the allies' front that the enemy had evacuated their positions. An attack launched by GdK Böhm-Ermolli's troops between 2:00 and 3:00 AM mostly encountered empty trenches. Only 13 LW ID met some resistance. Orders were issued for unflagging pursuit.

The morning was cool, and light rain fell for a while. The pursuing columns came forward vigorously, and didn't encounter resistance. They reached, and in some places passed, the line Rudki-Sadowa-Wisznia-Jaworow by 3:00 PM. Meanwhile aerial scouts reported that the roads leading east in front of 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 11\textsuperscript{th} Armies were packed with long columns of Russian troops of all arms, flowing back to the protection of the Wereszyca line and to Magierow-Rawa Russka. Behind almost every clump of woods or hills, columns of smoke rose to heaven from burning villages and towns, marking the route which the fleeing enemy was taking. Their rearguard skirmished with 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army late in the afternoon. IV Corps had to overcome stronger detachments at Moloszkowice, as did 34 ID of XIX Corps west of Hartberg and 29 ID of the same Corps at Rodatyczce, before they could rest at these places and farther east. At Wolzuchy and Dobrzany, several Russian battalions with artillery tried to stop the XVIII Corps. However, they were driven away in the evening, as 9 ID entered the area southwest of Grodek. The advance was now becoming

\textsuperscript{354}Bonch-Bruievitch, Vol. V, p. 262
strenuous. Every effort was being made to seize the crossing points on the Wereszyca on this first day. 9 ID succeeded in this venture: after night fell the Beneschau IR # 102 thrust ahead to Grodek and established themselves in the western part of the town, which was still stubbornly defended by the Russians.

The units of V Corps, without being disturbed, reached Zaskowice (33 ID) and Chlopy (14 ID), with outposts thrust ahead to the Wereszyca. The Beskid Corps pushed past Jaworow to the area east of the village of Szklo.

The main body of 11th Army also moved ahead without any significant delay. XLI Res Corps, unhindered by the enemy, moved through Jaworow and in the evening was in the area west of Szklo. The k.u.k. VI Corps never encountered the Russians as it advanced through Wierzbiansy to Brzezina Wk. The Guard Corps had to fight to occupy Niemirow. Their neighbor to the north, XXII Res Corps, intervened to support this action and itself had to force back an enemy rearguard. At day's end they camped north of the Guard, with half the men facing east and the other half facing north. The X German Corps had a more difficult day. On the evening of the 15th they had been unable to take Lubaczow, which was stubbornly defended by Siberian troops in excellent positions. Therefore on the 16th they had to mount an even heavier attack. Meanwhile, however, the noteworthy advance of most of 11th Army was creating a dangerous gap between these units and X Corps in the most sensitive part of the front, the north flank of Mackensen's striking group. Therefore 11 Hon CD, which had been taken from 4th Army, was placed under X German Corps and sent to Rosznia. In the evening they deployed to the left of XXII Res Corps on the bank of Smolinka brook. At this time the right wing of X Corps moved closer to the Honved horse, after their main body had finally taken Lubaczow and the heights surrounding the town on the east and west. North of Oleszyce, Stein's Combined Corps gained just a little ground with 8 Bav Res ID in unbroken fighting. On the other hand, the 56 German ID advanced from the area west of Oleszyce to Cieszanow, pivoting sharply to the northeast.

4th Army also began its pursuit early in the morning. Soon, however, they found that the enemy was prepared to defend new, strong positions north and east of Cieplice. As the Austrians neared this area there were numerous clashes along the entire front. 11 ID, operating with 56 German ID of Stein's Corps on its right and 22 German ID on its left, didn't advance out of the forests south of Dzikow and Cewkow until night. The main body of XVII Corps (26 and 45 LW ID) fought their way to the area east of
Cieplice, while the skirmishing lines of IX Corps stayed hard on the heels of the enemy. Thus nearly all parts of the Army to the northeast of the San had won a favorable position from which they could carry on the attack on the heights on both sides of Dzikow and Cewkow.

Parts of 24 ID of X k.u.k. Corps, to the left of IX Corps, were able to cross the San. They secured the entire area where the Zlota flows into the San, but were unable to achieve any wider gains.

4th Army HQ issued its orders for the pursuit in the morning, before the enemy situation and extent of resistance was clarified. Following Mackensen's guidelines, the orders stated that:
- The Army's 3 Cav Bde, moving toward Cieszanow, would reconnoiter the Rawa-Russka-Narol-Tomaszow area;
- XVII Corps and most of IX Corps would head east alongside 11th Army;
- 106 Lst ID from IX Corps and X Corps would be the only units thrusting north toward Tarnogrod.

This meant that the Army's components would be considerably spread out. Unless sufficient reserves became available behind the thin front, the danger of over extension which had threatened 4th Army since the start of the spring campaign would continue to exist. Therefore Army HQ had proposed to Mackensen that the thrust through Cewkow to the east shouldn't begin until the advance on the road to Tarnogrod made decisive progress. Mackensen, however, didn't agree. The advance to the east would continue until it was halted by a Russian counterattack. As a precaution, though, the XVII and IX Corps would deploy in echelon and in depth against possible danger from Tarnogrod while they moved east on the 17th to the line Cieszanow-Rozaniec.

b. The thrust to the Wereszyca and to the Tanew

2nd Army

The approach of night and the exhaustion of the troops had halted most of 2nd Army on 16 June a few kilometers away from the Wereszyca and the waiting enemy. Their task on 17 June was to break through the Wereszyca line. After a few hours of rest, the XVIII and V Corps quickly reached the west edge of the ponds and the western bank of the adjacent parts of the river, where a new

---

355IX Corps consisted of 10 ID and 106 Lst ID plus three brigade-level groups of varying size (GM Szende's Group, 74 Hon and 41 LW Inf Bdes).
battle erupted. The 27 Inf Bde of 14 ID fought its way with
difficulty along the Dniester to the point where it is joined by
the Wereszyca; the Russians were dug in here on the west bank of
the latter river. The left wing of the Division reached the edge
of the Wereszyca. Meanwhile, 33 ID sought in vain to cross over
west of Lubien Wk. 9 ID pushed ahead along the pond southwest of
Kiernica and also fought all day against a stubborn enemy force
in the streets of Grodek. Toward evening the Division, supported
by detachments of 1 Lst Inf Bde, took the east part of the town
from the Russians.

North of the railroad to Lemberg, the Russians had built their
positions in an arc facing toward Janow, skirting the edge of the
broad zone of forests. Of the ten divisions moving east on the
left wing of the 2nd k.u.k. Army, only 13 LW ID and 34 ID (of XIX
Corps) came up to the enemy's main line of resistance on the
17th, by Wielkopole. This led to heavy actions which lasted into
the evening hours. At the same time IV Corps came close to the
Russians on both side of Janow, as did the Beskid Corps to the
northwest of this town.

On the 18th, Böhm-Ermolli's southern wing set out to cross the
Wereszyca. 27 Inf Bde of 14 ID had worked their way forward
during the night, and in the early morning reached the point
where the Wereszyca flows into the Dniester. 28 Inf Bde moved
through Komarno, which had been burnt to the ground, and reached
the river bridges, which had been destroyed by the Russians. 33
ID sent some detachments over to the other side, where they
covered the construction of a military bridge southwest of Lubien
Wk. V Corps reported in the evening that its troops had reached
the east bank of the Wereszyca along the entire front downstream
from Lubien Wk.

The Russians holding Grodek and the gap between the ponds at
Kiernica refused to give up during the 18th. The fighting
dragged on. Farther north the Bohemian 29 ID took Kamienobrod,
while the main body of the Army's left wing prepared to storm the
enemy's new main position.

11th Army

After the substantial advance on the 16th, the east front of 11th
Army enjoyed a quiet night. On the 17th there was also little
enemy resistance at first, although the passage of the broken and
wooded terrain was difficult because there were only a few poor
roads; moreover, the Russians had broken the local bridges.
Toward 1:00 PM there were increasing collisions with Russian
troops. Enemy shells began to fall among the heads of the marching columns. Soon there was no longer any doubt: the main line of resistance had been reached, and there was no chance that it could be taken by a quick coup de main.

The specific situation of the Army's components was as follows.

XLI Res Corps moved slowly because the road network was especially scanty in their area. After taking some advanced enemy positions south of Wiszenka, on the evening they were on the upper reaches of the Wereszyca, still 2 to 3 km from the Russian main position. Farther north, around noon the first elements of Arz' Corps pushed back some weak detachments west of Wiszenka and then in a quick attack seized the western part of that sprawling town and the Czarny Horb heights to the north. When they crossed this line, however, they found that the Russian had hastily dug deep trenches on the heights of Horodysko. 39 Hon ID secured the eastern edge of Wiszenka, and the left wing of 12 ID also made some further progress. Otherwise, however, the pursuit was over for the day.

Around the same time as VI Corps, the Guards also came upon the enemy at Szczerzec and farther south. They soon threw this detachment back, but east of the town they were checked by another strong position.

The experiences of XXII Res and X Corps were similar. When night fell they had reached a line running from north of Szczerzec through Smolin to Horyniec. While advancing in this sector, the right wing of X Corps had been reinforced by 11 Hon CD; the left wing, however, was stretched out in order to maintain a link with Stein's Combined Corps. Stein advanced toward the northeast, with 8 Bav Res ID moving through Dachnow and 56 ID farther west. They came upon an entrenched enemy force south and southeast of Cieszanow, and were unable to defeat them during the day. Stein's left was in close contact with 11 ID of the k.u.k. XVII Corps, but on his right there was only a thin screen of troops covering a gap which developed in the direction of X German Corps between Dachnow and Horyniec. In the evening, X Corps had to halt at Smolin and north of Horyniec.

During the whole day, pilots reported that long columns of troops were pulling back to the east behind the Russian front. The roads leading from Grodek to Lemberg and from Janow to Zolkiew, and the the areas around the latter two towns, were full of

---

356 This town shouldn't be confused with another "Szczerzec" southwest of Lemberg.
troops and supply trains. There was lively train traffic at
Lemberg. On the other hand, in the evening the number of Russian
troops in the villages near their lines increased, and some
columns were even observed marching west.

As usual, intercepted Russian radio messages helped the allies in
their evaluation of the enemy's moves and intentions. The
population of the recovered lands, amid the burning ruins of
their destroyed hamlets, could only report that fleeing enemy
troops had passed through, devastating as much of the area as
possible. All they knew about the main enemy position was that
it had been under construction for a month. More useful data was
gleaned by identifying the units from which prisoners had
originated, and by compiling their reports. VI Corps alone had
taken in prisoners from no less than six Russian divisions, who
indicated that the enemy was in hurried retreat and lacked both
artillery and ammunition. On the other hand, the actions on the
17th indicated that the other side still was determined to
resist. Thus on the evening of this day it was still uncertain
whether the Russians would attempt a sustained defense of their
current line. Mackensen's HQ decided that on the 18th his corps
could strike ahead on their own initiative as soon as each was
ready. Perhaps a quick success in one or two sectors of the
battlefield would lead to a general success.

The corps commanders, however, didn't want to launch
uncoordinated attacks. They felt that a combined and carefully
planned attack after an artillery bombardment was needed to
overcome this last major position in front of Lemberg. On the
other hand, only one day, 18 June, would be needed for the
preparations. On the 18th the infantry mopped up enemy elements
in front of the main position, scouted the net of trenches, and
prepared the lines of advance and deployment areas. They worked
hard to bring their own front as close as possible to that of the
enemy. The field artillery had already come into position on the
17th, and was in action during the 18th. The heavy artillery,
which had to move more slowly on the sandy roads, was also
starting to arrive. Behind VI Corps there were no roads at all
which were suitable for the movement of its 30.5 cm mortars, so
they were lent to XXII Res Corps.

On the 18th, G.Lt Stein's Combined Corp had to march farther than
the others, and engaged in several actions. His 56 ID had been
engaged in a difficult action on the afternoon of the 17th
southwest of Cieszanow. They were assisted in the evening,
however, when the k.u.k. 11 ID, their neighbor on the left,
reached the heights northeast and north of Cieszanow. This

529
enabled the combined Corps (8 Bav Res and 56 ID) to once again turn sharply to the east. Now they joined with X German Corps into a striking group under GdI Emmich; the assignment of the group was to cover the attack of 11th Army in the direction of Rawa Russka. Afterwards they would advance themselves toward Rawa Russka with their right wing.

The Russians' defensive strength was by no means broken. They had thrown fresh forces into the fighting. As Stein's Corps advanced in the afternoon toward Horyniec and Bruno Str., they were met by a fierce counterattack from the north in front of the latter town. The k.u.k. XVII Corps intervened through Chotylub to assist German 56 ID, and the Russian attack was fended off. In bitter fighting, the combined Corps won the area north of Horyniec in the evening after several hand-to-hand actions with the Russian 3 Gd ID. The German X Corps deployed in contact with the enemy between this town and Smolin, with 11 Hon CD on its right wing.

4th Army

The 4th Army, guarding the flank of the attacking group, was still deployed in depth and in echelon, as it had been since Gorlice. Half the units faced north, half faced east. Early on the 17th it was in a difficult situation. Fortunately it appeared that the opposing Russian units - X, III Caucasian, XXIV and XXIX Corps - had been badly shaken by the recent actions. The defeats west of Lemberg must also have affected them. Very early on the 17th the allies learned from radio messages that the Russian corps HQ were moving, which usually preceded a retreat. The enemy line actually began to pull back as a result of a strong thrust in the night east of Majdan by the inner wings of 22 German ID and 45 LW ID. The Russians made a strong counterattack east of Cieplice, but were completely unsuccessful. Army HQ was already able to announce at 9:00 AM that the enemy had evacuated their positions opposite XVII, IX and X Corps, and were withdrawing from Cewkow toward Tarnogrod. During the day the Russians also began to move to the rear on both sides of the Sieniawa-Tarnogrod road.

Therefore the troops of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were on the move on 17 June. They pushed aside Russian rear guards. By evening, 11 ID was at Cieszanow next to 8 Bav Res ID; 22 German ID was north of Cewkow and moving east. Next in line and southeast of Cewkow was 10 ID of Kralicek's k.u.k. IX Corps; the Division was seeking to establish contact with 22 ID by sending a detachment to the southeast. Most of IX Corps (106 Lst ID and
the three brigade-groups) reached Tarnogrod. Advance elements of X Corps had moved even farther to the north, and reached the heights south of the Tanew and northeast of Krzeszow. XIV Corps was able to move closer to the San.

These successes were worth while. However, when the Archduke's divisions rose on 18 June after a brief night's rest, they encountered new resistance at many points. XVII Corps, which meanwhile had been reinforced by 3 Cav Bde, had to throw 45 LW ID into the fighting north of 11 ID in the afternoon. The Landwehr, however, were also unable to drive the stubborn defenders out of their positions north of Zukow. Anyway, by this time it seemed to the commanders that it would be advantageous to halt XVII Corps as well as Stein's Combined Corps in the sectors they had reached. Therefore GO Mackensen ordered that XVII Corps should be held in readiness so that when the time was appropriate it could support 11th Army in a coordinated advance with Stein toward Narol-Miasto.

IX and X Corps, after capturing several strong points still held by the Russians, occupied the entire area south of the Tanew up to and including Ulanow. They began to fortify this new line. At Ulanow the line of the right wing of XIV Corps linked up with the left of X Corps on the other side of the San.

c. The breakthrough at Magierow and forcing of the Wereszyca

According to the orders issued by Mackensen's HQ during 18 June, the main body of 11th Army was to break through the Russian positions west of Magierow on a 20 km front. Then they would push the enemy back to the northwest, in the direction of the Lemberg-Rawa Russka road. This would disrupt the Russian forces north of Lemberg. The Army's reserves (119 ID and 11 Bavarian ID), would move up to Niemirow and Starzyska. At the same time 2nd Army would continue the attack they had already initiated on the Wereszyca, capture Lemberg, and push the defeated enemy toward the east, rolling up their front on the Dniester from the left. As previously, 4th Army on the San and Tanew would stand on guard toward the north. However, its XVII Corps on the right wing would advance from the Cewkow-Chotylub area toward Narol-Miasto and thus assist the offensive northwest of Lemberg. They would work closely with Stein's Combined Corps and Emmich's Corps of 11th Army, who were responsible for securing the flank of the attack group along the 35 km front between Chotylub and Rawa Russka.
Early on 19 June the allied troops moved onto the battlefield under a cloudless summer sky, aiming to take the last Russian position that covered Lemberg. This task wouldn't be accomplished without casualties, since the enemy had no intention of giving up this last prize from the great initial campaign of summer 1914 without a struggle.

11th and 4th Armies

The heavy fighting opened in the center of 10th Army, where the k.u.k. VI and Guard Corps were victorious. Here the Russians had devoted the greatest effort to constructing the defenses. They had converted the entire area around the dominating Horodysko Heights and the homonymous village into a true fortress.

After two hours of powerful artillery preparation, the infantry began to attack at 7:00 AM on the entire front of 11th Army. In Arz's Corps, 12 ID on the left wing was the first to move forward, as ordered. The storm troops however were pinned down 150 paces in front of the Russian breast works, so a new artillery bombardment had to be opened between 9:00 and 10:00 AM. Meanwhile 39 Hon ID also worked its way forward to the Russian positions. Around 11:00 AM, IR # 63 on the right wing of the Honveds thrust ahead from the east side of Wiszenka. The whole Corps joined this attack, along with the right wing regiment of the Guard Corps to the north. In the early afternoon the XVIII Russian Corps abandoned the battlefield which they had defended at such great cost, leaving 2500 prisoners and a quantity of equipment in the hands of the victors. 12 ID pushed through the break in the line and followed the enemy to Kunin; 39 Hon ID stopped somewhat further back so that it could remain aligned with the neighboring XLI Res Corps.

After the Guards, reinforced by 119 ID, had also broken the enemy line in fierce fighting, they advanced even further than Arz's Corps; their advance elements reached the Zolkiew-Rawa Russka road at Dobrosin. To the left of the Guards, XXII Res Corps came to the area south and southwest of Kipnik. In Emmich's Group, only the right wing of X Corps advanced toward the north; it accompanied XXII Res Corps to the Ulicko-Seredkiewicz area. Most of the Group (the main body of X Corps and Stein's Combined Corps) stayed in their positions, which extended to a point east of Cieszanow.

Farther west, the right wing of 4th Army was also heavily engaged as it advanced to the northeast on 19 June. XVII Corps couldn't conquer the Russian lines north of Zukow. 10 ID, although
finally reinforced by most of 26 LW ID, was equally unsuccessful in the sector between Lubliniec Str. and Lukowa. Meanwhile the 22 German ID, assembling south of Cieszanow, once more came under the direct orders of 11th Army.

Along the San, the right wing of XIV Corps advanced to the mouth of the Tanew, keeping pace with the progress of X Corps. Since this shortened the line, Army HQ seized the opportunity to create a new reserve force at Army level. For this purpose, XIV Corps was instructed to provide 40 Hon Inf Bde (Col. Schnetzer). Reinforced by eight Landsturm battalions, the Brigade had been holding the sector west of the San to Nowosielec; now it was relieved by part of VIII Corps on its left, and went back to assemble near Lezajsk and Kamien.

Thus only the k.u.k. VI Corps and the Prussian Guards in the center had won a major success during this day of difficult actions. This was because the right wing of Mackensen's Army Group, like his left, had been limited to a few gains. XLI Res Corps, engaged south of VI Corps, had indeed begun the day with some promising successes, but then encountered determined resistance and was only able to reach the heights east of Majdan by evening.

2nd Army

The Beskid Corps was hanging back even further than XLI Res Corps; it took only a strong point by Stawki, and was unable to break through the fortifications on the Kubyn Heights.

The main body of 2nd Army also had to endure difficult fighting against the main Russian position. The day provided little satisfaction. At the mouth of the Wereszyca, 27 Inf Bde reported it was only able to work its way ahead to the enemy's principal fortifications. The rest of 14 ID and all of 33 ID were engaged at Komarno and farther upstream; they were able to reach the stream itself, but couldn't send strong forces over to the east bank which was dominated by Russians entrenched along the heights. After more than two days of combat, XVIII Corps was finally able to complete the conquest of Grodek; however, immediately to the east they encountered new resistance from four regiments, each from a different Russian division. Fresh blood again covered this battle field, on which troops from Styria and Carinthia under FML Edl. von Gelb's Division had laid down their lives in September 1914.

North of the Lemberg railroad, XIX and IV Corps spent the whole
day trying to wear down the enemy lines between Kamienobrod and Janow. Only 29 ID was able to break into the foremost Russian position at the former town; they built a military bridge to their rear. In 27 ID's sector, the enemy used the Janow Pond as a barrier to hinder our advance. Just as in the summer of 1914, Russian batteries on the heights at Stradcz sent a storm of shells into the woods which covered the adjacent low ground. Around 6:00 PM, five divisions (29 and 34 ID, 13 LW ID, 31 ID, and 43 LW ID) mounted a general attack on the stubbornly defended Russian trenches. The fighting along the Wereszyca raged on long into the night without reaching a decision.

Now, however, the efforts of 2nd Army were finally rewarded. On the extreme south wing, 14 ID broke into the Russian positions. East of Grodek the XVIII Corps stormed the enemy's second position. Around 3:00 AM on the 20th, the two corps on the north wing also took possession of the main Russian position. 29 ID captured the trenches east of Kamienobrod, 34 ID and the Viennese LW ID drove the Russians to the northeast. The Budapest 31 ID took Wielkopole, and at 4:00 AM the 43 LW ID occupied the famous heights at Stradcz. 27 ID advanced on both sides of the Janow pond. Meanwhile the Beskid Corps, exploiting its earlier success at Stawki, broke into the enemy position; this forced the Russians opposite the right wing of XLI Res Corps to also retreat. The battle was won. As day broke, the decimated Russian regiments were streaming back toward Lemberg.

d. Actions south of the Dniester

On 16 June, while Mackensen's Army Group engaged the enemy in the second great battle on the roads from Przemysl to Lemberg, the units south of the Dniester - 7th and South Armies plus FML Kornhaber's Group from 2nd Army - were striving to push the remaining enemy troops over that river. Moreover, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin was being forced to take measures against a threatened Russian counterattack on his eastern wing.

The withdrawal of XI Corps on the eastern wing, which had been ordered on the 15th, took place on the 16th without any interference from the enemy. FML Lehmann was instructed to guard the Dniester between Onuth and the mouth of the Sereth; he deployed 10 CD and half of 8 CD on the river itself. Behind them was the Army's reserve - the second brigade of 8 CD, half of 5 Hon CD, and six battalions which had been hurriedly brought up from III Corps. This disposition proved its worth in the next three days of defensive fighting. The stubborn attackers were
the Russian III Cavalry and XXXII Corps, which had been ordered "to smash the enemy units operating in the sectors between Zaleszczyki and Czernowitz."\(^{357}\)

The first attacks occurred on the afternoon of the 16\(^{th}\) in the area north of Toporoutz. These Russian thrusts were followed the next morning by sharp attacks against 42 Hon ID, stationed on both sides of this town, and against Col. Küttner's Polish Legion Brigade, defending Rarancze. The Russians attacked the gallant Poles - who were reinforced by the half of 5 Hon CD (19 Hon Cav Bde) from the Army's reserves - eight times through the afternoon, but were shattered. The Russians who attacked GM Apor's Cavalry Corps (the other half of 5 Hon CD, i.e. 23 Hon Cav Bde, and 6 CD) suffered the same fate; they were held off until parts of 10 CD hurried to the aid of GM Apor. On the 18\(^{th}\) the Russians again tried to break through at Dobronoutz, but were checked by Apor's dismounted cavalry; meanwhile the 19 Hon Cav Bde was moved quickly north from Rarancze to deploy behind the threatened sector. To ensure that there was unified control over operations at the Army's northeastern corner, FML Lehmann was given command of all four cavalry divisions. This measure seemed all the more necessary because reports from several sources indicated that the next Russian attacks wouldn't occur on Korda's southern wing, but rather would originate in the forests opposite Dobronoutz and from Uscie Biskupie.

On the west wing of 7\(^{th}\) Army, the capture of the Russian bridgehead at Nizniow made it possible to entrust the defense of the Dniester from Mariampol to Otra solely to Schönburg's Group. Thus, 6 and 5 ID plus parts of 36 ID became available to reinforce Czibulka's Group. Czibulka's 15 ID had already established a firm foothold north of the Dniester at the bend in the river near Kosmierzyn. His next assignment was to reach the line Koropiec-Potok Zlotty. From this point the Russian bridgehead at Czernelica, which was pinning down Krautwald's Group, would be so endangered from the rear that it would become untenable. Rhemen's XIII Corps HQ would control the entire operation, so it took over the hitherto independent groups of Czibulka and Schönburg.

In the morning of the 17\(^{th}\), Rhemen reinforced Czibulka's Corps with four battalions and the artillery from 6 ID; he ordered them to capture Kosmierzyn and to clear the Russians out of the river bend farther west. 5 ID (FML Habermann), supported by Schönburg's east wing, would move through Koropiec to Heights # 386. This attack against the east wing of Russian XXX Corps

\(^{357}\)Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 53.
was very difficult because of the steep banks along the Dniester, which flowed through a series of many loops and curves; by the evening of the 18th, Rhemen's battle groups reached Koropiec and the end of the Kosmierzyn loop. Despite the danger threatening the Army's eastern wing, Rhemen was ordered to continue his attack on the 19th in full strength. It was hoped that by reaching the line Heights # 386-Potok Zloty he would force XXXIII Russian Corps to abandon its bridgehead at Czernelica. Then 12 battalions would move from the west to the east wing of the Army, where they would join Lehmann's Group on the 22nd.

Although the left wing of 9th Russian Army had been ordered to continue their offensive, the commander Letschitzky had no intention of allowing his right to be driven from the south bank of the Dniester. During the night of 18-19 June he sent XXX Corps to counterattack; it had been reinforced by a divisions which had been moving toward the Bessarabian front, but then was hastily brought back by truck from Buczacz. The Russians recovered Kosmierzyn from Czibulka's Group in the morning of the 19th. Also during the night, the k.u.k. 15 ID had tried to attack through Koropiec but was unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties from the start of the action.

There was also heavy fighting on the eastern front during the night. XI Corps defeated the Russians with heavy losses. Just south of the Dniester, however, parts of III Cavalry Corps broke through 6 CD and reached the line of its artillery. A counterattack in the morning drove them back out of the position.

The results of this eventful night had clearly indicated:
. That the attacking strength of Rhemen's Corps was exhausted because of the heavy casualties and a shortage of ammunition, and
. That quick movement of troops to help the Army's eastern front could no longer be postponed.

On the evening of 19 June, new Russian attacks on Czibulka's Group were repulsed only with great difficulty; early on the 20th, therefore, the HQ of 7th Army ordered Rhemen's Corps to halt their offensive. 6 ID (with 12 battalions) would be pulled into the Army's reserve at Jezierzany, and placed once more under Schönburg. His former group - which now had 8 battalions and 5 batteries - was given to GM Weiss-Mainprugg, the commander of 9

---

358On 16 and 17 June, about 6000 badly wounded men from Rhemen's Corps were in the rear-area hospitals. Between 5 and 19 June the 7th Army had lost 5000 dead and 12,000 wounded. There were also hundreds more wounded men in the Army's field hospitals.
Inf Bde. FML Benigni took over from FML Lehmann the command over the corps-sized group in the Army's northeast corner, which had grown to 14 cavalry regiments and 15 battalions.

The South Army and Kornhaber's Group from 2nd Army were able to enjoy some rest on the 16th and 17th after their costly actions of the first half of July. The two German divisions from Syrmia began to arrive behind South Army, which was preparing to cross the Dniester shortly. FML Kornhaber pulled most of 51 Hon ID out of the narrow and swampy tongue of land where the Bystrzyca and Tysmienica brooks converge. These troops relieved Col. Rehwald's group, so they could attack on the 18th east of the Tysmienica. Szurmay would join in this operation; he pulled Rehwald closer to the rest of his men and had 38 Hon ID relieve the remnants of 40 Hon ID.

On 18 June, while Böhm-Ermolli's Army was driving the Russians from the west bank of the Wereszyca, FML Kornhaber's Group pushed them out of Horucko. At this point Szurmay had 7 ID, Rehwald's Group, five battalions of German 48 Res ID, 18 Hon ID and 1 CD at the front, with 40 Hon ID and 128 Hon Inf Bde in reserve; he forced the Russians in his sector to also abandon their positions. In the evening the VI Russian Corps held only a few islands of firm ground in the swamps in front of the bridges at Kolodruby, plus rear guard positions along the road leading from Horucko to Zydaczow. 4 CD rode west around the Wielkie Bloto to Rudki, where it was placed at the disposal of 2nd Army.

On the 19th, most of Kornhaber's and Szurmay's troops reached the Dniester, where they found many bridges destroyed. On the next day, 51 Hon ID would move north of the river to join its own (2nd) Army. Linsingen intended to lead the bulk of South Army to north bank on both sides of Zurawno by the 22nd at the latest.

8. The Capture of Lemberg (20-22 June)

a. Measures of the Headquarters

Even before Mackensen's striking group had exerted all its strength to break through from Niemirow to Magierow, the leading figures of the Stavka and of the Southwest Front HQ had met at Cholm to react to their critical situation. To their strategic difficulties - which apparently were compounded by the continuing activity of the Germans in Courland - was added concern for the
internal cohesion of their armies. The Fronts lacked half a million rifles and more than half of their authorized ammunition supply. Replacements for lost weapons were becoming increasingly hard to find. Evil reports about lack of responsibility and corruption in the rear area administrative services and even of treason among prominent personalities poisoned the outlook of both officers and men, as well as their attitudes toward each other. The spirit and determination of the men left so much to be desired that Brussilov had issued a general order that his troops should be forced to hold on by fire from their own machine guns.

Because of the distressing situation and the depressing mood, the Cholm conference decided for the time being to renounce the strategy of offensive warfare which had been the guiding spirit of the Tsar's armies since August 1914. Now the muzhiks would be urged only to defend the soil of their fatherland. The Tsar had already sworn to do this at the beginning of the war in an oath to Our Lady of Kazan, just as his ancestors had in 1812.

In implementing this task, the main concern was the security of the area beyond the Vistula, where the front still extended far to the west and was now threatened from both flanks by allied forces in East Prussia and eastern Galicia. To parry this threat, very strong fortifications would be built on the flanks, while a large number of mobile reserve units would be made available. The areas which received the greatest attention were Grodno-Bialystok in the north and Cholm-Kowel in the south. This decision implied that Lemberg would probably have to be given up. In this case, all units which fell back north to the line Lublin-Cholm-Vladimir Volynsky would come under Alexeiev's command. Ivanov would control only the armies which fell back east toward the Kiev Military District. 359

Thus the decision to abandon eastern Galicia had basically been taken. However, it is understandable that each step by which the decisions of the Cholm conference was implemented had to be forced upon the Grand Duke-Generalissimo and his subordinates by fate. Moreover, the need to evacuate the facilities on the lines of communication and to prepare new defensive positions dictated that the withdrawal should be slow and stubborn.

On the 19th, the Stavka ordered that the right wing of 3rd Army, still stationed in front of the San-Vistula confluence, should pull back over the San. In conjunction with this maneuver, 4th

Army would bend its south wing back to Zawichost, which would make it possible to pull some units into reserve. While these orders were carried out, the troops of Brussilov and Olochov, along with the cavalry divisions posted on their inner wings, would fight with desperate courage on the heights east of the Wereszyca and on the rising ground to the west of the Bug-Styr basin. However, in the following night it became clear that General Katschalinsky's group (XXVIII and VIII Corps) had lost the Rawa Russka-Zolkiew position, exposing the north flank of the Russian lines on the Wereszyca. 8th Army was thus forced to immediately retreat to the trenches at the gates of Lemberg. Early on the 20th, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo ordered all unnecessary military equipment to be evacuated from the Galician capital. At the same time he ordered preparations initiated for the retreat of the Galician armies to the north and east. The Grand Duke was drawing self-evident conclusions from the tense situation. Meanwhile Ivanov was ordering XXIV Corps to counter-attack on the upper Tanew, Katschalinsky's group (which had already withdrawn through Hujce) to advance once more to the Zolkiew-Rawa Russka road, Brussilov's divisions to resist to their last strength along the earthen walls around Lemberg, and Letschitzky on the Front's left wing to reinforce his attacks against Pflanzer. All these measures, however, couldn't alter the situation or the final outcome of the campaign. At best they might win some time.

In the allied camp, ideas were already under consideration in the last few days for continuing the offensive; the capture of Lemberg would be followed by a thrust to the north, between the Bug and Vistula. Just as in August 1914, the wide extension of the Russian lines toward the west practically invited such an attack. Therefore GO Mackensen suggested on 19 June to the k.u.k. high command that his troops shouldn't cross the Lemberg-Rawa Russka road for the time being. Instead the 11th Army would be diverted toward the north, especially since the enemy was apparently retreating the majority of their units in this direction. Teschen agreed, with the reservation that the situation at Zolkiew and on the north wing of 2nd Army would dictate whether some parts of 11th Army might still have to move toward Lemberg. However, the successes won on 20 June induced Conrad to propose in the morning to Pless that most of 11th Army should immediately pivot to the north. Falkenhayn however replied that this maneuver shouldn't be attempted until Lemberg had finally been taken.

On this basis the two Chiefs of Staff issued new orders. The three armies under GO Mackensen (2nd, 4th and 11th) would continue
their offensive to capture the capital city. Szurmay's Group was assigned to 2nd Army. South Army would thrust over the Dniester "into the area east of Lemberg." 7th Army would also cross the river, but it would also have to take measures to ensure the security of its right flank and of Czernowitz.

These orders for the chess board of the Galician battlefield initiated the last phase of the campaign to recover Lemberg, which had been held by the Russians for almost 10 months.

b. The decisive combats around Lemberg

Most of Brussilov's Army was retreating on the morning of 20 June. His south wing went back to the heights east of the Szczerek brook, where it stayed in close contact with the right wing of 11th Russian Army, which had pulled back in front of Szurmay. Brussilov's center withdrew to the west and northwest sectors of the trenches around Lemberg - they occupied the west edge of Sokolniki, the works east of Zimna Woda, the town of Rzesna-Polska, and the high ground stretching east from Brzuchowice between the Peltew and the lower terrain at Dublany. Farther north the Russians held entrenched field works at Zarudce and Zolkiew, from where the line ran north along the railroad to Rawa Russka.

In the center (2nd and 11th Armies)

The 2nd k.u.k. Army pushed energetically against the retreating enemy. The Austro-Hungarians were already harassing the Russian troops leaving their old positions, and thereafter stayed on their heels. In hot pursuit, the V Corps reached the Szczerek sector on the evening of the 20th; on their south wing they were aided by 51 Hon ID, which had crossed the Dniester at Kolodruby. XVIII Corps reached the line Pustomyty-Nawarya-Sokolniki with 1 Lst Inf Bde and 9 ID. Under XIX Corps, 29 ID reached the approaches to the Lemberg defenses at Zimna Woda, while 13 LW ID did the same at Rzesna Polska; 34 ID, at Mszana, had gone into the second line. IV Corps and its three divisions reached Rokitno and the area to the south and southeast; they sent scouting detachments up to the Russian trenches.\textsuperscript{360} The Beskid Corps pushed toward the east; after several rear guard actions they reached the same level as the rest of the Army north of Rokitno.

\textsuperscript{360}TRANSLATOR's NOTE - There are several references to the "three divisions" of IV Corps in this part of the narrative; they refer to 27 and 31 ID plus 43 LW ID. 32 ID was also part of the Corps, but remained in reserve just behind the front throughout the Lemberg operation.
Opposite the south wing of 11th Army, the VIII Russian Corps had taken up a new position on the heights southwest of Glinsko, in front of this town, and on the edge of the woods east of Kunin. Because of the importance of the Zolkiew position to their efforts to retain Lemberg, the Russians sought to hold it by launching several counterattacks. The artillery of XLI Res Corps, advancing toward Glinsko, spent so much effort in fending off these attacks that on the evening of the 20th the Corps was still 800 meters away from the Russian positions. To their north, 39 Hon ID of VI Corps held off a Russian thrust in the afternoon and took 16 officers and 840 men as prisoners. The south wing of 12 ID, advancing east from Kunin, also had to repulse several attacks; the Division's north wing was able to reach the railroad. The Guards, who'd been ordered to stay along the railroad, fought several small engagements with detachments of Kaschtalinsky's Group, which had withdrawn but now was returning to the scene. The corps which Mackensen had sent north dug in on the heights south of Rawa Russka and on the line Potylicz-Brusno; Rawa Russka was occupied by the advance guards of XXII Res Corps. 11 Hon CD rode behind VI Corps, and was prepared to pursue the Russians through Zolkiew toward Mosty Wielki. 22 German ID was taken from 4th Army and placed behind the left wing of the 11th.

New Russian resistance on the heights east of the Szczerek brook and at Nawarya made it impossible for the k.u.k. XVIII Corps to pivot against Lemberg's southern front on the 21st. This Corps, like the V Corps to its left, had to continue attacking toward the east. At the same time FML Szurmay's Group, which now had returned to the control of 2nd Army, was readying 128 Hon Inf Bde and 40 Hon ID to cross the Dniester upstream from Zydaczow; also, Szurmay was sending 7 ID and Col. Rehwald's Group through Kolodruby to Humieniec, where they would be placed at the disposal of V Corps.

On the 21st, V Corps broke into the enemy lines southwest of Mikolajow and south and northeast of the Szczerek, but without winning a decisive success. Because of heavy fire from the artillery in the Lemberg defenses, coming in part from the flank, XVIII Corps was only able to make limited advances. XIX Corps, covered on its south flank by half of 34 ID, worked its way forward as close to the Russian positions as its own artillery bombardment would permit. In the evening of the 21st, the 43 LW ID of IV Corps dug in just in front of the barbed wire covering the work at Brzuchowice. The other two divisions of IV Corps (27 and 31 ID) were able to capture several trenches in the low
ground stretching from Brzuchowice toward the northeast. The Beskid and XLI Res Corps sought to gain ground through Zolkiew, which was of special significance for the course of the fighting at Lemberg; if they were successful, the city would be outflanked from the north as well as from the south, and Brussilov's position would become untenable. However, the advance of the two German corps didn't meet the expectations of the impatient high-level commanders. At Zarudce and the Glinsko Heights the XVII and VIII Russian Corps fought with the greatest stubbornness and forced the attackers to pay for every foot of soil with bloody casualties. In the evening the Germans were still west of Kulikow and Zolkiew.

Following the orders of their Army commander, Mackensen's shock group didn't advance over the Zolkiew-Rawa Russka road. Kaschtalinsky's Group returned to this sector on Brussilov's right wing, and re-occupied the positions east of Rawa Russka which they had previously abandoned. The 12 ID of Arz's Corps noticed that enemy resistance increased in the woods south of Dobrosin; nevertheless, they advanced up to the highway along their entire front.

In the afternoon, the heavy artillery began to fire on the earthworks in front of Lemberg. The bombardment was scheduled to end at 4:00 AM on the 22nd so that the infantry could attack at the discretion of their corps commanders.

The armies on the allied wings

Meanwhile Pflanzer's Army on the extreme right wing of the Galician front was again enduring difficult days. The enemy, who was already attacking at Kosmierzyn, also began to attack at Zaleszczyki on the 20th. The Russians suffered heavy casualties and didn't gain any ground. On the 21st the fighting slackened off markedly at both locations. On the other hand, the Army's eastern front had to fend off heavier Russian assaults on the night before; in the morning hours of the 21st the III Cavalry Corps broke into FML Benigni's lines and forced him to pull his right wing back somewhat. Now the transfer of troops from Rhemen's Corps to Benigni, already prepared, was ordered to begin. However, a new attack by XXX Russian Corps compelled Czibulka to give up Kosmierzyn and delayed the release of the battalions for Benigni.

In the night of 21-22 June, Rhemen's troops - with ranks diminished and suffering from exhaustion after two weeks of unending action - once again had to prove their skill in hand-to-
hand fighting along the bends in the Dniester. However, the anticipated simultaneous Russian attack on Pflanzer's eastern front didn't materialize, except for local thrusts at the Polish Legion and the Domobranen. Early on the 22nd, when 6 ID with its commander FML Schönburg joined Benigni (leaving 12 Inf Bde behind at Jezierzany), the storm against 7th Army was already subsiding. With some justification, the high command had already enquired on the 20th whether the Army might be able to again take the offensive north of the Dniester in a few days.

The South Army wasn't directly involved in the fighting to their right or left. They prepared for the Dniester crossing which was scheduled for the night of 22-23 June. Now they planned to not only attack on both sides of Zurawno, but also between that town and Halicz.

While the fate of the Galician capital was being contested, the k.u.k. IX Corps of 4th Army, which had already been sorely tested, once more endured several critical hours. To their right, the XVII Corps strove in vain between the 20th and 22nd to seize the heights at Zukow. Similarly, the right wing of IX Corps' 10 ID wasn't able to win any ground at Lubliniec. In the night of 20-21 June, three regiments of XXIV Russian Corps fell upon the left wing of 10 ID and upon Szende's Brigade, and pushed them back from the Tanew. This awoke memories of Sieniawa at Army HQ. They gave IX Corps the 21 LW ID, most of which would launch a counterattack, and also moved 41 Hon ID into the area south of Tarnogrod. HQ also ordered XIV Corps to assemble a group as quickly as possible behind its east wing, so that it could immediately move east of the San. The actions at Osuchy [Osuchi] lasted throughout the 21st, but ended that night when the Russians had to once more evacuate all of the south bank of the Tanew. In the evening of the 22nd it was learned from Russian broadcasts that the HQ of the four corps opposite the left wing of 4th Army and opposite 1st Army would be pulling back; this was a sign that the enemy was going to evacuate the sector at the mouth of the San, as had already been envisioned by the Stavka on the 19th. Even more significant for the entire northern front of Mackensen's Army Group was the report received 24 hours previously that Ivanov was moving his HQ from Cholm back to Rovno.

The advance into Lemberg

In the night of 21-2 June, the Russians evacuated the key point of the most recent battle, the heights west of Zolkiew, and withdrew into the extensive woods east of this town. On the next
morning, Kaschtalinsky's Group once more pulled back from the road and railroad between Zolkiew and Rawa Russka. XLI Res Corps and the k.u.k. VI Corps immediately started to pursue. The Beskid Corps, however, had to take the positions west of Kulikow at dawn by storm. After finally capturing Kulikow itself, the Germans pushed across the Lemberg highway toward Zoltance.

At the same time, the Corps of Schmidt-Georgenegg and Trollmann were fighting their way toward the capital city. The decisive blow was struck by the two Viennese LW IR (# 1 and 24), which stormed the work at Rzesna Polska (Point 320) in spite of heavy casualties. Then the Landwehr pushed ahead on both sides of the road to Lemberg. On their left flank, 43 LW ID of IV Corps took Brzuchowice (Point 348) around 9:00 AM; the Bohemian 29 ID took the Sknilow work (Point 322) southwest of Lemberg around 10:30. Soon afterwards the "German Kaiser" IR # 34 (from Kaschau in north Hungary) broke into the enemy defenses on the Lysa Gora east of Brzuchowice. The half circle of works that covered the capital city of Galicia toward the northwest, west and southwest had been taken in several actions, some of them quite bloody.

Meanwhile the loss of Zolkiew and Kulikow had forced Brussilov, the commander of the enemy Army, to issue orders several hours earlier for the divisions defending Lemberg to evacuate the city. Soon after noon the first Aus-Hung. cavalry patrols rode into Lemberg from the west while the last Russians were leaving the city toward the east.

Now the enemy could no longer hold their ground south of Lemberg, where there was still bitter fighting in the morning on the heights east of Szczerzec and at Sokolniki. Around noon it was learned from Russian broadcasts that Brussilov and Shcherbatchev were about to break off the battle here. Böhm-Ermolli ordered XIX Corps, which had driven into Lemberg, to immediately send strong detachments on the road to Bobrka, thus doing as much damage as possible to Brussilov's south wing. IV Corps to the northwest of Lemberg would guard the north flank of the XIXth. As evening fell, the two southern corps camped on the Mikolajow-Lemberg road. GM Berndt's cavalry group (4 CD and 1 Lst Huss Bde) were ready to take up the pursuit in the next morning. XIX

362 Bonch-Bruevitch, Vol. II, p. 226. Zayontschovsky (p. 308) reports that Brussilov had already issued the evacuation order on the evening of the 21st, but this must be an error since in the order Brussilov himself stated that it was caused by the retreat of his right wing from the key positions at Zolkiew and Kulikow.
and IV Corps posted pickets on the line Dzwinogrod-Gaje-Barszczowice and on the heights west of Jaryczow-Nowy. The Beskid Corps was still fighting around the heights at Zoltance. The right wing of 11th Army followed the retreating enemy in the forests east of Zolkiew, in the area south of Turynka and up to Zameczek. 11 Hon CD, which had been sent to Mosty Wielki, sharply attacked an enemy group at Turynka in the afternoon. The Russians fell back toward Bojaniec, and were again defeated in the night at Derewnia. The left wing of German 11th Army was able to advance its lines at Bursno Str.

The order of battle of the allied forces from Warsaw to the south was as follows at the end of 22 June (from left to right): 363

9th German Army - III Res, XVIII, XXV, Posen, XI Corps
Woyrsch's Army - Kovess' k.u.k. Group, German LW Corps
1st Army - II, I Corps
4th Army - VIII, XIV, X, IX, XVII Corps
11th German Army - Stein's Combined, X, XXII Res, Guard, VI k.u.k., XLI Res, Beskid Corps
2nd Army - IV, XIX, XVIII, V, Szurmay's Corps
South Army - Bothmer's, X Res, Gerok's, Hofmann's, Marschall's Corps
7th Army - XIII, Czibulka's, III, Benigni's, XI Corps

At 4:00 PM, GdK Böhm-Ermolli with his immediate staff entered Lemberg, where he was greeted with genuine enthusiasm. Only a relatively small part of the population had collaborated with the Russians. Emperor Franz Joseph expressly ordered that there was to be no "formal prosecution" of such lapses. Most of the inhabitants of Lemberg, especially after the pan-Slav Count Bobrinski became its governor, had suffered during the occupation. They breathed more easily when the last representatives of the Ochrana (the Russian secret police) left the city.

The psychological results of the recovery of Lemberg were even more significant than its considerable military importance. This was clearly evident in the interior of the Monarchy. From Bregenz to Czernowitz, and from Lake Constance to Cattaro, the citizens gained new confidence from this victory. Even those whose loyalty had been wavering now began to seek a new accommodation with the state. They recognized that it offered them cultural and economic advantages even if they were denied national independence. The capture of Lemberg made a deep impression in the Balkans, where the Serbs finally renounced

363TRANSLATOR's NOTE - This information appears in Beilage 25 of the original text.
whatever plans for taking the offensive which they'd been nurturing. The advocates of neutrality gained the upper hand in Romania and Greece. Bulgaria resumed negotiations aimed at an alliance with the Central Powers. The event also brought some relief to the Turks during their defense of the Dardanelles, since the units which the Russians assembled at Odessa had to be shipped to Galicia instead of landing on the Bosporus to assist the English and French at Gallipoli.

The successful commanders of both allied armies, who had already won a series of distinctions from their Emperors in the last few weeks, now received additional rewards. GdI Conrad was promoted to Generaloberst, GO Mackensen to Generalfeldmarschall. However, no one could rest on the laurels won on 22 June. The faint hopes of peace which had recently emerged at Pless and Teschen remained unfulfilled. Around this time, when the Chief of Staff visited Vienna to brief Emperor-King Franz Joseph, the aged monarch told him that the Russians had no intention of giving up the game and abandoning their allies. Thus on the evening of the 22nd orders were issued to continue the campaign, which would bring the allies over the central Vistula and into Volhynia.
I. First Actions on the Southwestern Front

1. Plans of campaign

a. Austria-Hungary

On 23 May 1915, Italy's ambassador came to the Ballhausplatz to deliver his government's declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy. The aged Emperor-King Franz Joseph announced this development to his peoples in words expressing the greatest indignation:

"The King of Italy has declared war on me. The Kingdom of Italy has committed a treachery against its two allies which is unparalleled in history. After an alliance of more than 30 years - during which it increased its territory and experienced great prosperity - Italy has abandoned us in the hour of danger and gone over to the camp of our enemies with flags flying."

He went on to say that the new enemy in the south had actually been an old antagonist of the Monarchy in the past:

"The great memories of Novara, Mortara, Custozza and Lissa, which constitute the pride of my youth, and the spirit of Radetzky, Archduke Albrecht and Tegetthoff, which lives on in my Army and Navy, make me confident that we will also defend the southern borders of the Monarchy with success."

This unusual proclamation of the ruler reflected not only the feelings of the official circles of Austria-Hungary, but also those of the vast majority of its 50 million citizens. The Germans of Austria saw that the original territories of the Monarchy and the Alpine lands were directly threatened; the allies of yesterday were stretching greedy hands not only toward Trieste and Trent, but also toward Bozen which had been German-speaking since the start of the Middle Ages. Although the Magyars had old national connections with Italy, to which Stephan Tisza had referred in a final diplomatic attempt to get Italy to change its course at the eleventh hour,\(^\text{364}\) they were upset by the Italians' deliberate betrayal at a time when the Russians had advanced to the Carpathian watershed. The South Slavs almost to a man turned against the new enemy, who was competing against the Slovenes in the lands on the Isonzo and against the Croats along the Dalmatian coast by seeking to separate them from their

brethren inland from the Adriatic. While the South Slavs at home expressed their indignation, the emigrant politicians who had fled to London and Paris were deeply disappointed by the London Treaty of 26 April (which had promised Italy dominion over Slavic-speaking territories). One of the emigrants complained a few weeks after the start of the Italian war that "Our regiments are fighting on the Isonzo like lions." The example of their South Slav brethren had an effect on the northern Slavs, even including the Czechs. A March battalion of the Prague IR # 28, which had stayed in service after the dissolution of its parent regiment, fought so well in the second Battle of the Isonzo that its deeds led eventually to the rebuilding of the Prague regiment.\footnote{However, the battalion in question did include some German-speaking troops and was led mostly by German-speaking officers.} Thus in the Pentecost season on the Isonzo and in the mountains of Tyrol and Carinthia, Grillparzer's statement about Radetzky's Army was proven true for the last time: "In your camp is Austria."

The determination with which Austria-Hungary faced its new foe was reinforced by the favorable turn which the fighting had taken in the northeast – against Russia – in the last three weeks. However, there was no doubt that the entry of Italy into the war had significantly impaired the general situation of the Monarchy. This was true of political and economic affairs as well as in a military sense. The Aus-Hung. high command estimated that the Italians had 44 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions, which was only a slight exaggeration. Regardless of the actual number of troops which the enemy deployed, the Habsburg Monarchy could oppose them with only a fraction of the total. At the hour when war was declared, there were 128 battalions on the border (mostly of second-line troops), while 94 battalions were approaching to provide the initial reinforcements. On the other side, the Italians had been busily preparing for months and were expected to immediately attack. Thus the Danube Monarchy and its armed fores, which had already been fighting for nine months, faced a situation that had scarcely any precedent in world history. When Victor Emmanuel's soldiers spoke of a "stroll to Vienna", they weren't just uttering empty words.

In Teschen, the staff expected that the Italians would commit 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions plus 10 Alpini battalions as the main striking group on the front in the coastal lands. There would be 2 ½ divisions and 15 Alpini battalions on the Carinthian border, 3 divisions in Cadore, 9 ¼ divisions opposite the south Tyrol bastion, and 2 cavalry divisions between the Tagliamento and the Livenza. As was later established, this estimate of the
situation on the border was rather close to reality. Of the remaining 16 Italian divisions, the k.u.k. General Staff believed that 7 were at Ancona, Bari and Brindisi for operations over the sea, while 2 were on the Swiss border and 2 more in Libya. There was no theory regarding the disposition of the other 5 divisions. Based on these calculations, on 28 May the AOK ordered the commander of the Southwest Front "to defend Tyrol to the utmost with the troops to be found there, to oppose the enemy invasion of Carinthia, the coast lands and Carniola while conceding the smallest possible amount of ground, and eventually to strike back with as strong a blow as possible." Because the fighting in central Galicia was still undecided, the high command declined to make definite promises about further reinforcements. The message went on to exhort Archduke Eugene "to win time by the defensive measures we are ordering, to weaken the enemy and to avoid any unnecessary loss of ground." The commander of the units deployed against Italy was responsible for the detailed planning needed to carry out this difficult assignment.

b. Italy

In spring 1915 the Italian war party had gained greater confidence in their army's readiness. At this point General Cadorna felt obliged to put his guidelines for the upcoming campaign, which had been given to the higher level HQ in September 1914, in more concrete form. However, he retained his original general conception. New mobilization measures had been in effect since 1 March, but as of 1 April most of the army was still stationed in its peacetime garrisons. Now, while hasty diplomatic negotiations between Rome and Vienna were still going on, he published the following revised orders for the Army commanders:

- 1st Army (under G.Lt Brusati) had III (Milan) Corps, a reinforced brigade from the Verona garrison, and V (Verona) Corps. They would deploy around the Tyrol border from the Stilfser Joch to the Cismon valley (inclusive). They would stay on the defenses not only during the first days of the campaign, but also as long as 4th Army was operating from Cadore against Toblach. Cadorna believed that the Austrians might attack out of Tyrol; therefore, even local attacks onto enemy soil should only be undertaken to improve the defensive positions on the border.

. 4th Army (under G.Lt Nava) had IX (Rome) Corps and Ist (Turin) Corps. It would deploy between the Cismon valley and Mt Peralba. They would attack the enemy border posts at Sexten, Landro and Tre Sassi; their ultimate objective was the Toblach area and the heights around the Sella.

. The Carnic Group (under G.Lt Lequio) had two brigades from XII (Palermo) Corps plus 16 Alpini and 3 Finance Watch battalions. It would deploy between Mt Peralba and Mt Maggiore to cover the approach of 2nd and 3rd Armies to the front; its first attack would be directed against the border positions at Malborgheth, Raibl and Predil.

. 2nd Army (under G.Lt Frugoni) had IV (Genoa), II (Alessandria) and VI (Bologna Corps) plus a combined Bersaglieri Division and two Alpini Groups. It would deploy between Mt Maggiore and the Cormons-Görz road; its first mission was to cross the Isonzo at Caporetto [Karfreit] and, if possible, to capture the Kolowrat Ridge and the Korada.

. 3rd Army (under G.Lt the Duke of Aosta) had X (Naples), XI (Bari) and VII (Ancona) Corps plus the cavalry divisions. It would deploy between the Cormons-Görz road and the Adriatic Sea; in conjunction with 2nd Army it would capture the heights at Medea and the bridges over the Isonzo at Pieris.

The Italian high command explicitly insisted that after hostilities began there should be no attacks on Austrian soil until sufficient troops were available on the scene. Cadorna's HQ was still burdened by the imaginary threat of a surprise Aus-Hung. offensive before the Italians were themselves ready to strike a blow. If such an offensive did occur, the Carnic Group and the two armies on the right wing (2nd and 3rd) would hold the line Mt Peralba-Mt Maggiore-Mt Matajur-Cividale-Campoformido and then south to the sea.

The high command designated VIII (Florence) Corps as a strategic reserve, along with the new XIII and XIV Corps, created from reserve divisions. They would be placed on the outlets from the valley east of the Adige; later, when the situation warranted, they would join the principal attacking group on the Isonzo.

When the initial Italian deployment was in full swing, Cadorna released his first operational order on 16 May. The Carnic Group and 2nd and 3rd Armies were instructed to be ready to launch their attack against the Carinthian border works and the Isonzo bridges as soon as they received the go-ahead by telegraph. In this
first phase, 2nd and 3rd Armies were supposed to seize the Caporetto basin, the mountains of Krn and Mrzli vrh, the Kolowrat basin, the Jezia, Korada, Mt Quarin, Mt Medea and finally the line from the Torrente Torre through Judrio to the lower course of the Isonzo. Although Cadorna intended this action to be an energetic surprise invasion, the first goals were very restricted; downstream from Tolmein they were all still on the west bank of the Isonzo. After this first movement, he was prepared to immediately advance over the Isonzo only if there was no determined resistance. In this event, 2nd Army would push onto the plateau of Bainsizza; 3rd Army, following in echelon on the right, would take the Görz basin and the high ground at Comen. There was some discussion of a plan for landing troops from four old cruisers in the Bay of Trieste to support the right wing of 3rd Army. However, disturbing rumors regarding a mine barrier laid by the Austrians kept the Italians from implementing this idea. On 16 May, the 4th Army was once again told to invade the Puster valley.

General mobilization was ordered on 22 May. In practice, this meant that the necessary horses and vehicles began to assemble. On the same day, the Italian high command at Rome sent messages by wire to open hostilities in the middle of the night of 23-24 May. At this hour the army was far from fully ready for battle; almost half of the divisions and large parts of the supply trains were either journeying to the front or even still at their mobilization points. At the last moment there were some changes to the composition of the individual Armies - VI Corps was reassigned from 2nd to 3rd Army; in its place the 2nd received XII Corps (of just two brigades) and X Corps. 3 and 4 CD would be placed in reserve behind 2nd Army.

It was very fortunate for the Central Powers that Italy didn't enter the war until three weeks after Gorlice. Moreover, the fact that the Apennine Kingdom had waited until the last day allowed by the treaty of London to open the fighting was justly regarded by the Entente - especially Russia - as a serious drawback. The impatience of Italy's new allies would only increase for the next few weeks before a major clash of arms finally developed. In the meantime there was merely a series of border actions, none of which had any decisive consequence or significant impact on the general course of the war.

2. Border actions in Tyrol, May and June 1915
a. Operational expectations and measures on both sides

The mountains on the border of south Tyrol on both sides of the Adige extended like a wedge into the plains of upper Italy. They provided an ideal base for a sortie against the two main railroads on which Italian troops were sent to Venetia during mobilization; in some places the border was only a day's march from the foot of the mountains. The greatest menace to the Italians seemed to be from the plateau of Folgaria (Vielegereut)-Lavarone (Lafraun); this area, a relatively good point to assemble troops, was only 100 km from Venice.

Cadorna decided to confront this danger by deploying more than a third of his forces against Tyrol, and by holding back a strong strategic reserve at the beginning in the Verona-Vicezna-Bassano area. Thus the Italians faced Tyrol on three sides in a semi-circle, presenting quite a challenge to the defenders. The most sensitive point was the Toblach area, where the vital railroad in the Puster valley was just 12 km from the border.

The Austrians had decided to shorten their front by giving up the most forward parts of the 450-km long border and by basing their defense on the line of permanent fortifications and along the watershed of the Fassaner Alps; this saved about 100 km. As Conrad had always intended, this made all of south Tyrol a large fortress. The troops on the western side would remain completely on the defensive; those in the south and east would have the opportunity to counterattack if the opportunity arose. The major fortress at Trent backed up the front line.

The nature of the terrain, and thus of the possible invasion routes, was the basis of the division of south Tyrol into five defensive regions. The following narratives will trace the course of events by region. The troops of Region I were responsible for defense of the high mountains between the Swiss border and the Ortler Pass, especially the road through the Stilfser Joch. Farther south, as far as the Presanella area, the garrison of Region II covered the border and the Tonale Pass. In Region III - later called the "South Tyrol" Region - the numerous roads leading to Trent between the Chiesa and Sugana valleys had to be blocked. The lines of Region IV ran along the crest of the Fassaner Alps, and those of Region V through the Dolomites up to the Carinthian border.

The backbone of the defenders was a group of garrison detachments in the border fortifications; they were from the three Landes-Schützen Regiments, local units specially trained for mountain
warfare. Ahead of the defensive front and up to the frontier there were watch posts manned by the police and customs guards, reinforced by local Landsturm troops. Each post had 20 to 30 men. Most of the March and Landsturm battalions organized in brigades were made up of soldiers from the Alpine lands; the Reserve battalions of IR # 29 and 37, on the other hand, were from the Hungarian plains. The Stand-Schützen Battalions were created after their personnel were called up for service on 19 May. Their ranks were filled by young men under age 18 and old ones over 45, who enthusiastically answered the summons to help defend the soil of the homeland. They were true to the traditions of their glorious forebears of 1809. Although the Stand-Schützen were trained in marksmanship, they otherwise had no military background.

On 23 May the Tyrol Land Defense HQ controlled 27 ½ battalions, 39 Stand-Schützen Battalions, 8 Landes-Schützen detachments, 1 ½ squadrons, 22 mobile batteries (75 guns), and 540 pieces of stationary artillery. There were 110 riflemen per kilometer of front. The only unit capable of offensive operations began to arrive in Tyrol by rail on 25 May. This was the German Alpenkorps (under G Lt Krafft von Delmensingen), a division-sized force that was trained for mountain warfare and composed mostly of veteran Bavarian troops.

On 25 May the former commander of 1st Army, GdK Dankl, took over the Tyrol Land HQ.

When GdK Dankl was entrusted with his new command at Teschen on 23 May, he immediately decided to defend the area by attacking when possible. Thus the March, Landsturm and Stand-Schützen Battalions would occupy the foremost positions, while the German Alpenkorps, after its arrival, would provide a mobile group for counterattacks. The enemy's two most probable objectives were the Puster valley (for strategic reasons) and Trent (for political reasons). The Alpenkorps would deploy in the area Bruneck-Brixen-Bozen-Auer, one day's march from both Bruneck and Trent; thus it could be used in either of the threatened sectors.

As will be noted below, the Italian advance was very hesitant and systematic; their units moved together, so that none were left in isolation. This made it very difficult at the beginning to determine which part of their front would be most vulnerable to a counterattack. At first Dankl had favored a thrust from the

---

367Based on correspondence by GO Dankl with the Military Archives, 13 August 1930. See also Steinitz, "Errinnerungen an Franz Joseph I" (Berlin, 1931), p. 336; Pastor, "Viktor Dankl" (Freiburg, 1916), pp. 62 ff.
Dolomite front toward the south. He changed his mind when the advance of four enemy groups on 28 May - one each against Folgaria-Lavarone, in the Sugana valley, against the Fassa valley and against the Puster valley - seemed to become dangerous. Dankl was concerned that he would lose his freedom of action as his units were pushed back step by step; he felt that a counter-thrust was necessary. Since the enemy units at Cortina d'Ampezzo had halted, Dankl decided to have the Alpenkorps attack east from the Fassa valley before he turned his attention to the enemy units threatening the fortifications at Folgaria-Lavarone. Thus he would advance the defensive front to a line running from Rolle Pass through the Pellegrino Ridge and Marmolata to the hamlet of Cherz, and recover the Arabba-Pordoi joch road which would improve communications between Regions IV and V. Part of this new line would lie on the Italian side of the border.

The German OHL, notified of Dankl's plans, issued an order to the Alpenkorps on 4 June that "German soldiers should not enter Italy at the present time" and that "in any clash between German and Italian troops in Tyrol measures must be taken to ensure that the Italians are the attackers." Since the retention of south Tyrol as protection for Bavaria was in Germany's interest, this order at first glance seems hardly comprehensible. However, Germany was not at war with Italy and didn't want to lose the advantages of trading with the Appenine Kingdom through Switzerland. The AOK was obliged to agree with this German order, and justified it to their own subordinates on the grounds that "if Germany opened hostilities [with Italy], Romania would be obliged by treaty to intervene against us."

This restriction placed the Tyrol Defense HQ in a predicament that they very bitterly resented. GdK Dankl now understandably inferred that the Germans would defend the line of the Brenner Pass, which led directly to their own country, but wouldn't fight to defend south Tyrol. He asked that the (Innsbruck) k.u.k. XIV Corps be sent to replace the Alpenkorps so that his operations wouldn't be restricted. Because of the situation on the Russian front, however, the AOK was not able to transfer XIV Corps, so Dankl would have to remain strictly on the defensive.

**Italian planning**

Of the two Italian armies opposite south Tyrol, General Brusati's 1st Army (6 ½ infantry divisions, 4 Bersaglieri regiments, 16 Alpini and 6 border guard battalions) had a purely defensive role. As mentioned above, the 4th Army (5 infantry divisions plus 6 Alpini, 3 Bersaglieri and 1 border battalion) had already
been instructed to attack toward Toblach. On 22 May the Italian high command instructed this Army to seize important strategic points on the other side of the border immediately after the start of hostilities; these points would serve as starting points for the main attack. The commander of Ist Corps, however, declined to cross the border. The commander of IX Corps suggested several goals, but the leader of 4th Army (General Nava) only approved the capture of the S. Pellegrino Pass and the mountain crossing east of Valazza; both of these positions lay well ahead of the Austrian line of defenses. Nava apparently feared that by seizing too many positions he would prematurely reveal the direction of his later offensive and ruin any chance for a surprise. Also, he felt his forces were too weak at the moment for this operation. He was thus throwing away a brief opportunity to break through the thinly-held Dolomite front toward Toblach.

On the first day of the war, the two left-wing Italian Armies (1st and 4th) had 190,000 riflemen (not counting nearby reserves under supreme HQ) to confront just 50,000 troops defending Tyrol. Nonetheless, the Italians stayed on the defensive, just as the Austrians did, and in the beginning refrained from any significant operations. Since the Austrians were inactive, the Italian high command theorized that their opponents either couldn't or wouldn't offer any serious resistance. After hearing similar reports from the coast lands, on 27 May Cadorna ordered all his Army commanders to take advantage of any opportunity to give their operations a decisive character, and to quickly take any positions which they enemy wasn't earnestly defending. Cadorna's orders ended with an exhortation: "Energy, offensive spirit, and achievement of moral superiority over the enemy!" Since the Armies on the Italian right soon came to a halt in front of the Austrian Isonzo front, this order could only be carried out by 1st and 4th Armies, as the Italian official history notes. The 1st Army was already in motion in several sectors, but the troops were instructed only to quickly seize points which were suitable for long-term defensive holding.

b. Events on the west front of Tyrol and in the "South Tyrol" District

368Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, P. 63
369The total of 50,000 doesn't include the German Alpenkorps, or several march battalions that arrived after the war started.
Districts I and II

The snow was still very deep at the end of May in the very high mountains near the Swiss border. Therefore the five Alpini battalions and three mountain batteries opposite the Stilfser Joch and Tonale Pass were instructed at first to be content with occupying a line 3 to 4 km west of the border, along which lay the Ortler massif, covered with eternal ice and snow. Advance guards would occupy Mt Scorluzzo, which dominated the road over the Stilfser Joch (only free of snow during July and August), and would block several foot paths leading to the mountain gap. In the Tonale area, the Italians would occupy the portions of the border ridge north and south of the Pass that were free of glaciers. An infantry regiment at Tirano would serve as a back-up.

On the Austrian side, the 53 Half Bde stationed in District I had to watch the Münster valley as well as the Suldenbach valley, since it wasn't clear that Italy would respect the neutrality of Switzerland. Old Fort Nauders blocked the route leading into the Inn valley. Another consideration was that any artillery fired against the Italians shouldn't land on neutral Swiss territory. These factors, as well as the high level of the snow, led to the initial deployment of groups directly behind the borders, on the line Taufers-Schafberg-Gomagoi blockhouse-Innersulden-Firkelescharte.

There were no actions in the Ortler area in May. On 4 June however, an Austrian gendarme detachment seized Mt Scorluzzo, on the Italian side of the border, in a bold thrust. This made the Stilfser Joch secure. Since Swiss troops were guarding their own border, there was no longer any danger that the Italians could advance through Taufers. Therefore the entire defensive front was moved forward to the much higher line running from the Stilfser Joch through Mt Scorluzzo to the Nagler summit. There was no enemy opposition. The new line was held until the end of the war. 371

In District II, the 54 Half Bde blocked Val del Monte and Val di Sole, based on the old work at Pejo and the partly-modernized group of forts at Tonale. The Italians made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Paradiso Pass (south of Tonale) on 9 June; otherwise there were no actions in May or June.

The report that German troops had arrived in Tyrol caused 1st

371Lempruch, "Der König der deutschen Alpen and seine Helden" (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 13 ff.
Army HQ to fear that their opponents would attack into the upper Adda and Oglio valleys. Therefore on 5 June they moved the HQ of 5 ID and a second infantry regiment to Edolo.\textsuperscript{372}

**District III**

The important "South Tyrol" District, with its numerous potential invasion routes running together at Trent, was defended by 91 ID. The Division was originally led by FML Edl. von Guseck, the Trent fortress commander. After Dankl arrived at Innsbruck, FML Koennen-Horak took over the command of District III.

Between the Adamello group of mountains and Lake Garda, the routes into Judicarien were defended by 50 Half Bde and the garrison of the Riva fortress. The narrow mountain paths that crossed the glaciers of the Adamello massif and came together in the Val di Genova only had to be observed. Farther south, however, a more or less continuous line of defenses was needed along the slopes of the Val di Daone; the key position was the modern work at Lardaro. To the east, the line then formed an arc around the Val di Concei, blocking a possible thrust from Storo to the northeast. The Riva fortress had been strengthened during the winter (which in this area was mild) by its energetic commander GM Schiesser. It blocked the enemy from landing on the north shore of Lake Garda and from advancing up the Sarca valley.

6 Italian ID, although reinforced by the 7\textsuperscript{th} Bersaglieri Regt and three Alpini bns, advanced with extreme caution between Mt Listino and Lake Garda. The invaders were content to occupy heights along the border which had been voluntarily relinquished by the defenders - these were southwest of Val Daone, of Condino, and of the southern slope of the Val Ampola and the Valle di Ledro. Since the Italians remained at a considerable distance, 50 Half Bde and the Riva garrison had a welcome opportunity to further strengthen their defensive lines without interference.

The defense of the Adige [Etsch] valley was entrusted to 181 Inf Bde. For this purpose it took up a position on both sides of the south edge of Rovereto. The Italians in the sector between Lake Garda and the Vallarsa - a brigade from the Verona garrison and parts of 9 ID - advanced just as cautiously as 6 ID on the other side of the Lake. The faint-heartedness of the advancing troops was well illustrated on 27 May, the fourth day of the war, when 170 Austrian gendarmes and Landsturm men held off two enemy battalions and a battery for the entire day at Ala, which was just 10 km from the border. The Italians finally came within

\textsuperscript{372}Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 144
artillery range of the Austrian position in the Adige valley on 5 June, and then dug themselves in.

Events were considerably livelier on the Folgaria-Lavarone palteau, where our works lay within range of the guns on the Italian border. Since the Austrian forts had been designed merely to temporarily guard the area as a base for an offensive, their protective armor and weapons were considerably inferior to the Italian forts they faced. Originally the 51 Half Bde was supposed to be the mobile defense force for the plateau, but it transferred to the Dolomites. On 28 May the 181 Inf Bde came up from Innsbruck to take over this task.

The Italian V Corps deployed most of 9 ID and half of 34 ID, along with four Alpini battalions, against the fortified plateau. They wouldn't be assigned specific objectives until the forts were silenced by the Italian artillery.\(^{373}\)

The guns in the Italian forts opened fire on 24 May, and on the next day their bombardment mounted to a great intensity. The forts east of Lavarone were especially hard hit by 15 cm and 28 cm shells, as was the fort at Serrada. Heavy damage impaired the effectiveness of the works, which could only be partly repaired during the night with great toil. There was a critical moment on 28 May when the commander of the work at Lusern had a moment of weakness and hoisted a white flag. However, artillery fire from the neighboring works and the energetic intervention of the commander of the mobile troops soon ended the danger that Lusern would be surrendered unnecessarily.

After six days of bombardment, the Italians launched their infantry attack. Parts of 34 ID made the first thrust on 30 May in the Verle-C. di Vezzena sector; they were fended off by the heroic resistance of the Tyrol Landsturm and Stand-Schützen, ably supported by the artillery of the forts. The enemy in this area remained active in early June and tried to inch closer to our works, hoping to stop the anticipated Aus-Hung. counter-thrust before it reached the zone of the Italians' own fortifications.\(^{374}\)

The arrival of heavy artillery, including a 30.5 cm mortar battery, enabled 180 Inf Bde in June to maintain an effective counter-fire against the group of Italian works on Campomolon and Mt Toraro. The enemy fire slackened off, which allowed the defenders to extend their field positions in front of the forts at Lavarone. Thus we were able to move our position forward in

\(^{373}\)Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 147
\(^{374}\)Tosti, p. 117
the only sector in which the Italians had made a serious attack.

The relatively wide Sugana valley was blocked by a position which bent back considerably toward the west and was established between the field works at Sommo and the old blockhouses at Tenna and Colle delle bcene; there was also a line on the heights running to the Kreuzspitz. However, the 15 Italian ID advanced very slowly, and didn't approach Agnedo until the first week of June. Therefore the 52 Half Bde, responsible for defending the Sugana sector, kept its outposts far in advance of the main defensive position through the end of June.

The fortress of Trent was further strengthened and connected by several lines of communication with the nearest border sectors of District III. Thus if part of the first lines were lost it would be possible to oppose the enemy with a new defensive front.

c. The defense of the Dolomite front

The southeast flank of Tyrol was defended on the crest of the Fassaner Alps, on the mountains of the Dolomite range (proper) and on the western part of the Carinthian watershed. The basins which lay in front of this position — Fiera di Primiero (or Primör in German) and Cortina d'Ampezzo — were voluntarily evacuated. District IV initially held the line in the Fassaner Alps from the Kreuzspitz to Pordoijoch with just 55 Mountain Bde. A few days after the war started, 179 Inf Bde came up from Bozen to cover the northern part of this sector. The HQ of 90 ID took over both brigades. District V initially guarded the Dolomite sector from Pordoijoch to the Hochspitz with just 56 Mtn Bde. The defense was based on the works at Tre Sassi, Plätzwiese, Landro and Sexten. The old works at Ruaz and Corte east of the Pordoijoch lay in front of this front. On 8 June the HQ of the new "Pustertal" [Puster valley] Division was placed under District V; 56 Mtn Bde was responsible for the eastern part of the Division's front while 51 Mtn Bde, created in part from 51 Half Bde, took the western part. Since the Alpenkorps couldn't be used for an attack, GdK Dankl wanted to employ its commander G.Lt Krafft on the defensive front. On 6 June he gave the German general command over both Districts IV and V; the majority of Krafft's troops were deployed in groups between Cavalese and Bruneck as a reserve.375

375Bavarian Military Archive, "Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege 1914-1918" (Munich, 1923), p. 212. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The language in the cited passage gives a good insight into the disdain with which the Germans regarded their Austrian allies. Without even mentioning the restrictions
Based on his orders from the Tyrol Land Defense HQ, but also on the restrictions imposed by the German OHL, G.Lt Krafft issued the following instructions on 11 June: "The principal task of the Austrian sector commands is to defend the border positions, if possible with their own resources. The Alpenkorps is the reserve force of the Tyrol Defense HQ and will play the key role in the defense of south Tyrol. As soon as we can determine the direction of the enemy's main assault on our positions, the Korps will counterattack with the greatest possible strength."

However, the major offensive which the defenders expected never took place. Cadorna had given General Nava, the commander of 4th Italian Army, strict orders to take Toblach; the latter, however, let the first days of the war go by while doing almost nothing. After receiving Cadorna's order of the 27th urging an offensive, on the 28th Nava had the Tre Croci Pass east of Cortina d'Ampezzo occupied, and on the 29th the town itself. Finally, on 1 June he ordered IX Corps to have 18 ID take Mt Migogn, west of Caprile (which wasn't occupied by the enemy), while holding onto the Pellegrino Ridge. 17 ID would take the Tre Sassi works. Under Ist Corps, the 2 ID would attack the Falzarego Pass and the Austrian trenches north of Cortina at Son Pauses, and 10 ID would attack the works at Plätzwiese, Landro and Sexten.

The IX Italian Corps took a lot of time preparing for its operation. Eventually, 18 ID went over to the offensive in the area between S. Pellegrino valley and the Fedaja Pass against 179 Inf Bde on 18 June. The stubborn fighting, which was joined by several German companies, ended the same day with the complete defeat of the Italians. Meanwhile 17 ID restricted its activity to scouting thrusts.

The 2 ID of Ist Corps began to carry out its mission earlier than 18 ID. On 9 June, about four battalions moved toward Son Pauses and the positions on both its sides; east of Son Pauses they were driven back by a company from X March Battalion of IR # 14. An Italian battalion which tried to break into the Fanes valley was engaged by another company of the 14th and a German company in a fluctuating action that ended with the retreat of the attackers. However, the Italians were able to establish themselves on the Col Rosa, and thus threatened the line of communications in the Travenanzes valley. Four days later they repeated their attack imposed on the Alpenkorps, it states that "As time went on German detachments were gradually inserted between the Stand-Schützen and the [other] Austrian troops, to support them and increase their military value."
along the entire front between Tre Sassi and Son Pauses. Although the Italians won some temporary successes, they were pushed back eventually by the gallant defenders, who also used landslides of stones as weapons on the western slopes of Tofana I. The Italians thrust against S. di Stria on the 14th and against the Falzarego pass on the 15th, again without permanently gaining any ground.

Farther east, 10 Italian ID remained in a state of hardly comprehensible inactivity. They were content to incorporate a few high points of the Drei Zinnen massif in their positions, but didn't occupy the Kreuzberg ridge which had been conceded by the defenders at the outset.

The Austrians in this sector were considerably more active. On 7 June, some Landes- and Stand-Schützen overran the Alpini on Mt Piano and occupied its north slope. This considerably improved the defensive situation at the southern outlet of the Höhlenstein valley leading from Toblach. On 23 June the front in the Sexten valley, which until then had followed the line of pre-war defensive works, was advanced toward the Kreuzberg ridge by incorporating the Burgstall, Seikofl and Eisenreich. Similarly, on the Carinthian watershed the successful occupation of Cima dei Frugnoni and the Pfannspitze on 2 June improved the defensive front, which was so thinly held.

There had been no change in the situation and deployment of the two opponents during the spring fighting in Tyrol. However, the energetic defenders had held loss of ground to a minimum through numerous small but well-conducted operations. They had also won the proud confidence that they could stand up to the enemy despite considerable numerical inferiority. They were determined to stubbornly defend every foot of their homeland.

Although the Italians enjoyed a 3:1 superiority, they hadn't gained any positions other than those evacuated by the Austrians according to plan. This was true even in 4th Army's sector, where they had massed together for the attack on Toblach. The failure to thrust in this direction had considerably impaired Cadorna's overall plans for an offensive, and certainly had a negative impact on the Italian units fighting on the neighboring front opposite Carinthia.

3. Fighting on the Carinthian front, 23 May to early July 1915
Planning of the two sides

On 22 May, GdK Rohr took over his smaller sphere of responsibility as commander of the forces in Carinthia; his task was to defend the Carnic watershed and the Carinthian fortifications no matter what happened. He planned to halt the Italians at the border; if this proved impossible, he would at least delay the enemy advance into the interior of the land. The General's units were:

. 92 ID (FML von Langer), created in Carinthia;
. 57 Half Bde (GM Lanzinger), stationed at Lienz as a reserve and to secure the communications with Tyrol;
. VII Corps (GdK Archduke Joseph), arriving by rail from Galicia at Villach with 20 Hon ID and 17 ID; and
. 59 Mtn Bde (GM Fernengel), created in Galicia by 4th Army and now arriving on the Tauern railroad.

While still at Vienna on 23 May, Rohr divided his border defenses into two sectors. The western sector, from the Tyrolean border to the Kanal valley, was under Archduke Joseph; with 183 Inf Bde (from 92 ID), 57 Half Bde, 59 Mtn Bde and 17 ID he would first defend the Carnic crest. If necessary, he would then fall back to offer stubborn resistance in the Gail valley Alps. The eastern sector, along the border between the Kanal valley and Krn, included the permanent defensive works. It was placed under FML Langer (from 92 ID), who commanded the 184 Inf Bde of his own Division plus 20 Hon ID. He was instructed to make the defense of Tarvis his primary mission; this would prevent the Italians from invading the upper Sava valley and/or the Gail valley, and from moving through the Wurzen Pass toward Villach. For this reason the 20 Hon ID, now approaching Arnoldstein on the rails, would deploy at Tarvis and Feistritz a.d. Gail.

Archduke Joseph's group was also responsible for supporting his neighbors, both in Tyrol and by Tarvis. It was possible that the enemy might break through toward Oberdrauburg. In this scenario, the Archduke's troops would move back toward the east. Together with Langer's Group - which under all circumstances would still hold the Carinthian fortifications - they would create new positions on the line Obervellach (in the Gail valley)-Weisen Lake-Sachsenburg-Isel valley to cover the Tauern railroad.

In the afternoon of 23 May, GdK Rohr learned that Italy had declared war. He must have wondered whether the orders he had
issued a few hours earlier were feasible, because the 100 km long border he was supposed to defend was at this time occupied only by the two brigades of 92 ID plus two battalions and one battery attached from 57 ID.

GM Gössmann's 183 Inf Bde held the western sector (along the Carnic crest from the Tyrolean border to Schinouz). There had been no prior attempt to build fortifications along the crest because of the deep snow and the desire to avoid giving the Italians any pretext to complain about hostile measures. The only field work had been constructed about 1 km north of the narrow Plöcken Pass, blocking the only practical route. East of the Findenigkofel, where the crest became lower and ran a little to the rear of the border, the troops had hastily dug several trenches on the paths that crossed the mountains. Farther north, however, strong points had been built to defend all the bridges over the Gail and Drava as well as the heights next to the passes through the Gail valley Alps.

In the eastern sector (Schinouz-Krn), GM Jaschke's 184 Inf Bde enjoyed better conditions; there were permanent works at Malborgeth, Raibl and Flitsch to guard the roads through the passes. Although these forts had been largely disarmed, they still afforded protection; field works had been constructed around and between them. Few defensive preparations had been made along the steep ridges which rose from Flitsch to Krn, since they were naturally strong positions.

Initially the only reserves available for the entire Carinthia district were the weak 57 half Bde at Lienz and nine battalions of Carinthian Volunteer Rifles at Villach; the latter weren't ready yet for any serious fighting. Reinforcements, however, were coming up by rail. 59 Mtn Bde was expected at Oberdrauburg on the 24th, as were the first trains of 20 Hon ID at Arnoldstein. 17 ID would begin to arrive on the 27th at Oberdrauburg and Hermagor.

General Lequio was commander of the Italian "Zona Carnia" (Carnic Group) which deployed on the Carinthian border. He had 31 battalions, 1 squadron and 13 batteries, which he divided into two groups for his first mission - the capture of the border positions. The western ("But-Degano") group would take the Carnic crest; its operation would be covered by the eastern ("Fella") group, which would also begin siege-like operations.

---

376Tosti, p. 124. The Carnic Group was reinforced in June by 12 heavy batteries (Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 288)
against the Austrian border forts. Moreover, the Fella group was supposed to prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Tarvis through Predil and Flitsch into the Isonzo valley; the IV Corps of 2nd Army, advancing toward Krn, would share in this mission. After overcoming the border defenses, the Carnic Group would invade the basins of Travis and Villach. From these points they would either advance east down the valley of the Wurzner Sava to support the offensive of 2nd and 3rd Armies toward Ljubljana, or west in the Gail and Drava valleys to help 4th Army take Toblach.

The fighting begins

Following these orders, Lequio's battalions began to advance cautiously on the 24th. The troops in the extreme west collided with the weak Austrian detachments of 183 Inf Bde right on the border on both sides of the Plöcken Pass. Thanks to their numerical superiority and skill in mountain climbing, the Alpini were able to capture several dominating heights on the border between the Lahner Joch and the Findenigkofel, after some hard fighting. On the Lahner Joch, however, a sharp counterattack soon drove the Italians back into the valley. Near Lake Wolay they had to be content with taking the Seekopf and the adjacent pass; the defenders created a new strong new position on the north shore of the small mountain lake and on the southern slope of the Rauchkofel. The situation in the Plöcken area was more critical, because in their first onset the enemy took the weakly held heights of the Klein and Gross Pal; then they took the Promoser Törl. Between the two Pal heights, a company of the Styrian Lst March Bn # 10 still held the Freikofel.

South of the Kanal valley, the Italians occupied the terrain which the Austrians had voluntarily relinquished in front of their defensive positions. From batteries still deployed on Italian soil, they opened an ineffective bombardment against the works at Malborgeth and Predil. The Italian advance toward Flitsch through the Ucea and upper Isonzo valleys was even more hesitant; their cannon didn't fire the first shot against Flitsch until the 29th.

After the arrival of 59 Mtn Bde on 24 May, its commander GM Fernengel was given control of the Armeegruppe's western sector up to and including the Promos; GM Gössmann controlled the

378Ibid., Vol. II, Text, p. 60
379The Italian Official History (Vol. II, Text, p. 61) states that the Italians were driven from Klein Pal on the 24th and didn't finally secure these heights until 26 May.
eastern sector up to the Kanal valley. GM Fernengel recognized that there was a danger that the enemy would thrust into the Angerbach valley and capture the Plöcken road; he decided to eliminate this threat by recapturing the border heights between Plöcken Pass and the Promoser Törl. First, however, his troops had to be issued their mountain equipment.

On the afternoon of the 25th, GdK Rohr set up his HQ in St Veit a.d. Glan; he was glad to learn that the enemy hadn't undertaken their anticipated advance toward the Gail valley, but were fortifying the heights on the border and seeking only to gain a few more positions in this area. Although the Italians were on the heights at Promos, Hoher Trieb and Findenigkofel, they hadn't taken the Plöcken road or the Zweispitzen gap. The faint-hearted conduct of the Italians is apparent in the statement of General Lequio that he considered even a short advance by the Fella group to have "little prospect of success" until the Austrian border works had been taken. He claimed that the But-Degano sector had made a "major accomplishment by holding the line of the border against heavy and constant enemy pressure." Nevertheless, GdK Rohr's HQ endured some nervous hours and days, because the enemy would have been able to thrust into the Gail valley almost unopposed because of their numerical superiority.

Deployment of the VII k.u.k. Corps

Now the VII Corps began to arrive in Carinthia - 20 Hon ID came to Arnoldstein on the 24th, and 17 ID began to appear at Kötschach on the 27th. Their troops, however, had to be prepared for mountain warfare; especially they needed new footgear and pack animals. Another disadvantage was that the regiments - especially the Honveds - were mostly from the Hungarian plains and totally unaccustomed to the high mountains.

The Italian Carnic Group was still inactive when Archduke Joseph arrived in the afternoon of the 27th at Oberdrauburg, where he established his first headquarters. He agreed with GM Fernengel that to retain the important Plöcken Pass it would be necessary to at least recapture the Klein and Gross Pal; he would commit parts of 17 ID for this operation. This Division (led by FML Gelb) left one regiment at Oberdrauburg and massed its main body in the Gail valley. To make the organization more flexible in response to the nature of mountain warfare, 17 ID's IR # 39, the II Bn of IR # 37 and some artillery created the 57 Mtn Bde under Col. Freiherr von Henneberg; on 2 June the new Brigade deployed on the border watershed in the Promos-Hochwipfel sector between

59 Mtn Bde opened its counterattack on 29 May against the part of the Freikofel which the enemy had occupied; after a series of actions they secured the heights of the western summit. On the next day the Brigade attacked the Gross Pal, but captured just the western half of the border mountain. By now the Armeegruppe HQ was confident that it would be able to repel any enemy attack, since its strength was growing daily and the people of Carinthia were willing to sacrifice themselves for the defense of their beloved land.

In the next few days, Fernengel's 59 Mtn Bde was engaged in continuing actions on the heights; the Italian artillery, which had been brought up to their front lines, began to take its toll on his men. However, plans for driving the enemy from the rest of the heights would have to wait until 17 ID had completed its preparations for mountain warfare.

In FML Langer's sector, the 20 Hon ID (GM Edler von Nagy) was fully available by 29 May; its 39 Hon Inf Bde was at Arnoldstein and Vorderberg, and 81 Hon Inf Bde at Tarvis. The latter had sent 3 battalions to Malborgeth, Raibl and Flitsch (respectively) to strengthen 184 Inf Bde. In the last days of May there were few important events in the area between Malborgeth and Flitsch - except that the Italians occupied the Zweispitz and Mittagskofel almost without fighting. The enemy was more active opposite the southern wing of the Armeegruppe; about three Alpini battalions made their way forward toward the Vrsic-Vrata-Krn ridge, defended by V Bn/BH IR # 4, detached from 57 ID to 184 Inf Bde. GM Perneczky, the commander of 81 Hon Inf Bde, was given command of the Flitsch sector on 29 May. He had just finished equipping one of his Honved battalions for mountain warfare and was bringing it up to the front at dawn on 31 May when the Alpini seized the Vrsic and Vrata Heights in a surprise attack. In response, the Hon IR "Nagyvarad" # 4 was quickly sent through the Mojstrovka.
Pass to reinforce GM Perneczky; GdK Rohr was still holding back the main body of 20 Hon ID (two infantry regiments and the artillery) as a reserve in the Tarvis-Arnoldstein-Vorderberg area. He wanted to recover the border heights in enemy hands east of the Plöcken Pass and the ridge which had just been lost north of Krn, while making the Italian attack against the permanent border works as difficult as possible. Thus he was considering a plan for an attack on the Zweispitze, Mittagskofel and Köpfach heights; this would interfere with the concentration of Italian heavy artillery in the Dogna valley for the reduction of the fort at Malborgeth.

Roth's plans led to fighting to clear the Carnic crest, and further actions in the Krn sector. June would be an eventful month on the Carinthian front.

b. Fighting on the Carinthian crest, early June to early July

The preparation of 17 ID for mountain warfare proceeded all too slowly for the impatient commanders. The next unit to complete the process was IR # 43, which on 5 June entered the front between Hochwipfel and Schinouz; along with some artillery, they were commanded by the HQ of GM Lanzinger's 34 Inf Bde, which took the place of 183 Inf Bde. Here the enemy had been content to send advanced outposts up to the Pontebbanabach, which marked the border of the Empire; they had made no preparations for a major or minor offensive against our positions on the heights. After its relief, 183 Inf Bde assembled at Hermagor as the Armeegruppe's reserve.

Meanwhile General Lequio was urging the troops of his western sector to take the Freikofel, the last border mountain in the Plöcken sector that was still in Austrian hands. After bringing up reinforcements, whose arrival was noted by the vigilant defenders, overwhelming Italian forces attacked the Freikofel early on 6 June. With difficulty, parts of 59 Mtn Bde managed to hang onto about half of the heights. Thanks to the energetic intervention of the brigadier, GM Fernengel, and the bravery of the handful of companies engaged, the Italian advance was checked in the evening. To unite the defenses of the threatened border sector in one hand, VII Corps entrusted the entire area from the Tyrol border to the Hochwipfel to FML Gelb, the commander of 17 ID; he now led 59 and 57 Mtn Bdes plus IR # 46. The 33 Inf Bde was still in the Gail valley as the Corps reserve; after they had received all their mountain equipment, Archduke Joseph planned to send them to capture the Promos and then Mt Paularo. If this
thrust were successful, it would force the Italians to retreat from the heights on the border east of the Plöcken Pass.

The Italians renewed their attacks on 7 June; now they concentrated on the Plöcken Pass and the defenses on its western side. They were completely unsuccessful; however, they forced 17 ID to commit all its available troops as well as parts of the Corps reserves. For the next day, GM Fernengel pulled as many men as possible from other sectors, so that he could drive the enemy units from the half of the Freikofel which they occupied, and from the slope farther west. After a difficult action, which coursed back and forth several times over the heights, the Freikofel was finally in the hands of 59 Mtn Bde (for good) by sunset.  

17 ID expected the Italians to counterattack, but they didn't. However, in the next few days the enemy did make some strong thrusts at Lake Wolay and in the Mt Peralba area. They were able to gain some ground near the pass by the Lake. At Mt Peralba, on the other hand, our troops not only threw the Alpini back, but in a counter-thrust on the 11th even seized the summit, which lay on Italian soil and provided an excellent view of the area. East of the Plöcken Pass, the gallant but very tired defenders of the Freikofel were relieved by battalions from the Corps' reserves. 

Following GM Fernengel's plan for a systematic recovery of the border ridges, the next step was to take the Klein and Gross Pal, the Promoser Törl, and the heights farther east. On the 14th, the Klein Pal was taken from two Italian finance watch battalions in an operation that was carefully prepared and well supported by the artillery. At the same time, a neighboring group conquered the Gross Pal at their own initiative. Several counterattacks were repulsed. On the 16th an attempt was made to drive away the Alpini who were still clinging to the slope between the Klein Pal and Freikofel. This attack through wild and rugged granite ridges by Hungarian troops unaccustomed to mountain warfare was a failure. In the next eight days the Italians made a series of assaults, trying in turn to take the Klein Pal, Gross Pal or the Freikofel; they were defeated with heavy losses. After the 24th, they realized they would have to be content with their new positions. Meanwhile Austro-Hungarian casualties were also

---

382The Italian Official History (Vol. II, Text, p. 128) comes to a different conclusion. It states that after fluctuating fortunes on 6 to 10 June, the mountain was fully occupied by the Italians. This assertion is disproved by the primary sources in the Austrian military archives.

383At the capture of the Gross Pal, several companies of the Styrian Lst March Bn # 10 once again distinguished themselves, as they had already done several times in the border fighting.
heavier in the defensive actions than in their capture of the Gross and Klein Pal, because they didn't have the time or equipment to prepare strong defensive works.

Effective with the start of 19 June, VII Corps entrusted the western sector from the Tyrol border to Lake Wolay (inclusive), with its four battalions and two batteries, to Col. von Pacor, the commander of 33 Inf Bde. 17 ID would consist of the 33rd Bde plus 59 Mtn Bde; the 57 Mtn Bde and 34 Inf Bde were placed directly under VII Corps HQ.

Despite the capture of Gross and Klein Pal, the situation of the troops dug in south of the Angerbach was only marginally improved, because their positions on the narrow line of ridges was outflanked by and was lower than the Italian post on the Promos. The capture of this post therefore seemed necessary. However, on the 24th the Southwest Front HQ ordered IR # 46 and three batteries to be prepared to move to the Isonzo. Although two Landsturm battalions from 183 Inf Bde (which had meanwhile been dissolved) and a 30.5 cm mortar battery were made available, these units didn't make up for those which were leaving the Carinthian front. The most serious shortage in VII Corps, however, was the lack of mountain troops who could overcome the difficult local terrain. At this point only Lst March Bn # 10 and the IX March Bn of LW IR # 4 were experienced mountain fighters.

On 5 July, parts of 57 Mtn Bde and several companies of 17 ID attacked toward Promos and the heights running east as far as the Hoher Trieb. GdK Rohr and Archduke Joseph were on hand to watch. Despite careful preparation by the artillery – including some 30.5 cm mortars – the attack failed because the infantry force was too small and because the storm parties were unable to coordinate their advance with the artillery in the difficult terrain.

This was the last major action by VII Corps on the Carnic crest; moreover, it was the end of the most significant operations in this sector during the entire war. As will be noted below, the Corps HQ left for the Isonzo front on 6 July, followed several days later by 17 ID.

384This detachment, plus Hon IR # 17 and two batteries from 20 Hon ID, left for the Isonzo on 27 June; this started a process by which 20 Hon ID and 44 LW ID swapped positions (which will be further explained in the section on the Ist Battle of the Isonzo). At this time, the two battalions and the battery which had been attached from 57 ID were also sent to 5th Army.
VII Corps had been unable to recapture all of the important border heights, which would have given the k.u.k. forces the best points for viewing and dominating the battlefield. The Italians still held the highest ground between Lake Wolay and the Plöcken Pass, and on the Promos, Hoher Trieb and Findenigkofel. On 6 July their heavy artillery fire forced the Austrians to evacuate the post at the summit of the Gross Pal. The most galling thorn in the flesh of the border defenses, however, were the heights at Promos. They provided the enemy visibility over the Austrian positions to the west and east, as well as the lines of communications; the Italians were thus able to fire upon the flank and rear of the defending units. Casualties were high also because at first it was impossible to protect the March formations as they came up to reinforce the front. With the passage of time, defensive positions and roads to the front were improved, and the casualty figures dropped. Despite all disadvantages, the troops who fought and suffered here, along with their energetic leaders, had limited enemy progress to a small advance along the border heights. By their initiative they had kept the Italians out of the Gail valley; unless the enemy significantly reinforced the Carnic Group, they no longer had any chance of taking the Drava valley railroad.

Apparently the Italian commander General Lequio himself had never pursued such wide-ranging goals. In the initial plan, his neighbor on the left, 4th Army, was supposed to thrust toward Toblach and then down the Gail and Drava valleys, which would have opened the border passes to the Carnic Group. However, 4th Army had failed to act, and therefore Lequio was content to hold onto the sectors he had seized in the first hours after the declaration of war.

c. Fighting between Krn and Flitsch, late May to late June

In the area south of the Kanal valley, FML Langer's group of Rohr's Armeegruppe was engaged mainly in artillery actions at Malborgeth and infantry actions around the Krn massif. The sector in the middle - between the Seissera and upper Isonzo valleys, including the forts at Raibl and Flitsch - were little disturbed by the enemy.

At first the Italians used light batteries to bombard Fort Hensel at Malborgeth and the group of works at the Predil Pass. These batteries were deployed in the Dogna and Raccolana valleys - some of them apparently before the declaration of war. Their fire was
directed from advanced observation points on the Zweispitz and the Mittagskofel. On 12 June they were joined by heavy guns, including 28 cm howitzers.\textsuperscript{386} The artillery systematically bombarded the plainly visible targets, and scored numerous hits. However, the Austrian guns had mostly been moved outside the works, so the success of the Italian barrage was meaningless. From the beginning, GdK Rohr had planned to drive away the troublesome Italian artillery spotters by capturing the heights south of the Kanal valley. However, he had to abandon this plan after the Italians took the ridge northwest of the Krn on 31 May and thus threatened the road running through the upper Isonzo (Soca) valley and the Mojstrovka Pass to Kronau. Therefore all available units had to be diverted to this sector.

Fortunately, on 1 June the Italians failed to exploit their success on the Vrata and Vrsic heights by attacking toward the Soca valley. The Honved companies which hastened to the scene were able to seal the broken line. Moreover the XV Corps, arriving by rail at Tolmein, sent a battalion of 50 ID to the Krn; this was part of preparations for an attack planned by that Division for 2 June. GM Perneczky's group (18 companies and 1 mountain battery) was instructed to support 50 ID by recovering the Vrata-Vrsic heights. Despite valiant efforts and heavy losses, however, the Honveds' attacks on 4 June failed because of their lack of experience in the mountains. The commander of 20 Hon ID, GM Nagy, was now entrusted with command of the counterattack. He tried to force the enemy to abandon the line on the heights by committing another regiment of the Armeegruppe's reserve - Hon IR # 3 - to an attack from Javorcek heights toward the southeast. However, the Italians had been reinforced, so when the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Regt attacked on 8 and 9 June it was checked after an initial success.

In the next few days, Nagy's group sought to establish a fortified position on the fissured granite slopes near the enemy lines. On 16 June, two Alpini companies took the summit of the Krn in a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{387} At the same time the ridge between Krn and Vrata, held by two Honved companies, was lost; the Italians, however, failed to follow up on their success.

At this point, Armeegruppe HQ gave GM Nagy the Carinthian LW IR # 4, a mountain unit which had just arrived from the Russian front. The battalions of this Regt were sent to various

\textsuperscript{386}Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 130
positions and fought several actions through 22 June, but were unable to change the situation. Therefore the Armeegruppe had to accept the front as it now was established. The summit of the Krn wasn't an especially useful position to the enemy. 5th Army HQ displayed little interest in the Krn, but was concerned about holding onto the ridge which ran south of the massif to the Mrzli vrh. Therefore, Southwest Front HQ ordered Rohr to prepare a new defensive line somewhat to the east of the Krn-Vrsic ridge. The sector boundaries were changed so that our forces opposite the Krn summit were placed under the jurisdiction of 5th Army.

4. First combats in the coastal lands

a. The Italian invasion, and response of k.u.k. 5th Army

The covering troops already in the coastal lands before Italy declared war - 57, 93 and 94 ID - were ordered by GdK Rohr on 16 May to resist the Italian invasion in the fortifications on the Isonzo line. A second concern was the possibility of Italian amphibious operations in the Trieste area or at other points along the coast. If the Italians landed, Rohr planned to contain them along a defensive line running from Trieste toward Mt Maggiore at Lovrana. In the event of an overwhelming overland attack, or an amphibious strike by very strong forces, the defenders would pull back step by step to a fortified line running from Podbrdo through Zoll to Dornegg.

When the Italian ambassador was handing over the declaration of war at Vienna on 23 May, the first troop trains from Syrmia were arriving on the Isonzo. The two corps commanders, GdI Fox of XV Corps and FZM Wurm of XVI Corps, had received their orders at Peterwardein on the 22nd in a briefing from Southwest Front HQ. They were "to stop the Italians as far forward as possible, to delay their advance, and to inflict as many casualties as possible." XV Corps (1 and 50 ID) was sent to Tolmein; together with the covering troops already in the area they would prevent the enemy from advancing to Bischoflack and Idria. XVI Corps (18 and 58 ID), coming up on the southern rail line, would oppose the Italian advance in the area between Britof (8 km northeast of Görz) and the Adriatic. 48 ID, whose trains would arrive last, was the Army's reserve; it would assemble in the Dornberg-St

388TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The original sentence closed with a long phrase that I couldn't sort out. It read "also, the General paid particular attention to die Wochein, which to him seemed endangered." I don't know if Wochein is a word I couldn't find in the dictionary or some obscure place.
Daniel area, whence it could reinforce the Isonzo front or oppose any Italian landing near Trieste.

At dawn on 24 May, the first troops of the Italian 2nd and 3rd Armies crossed the border along almost the entire front of the new k.u.k. 5th Army. After light skirmishes with outposts held by gendarmerie and customs guards, on the 24th they reached Mossa, St Florian, Verhovlje and the Kolowrat ridge between the Korada and Jeza Heights; they also occupied Caporetto. By firing upon Canale, Italian artillery halted rail traffic in the Isonzo valley. However, 50 ID at St Lucia and 58 ID at Görz were able to continue leaving their trains without being disturbed. Farther south, Lst Inf Bn # 152 on the lower Isonzo blew up the bridges at Pieris; this prevented the approaching 1 Italian Cav Div from crossing to the east bank of the river, which was swollen after recent rain storms.

On the same day the Aus-Hung. Navy under Admiral Haus delivered a sharp blow against the Italian east coast. Their heavy guns destroyed several rail lines and bridges, as well as barracks and harbor installations between Venice and Barletta. The principal target was the Ancona area. The damage to the rail system slowed down the Italian mobilization somewhat, but the main result of the raid was to give the k.u.k. naval arm a moral boost. It would never lose its feeling of superiority over the Italian fleet, which did nothing to stop the attack. Only one enemy vessel was engaged, the destroyer "Turbine" which failed to run away fast enough. It was promptly sunk. Throughout the war the Adriatic would remain, in the words of one foreign historian, "an Austrian lake", a factor which precluded any Italian amphibious adventures.

For 25 May, Cadorna ordered his 2nd Army to advance with its left wing toward Tolmein and its right through the Coglio area to the Isonzo; scouting parties should also cross to the east bank of the river. He also ordered 3rd Army to hold back somewhat; it would coordinate its own advance with that of the right wing of 2nd Army, and secure the Isonzo crossing points at Pieris. Scouting parties would be sent ahead onto the Karst plateau.

---

389 Austrian Naval Archive, "Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914-1918", pp. 193 ff. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The last five sentences in the paragraph are added to give a little more detail on this operation, which was the only action of the war involving almost the entire surface fleet.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - In German Karst is a geological term meaning "a chalky formation." Unofficially, however, the much-contested chalky plateau south of Görz has gone down in history simply as "The Karst", and the word will
In fact, on the 25th the Italian advance guards did reach the Isonzo between Pieris and Gradisca, and also north of Görz between Mt Sabotino and Selo; at Woltasch they felt their way ahead toward our bridgehead west of the river (covering Tolmein).

Because of the strong Italian forces located on the Kolowrat ridge, XVI Corps HQ - which had already arrived at Dornberg shortly before midnight on 23 May - was concerned for the security of the Bainsizza plateau, guarded by just two battalions. Therefore they shifted 6 Mtn Bde of 57 ID from the Tolmein bridgehead into the Cepovan valley. Because of the importance of the bridgehead at Görz, GM Erwin Zeidler's 58 ID immediately reinforced its weak garrison with the five battalions of the Division which had arrived to date. This was completely in accordance with the plans of XVI Corps, which intended 58 ID to defend Görz, while 93 ID would hold Bainsizza. The group at Monfalcone (2 and 60 Mtn Bdes) would be reinforced by moving 6 Mtn Bde once again from the Cepovan valley to the lower Isonzo.

Near Tolmein the commander of 50 ID, FML von Kalser, sent the first of his units to arrive - 3 Mtn Bde - to the ridge which stretched both north and southeast from Mrzli vrh. Until the arrival of 1 ID, Kalser's 15 Mtn Bde would hold the Tolmein bridgehead. When he heard reports that enemy detachments were moving from Luico to the east, however, FML Kalser decided that it was too soon to send 3 Mtn Bde so far ahead. He ordered the Brigade to stay on the line of heights between Tolmein and Vohu (9 km farther northeast) to cover the other units as they detrained. The Brigade didn't move to the forward position at Mrzli vrh until the 27th.

Among the lagoons southwest of the Isonzo, the Italians overran an Aus-Hung. coastal defense post at Porto Buso on 25 May, and occupied the resort town of Grado on the 26th. In the plains of Friuli, however, they advanced only with very great hesitation because of false reports that the Austrians had mined the roads and left other hidden booby traps. In the Coglio they approached Mt Sabotino, the northern pillar of the Görz bridgehead; this led to several uncoordinated and thus fruitless attacks on the hill. At Kamno, on the upper Isonzo half way between Caporetto and Tolmein, strong infantry, Alpini and Bersaglieri units crossed to the north bank of the river.

The success of their advance to date caused the Italian high command to order its Armies on 27 May to immediately seize any be used in the translation in this sense.
positions that weren't being seriously defended.

Apparently this order led to the five attempts on the 27th and 28th to take Mt Sabotino by surprise; if they had been successful, they would have been followed by a blow against Görz. However, the raw troops of 93 ID were able to foil the Italian plans.

**Boroevic's Army deploys for defensive action**

On 27 May, GdI Boroevic with the immediate staff of his former HQ (3rd Army) arrived at Ljubljana to take over command of the new 5th Army. His sector stretched from the line Triglav-Krn-Mt Maggiore (west of Saga) down the Isonzo to the sea. It also included most of the coast from the Isonzo to the border between Croatia and Dalmatia, except for the area south of the line Prenzo-Lovrana; the latter was under the Pola Military Harbor, which in turn was directly under the HQ of Southwest Front. Boroevic thus assumed the tasks that had already been assigned to XV and XVI Corps. Although the situation was still not fully clear, the energetic Army commander was willing from the start to hold the hastily constructed defenses on the Isonzo for as long as possible. In his first orders, he counseled the defenders to be extremely active and to pick the best available positions; a withdrawal of any portion of the front could take place only with his authorization.

Meanwhile, by the evening of the 27th the XV Corps had 18 battalions and 3 batteries at the front; XVI Corps had 14 battalions and 6 batteries. All of 48 ID was still coming up by train.

GdK Rohr had considered the high ground at Bainsizza to be the key point on the Isonzo. GdI Boroevic, on the other hand, felt that the plateau of Comen was of special importance if Görz was to be defended. His intelligence reports convinced him that the enemy was now fully ready for battle, so he anticipated immediate attacks, which might also include amphibious operations.

He formalized his command arrangements based on the terrain, and on 28 May created four defensive sectors. The 1st Sector was under GdI Fox of XV Corps (1 and 50 ID); it extended from the Army's northern boundary to the line Auzza-Tribusa. To its south was Sector II, which reached to the Wippach; it was defended by FZM Wurm with XVI Corps (18, 58 and 93 ID). Sector III, under FML Heinrich Goiginger, lay between the Wippach and Parenzo (on the coast north of Pola); it commanded 57 and 94 ID. Sector IV
was responsible for coast defense between Mt Maggiore (in Istria)\textsuperscript{391} and the Croatian-Dalmatian border, including Fiume; GM von Maric was its commander.

The Italian Navy remained inactive in its bases. Therefore the k.u.k. naval command declared that it was improbable that there would be any enemy landings, even at Trieste where the harbor was initially guarded merely by two submarines and some dummy mines. Any attack against Fiume, where the approaches were heavily mined for real, was impossible. Therefore on 31 May GdI Boroevic changed the borders of FML Goiginger's Sector III so it could concentrate on the important land front with 57 ID and 60 Mtn Bde; their area of responsibility would end on the sea at Duino. The coast between Duino and Parenzo became a new Sector IV under FML Kuczera; he commanded most of 94 ID plus some coastal defense detachments under Vogelhuber, a gendarme colonel. The Fiume area, formerly Section IV, became Sector V.

Meanwhile the Italians opposite 5\textsuperscript{th} Army were reinforced by newly-arrived units and began to dig in. In connection with the attack against the Krn massif (which extended to the area north of the Krn summit), the enemy sent a strong scouting party of one or two Alpini battalions southeast of the peak on the 28\textsuperscript{th}. Larger forces advanced against the Mrzli vrh. After the failure of their first blow against Görz, the Italians bombarded the city's rail station and forced the unloading of troops to be shifted back to Prvacina. FZM Wurm had no doubt that he could hold the Görz bridgehead, but its size was uncomfortably cramped. Boroevic also would have liked to see it extended to the tactically strong line Plava-Quisca-St Florian. However, this could now be achieved only by a major offensive with all available units, the outcome of which was doubtful because of the Italians' significant numerical superiority. Therefore on 2 June Archduke Eugene refused to approve the plan. Meanwhile XVI Corps HQ was also concerned about the steadiness of the inexperienced Landsturm battalions on its front lines. Therefore on 29 May they moved their original reserve, 18 ID, forward to the line Auzza-Gargaro and pulled 93 ID (with its Landsturm formations) back to Schön Pass and Cernizza for training and consolidation.

Although the HQ of Southwest Front recognized that their primary role was purely defensive, they were still resolved to seize any opportunity to win partial successes by counterattacking. Such a

\textsuperscript{391}TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Confusingly, there were two "Mount Maggiores" at opposite ends of 5\textsuperscript{th} Army's zone. One was in the upper Isonzo area (west of Saga) and the other - merely a glorified hill - was near the Istran coast near Lovrana.
chance seemed to be developing between the Krn and the Isonzo, where the Italians had advanced on 31 May and 1 June and attempted to seize the forward slopes of the Mrzli vrh in a series of prolonged but unsuccessful attacks. High water on the Isonzo swept away the enemy's bridges on the 31st; therefore it seemed that if the Austrians could storm ahead quickly they might win a significant victory.

Meanwhile General Cadorna, following his original plan of seizing the Bainsizza plateau, ordered on 30 May that the troops on the middle and lower Isonzo should attack. They would pin down the Aus-Hung. units on this stretch of the river and make it easier for the Italians farther upstream to take Tolmein. Cadorna also ordered that after the Isonzo was crossed and Bainsizza was secure, Görz should be captured and a firm foothold established on the Karst plateau east of Sagrado.  

b. Meeting engagements between Krn and Tolmein, 2-4 June

Command over the attack against the Italians east of the Isonzo crossing at Kamno was entrusted by XV Corps to FML Kalser; besides his own 50 ID he had parts of 1 ID at his disposal. The attack wasn't scheduled to start until 2 June because of the absolute necessity of first getting the troops into position (with their right wing extend to the Krn) and because of other special preparations (deployment of artillery which was just arriving, shipment of ammunition, etc.).

3 Mtn Bde would attack from the line between the Krn summit and Mrzli vrh, in an attempt to envelop the enemy from the right. They were supported by parts of 8 Mtn Bde; most of the latter Bde would stay in place farther south as far as Tolmein. 15 Mtn Bde in the Tolmein bridgehead would pin down the enemy by pretending to advance toward the Jeza. 7 Mtn Bde would hold the Selo-Auzza position. GdK Rohr promised assistance from 81 Hon Inf Bde, which was fighting on the Vrata-Vrsic Heights.

At this point, on the other side orders were issued for an attack by the north wing of 2nd Italian Army; this would involve all the troops who had crossed the upper Isonzo (8 ID, plus parts of the Bersaglieri Division and of Alpini Groups A and B). Therefore on 2 June an encounter battle developed on the steep southern slope of the Krn massif; part of the terrain was wooded, part was broken up by fissures in the granite cliffs.

---

393Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, p. 135
Early on the morning of 2 June, the 3 Mtn Bde opened their attack ahead of the enemy. Heavy fighting soon developed around a gap southeast of the Krn summit and around the Mrzli vrh. The Austrians threw the Italians back, but suffered substantial losses due to flanking fire from the Kolowrat ridge and had to be content with retaining the position from which they had started.

Southwest Front HQ was dissatisfied with the outcome of the fighting. They ordered "this action to be carried through to final success" by the advance of XV Corps and 92 ID. GdI Boroevic told GdI Fox to employ all available combat troops for this purpose.

Fox decided not to further reinforce the right wing. Instead, for 3 June he ordered 50 ID to pursue its original course, and also told 1 ID to attack. The latter Division would continue to guard its position in the bridgehead and on the river bank, while sending five battalions from Selo to attack the Jeza; this would prevent the enemy from hitting 50 ID in the flank. 81 Hon Inf Bde of Rohr's Armeegruppe was instructed to support 50 ID as soon as its own attack on the Vrsic Heights had succeeded.

On 3 June the attack of 3 Mtn Bde did achieve an initial success. Soon however they encountered a larger enemy force, which pushed from the village of Krn against the Brigade's center; the Italians were also dug in so strongly on the hotly contested forward peak of the Mrzli vrh that further advance was impossible in that area. The north wing of 8 Mtn Bde moved forward somewhat. The attacking group from FML Bogat's 1 ID, which went into action a little late, was also able to climb some distance up the Jeza; however, the strong enemy positions on that height and heavy fire from the artillery deployed at Srednje soon stifled the attack. After renewing the offensive and once more being halted, the exhausted troops pulled back to the Tolmein bridgehead in the evening. GM Perneczky's Honved group north of Krn hadn't been able to help XV Corps.

For 4 June, GdI Fox planned to repeat the attack; XVI Corps promised to help out by attacking over the Isonzo toward Srednje. However, GdI Boroevic didn't have in mind a frontal attack against the strongly defended Kolowrat ridge; he had only wanted to throw back the Italians who had advanced northeast of the Isonzo. Therefore he ordered XV Corps HQ to restrict its offensive to this original objective. Accordingly FML Kalser attacked on the 4th with just 3 and 8 Mtn Bde plus three battalions from the Corps' reserves. At the same time, the Italians again sought to capture the line of heights from Krn to
Mrzli vrh.\textsuperscript{394}

In heavy fighting against the reinforced enemy, the right wing of Kalser's attacking group gained only a little ground toward Point \# 1602 south of the Krn summit. 3 Mtn Bde, outnumbered 2:1 by the enemy, had to stay on the defensive; however, they noted with satisfaction that the Italians, convinced that their own attacks were hopeless, evacuated the advanced western summit of Mrzli vrh in the evening.

Because the enemy's strength was constantly increasing, 5\textsuperscript{th} Army HQ was compelled on the evening of 4 June to order the offensive halted. This was all the more necessary because 81 Hon Inf Bde had failed to recapture the Vrata heights.

At almost the same hour the Italian high command decided that their own offensive held no promise of success. They decided to suspend further attacks until the arrival of more artillery.\textsuperscript{395} Both sides thus fell back on the defensive. The fighting of the last three days had cost the k.u.k. XV Corps about 1000 men. The enemy's casualties were much higher; on 2 June the Modena Brigade of 8 ID alone had lost 37 officers and 1200 men; the 12\textsuperscript{th} Bersaglieri Regt lost 400 men.\textsuperscript{396} Thus in their first attack along the Isonzo the Italians had encountered earnest determination on the part of the defenders, despite their considerable numerical inferiority.

c. First fighting between Plava and the sea, 5-22 June

While the north wing of the Italian 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army - worn down by the counter-action of the k.u.k. XV Corps north of Tolmein - began to dig into a strong position, the corps of the Italian main body south of Tolmein moved forward to seek a decision in the area running down to the sea. In 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army, the Duke of Aosta instructed VII and XI Corps to capture the Plateau of Doberdo.\textsuperscript{397} The former would cross the Isonzo at Pieris, the latter would cross at Sagrado and Sdraussina afer capturing heights \# 115 east of Farra. VI Corps would cross at Pevma to attack Görz. Its neighbor, II Corps, was ordered by the commander of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army (General Frugoni) to help out by simultaneously feinting against Mt Sabotino, establishing a firm bridgehead east of the Isonzo at

\textsuperscript{394}Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 79
\textsuperscript{395}Zingales, p. 227
\textsuperscript{396}Tosti, p. 64
\textsuperscript{397}On some maps the plateau appears as "Doberdob", an alternate spelling that was hardly used in practice.
Plava, and capturing the Kuk # 611.

Fearing that they were confronted by a strong enemy force, the Italian VII Corps and 2 Cav Div sent several battalions and machine gun detachments over the Sdobba on the night of 3-4 June.498 Forty eight hours later, also at night, the main body of VII Corps crossed over at Pieris. By this point the waters of the Isonzo were rapidly sinking and were hardly an obstacle any longer. The Austrian Lst Inf Bn # 152, outnumbered 30:1 by the enemy, had convinced them for 12 days that the river crossing points were held in strength. Now the Battalion fell back onto the Karst Plateau, sparing the 3rd Italian Army the anxiously awaited "Battle on the Isonzo." VII Corps cautiously pushed ahead to the southwest edge of the Karst, where the k.u.k. 57 ID had created an artificial flood by damming the Isonzo canal. After occupying Monfalcone and unleashing a heavy but fruitless bombardment of the Karst heights, the Italians halted their advance.

The enemy XI Corps was even less successful. They occupied heights # 115 and the town of Gradisca on the 6th. However, the bicycle troops whom they sent ahead at Sagrado on the 9th were repulsed with losses; farther north a military bridge was built over the river, but it was destroyed by Austrian fire and most of the troops who'd crossed over were wiped out. Discouraged by these setbacks, the Corps abandoned any further crossing attempts.

The fighting in front of Görz was heavier. Here the Italian VI Corps had been placed under 2nd Army for the attack.499 They advanced on the bridgehead through the rolling hills of the Coglio, which were covered with grape vines. After a heavy but ineffective bombardment, the Italians opened their first coordinated attack in the afternoon of the 8th. Although troops in at least division strength stormed against the positions of the outnumbered defenders, 5 Mtn Bde of 58 ID drove them back without great difficulty. On the 9th and 10th, several battalions launched further isolated and unsuccessful attacks; thereafter the Italian high command ordered a halt to the fighting.400

Cadorna was equally disappointed by the reports he received from his II Corps. This unit had built a bridge at Plava on the

498 The "Sdobba" was not a separate river, but an alternate designation of the lower reaches of the Isonzo. The upper reaches were sometimes called the "Soca."
499 Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 94
400 On 10 June alone, the 35th Italian IR lost 32 officers and 607 men (Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 100)
evening of 3 June, but it was blown up the next morning by the alert artillery of 1 Mtn Bde (18 ID), which was responsible for this sector. II Corps then decided to fire an extended artillery barrage before opening the next attack. Many batteries were deployed west of the river, while about 200 men crossed over in the evening of the 9th and dug in on the eastern bank. Covered by fire from about 50 guns, two battalions crossed the Isonzo the next night and stormed against heights # 383 (1 km east of Plava). In bitter fighting, however, they were thrown back over the river by several companies of 1 Mtn Bde, which left their own positions during the action.\footnote{According to the version in the Italian Official History (Vol. II, Text, p. 102), the two battalions did manage to retain a small foothold on the eastern bank.}

GdI Boroevic now expected the enemy to open the decisive offensive against the Karst plateau at any time. Since he laid great importance on retaining this position, on the 7th he ordered the battalions of 93 ID that were ready for action (namely 58 Mtn Bde) to support 57 ID, even though at the moment the main Italian thrust seemed to be aimed at Tolmein. On the 10th these battalions took up reserve positions at Oppachiasella and Kostanjevica. Boroevic was able to make this move because he now had a new Army reserve - 48 ID had begun to arrive on the 4th at Dornberg and St Daniel. On 10 June, after the last troop trains of this Division came up, 5th Army had 76 \\(\frac{1}{2}\) battalions, 14 squadrons and 75 batteries.\footnote{This total doesn't include the two battalions and one mountain battery of 57 ID which were still in Carinthia.} At this point they were still heavily outnumbered by the two Italian armies, which (not counting reserves of the high command) controlled about 214 battalions, 40 squadrons and 188 batteries.

The Italians prepare for a major offensive

Despite this significant superiority in numbers, the misfortunes which had befallen the Italian main body on the Isonzo caused Cadorna on the 10th to order that the fighting wouldn't resume "until the arrival of further reinforcements and technical equipment. Above all, we must train the troops to attack based on lessons learned from the other theaters of the war."\footnote{Tosti, p. 69. Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, pp. 136 ff.}

The recent defeats also caused the Italian high command to alter their operational plans on the 11th. The units hitherto had been equally divided along the front. Now they were to concentrate for the achievement of two objectives - the high ground between Monfalcone and Sagrado, and the middle reaches of the Isonzo.
between Plava and the mouth of the Wippach. The former task was assigned to 3rd Army, the latter to 2nd Army (which would retain the recently attached VI Corps). The only units which would remain in the Caporetto basin were those judged necessary to assist the Alpini in taking the Krn summit, an operation which was already successfully under way. 2nd Army would move all the others to its southern wing. At the same time the methodical and very cautious commander-in-chief began to prepare a rear position which would run from Caporetto along the Kolowrat ridge, Coglio, Mt Quarin, Mt di Medea and then down the west bank of the Torre and Isonzo to the sea. 404

The Italian corps shifted their forces in accordance with Cadorna's orders, and there were some further engagements. The most active was II Corps, which still had the important assignment of gaining the east bank of the Isonzo at Plava. On the 12th, a brigade from 3 ID once more crossed the river and stormed heights # 383, again in vain. Only some scanty remnants of the Brigade managed to dig in along the precipice. Further efforts made in the next two nights had no better luck. Finally on 16 June, after the arrival of the second brigade of 3 ID and one from 32 ID, parts of II Corps were able to establish themselves in the position of 1 Mtn Bde. 405 The proximity of the enemy, however, had one advantage for the defenders: the Italian artillery could no longer effectively bombard the foremost Austrian line without endangering their own infantry. In the next few days the Italians made several more attempts to break out of their tiny bridgehead on the east bank, but all their thrusts were shattered by the splendid defenders of 1 Mtn Bde under GM Novak von Arienti. 406 Toward the end of the actions they were reinforced by two battalions from 48 ID and one from 13 Mtn Bde. The troops paid for their defensive victory by losses of 2300 (dead, wounded and missing) through the 22nd. The Italians, however, had already lost 93 officers and 2000 men by the 17th.

After the termination of the encounter battles at the start of June, the front of XV Corps was generally quiet. On 16 June, the Krn summit in the neighboring (Carinthian) sector was lost, but the only effect on the Corps was that 50 ID took up a new defensive line immediately to the east.

Meanwhile the garrison of the Görz bridgehead occasionally suffered from heavy bombardment, but saw virtually no infantry

405Zingales, p. 228
406GM Guido Novak von Arienti received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order for his brilliant leadership in these actions.
attacks. Farther south, however, the Italian 3rd Army was quite active in front of 57 ID. The enemy made stubborn but unsuccessful attempts to cross the river at Sdraussina and Sagrado. After getting past the area which the Austrians had flooded, they also made fruitless thrusts against the edge of the heights between Redipuglia and Monfalcone. The Italian artillery here was a formidable problem; on the 20th they began to fire during the nights as well as the days, which made it difficult for the defenders to repair the damage done to their positions.

The Italians undertook all these measures in preparation for their first attack on the Isonzo front. Since their attempt to thrust ahead quickly had failed and it was no longer possible to count on surprise, they now intended to launch a systematic offensive. After the arrival of about 20 heavy guns, the 1st Battle of the Isonzo would commence on 23 June.

The purely defensive mission of Southwest Front

The AOK had already informed Archduke Eugene on 8 June that "the strength of the Southwest Front is insufficient for an offensive against the Italian army" and that he "was to adhere unconditionally to our orders for a defensive operation." The instructions went on to say that the Archduke "will have performed a great service if he succeeds in holding off the much larger enemy forces. The AOK itself will decide when an offensive is feasible and how many troops will be needed." In turn, the Southwest Front HQ informed its own subordinates that their mission was "to win time, with minimal losses of terrain and manpower, until the arrival of larger forces." Therefore, "The retention of positions isn't an end in itself, but rather a way to force the enemy to attack in situations which will cause them much greater casualties than ours." In the event, almost a year would pass before "larger forces" arrived in the southwest.

5th Army HQ was aware of the Italian preparations. On 20 June they were fully informed about the situation along the enemy front lines, although there was some doubt about the size of the Italian strategic reserves back on the Tagliamento. Expecting an attack at any hour, GdI Boroevic had brought his own small reserve forces closer to the battle lines. He had already sent 12 Mtn Bde of 48 ID to XVI Corps on the 17th, and the remaining troops of 93 ID plus the Division HQ would be committed to Sector III between Sagrado and the mouth of the Wippach. Therefore the only units still at Boroevic's disposal were 48 ID HQ with 11 Mtn

407In the initial actions, the 2nd and 3rd Italian Armies had lost 11,000 men (including 450 officers) - Zingales, p. 231
Bde (in the Aisovizza-Vertojba-Vogersko area) and 44 LW ID which had been released by the AOK. The latter, with just five battalions and six batteries, had arrived from Galicia and since 19 June was stationed by Schön Pass and Cernizza. Boroevic also moved the March battalions closer to the front so that casualties could be quickly replaced; the nine battalions sent to 57 ID would be used from the start as combat units.

GdI Boroevic faced the future with confidence. However, the technical preparation of the battlefield left very much to be desired. Since there was a lack of drilling machines, in most cases the troops had to be content with building stone breastworks; these provided some cover against small arms fire but were of doubtful protection against artillery fire, especially since bursting shells could send splinters of stone flying in all directions. Secure dug-outs were as scarce as trenches or shell-proof breastworks. Only the barbed wire and other obstacles in front of the positions met the contemporary requirements of a well-constructed defensive position.\(^{408}\)

Despite the technical deficiencies and the enemy's superiority in numbers and armaments, there was no doubt that the defenders here were superior in experience and soldierly morale, just as was the case in Carinthia and Tyrol. They knew that the attackers lacked experience in warfare. Thus the officers and men on the Karst awaited the attack with quiet but proud determination behind their stone defenses and in their foxholes. The offensive of 23 June was the first of eleven which the Italians would mount - with ever increasing force - through this wilderness of cliffs, hills and forests.

\section*{J. The Campaign of Brest-Litovsk}

\subsection*{1. The offensive on the Gnila Lipa}

\subsubsection*{a. The military-political situation after the capture of Lemberg}

After the capture of Lemberg, the allies could go on to ensure that the major fighting in the East would take place on Russian soil. The major factor behind this new campaign was the flanking

\footnote{408Several Italian sources refer to technically advanced Aus-Hung. positions (Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, p. 129. Zingales, p. 232. Tosti, pp. 59 ff. and 70). They are incorrect. See also Pitreich, "Der österreichisch-ungarische Bundesgenosse im Sperrfeuer" (Klagenfurt, 1930), pp. 219 ff.}
position which the Central Powers in east and central Galicia had established against the Russians who were holding on in Poland. Moreover, a second pincers would soon be striking against the Polish salient from East Prussia.

These decisions had already been made before the Lemberg fighting. At the moment when they began to be implemented, the front in Galicia ran from the Bessarabian border up the Dniester to the Mikolajow area, and thence east around Lemberg. Then it turned sharply to the north to run along the southwest edge of the Bug-Styr basin and the south edge of the Tanew area. Finally it cut through the San-Vistula confluence, where the enemy was starting to abandon their positions. The situation north and west of the Vistula was virtually unchanged since 22 May. The 1st k.u.k. Army deployed in the hilly terrain south and west of Opatow; Woyrsch's units held a shallow arc swinging toward the northeast, between the southern bank of the Kaniemna and Nowe Miasto. The 9th German Army was dug in on the Rawka and the Bzura in sectors which its troops had taken around the first of the year. (Since 16 April the Army was commanded by GFM Leopold, Prince of Bavaria, the son-in-law of Emperor Franz Joseph.)

North of the lower Vistula, Hindenburg's thin front ran from Plock through Augustowo to the area west of Kovno; then it generally followed the Dubissa up to the latitude of Libau, where it turned west at a right angle toward that Baltic port. In this last-named sector, in Courland, there were no continuous lines of trenches; instead, wide open spaces allowed units to fight a small-scale war of maneuver.

Given the military situation on the Eastern front, the thrust between the Bug and Vistula now planned by the allied high commands didn't present any insuperable difficulties. Their armies were strong enough, despite the demands and stresses of the campaign they had just completed, to push back the Russians, whose units were confusingly intermingled, considerably under strength, and - above all - suffering from a crippling shortage of ammunition. The portion of the Russian Army which was the target of Mackensen's attacking phalanx seemed to be suffering more than the others from these deficiencies.

Influence of other fronts on allied plans

A decisive condition for success in the new campaign was that the allies wouldn't have to give up any significant forces to fight on other fronts. However, the situation in these other theaters was by no means simple and clear. The offensive mounted by the Western powers since 9 May at Arras and La Bassée had been
shattered. Nevertheless, the English and French felt obliged to mount smaller-scale attacks along the entire German Western front, if only to help the Russians. If necessary, GdI Falkenhayn was prepared to take four of Mackensen’s divisions and send them to France; these would be 81 and 82 Res ID (of XLI Res Corps), 8 Bav Res ID and 56 ID, since they could be placed on trains sooner than any others.

No less hazardous were the risks which the Aus-Hung. high command was running in the Balkans. Although the allies had 177,000 riflemen, 500 machine guns and 1100 artillery pieces in the Balkans, GdK Tersztyanszky commanded just ten Aus-Hung. and nine German field battalions; GdI Sarkotic (commanding at Sarajevo) had none. All the other troops were Landsturm. They were opposed by 11 Serbian divisions (almost at full war-time strength) and 4 Montenegrin divisions. A large-scale deception maneuver was staged along the north bank of the Danube on 26 June to mask this disparity in force; it reached its high point on the 29th. There was lively artillery fire, much activity on the railroads, and considerable troop movement; the men kept shifting their camps. Units of 103 German ID in particular made themselves visible among the Serb-speaking population in some districts of south Hungary. It was noted that the Serbian Army took measures in response to these demonstrations, so they had some effect.

GO Conrad believed that very serious danger was threatening from Romania. It was no secret that the neighboring Kingdom was negotiating with Petersburg; therefore Conrad constantly urged the Foreign Minister Baron Burian to use every possible means to bring Romania over to the side of the Central Powers. Conrad was even prepared to approve a separate peace with Russia to avoid a possible Romanian attack against the Danube Monarchy. Since it was questionable, however, that Russia would leave the opposing coalition, he declared it was essential that "Romania must for the time being at least be coaxed into a benevolent neutrality"; this could be achieved by national concessions to Romanians living in Hungary and financial gifts from Germany.

The AOK also had to take military preparations against a possible Romanian invasion, since Transylvania had been left without any field troops since the departure of Pflanzer-Baltin in October 1914. Reinforcements were in short supply because substantial forces were needed for the southwest front after Italy's intervention. Recourse was therefore had to the 69 gendarmerie posts, reinforced by Landsturm, on the Romanian border, along with several reserve formations of gendarmerie in the interior.
9600 men were drawn from these sources to create the "Transylvania Gendarmerie Division." Its commander was GM Goldbach, formerly Chief of Staff to the Hermannstadt (XII) Corps, who was called back to the province at the start of June. This division was responsible for guarding the border and preparing field fortifications in the 13 mountain passes which crossed it; in fall 1915, after releasing most of its professional gendarmerie, the unit would become the 70 Hon ID. Meanwhile the Hermannstadt (XII) Military District was building a line along the Little Kokel and the Maros, which could provide cover in case a deployment against Romania became necessary. In like manner, the Temesvar (VII) Military District took steps to connect the Maros-Kokel line with the defensive works they had already prepared in connection with the campaigns against Serbia; they also fortified the Danube valley at Orsova.  

The AOK planned to further reinforce the Transylvania garrison with two brigades which had just been raised in the interior. 202 Hon Inf Bde was stationed for a short time at Maros-Vasarhely and Szasz-Regen; 205 k.k. Lst Inf Bde, however, was actually sent to the Serbian border as soon as it was ready.

The Ballhausplatz was less concerned about the Romanian question than was the AOK at Teschen; they were of the opinion that Bucharest wouldn't spring any surprises after the recent allied victories in Galicia.

Although an initial defensive line had been established against Italy, in the days after that country declared war Conrad continued to insist that in four or five weeks it would be necessary to counterattack the new enemy from Inner Austria. His contention was based on the reasonable assumption that by that time the fresh Italian Army would long since have overrun the weak defenses on the Isonzo and entered the Karst in the coastal lands as well as the passes of the Carnic-Julian Alps. However, the situation actually developed quite differently. Because the Italian advance was unexpectedly slow and cautious, it was possible to hold the front from the Stilfser Joch to the Adriatic with a thin cover of troops. With hearty determination, they had fended off Cadorna's first thrusts, which fortunately had been weak and uncoordinated. The k.u.k. high command was well aware, however, that the Italians were still assembling large bodies of troops in the Cadore, in front of Tolmein and Görz, and at the foot of the Karst plateau. They expected these troops to attack at any hour.  

409Kiszling, "Der Feldzug gegen Rumänien 1916" (Mil. wiss. Mitt., Vienna 1929), pp. 3 ff.
Nevertheless, in the conversations between the two Chiefs of Staff during the Lemberg fighting there was no further mention of a possible counterattack against Italy, such as had been considered in May. Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed that regardless of any dangers in the West and especially in the Southwest, they would seek their next success in the area where it was most likely, i.e. against Russia. In this sense an order was issued from Teschen on 22 June to the Galician armies: "GFM von Mackensen will pursue the retreating enemy toward the north with 4th and 11th Armies. He will be given the Beskid Corps [from 2nd Army] to guard his eastern flank. The 2nd Army will leave Mackensen's command and follow the enemy in the direction of Busk and Firlejow (inclusive). South Army will force its way over the Dniester downstream from Zurawno, envelop Halicz from the north, and thrust over the lower Gnila Lipa."

7th Army would continue to pursue its earlier goals by thrusting over the Dniester while guarding the right flank of the Eastern front and the city of Czernowitz.

Unfavorable situation of the Russians

At this time the Tsar's Army was in a more difficult situation. The strategic position was very unfavorable: since the southern wing had been pushed back, the loss of east Galicia was imminent, and then the positions west of the Vistula would have to be abandoned. The entire Southwest Front was in miserable condition. Between them, the two Fronts were short about 500,000 men. Russia still had large reserves of manpower to fill gaps in the ranks, but the new soldiers were inadequately instructed and trained and almost without equipment. Thus they were replacements of questionable value. Reference has already been made to the ongoing shortage of arms and ammunition.

Russia in its plight could find little help from its allies. After the relief attack of the Western powers had failed, they were devoting their efforts to equipping their own armies; Russia couldn't expect further help on the Western front until fall. The Russians also got the impression from Paris that the French Army would endure a second winter in the trenches only with great reluctance.410

The Italians also had brought no relief to the Tsar's Army with their ponderous and cautious advance; they had bitterly disappointed the Russians. When Lemberg fell, the Italian Army

410"Tsarist Russia in the World War", pp. 214 ff. Danilov, p. 510
was just on the eve of its first full-scale offensive on the
Isonzo front.

The Russians received even less satisfaction from their Serbian proteges. Instead of attacking Austria-Hungary, the Serbs had begun to occupy northern Albania. Under the pretext that they were defending their rear areas against rebellious Arnauts, they sent III Ban units to take Elbasan on 8 June, and Tirana on the 11th. The Montenegrins occupied Scutari on the 28th. The South Slavs weren't troubled by Russian protests. On 23 June, the Russians once again asked Serbia to thrust into Syrmia to help them in their difficult military situation; at first the Serbs put them off until the end of the month. Then the Serbs were warned from London not to be in any hurry and to avoid drawing heavy enemy forces in their direction (apparently the English and French were concerned about their own offensive on the Dardanelles). Serbia used this difference of opinion between the Entente great powers to justify its own inactivity.411

Russia's approaches to Romania were equally futile. In prolonged negotiations, Minister President Bratianu kept increasing the price for his military intervention. Finally he declared on 20 July that because of Russia's unfavorable military position this wasn't the right time for his country to enter the war.

Russian measures and plans

Thus left in the lurch, Russia thus had to restore its military situation with its own resources. The task was complicated by the fact that the miserable condition of the Army led to domestic political difficulties, which found expression in widespread unrest at Moscow. The first revolutionary stirring had appeared during the Carpathian campaigns; now it was intensified by the reactions to the heavy casualties among the Russian troops, who wanted to go home. Changes were also made in the highest levels of the administration; the War Minister Sukhomlinov was blamed for the deficiencies in military preparations and was replaced by General Polivanov.

On 20 June the Grand Duke-Generalissimo had already anticipated the practically unavoidable loss of Lemberg; he had ordered the evacuation of the capital and most of the other Galician territory which his troops still held. He instructed the units of Southwest Front retreating to the north to hold the line Lublin-Cholm-Vladimir Volynsky; the south wing would pull back to the Zbrucz. When Lemberg did fall on the 22nd, Ivanov ordered 4th

411Serbian Official History, Vol. VIII, pp. 121, 125 ff. and 139
and 3rd Armies, along with Olochov's Group (which provided the link with the south wing, and commanded II and V Caucasian, XXIII and XXIX, and IV Cavalry Corps), to withdraw to the new position between Lublin and Vladimir Volynsky. Here they would cover the roads leading to Brest-Litovsk. 8th and 11th Armies would retreat to the general area of the Austro-Russian frontier, where they would energetically construct new defenses against the enemy. 9th Army would pull its front back to stay in touch with the 11th.

A meeting was held at Baranowicze on 24 June to wrestle with the very thorny problem of further strategic measures; the Tsar himself was in attendance. Here it was agreed that the immediate goal was to win time until autumn. After two to two and a half months the weather would change, making the roads impassable. This would force a halt to operations and give the Army time for basic reorganization. Meanwhile, however, the center armies were in danger of flank attacks from the north and south because of their position reaching far beyond the Vistula to the west; they would have to gradually withdraw. It was decided that after the retreat it would be advantageous to hold a line from Riga through Kovno, Grodno and Brest-Litovsk, then along the upper Bug to one of the tributaries of the Dniester; finally the line would follow the Dniester to the Romanian border. The Army's outermost flanks were already stationed pretty much on this new front. Therefore they would hold their ground, while the center carried out a long retreat to avoid the danger of encirclement. At this point no time was set for the start of the operation.

A new division of responsibilities was also established at the Baranowicze meeting. As a result of the increasing influence of the commander of Northwest Front, General Alexeiev, his authority was extended to 4th and 3rd Armies as well as to Olochov's Group (which later became 13th Army under General Gorbatovsky). Thus as of 25 June he had 8 armies (with two thirds of the Tsar's total force of 108 infantry and 35 cavalry divisions plus 16 rifle brigades). Ivanov's command was restricted to 8th, 11th and 9th Armies (which together had just 37 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions). After the retreat was finished the dividing line between the two Fronts would be the Pripyat Marshes [Polesie]. Since the Russians considered the marshes unsuitable for large-scale operations, only cavalry would deploy there to link up the inner wings of the Northwest and Southwest Fronts.412

b. The Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka - first phase (23-28 June)

412Danilov, pp. 512 ff. and 521 ff. Korolkov, "The Unsuccessful Cannae" (in Russian; Moscow, 1926), p. 14
On 22 June the AOK had ordered 2nd Army to pursue the retreating enemy in the direction of Busk and Firlejow. In turn, GdK Böhm-Ermolli gave his five corps their goals for the 23rd. They would advance in echelon, with the left wing forward; the goals were:

- For IV and XIX Corps - the stretch of road from Nowosiolki (southwest of Busk) through Wyzniany to Podjarkow;
- For XVIII Corps - the road between Kocurow and Bobrka;
- For V Corps - the brook between Chlebowice Wk. and Wybranowska; and
- For Szurmay's Group - the Brzozdowce area.

Through intercepted radio traffic, it was known that 8th and 11th Russian Armies were moving their corps HQ back to the line Dobrotwor-Gliniany-Borka-Narajow; however, it was expected that their rear guards would offer stubborn resistance.

2nd Army begins its advance

Early on the 23rd, the k.u.k. IV Corps sent 27 and 32 ID and 43 LW ID to attack the Russian VII Corps on the line Barszczowice-Miklaszow. 31 ID, which had been north of the new boundary between 2nd and 11th Armies (the Jaryczowski Canal), moved south and was stationed behind 27 ID as IV Corps' reserve. Soon after 10:00 AM the 43 LW and 32 ID stormed the stubbornly defended village of Miklaszow, and then the Corps advanced to the east. 27 ID had to extend its line somewhat as it attacked, because the Beskid Corps, its neighbor on the left, was moving north toward Zoltance and thus left the left flank of the 27th open.

Under XIX Corps, 29 ID advanced toward Czyzykow; it was reinforced by half of 13 LW ID (the 26 LW Inf Bde of the latter Division was staying for the time being as a garrison at Lemberg). 34 ID took Dzwinogrod from the enemy; then it sent some men to the south to cut off the retreat of the Russians who were still resisting XVIII Corps (which had just 9 ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde) at the bend in the railroad at and south of Stare Siolo. For the same purpose, GM Berndt's Group (4 CD and 1 Lst Huss Bde) were moving up from the south.

V Corps (33 and 14 ID, 51 Hon ID) was just slightly hindered by the rear guards of Russian VI Corps as it moved directly to the east. However, only the Honved division reached its objective (Wybranowka), after advancing through Mikolajow early in the day and finding it abandoned. The march of the 33 and 14 ID was hindered by the wide forests; they reached Suchodol. 7 ID was following behind 51 Hon ID. Szurmay's Group (40 Hon ID and 128 Hon Inf Bde) crossed over to the north bank of the Dniester.
Thus by the evening of the 23rd the 2nd Army had brought its center, which had been hanging back, in line with the rest of its units. However, the day's objectives were reached only on the extreme southern wing.

Meanwhile the German 11th Army was preparing for its thrust to the north; to cover its open flank toward the east, it had been given the Beskid Corps. To attack northwest with all his strength and without interference on the Army's right flank, GFM Mackensen considered it imperative that the Beskid Corps, while guarding toward the east, should itself move to the north.

Mackensen got the AOK to agree to extend the 2nd Army's area of advance to Kamionka-Strumilowa. For this purpose, Böhm-Ermolli created a group under FML Edler von Kreysa to take over the sector hitherto held by the Beskid Corps; Kreysa would command 31 ID plus the half of 13 LW ID already attached to that Division. To replace the units it was losing, IV Corps was given GM Berndt's cavalry group; they would move to the Corps' northern wing by the 26th.

Since 2nd Army's area of advance was expanding to the north, and would probably extend again if the thrust of Mackensen's Army Group was successful, the importance of Böhm-Ermolli's north wing was increasing. Therefore the Army commander pulled 7 ID and Szurmay's Group into reserve and sent them to Lemberg. The sector formerly held by Szurmay was being reduced anyway as South Army advanced; the remainder of it was taken over by V Corps.

South Army begins its advance

After the German South Army reached the Dniester on the 20th, it had already been ordered to attack over this river. Based on the anticipated arrival by rail of G.Lt Kosch's X German Reserve Corps (101 and 105 ID) from Syrmia, the attack would start on the night of 22-23 June. By this time at least two-thirds of the Corps would be in place.

After crossing the river, GdI Linsingen wanted to assist the right wing of 2nd Army and to avoid getting entangled in the hills surrounding Zydaczow to the north, where new Russian fortifications had appeared. Therefore he shifted the main body of his Army to the right to concentrate between Zurawno and Halicz. From here he could strike the south flank of the enemy units facing 2nd Army. The Dniester would be crossed by GdI Gerok (with just k.u.k. 19 ID) on the right, X Res Corps in the center almost up to Zurawno, and GdI Bothmer (with German 1 ID
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 2

and 3 Gd ID) on the left at Zurawno itself. To cover the eastern flank, most of the troops under GdK Marschall would attack Halicz from the south, while Col. Bolzano's Brigade encircled the town from the north. On the Army's western flank were the units on the left of Bothmer's Corps (48 Res ID, 43 LW ID and 1 CD); they would be ready to parry any Russian thrust through Zydaczow toward the south. On the other hand, they would immediately pursue to the north bank of the Dniester if the Russians evacuated Zydaczow. 7th Army would support Linsingen's advance with an attack at Mariampol.

The troops of South Army attacked over the Dniester east of Zurawno on the 23rd in thick morning fog. They encountered a well-prepared enemy who tried to throw the allies back into the river with hefty counterattacks. The armies of Linsingen and Böhme-Ermolli, fighting shoulder to shoulder, would be engaged in six days of bloody fighting that would become known as the "Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka."

Despite the heavy Russian counterattacks, IR # 35 and 81 were able to hold onto the bridgehead over the river they had won at Perloucow. However, the Russians did great damage to 19 ID; they pushed parts of it back into the Dniester with substantial losses, especially in prisoners. The total casualties of the Division on the 23rd were 72 officers, 2600 men and 10 machine guns. X Res Corps and the two divisions (1 ID and 3 Gd ID) on Bothmer's right also encountered stubborn resistance and had to be content with gaining small bridgeheads. Bothmer's left wing, on the other hand, soon discovered that the Russians in their sector had withdrawn from the south bank of the Dniester during the night. They quickly pursued over the river and by evening had reached Chodorow, where there is a narrow passage between two lakes; on the morrow they expected to push ahead to Knihynicze and Fraga.

Actions on 24 and 25 June

GdI Bothmer now took advantage of the surprisingly quick advance of his left wing by also sending 3 Gd ID to the north bank of the Dniester through Zydaczow. This would increase the pressure on the flank of the Russians who were so stubbornly defending the north bank downstream from Zurawno. On the 24th, however, South Army was unable to gain ground either on the Dniester or on the Lug (by Chodorow); on the 25th the 11th Russian Army again offered very stout resistance in both sectors. Russian artillery supported the thrusts of their infantry against the allies' bridgeheads with a surprising quantity of ammunition. Thus IR
35 and 81, temporarily placed under GM Steiger, endured about sixteen counterattacks on the 25th. On the other hand, during this day almost all the infantry and part of the artillery of Gerok's, Kosch's and Bothmer's Corps was brought over to the north bank. 19 ID finally took firm possession of Martinow Str., X Res Corps stormed Bukaczowce, and Bothmer's 1 ID advanced 2 km past Zurawno. South Army had taken 3500 prisoners in the last three days; now they could continue to attack over the Lug and Dniester on the 26th with all their strength.

On the evening of the 23rd, Böhm-Ermolli learned of the quick advance of Bothmer's right wing and the possibility that these units would take Knihynicze and Fraga in the next few days. Therefore he urged his XIX, XVIII and V Corps to reach Kurowice and the Swirzbach on the 24th. The Russians, however, were prepared to fight 2nd Army on a line running from Dziewietniki along a low wooded ridge that lay between the Lug and the Bialy p. Brook, then through Dzwinogrod, Bilka Szlachecka and Jaryczow-Stary to Zoltance. Thus there was heavy fighting east of Lemberg on the 24th. V Corps attacked with 51 Hon ID toward Dziewietniki, with half of 14 ID toward Sokolowka, and with its main body (the other half of 14 ID plus 33 ID) toward Bobrka. Farther north, XVIII Corps sought to drive the enemy from the bend in the railroad at Podmanasterz. XIX Corps attacked the area between the roads to Bobrka and to Przemyslany. IV Corps advanced on both sides of the Brody railroad. Kreysa's Group began to relieve the Beskid Corps.

In most places the k.u.k. troops met very heavy resistance; the enemy obviously had no intention of relinquishing the field without a fight. Therefore Böhm-Ermolli's divisions didn't gain ground on the 24th. On this day the Army HQ was moved to Lemberg.

On the next day, FML Goglia's hard-fighting V Corps was able to break the line of VI Russian Corps near Bobrka, and threw them back to the western edge of this town. Farther south, the enemy was cleared away from the entire western bank of the Bialy p.; contact was made with Bothmer's north wing (38 Hon ID), which was still pinned down against the chain of ponds on the lower reaches of that brook.

XVIII Corps threw the north wing of VI Russian Corps out of two positions lying behind each other east to the railroad, and stormed ahead as far as Wodniki; however, they didn't completely break enemy resistance here. XIX Corps attacked at the junction between 11th and 8th Armies, and compelled the enemy to beat a
disorderly retreat in the area north and south of Dzwinogrod.

IV Corps had already deployed Berndt's Group on its north wing in front of Jaryczow-Stary. In the night of 24-25 June, the 27 ID was struck by a powerful counterattack and pushed back about 1 km. On the next day, Schmidt-Georgenegg's Corps attacked the stubborn VII and XVII Russian Corps, but was unsuccessful.

As instructed, Kreysa's Group brought 26 LW Inf Bde up from Lemberg and on the 24th deployed it at Zoltance and the area farther south. In the night of 24-25 June, the Russians successfully infiltrated the lines of the neighboring Beskid Corps; this led FML Kreysa to send a brigade of 32 ID to help out. Meanwhile the main body of his group advanced east through Kuzikow.

In the Army's reserves, the 7 ID reached Zydatycze on the 25th, while Szurmay's Group reached Winniki. The Army commander would use them to switch his main effort to the northern wing. On the 26th the units here would attack toward the line Dernow (5 km south of Kamionka-Strumilowa)-Zelechow Wk.-Nowosiolki-Kuwrowice-Swirzbach. This was also consistent with GFM Mackensen's request that the north wing of 2nd Army should strike toward Kamionka-Strumilowa in cooperation with the Beskid Corps. However, GdK von der Marwitz reported that he wouldn't start his thrust to Batiatycze until the 27th; therefore the goals of Kreysa's Group and of IV Corps were reduced by about 8 km.

c. Activity of Mackensen's Army Group, 23-28 June

1) Preparations to attack north

Mackensen received the order of the k.u.k. high command to pursue the retreating enemy toward the north on the evening of 22 June. At this time the k.u.k. 4th Army (VIII, XIV, X, IX and XVII Corps) held a line that started in the west at Tarnobrzeg on the Vistula; it crossed the lower San at Ulanow, and then ran along the swampy banks of the Tanew and along the Brusienka to Brusno. XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID) had left the front to serve as the Army's reserve; they assembled south of Rudnik whence they could counter any Russian thrust east of the San.

On the right of 4th Army was the German 11th Army (X, XXII Res, Guard, k.u.k. VI, and XLI Res Corps); they held a line extending east through Rawa Russka and Turynka to Dzibulki. The XLI Res
and a combined corps (over 8 Bav Res and 56 ID) were under orders to leave the front so they could be sent to France.

Until this point, 11th Army had advanced generally toward the east; the main mission of 4th Army since crossing the San had been to cover the flank of the 11th. Now both Armies had to make ready to attack to the north. GFM Mackensen issued the necessary orders on the 23rd; the offensive would start on the 26th.

Mackensen's need to cover his eastern flank

Because of the direction followed by the lines of communication and by the Bug River - which would be the border of Mackensen's right flank - the attacking troops would tend to veer toward the northwest. Therefore the first step would be to bring the eastern wing of German 11th Army farther toward the west. This would also give 11th Army a chance to envelop parts of the 3rd Russian Army, which were standing in front of the right wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army.

However, this would make it difficult for Mackensen's Army Group to solve the problem of guarding their flank toward the east. To completely defeat the Russians the thrust to the north would have to be always in motion, which meant that units would have to be detached to guard the eastern flank as it grew longer day by day. It was clear that the Beskid Corps, assigned from 2nd Army, would be insufficient for this task. GM Seeckt, Mackensen's Chief of Staff, expected the next prolonged Russian resistance to occur on the line Ivangorod-Wlodawa, where they could assemble forces from both west and east of the Vistula. He was worried that the Russians could find additional units and deploy them from the railroads through Brest-Litovsk and Kovel against the right flank of 11th Army, which was already about 150 km long. Although the AOK was going to extend the line of 2nd Army to Kamionka-Strumilowa as a counter-measure, GM Seeckt felt that this wouldn't be enough. On the 24th he suggested to Teschen that 2nd Army should take part in the northern offensive by advancing in echelon in the general direction of Vladimir-Volynsky. This maneuver would outflank the Russian position anchored on the Bug at Wlodawa, and later protect against any counterattack from Brest-Litovsk. Seeckt felt that 7th and South Armies would be strong enough to complete the recovery of east Galicia.

In the next few hours and days, however, it became apparent that the 8th, 11th and 9th Russian Armies intended to stubbornly defend east Galicia in strength. Therefore the AOK couldn't approve Seeckt's proposal for the use of 2nd Army, although in a response
on the 29th they recognized "that in the long term the eastern flank of 11th Army can be protected only by attacking." The AOK instead planned to relieve 1st Army from its position west of the Vistula and to move it to the Bug. Later - in the second half of July - they would in fact advance to Vladimir-Volynsky as Seeckt had envisioned.

Mackensen's order of 23 June directed 11th Army to prepare to advance early on the 26th along a broad front. The starting point would be a line from Brusno through Werchrata, Siedliska and the area north of Rawa Russka to Turynka. Since parts of this line were still in the enemy's hands, there would have to be preliminary fighting leading up to the 26th.

**Actions leading up to the offensive**

The immediate protection of the right flank of 11th Army was the task of 11 Bav ID and of the Beskid Corps (the latter reinforced by 11 Hon CD); they began to deploy on the line Zoltance-Turynka, relieving XLI Res Corps and 39 Hon ID; the Beskid Corps was taking the place of XLI Reserve and the Bavarians that of the Honveds. In the night of 24-25 June, however, the Russian VIII Corps counterattacked; only half of XLI Res Corps (81 Res ID) could be relieved. Near dawn on the 24th, parts of XXVIII Russian Corps launched a surprise attack on outposts of 39 Hon ID, and gained ground in the direction of Zolkiew; this also delayed the shifting of the allied units. Quick intervention by 11 Hon CD, which was sent to the Army's right wing, limited the enemy incursion. Reinforcements from 39 Hon ID and from 11 Bav ID, which were moving up to relieve the Honveds, restored the situation in the early afternoon. Thereafter the departure of 39 Hon ID took place smoothly; Arz's Corps (with 12 ID on the left and 39 Hon ID in echelon on the right) were able to reach their new positions by evening of the 25th without further fighting, as was the Guard Corps.

On the other hand, XXII Res Corps and GdI Emmich's X Corps (the latter reinforced by 22 ID), encountered stubborn resistance from Olochov's Group as they advanced to their allotted stations on a line just north of Rawa Russka and in front of Werchrata. They worked their way up to the enemy positions, but couldn't break through by the evening of the 25th. 107 and 119 ID were in the Army's reserve. 56 ID and 8 Bav Res ID, behind the Army's left wing, were ready to leave by train for the Western front.

413 TRANSLATOR's NOTE - The original says the response to Seeckt was dated on 29 July, but by that point the whole strategic situation had changed. Presumably the date should read 29 June.
4th Army HQ instructed their corps on the 23rd to hold onto their present positions until the new offensive started.

Meanwhile the XV and IX Russian Corps began to evacuate their position in front of the San-Vistula confluence in the night of 22-23 June. The k.u.k. VIII Corps, to which 40 Hon Inf Bde (reinforced by nine Landsturm battalions) had been attached, thrust ahead immediately. On the 23rd they reached the line Sokolniki-Turbia, and on the 24th their advance guard reached the San between its mouth and Ulanow, and began to prepare defenses along the embankment.

Since 11th Army would attack toward the northwest, while the offensive of 4th Army would be hampered by the swampy low ground along the Tanew, on the 24th GFM Mackensen told 4th Army that if the 3rd Russian Army retreated without fighting the k.u.k. units should follow them in the area between the Vistula and the line Brusno-Narol-Obrocz-Gorajec. On the other hand, if the enemy sought to hold their ground in front of 4th Army, the k.u.k. XVII Corps would join the attack by 11th Army. On the 25th, 4th Army HQ reinforced Kritek's XVII Corps with 41 Hon ID (which had been stationed behind IX Corps) and with half of 26 LW ID. They ordered XVII and the right wing of IX Corps to make an enveloping attack on the rising ground north of Zukow which dominated the Cieszanow-Narol-Belzec road. All the other corps would pin down the enemy and be ready to break through. XIV Corps, in reserve, was posted at Lezajsk.

Based on the decisions of the high command on the 24th, the Russian commands opposite Mackensen (3rd Army, Olochov's Group and the three right-wing corps of 8th Army), were to delay the allies until 4th and 2nd Armies were able to withdraw from the western to the eastern bank of the Vistula. No fixed timetable was set for the withdrawal. Until it was complete, 3rd Army and Olochov's Group were ordered by Alexeiev on the 25th "to guard the roads leading to Lublin, Cholm and Vladimir-Volynsky and to slowly fall back to the Opole-Krasnostaw-Vladimir Volynsky-Swiniuchy position, but only when pressured by the enemy." 414

2) The thrust to Tomaszow, 26-28 June

On 26 June only the left wing and center of 11th Army opened their attack; the right wing still had to stay in place to

414Zayontschovsky, "The Period of Mobile Warfare in the Russian-European Theater of Operations, 1914-1915" (in Russian, Moscow, 1929); p. 322
maintain the connection with 2nd Army.

On the left wing, Corps Emmich had already encountered heavy resistance from Olochov's Group on the 25th; after further stubborn fighting on the 26th they were able to reach their objectives - Miasteczko and Point # 390 - in the evening. On the other hand, Brussilov's XII and XXVIII Corps pulled back without offering resistance. Thus the XXII Res, Guard and k.u.k. VI Corps, along with 11 Bav ID, advanced to Teniatyska on the north bank of the Solokija, to the northern edge of the wide band of forests south of Uhnow, and to Poddouhe; in some places they had moved beyond their original objectives.

In the original plan, the right wing of 4th Army was to take part in a pincers attack against the Russians at Zukow along with Emmich. However, problems caused by the weather and terrain caused the relief of parts of 22 German ID by FML Schay's group415, which was fighting right next to 11th Army; this allowed 22 ID to concentrate its forces more toward the right. Schay joined the attack of the German division on the next day, the 27th; at this point, both allied units found the enemy positions empty. In the night the Russians had pulled back to a prepared line running from Ruda Rozaniecka through Plazow and the heights south of Narol to Chlewiska; toward evening the inner wings of the two allied Armies moved forward to attack this line. While 45 LW ID and the right wing of 10 ID were still pinned in front of the strongly-held Russian trenches, 11 ID stormed the burning town of Plazow. Around midnight the 41 Hon ID took the Bildstock Heights south of Narol. Farther east, Emmich's Corps broke the Russians' resistance at Chlewiska and in the evening his 22 ID was enveloping Narol.

These actions from 25 to 27 June - which the Russians called the "Battle of Tomaszow" - did more damage to the enemy, especially to Olochov's Group, than the allies recognized at the time. In the night of 27-28 June the Russians withdrew from 11th Army and the right wing of 4th Army, leaving weak rear guards behind. On the Tanew and the San, however, the 3rd Russian Army continued to hold their positions in apparently undiminished strength.

The allied troops pushed ahead after Olochov's Group and the XXIV Russian Corps. 10 ID of IX k.u.k. Corps reached the swamps and

415TRANSLATOR's NOTE - FML Schay commanded 41 Hon ID, and presumably this "group" was in reality most or all of his Division, since it appears as an entity later in the paragraph. The original at this point makes a confusing cross reference to "Schay's Group" as it existed in late May 1915 (when Schay and 41 Hon ID were still part of 1st Army); this has no real bearing on the situation or make-up of his command on 26 June.
forests on the south bank of the Sopot Brook on the 28th. 21 LW ID entered the line between 10 ID and 106 Lst ID. XVII Corps was only lightly engaged as it took the open high ground northwest of Narol.

Without fighting, the 11th German Army reached their day's objectives already at noon on the 28th; then they moved on to the line Grabowica-Grodyslawice-Ulhowek-Belz. However, this rapid march to the northwest made the question of guarding the right flank more urgent than ever. 119 ID had to be sent into the line between the Beskid Corps and 11 Bav ID; with the latter unit they now made up "Kneussl's Corps", and threw back the Russians at Kuliczow. It seemed inevitable that Mackensen's last reserve, 107 ID, would also have to be used on the 29th to guard the position toward the east; otherwise a gap would develop between Arz and Kneussl. At this point new orders came from Teschen regarding the continuing offensive and the need to strengthen Mackensen's attacking group; they are described below.

d. Advance of 1st Army toward Zawichost and Gliniany, 23-28 June

Based on the Stavka's orders of the 19th, Evert pulled the left wing of his 4th Army back toward Zawichost on the night of 22-23 June in coordination with the retreat of the right wing of 3rd Army. Early on the 23rd, therefore, the 1st Army as well as 7 CD, Bredow's Division and 3 LW ID of Woyrsch's Army were able to leave the trenches they had held since the Battle of Opatow and to follow the enemy. After 3:00 PM the 46 LW ID of Ist Corps occupied the Sandomierz bridgehead, given up by the Russians without a fight. In the evening the 16 Cav Bde (from 2 CD), reinforced by Landsturm infantry, stood on guard farther north. II Corps reached the line Pielaszow-Cmielow-Ostrowiec. The right wing of Woyrsch's Army crossed the Kamienna.

On the next day (the 24th), however, the pursuing troops already came up against the new position from Zawichost through Gliniany to Baltow, which Evert had prepared for his left wing. As instructed by FZM Puhallo, the two corps of 1st Army worked their way up to the Russian lines on the 25th; Ist Corps was also responsible for maintaining contact with the left wing of 1st Army. 7 CD was to the left of II Corps; Bredow and 3 LW ID fought several actions and then came up against well-entrenched Russians on the line Baltow-Sienno-Ilza.

1st Army's opponent was XXV Russian Corps, which had been reinforced by 13 CD, the Ural Coss Div, and two opolcheniye
brigades; the Corps' north wing reached through Kamienna. On the 23rd the allies were still bringing in prisoners from XXXI Corps, but a radio transmission revealed that the HQ of that Corps had moved to the area east of Kazimierz; apparently the majority of the troops had followed their HQ.

The task of 1st Army was now to break through the enemy lines in the direction Gliniany-Tarlow; the south wing of Woyrsch's Army would assist. From the start, however, the Russians demonstrated their resolve to hold their new lines. When Puhallo attacked on the 26th, his Ist Corps - which had already suffered substantial casualties during the pursuit actions - was stopped cold by the Russian positions. Under II Corps, GM Ritt. von Jemrich's 4 ID was initially able to break into the enemy trenches and beyond; in the night, however, they were forced to relinquish the ground they had won.

The high command now also issued explicit instructions for an attack on Tarlow. Preparations for the assault took up the 27th and 28th. On the latter date, it was decided at a generals' conference that the offensive would open on the 30th. However, the intervening 48 hours witnessed a substantial change in the situation.

e. The Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka - the decision (26-28 June)

On 26 June the k.u.k. 2nd Army renewed its attack. The men were proud due to their victories, including the capture of Lemberg, and because they had taken 11,000 prisoners and 23 machine guns between 21 and 25 June. However, considerable difficulties had to be overcome to continue the offensive. The infantry were very tired after the long, almost unbroken fighting. Moreover, their combat strength was greatly diminished. For example, 27 ID had just 4,000 riflemen; 40 Hon ID had 2600 and 128 Hon Inf Bde had just 800. HQ had received several requests for a two- or three-day pause so that replacements could enter the ranks as they arrived, but turned them down because of the general situation. There were also some ammunition shortages; the supplies couldn't keep up with the rapid advance. The enemy was quite active and mounted powerful counterattacks, especially at night. They struggled mainly against Böhm-Ermolli's north wing, apparently in an attempt to cover the loading of valuable military equipment at the station in Krasne. There were several reports that Russian reinforcements were approaching, but they couldn't be verified because hazy weather hampered the visibility of the aerial scouts.
On the 26th, FML Kreysa's Group pushed back VII Russian Corps, and by evening had nearly reached their immediate objectives. IV Corps was reinforced by 7 ID from the Army's reserve; they sent 14 Inf Bde to join GM Berndt's Group, which took Jaryczow Stary after a difficult and costly action. Then Berndt moved to the northeast to keep in line with Kreysa's Group. 27 ID, and then 32 ID and 43 LW ID, repulsed sharp Russian attacks during the night; they were all placed under the command of GM von Jordan-Rozwadowski (of the 43rd). Continuing to fight, they advanced to the Bilkabach.

Under XIX Corps the troops didn't get to rest during the night. In the darkness, 29 ID made a vain attempt to gain the eastern bank of the Bilka, while the south wing of 34 ID was driven again out of Kocurow (which had been captured on the 25th). The two exhausted divisions were content to hold their current lines on the 26th.

Böhm-Ermolli's southern wing won a complete success. During the night a Russian thrust from Kocurow routed a regiment of 1 Lst Inf Bde (XVIII Corps); however, in bloody fighting that lasted until the morning of 27 June Trollmann's right wing and the V Corps broke into the positions of VI Russian Corps in several places. The fighting was especially bitter in the villages on the Bialy potok, especially Bobrka. Early on the 27th, Goglia's Corps stood in triumph on the eastern bank of the Bialy potok.

For South Army, the Battle of Bukaczowce and Bobrka also reached its climax on 26 June. Gerok still had to withstand powerful relief thrusts by XI Russian Corps (of 9th Army), directed mainly at the crossing point at Martinow Stary. X Res Corps was engaged in a toilsome attack that lasted into the night, but finally thrust XXII Russian Corps back behind the Swirz brook in the sector Bukaczowce-Czerniow-Zuwro [Zurkow]. On their left, Bothmer's 1 German ID and 3 Gd ID crossed the railroad in the direction of Knihynicze; along with 48 Res ID, they opened the gap between the ponds at Chodorow. Now 38 Hon ID and 1 CD drove parts of XVIII Russian Corps, which were showing signs of breaking apart, out of Dziewietniki.

Linsingen and Böhm-Ermolli planned to force the enemy to retreat further on the 27th with a pincers attack by their Armies. To strengthen the southern part of the pincers, on the evening of the 26th Linsingen ordered 48 Res ID to move from Bothmer's Corps to Martinow Stary to join XXIV Res Corps. Böhm-Ermolli on the other hand sent his entire Army reserve to the northern wing -
Szurmay's Group HQ and 40 Hon ID were placed under IV Corps, 128 Hon Inf Bde under XVIII Corps.

However, when the allied troops moved up to attack early on the 27th they found only some rear guards in the trenches formerly occupied by the Russians. The enemy had pulled back. The pursuit began immediately; it involved numerous actions that in some places lasted until darkness fell. By evening, Kreysa's Group reached Jakimow; their left wing had advanced along the railroad in conjunction with the Beskid Corps. IV Corps moved ahead on both sides of the Jaryczowski Canal and the Feltew, and reached Zadworce. XIX Corps came to Wyzniany and Kurowice. Under XVIII Corps, 9 ID was still fighting at 7:00 PM, when they attacked and took the forested heights northeast of Swirz (town). Almost 2700 Russians had surrendered their arms to 2nd Army during the day.

The Russians had also given way to the South Army. Bothmer's Corps advanced to the Swirzbach without meeting much resistance. However, the attempts of X Res Corps to reach the east bank of the Swirz at Zurow and Bukaczowce were resisted by XXII Russian Corps. Bolzano's attempt to cut off Halicz from the north also failed; this was due to the opposition of Letschitzky's XI Corps, which did however evacuate its bridgehead over the Dniester and Halicz itself. Hofmann's Corps entered that town unopposed. Meanwhile air pilots had reported that numerous towns on the Gnila Lipa were on fire; this was a sign that the Russians didn't intend to offer prolonged resistance on the river and hadn't prepared any defensive positions. On the other hand, pilots from South Army noticed that trenches were being built on the Zlota Lipa. It could thus be assumed that the advance beyond the Gnila Lipa to the Zlota Lipa would be more or less unopposed.

The 2nd and South Armies continued their pursuit on 28 June; the former reached a line from Kamionka-Strumilowa through Kutkorz, Gliniany and Przemyslany to Firlejow. To create a new reserve force, Böhm-Ermolli ordered V and IV Corps to give up 51 Hon ID, 40 Hon ID and Berndt's Group as soon as it was feasible.

Kreysa's Group, reinforced by half of 7 ID (71 Inf Bde) from IV Corps, followed VIII Russian Corps; 31 ID met little resistance and moved quickly, arriving in front of the destroyed bridges at Kamionka-Strumilowa and Tadanie by evening. There they found that VIII Russian Corps occupying a hastily-prepared position. 13 LW ID thrust southeast to aid the north wing of IV Corps, which had found its advance barred at the heights northeast of Dziedzilow, stubbornly defended by the Russians. During the course of their attack, the Viennese Landwehr stormed the heights
southeast of Zelechow Wielki by evening. However, this pressure on the flank of XVII Russian Corps was insufficient to force them to abandon the positions they occupied, which projected to the west from Zelechow Wielki, then through Zadworze to the Peltew. Berndt's Group made repeated attacks which were costly and unsuccessful; also 27 ID and Szurmay's Group (engaged as the right wing of IV Corps, with 32 ID, 43 LW ID and 79 Hon Inf Bde⁴¹⁶) were limited to gaining a little ground in a few places. Similarly, after XIX Corps took a forward position southwest of Gliniany they came up against a strongly-held defensive line at the junction of the inner flanks of 8th and 11th Russian Armies. XVIII Corps crossed the Kurowice-Przemyslany road with 9 ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde and encountered the very strong defenses of Shcherbatchev's north wing in front of Lahodow; 128 Hon Inf Bde, as the Corps' reserve, followed up behind the lines in the center.

Because of the exhaustion of the troops, most of V Corps didn't begin its advance until 10:00 AM and 33 ID didn't start until noon. In the afternoon, the 33rd came upon VI Russian Corps in entrenchments in front of Przemyslany, and opened an attack; the advance of 14 ID had already come to an end at Ostalowice. 51 Hon ID worked its way forward to the west bank of the Gnila Lipa and captured Firlejow, where its line joined that of the South Army.

Linsingen's Army also followed up the defeated enemy and reached the west bank of the Gnila Lipa during the morning – Corps Bothmer on both sides of Rohatyn, X Res Corps at Koniuszki, and XXIV Res Corps (now reinforced by 48 Res ID) at Bursztyn. The main body of Hofmann's 55 ID crossed the Dniester at Halicz and occupied the railroad embankment farther north. There were Russians in position along the higher eastern bank of the Gnila Lipa, but they were believed to be just rear guards; therefore the corps of South Army opened a general attack over the river. The allied troops were hit by surprisingly heavy defensive fire; nonetheless, strong detachments of Bothmer's and Kosch's Corps had established a firm foothold east of the Gnila Lipa by evening.

**f. Combat on the Dniester, 23-28 June**

During the fighting around Lemberg, the main body of the k.u.k. 7th Army was deployed on the winding course of the Dniester between Uscie Zielone and Okna, holding the 9th Russian Army in

⁴¹⁶The other half of 40 Hon ID made up the Corps' reserve.
check. Part of the 7th guarded the line between the Dniester and Pruth, facing toward the east. Pflanzer-Baltin's 60,000 combat soldiers were divided into five corps groups in which the original order of battle had been completely broken up. This mixing of units from various commands was a result of the Army commander's extraordinarily active and energetic leadership style; he was always trying to get the greatest possible use out of the available units.

Thus on 22 June the 7th Army consisted of:

- XIII Corps (GdI Rhemen)
  - Group GM Weiss (commander of 9 Inf Bde) = 3 bns, 2 ½ sqdns and 7 batteries from 5 and 30 ID
  - Group FML Habermann (commander of 5 ID) = 11 bns, 1 sqdn and 19 batteries from 5, 30 and 36 ID
  - FML Czibulka's Corps (placed under Rhemen's XIII Corps HQ)
    - Group GM Stracker (commander of 15 ID) = 16 bns, 2 sqdns and 19 batteries from 5, 6, 15, 30 and 36 ID and from Lt Col Papp's Bde
    - Group FML Schreitter (commander of 36 ID) = 9 ½ bns, 2 sqdns and 16 batteries from 15 and 36 ID

- III Corps (FML Krautwald)
  - Group FML Schmidt-Fussina (commander of 22 LW ID) = 10 bns, 2 sqdns and 6 batteries from 15, 22 and 28 ID
  - Group GM Hinke (commander of 28 ID) = 6 bns, 3 sqdns and 5 batteries of 28 ID
  - Group FML Kaiser (commander of 30 ID) = 10 bns, 2 sqdns and 9 ½ batteries of 22, 28 and 30 ID and from Lt Col Bekesi's Lst Inf Bde

- FML Benigni's Group = The main body of 6 ID (FML Schönburg) plus parts of 28, 30 and 36 ID and of 42 Hon ID; also 5 Hon CD, 6, 8 and 10 CD; total strength was 20 bns, 63 sqdns, 11 batteries

- XI Corps (FML Korda) = The main body of 42 Hon ID (FML Salis-Seewis), 2 Bde of the Polish Legion, main body of Lt Col Papp's Bde; total strength was 28 bns, 10 sqdns, 9 ½ batteries

While the South Army prepared to attack over the Dniester in the Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka, Pflanzer-Baltin was supposed to help by thrusting over the river at Mariampol. However, he had just seven battalions in this 20 km long sector (between Nizniow and the Army's western border). The tense situation in the Dniester bend at Koropiec made it impossible to send any reinforcements. Therefore 7th Army HQ would restrict their activity to a feint attack at Mariampol while spreading false information about impending troop concentrations on their western wing. Their concerns about the situation were justified on the night of 21-22 June, when the Russians broke through GM Stracker's Group at
Kosmierzyn. On the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, however, a counterattack enveloped the enemy, captured 600 prisoners, and restored the situation.

Spies reported to the HQ at Kolomea that strong Russian forces were arriving on the Bessarabian border from Odessa. It was difficult to brush these reports aside, especially since the enemy stormed the position of Papp's Brigade on the evening of the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, although without success.

GM Weiss' Group made their feint attack over the Dniester at Mariampol on the 24\textsuperscript{th}; it failed. Further efforts were canceled due to the arrival of strong enemy forces in the area.

On the 25\textsuperscript{th}, Letschitzky attacked Benigni's Group in an effort to help 11\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} Armies, which were sore-pressed at Bukaczowce-Bobrka. Here the III Russian Cavalry Corps deceived the defenders when the first row of troops moved forward with weapons concealed and their hands in the air. At the last moment the Russians reached for grenades they'd concealed in their coats. They overran a Honved Hussar Regiment which had been stationed on a wooded heigh along the border east of Dobronoutz. FML Benigni immediately led two cavalry brigades and a regiment from 42 Hon ID in a counterattack, and by evening the enemy was again held in check.

Russian reinforcements arrived opposite the k.u.k. III Corps. However, on the 27\textsuperscript{th} it was learned that the HQ staffs of XI and XXX Russian Corps had moved back to Buczacz; this confirmed speculation that Shcherbatchev's retreating Army would halt only briefly on the Gnila Lipa. To prepare either for a possible enemy assault on Krautwald's III Corps or to exploit the favorable general situation, Pflanzer-Baltin pulled all available units from the other groups. He used them to create an Army reserve of five battalions and ten batteries at Horodenka. Pflanzer planned to join the advance of South Army, as soon as they crossed the Gnila Lipa, with a powerful thrust north from Horodenka. He hoped to thus make it impossible for the enemy to halt behind the Zlota Lipa. However, more than two weeks would pass before he would have an opportunity to implement this plan.

2. The thrusts to the Zlota Lipa and through Krasnik and Zamosc, 28 June to 13 July

a. The prospects of the high commands at the end of June
The allies

The development of the military situation in the East in the last week of June - Mackensen's thrust through Tomaszow and the Russians' retreat behind the Gnila Lipa - had confirmed the correctness of the plans which the allied chiefs of staff had made on the 20\textsuperscript{th}. They held further conferences about implementing the plans, including one at Teschen on 27 June. The 4\textsuperscript{th} and 11\textsuperscript{th} Armies, under the overall command of GFM Mackensen, would continue to thrust north between the Bug and the Vistula.

Discussions regarding details of the operation centered many times on the difficulties presented by the geography of the theater; these were the same problems which had hampered the initial Aus-Hung. campaign the year before. On 28 June both Chiefs of Staff revisited the issues of how to keep fresh troops constantly flowing to the main attack, and how to secure the right flank. From the beginning, Falkenhayn had wanted 7\textsuperscript{th} and South Armies to assume static defensive positions to guard toward the east; the latter Army should be stretched as far as possible toward the north, which might free 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army to join the main offensive. Conrad didn't agree. Based on the experiences of the August 1914 battles, he didn't want to create a continuous, static defensive front. He preferred to have a mobile battle group following 11\textsuperscript{th} Army in echelon toward the right; it would carry out the role envisioned at the start of the war for Brudermann's Army and Böhm-Ermolli's corps.

There was still no final resolution of this issue. The first priority was to give the northern thrust more room to maneuver by pushing the flank guards farther to the east. Since both Linsingen's and Böhm-Ermolli's Armies were attacking toward the northeast, they were taking Mackensen's needs into account. Moreover, reserves were assembling behind the left wing of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army which would allow that command to extend its flank toward the north. Finally, it was hoped that in the next few days the 1\textsuperscript{st} Army together with the right wing of Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung would push the enemy back to the Vistula on both sides of the lower Kamienna. Once this was accomplished, most of 1\textsuperscript{st} Army would no longer be needed west of the Vistula and could be sent to east Galicia. There they would be available to either reinforce the main offensive or further extend the line of flank guards.

These considerations lay behind the "Directives for Continuing the Operation" which were issued on the evening of the 28\textsuperscript{th}:

"GFM Mackensen will attack with 11\textsuperscript{th} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Armies to the..."
right of the Vistula, between the Vistula and Bug toward the north.

- 2nd Army will follow the enemy retreating toward the northeast, initially to Kamionka-Strumilowa (inclusive)-Busk and to the Zlota Lipa as far as Dunajow (inclusive). They will maintain strong reserves on the north wing to secure the stretch of the Bug up to the mouth of the Rata. Further forces will later be brought to this wing to create an army which will advance through Sokal and Radziechow; it will also be ready to intervene either to the right or left as needed.

- South Army will advance over the Gnila Lipa to the Zlota Lipa downstream from Dunajow.

- 7th Army will secure, as earlier, the right flank of the front and ensure the safety of Czernowitz.

- 1st Army will break through the Russian position south of the Kamienna, in the direction of Tarlow. Then they will be sent by rail through Lemberg as soon as possible.

- Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung will take over the whole front from the Pilica to the Vistula; if the Russians withdraw units from this sector they will attack; if the enemy withdraws to the Vistula they will pursue."

To make Mackensen's Army Group as strong as possible, GO Conrad persuaded the OHL at Pless to leave XLI Res Corps with 11th Army rather than shipping it to France.

The Russians

At about the same time that these measures for continuing the offensive were undertaken at Teschen and Pless, the Russians' higher command levels were also making decisions of great significance.

After the unfavorable outcome of the Battle of Bukaczowce-Bobrka on the Southwest Front, early on the 27th General Ivanov had to pull back the left wing of 8th Army, all of the 11th, and the right wing corps of the 9th Army behind the Bug south of the mouth of the Rata, and behind the Gnila Lipa. It is impossible to determine from the existing Russian literature whether they planned to offer sustained resistance here or behind the Zlota Lipa. Anyway, Ivanov felt there was a strong threat to his right wing and therefore ordered 8th Army to pull XXI Corps back to Dubno as a reserve for Southwest Front HQ. Between the Dniester and Pruth, Letschitzky's left wing canceled its offensive because of the reported appearance of enemy reinforcements at Czernowitz.
The Northwest Front had now been expanded to include 3rd Army and Olochov's Group. For the time being, the Armies between the Baltic Sea and the Pilica were instructed to hold their lines. However, General Alexeiev was having positions constructed on the Narew so that if necessary he could pull 12th and 1st Armies back to this shorter line, which would require fewer troops. This would provide him reserves to help his south flank (3rd Army and Olochov's Group), which were threatened by new dangers. He had already ordered 12th and 1st Armies to pull the Guard and II Siberian Corps from the line and to send them to Ostrow (south of Lomza) at the disposition of Front HQ. In front of Warsaw, the 2nd Army was prepared to retreat to the Blonie-Grojec position; after this was accomplished it could give up two of its corps. XXVII Corps was designated as the garrison of Nowogeorgievsk. 4th Army, which had pulled its left wing back to the line Ilza-Zawichost, had sent XXXI Corps as a reserve to the Opole-Kazimierz area.

On 26 June, General Alexeiev also released a study concerning the dangers caused by continuing German attacks in Courland. He felt that an army of six to seven corps was needed to defend this area; Olochov's Group could provide the kernel of this new force, if needed.417

Finally Alexeiev, who now bore the main burden of conducting operations, instructed the military railroad offices to have a large number of trains ready for shipment of the strategic reserves.

Thus the HQ of Northwest Front at Siedlec was beset by serious concerns. The principal questions were:
. Where would the allies make their next attack?
. Would there be enough troops and time to parry the attack?

b. The Russians abandon the San-Tanew line, 29-30 June

Because of the quick advance of the German 11th Army and the right wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army, the Russian position on the Tanew had been outflanked. Their 3rd Army therefore could no longer hold its position along this river with the swamps in its rear. On the night of 28-29 June, the troops of 3rd Army began their carefully prepared retreat to the heights along the north and northeast edge of the Tanew area.

When Joseph Ferdinand's troops became aware early on the 29th

that the Russians had pulled back, they began to pursue in accordance with the very detailed orders which had already been issued by Army HQ. They advanced on the same roads which Dankl's Army had used ten months earlier before the Battle of Krasnik. Pausing just for brief rest, they marched day and night through the broad forests and swamps. Early on the 30th, 4th Army climbed the rim of high land at the edge of the swamps; although this terrain was very suitable for defense, and dominated the routes leading out of the Tanew region, they didn't encounter serious resistance. This seemed to confirm the opinion at 4th Army HQ that the Russian 3rd Army was retreating to Lublin. Weak enemy rear guards were soon driven away. On the evening of the 30th, the leading divisions of VIII, X, IX and XVII Corps reached the line Swieciechow-Stany-Pilatka-Goraj-Gorajec. XIV Corps, following the Army's right wing, was at Bilgoraj. Scouting parties from 4th Army now ascertained that the Russian trenches on the north bank of the Wyznica and the Por, which had been spotted by pilots several days earlier, had been occupied, as were some positions lying immediately to the south. Aerial reconnaissance also identified large concentrations of troops east of Jozefow and Solec; the high command believed they were from XXXI Corps, which had come over from the west bank of the Vistula.

The four corps on the left of 11th Army followed the Russians on the 29th in long marches, most of which didn't involve combat; they came up to the line Obrocz-Lipsko-Labunie-Tyszowce-Telatyn. Kneussl's Corps had already opened the road in the night of 28-29 June by hurling back the Russians who tried to stand their ground near Kuliczow and Sielec; by evening the Corps was engaged in front of the crossing-points on the Solokija at Belz and Waniow. The main body of the Beskid Corps came up to the strongly-constructed bridgehead over the Bug at Dobrotwor, which the Russians had no intention of evacuating. Opposite the inner wings of von der Marwitz' and Kneussl's Corps, Brussilov's right wing evacuated the west bank of the river. The north wing of 11th Army discovered that the Russian positions in their sector covered the north bank of the upper Por and the confluence of the Wolica with the Wieprz, then extended through Grabowiec to a bridgehead over the Huczwa at Hrubieszow and down to the Bug at Krylow.

As Mackensen's Army Group advanced north, flank protection toward the east became more difficult each day. Von der Marwitz' and Kneussl's Corps were responsible for this duty, and the latter had already been reinforced by 107 ID from 11th Army's reserve. The time had arrived when the majority of the Army would have to
be used to protect the Army Group toward the east, leaving only
the troops on the left wing available to thrust north. An order
issued by the Gneralfeldmarschall to 11\textsuperscript{th} Army on the evening of
the 30\textsuperscript{th} clearly recognized the situation: "On 1 July, XXII Res
Corps and Emmich's Corps will continue to advance north. The
right wing will halt until 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army is in a position to free up
parts of the Beskid Corps; this will probably occur in the night
of 3-4 July. 4\textsuperscript{th} Army will push on toward the north."

Thus 11\textsuperscript{th} Army had six corps at the front but only two could
continue to attack; their offensive strength was dissipating.
The only force Mackensen had available to add fresh impetus to
the attack was XLI Res Corps in the Army's reserve; it moved up
to Dobrosin and Rzyczki. Thus the burden of the offensive to the
north naturally passed to 4\textsuperscript{th} Army. When the operation started,
11\textsuperscript{th} Army had opened the roads to the north for the 4\textsuperscript{th}; now the
latter Army would have to make it easier for the 11\textsuperscript{th} to move
forward while rendering the Russian positions west of the Vistula
untenable. Therefore GFM Mackensen issued the following order to
4\textsuperscript{th} Army on 30 June: "The Army's task is to quickly advance with
its left wing toward the Vistula and its right toward Lublin.
They will make it impossible for the enemy to remain on the west
bank of the Vistula, and will hurl the forces east of the river
back as far as possible to the north. The left wing of 11\textsuperscript{th} Army
will take part in this advance, while the right remains deployed
in echelon toward the Bug until such time as fresh forces can
protect the flank in this direction."

The strong pressure which 11\textsuperscript{th} German Army directed against
Olochov's Group led General Alexeiev to believe that German
reinforcements had arrived. He now took extensive measures to
strengthen his south wing between the Vistula and Bug. On the
29\textsuperscript{th} he ordered Evert's 4\textsuperscript{th} Army "to destroy the crossings at
Annopol and to pull his left wing into the bridgehead [over the
Vistula] opposite Jozefow." 3\textsuperscript{rd} Russian Army, which on this day
was retreating through the Tanew region, would "base its center
and left wing on the positions from Urzedow through Krasnik to
Szczezbrzeszyn." Since the right wing of Olochov's Group was
supposed to dig in at Grabowiec, implementation of this order
would create a gap between the two commands, which had to be
plugged by a reinforced cavalry division until the arrival of
reserves. However, there was no enemy activity in this sector.
Another gap, of about 50 km, developed between Olochov's left
wing (which had pulled back to Krylow) and the right wing of
Brussilov at Sokal. Since no infantry was immediately available,
the area was watched only by some cavalry. Here it was possible
that the enemy could break through toward Vladimir Volynsky. To
prevent this development, XXXI Corps was ordered to the area, and
entrained southeast of Ivangošod. The Guard Corps, which had
been taken from 12th Army, was ordered to the Bug between
Hrubieszow and Sokal. II Siberian Corps, in the Stavka's reserve
at the disposal of the Grand Duke-Generalissimo, went to Rejowiec
(15 km southwest of Cholm); 13 CD was ordered to back up 4th
Army.  

Russian intelligence believed there were 22 German divisions in
Galicia; they identified 11 or 12 divisions in the Belz-Tomaszow
area alone. This caused the Russian leaders to build a large
reserve at Brest-Litovsk on the 30th; it would consist of VI
Siberian Corps from 2nd Army plus one infantry division apiece
from 5th and 10th Armies. 

The Russian high command was thus prepared to hold the line
Jozefow-Hrubieszow (covering the important Ivangošod-Lublin-Cholm
railroad) and then the lines along the Bug, Gnila Lipa and the
Dniester. They hoped to thwart the allied attack by following
the guidelines issued just before the evacuation of Lemberg.

**c. The Battle of the Gnila Lipa and pursuit to the Zlota Lipa**

While Mackensen's Army Group prepared to advance between the Bug
and Vistula, as the left wing of the Aus-Hung. forces had in
August 1914, the Armies of Böhm-Ermolli and Linsingen - covered
on their right by 7th Army - sought to win more ground for the
main attack to maneuver.

**29-30 June**

On the 29th, the k.u.k. 2nd Army was engaged in heavy actions in
most of the sectors it had reached on the evening of the 28th.
Shortly before noon, Army HQ gave the five corps groups their
objectives, which lay to the northeast on a line between Dunajow
and Kamionka-Strumilowa. 40 and 51 Hon ID, 7 ID, 4 CD and 1 Lst
Huss Bde were supposed to leave the line. 40 Hon ID, 7 ID and 4
CD made up a new Group under Szurmay; in accordance with the high
command's orders on the 28th, the Group would take over the front
as far as the Rata from the main body of 11th Army's Beskid
Corps.

GFM Mackensen attached great importance to this change because
the length of his line was growing while his resources were

---

418Zayontschovsky, "The war of movement 1914 and 1915", p. 323
419Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 69
diminishing. He wanted the units of the Beskid Corps in the southern half of the sector to be relieved by the 29th, and those in the northern half (up to the mouth of the Rata) by the evening of the 30th. At this point, however, Böhme-Ermolli's own front was heavily engaged and he had just two brigades left in reserve; therefore he doubted that he could complete the redeployment of Szurmay's Group before 3 July, the day on which he hoped to have reached the line Busk-Zlota Lipa. In the event, Böhme-Ermolli was proved to be correct.

During 29 June, the V Corps gained a foothold on the east bank of the Gnila Lipa at Firlejow, Brzuchowice and Wolkow with 51 Hon ID and 14 ID. However, the attackers met determined resistance from the inner wings of XVIII and VI Russian Corps. 33 ID was engaged in a continuing fire fight at Przemyslany.

Under the k.u.k. XVIII Corps, 9 ID and parts of 1 Lst Inf Bde were unsuccessful in attacks against the positions on the Ciemna Heights # 386 southwest of Lahodow, defended by a reserve division from VI Russian Corps. 128 Hon Inf Bde and the rest of 1 Lst Inf Bde lay behind the wings in reserve.

XIX Corps suffered badly from flanking fire by the batteries on the Ciemna, which now had sufficient ammunition. If the neighboring XVIII Corps had taken the heights, 34 ID would have been able to thrust forward on both sides of the road to Zloczow. Instead, however, the heavy mortar fire prevented them from breaking into the enemy trenches. Throughout the day numerous Russian counterattacks were fended off.

Under IV Corps, 43 LW ID advanced in conjunction with 29 ID (of XIX Corps). 32 ID launched two attacks against VII Russian Corps on its own initiative, but was repulsed. Farther north, 27 ID held off several Russian thrusts; Berndt's Group, supported by detachments from 13 LW ID (fighting on a long front under Kreysa's Group), was still holding its lines with a very inadequate number of men. At Tadanie and Kamionka-Strumilowa, 31 ID just exchanged a few shots with the Russians on the other side of the Bug. The half of 7 ID stationed in this area stayed in the second line.

The Army continued to attack on 30 June. V Corps wanted to break the Russian lines with 51 Hon ID and 14 ID and then have 33 ID roll up the enemy from the south. 14 ID was able to get all of its regiments over the Gnila Lipa; at 10:00 AM, FML Goglia ordered his Corps to continue to advance in the Dunajow-Wisniowczyk area. However, the offensive stalled in the swampy
ground of the valley, and artillery ammunition began to run short. Toward evening the Russians received reinforcements, so V Corps halted the attack; only some further parts of 51 Hon ID were able to gain the east bank of the Gnila Lipa during the night.

Farther north the Ciemna Heights were still the principal battleground of XVIII and XIX Corps. Since the Heights dominated the sector of XIX Corps like a glacis, FML Trollmann proposed that both corps should attack them. Army HQ concurred, and put GdK Ziegler in charge of the inner wings of the corps for this attack. Around 6:15 PM the Austro-German Landsturm IR # 1 and 2 and the Czech IR # 102 stormed the first lines of the deep Russian position but couldn't break through completely. To their left, 34 ID reached the Bildstock Heights just north of the Ciemna during the night of 30 June-1 July; however, a furious Russian counterattack forced them to give up the ground they had won.

Under IV Corps and FML Kreysa's Group, only GM Berndt (reinforced by 79 Hon Inf Bde) and 13 LW ID won substantial successes at Dziedzilow; then they also came up against new Russian positions. FML Schmidt-Georgenegg, commanding IV Corps, felt that these local successes meant that the enemy front was crumbling. Army HQ approved his proposal for a general offensive on 3 July; he would also control Kreysa's Group, and would commit five infantry divisions (43 LW, 32 and 27, 40 Hon and 13 LW) plus Berndt's Group. Schmidt-Georgenegg's offensive was supposed to break though to Busk and Krasne.

South Army was also involved in relatively stubborn fighting during these two days of battle. On 28 June the Army had reached the lower Gnila Lipa and sent several detachments over the river in the evening. GdI Linsingen believed he was opposed by just XXII Russian Corps, and that the enemy main body was continuing its retreat to the east and northeast. He was strengthened in this belief when intercepted radio messages revealed that the HQ of XI and XXX Russian Corps had pulled back to Buczacz. Therefore Linsingen ordered his corps to continue to attack on the 29th. He planned to move X Res Corps and 1 CD to Halicz on this right wing, apparently to increase the pressure against the enemy from the south.

However, on 29 June the German and Aus-Hung. battalions which had crossed the Gnila Lipa encountered stronger resistance than expected; therefore the transfer of X Res Corps was put on hold. This unit and Bothmer's Corps were able to work their way forward.
on the 29th almost up to the enemy's stubbornly-defended trenches. Under Gerok's Corps, the k.u.k. 19 ID fought their way to the east bank at Bursztyn. Bolzano's Brigade and the 55 ID of Hofmann's Corps attacked over the Gnila Lipa on the railroad embankment north of Halicz. 5 German CD was preparing to cross the Dniester at Mariampol.

During the night many Russian counterattacks had to be repulsed. The hot actions continued on the 30th. 55 ID crossed the Gnila Lipa just north of its mouth; despite fierce resistance from XI Russian Corps, the Division took the line of the former Halicz bridgehead by evening. Bolzano pushed up to Bolszowe. 5 CD canceled its attempt to cross the Dniester because of heavy Russian fire. All of the infantry of Gerok's two divisions (48 Res and 19) passed over to the east bank; they planned to storm the enemy positions on the next morning. Kosch's Corps had already begun its attack on the afternoon of the 30th with success. The right wing and center of Bothmer's Corps also gained some ground in a continuing offensive just east and north of Rohatyn.

1 July

On 1 July the only successful component of 2nd Army was GdK Ziegler's attacking group at Lahodow. After fighting throughout the day without gaining any substantial ground, in the following night the 128 Hon Inf Bde and the south Bohemian IR # 11 (the oldest in the Army) threw the enemy off the heights to the east of Lahodow.

Meanwhile the south wing of 51 Hon ID was drawn into the defensive actions which the left wing and center of Linsingen's waged in the morning between Bursztyn and Firlejow; they had been attacked by the center and south wing of 11th Russian Army. The Russian offensive was successful only in the northernmost sector, where they pushed back the left wing of Bothmer's 38 Hon ID and especially 51 Hon ID behind the Gnila Lipa. Exaggerated reports regarding the fate of the latter division made the commander of South Army concerned about his northern wing and led him to call for help from the k.u.k. high command. The AOK, in turn, advised 2nd Army that if necessary they should stay in place behind Mackensen's right wing until the arrival of 1st Army. GdK Böhm-Ermolli was worried about the exhaustion of his troops (who'd lost another 10,000 men in the last four days) and about a newly critical shortage of ammunition; therefore he

420TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Thus the only area in which the Russians were successful was where they faced Hungarian rather than German units.
didn't hesitate to go along with the instructions of the high command. On the evening of 1 July he ordered his corps to go over to the defensive in the most suitable positions. For tactical reasons the inner wings of XVIII and XIX Corps therefore abandoned the ground they had won on the Ciemna Heights. One brigade from XIX Corps, 40 Hon ID and 4 CD (with 1 Lst Huss Bde) became the reserves of Army HQ.

Meanwhile, however, the tide of the battle had turned on the lower Gnila Lipa. Aerial reconnaissance had already confirmed the estimate of the allies that the attack by 11th Russian Army had been designed mainly to make it easier for the massive supply trains to evacuate the Narajowka valley. Soon thereafter, Bothmer's and Kosch's Corps as well as Gerok's k.u.k. 19 ID launched decisive attacks which went on until darkness fell; they drove the enemy from the line Point # 356 (northeast of Bursztyn)-Pukow-Point # 426 (4 km northwest of Pukow). This forced the commander of the Russian Southwest Front to abandon the defensive front on the Gnila Lipa. Ivanov felt it was necessary to withdraw the corps in this area to the positions which he'd prepared behind the Zlota Lipa. In the night of 1-2 July the XI Corps of 9th Russian Army plus the XXII and XVIII Corps of Shcherbatchev's 11th Army began to retreat.

2-5 July: Pursuit to the Zlota Lipa

Early on 2 July, the South Army discovered that the Russians were being forced to retreat, mainly because of Gerok's success during the night. They immediately began to pursue. GdI Linsingen brought the German 5 CD, hitherto detached to guard the Dniester downstream from Jezupol, over the river on his right wing. G.Lt Kosch's X Res Corps, which had left the front, would also move to this wing; it was hoped that their advance would be joined by Pflanzer's left.

On this first day of the pursuit, the Russians made a stand on the line Horozanka-Hnilcze-Lipnica Gora and further upstream on the Narajowka, where they stayed throughout the 3rd.

In 2nd Army's sector, the enemy evacuated only their positions opposite 51 Hon ID early on 2 July. However the commander of V Corps, FML Goglia, believed that the moment had arrived to lead his entire corps as quickly as possible to the heights east of the Gnila Lipa; from this point he could roll up the Russian lines opposite the center of the Army. The Army's HQ approved his decision, and around 11:00 AM advised the other corps that they should once more go over to the offensive "as soon as
conditions are even half-way favorable." The objective was the line Dunajow-Gologory-BusK-Kamionka Strumilowa. However, the enemy showed no inclination on the 2nd or 3rd to follow the example of their comrades farther south. V Corps moved forward only slowly in the fighting around the Koleso Heights, even though they gained some assistance from the pressure exerted by South Army. During the 3rd, the Russians attacked the 75 Bde of 38 Hon ID as it advanced on Linsingen's north wing, and drove it back; V Corps was unable to assist the neighboring Brigade.

At this time the need to relieve the portions of the Beskid Corps stationed between Kamionka-Strumilowa and the Rata continued to be a major concern of 2nd Army HQ. The first instructions to relieve them using Szurmay's reinforced corps (7 ID, 40 Hon ID, 4 CD) were issued at noon on the 2nd. Army HQ had also asked for further clarification of the situation from the AOK; in the evening some explicit directions arrived from Teschen. The main thrust of the offensive would take place between the Bug and Vistula, and for this purpose as many units as possible were needed by 11th Army, which held a line of 170 km with 150,000 riflemen. "To make this possible without endangering the eastern front of 2nd Army, three divisions will be sent from 1st Army; the first of these (46 LW ID) should arrive at Lemberg in the morning of 4 July." Because of these reinforcements, the high command saw "no danger in having 2nd Army temporarily extend its front [to relieve] units of the Beskid Corps."

In another order issued in the afternoon of 3 July the high command again referred to the overriding importance of the thrust to the north; at present there were insufficient forces for a simultaneous major offensive in eastern Galicia. South Army should be content with reaching the Zlota Lipa, and would stretch its northern wing to the line Wolkow-Ciemierzynce to support 2nd Army. Similarly, Böhm-Ermolli's Army would extend itself to Kamionka-Strumilowa; after Szurmay took over the sector held by the Beskid Corps, he would come under control of 1st Army. The portions of the Beskid Corps between the Rata and Sokal would be relieved by 46 LW ID. The rest of 1st Army would be deployed on the Bug between Kamionka-Strumilowa and Sokal in accordance with the AOK's orders of 28 June. The three Armies on the right wing would use the next few days to reorganize their units, absorb replacements and build up their ammunition. They should be ready to resume the offensive in eastern Galicia when the high command felt that the time was ripe. The energetic commander of 7th Army had enquired about the feasibility of attacking east of the Strypa toward the north; he was told to prepare for this operation. This might punch a hole into the Russian front along
the Dniester which Pflanzer-Baltin's cavalry could exploit in a deep exploitation. The k.u.k. 3 CD, which had been serving north of the lower Vistula under Gallwitz' German Army, was now ordered to reinforce 7th Army's horsemen for this purpose.

On the evening of 3 July, GdK Böhm-Ermolli learned that the 11th Army had halted their offensive soon after it began and wouldn't resume until the arrival of 1st Army. Therefore the commander of 2nd Army asked that the relief of the Beskid Corps by Szurmay should also be postponed. This was desirable because:
. Szurmay's troops would have to march up to 50 km to take over the positions of the Beskid Corps; and
. the necessary regrouping of the Army's other units which this move entailed shouldn't take place during the currently unclear situation. (XIX Corps would be obliged to stretch its line to the Peltew to support the weakened IV Corps).
However, Böhm-Ermolli was informed that Szurmay was still expected to take over the entire front from Kamionka-Strumilowa through Sielec to Krystynopol during the 5th.

Meanwhile, however, the situation of 2nd Army hadn't substantially improved. Its attack was still lagging behind that of the South Army, which was fighting under better conditions. Under the latter Army, XXIV Res Corps advanced to the heights west of the Zlota Lipa during the night of 3-4 July. At the same time, Hofmann's Corps stormed the village of Hnilcze after some difficulty in bringing up their artillery. During the pursuit of the defeated enemy, 55 ID reached the Zlota Lipa at Zawalow around noon, while Bolzano's Brigade reached the river near Rudniki. Farther north, Bothmer's Corps (reinforced by 1 CD) was approaching the river; FML Goglia was assembling reserves on his right wing to ensure that South and 2nd Armies remained connected. On Linsingen's south wing, 5 German CD at Toustobaby was engaged only with Russian rear guards, who finally abandoned the west bank of the Zlota Lipa two days later. Pflanzer-Baltin assembled a group of three battalions and three batteries on his flank under Col Hauser (of IR # 13); on the 4th they pushed the Russians over the Zlota Lipa east of Uscie Zielone.

The success of South Army on 3 July forced Ivanov to also pull back the inner wings of 11th and 8th Armies. If they were to stay in their current positions so far to the west, they ran the risk of encirclement; therefore they would have to go back to the shorter and safer line from Kamionka-Strumilowa to Dunajow. In some places, Böhm-Ermolli's troops noticed that this withdrawal had already begun around 2:00 AM on the 4th. The Austro-Hungarians immediately began to pursue; Army HQ ordered that they
should reach the new line chosen by Ivanov during the 5th. V Corps did reach the Zlota Lipa during the day with 14 and 33 ID between Ciemierzynce and Wisniowczyk (51 Hon ID was still hanging back somewhat west of Dunajow). Farther north, XVIII Corps reached the new Russian positions near Tredowacz, and XIX Corps did so between that town and Bortkow. The advance of IV Corps and Kreysa's Group was more difficult. (On the 5th, command over the latter group was assumed by FML Czibulka, who came from 7th Army along with a corps HQ staff.) The troops encountered resistance from the Russians in some forests that they had to cross, and when they reached the Bug they found the enemy had dug into well constructed bridgeheads west of the river at Busk, Derewlany and Spas.

Linsingen was inclined to believe that the Russians wouldn't offer prolonged resistance in the positions on the Zlota Lipa, but Böhm-Ermolli's HQ didn't agree. In an order issued on the evening of the 4th, the high command went along with Linsingen's views. They stated that if the Russians continued to retreat they should be pursued only to the Strypa and to the line Zborow-Zloczow-Busk. The order was also a sign that Falkenhayn's concept of creating a stationary force to guard the eastern flank had triumphed over Conrad's plan of creating a mobile force for that purpose. However, the k.u.k. high command wanted to do everything possible to ensure the success of the main offensive. After consultation with Pless, they instructed 2nd Army to immediately transfer 13 LW ID to the control of 1st Army (it would thus be available for any eventual thrust to the Strypa). Also the South Army would transfer a corps of two divisions to 11th Army.

GdI Linsingen decided to send X Res Corps - which had been placed in reserve and intended to reinforce his southern wing - to 11th Army. In the night of 4-5 July, Böhm-Ermolli ordered all his corps to shift toward the left. The new order of battle (from right to left) would be - V Corps (14 and 33 ID), XVIII Corps (9 ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde), XIX Corps (34 and 29 ID), IV Corps (27 and 32 ID plus 1 Lst Huss Bde), and Corps Czibulka (43 LW ID and 31 ID). 51 Hon ID, which had been relieved by Bothmer's left wing, went to Lahodow as the Army's reserve; a few days later the Division absorbed 128 Hon Inf Bde, which had been reduced to a remnant.

The relief of the Lower Austrian-Moravian 13 LW ID by the east Galician-Bukovina 43 LW ID on the 5th ran into some difficulties, because the former Division was still engaged in mopping up the west bank of the Bug between Derewlany and Spas. Neither in this
area nor at Busk was the process completed for several days. When 13 LW ID finally departed, Böhm-Ermolli praised it warmly for its extraordinary efforts under his 2nd Army in the fighting since the Carpathian winter.

d. 1st Army's last actions west of the Vistula, 29 June-2 July

Late on 28 June, FZM Puhallo had received the order from the high command that he should send his 1st Army ahead through Tarlow while preparing for its imminent departure by rail to Lemberg. That night his troops reported that the enemy had evacuated their trenches along the entire front. In an immediate pursuit, parts of 1st Corps occupied Zawichost at 3:30 AM on the 29th. The enemy also pulled back in front of Bredow's Division.

Toward noon, however, 1st Army came up against the bridgehead position which the Russians had established on the heights east and north of Tarlow to cover the crossing-point over the Vistula at Jozefow. At the same time the Army commander received new orders from the high command which emphasized the necessity of his moving to east Galicia as quickly as possible; the pursuit of the Russians south of the Kamienna should be left to a minimal number of troops, while the bulk of the Army took to the rails as soon as they could.

Based on these orders, only 2 CD from 1st Corps and 4 ID from II Corps would continue to push against the Russians beyond Tarlow, which was occupied on the evening of the 29th. However, the other units weren't able to leave the line immediately; one brigade of 46 LW ID, the 1 Brigade of the Polish Legion, and parts of 25 ID remained in contact with the enemy. The Russians finally evacuated their positions southwest of Jozefow in the night of 1-2 July, when their entire XXV Corps finally crossed the Vistula. II Corps took the Jozefow bridgehead. At daybreak on 2 July the IR Deutschmeister # 4, who were still in line, reached the Vistula; thereafter GdI Johann Kirchbach could report that the entire sector south of the Kamienna was free of the enemy.

Thus 1st Army had finished its task west of the Vistula. FZM Puhallo and his staff departed on 3 July. 25 ID boarded the waiting trains at Ostrowiec and Kielce, 46 LW ID at Tarnobrzeg. 4 ID would follow the 46th. The Polish brigade went over the Vistula through Annopol to join 4th Army. 2 CD, reinforced by an Etappen-March regiment and Col Mischek's Pioneer Group (of four companies), was reassigned from 1st Army to the command of GO.
Woyrsch, who deployed his right wing between the mouth of the Kamienna and Sienno. 7 CD had returned to Kövess' Armeegruppe.

e. The II Battle of Krasnik, 1-10 July

1) The initial actions, 1-2 July

Following the high command's orders of 28 June, GFM Mackensen turned over the main burden of the thrust between the Vistula and the Bug to 4th Army and to Emmich's Group of 11th Army (which consisted of German X Corps and XXII Res Corps). The inner wings of the two Armies would attack toward Lublin. The center and right wing of 11th Army (the Guards plus the corps of Arz, Kneussl and Marwitz) would for the time begin stay on guard toward the northeast and east, deployed in echelon. Reports from all sources indicated that the Russians would stand to fight in their long-prepared positions north of the Wyznica, the Porbach and the Wolica.

4th Army HQ believed that it faced between five and eight infantry and two cavalry divisions between the Wieprz and Vistula. Testimony from prisoners indicated that these units had been badly worn down. Army HQ therefore hoped they wouldn't meet sustained resistance. On 30 June they ordered their corps to thrust the enemy back through the line Tarnawka-Krasnik-Jozefow and the heights farther north. The first echelon (XVII, IX, X and VIII Corps) would advance to the area between Lublin and the Vistula. The Army's reserves (XIV Corps and 26 LW ID) would follow the center east of the Bystrzyca, at first to the Goraj-Janow area. The attacking troops were told to advance quickly and to take advantage of all opportunities.

1 July

On 1 July, a hot and sultry summer day, the corps of the first echelon advanced to the north on a broad front: VIII Corps with its right wing toward Dzierzkowice, X with its center toward Krasnik, IX over the heights east of the Bystrzyca, and XVII Corps toward Tarnawka. By evening, the VIII and X Corps had thrown back the enemy's foremost troops south of the Wyznica valley in light actions. All attempts to cross this brook, however, were shattered by heavy fire directed against the attacker from the northern slopes. Three companies of X Corps had already entered Krasnik, but were forced in the evening to
pull back to the southern edge of the city by larger enemy forces.

IX Corps spent the day working its way up to the enemy positions on the heights east of the Bystrzyca. The heaviest fighting encountered by XVIII Corps took place on the two wings - 45 LW ID was on the upper reaches of the Por, while 11 ID was on the lower reaches of this brook, at Mokre Lipie, and farther east. The latter Division was instructed by XVII Corps HQ to help the heavily engaged X German Corps in its efforts to cross the Por. After driving away the foremost enemy troops, most of 11 ID was able to force its way over the Por brook in bitter fighting; like the neighboring German corps they established a footing on the northern bank.

Some troops from 11 ID established themselves southwest of Turobin; along with advanced detachments of 41 Hon ID (the center unit of XVII Corps, which reached its allotted objectives of Tokary and Grodki without seeing action), they maintained a link with 45 LW ID on the left. By evening the Landwehr Division had still not been able to take the advanced Russian positions south of the Por because the terrain was unfavorable for attacking.

The reserves of 4th Army reached the Goraj-Janow area as ordered.

Just like 4th Army and X German Corps on the Wyznica and the Por, the XXII Res Corps and its neighbor the Guards met stubborn resistance from the Russian X and III Caucasian Corps on the Labunka. While the left wing group of XXII Res Corps was engaged through the evening in indecisive fighting around the fords of the Wieprz at Nielisz, 44 Res ID and the Guards crossed the Labunka in heavy fighting and established themselves on the north bank.

There were no significant events involving the other parts of 11th Army on 1 July. 22 ID came up behind the Guards, and 119 ID behind XLI Res Corps (which was now commanded by G.Lt von Winckler).

GFM Mackensen was under the impression that the enemy, who had pulled back behind the Bug opposite 11th Army, was also retreating to the northeast opposite the center. Therefore he ordered his entire Army Group to advance on 2 July. 11th Army, covered on its right by the Beskid Corps, should reach the line Warez-Terebin-Grabowlec-Tarnogora-Zolkiewka; 4th Army should "conduct its advance so that its right wing penetrates at least as far as the left wing of 11th Army."
Despite the heavy resistance which the allied troops had encountered in most sectors on 1 July, 4th Army HQ also believed that the main body of the Russian 3rd Army was moving back toward Lublin and that the resistance came only from strong rear guards in admittedly good positions. HQ therefore ordered the entire Army to attack on 2 July. If the Russians did stand and fight, contrary to expectations, they would be quickly overcome by committing XIV Corps in the sector of IX Corps. In this scenario, both corps would launch a coordinated assault with all five divisions supported by artillery. FML Roth would be in overall command of the assault, which would start at 6:00 AM on 3 July on the heights east of the Bystrzyca against the Russian front from Stawce to Stroza. 26 LW ID would stay in the Tokary-Grodki area, but would be available to reinforce the offensive if necessary. These orders of 4th Army HQ initiated a significant operation.

2 July

On 2 July the fighting raged with great intensity on the entire front. In most places the Russians offered very stubborn resistance to the attackers in excellent positions. It was already clear to 4th Army in the morning that the commitment of XIV Corps would be necessary to gain a decisive success.

After several conversations with the commander of IX Corps, FML Roth created two attack groups with troops from both corps. On the right, FML Horsetzky led 10 and 3 ID; on the left, FML Fabini led 8 ID and the bulk of 21 LW ID. On 3 July they would attack with their inner wings in the general direction of the heights northeast of Krasnik. Farther west, 106 Lst ID would support the main attack by thrusting to the heights at Majdan Skotnik. On the left wing of XVII Corps, 45 LW ID would help by capturing the heights southwest of Stawce, which threatened the flank of Horsetzky's attack group.

While the troops of IX and XIV Corps prepared on the 2nd for next morning's assault, the other divisions of 4th Army in most areas worked their way closer to the enemy positions; in some places they broke into the enemy lines by storm.

In VIII Corps on the left wing, Stöger-Steiner's Division - which from now on was designated the 62 ID - lay one hundred paces in front of the enemy barbed wire and abatis; 47 Res ID fought a bitter action around two small villages west of Dzierzkowice; 37 Hon ID took Wiznianka. Under X Corps, the 24 ID wasn't able to
move out of its positions south of Krasnik; 2 ID, however, stormed the heights just southeast of Stroza and held them against all counterattacks. The troops of IX Corps inched their way up during the day closer to the works that were stubbornly defended by parts of IX Russian Corps; in the evening, 10 ID and parts of 21 LW ID even pushed into the enemy line on a front of 6 km.

As on the previous day, XVII Corps was engaged on 2 July in two groups separated by 14 km. In the east, 11 ID captured a strong Russian position at Nowa Wies in a prolonged action, then broke into the lines east of that blazing village; they took 1600 prisoners. The Corps' western group (45 LW ID reinforced by 41 Hon ID) drove the last Russians from the southern to the northern bank of the Por.

Despite these local successes on 2 July, which were anticipated because the Russians were pulling back, FML Roth adhered to the plan of postponing the main breakthrough assault until the 3rd. The other corps of 4th Army were ordered to also attack wherever they spotted a chance of success. 26 LW ID, directly under the Archduke, was in place rather early at Otrocz.

The operations of the east wing and center of 11th Army went according to plan on 2 July; the troops reached their day's objectives in light fighting. However, Russian resistance was heavier farther to the west. Thus the Guard Corps moved its right wing up to the Wolica, but the left didn't reach its objective, the Izbica area. XXII Res Corps moved in line with the Guards; its left wing forced its way over the Wieprz, but didn't gain much more ground toward the north. X German Corps came up against a second Russian position running through the heights east of Turobin.

When GFM Mackensen issued further orders in the evening of 2 July, he believed like 4th Army HQ that the Russians were retreating to the north. He instructed both Armies to continue the pursuit; the role of 4th Army remained the same. On the other hand, the right wing and center of 11th Army were given new goals which lay on the other side of the Wolica and far behind the enemy positions on the slopes along the north edge of the swampy river valley. The two corps on the left wing of 11th Army would attack toward the objective already assigned for 2 July: the line Tarnogora-Zolkiewka.

The following was the order of battle for 4th Army and the left
of 11th Army as of the evening of 2 July (from left to right):

4th k.u.k. Army - VII Corps (62, 47 Res, 37 Hon ID), X Corps (24, 2 ID), Group Roth (HQ of XIV Corps, also over IX Corps - 106 Lst, 8, 21 LW, 10, 3 ID), XVII Corps (45 LW, 41 Hon, 11 ID); Army reserves - 1 Polish Legion Bde (arriving from west of the Vistula), 3 Cav Bde, 26 LW ID

Emmich's Group of 11th German Army - X Corps (19, 20 ID), XXII Res Corps (43 & 44 Res ID).

2) The attack of 4th Army reaches its high point, 3-6 July

The Russian main position, which consisted of several lines right behind each other, ran straight through the rising ground along the watershed between the sources of the Wyznica, the Por, and the Bystrzyca. It was now the center of very bitter fighting. This defensive front was strengthened by well-sited infantry strong points and an almost continuous line of barbed wire. The inner wings of XV and IX Russian Corps took part in the defense of this sector, which was almost the only point between the Vistula and Bug where there were strong natural obstacles to an offensive.

3 July

When morning broke on 3 July, Roth's Group were still preparing for the offensive. 45 LW ID had just started to attack the heights south of Stawce, which threatened the flank of the main advance. Uncertainty about the situation of the enemy's fortified line in front of Horsetzky's group and bad weather interfered with and delayed the artillery bombardment. Therefore the final action by the batteries and the infantry assault were postponed until the first hours of the afternoon.

Around 11:00 AM, 45 LW ID had stormed the heights south of Stawce; thus the way seemed open for FML Roth's right wing (Horsetzky's Group) to attack toward the north. After careful artillery preparations which lasted until 4:00 PM, the infantry of XIV and IX Corps pushed forward. They moved ahead step by step, with heavy casualties (the wing also suffered from Russian flanking fire). Despite desperate enemy resistance, all five attacking divisions broke into the first Russian line and by day's end had penetrated the entire net of trenches on a 14 km front. The regiments immediately opened a pursuit and by 10:00 PM reached the north edge of the forested zone north of Studzianki. The booty of both corps during this hot day of

421In the original, this information is on Beilage 31
fighting included 1000 prisoners, 3 cannon and 3 machine guns.

The neighboring corps of the army could offer just limited support to Roth's Group in its difficult struggle. VIII Corps attacked in the afternoon, but won only a little ground in a fire fight that lasted into the evening. The left wing of X Corps (24 ID) took Krasnik; the right wing (2 ID) were fully occupied throughout the day in repelling strong Russian counterattacks on the positions they had won on 2 July.

It was a disadvantage that the west wing of XVII Corps (FML Smekal with 45 LW ID and 41 Hon ID) weren't in a position to seize the fords on the upper Por, which were stubbornly defended by the east wing of IX Russian Corps. Thus the heights north of Stawce were still in Russian hands, which enabled them to fire upon the flank of FML Roth's attacking group. This led Army HQ to place 26 LW ID under XVII Corps, which was ordered "to join the thrust of Roth's Group as strongly as possible through Stawce, while leaving sufficient protection on the Por front."

The main body of 11 ID stayed on 3 July in the sector of X German Corps, which was completing its preparations to attack the heights east of Turobin.

Meanwhile Archduke Joseph Ferdinand instructed Roth's Group to continue to energetically pursue the wavering enemy during the night until they reached the heights northeast of Krasnik; most of the troops reached this sector before dawn. On 4 July, FML Roth's Group would continue to attack, while the other corps of the Army also sought to gain ground toward the north.

3 July was also a difficult day of action for the center of 11th German Army; General Gorbatovsky's 13th Army (formerly Olochov's Group) launched strong counterattacks against the XXII Res, Guard and k.u.k. VI Corps. The Russians began their thrusts in the night and continued them with unequaled determination throughout the day, supported by a surprisingly great expenditure of ammunition. These numerous attacks - Arz's Corps alone had to face six of them - had to be repulsed before 11th Army could even think of carrying out their own offensive which had been ordered for 3 July. Kneussl's Corps came up against stoutly constructed positions at Metelin and made preparations to assault them; the attack, however, would never take place.

Reports that strong enemy forces were assembled at Hrubieszow and Vladimir Volynsky reawakened concern in Mackensen's staff about the Army Group's sensitive eastern flank. This factor, and the stubborn resistance and heavy counterattacks of the Russians on
the entire front of 4th and 11th Armies, caused Army Group HQ to change its analysis of the situation. At 6:30 PM on 3 July they ordered both Armies to halt further attacks until 1st Army could finish moving to the Bug.

This important order reached the troops of 11th Army in timely fashion. However, 4th Army HQ at Godziszow didn't get it until 3:30 AM on 4 July, at which time Roth's tireless soldiers were again advancing. Therefore the Archduke didn't revise his own orders for the 4th, even though 11th German Army would temporarily stay on the defensive. To at least protect the right wing of 4th Army as it attacked, Emmich's Group was supposed to take and hold the line Plonka-Turobin.

4 July

The regiments of 4th Army began to attack in the early morning of 4 July and achieved full success. The main thrust north by the divisions of Roth's Group drove the Russians back from one line after another; by evening Roth had reached the heights on both sides of Kielczewice and at Wilkolaz.

Under XVII Corps farther east, in the morning 45 LW ID stormed the heights north of Stawce which for so long had been the center of bitter fighting; then they advanced to the heights at Stara Wies. 41 Hon ID reached the heights on both sides of Tarnawka. The main body of 11 ID, well supported by heavy artillery on the south bank of the Por, captured the Russian positions north of Nowa Wies; they worked in close cooperation with X German Corps, which by evening had nearly reached Turobin and Plonka.

To the left of Roth's Group, the 2 ID of k.u.k. X Corps reached the area west of Wilkolaz; 24 ID drove the Russians away northwest of Krasnik and took the edge of the woods south of Urzedow. Only VIII Corps was unable to win much ground, despite support from artillery fire stationed on the west bank of the Vistula. They spent the day in difficult actions against carefully prepared enemy positions that in some places were covered by ten rows of barbed wire; the defenders, parts of XV Russian Corps hastily reinforced by men from XXV Corps, fought with great bravery. 37 Hon ID, holding the left of VIII Corps next to X Corps, was able to break into the enemy positions north of Wyznianka before twilight and established a firm footing there.

The extent of the successes won by 4th Army against a courageous opponent was measured both in the amount of territory captured
(40 km wide from Tarnawka to Wyznica and 15 km deep between Studzianki and Wilkolaz) and the number of trophies (29 officers and 8000 men taken prisoner, 6 machine guns and 6 guns captured). The victorious divisions had been either fighting or marching without a break since 29 June under the most difficult circumstances - unusual heat, lack of water, insufficient sleep, and unfavorable terrain. It would soon become apparent that the hard fighting had decimated the ranks of the attackers as well as the defenders.

Impressed by this success, Army Group HQ ordered that on 5 July the 4th Army should continue their pursuit "in order to exploit the advantages already won." The left wing of 11th Army (Guard, XXII Res and X Corps) would "enable [4th Army] to take advantage of its success" by capturing the heights on both sides of Izbica and at Wolka Zolkiewka.

4th Army HQ had learned from intercepted broadcasts that the HQ of Russian XV Corps had moved back to the Lublin area; also, they believed that the Russians opposite the Army's center were outnumbered. These factors indicated that another energetic thrust would be a great success. Roth's Group would push ahead west of the Kosarzewka brook and on both sides along the road to Lublin, up to the line Osmolice-Borzechow; X and VIII Corps would advance to Opole and Kamien. However, if the Russians continued to stand their ground on 5 July behind the Wyznica, they would be defeated by a combined attack from the latter two corps. XVII Corps would act in conjunction with the left wing of 11th Army; Antoniowka was the objective of the Corps' right, Tuszow of the left.

Long after darkness fell on 4 July, 4th Army HQ learned from Russian radio messages that the enemy intended to counterattack toward Urzedow with one infantry and one cavalry division. Martiny's Corps received this important information around midnight. However, because of a lack of telephone connections the troops in the very first line didn't receive the message in time.

In the evening of 4 July, the center of 4th Army was thus only about one day's march from the Lublin-Cholm railroad, which was a vital artery of the Russian Northwest Front. Moreover, the combat strength of XV, IX and X Russian Corps was considerably diminished because of the fighting to date near Krasnik. On 4 July, Alexeiev reported to the high command: "If you are not aware of the situation of the 3rd and 13th Armies, I must tell you that their ranks are greatly weakened and the men are very tired;
they are no longer capable of serious resistance. X Corps has no more than 4000 riflemen and almost no officers."  

In this serious predicament, General Alexeiev asked the Stavka to give further instructions to his Northwest Front. On 4 July, he had also taken steps on his own initiative to support 3rd and 13th Armies with reserves. To gain time for the reserves to deploy, he told 3rd Army "to offer the most stubborn resistance to the enemy's pressure for the next few days" in the prepared positions from Niedrzwica Mala to Bychawa and behind the Zolkiewka; he told 13th Army to do the same behind the Wolica. After XXV Corps had crossed to the east bank of the Vistula, 4th Russian Army commanded just the XVI and Grenadier Corps west of the river, totaling 4 ½ infantry and ¾ cavalry divisions plus some opolcheniye detachments. The Army's lines just south of the Pilica were taken over by 2nd Army, which extended its own front. Now 4th Army was to pull back its left wing to Borzechow-Opole and concentrate as many troops as possible right on the Vistula bank. Alexeiev sent all his immediately available reserves - XXV and II and VI Siberian Corps - hurrying toward the Lublin-Cholm area.

5 July

On 5 July the Russians opened the counterattack toward Urzedow which 4th Army HQ was expecting. Since the covering troops of the k.u.k. X Corps hadn't been informed of the pending enemy attack, they were taken by surprise; a combined corps (3 Gren Div from XXV Corps plus the Ural Coss Div) threw them from the northern bank of the Urzedowka back over the brook; they also gained ground from 24 ID in the area south of Popkowice. Then, however, 24 ID established a firm front; 2 ID counterattacked and recovered the heights west of Wilkolaz. When the arrival of more Russian units was reported in the morning, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand placed 21 LW ID (which he had held back after the breakthrough at Majdan Skotnik) under X Corps; the Division was instructed to "defeat the enemy in front of 2 ID." At 4:30 PM the Bohemian Landwehr attacked toward the northwest; they reached Ryczydol, assisted the advance of 2 ID, and covered the left flank of 106 Lst ID which made the greatest progress (up to Sobieszczany). The left wing of X Corps was aided by the advance of the neighboring 37 Hon ID to Urzedow.

Thus by the evening of 5 July the situation of X Corps was restored, and the attack of the Russian combined corps had been

---

422Zayontschovsky, "The Mobile War of 1914 and 1915", p. 325
423Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 70
shattered. The loss of Popkowice seemed to be more than offset by the ground gained toward Ryczydol.

As ordered, the right wing continued its pursuit to the north in the early morning, undisturbed by the reports from X Corps. This involved IX Corps (106 Lst and 8 ID), XIV Corps (10 ID in the first line, 3 ID in the second), and XVII Corps (45 LW and 41 Hon ID). The troops advanced on both sides of the Bystrzyca, with the left wing along the road to Lublin; at noon they came up against Russian positions south of Sobieszczany, at Bychawa, and north of Gielczew. Because of the strength of the defenses and the increasing concentration of enemy infantry and artillery, it was decided to pause to reconnoiter and prepare a coordinated attack. Therefore the afternoon passed without noteworthy fighting; only 10 ID stormed an enemy position. By evening the troops of the Army's right wing had made their way right up to the Russian lines in most sectors. 11 ID, which had left the area of X German Corps, joined XVII Corps southeast of Gielczew.

5 July passed without any major actions for 11th Army. Their left wing corps reached the goals assigned for the day.

Fighting east of the Bystrzyca died down after night fell. Farther west, however, X and VIII Corps were still in action. 21 LW ID worked their way up to the heights northeast of Popkowice, then halted at 1:00 AM when they discovered a strong enemy position. The Russians continued to attack X Corps without success. Under VIII Corps, 47 German Res ID broke into the first enemy line in the evening after careful artillery preparation; by the morning of the 6th they had driven the desperately fighting enemy (from XV Corps, reinforced by parts of XXV Corps) out of their positions. Troops from 62 ID stormed a strong point of the Vistula bridgehead at Jozefow.

6 July

4th Army HQ ordered the pursuit to continue on 6 July; the Army would gain more ground toward the north, especially on the left wing where X and VIII Corps were supposed to throw the enemy back. In connection with their advance, the west wing of Roth's Group should stay in step with X Corps; the east wing would operate along with the left of XVII Corps. In the Army's reserve, half of 26 LW ID would assemble behind the center (one brigade of this Division was already engaged under 41 Hon ID); 3 Cav Bde, which had been waiting in vain for an opportunity to break through, moved to Tarnawka. Since he had advanced so far in front of the neighboring corps, FML Roth decided to halt the
divisions of his Group and to postpone any further advance until X and XVII Corps were in line with his men. VIII Corps aimed their main attack against the Russian positions on the north bank of the Podlipiebach, and X Corps against the heights north of Popkowice. XVII Corps' objective was the enemy's main position running east of the Kosarzewka to Gielczew. GFM Mackensen approved 4th Army's plan for the advance to the north; he ordered only the left wing of 11th Army (X German and XXII Res Corps) to attack in cooperation with 4th Army.

The attacking units of VIII Corps - 47 Res and 37 Hon ID - reached the south bank of the Podlipiebach by evening. The Honveds had planned to strike toward Wierzbica in the afternoon, but this move was canceled when reports arrived that strong enemy forces were arriving; the Division anticipated heavy counter-attacks.

Under the k.u.k. X Corps, 21 LW ID and 2 ID moved forward laboriously in the afternoon from the east toward the positions north of Popkowice; they weren't able to break into these Russian lines. 24 ID couldn't advance at all. Since the troops were exhausted, FML Martiny halted the attack of his Corps around 8:00 PM.

The main body of XVII Corps (45 LW ID and most of 41 Hon ID) reached the position of IX Russian Corps on the 6th. The other parts of the Honved Division and the 11 ID stormed the heights north and east of Gielczew. They were linked up with 11th German Army, whose left wing had reached the line running from Antoniowka to the heights north of Potaznia # 294 and the area west of Tarnagora; the Germans didn't encounter much resistance on 6 July.

While these actions occurred on the wings of 4th Army, there was also heavy fighting in the center. 106 Lst ID repulsed a strong Russian attack in the morning, and 10 ID did the same in late afternoon.

6 July had been generally a successful day for 4th Army - some ground had been gained and all Russian attacks fended off. However, most of the troops were now in the front line; Army HQ had just 3 Cav Bde and half of 26 LW ID in reserve. Most reports from air and ground reconnaissance indicated that the Russians were reinforcing opposite the Army's left and center with both infantry and artillery. Riflemen from VI Sib Corps had been identified east of the Bystrzyca; 106 Lst ID, VIII and X Corps reported the presence of troops from both divisions of XXV
Russian Corps. According to intercepted radio messages, the Guards were arriving by train behind 3rd Army, and II Sib Corps had arrived at Rejowiec on the Lublin railroad. Although the Russians were thus being reinforced by units that were apparently intact and at full strength, 4th Army HQ was still confident about the immediate future. They weren't aware of the extent of the heavy casualties their own regiments had suffered in the recent fighting. However, Army HQ still decided reluctantly to halt the offensive for two days; they needed to replenish the ammunition supply, which had been temporarily depleted during the quick advance. The units would regroup and on 9 July would mount a new thrust along the Lublin highway. In the meantime, only VIII and X Corps would attack. Army HQ issued orders to this effect in the evening of 6 July.

3) Preparations for a further offensive

In these days the allied high commands reached some important decisions regarding the continuation of the offensive against Russia.

An order issued from the AOK at Teschen on 3 July included the following guideline: "Everything must now be set in place to strike a blow by 4th and 11th Armies with full force between the Vistula and Bug." Above all, measures were needed to make it possible for Mackensen's Army Group to attack immediately and without pausing. Initially, this was to be accomplished only by reinforcing Mackensen with X Res Corps from South Army. However, on 4 July Falkenhayn proposed to Conrad that on the right wing of German 11th Army a new "Army of the Bug" should be formed under GdI Linsingen; it would consist of the Beskid and XLI Res Corps plus 107 and 11 Bav ID. On 6 July the k.u.k. AOK issued the necessary orders for the creation of the Bug Army, which was placed under Mackensen's Army Group. 5 German CD would immediately join the new Army; 1 German ID would also reinforce it as soon as the South Army was firmly established on the Zlota Lipa. GdI Bothmer was named the new commander of South Army, while GdK Marschall took over his corps. GdI Gerok with the staff of XXIV Res Corps also moved to the Bug Army, where they received 107 and 11 Bav ID.

The 1st Army was moving up to deploy between the Bug and 2nd Armies. Besides providing a reserve force to guard toward the east, they would make all necessary preparations to attack over the Bug. The first transports of the Army's 46 LW ID arrived north of Lemberg on the morning of 4 July. However, the movement of the remaining units suffered several delays because the
railroads were overworked.

Mackensen's Army Group also expected to get substantial help on their left from the Army of GO Woyrsch, whose sector included all the territory between the Pilica and Vistula after the departure of 1st Army. To supplement orders he had already received on 30 June, he was instructed on 3 July to advance in strength toward Zwolen and "if further Russian units moved east of the Vistula he was to follow them over the river." By 6 July, GdI Kövess (whose command now included 7 CD) extended his front past the Kielce-Radom railroad up to Wierzbica. On Woyrsch's right, Bredow's group was prepared to attack.

For 4th Army HQ there seemed no reason to change its intentions for the next few days. The intended pause in operations on 7 and 8 July was consistent with the orders from the higher echelons. GFM Mackensen was focusing his entire attention on the redeployment of units on the right wing of his Army Group, which was to be finished by mid-July - the new dispositions of 11th Army, the creation of the Bug Army, and the arrival of 1st Army. Since 4th Army had stopped, the left wing corps of 11th Army were also instructed just to hold the lines they had reached by 6 July. It would be easier to prepare for the next general offensive if there was a cessation of major fighting between the Wieprz and Bug.

4) The Russian counterattack toward Krasnik

Meanwhile, though, the Russian 3rd Army HQ was ready to deliver a powerful blow on 7 July. Based on the general instructions from the commander of Northwest Front, they had decided to send the fresh troops of XXV and VI Sib Corps against the front of the units which had broken through on both sides of both Bystrzyca; the counterattack should bring the Austrian advance to a halt. This decision led to three days of furious fighting on the entire front of the k.u.k. 4th Army.

7 July

The first thrusts against the Wilkolaz-Krasnik line were already starting on the night of 6-7 July. They were directed against 106 Lst ID, which had penetrated farther to the north than any other part of 4th Army and was therefore somewhat isolated, and against 24 ID on the left wing of X Corps. For several hours the troops of 106 Lst ID fought a very gallant defensive action involving nighttime hand-to-hand combat in the woods; then they
wavered and had to be pulled back through Wilkolaz. Despite heavy losses, the Landsturm were able to offer successful resistance to the pursuing enemy on the heights south of that town. The outnumbered left wing of 24 ID also had to give way under attack from the Grenadiers of XXV Russian Corps, who had been able to approach close to our lines under cover of fields of tall wheat; the defenders retreated from the heights north of the Urzedowka to the south bank of the brook.

The withdrawal of 106 Lst ID and 24 ID caused serious difficulty for the units fighting between them, 21 LW ID and 2 ID; their flanks were now exposed and their position untenable. X Corps therefore had both divisions retreat behind the Urzedowka to stay in line with 106 Lst ID and 24 ID. This disengagement from the nearby enemy in daylight led to heavy casualties, especially for 21 LW ID. Late in the morning, the front began to solidify on the slopes south of the Urzedowka; the connection was restored between 8 ID, whose left wing had to bend back somewhat, and 106 Lst ID. The danger seemed to subside for the moment.

The other sectors of the Army were quiet while these actions were in progress. However, further enemy attacks were anticipated, especially against X Corps and Roth's Group, since it was reported that strong Russian forces were still moving up to their positions. FML Roth did all he could to remain on top of the situation. To enhance the resistance of 106 Lst ID, half of 26 LW ID was to be brought up from Majdan Skotnik and placed under its command. IR # 21 of 10 ID had been placed under XIV Corps HQ; now it was ordered to the left wing of 8 ID to strengthen its link with 106 Lst ID. IR # 14 of 3 ID was placed behind this position as a reserve, while the rest of 3 ID supported the weakened 10 ID. The half of 26 LW ID which had been attached to 41 Hon ID came back to FML Roth; he planned to station it at Zakrzowek as his reserve. At noon, 4th Army HQ forcefully ordered X Corps and 106 Lst ID "to dig in on the heights south of the Urzedowka and hold out indefinitely." VIII and XIV Corps should place any troops they could spare at the disposal of X Corps, which was fighting without reserves of any kind.

Before the defensive measures listed above went into effect, the main body of XXV Russian Corps launched a powerful attack against the entire front of the k.u.k. X Corps in the first hours of the afternoon. At the same time, the riflemen of VI Sib Corps thrust against 10 ID. Toward 5:00 PM the Russians pushed back the entire left wing of 24 ID and took the heights which dominated the area south of Popkowice, opening a gap between X and VIII

424The Russian XXV Corps consisted of the 3 Grenadier Div and 46 ID.
Corps. X Corps HQ, which still didn't have any reserves, ordered 24 ID to retreat behind the Wyznica while 2 ID and 21 LW ID fell back through the heights north of Krasnik in line with 106 Lst ID. Army HQ was extremely concerned about the situation of X Corps; they ordered the half of 26 LW ID to move in all haste from XVII to X Corps, along with the brigade of the Polish Legion that had arrived from 1st Army, and with 3 Cav Bde. While these troops approached the battlefield, X Corps was able to take up its new positions without hindrance from the enemy.

The withdrawal of 24 ID behind the Wyznica gave the Russians a free hand against 37 Hon ID. A powerful thrust broke the Honveds' front and forced them to pull their unsupported right wing behind the Wyznica. In this critical situation, VIII Corps HQ had the German 47 Res ID take over part of the front from 37 Hon ID; at Wyznianka they deployed the Polish brigade which had been marching to X Corps, to fill the gap between 37 Hon ID and 24 ID. Thus it seemed that any further Russian advance had been precluded. 62 ID wasn't engaged in any actions. The commander of VIII Corps, FZM Scheuchenstuel, asked Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung if they had any available reserves to commit to the fighting east of the Vistula. Woyrsch willingly placed half of 2 CD, his Etappen March Regt, and a German Landwehr battalion at Scheuchenstuel's disposal. They wouldn't be able to intervene, however, until 9 July.

The actions of 10 ID proceeded more favorably. The enemy attacked after excellent artillery preparation, but the Division was able to halt them by an extraordinary effort, while suffering heavy casualties. The Army's right wing, under XVII Corps, passed through 7 July without incident. They made half of 41 Hon ID available for the Army's reserve.

The 7th of July had been a difficult test for the troops and commanders. Now the exhaustion of the troops had first become evident in the defensive fighting; it was also clear that their combat strength had declined to a shocking degree. The commander of X Corps, FML Martiny, reported that his men were very tired and had suffered losses of up to 50%. VIII Corps HQ believed that officers would have to be sent to the Wyznica valley "to ensure that the troops stayed in place and held onto the southern bank." The commander of 10 ID believed that his battalions were no longer capable of withstanding any heavy attacks.

The confidence which still filled HQ of 4th Army on 6 July had disappeared, and their faith in the Army's capacity was shattered. Because of the exhaustion of the men and the high
casualties, Army HQ "no longer was fully convinced that their entire front could offer prolonged resistance." Based on this new appreciation of the situation, they approached the high command and Mackensen's Army Group HQ with a request "that they should ponder whether and how to relieve 4th Army - either directly by sending reinforcements or indirectly with an offensive in another sector." The k.u.k. AOK didn't agree that the situation of 4th Army was dangerous; therefore at first they turned down an offer from the OHL to send 103 German ID from Syrmia as reinforcements. The AOK was surprised by the depression of 4th Army HQ, which was in such sharp contrast to their confidence of the last few days; through GM Metzger, they warned the Chief of the Army's Operational Detachment (Col Paic) that "under no circumstances should any more ground be given up in the coming days of heavy action." So 4th Army would have to expect further hard fighting. Concentrations of Russian troops were reported at Lublin, and in the afternoon a strong column of all arms was marching toward XVII Corps. Army HQ instructed their subordinates to prepare strong defensive positions and prepare to defend them stubbornly.

On this eventful day, Bredow's Group of Woyrsch's Army launched an attack against the Russian bridgehead on the Kamienna; they were joined by 3 LW ID. The Germans further reduced the size of the enemy bridgehead and reached the line Zemborzyn-Sienno-Grabowiec. However, their success didn't bring any noticeable relief to 4th Army.

8 July

Except for isolated and unsuccessful Russian attacks, the night of 7-8 July passed without incident. On the next day the enemy committed all of VI Sib Corps to the battle, and extended their attacks to include Roth's Group. Their main targets were the left wing of 8 ID (west of the Bystrzyca) and 106 Lst ID. The attack against the Landsturm Division was repulsed already in the morning. However, the Siberian riflemen, followed by Ural Cossacks, fought their way into Bystrzyca village and broke into the position of the mainly Czech IR # 21, whose soldiers gave way without offering much resistance.\(^{425}\) The Kaiser Jaeger and IR # 14, stationed on both sides of this breakthrough, were surprised to be assaulted from the flank and rear; they began to

\(^{425}\)Afterwards the conduct of IR # 21 in the actions of 8 July was the subject of an exhaustive inquiry. Eyewitnesses "agreed that the personnel of IR # 21 let the Russian infantry come close to their lines; instead of fighting the infantry and Cossacks, some of them threw their rifles away and withdrew. Others went over to the Russians with their hands up or waving white cloths in token of surrender."
waver, which in turn endangered the soldiers of 8 ID east of the Bystrzyca. Soon after mid-day, all of 8 ID was retreating to the south on both sides of the Bystrzyca. When FML Fabini, the Division commander, learned what was happening he ordered his men to halt and to recapture their old position. This attack started soon after 3:00 PM, when half of 41 Hon ID had arrived on the battlefield. The troops were moving forward successfully on both sides of the Bystrzyca, but then the Russians launched an overwhelming offensive against their neighbors to the right, the exhausted 3 and 10 ID whose lines had already been stretched thin. The Russians pushed ahead to a point half way between Kielczewice and Rudnik. FML Roth now halted his counterattack once it had come level to the line of 10 ID. The 8 and 10 ID, both with parts of 3 ID attached, sought to defend their new position as well as possible.\(^{426}\) At this time the Russians struck against the now-exposed flank and rear of 45 LW ID and compelled this Division to also retreat.

Although the Austrians had lost barely 3 km of ground by the end of 8 July, the Army HQ was concerned about what would happen next. There had been heavy casualties in the day's fighting, and the best units had suffered the most. The Tyrolean Kaiser Jaeger reported that their combat strength was reduced to about 300 to 400 men per regiment; 10 ID was "worn away." Thus the Siberian regiments, which were at full strength, had the same strength as Austrian corps. 4th Army HQ had no reserves and none could be obtained because all the men were needed at the front. The units provided by Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung, which 4th Army placed behind the right wing of VIII Corps, were too weak to make a decisive difference. GFM Mackensen moved 11th Army's reserve, the 119 ID, behind X German Corps; however, he refused to provide direct support to 4th Army because he couldn't spare any troops without jeopardizing the success of his impending offensive. Moreover, he didn't want to launch preliminary minor attacks that couldn't gain any significant success. Army Group HQ did hope "that 4th Army will be able to hold most of the line on which it now stands until the general offensive opens."

9 July

Therefore Mackensen ordered 4th Army to stand in place on the defensive on 9 July.

As day began, the troops of 4th Army were still in their

\(^{426}\)For his part in these actions the commander of 5 Inf Bde, GM Richard Müller, was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
positions of the evening before. Fighting had flared up periodically during the night along the entire front; different sectors had been engaged at various times, but the outcomes were never decisive. On 9 July the Russians renewed their assault along the whole line. There were many heavy attacks, some involving hand-to-hand combat; XVII Corps repulsed the enemy in the morning, the main body of the Army (XIV, IX and VIII Corps) in the afternoon. The most stubborn Russian assaults were directed against the defenses of 106 Lst ID on the heights just south of Wilkolaz, which rose like an island above the flat surrounding terrain. The lines were bombarded by heavy and light artillery throughout the day; the offensive reached greater intensity as night began to fall. The Germans and Czechs of the north Bohemian LW IR # 9 (from 26 LW ID) fought in the ranks of the Landsturm and were able to remain in control of the position only after a counterattack and bitter hand-to-hand actions.

So the 4th Army had weathered all storms during this day of hot combat. However, the Archduke still had serious concerns after asking all corps commanders to report on the situation and condition of their regiments during the 9th. Oral reports from the commanders indicated that the troops were very tired because of the constant fighting of the last few days plus the heat and lack of water. The Army commander was "under the impression that a critical situation [would develop] by the afternoon of 10 July." This could only be avoided by pulling some reserves from the front and having them ready to act by that time. The AOK at Teschen had already contacted 4th Army HQ about this problem.

Falkenhayn had insisted that some reinforcements should be sent to the Army; therefore the AOK overcame its earlier resistance to the idea of transferring 103 German ID from Syrmia to the Russian front. "In order, however, to bring assistance to 4th Army more quickly" the AOK had available the 4 ID from 1st Army. That Division had been at Tarnobrzeg awaiting shipment to the Bug; on 9 July it was reassigned to 4th Army. When 103 German ID arrived it would replace 4 ID in Puhallo's 1st Army. 4th Army reckoned that 4 ID would be available around Zaklikow on 10 July; meanwhile they united the two brigades of 2 CD at Majdan Skotnik and assembled the five battalions attached from Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung along with two horse artillery batteries of 2 CD at Stroza. Moreover, the Army strove to provide reserves from its original units. XVII Corps sent half of 41 Hon ID behind the right wing of Roth's group; VIII Corps sent "a strong group" behind its boundary with X Corps.

427However, Woyrsch's five battalions were never actually needed at the front; in mid-July they were returned to his Armeeabteilung.
The AOK at Teschen apparently wished to check the growth of pessimism regarding the situation; in a forceful phone conversation with the head of 4th Army's Operational Detachment, they stated: "It will be a week until preparations to the east of your Army are advanced enough to allow an offensive at full power; until then you must hold on. This won't happen unless everyone from the highest commanders down the line are constantly at work day and night. Landgraf, be hard!"

4th Army had asked Mackensen's HQ to send 119 German ID, stationed behind X German Corps, to the area north of Biskupie on 10 July. The request was turned down. This Division was earmarked for use as a reserve behind the left wing of 11th Army as it made its decisive assault; the Germans didn't want it diverted farther west into 4th Army's sector.

10 July

Only VIII and IX Corps were in heavy fighting during the night of 9-10 July. Troops from XV and XXV Russian Corps, reinforced by two regiments which had come over the Vistula from the Grenadier Corps, attacked the trenches of 47 Res ID and the right wing of 62 ID in thick lines. In some places they penetrated the allied positions, but were then repulsed in vicious hand-to-hand combat. The enemy also failed to take the much-contested heights south of Wilkolaz from 106 Lst ID; the Russians expended much blood in vain. In the other sectors the night passed quietly. Except for an unsuccessful Russian thrust along the Bystrzyca, the lines remained undisturbed during 10 July. Most of the reserves were able to assemble as planned. However, 4 ID wouldn't arrive at Zaklikow until 12 July rather than on the 10th.

The Russians began to entrench themselves in front of XIV, IX and X Corps. In front of the right wing of VIII Corps they even pulled back behind the Urzedowka. Pilots reported no further enemy troop movements on the morning of 10 July. Although the Russian attacks on 9 July had been powerful, they lacked coordination and determination. All of these factors indicated that the enemy's offensive capability had been greatly reduced in the costly fighting of the last few days.

Thus the II Battle of Krasnik ended with heavy losses on both sides. From 3 to 6 July, the troops of 4th Army had broken through the fortified lines of XV and IX Russian Corps on both sides of the Bystrzyca. They captured 56 Russian officers, 15,500 men, 6 guns and 21 machine guns; after penetrating 20 km they were within a day's march of the rail line Ivangorod-Lublin-
Cholm, which was vital to the enemy. Because of his concern for this major artery of his armies, Alexeiev had thrown all available reserves into the battle between 7 and 9 July—these were the XXV and VI Sib Corps, both at full strength, which originally were supposed to block the approach of 11th Army in the Cholm area. Thus the 4th Army, with just its own units (neither 4 ID nor the reinforcements sent by Woyrsch arrived in time to fight in the battle) had drawn a mass of fresh Russian units into its sector. Before the Russian counterattack was checked, the k.u.k. troops had lost about 5 km of the ground they had conquered with such difficulty and—more critically—they had suffered large casualties. When the high command first learned about the withdrawal of XIV and IX Corps they had anticipated a substantial setback. Finally, however, they could truthfully state that 4th Army had worn down the enemy to assist the forthcoming thrust by Mackensen's main body. The German OHL also stated on 9 July that "it would perhaps prove useful later" that the enemy had committed such strong forces against the 4th Army.

Such comments may seem to be an attempt to present the outcome in the most favorable possible light. Actually, however, the battle at Krasnik had another result which the allies didn't realize at the time; it played a major part in leading the Russian high command to take decisions that would have considerable consequences.

f. Major command decisions in the first half of July

The Russians

The defeat of 3rd Russian Army's XV, IX and X Corps in the actions north of Krasnik and on the Zolkiewka had diminished that Army's ability to resist the allies. This caused the commander of the Northwest Front, General Alexeiev, to take some important measures on 4 July. His goals were:
- To reinforce 3rd and 13th Armies, thus improving their chances of holding off the principal offensive of the allies; and
- To deploy reserves in the Bialystok-Ossoviets area, because the overall strategic situation made it seem likely that the Germans would also attempt to attack over the Narew.428

In May and June the allied armies serving under the Aus-Hung. high command on the Eastern front had taken from the Russians 1400 officers and 460,000 men as prisoners, plus 344 guns and 940 machine guns. During these extremely costly actions, all the

428Nesnamov, Vol. IV, pp. 70 ff.
Russian reserves has been used up; new reserves would have to be provided by pulling back and shortening the lines of 12th, 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies. In detail, these were Alexeiev's directives:

1. 1st Army and the right wing of 12th Army would withdraw at a time to be determined by the two Army commanders to the line Krasnosielc-Ciechanow-Plonsk; then each Army would have a division in reserve (south of Ossoviets and at Rozan).

2. 2nd Army, reinforced by some fortress artillery, would retreat in the night of 6-7 July to the Blonie-Grojec position.

3. 4th Army would pull its left wing back to the lower Ilzanka and the Chodelbach and then assemble the strongest possible force on the eastern bank of the Vistula. If necessary, this Army would retreat in stages on its entire front to the line Wysmierzyce-Jedlnia-Janowiec.

4. The two Armies on the northern wing of Alexeiev's Front - the 10th and 5th - would hold their current positions. The former would be ready to repulse any enemy thrust on the Augustow-Grodno road; the latter would send a rifle brigade to Bialystok, where it would be at the disposal of the high command.

5. 3rd and 13th Armies should "oppose the enemy's pressure with several days of the most stubborn resistance."

Also, nothing was overlooked in an attempt to increase the combat strength of the Armies of the Northwest. The Front received all convalescent officers and men, all available officer replacements, about 100,000 armed reserves drawn from ersatz battalions, and the last remaining stock of 40,000 rifles.

General Alexeiev was aware that the measures listed above by themselves wouldn't be sufficient to redeem the critical situation of the Russian armies in the Vistula area, which were enveloped by the allied forces. To discuss his concerns, he invited the Grand Duke-Generalissimo to a conference at Siedlec which took place on 5 July. During a discussion of the situation, it was decided that the enemy attacks west of the Vistula, on the Narew and the Niemen, and in Courland were all just diversionary maneuvers that could be checked by the defenders. The offensive between the Vistula and Bug, however, was very ominous, and threatened the Russians still deployed "in the forward parts of the theater." To enable Alexeiev "to preserve the existence of the Armies entrusted to him, which would be needed for this prolonged war", the high command authorized him to withdraw the Armies on the central Vistula farther to the east. Without giving Alexeiev definite orders regarding the new positions, they suggested the line Lomza-Malkin-Lukow-Parczew-Wlodawa-Ratno. If he felt it was necessary, he could retreat as far as the Bobr, the upper Narew, Brest-
Among the fortresses in the areas to be evacuated, Ivangorod was to be used merely as part of an already-existing line of field fortifications that would "ensure freedom of maneuver on both banks of the middle Vistula." In the upcoming campaign it would be evacuated rather than left as an isolated fort. The conference decided that Novogeorgievsk, on the other hand, should be prepared for a siege after it was surrounded by the enemy.  

Thus the advanced Russian line, an arc 650 km long between the mouth of the Bobr and Sokal, would be pulled back to a relatively straight line between these points, which would be between 375 and 400 km long. The maneuver, however, was considerably delayed. Because of the shortage of rolling stock, it would take about three weeks to evacuate the supplies and industrial equipment from around Warsaw. Before this was accomplished, the allied armies were attacking not only on the Dniester and between the Vistula and Bug, but also on the lower Narew.

The allies

On 28 June, Conrad had already drawn Falkenhayn's attention to the issue of how Hindenburg's Army Group would cooperate. He suggested that Gallwitz's Army should attack toward Siedlec; along with the offensive of Mackensen's Army Group, this would lead to the envelopment of the Russian masses between the Bug, Vistula and Narew from two sides. He believed that this operation could be reinforced by troops drawn from 9th German Army (in front of Warsaw); they should be shifted to the east just as the k.u.k. 1st Army had been. These additional units, and perhaps others from the German 10th and 8th Armies, would make Gallwitz's group especially strong for the offensive.

Falkenhayn quickly agreed with Conrad's suggestions, that were based on the latter's operational plans for the summer campaign of 1914. However, the leading personalities of German "Oberost" had different ideas. On 7 June, Ludendorff had already proposed that the German Army of the Narew (stationed north of that river) should be reinforced for an advance through Kovno and Vilna against the rear of the Russian main body. This could lead to the destruction of the enemy. GFM Hindenburg raised this idea

Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 71; Danilov, pp. 524 ff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The Russians' reliance on the strength of Novogeorgievsk, "the symbol of Russian rule in Poland", was one of their greatest mistakes during the summer. See Stone, pp. 181-182.

Korolkow, "The Unsuccessful Cannae", pp. 29 ff.

again on 2 July in a conference at Posen which was chaired by Emperor Wilhelm.

However, the opinions of the Generalfeldmarschall didn't convince Falkenhayn.\textsuperscript{433} To him it still seemed questionable whether a reinforcement of two divisions would enable the Niemen Army to quickly take the fortress of Kovno; he found it even more dubious that with such a small force they could conquer the wide areas north of the Niemen. Because of the tense situation in the West it would be impossible to bring further reinforcements from that front; a transfer of troops from Galicia would consume too much time. Anyway, Falkenhayn reckoned that the Russians had already long foreseen the danger that they would be enveloped by a wide-reaching operation, and that they had the means available to check such a maneuver - numerical superiority, a convenient railroad net, and a willingness to give up ground ruthlessly.

Therefore Emperor Wilhelm decided against Hindenburg. Gallwitz's Army was ordered to advance on 12 July from the southern border of East Prussia; he would break through the Russian positions on the lower Narew on both sides of Przasnysz and advance toward the Bug to support Mackensen's Army Group.\textsuperscript{434} This was in accordance with most of Conrad's wishes.

On the day before, FM Archduke Frederick had issued to the Armies under the k.u.k. high command the "Directives for Continuing Operations", which had been prepared by Conrad and Falkenhayn. The objective was to eliminate the Russian position on the Vistula.

GFM Mackensen would attack between the Vistula and Bug with the 4\textsuperscript{th}, 11\textsuperscript{th} and Bug Armies. 1\textsuperscript{st} Army, which was now also placed under Mackensen and reinforced by XLI Res Corps, would thrust over the Bug toward Vladimir-Volynsky with at least four infantry and three cavalry divisions; the rest of the army would guard the Bug as far as Dab (5 km east of Mosty Wielkie). 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army would relieve Szurmay's Group, which was still stationed on the Bug between Kamionka-Strumilowa and Dab, by 14 July. Böhm-Ermolli's and Bothmer's Armies would guard toward the east; they would also be ready to go over to the offensive if there was any sign that the enemy was pulling back in their sectors. 7\textsuperscript{th} Army would attack between the Strypa and Sereth toward Buczacz and Czortkow. GO Woyrsch would hinder the transfer of Russian units from the west bank of the Vistula and would himself advance with a strong

\textsuperscript{433}"Aus meinem Leben" (Leipzig, 1920), p. 127
\textsuperscript{434}Falkenhayn, pp. 96 ff.
\textsuperscript{434}Kuhl, Vol. I, pp. 232 ff. See also Gallwitz, pp. 268 ff.
right wing in conjunction with 4th Army. If feasible, he would also decide whether he could himself attack over the Vistula. The times for beginning the attacks were left up to Mackensen, Woyrsch and Pflanzer-Baltin.

3. Driving the Russians from the middle Vistula

a. Actions on the Dniester, 14-19 July

1) Fighting on the first two days

7th Army's mission was to thrust toward Buczacz and Czortkow. GdK Pflanzer-Baltin planned to accomplish this with a pincers attack from two fronts, beginning on 14 July. The main attack would be that of FML Krautwald's III Corps, between the Strypa and Sereth in the direction of Tluste; for this purpose Krautwald was given most of the Army's reserves - 9 and 12 Inf Bdes and Kuhl's Bde, totaling 14 battalions. His principal initial objective was to cross the Dniester between Iwanie and Uscieczko. On the right of III Corps, FML Benigni's Corps Group (3, 6, 8 and 10 CD) would thrust into the rear of 9th Russian Army. To open the way for this large force of 9600 horsemen, FML Schönburg's 6 ID and foot detachments from the Cavalry Divisions themselves would cross the Dniester at its Doroschoutz loop, and break through the Russian position. The mounted squadrons would then ride north through the gap along the east bank of the Sereth, while guarding against any intervention from the direction of Chotin or Kamenets-Podolsk. 6 ID would deploy in a bridgehead on the north bank of the Dniester as a back-up to the cavalry.

FML Schreitter's 36 ID of XIII Corps would make a secondary attack; reinforced by parts of 15 ID to a total of 16 battalions and 15 batteries, it would thrust over the lower Zlota Lipa and east toward Buczacz. The 5 and 15 ID, which together had been reduced to just 14 battalions and 10 batteries, would hold the stretches of the Dniester adjacent to Schreitter. FML Korda's XI Corps would guard the flank and rear of 7th Army between the Dniester and the Pruth; they were reinforced by Col Savoly's 202 Hon Inf Bde which had arrived from Transylvania. 5 Hon CD, stationed west of Dobronoutz, was the Army's reserve.

The South Army was asked to cooperate, but wouldn't be ready for major operations until 16 July. However, the commander of Corps
Hofmann, on the immediate left of 7th Army, would send 1 CD (strengthened by infantry) to help 36 ID cross the Zlota Lipa; initially Bolzano's Brigade and 55 ID would just cooperate with artillery fire. 48 Res ID, now directly under HQ of South Army, made a similar commitment.

The principal attack

The offensive of III Corps opened on the night of 13-14 July when Col Rudolf Müller's 12 Inf Bde crossed the Dniester and threw the enemy back from Iwanie into the forest north of that town. The next unit to the east, FML Kaiser's 30 ID, opened their attack at 11:00 PM on 13 July with a strong left wing; they broke through three Russian positions and on the 14th made contact with Müller's Brigade. GM Edler von Hinke's 28 ID had already attacked the Russian bridgehead south of the Dniester at Czernelica in the evening of the 13th with a strengthened right wing; they gained some ground next to the river, but then were checked by Russian flanking fire from the north bank.

Benigni's Corps crossed the Dniester in the afternoon of 13 July with 13 infantry and (dismounted) cavalry rifle battalions in two battle groups under FML Schönburg and Col Gheri (of IR # 97). They overcame the Russian position on the north bank and by dawn had reached a line between the mouth of the Sereth and Sinkow. To continue the attack, 8 and 6 CD were dismounted and sent to the right wing; along with Gheri's Group they were placed under the commander of 8 CD, FML Lehmann. The renewal of the offensive, however, had to be postponed because of necessary artillery preparations and the deployment of the new reinforcements; also the Russians made strong counterattacks which lasted into the evening of the 14th. The commander of XXXIII Russian Corps (which had about four infantry and three and a half cavalry divisions) immediately recognized the threatening danger and had sent his reserves up from Tluste to strike Benigni's Group and 12 Inf Bde. In bitter hand-to-hand combat, by noon on the 15th Benigni's troops were able to break through the barbed wire of the strong Russian position at Sinkow and to extend their bridgehead toward the east.

III Corps fought with less success. Strong Russian counterattacks severed the link between the groups of Kaiser and Müller. The latter was pushed back to Iwanie, where the often-distinguished Carinthian IR # 7 repulsed an enemy force that outnumbered them four to one.435 There was also no hope of

435On 14 and 15 July, IR # 7 lost 32 officers and 1553 men. 1st Lt Friedrich Tomann of the Regiment, a company commander, won the Knight's Cross of the
success on the south bank, where the enemy was still fighting in strength. Since the plan of thrusting directly north from Zaleszczyki was no longer feasible, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin ordered III Corps to halt its offensive and to transfer its unneeded reserves - two battalions of the "Varasdin" IR # 16 - to Benigni's Group. Benigni in turn was instructed to continue to attack on 16 July with all his strength; the main effort would be on the west bank of the Sereth, in order to bring relief to III Corps.

Meanwhile FML Schönburg's 6 ID had already gained ground east of Duninow on the 15th and had a firm foothold at the confluence of the Sereth and Dniester. Behind this unit, 3 CD and IR # 16 were held in readiness as the Corps' reserve; FML Benigni was still holding the main body of 10 CD on the south bank of the Dniester.

The secondary attack

FML Schreitter began to lead the western attacking group of 7th Army, the 36 ID, over the lower Zlota Lipa around 4:00 AM on 14 July. Only the brigade on the left wing was able to overcome the stubborn resistance of the right wing of XXX Russian Corps and to establish a bridgehead 1000 paces deep on the eastern bank. Some small parts of 1 CD joined this advance.

FML Schreitter had planned to attack again in the night, but this was impossible because of a sudden surge of high water. On the 15th, the left wing was able only to make its way with difficulty up to the strong Russian positions, defended by riflemen and Cossacks. The center reached the edge of the eastern bank of the Zlota Lipa.

HQ of the German South Army believed that Schreitter's attack might still succeed, and ordered Hofmann's Corps to lend energetic support. At the same time, however, 55 ID was supposed to stretch its line toward the north, because GdI Bothmer wanted to gather all available troops at Narajow behind his left wing. Here "if the general situation warranted, and if possible in cooperation with 2nd Army, they could break through the enemy on the Zlota Lipa on the 17th or 18th."

At this time the 7th Army HQ had similar ideas and hopes. The Army's Chief of Staff, Lt Col Ritter von Zeynek, told the AOK in a phone conversation that Benigni's attack would soon pass its high water mark, but that Schreitter's Group and the South Army would then have even greater possibilities of success.

Maria Theresia Military Order.
Unfortunately only the first part of Zeynek's prediction was fulfilled.

2) **Events on 7th Army's eastern wing, and on the Zlota Lipa**

On the morning of 16 July, FML Schönburg's Group of Benigni's Corps began to attack north along the eastern bank of the Sereth; this maneuver was intended to bring help to the hard-pressed III Corps. Toward noon, however, Schönburg's men were hit by a counterattack of about ten Russian battalions from Wygoda; the enemy broke through their lines and advanced to a point south of Duninow. 3 CD and IR # 16 were hastily sent into the battle; after a bitter struggle that lasted until evening on the south edge of Duninow and the forest farther east, the Russians were finally thrown back.

The Army commander, who was on the scene, now ordered that two battalions should quickly be brought east from XIII Corps. This seemed all the more necessary because XI Corps was also under heavy attack. This Corps had already repulsed relief offensives by the Russians' III Cavalry and XXXII Corps (the latter was composed mostly of opolcheniye brigades). From early on the morning of the 16th the enemy again attacked Korda's Corps on the Bessarabian front; they struck east of Dobronoutz, at Rarancze and at the Dolzok heights. However, the k.u.k. units were able to repulse all attacks. The Russians tried again to storm these points in the next two nights, but suffered the same misfortune.

Benigni's Corps also had to fend off renewed attacks by XXXIII Russian Corps on the 17th; the enemy was now concentrating on the flanks of the Austrian bridgehead north of the Dniester, hoping to squeeze the defenders into a trap. Effective flanking artillery fire from the south bank helped thwart the Russians' plans.

Thus Benigni's offensive had reached its high point on the morning of the 16th, and his Group was now forced back completely onto the defensive even though it had been reinforced to a total of 19 infantry and 5 cavalry rifle battalions plus 69 mounted squadrons. Benigni again had to repulse heavy counterattacks on the evening of the 18th and early on the 19th.

In the night of 18-19 July, parts of XI Corps made two successful sorties (at Dobronoutz and on the Dolzok heights); this finally forced the Russian opolcheniye and cavalry detachments between the Dniester and the Pruth to cancel their attacks. Thereafter
the fighting on Pflanzer-Baltin's eastern wing died away.

In the center of Pflanzer's Army the only actions on the 16th and 17th were nighttime attacks by the Russians against the positions at Iwanie, which were stoutly defended by Col Müller's Group. Although prisoners from eight different Russian regiments were taken here, the center of XXXIII Corps with its hastily assembled troops had lost the momentum it needed to capture the bridgehead after suffering such high casualties since the 15th.

On the east bank of the Zlota Lipa, 36 ID was reinforced late in the evening of the 15th by 1 CD. However, these units attacked in vain on the 16th against the well-built and strongly occupied positions on the inner wings of the XXX and XI Russian Corps. Schreitter's north wing was moreover very tired after fending off an enemy attack the night before. At 6:00 PM, 7th Army HQ ordered that two battalions of 36 ID should be sent to Benigni's Corps, which marked the end of the attack over the Zlota Lipa. On the 17th FML Schreitter even had to pull his center back to a better defensive position on the western bank.

Under South Army, FML Hofmann had his corps ready for an attack that was supposed to start on the night of 17-18 July. However, the Russians struck first against 1 CD that night; their thrust was repulsed, but it delayed Hofmann's own offensive. When Bolzano's Brigade did advance against the strong enemy positions along the Zlota Lipa east of Toustobaby, they came under very effective Russian artillery fire and were forced to the ground without making any progress. Parts of 55 ID were able to reach the eastern bank, but on the 19th they had to pull back to the western bank since Bolzano's Brigade wasn't able to support them. On the 20th FML Hofmann ordered his troops to stay on the defensive for the time being (except that Bolzano's troops would dig trenches up to the Russian lines).

GdI Bothmer had no opportunity to carry out his plans for an offensive by his northern wing.

Results and analysis of the action

The only result of the Dniester Battle was that the k.u.k. 7th Army had won three bridgeheads. Two were over the Dniester - a large one north of Doroschoutz and a smaller one at Iwanie; the other bridgehead was east of the Zlota Lipa at Krasiejow. Naturally these positions would require more men than the original lines which had the rivers to their front. In comparison to the goal, the defeat of Letschitzky's Army, these
were dubious gains and had been dearly bought. Benigni's Corps alone had lost 8800 men between 13 and 21 July.

The Russian 9th Army consisted of 13 infantry and 8 ½ cavalry divisions; since they were once more well supplied with ammunition, they were able to stand their ground stubbornly. Pflanzer-Baltin's force of 10 ½ infantry and 5 cavalry divisions was simply not large enough to carry out its ambitious task.

b. The allies advance to Cholm, Lublin and Ivangorod (15 July to 1 August)

1) Plans and preparations of the Armies

The plans

GFM Mackensen's command now had 41 ½ infantry and 5 cavalry divisions. On 11 July he was ordered to resume the offensive with the 4th, 11th and Bug Armies between the Vistula and Bug. At the same time, 1st Army was placed under his command with the task of guarding toward the east. In conjunction with this offensive, Woyrsch's Army (of just 5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) would attack west of the Vistula with a strong right wing.

The three Armies that would strike north had 33 ½ infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. Mackensen gave them "the capture of the line Novo Alexandriya-Lublin-Cholm" as their first goal.

4th Army (with 15 ½ infantry and 1 cavalry divisions) would advance east of the Vistula; its right wing would attack toward Lublin and quickly "seize the high ground west of Lublin, which is of decisive importance."436 To the right of 4th Army was the German 11th Army (of 12 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions); it would attack on both sides of the Wieprz, making the main effort west of the stream. This thrust would make the strong Russian positions lying behind the Wolica and Wojslawka untenable. The front to the east (as far as the Bug River) was held by the Bug Army of 6 infantry divisions; it would advance with its left wing toward Cholm.

436The 4th Army had been joined by a new Brigade of the Polish Legion which had been formed at Piotrkow. Commanded by Col Grzesicki, it consisted of just one infantry regiment plus a cavalry squadron.
4th and 11th Armies would start to attack on 16 July, the Bug Army a day earlier (so that their line would be even with that of 11th Army on the 16th). Every sector was supposed to move forward during the offensive. To ensure that the Bug and 11th Armies acted in unison, their goals for the first day of the joint attack were Hrubieszow, Uchanie, and the heights north of the Wojslawka and northwest of Krasnostaw, then the line Siedliska Wk.-Stryjna. 4th Army instructed its corps to move just as far on the first day - their goals were the heights on both sides of Piotrkow, south of Borzechow and south of the Chodelbach.

1st Army (with 8 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) would cover the right flank of Mackensen's attacking troops. The Army's right wing would remain on the Bug, while the left moved forward over the Bug in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky.

Opposite Mackensen's attacking group the Russians were deployed in carefully built defenses mostly constructed behind natural obstacles. They had 33 ½ infantry and 6 ½ cavalry divisions - 13th and 3rd Armies, three corps of 4th Army, and the reserves of the southern part of Northwest Front (Guard and II Sib Corps). 437 In the wide area between the Vistula and Pilica, Woyrsch's Army was opposed by only two corps of 4th Russian Army and a flank detachment of 2nd Army (about 5 infantry and 1 ½ cavalry divisions). Because of this disparity in strength, the allied high commands hoped that Woyrsch's planned attack at Sienno would quickly succeed so that he would soon gain ground toward Ivangozod. East of the Vistula, however, they had to anticipate very stubborn resistance; naturally the Russians wouldn't wish to give up their principal rail line from Cholm through Lublin to Ivangozod as long as they still had troops deployed on the Vistula. This conviction of the allied high commands was strengthened by the fact that the Russians had been industriously building trenches between the Vistula and Bug. Moreover, a stream of reinforcements had arrived, including the Guard and II Sib Corps which were believed to be at full strength. 438

The Preparations

Mackensen's Army Group as well as Woyrsch's Army (which would also attack on the 16th) spent the few days that remained before the offensive in preparing for the great test of arms.

The first task for the k.u.k. 4th Army was to bring order to the

437Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 73
438In fact the Guards (1 and 2 Gd ID plus Gd Rifle Bde) had 40,000 riflemen and II Sib Corps (4 and 5 Sib Rifle Divs) had 32,000 (per Knox, Vol. I, p. 300).
units of IX and XIV Corps, which had become mixed up during the II Battle of Krasnik. This was made easier by the lull in fighting after 10 July and the Russians' voluntary withdrawal from the positions on the southern bank of the Urzedowka which they had won with such difficulty. As ordered, Army HQ intended to make their main effort along the Lublin highway. They reinforced IX Corps by 4 ID (from 1st Army), which was placed in line between 106 Lst ID and 41 Hon ID. The high ground abandoned by the enemy south of the Urzedowka was occupied by X Corps and adjacent parts of IX and VIII Corps on the night of 14-15 July. Thus they would be as close as possible to the Russian positions when the offensive started, and lined up with the foremost lines of their neighbors.

The deployment of 11th Army had to address two needs:
- the wing west of the Wieprz, which had the decisive role, would have to be strengthened, and
- room had to be made for the Beskid Corps on the left wing of the Bug Army.

Therefore the eastern wing of 11th Army shifted to the west: the German 22 ID and most of VI Corps turned over their positions to the Beskid Corps. These units in turn relieved the Guards on the eastern bank of the Wieprz, making them available to participate in the main attack.

For the Bug Army it was important that the Beskid Corps should arrive as soon as possible. The Army Group HQ had naturally urged that this Corps should be relieved quickly from its positions on the Bug by troops of 1st and 2nd Army.

1st Army HQ had arrived on 5 July in Lemberg and took command over Szurmay's Corps which was guarding the Bug. They earnestly tried to follow out the orders of Army Group HQ as soon as circumstances permitted. However, the deployment of 1st Army was delayed because of the insufficient capacity of the railroads, which were also choked with supply trains of all kinds.

By 8 July the troops of 46 LW ID had detrained and 13 LW ID had arrived at Mosty Wielkie from 2nd Army; on 9 and 10 July they were able to relieve the Beskid Corps, freeing it for its new mission. In the night of 12-13 July the Beskid Corps came to the Werbkowice-Grabowiec sector, where it relieved Arz's Corps and the German 22 ID. These troops, in turn, took the place of the Guards, whose main body deployed west of the Wieprz to join the left wing of 11th Army for the main attack. The Guards took over some of the positions of XXII Res Corps, which thus was able to concentrate closely for the offensive. On the evening of 15 July
the front-line corps of 11th Army were ready for the assault. The Army's reserves were also in place - 119 ID and the Prussian Gd CD (which had come from the West) were behind the left wing, and X Res Corps was behind the Army's center on both sides of the Wieprz. Thus the new organization of 11th Army was complete.

The deployment of the Bug Army was simpler. It consisted of the Beskid Corps, GdI Gerok's reorganized XXIV Res Corps (with 11 Bav and 107 ID) and German 1 ID, and held the line between Grabowiec and Krylow. The deployment ended on 14 July with the arrival of the Beskid Corps at the front and of 1 ID in the rear areas; Gerok's divisions were already in line, and XLI Res Corps and 11 Hon CD had been reassigned to 1st Army.

1st Army had also done everything necessary to prepare for both parts of its mission. Two corps would take part in the thrust toward Vladimir Volynsky:

- XLI Res Corps, which was already south of Krylow on the Bug;
- Szurmay's Corps, which had been reassigned from 2nd Army and reached the area Moszkow-Zabcze on 15 July.

Three cavalry divisions made up a mounted corps in reserve under German G.Lt Heydebreck: on the 15th the 4 CD and German 5 CD were around Belz, while 11 Hon CD was at Oszczew. Ist Corps covered the deployment and would also cover the thrust to the north. It had moved 46 LW ID up toward the Bug; the Division was nearly at Sokal on the 14th. The Corps would soon be reinforced by the German 103 ID coming from Syrmia, which detrained at Lemberg on the 15th. South of Ist Corps, the II Corps was also supposed to stand guard toward the east. Its 25 ID was deployed south of Sokal as far as Krystynopol; 13 LW ID was farther south.

The Russians didn't interfere with the deployment of the east wing of Mackensen's Army Group. Also the Russian XXVIII and XII Infantry and IV Cavalry Corps - which perhaps had an opportunity to win an easy victory over Puhallo's Army before it was fully deployed - remained passive except for some scouting parties.

Although the last transports of the k.u.k. 1st Army didn't arrive until 29 July, the deployment of its combat units was mostly complete on 15 July. Under the circumstances (considering that the railroads had just been put back in service after being badly damaged by the Russians), this was a considerable achievement.

As the sun rose on 15 July, the new organization of Mackensen's
Army Group was complete, and the last preparations for a general offensive between the Vistula and Bug were in place.

The following was the order of battle of the allied units involved in the offensive, as of 15 July (from left to right; German units are in italics).

- **Woyrsch's Army**
  - Kövess' Armeegruppe = 35 ID, 9 CD, 16 ID, 7 CD
  - Landwehr Corps = 4 LW ID, 3 LW ID, Div Bredow

- **Mackensen's Army Group**
  - 4th Army = VIII Corps (62 ID, 47 Res ID, 37 ID with attached Polish Legion Bde), X Corps (2, 24, 26 ID), IX Corps (106, 4, 41, 21 ID), XIV Corps (8, 3, 10 ID), XVII Corps (45, 11 ID); 2 CD
  - 11th Army = X Corps (19, 20 ID), XXII Res Corps (43 & 44 Res ID), Gd Corps (1 & 2 Gd ID), 22 ID, VI Corps (39, 12 ID); in reserve were Gd CD, X Res Corps (101, 105 ID)
  - Bug Army = Beskid Corps (4 ID; 25 & 35 Res ID), XXIV Res Corps (107 ID, 11 Bav ID); in reserve was 1 ID
  - 1st Army = XLI Res Corps (81 & 82 Res ID), I Corps (46 ID only; 103 ID coming up), II Corps (25, 13 ID); in reserve was Heydebreck's Cav Corps (4 & 11 CD, 5 CD) and Szurmay's Group (7 & 40 ID) plus 103 ID coming up by train
  - Czibulka's Corps of 2nd Army = 31, 43 ID.

The Russians deployed opposite the allied attackers were:

- 4th Army = XVI, Grenadier, XXV, XV, VI Siberian Corps
- 3rd Army = X, XIV, III Caucasian, XXIV Corps
- 13th Army = II & V Caucasian Corps; XXIX, XXXI Corps; IV Cavalry Corps
- XII and XXVIII Corps of 8th Army
- In reserve under NW Front = Guard, II Siberian, XXIII Corps.

2) The Battle of Krasnostaw, 16-18 July

To quickly reach the Ivangorod-Lublin-Cholm rail line, Mackensen made the major thrust of 11th Army in the area west of the Wieprz through Krasnostaw, with the main body of the Guards and with XXII Res Corps and 20 ID. Here the distance to the railroad was shortest, and the advance would make the two strong positions behind the Wolica and behind the Wojslawka untenable. 19 ID of X German Corps, which held the junction with 4th Army, wouldn't be engaged at the start; they would wait until the attack had made progress before joining in.

The Generalfeldmarschall thus selected the same route where
eleven months earlier (in late August 1914) the k.u.k. X Corps had made a successful attack.

A secondary and smaller attacking group of 11th Army was the k.u.k. VI Corps. In conjunction with the Bug Army, they would thrust across the upper reaches of the Wolica and the Wojslawka, thus catching in a pincers any Russians who stood their ground. The German 22 ID and a mixed detachment from 2 Gd ID (with 3 battalions, 4 squadrons and 4 batteries under GM Freiherr von Preuschen) held the line between the two attacking groups; initially they would just stay in place, but were ready to break through once the attackers were successful.

The great battle opened on the 16th amid hazy weather that hampered the artillery preparation. West of the Wieprz, the main assault by 11th Army won a great success on the first day. The Russian positions were stormed along their entire length, and 6000 prisoners were taken. However, in no sector was it possible to break through the Russian front as had been planned, even though the 119 ID and parts of Gd CD from the Army's reserve had already been committed. In the evening the troops were confronted by new Russian trenches running from the lower course of the Zolkiewka over the heights farther west to the upper course of the Gielczew Brook. Since the enemy lines were unbroken, it was impossible for the Guard cavalry to open a pursuit.

The main offensive also failed to gain its objectives on 17 July. The German troops once more threw the Russians out of all their positions, but couldn't break through. On this second day of the battle, however, conditions were developing that could lead to greater success on 18 July. In the evening the Guards stormed Krasnostaw and Gory; thus they secured a bridgehead on the east bank of the Wieprz and threatened the rear of the Russian position on the Wolica as well as the flank of the position on the Wojslawka. Because the left wing of the attacking group had advanced so far north, the Russians in front of the German 19 ID and in front of 11 ID of 4th Army were compelled to pull back somewhat to the north.

East of the Wieprz, parts of VI Corps were able on 16 July to cross the swampy valley of the Wolica and to enter the main enemy position. In general, Preuschen's Group and 22 ID stayed in place; to cover the left wing of VI Corps, however, 22 ID did occupy Skierbieszow. Along with some troops from Arz's Corps, the Division held Skierbieszow against strong enemy counterattacks. On the 17th, the VI Corps was unable to win any
noteworthy success despite all the courage of its soldiers.

On 18 July, HQ of 11th Army switched their main effort to the sector east of the Wieprz. For this purpose they brought up 105 ID from reserve into the bridgehead which the Guard had established at Gory; the Division was instructed to thrust east in the area north of the Wojslawka. This would first of all make it easy for 22 ID to cross the Wolica. Then both divisions, which were placed under the commander of X Res Corps, would thrust ahead to the line Siennica-Krolewska-Stara Wies. The other division in the Army's reserves, 101 ID, deployed behind 22 ID where it would be immediately available if needed. Meanwhile VI Corps would once again try to break through the Russian front in its sector. West of the Wieprz the Guard, XXII Res and X Corps would continue to advance from their current positions.

Thus the Russian Northwest Front was still endangered from the south. If the allies reached the Cholm-Lublin-Ivangorod railroad, an orderly withdrawal from the Vistula valley wouldn't be possible. To prevent a breakthrough, General Alexeiev placed his Front reserves - the Guard and II Sib Corps - at the disposal of the commander of 3rd Army.

The attack which the right wing of 11th German Army mounted from two sides on 18 July was only partly successful. By concentrating most of the men in a small area, Arz's Corps was able to break through the Russian front at Gajowniki around 9:00 AM; by evening they had also captured the main enemy positions farther north, along with 3500 prisoners. The German 22 ID, on the other hand, had to be content with reaching the northern edge of the river bank west of Skierbieszow. Although 105 ID stormed ahead in the most promising direction, the Russian Guards came up and limited the Germans' gains to a hill southeast of Gory.

Meanwhile the German corps west of the Wieprz, although they were now also opposed by II Sib Corps, attacked again and gained substantial ground. By evening they were at Czestoborowice and Olszanka. Since the 16th they had captured 15,000 men and created a hole 32 km wide and 12 km deep in the front of 3rd Russian Army. Although they hadn't been able to break 3rd Army's resistance, the sacrifices of the German corps would not be in vain.

The Bug Army had already begun their attack on the 15th, accompanied by 81 Res ID on the left wing of Winckler's XLI Res

439 However, the losses of VI Corps itself on 18 July were substantial - 1200 dead, 4700 wounded and about 1000 missing.
Corps. They won some initial successes: Gerok's Corps captured the strongly fortified village of Werbkowice while the Beskid Corps stormed the cemetery heights at Zaborce and parts of Berescie village. Then, however, the Army's advance bogged down in front of the enemy's main positions. 1 ID was committed to the operation in the sector of Gerok's Corps, but this didn't alter the situation. The Bug Army failed to break through the enemy lines by the evening of 18 July. Also they were unable to advance their front as far as the attacking group of 11th Army; perhaps this was partly because 1st Army had been unable to support the opening of the Bug Army's offensive.

3) The k.u.k. 1st Army captures Sokal, 15-18 July

The 1st Army's mission was to prevent any interference with Mackensen's offensive from the east; this would be implemented in two ways. The right wing would guard the Bug between Zdzary and Dab, where it linked up with 2nd Army; they would also seize the heights east of the river at Sokal and Zdzary. "By gaining these bridgeheads they will ensure that we keep the initiative on this portion of the front." The Army's left wing "will thrust as soon as possible from the line Zdzary-Kosmow toward Vladimir-Volinsky; this will ensure that the enemy can't attack from this area against the right wing and flank of the Bug Army." Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps would hold the line between the Army's two wings.

FZM Puhallo entrusted the defense of the Bug to II and I Corps. GdK Karl Kirchbach, the commander of I Corps, was instructed specifically "to attack on 15 July" on the Bug south of Sokal with 46 LW ID and all available parts of 25 ID "to take the heights east of Sokal and if possible also those east of Skomorochy." The Army intended to also employ 103 ID here after its arrival by train. The thrust to the north would be carried out by Szurmay's Group, XLI Res Corps and the cavalry corps. It couldn't start until Szurmay's Group arrived from 2nd Army to relieve 82 Res ID in the Zdzary-Litowiz sector, and this wasn't expected to happen until the 17th. Therefore the operation toward Vladimir-Volinsky, which was so important for the outcome of Mackensen's offensive in the north, would take place after the attack to the east around Sokal.

Opposite Puhallo's right wing was XII Russian Corps on Brussilov's north wing; it had four infantry divisions. Upstream from Zdzary was IV Cavalry Corps (of about four divisions) and XXXI Corps (of three infantry divisions), which both belonged to 13th Army. The Russian units had apparently been instructed to
stubbornly defend the river line.

25 ID and 46 LW ID attacked early on the 14th in fog and haze that had developed after a severe storm on the previous evening; the roads leading to the Bug between Krystynopol and Horodlowice were still soaked. There was no place to ford the rain-swollen river, and strong enemy positions were visible along the heights on the other side. Thus both divisions had to be content on the 14th with the capture of several small Russian bridgeheads on our side of the Bug. The enemy was able to hold onto their defenses west of the river at the point where it bends south (this is southeast of Horodlowice). Although neither Szurmay's Group nor 103 ID had arrived, Mackensen was insisting on a quick attack at Sokal to pin down the enemy. He also wanted the troops to thrust over the Bug farther upstream so that the cavalry squadrons could fan out to the north and northeast.

In the night of 15-16 July, one battalion each from LW IR # 31 and 32 waded over the river north of Sokal and after heavy fighting established themselves on the eastern bank. In front of Sokal, however, the inner wings of 46 LW and 25 ID were pinned down on the western bank of the Bug. After personally viewing the situation, GdK Kirchbach was convinced that there was little chance that an offensive here over the swollen river against the steep eastern bank could succeed. Therefore he shifted troops toward the left; some would reinforce the small bridgehead already established north of Sokal and others would attempt to cross the river still farther north. To drive the Russians out of Horodlowice, Puhallo reinforced Ist Corps with foot detachments drawn from the cavalry corps. On the 17th, Szurmay would mop up the Russian groups who were dug in on the south bank between Horodlowice and Litowiz, while XLI Res Corps thrust toward Krylow.

The II and I Corps used 17 July to prepare for the attack over the river on the 18th. The few units who'd already dug in on the east bank defended themselves against a larger enemy force by well-led counterattacks; they even managed to enlarge the small chunks of territory they already held and took over 1000 prisoners. On the Army's left wing, 82 Res ID was relieved by the parts of Szurmay's Group which had already arrived, who attacked the Russian groups still on our side of the Bug south of Zdzary and threw them over the river.

440On this occasion, a company commander in LW IR "Teschen" # 31 - Captain Karl Neusser - was so distinguished that he won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
On 18 July the inner wings of I and II Corps, led by GdK Kirchbach, attacked Sokal. First the LW IR "Troppau" # 15 (from 46 LW ID) stormed the heights south of Skomorochy; then they turned to the south. Meanwhile the left wing of 25 ID (led by Col Hassenteufel of IR # 4) crossed the Bug south of Sokal, where the river was full of underwater barbed wire. These troops from the south and LW IR # 15 from the north captured the town. The second Russian position was soon overrun. Around 3:00 PM, afer GdK Kirchbach committed his last reserves to the fight, companies of the Deutschmeister # 4 also pushed their way into the third Russian position, on Heights # 254 (Gora Sokal) which dominated the battlefield. The bridgehead thus established was widened in the north by the occupation of Skomorochy. The right (south) wing of 25 ID was now also able to cross to the east bank of the Bug; they established themselves east and northeast of Krystynopol.

Parts of 7 ID of Szurmay's Corps, supported by detachments from the cavalry corps, pushed the Russians away from the bend in the Bug at Horodlowice. Szurmay's main body now all deployed along the river west of this town and were preparing to cross over. XLI Res Corps attacked toward Krylow on both banks of the river; they were held up, however, by an (ultimately successful) engagement of their right wing at Litowiz.

Although 1st Army was advancing successfully on its entire front, at 2:00 PM they had already received an order from GFM Mackensen to halt the offensive because the Russians were increasing their resistance to the Bug Army. The XLI Res Corps, 11 Hon CD and 103 ID were transferred to Linsingen. 1st Army would guard the Bug between Slipcze and the junction with 2nd Army; however, they would also retain the bridgeheads they had won and create another one at Zdzary. This might give the cavalry corps a chance to break through toward the Luga River between Vladimir-Volinsky and Ustilug.

4) The k.u.k. 4th Army attacks on both sides of the Bystrzyca, 16-18 July

The k.u.k. 4th Army attacked to the left of Mackensen's main striking force (11th German Army). Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had been told to reach the heights west of Lublin as quickly as possible. On 15 July he commanded 100,000 riflemen, 8100 horsemen, 365 machine guns and 593 guns. He concentrated all available units in the area between the Lublin highway and the

441 A description of this gallant action by IR # 4 is in Hoehn, Waldstätten and Seifert, "Die Deutschmeister", pp. 429 ff.
Bystrzyca. The principal attack in this sector would be delivered by FML Kralicek's reinforced IX Corps. His neighbors (XIV and X Corps) would assist the attack with their strengthened inner wings, since the Army commander had stated that "the closest cooperation in this sector is of very great importance." Of the units in the Army's reserve, 26 LW ID and 10 ID were placed behind the main attack. 2 CD, which had been reunited, was held in readiness at Stara Wies.

The corps on the Army's wings had special assignments. VIII Corps was instructed "to roll up the Russian position north of the Urzedowka from the west with its main body in an energetic attack, using the strongest possible force." XVII Corps would both guard the Army's right and remain linked to 11th Army. Once again it fought in two separate groups, since its difficult tasks were both to join the attack of X German Corps and to support the k.u.k. XIV Corps.

Early on 16 July, in cloudy weather, the batteries of 4th Army were continuing the bombardment of the enemy positions which they'd opened the night before. Meanwhile the infantry were moving up as close as possible to the Russian lines, and began their main attack at 11:00 AM. The troops advanced slowly step-by-step, fighting bitterly for all the advanced enemy positions and suffering heavy casualties. In the evening they were pinned down in front of the main enemy line. The result of the first day's fighting was that the Army now had a full picture of the strength of the enemy fortifications, and recognized that they could only be worn down gradually.

Throughout 17 and 18 July the fighting raged along the principal Russian position. Everywhere the attacking infantry encountered the most stubborn resistance, and the Russians launched heavy counterattacks. The Russians had constructed many individual strong points along the lines, which hadn't been damaged by our artillery. Therefore the infantry, despite all their bravery, couldn't prevail. Here and there some troops (as in 4 ID's sector) did penetrate into the Russian position; however, the ground thus gained was limited, and in some cases was soon lost to enemy counterattacks. Only the corps on the wings were able to win some territory, thanks to the successes of the neighboring armies. VIII Corps took Moniaki; however, they were unable to carry out the next phase of the plan by thrusting east and rolling up the Russian line north of the Urzedowka. On the Army's other wing, the Russians opposite the right wing of 11 ID (XVII Corps) pulled back to the heights south of Krzczonow early on 18 July.
Thus 4th Army had won no decisive success; the attempt to break through the Russian front on the Lublin road had failed.

5) Woyrsch breaks through at Sienno, 16-18 July

On 12 July, the k.u.k. high command had ordered Woyrsch's Army to attack with a strong right wing at the same time that Mackensen's Army Group was advancing. For this purpose, GO Woyrsch assembled his three German divisions as a shock group at Sienno; behind the lines he deployed a reserve mounted brigade, drawn from the divisional cavalry, at Wierzbnik and Lubienia. To enable the Germans to concentrate, Kövess' Armeegruppe had to once more stretch their lines further to the east; on the 13th his 35,900 riflemen held a front of 85 km. The only reserves available to the group were two cavalry brigades. GO Woyrsch had asked 4th Army to return the troops he'd sent them during the II Battle of Krasnik, but his request was only partially honored.

The attack was scheduled to start on 17 July, under the command of GdK König of the Landwehr Corps. In the meantime, measures were taken to properly deploy the troops and to deceive the enemy.

On the 16th, continuous artillery fire opened up along the Army's entire front. However, in the morning hours of the 17th the guns concentrated with full fury on the point selected for the actual breakthrough, at Sienno. With this support, the storm troops (3 LW ID under GM von Arnim) drove into the enemy position. By evening they had reached the Krepianka between Krepa and the eastern edge of Rzeczniow. The breakthrough was 10 km wide and 6 km deep; it was a brilliant success for the Silesian Landwehr. The columns which accompanied the storm troops and tried to widen the breach still encountered stubborn Russian resistance, especially at Rzeczniow. GO Woyrsch intended to exploit his initial success with a vigorous thrust to prevent the enemy from digging in along the Ilzanka. For this purpose, GdI Kövess was instructed to help the left wing of the LW Corps. Meanwhile the Russians were retreating from 9th German Army north of the...
Pilica, which apparently would soon have an effect in front of the k.u.k. troops. Kövess' divisions would thus have to be ready to advance. On the next day, the strengthened right wing of 16 ID was to advance west of Ilza; the horsemen of 7 and 9 CD would serve as a reserve.

Almost all of the allied units under GO Woyrsch advanced on the 18th. The Russians were burning the bridges on the Vistula at Solec. Other columns of smoke and explosions behind their lines were unmistakable signs of their impending retreat. The Germans who'd reached the Ilzanka broke through the Russians before they could prepare a new line; in the night of 18-19 July the LW Corps stormed Ciepielow and Kazanow and established a firm bridgehead on the north bank of the Ilzanka.

The Russians also had to give way before the south wing of Kövess' Armeegruppe and took up new positions near Skaryszew. They still retained their old trenches on the Kowala-Przytyk line in front of Radom, including the forward outposts. However, on the Pilica they pulled back their right wing to Wysmierczyce to stay in line with 2nd Russian Army (which had retreated along the north bank of the Pilica on the 17th). Thus only Kövess' two wings could advance; in the center the main body of 16 ID stayed in place along its very extended line.

Besides taking 2000 prisoners, Woyrsch's breakthrough at Sienno would bring relief to the k.u.k. 4th Army. That Army's left wing on the Vistula was still at Jozefow, but the Germans west of the river had already advanced 20 km north of this point.

6. The Battle of the Chodelbach and reorganization of Mackensen's Army Group, 19-28 July

Because of the deep penetration of the German 11th Army west of the Wieprz and the powerful attacks by the 4th and Bug Armies, the Russian front between the Vistula and Bug was threatening to collapse. To prevent this, on the night of 18-19 July the Russians disengaged from their opponents. Leaving some rear guards behind, they pulled back to a long-prepared position south of the Cholm-Lublin railroad; it ran from Hrubieszow up to the north bank of the Siennicabach, then through Fajlawice, Chmiel, Niedrzwica Mala and the heights north of the Chodelbach. Because of the breakthrough of Woyrsch's Army Detachment at Sienno, the right wing of 4th Russian Army was also retreating. As will be related shortly, the 1st and 12th Armies north of the Narew were
being pushed back to that river by the attacks of Gallwitz's Army. Because of these setbacks, when Alexeiev attended a conference at Siedlec on the 19th he was empowered by the Grand Duke-Generalissimo "to decide when to retreat east from the Vistula when necessitated by the general situation of the Armies." This was the final decision to evacuate Warsaw and Ivangorod, which had been discussed for so long.

The Battle of the Chodelbach

The troops of Mackensen's three attacking armies recognized early on the 19th that the enemy had pulled back; they began to pursue along the entire front, and by evening had come up to the new Russian positions. Army Group HQ didn't need to issue any new orders for attacking these lines. The Armies would continue to operate under the general directives for the offensive. Mackensen no longer anticipated any danger to his eastern flank from the Russians who were bunched together between the Vistula and Bug; therefore he ordered XLI Res Corps and 11 Hon CD to transfer from 1st Army to the Bug Army; 103 ID, which was still arriving from Syrmia, would follow them. The weakened 1st Army was no longer expected to attack toward Vladimir Volinsky.

4th Army HQ wanted to move as quickly as possible to Lublin on a broad front. They instructed all the corps to advance to the line Prawiedniki-Belzyce-Wronow-Opole on 20 July. The reinforced IX Corps (106 Lst, 21 LW, 4 and 41 Hon ID) would strike with particular force along the Lublin highway. Simultaneously the XVII Corps, reinforced by 10 ID, would thrust past Chmiel to reach the Lublin-Cholm road as soon as they could. In the Army's reserve, 2 CD deployed behind XVII Corps; 26 LW and 37 Hon ID were assembled in the area west of the Lublin highway. A division-level HQ under FML Durski was established for the Polish Legion, over their 1st Brigade and Col Grzesicki's newly-formed (3rd) Brigade; the Poles were also in reserve west of the Lublin highway. XIV Corps, stationed between IX and XVII Corps, would "gain ground toward Lublin, or at least support its neighbors." VIII Corps was instructed to operate closely with X Corps, and to hold the heights between Opole and Kamien "with just minimal forces." They also created a mixed detachment to maintain contact with Woyrsch; it would attack right along the Vistula in the direction of Kazimierz.

On the morning of 20 July, the artillery bombarded the Russian positions while the lines of attacking infantry moved to their jumping-off points. Late in the afternoon, the left wing of IX

444Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 78
Corps (106 Lst and 21 LW ID) and all of X Corps assaulted the Russian front running from Niedrzwica Mala through Borzechow to Skrzyniec. In sometimes fierce hand-to-hand combat they broke into the enemy lines along the entire front and took 6000 Russian prisoners. The troops east of the Lublin highway still weren't ready for a general offensive by evening. Some attempts by individual units to break into the enemy lines were unsuccessful. The Russians responded to the Austrian advance with desperate counterattacks along the entire front of the Archduke's Army. They were all repulsed, although in the sectors of IX and X Corps the fighting raged late into the night. The Archduke ordered all his units to continue the attack on 21 July. The reserves would join the fight in the area where the enemy lines had been broken west of the highway; they would widen the breach and cause the entire Russian line to fall back. 37 Hon ID was placed under X Corps, the Polish Legion under IX Corps. One of the two infantry brigades of 26 LW ID was placed behind each of these Corps to guard against any surprise attacks which the Russians might venture during the night. XVII Corps would resume its unsuccessful attempt to break through past Chmiel. XIV Corps' instructions for the 21st were the same as for the 20th.

The fighting resumed along the entire front as day began to dawn on 21 July. The Russians sought to stop the advance of 4th Army with very stubborn defensive actions plus powerful counterattacks; they also brought infantry and artillery up to reinforce the positions covering the Lublin highway and Borzechow. Early in the morning, they used overwhelming force to strike the thin lines of 24 ID, and pushed them back to their starting point. At noon the 37 Hon ID (which had joined X Corps after midnight) counterattacked. Along with 24 ID, which returned to the fight, they took the Russian lines after four hours of action. Working closely with X Corps, the German 47 Res ID stormed the trenches northwest of Chodel village. East of X Corps the situation didn't change on this day, except for several local successes.

There were also hot actions along the front of 11th Army on 20 and 21 July. Here and there the Russian lines were penetrated, and their counterattacks were repulsed; however, the Army couldn't achieve any decisive progress. The Russians stubbornly defended the rail line and road between Lublin and Cholm. The troops of 11th Army were exhausted because they hadn't rested since the Battle of Krasnostaw began. To give them a chance to recuperate and to reorganize their units (which had become mixed together), GFM Mackensen held the Army in place on 22 July. However, he gave the 4th and Bug Armies on the flanks, both of
which were victoriously advancing, a free hand to implement the general directives issued back on 12 July. The Bug Army had advanced slowly but steadily since 19 July, in heavy fighting; by 21 July their right wing had moved through Hrubieszow.

Under these conditions, 4th Army HQ decided that only the three corps west of the Lublin highway would continue to attack on 22 July. The right wing (XIV and XVII Corps) would halt, along with the left wing of 11th Army. Early in the morning of the 22nd the VIII, X and IX Corps started to advance; by evening they had driven the Russians from all of their lines. 4 ID reached Niedrzwica Mala and fought its way in heavy actions from house to house through the north edge of the town. 21 LW ID stormed a cemetery northwest of Niedrzwica Mala; 106 Lst ID and 26 LW ID took the Russian positions farther west in a frontal assault. X Corps advanced, fighting in stages, to the northern edges of the forested area southwest of Belzyce; VIII Corps advanced to the heights of Wronow. XIV and XVII Corps were able to push the inner wings of their lines somewhat forward.

Just as the German 11th Army had won the success at Krasnostaw, so now the k.u.k. 4th Army won the victors' crown. In an area 23 km wide west of the Lublin highway the Russian positions had been stormed; 48 officers and 12,400 men were taken prisoner, and 23 machine guns captured. This latest setback to 4th Russian Army prompted General Alexeiev on the 22nd to order the general withdrawal of his 4th, 3rd and 13th Armies to the trenches on the line Ivangorod-Kock-Wytyczno-Opalin-Luboml-Kovel. Based on this authorization, the commander of 4th Army (General Evert) began to pull the defeated part of his Army back in the night of 22-23 July in the sector Kowala-Belzyce-Prawiedniki. The enemy retained their old positions only opposite the wings of the Archduke's Army (in front of our XVII Corps and the extreme left wing of VIII Corps).

Early on the 23rd the k.u.k. units in the center (the right wing of VIII Corps, and the X, IX and XIV Corps) immediately took up the pursuit; in the first hours of the morning they once more caught up with the enemy. The position the Russians occupied had been carefully prepared weeks earlier; it didn't seem advisable to have the troops, tired after eight days of almost unbroken combat, initiate an immediate assault. Moreover, on 23 July all signs indicated that the Russians were preparing a powerful blow against the left wing of 11th Army, which had withstood some heavy attacks the night before. Since 4th Army HQ was uncertain of the further intentions of the Army Group command, or of the

445Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 78
situation of the neighboring Armies, they decided to halt their operation for a while. They didn't want to advance in isolation. After clarifying the situation, they would "assemble strong forces in a sector where another breakthrough would succeed." Therefore Archduke Joseph Ferdinand ordered that his men "should hold the lines they had reached and technically improve them."

At the same time, 4th Army HQ pulled 4 and 24 ID, 21 and 26 LW ID, and 2 CD from the front line. The k.u.k. 10 ID, as ordered by Mackensen, assembled behind the endangered left wing of the German X Corps.

A pause to regroup

The actions since the start of the Battle of Krasnostaw convinced Mackensen's HQ that a decisive success could not be won by a frontal assault with the three Armies between the Vistula and Bug. Both at Krasnostaw and Chodelbach the Russians had been able to evacuate the battlefield at the last moment, defeated but still able to fight again. Meanwhile the Bug Army could only advance slowly, step-by-step, in constant fighting that caused heavy casualties. The Russians' power of resistance seemed unbroken. In the last few days they had even brought up fresh reserves and launched strong counterattacks along the entire front of the Army Group, especially against the 11th and Bug Armies. They held their positions in seemingly undiminished strength, ready at any time to go over to the attack if necessary to facilitate the retreat of their neighbors west of the Vistula.

The only promising way to prevail against such a stubborn enemy was to strike a blow with concentrated forces. On strategic grounds, the best place to strike would have been on the eastern wing, near the Bug. However, it would take time to shift more troops to this sector, and the terrain was unfavorable. Therefore Mackensen decided, as he announced on the 24th, to continue to make the main effort with the center of his Army Group. He also hoped to break the line to which the enemy was still clinging on both sides of Ivangorod.

The next offensive would start on 29 July. The main attack by 11th Army would be delivered on a narrow front west of the Wieprz in the direction of Biskupice. It would be led by GdI Emmich, commanding seven infantry divisions (two each under XXII Res, X Res and X Corps plus 119 ID) and the Guard cavalry. The Army's right wing east of the Wieprz (the Guard infantry and Arz's Corps) wouldn't attack until the offensive by the striking force became effective.
The 4th Army had two missions:
. To take part in the main attack by advancing to Lublin with a strong right flank, and
. To thrust its left wing forward to help Woyrsch's Army Detachment, which had already reached the Vistula and was planning to cross the river downstream from Ivangorod; this would pin down some enemy troops who otherwise would have opposed Woyrsch.

Army HQ concentrated the available forces on both wings to carry out these assignments. The main attacking group on the right wing was XVII Corps, reinforced by 4 and 10 ID. Their first task was to seize the heights northeast of Chmiel; this would enable the Army to roll up the Russian front opposite XIV Corps, and also open the way for the neighboring Germans (19 ID) to cross the line of ponds which ran northeast from Chmiel. On the Army's left, the inner wings of VIII and X Corps would thrust to the heights on both sides of Lubki. From here they could either roll up the Russians' Belzyce-Prawiedniki line from the west or at least pin down as many units as possible. The Army's center (IX and XIV Corps) would stay on the defensive.

Army Group HQ instructed the Bug Army "to help out by advancing on Cholm, but to do so without leaving the right flank unprotected." From 22 July the XLI Res Corps and 11 Hon CD were engaged on the right wing of this Army.

During the pause in action from 24 to 28 July, the 4th and 11th Armies made the necessary changes to their orders of battle. Under 4th Army, the 10 ID entered the front on the right wing of XVII Corps to support the upcoming offensive by 11 ID on its left. 4 ID went into XVII Corps' reserves. Under XIV Corps, 8 ID was relieved by 26 LW ID. The former unit now consisted of just KJR # 2 and 3 plus the divisional artillery; it was removed from 4th Army's control and prepared to move to the Italian front (whence KJR # 4 had already been sent on 12 June, followed by KJR # 1 on 15 July). Under IX Corps, the Polish Legion was placed in the first line to make other units available for the Army's reserves. As finally deployed, these reserves were 24 ID (behind the right wing of X Corps) and 21 LW ID (behind the east wing of IX Corps). The AOK had ordered 2 CD to transfer to Woyrsch's Army; it was instructed to reach Jozefow by the 30th.

Meanwhile 11th Army was assembling its striking group. X Res Corps was inserted in the line between XXII Res and X Corps; 119 ID was stationed behind them in reserve. East of the Wieprz, 22 ID left the line; it then deployed behind the Guards along with 103 ID – which hitherto had been held back as a reserve for the
Bug and 1st Armies.

It was more difficult for the Bug Army to rearrange its units because there were still heavy actions on its front until 27 July. By that date Linsingen had managed to move his lines up to Gusynne, through Ubrodowice and to Teratyn; his men were constantly either attacking or fending off Russian counterattacks. The Bug Army planned to resume the attack on 29 July - the right wing of the Beskid Corps would move north through Uchanie while Gerok's Corps advanced toward Teratyn. Accordingly, the main body of the Army was assembled in the Ubrodowice-Uchanie area.

By the evening of 28 July all preparations had been completed by the Army Group; the new offensive against the Russian positions between the Vistula and Bug could begin the next morning.

7) Woyrsch advances to Ivangorod and crosses the Vistula at Ryczywol, 19-31 July

While the Russians east of the Vistula were stubbornly fighting Mackensen's Army Group and repeatedly checking their advance, the offensive of Woyrsch's Army west of the river was moving smoothly. The Russians in this area had already been ordered back to the river and didn't offer serious resistance. Therefore, on the 19th GO Woyrsch could allow the LW Corps to push ahead from the crossing points on the Ilzanka (Kazanow and Ciepielow) which they had captured. They would advance to the Zwolen-Radom road; the Landwehr cavalry, followed by 11 Cav Bde of 7 CD, would thrust toward Jedlnia. By evening the three German divisions reached the line Przylek-Zwolen-Podgora, taking 5000 prisoners on the way. The Russians, however, were able to prevent the cavalry from breaking through to Jedlnia. The right wing of 16 ID and the other half of 7 CD, cooperating closely with the Germans, threw the enemy back through Skaryszew. Southwest of Radom the Russians were still holding their lines on the railroad and the highway, although the bulge in their position was pushed in by the left wing of 16 ID. 35 ID, together with 9 German CD operating on the other side of the Pilica, also made some progress toward the east.

Intelligence reports meanwhile indicated that the Russians had decided to evacuate Radom and retreat to the line Janowiec-Policzna-Jedlinsk-Bialobrzegi.
Although the left wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army (VIII Corps) had reached Kamien, Bredow's right wing at Przylek was a good day's march farther north. Conrad now ordered GO Woyrsch to continue his attack with a strong right wing in the general direction of Ivangorod and to be prepared to cross the Vistula on the flank of the Russians east of the river. To attack the enemy's last field position in front of the fortress, which ran between the Zwolen-Nowo Alexandriya road and Policzna, the LW Corps had to shift to the northeast on 20 July while Bredow guarded the Vistula. To protect the left flank, Kövess was ordered to advance on Czarna with a strong eastern wing. The difficult fighting of the Landwehr ended in the night with success. The k.u.k. divisions, on the other hand, encountered less resistance; the Russians didn't try to hold the line through Bialobrzegi-Jedlinsk and farther east, but fell back to the Kozenice-Policzna position.

16 ID had already entered Radom in the morning. Then it shifted its right wing toward the east and reached Czarna and Makosy; since the front was shorter, some troops could be assembled as reserves. The 7 CD was reunited on the right wing to provide a connection with, and cover for, the LW Corps. The k.u.k. 9 CD was behind the left wing on the Radomka, with instructions to reconnoiter and observe the Russian bridgeheads at Ryczywoł, Magnuszew and Warka on the next day. 35 ID advanced in the area between Radomka and the Pilica, past the Jedlinsk-Bialobrzegi road; its northern wing had to be on the alert against a possible enemy flanking attack from beyond the Pilica. Because of this danger, GdI Kövess on the previous day had indicated that the advance of a strong column from the German 9 CD along the northern bank of that river would be helpful. However, on the 20th the right wing of 9th German Army had just begun to move over the Mogilanka, because the enemy was still holding the position Grojec-Prybyszew.

By the early hours of the 21st, König's LW Corps had punched a hole 2 km wide in the Russian front east of Zwolen. The attack temporarily stalled because of heavy enemy pressure at Policzna, but GdI Kövess helped out by sending 7 CD, reinforced by three battalions, to the east to overcome Russian resistance on the line Laski-Bogucin.

In the afternoon this latest allied onset succeeded. GO Woyrsch ordered a ruthless pursuit to keep the Russians from consolidating their lines in front of Ivangorod. A strong group built around the (4) LW Cav Bde was sent toward the bridges at Nowo Alexandriya. The LW Corps moved north of the road to Zwolen to the line Chechly-Policzna. Finally, Schariczer's Group (16 ID
and 7 CD) advanced through Bogucin-Stanislawica toward the Radomka.

The enemy's main body had been thrown back to the line Kozienice-Gniewoszow. Apparently they had decided to abandon the western bank of the Vistula; during the morning the covering line of cavalry opposite the northern wing of Kövess' Armeegruppe had already pulled back to Ryczywol and to Warka.

In the morning, 9 CD reached the Glowaczew area, and then sent 9 Cav Bde ahead to observe the bend in the Pilica at the point where it flows into the Vistula. In the afternoon, when GdI Kövess learned of the success of König's Corps at Zwolen, he sent the main body of 9 CD - reinforced by a detachment from 35 ID - to seize the bridgehead at Ryczywol and if possible the bridges themselves. However, the advancing troops found no enemy in either the fortified lines or the town. 35 ID stayed in place around Glowaczew, in echelon behind the left wing; it couldn't move because of the situation north of the Pilica, where the Russians didn't evacuate the Grojec-Bialobrzegi road until the morning.

Inter-allied debate on strategy

While the allied troops between the Vistula and Pilica moved on without pausing toward Ivangorod, there was a lively difference of opinion between Teschen and Pless regarding the future use of Woyrsch's Army.

Early on 21 July, Falkenhayn proposed to Conrad that in the next stage of the operation Woyrsch's Army should be combined with Prinz Leopold's (9th) into an Army Group that would be placed under the German high command. Conrad objected and wished to retain the current command arrangement. He believed that the Russians would probably evacuate the area west of the Vistula except for bridgeheads, which would free parts of their 4th Army to move to the Lublin-Cholm area; parts of their 2nd Army might also move toward the Narew. For the continued success of the campaign east of the Vistula it was therefore necessary that Woyrsch should next work closely with the k.u.k. 4th Army while simultaneously attacking Ivangorod with some of his troops. Similarly, 9th Army should work together with Gallwitz to encircle Warsaw and Nowogeorgiewsk.

446The numerous prisoners taken during the day including men from all the regiments of the XVI and Gren Corps. There were also some opolcheniye, apparently drawn from the Ivangorod garrison.
Falkenhayn countered immediately that his plan would prevent the Russians from sending further units toward Lublin-Cholm. If Woyrsch and 9th Army struck together over the Vistula toward Siedlec-Lukow they would threaten the Russian armies farther south from the rear, which would quickly bring relief to Mackensen. If either Army struck by itself, it would be too weak to have this effect. Conrad on the other hand stuck to his opinion that Woyrsch should advance through Nowo Alexandriya to link up with 4th Army; admittedly a thrust over the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangoord would menace the Russians, but it would take too long to develop. On the 22nd Falkenhayn partly conceded to Conrad; he stated that if Woyrsch had an opportunity to quickly cross the Vistula upstream from Ivangoord he should naturally seize it. The German Chief of Staff was concerned, however, that Woyrsch's Army wasn't strong enough for this task; if the planned thrust didn't succeed, it would be necessary to return to the idea of crossing the river below the fortress.

The Russian leadership had decided on 5 July and again on the 19th to give up the west bank of the Vistula. The allies in front of Ivangoord gained a much needed glimpse into the enemy's intentions from deciphered radio messages. Thus they learned on the 22nd that on the previous day XVI Corps had destroyed the railroad as far as the fortress works and left Ivangoord around 10:00 PM. Based on the location of Russian HQ, it appeared that the east bank of the Vistula between the mouth of the Pilica and Ivangoord was guarded by XVI Corps, reinforced by one and a half division of Cossacks plus some opolcheniye. The Gren Corps and two cavalry divisions were stationed on the river from Ivangoord south to Podgorz. This deployment, as well as intercepted orders, made it clear that the Russians wouldn't be surprised by an attempt to cross the river at Nowo Alexandriya.

Nevertheless, this was the area where GO Woyrsch was preparing to attack in support of the Archduke's 4th Army, which was still considerably farther to the south. On 22 July, Woyrsch instructed GdI Kövess to deploy north of the Radom-Ivangoord railroad to blockade the fortress and to observe the Vistula downstream as far as the Pilica. All other troops would concentrate to march toward Nowo Alexandriya. However, Schariczer's Group and König's left wing still had to overcome some resistance (they were already in range of the fortress' guns) before 16 ID and 9 CD reached the Vistula in the evening between Staszow and the Pilica.

Now Kövess was instructed to relieve the German troops in the line up to Gniewoszow by the 25th. To carry this out, 9 CD would
adhere to its original assignment; 16 ID became responsible for blockading the fortress; 35 ID would deploy in the Glowaczew area on both sides of the Radomka; 7 CD would concentrate north of Zwoleń.

GO Woyrsch brought up Col Mischek's k.u.k. pioneer group (of 4 companies) and began the necessary preparations for crossing the Vistula. Bredow's Division would pretend to cross at Kazimierz, but König's Corps would make the actual crossing at Nowo Alexandriya on the night of 24-25 July.

Meanwhile, however, the planned use of Woyrsch's Army again became the occasion of a lively dispute between Falkenhayn and Conrad, which they carried out in writing and conversation on 23 and 24 July. The former agreed with the analysis of Woyrsch's Chief of Staff, Lt Col Heye, who felt that it was pointless to cross the river at Nowo Alexandriya to attack the Russian flank since they were already falling back in front of 4th Army. Therefore Falkenhayn returned to his original proposal that Woyrsch should thrust toward Siedlec-Lukow. Conrad on the other hand pointed out that there was no indication that the Russians were making a large-scale retreat east of the Vistula; they were even making heavy attacks against 11th Army. After it became clear that these Russian thrusts didn't pose any immediate danger to 11th Army, the two Chiefs of Staff came to a compromise solution in a meeting at Teschen on the 24th. Around 8:00 PM, GO Woyrsch received the following order:

"Cancel the crossing operation on the Vistula upstream from Ivango rod. The LW Corps and Bredow's Division should instead cross the river near the mouth of the Radomka. The German OHL will try to help out with the right wing of 9th German Army. Kövess' Group (XII Corps plus 7 and 9 CD) will guard the Vistula between the mouth of the Chodel and Kozienice, while blockading Ivango rod from the west bank. They will attack once heavy artillery arrives."

The Silesian Landwehr soldiers, who had already manned their pontoons in preparation for the assault, were ordered back to the river bank.447

Under the new assignment, Woyrsch's Army had two goals. On 25 July the Generaloberst began to prepare for the more important task, to cross the Vistula. The attack on Ivango rod would follow later. First Kövess had to relieve the German units which were still assembled in front of Nowo Alexandriya. Thus 7 CD, reinforced by some Landsturm infantry, took over the stretch of the Vistula from Lucina north almost to Gniewoszow. To conceal

the new deployment from the enemy, two German companies stayed in their old sector, and the Austrian troops posted on the river bank wore German helmets. To the left of 7 CD, the 16 and 35 ID were opposite the Russian bridgehead west of the river at Ivangorod (the former held the line up to the railroad, the latter deployed farther north up to the Vistula). 9 CD stayed in place along the river, but now was placed directly under GO Woyrsch.

Thus König's Corps, Bredow's Division, the German LW Cav Bde and Mischek's Pioneer Group moved from the western wing of the Army through Zwolen to new positions on the eastern wing near the mouth of the Radomka. The maneuver was completed on the 28th.

The technical troops included six k.u.k. and four German pioneer companies, 21 sets of k.u.k. military bridge equipment, and 2 ½ German bridging trains. The k.u.k. Pioneer Company 3/10 had traveled 90 km in 26 hours. See Wörlen, "Die Pioniere bei Flussübergängen im Weltkriege" (Technik und Wehrmacht; Berlin, 1922, pp. 52 ff.) and GM Mischek, "Übergang der Armee von Woyrsch über die Weichsel bei Ryczywol am 29. Juli 1915" (an unpublished study in the military archives).

---

448 The technical troops included six k.u.k. and four German pioneer companies, 21 sets of k.u.k. military bridge equipment, and 2 ½ German bridging trains. The k.u.k. Pioneer Company 3/10 had traveled 90 km in 26 hours. See Wörlen, "Die Pioniere bei Flussübergängen im Weltkriege" (Technik und Wehrmacht; Berlin, 1922, pp. 52 ff.) and GM Mischek, "Übergang der Armee von Woyrsch über die Weichsel bei Ryczywol am 29. Juli 1915" (an unpublished study in the military archives).
The Germans cross the Vistula

The river crossing by the LW Corps (Bredow's Division was in reserve) was scheduled to take place on the night of 28-29 July along a front of 24 km. The main effort was at Ryczywol, using seven crossing points; a secondary group would cross at three points near Magnuszew. To deceive and pin down the enemy, at the same time Kövess had 7 CD pretend to cross the river between Kazimierz and Nowo Alexandriya; also he opened a heavy artillery bombardment along the entire line of forward positions at Ivangoz. The enemy didn't notice the preparations of the technical troops and the infantry. During the build-up, reconnaissance indicated only that the enemy on the eastern bank was hastily entrenching. On the other hand, the Russians north of the Pilica had thrown back the German 9 CD on the 27th and seemed to be building up their strength opposite the mouth of the Pilica. This made it necessary for the k.u.k. 9 Cav Bde, guarding the Vistula at this point, to be on the alert.

The enemy was completely surprised when the attack over the Vistula suddenly started at 1:30 AM on the 29th. The first echelon met determined resistance at only two of the crossing points; at the other eight they overran the patrols on the river bank and immediately dug in. By 5:00 AM, when heavy fire from the Russian artillery made it temporarily impossible to send over further troops, most of the Corps had already crossed. Despite the enemy artillery, the construction of a bridge east of Ryczywol was already finished in the morning.

As soon as the k.u.k. high command learned that the venture had succeeded, they wanted to reinforce Woyrsch's Detachment; they sent him 2 CD from 4th Army. At noon, however, GO Woyrsch replied that to exploit the success he had already gained he would need an infantry division. If he could restrict his activity in front of Ivangoz to an observation and a blockade, he could use the cavalry to replace one of the infantry divisions there. Then the siege artillery which was already moving up toward Ivangoz wouldn't be needed. Conrad confirmed the transfer of 2 CD, but stated that it would be necessary for Kövess' Group and a strong force of heavy artillery to strike against the fortress. This would shorten the line and pin down the enemy.

König's Corps had a very difficult time for the next few days. The Russians immediately became alert to the danger they were in;
not only did they make the Landwehr pay for every step forward with heavy casualties, but they began to counterattack. For this purpose, General Alexeiev ordered 4\textsuperscript{th} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Armies to throw the Germans back over the river by a combined effort. Therefore strong reinforcements would be sent from Lublin and the Ivangorod sector.\footnote{Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 83}

On the evening of the 29\textsuperscript{th}, the Germans were still confined in a narrow corridor east of the Vistula. Woyrsch had planned to send GdK Hauer with the k.u.k. 1 Cav Bde and 4 German LW Cav Bde over the river to destroy the Warsaw-Ivangorod railroad; this plan was canceled because the infantry hadn't gained enough ground. On the 30\textsuperscript{th}, the Germans continued their efforts to establish a secure bridgehead; a second bridge was completed south of the first one. The Russians pulled the Gren Corps from its old position (it was replaced by some cavalry), and sent it to join XVI Corps in the fighting. They launched especially heavy counterattacks against the Landwehr from Paprotnia. To keep the enemy from sending further troops against König on the next day, GO Woyrsch made another demonstration toward Ivangorod.

The German 22 LW Bde on the left wing, which had made the secondary crossing at Magnuszew, was especially hard pressed because it had not linked up with the main body; the Germans had no reserves left. 9 CD helped out on the 31\textsuperscript{st} by dismounting some troops from two regiments and sending them over the river to an island east of Magnuszew.

Meanwhile, Bredow's Division and the LW Cav Bde had crossed to the eastern bank in the sector held by König's main body. General Klembowski's XVI Russian Corp, reinforced by parts of XXXVI Corps (of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army) and by 14 Sib Rifle Div from Lublin, offered desperate resistance. Nonetheless GO Woyrsch's German troops were able to expand their bridgehead and to ensure the safety of the bridges. By now the advance of the k.u.k. 4\textsuperscript{th} Army had made it unnecessary to guard the west bank of the Vistula as far as Konskowola, so 7 CD moved to the Radomka on the 31\textsuperscript{st}. At this point the 9 German CD was also placed under GO Woyrsch, who thus would have four cavalry divisions available by 3 August. As soon as the infantry on the east bank had gained enough ground, the cavalry would cross over to break the enemy's lines of communication between Ivangorod and Warsaw.
8) The capture of Lublin and Cholm, 29 July-1 August

29 July

The attack which 11th Army opened west of Wieprz in the direction of Biskupice went according to plan; the first day of the battle was a great success. Emmich's shock group inflicted heavy casualties on II Siberian Corps and drove them from their positions; his right wing reached the railroad at Trawniki. Thus the long-standing goal of cutting the line between Lublin and Cholm was finally realized. The left wing of Emmich's Group came up to the heights south of Biskupice. East of the Wieprz, the left wing of the Prussian Guards was also able to move forward in the late afternoon, but couldn't break the resistance of the Russian Guards. Some of Emmich's shock troops were able to establish a firm bridgehead on the east bank of the Wieprz. This made it possible to plan for a pincers attack on the 30th that might destroy the enemy opposite the Prussian Guards and Arz's Corps.

The neighboring commands, 4th and Bug Armies, didn't keep step with the 11th on 29 July. After some initial success, they were still engaged in indecisive fighting in the evening; 4th Army's battle continued without interruption into the night. The inner wings of the Archduke's VIII and X Corps were able to take the Russians' advanced positions and to break into their first line. In the night they attempted to storm the second line by surprise, but were unsuccessful.

Under similar circumstances, the right wing of 4th Army couldn't win a decision. The attacking group of XVII Corps (which included parts of 4, 11 and 10 ID) crossed the line of ponds northeast of Chmiel during the day and threw the Russians out of their forward positions. However, the defenders of the heights beyond the ponds, dug in behind seven lines of barbed wire, stubbornly repulsed two assaults. In a third attack which opened just before sunset, very gallant troops from 11 and 10 ID finally took the enemy's main positions. The center corps - IX and XIV - attempted only to pin down the enemy by feint attacks. While the indecisive fighting on the flanks was still raging, 4th Army HQ decided to make their main effort on 30 July on the left wing. For this purpose, FZM Scheuchenstuel would command a shock group consisting of VIII Corps (62 ID and 47 Res ID), X Corps (37 Hon and 2 ID), and 24 ID; his mission was to break through and then roll up the Russian line toward the east. The assignments for the Army's other corps remained unchanged for the 30th.
The Bug Army had also encountered stubborn resistance on 29 July. Despite all the courage of the troops, they could make progress toward the north only step by step. Gdí Linsingen planned to continue his attack on 30 July in the same direction.

30 July

Before Mackensen's three Armies could carry out their plans, however, the situation in front of the Army Group was substantially altered. Because of the defeat which 3rd Russian Army had suffered at Biskupice and Chmiel, the enemy leadership decided to break off the fighting during the night of 29-30 July. They ordered the three armies engaged between the Vistula and the Bug to retreat to the line Nowo Alexandriya-Markuszow-heights north of Lublin-Swidnik-Pavlov-Rejowiec-Leszczyany-Korczewniki-Gusynne. Depending on the situation, the left wing of 13th Army east of the Bug would either stay on that river or pull back to the line Gusynne-Markostaw.450

Early on the 30th, the Russians had evacuated almost all their positions along the front of Mackensen's Army Group; they stayed in place only on the extreme right wing, opposite XLI Res Corps. Even in their own land, wide-ranging fires north of the great Lublin-Cholm highway marked the path which the Russians had taken. Large columns were marching north on the roads from Lublin to Lubartow and from Trawniki and from Cholm to Wlodawa; all passable routes in between were also full of supply trains and units heading in the same direction. Without pausing, Mackensen's armies took up the pursuit along a broad front. Soon the allies again encountered entrenched enemy troops.

The left wing and center of 4th Army reached their objectives for the day by evening on 30 July, without encountering noteworthy resistance. VIII Corps reached the Bystra downstream from Naleczow and sent covering troops to the north bank of the brook. X Corps advanced to the high ground south of Garbow. The foremost troops of IX Corps were on the heights south of the Ciemiega Brook on both sides of the Lublin-Nowo Alexandriya road. Mounted detachments from IX and XVII Corps had already clattered into Lublin at noon; after them XIV Corps moved through the city to occupy the heights farther north. Only XVII Corps was unable to reach its goal for the day, Leczna. The Corps had been able to move ahead on a broad front over the Lublin railroad and drove the Russians from their advanced positions. A few kilometers

farther north, however, they were stopped by the enemy main position. Because the Russians had retreated, the Army's reserves weren't engaged - 24 ID spent the night of 30-31 July at Belzyce, while 21 LW ID and 4 ID were southeast of Lublin.

The corps of 11th Army, like those of 4th Army, began to strike north in pursuit of the enemy early in the morning. In the afternoon they encountered entrenched Russians - which they believed to be only rear guards - on the heights on both sides and south of Milejow, at Siedliszcze, north of Rejowiec and southwest of Cholm. However, when the Russians were attacked they held their ground very stubbornly. By evening the 11th Army still hadn't broken this enemy resistance.

The Bug Army was also engaged on its entire front from early in the day. The Beskid Corps, advancing next to Arz's Corps, pushed its center ahead to Leszczyany. Gerok's Corps, reinforced by 1 ID, advanced fighting up to the heights south of Strzelce. Winckler's Corps shifted toward the northeast and attempted to drive the enemy over the Bug.

Army Group HQ got the impression during the actions of 30 July that the Russians had decided to offer serious resistance to 11th Army and in the area north of Lublin. GFM Mackensen wanted to make it impossible for the Russians to strengthen their defenses, and if possible to make their line in front of 11th Army untenable by outflanking it. Therefore he ordered that the wings of his Army Group should continue to attack on 31 July. 4th Army, while standing guard toward Ivangorod, would advance to the line Michow-Leczna; the Bug Army would thrust toward Cholm. 11th Army, on the other hand, was ordered not to attack until 1 August, while making all necessary preparations on the 31st.

31 July

4th Army HQ was still uncertain whether they were dealing with Russian rear guards or with the enemy's main body. However, to carry out Mackensen's orders without losing time they instructed all the corps to fight their way north in full strength "in order to throw the Russians over the Wieprz." Only if serious resistance was encountered would a "systematic" operation be opened on the Army's wings. FZM Scheuchenstuel's Group (VIII and X Corps plus 24 ID), supported by IX and XIV Corps, should capture the heights by Garbow, from which they could roll up the Russian positions farther east. The troops east of the Bystrzyca (45 LW ID, 11, 10 and 4 ID plus parts of 3 ID) were placed under GdI Kritek's command to advance to the heights south of the mouth
of that stream.

All the corps of 4th Army were in motion from the early morning of 31 July. It soon became apparent, however, that a carefully-planned attack would be needed to throw the Russians out of their positions. Several hours were devoted to preparation; in the afternoon the infantry started to attack. By evening, 62 ID of Scheuchenstuel's Group had advanced to the edge of the heights southeast of Nowo Alexandriya; 47 Res ID captured the heights north of the Lublin road west of Markuszw. 37 Hon ID and 2 ID of X Corps took the heights south of Garbow and drove the Russians back to the west edge of the town, where they again offered stubborn resistance. IX and X Corps came up to the enemy position south of the Ciemiegabach, but several attempts to break the Russian line failed. The attack by Kritek's Group also had failed to win a decision by evening. The main blow was delivered by 4 ID, which deployed deeply in echelon on a narrow front between 45 LW ID and 11 ID; they failed to move beyond the enemy's forward positions. 10 ID, the right wing unit of XVII Corps, was more successful; together with the German 19 ID they pushed the Russians back to a point 5 km in front of Leczna. 4th Army HQ ordered Scheuchenstuel's and Kritek's Groups to continue to attack on 1 August in the same directions and with the same goals. At the same time, IX and XIV Corps were to break forward with strong inner wings.

On the last day of July, 11th Army merely fought some minor actions to prepare for the scheduled offensive on 1 August; the purpose was to push the Russians back from their forward positions to their main line. Meanwhile 11th Army was preparing two mighty attack groups, each composed of three corps, which would thrust along the road from Trawniki to Wlodawa and farther east through Rejowiec; they would move north as far as possible. The preliminary actions gained ground in only a few places (in the sectors of German X Corps, XXII Res Corps, and the k.u.k. VI Corps). The Prussian Guards were unable to take the heights north of Rejowiec from the Russian Guard Corps.

Under the Bug Army, Gerok's Corps broke through the Russian positions on both sides of Strzelce and thus secured a stretch of the road leading to Cholm. Most of the Beskid Corps stayed in their own lines; only the left wing advanced somewhat to keep pace with Arz's Corps. XLI Res Corps successfully attacked toward the bend in the Bug at Ustilug. Its neighbor to the south was 11 Hon CD, stationed south of Gusynne.

1 August
During the night of 31 July-1 August the Russians evacuated their positions in front of the 11th and Bug Armies in order to pull back in stages to the long-prepared works south of the line Wlodawa-Ostrow. The two German armies pursued the retreating enemy starting at dawn. GFM Mackensen sent the Guard cavalry riding along the road to Wlodawa; their objective was the corner of the swamp southeast of Wytyczno. He broke up the sub-groups within 11th Army and ordered its corps to advance with their left wing toward Leczna. The Bug Army would move through Cholm to Tarnow. For now "the troops wouldn't move past this line. They will push back rear guards and feel their way up to the enemy's main positions while preparing for a general offensive." To ensure that there was a connection between the two German armies, the 103 ID - hitherto in reserve behind the right wing of 11th Army, was placed between the k.u.k. VI and the Beskid Corps.

4th Army would continue to pursue toward the line Leczna-Michow, while advancing to the lower Wieprz and guarding toward Ivangorod.

In carrying out these orders, the components of the Army Group experienced fighting of varying intensity on 1 August. 4th Army was unable to advance its line significantly farther past the positions held the day before; only the Army's left wing was relatively successful. 62 ID stormed the flat hill between Nowo Alexandriya and Konskowola, and 47 Res ID took another one about 2 km northwest of Markuszw. X Corps advanced its front methodically up to the Lublin road; at day's end its right wing was still engaged in indecisive fighting on the heights southeast of Garbow. The other corps (IX, XIV and XVII) worked their way up to the Russian positions, but didn't break into the enemy lines. 24 ID on the left wing and 21 LW ID at Lublin were still in reserve, so Army HQ had them available to seek a decision in the actions.

As the corps of 11th Army moved north, in the morning they already encountered strong rear guards blocking the roads from secure positions on the line Puchaczow-Swiecica. The Russians were starting to receive unusually strong artillery support. Although there were a few local successes, by evening the enemy's resistance still hadn't been overcome.

The main body of GdI Linsingen's Army, the Beskid Corps and Gerok's Corps, pursued the Russians toward Cholm. 4 ID of the Beskid Corps took over the old bishop's city of Cholm around 10:00 AM; then they encountered the enemy on heights north of the
town and were still engaged there through evening. Gerok's Corps, advancing directly east of Cholm, sent their leading troops over the Cholm-Kovel rail line; the main body camped for the night south of the rails. 1 ID was responsible for guarding the Army Group's flank on the Bug; they advanced fighting almost up to Dubienka. Farther up the river, XLI Res Corps advanced east of Gusynne. 11 Hon CD crossed the Bug to cover the construction of a bridge south of Gusynne; they occupied the heights to the southeast.

c. Hindenburg's thrust over the Narew, 13 July-4 August

According to the orders of the German OHL of 2 July, the concentric offensive against the Russians deployed in the deep bulge around the Vistula valley would start in mid-July and would also include an offensive by Hindenburg's "German East Front" over the Narew toward Siedlec. Therefore on 13 July the Eastern HQ sent Gallwitz's 12th Army, reinforced to twelve divisions, into an offensive on both sides of Przasnysz. Gallwitz's two wings and the two divisions on the right wing of 8th Army (between Szkwa and Pissa) would support the main offensive. The Russians' strong first line on both sides of Przasnysz was broken in a brilliant operation. The Germans had already taken the town itself on the second day; on the fourth day they took the strongly fortified second line. Russian resistance west of the Narew was broken on the 17th. Gallwitz's storm troops advanced toward that river, while the corps on his right wing was already pushing Russian covering troops from the outer positions of the Nowogeorgiewsk fortress. The operation seemed to be a second Gorlice.

Although the Russians were already resigned to losing the Vistula valley, the sudden German thrust took them by surprise. The orderly withdrawal of 4th, 3rd and 13th Armies could only be carried out as planned if the German thrust from the northwest was fended off for as long as possible. The Narew River, guarded by forts at Lomza, Ostrolenka, Rozan and Pultusk as well as the recently reinforced fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk, was the best line on which to delay the German offensive, as Alexeiev had already recognized on 7 July. Substantial reinforcements, some from Galicia and some from 2nd Army, would support 1st Army for this purpose.

Gallwitz's Army had meanwhile been reinforced by four divisions. On 19 and 20 July they came up to the fortifications on the Narew, and were preparing to attack over the river. At this

451Zayontschovsky, "The mobile war of 1914 and 1915", p. 325
point they encountered a large-scale counterattack by fresh Russian troops between Rozan and Pultusk. The German troops repulsed this attack, but it delayed their own offensive until 23 July.

On 20 July an attacking group of Landwehr and Landsturm was assembled on GdA Gallwitz's right wing to begin to encircle Nowogeorgiewsk; it was commanded by GdI von Beseler, who had successfully besieged Antwerp in 1914. While this operation was beginning, Gallwitz's main offensive opened on the 24th, and captured Pultusk and Rozan.

On 26 July there were eight divisions east of the Narew, ready to advance to and beyond the Bug. Here, however, the Russians had already concentrated significant forces in a bid to gain time to successfully complete their retreat. At least eight corps and three cavalry divisions were identified on the 26th opposite Gallwitz. Now the Russians opened a new and powerful counterattack on a 60 km front between Serock and a point east of Rozan. They hit the German troops when the latter were making final preparations for their own offensive. The Russians were repulsed in a difficult action; however, their 1st Army still had formidable powers of resistance. There were further Russian attacks in the next few days; Gallwitz's Army was bogged down in a continuous, stubborn fight and couldn't make any noteworthy gains. On 3 August, however, Ostrolenka fell; this allowed the German 12th Army and the south wing of 8th Army to push ahead on the east bank of the Narew from Nowogrod to south of Pultusk.

While making this powerful attack on the Narew, the German Eastern HQ hadn't given up its plans for a wider ranging and decisive advance through Kovno and Vilna into the rear of the retreating Russians. 10th Army initiated preparations for an attack on Kovno; hopefully they would be able to initiate the operation at a later point and by success in a decisive moment could persuade the OHL to throw in further support. At the very least, these preparations would add to the security of the left flank in Courland.452

In that sector, the Niemen Army had started to attack on 13 July, at the same time as 12th Army. Despite the relatively limited strength of the Germans in Courland, they were able to reach the lower Windau in their first onset. On 18 July their left wing reached a line running from Hofzumberge through Tukkum and Kandau to Windau, and nearly up to the Bay of Riga. Between 15 and 20 July, the Niemen Army also attacked Szawle and the area east of Rozan.

452Hindenburg, p. 129
Rossienie; on the 23rd they defeated the Russians at Szawle and by 25 July had pushed from that town and over the Dubissa into Poswol and Poniewiez. The 5th Russian Army retreated to Bausk.

While these victories were being won in the north, it was increasingly clear that the offensive on the Narew was "degenerating into a frontal assault", and that the Russians were completing their evacuation of the Vistula valley. Therefore Hindenburg returned to the plan of a thrust on the lower Niemen and toward Kovno. In his memoirs, Ludendorff later wrote: "It was already growing late; the capture of Kovno would take time, and the Russian retreat from Galicia was already largely accomplished. However, it still seemed possible to achieve more, maybe much more, than the current operation promised to do. The existing plan could only end in a purely frontal advance against the enemy from the west to the east."\textsuperscript{453}

GdI Falkenhayn would not agree with the plans of the Eastern HQ. His gaze was fixed on the West and the imminent French offensive in the Champagne, but above all upon the Balkans where he needed to open a free line of communications to help the Turks in their critical situation. He wanted to end the operations in the East soon and "consciously renounced wide-ranging strategic goals while adhering to his original plan of a methodical advance with limited objectives."\textsuperscript{455}

d. The capture of Ivangorod, 1-4 August

While the German troops of Woyrsch's Army were holding their ground on the east bank of the Vistula in stubborn and costly fighting, Kövess' Armeegruppe were preparing in cheerful haste to carry out their own mission, the capture of the fortress of Ivangorod. Because the first attack would be directed on the western side, several batteries of high-trajectory guns were given to 35 ID. Its commander, GM von Podhoranszky, was reinforced from the Armeegruppe's reserve, and built up an attacking group of 8 ½ battalions. On 1 August, after four hours of artillery preparation, he struck the forward Russian position at Slowiki Nowe, which consisted of tiers of strong points, some constructed of cement. The attackers broke through the enemy lines; the Transylvanian IR # 50 was especially distinguished. As planned, some of the troops then shifted to the southeast,

\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., p. 128
\textsuperscript{454} Ludendorff, "Kriegserinnerungen", p. 117
\textsuperscript{455} Volkmann, "Der grosse Krieg 1914 bis 1918" (Berlin, 1922), p. 71
took many Russians from behind, and forced them to lay down their arms. Thus the enemy line in the woods north of the railroad was rolled up in some bitter fighting. The north wing and later also the center of 16 ID joined the attack by 35 ID, and took several strong points from their determined defenders. The loss of 6 km of the front forced the Russians to also pull back from 16 ID; they withdrew to their second line of field entrenchments. This shorter line ran from Staszow through Mozolice Wz. and Slowiki Nowe, then along the road to Gniewoszow and to the Vistula. The triumph of k.u.k. arms had resulted in the capture of over 2300 men, 32 guns and large amounts of military equipment.

The Austrians obtained precise information about the garrison; it consisted of two regiments from 47 ID and two opolcheniye brigades, plus the fortress artillery. Information obtained from prisoners, the Russians' failure to counterattack, and aerial reconnaissance on 3 August all made it seem pretty likely that the fortress would be evacuated. Kövess therefore ordered his troops to be ready to advance as soon as they noticed that the enemy was retreating. On the other hand, preparations were continuing for another set-piece attack if needed - this time on the southern front by 16 ID.

As anticipated, however, the Russian command had in fact been forced by the overall situation to proceed with their long-planned evacuation of the "forward position" on the Vistula. General Klembowski's group had failed to drive GO Woyrsch's units from the eastern bank of the river, while Mackensen was winning new successes against 3rd and 13th Armies.\footnote{Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 83} As will be explained in more detail below, General Alexeiev decided to pull back his Armies on 3 August. Thus 2nd Army would give up its stretch of the Vistula along with Warsaw on the 4th and 5th, and its neighbor the 4th Army would also have to pull back. Since it had already been decided that there would be no attempt to maintain Ivangorod as a fortress behind enemy lines, as 4th Army withdrew it would abandon the anyway obsolete fortifications west of the Vistula.\footnote{Zayontschovsky, "The Mobile War in 1914 and 1915", pp. 335 ff. Danilov, pp. 528 ff.}

In the night of 3-4 August, the besieging forces in front of Ivangorod heard numerous explosions in the fortress, and fires flared out. In the morning the Russians evacuated their positions and withdrew over the Vistula. Both of the Transylvanian divisions thrust ahead to occupy the forts on the western bank. The enemy was still holding the eastern bank; they had destroyed the bridges and were guarding all the points where
the river could be crossed near Ivangorod.

North of the city the German troops on the eastern bank of the Vistula had been instructed to continue to advance, but they were still engaged in a difficult action against an enemy force estimated to be 68 battalions strong. On 1 August, Falkenhayn had asked whether these troops could be reinforced by the k.u.k. VIII Corps of 4th Army; since the Russians were still very active on the lower Wieprz, Conrad had to turn down this request. Therefore the Germans in the Vistula bridgehead had to be content on the 3rd with the ground they had already won. However, after the fall of Ivangorod GO Woyrsch was empowered by the k.u.k. high command to move 35 ID very quickly to Kozienice; 16 ID was responsible for guarding the Vistula.458

GO Woyrsch and his troops could look back on some very significant successes since 24 July. The boldly-conceived and carefully-prepared crossing of the Vistula had been directed against an important part of the Russian front, where the wings of the 2nd and 4th Armies came together. The victory must be considered an outstanding feat of arms, due to the technical troops (among whom Col. Mischek's Aus-Hung. pioneer group played a glorious role) and to the prowess of the Landwehr (who in the German Army were rated only as third-rate troops). Then the Aus-Hung. troops captured the western part of the Ivangorod fortress in a sudden stroke. This was one of the most important achievements for which their commander, GdI Kövess, eventually won the Commander's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.

Also on 4 August, the 9th German Army entered the Polish capital, Warsaw. Thus the Russians had lost both the points from which they had unleashed their "steamroller" toward the west ten months earlier. The center of the Russian front, now under pressure from three sides, wouldn't be able to pause before continuing its retreat.

e. Operations between the Vistula and Bug from 2 to 4 August

The reports which GFM Mackensen received on 1 August gave him the impression that the Russian armies would continue to retreat in front of him until they reached the line Rudka-Kolacze-Ostrow-

458TRANSLATOR's NOTE - Despite this sentence, and the title of this section, Ivangorod was not captured at this time; only the forts on the western bank were secured. The citadel on the eastern bank wasn't captured until 8 August as described further below.
Ivangorod before offering renewed resistance. Therefore he ordered the 4th, 11th and Bug Armies to continue to advance on 2 August.

2 August

On 2 August the 4th Army strove to continue the breakthrough which the k.u.k. X Corps had initiated against the enemy front at Garbow. Under the command of FML Martiny, it was to be carried out by X Corps plus parts of IX Corps and 24 ID. The main attack was delivered by 24 ID in a small area directly south of Garbow; they struck through the lines of 2 ID with support from the neighboring parts of 37 Hon ID and of 106 Lst ID. VIII Corps had assembled a strong reserve behind its right wing to exploit the expected success. The parts of the Army that weren't attacking were only supposed to hold their positions. 21 LW ID stayed back in Lublin as a garrison.

By evening the 24 ID had penetrated the Russian positions, but hadn't completely broken through. 47 Res ID, along with 37 Hon ID, had to repulse a strong counterattack in the morning and was forced to pull back its lines somewhat; in the evening it was hit by renewed attacks. This German division, which the high command had now selected to reinforce Woyrsch's Army, was supposed to be relieved by 2 ID as soon as the tactical situation permitted. The day passed mostly quietly on the rest of 4th Army's front.

Only the left wing and center corps of 11th Army moved ahead on 2 August; with the approval of Army HQ the right wing (Guard and VI Corps) postponed their offensive until the 3rd. The fighting in the center raged on without a decision into the evening; on the other hand, the inner wings of the German X and X Res Corps (20 and 105 ID) threw the enemy out of their positions; in the north they advanced through Puchaczow and in the west nearly up to Leczna. They didn't fully break through the enemy front. In their new positions the Russians renewed their resistance to 11th Army in the evening.

During 2 August, the left wing of the Bug Army also encountered heavy fighting as it attempted to drive the enemy from the swamps south of Wlodawa. The Beskid Corps took the Gora Lysa Heights north of Cholm. Gerok's Corps fought an indecisive struggle on the line Serebryszcze-Brzyzno. 1 ID pushed through Ostrow and Turka toward the east and thus extended the front along the Bug; XLI Res Corps and 11 Hon CD were guarding the river upstream without seeing action.
3 August

All three armies planned to continue the attack on 3 August. 4th Army would strike on both wings - by Garbow with X Corps and east of the Bystrzyca with XVII Corps (reinforced by half of 21 LW ID). 11th Army wanted to exploit the success of X Corps by committing 119 ID, which hitherto had been following in the second line behind XXII Res Corps. The Gd Cav Div, which couldn't break through along the road to Wlodawa, would now guard the route through Leczna toward the north. The Army's other corps, as well as those of the Bug Army, would continue to attack in the same directions as on the day before.

However, because of the blows they had suffered at Garbow and Leczna, the Russians pulled back opposite 4th Army in the night of 2-3 August; their new front ran from the hill north of the Ciemiegabach to the heights at Leczna. Opposite 11th Army, which still had to endure heavy counterattacks shortly before midnight, the Russians pulled back to the Swinkabach. They stood their ground only opposite the wings of the Army Group - VIII Corps and the Bug Army.

When the allied troops became aware of the Russians' retreat early on the 3rd, they quickly followed them up to the new positions. There was no change in the situation on 3 August on the left wing of 4th Army - the VIII and X Corps; the latter prepared for an attack scheduled for early on the 4th. The Army's center - IX and XIV Corps - advanced to the heights north of the Ciemiegabach. Under XVII Corps, the 10 and 11 ID reached the Wieprz between Leczna and the mouth of the Bystrzyca; 45 LW ID crossed the Bystrzyca and maintained a link with XIV Corps. 4 ID and the newly reunited 21 LW ID were held in readiness at Lublin as the Army's reserve. In the evening of 3 August the Army's HQ was under the impression that the enemy was determined to offer stubborn resistance in their current position. Therefore they intended to continue the offensive on 4 August with a concentrated thrust along the road to Lubartow by XIV and IX Corps plus 45 LW and 4 ID, all led by FML Roth. X Corps on the left wing would carry out the offensive they had already been preparing for the 4th.

On 3 August the troops of 11th Army had also opened their advance without delay. The German X Corps (reinforced by 119 ID) and X Res Corps fought a difficult action, but threw the Russians out of their positions north of Leczna and Puchaczow and took the heights in that area. The other corps came up against strong enemy positions after a short advance; apparently substantial
preparation would be needed to mount a successful attack. Therefore XXII Res Corps, the Guards and VI Corps decided to postpone the offensive until 4 August. 11th Army HQ ordered that the pursuit or attack on this day should continue to the line Dratow Garbatowska-Tarnow.

Despite heavy fighting by its west wing on the 3rd, the Bug Army was unable to make progress. They would try again on the 4th.

4 August

However, on this day the allied troops again were confronted only by rear guards, who were falling back to the new line Ivangoord-Lubartow-Tarnow which was occupied by the main Russian force.

GFM Mackensen recognized that the Russian corps still stationed near the Vistula were beginning to retreat. To inflict as much damage as possible, he planned to fall on the southern flank of the retreating enemy with a thrust against the railroad from Warsaw to Brest-Litovsk. First, however, "the apparent covering positions on the line Wlodawa-Ivangoord must be overcome as quickly as possible." Therefore on the morning of 4 August Mackensen ordered 4th Army to advance rapidly in the general direction of Kock and 11th Army to advance through Parczew. The Bug and 1st Armies would cover this operation against any interference from the east. The former Army would prevent any attacks from the Wlodawa area by driving the foremost enemy troops back to what was apparently their main position southeast of that town. 1st Army would advance to the Luga and capture Vladimir-Volynsky.

The new goals required the Army Group to shift some strength toward the west. 4th Army gave up XVII Corps' sector to 11th Army, which in turn gave the sectors of the Guard and VI Corps to the Bug Army. To free units of the Bug Army for the advance toward Wlodawa, 1st Army was instructed to take over the task of guarding the Bug as far as Dubienka from XLI Res Corps; 11 Hon CD was reassigned to 1st Army to help out.

Meanwhile GFM Mackensen allowed his Armies to carry out the instructions already issued for 4 August. Only the left wing of 11th Army was given the additional task of pursuing the enemy beyond the original objectives for the day. They were supposed to advance up the Wieprz to the heights at Lubartow in order "to make it impossible for the enemy to withdraw over the Wieprz south of Lubartow."
By evening on 4 August the corps of 4th Army had reached their objectives for the day after fighting some light rear guard actions. Under VIII Corps the 62 ID had nearly reached the enemy positions southeast of Ivangorod; 2 ID, which had relieved 47 Res ID, was on the heights north of Kurow. 47 Res ID meanwhile was at Kazimierz, getting ready to cross the Vistula. X Corps (37 Hon ID and 24 ID) spread out on the heights on both sides of Amelin. IX Corps (106 Lst ID, Polish Legion, 41 Hon ID) and XIV Corps (26 LW ID, 3 ID) had advanced through the north edge of the forested area southwest of Lubartow. XVII Corps - with 45 LW ID west of the Wieprz and 11 and 10 ID on the eastern bank - reached the enemy positions southeast of Lubartow without fighting. Army HQ had 21 LW ID follow closely behind XIV Corps, but still held 4 ID back next to Lublin.

On 4 August the 11th Army came up to the Russians on the line Rozkopaczow-Garbatowka-Tarnow. By evening they penetrated the enemy positions in some places.

The Bug Army completed part of its redeployment on 4 August. 1 ID and Gerok's Corps stretched further to the west so that the Beskid Corps could in turn relieve the VI and Guard Corps. XLI Res Corps, after leaving a screen of troops on the Bug, was marching to the north.

f. Actions on the Bug, 19 July-4 August

There were no significant events in east Galicia after the allies reached the Zlota Lipa. The ensuing pause in the fighting facilitated the relief and redeployment of some troops. It was of great benefit to the units, exhausted and short of personnel after the recent battles. It was also possible to take some measures against cholera, which once more had broken out in IV Corps. The XIIth March Battalions (in the k.k. Landwehr the Battalions # XI) were incorporated into the ranks during this quiet time. Thus the rifle strength of 2nd Army increased from 55,000 to about 70,000, that of the k.u.k. units in South Army from 34,000 to 43,000, and that of 7th Army from 80,000 to 91,000.

In mid-July, 2nd Army was given the purely defensive mission of guarding the Bug. However, on 17 July its commander GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided on his own initiative to join the advance of 1st Army, which at this point was supposed to guard the flank of Mackensen's northern offensive with its own thrust east toward Vladimir-Volynsky. Already on the 12th, after sending Szurmay's Group to 1st Army, Böhm-Ermolli had relieved GdK Ziegler's XVIII
Corps (9 ID and 1 Lst Inf Bde) from the front on the upper Zlota Lipa and shifted them behind his northern wing. Now he also placed the IV and Czibulka's Corps under Ziegler, as well as 32 ID (which had been in the Army's reserve since the 15th). They were all ordered to attack through Kamionka-Strumilowa toward Radziechow. First the enemy would be driven from their position west of the Bug in front of Dobrotwor; then the k.u.k. troops would form their own bridgehead over the river at the point where it makes a loop east of Kamionka-Strumilowa. Böhm-Ermolli would later select the time for the next phase, the breakout from the bridgehead to the area of the Bialystok and Ostrowka brooks.

General Brussilov unwittingly assisted Böhm-Ermolli's plans. He took VIII Corps, which had been stationed at Kamionka-Strumilowa, out of the line and filled the gap by extending the lines of its neighbors. VIII Corps was quickly moved north in response to the danger that the Austrians might break through Brussilov's front at Sokal.

Czibulka's divisions and 13 LW ID from II Corps began their attack early on the 19th. In this heavily wooded area the Russians had only maintained some outposts, which fell back before the attackers without offering much resistance. However, the k.u.k. units could only advance slowly because of the difficult terrain and the bad weather, which also hampered aerial reconnaissance. The weak Russian response and reports that several high-level enemy HQ were pulling back from Mackensen's Army Group caused 2nd Army HQ to order their corps to continue to advance up to Stanislawczyk on the upper Styr and then to the sector of the Ostrowka and Bialystok brooks.

Under 1st Army, the 25 ID and 46 LW ID had completed their successful and glorious action at Sokal as ordered; on 19 July they halted their offensive and began to entrench in their new positions. The enemy lines were still quite distant from 25 ID, but it was determined that they were already bringing up fresh troops through Tartakow.

Under Szurmay's Corps, 7 ID had already crossed the Bug at Zdzary during the night; they took the horsemen of the Russian IV Cavalry Corps completely by surprise and pushed them back. Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps moved up to the bridgehead thus established, but didn't break out because they couldn't bring artillery with them over the damaged bridge. 40 Hon ID, stationed on both banks, had to stretch its line to the west to relieve XLI Res Corps, which had been reassigned to the Bug Army and was urgently needed by Linsingen. The 103 ID had arrived,
but then was given up to Mackensen as a reserve to his Army Group HQ. The German commander stated that "the task of 1st Army isn't to advance toward the east, but for now only to guard the flank of the armies operating farther north." FZM Puhallo, whose Army of just five infantry and three cavalry divisions was holding a front of 50 km, was anxious about the next few days. His position was difficult because 1st Army was stationed at the dividing point between the allied units defending toward the east and those attacking toward the north. Puhallo anticipated counterattacks by the enemy, who now already outnumbered him by two infantry and one or two cavalry divisions, and who were also being reinforced by the VIII Russian Corps.

1) Fighting around the Sokal bridgehead, 20-31 July

Puhallo's forebodings were fulfilled only too quickly. In the night of 19-20 July the north wing of 46 LW ID and 40 Hon ID already had to repulse Russian counterattacks; detachments from Heydebreck's cavalry came up to the battlefield to support the Honveds. Tension increased along the Army's entire front on the 20th. The enemy sent forward an unending series of attacking columns, which apparently were trying to cut off the Sokal bridgehead from the south. 25 ID had to pull back their right wing (except for a garrison guarding a small fortified bridge east of Krystynopol) and center to the west bank of the Bug. South of Sokal the Russians were able to break through the lines of Col. Hassenteufel's Group and took most of FJB # 25 prisoner.459 The Colonel was forced to pull back his Group to a position closer to the river and to evacuate the Gora Sokal Heights # 254. To ensure that the fighting at Sokal was directed by one general, Hassenteufel's Group was now placed under Ist Corps HQ.

Meanwhile the IV Russian Cavalry Corps, reinforced by some infantry and Guard horsemen, attacked at Zdzary and forced the k.u.k. troops to reduce their bridgehead. Since G.Lt Heydebreck recognized that it would be impossible to break through toward Vladimir-Volynsky, he withdrew his cavalry from the northern back to the southern bank of the Bug. These strong Russian attacks kept the Germans from relieving all of Winckler's XLI Res Corps; only 82 Res ID could leave the line.

The critical situation compelled 1st Army HQ to request

459 This Battalion was recruited at Brunn; the majority of the personnel were Czechs. See also Hoen, Waldstätten-Zippert and Seifert, "Die Deutschmeister", pp. 448 ff.
assistance on the afternoon of the 20th. As a result, they were temporarily given control of 103 ID, which moved to Opulisko; however, this unit was supposed to be replaced as soon as possible by a division from 2nd Army. GdK Böhm-Ermolli selected 9 ID of Ziegler's Group for this purpose. The loss of 9 ID led Ziegler to cancel his plan to cross the Bug at Kamionka-Strumilowa, although he still intended to finish driving the Russians from all their footholds west of the river.

The loss of the Gora Sokal soon made it possible for Russian artillery to bombard the positions of 46 LW ID from the flank. Therefore the Division asked for reinforcements to help recapture this key part of the battlefield. Although 103 German ID was arriving in the area incrementally, it couldn't be used for a counterattack because Mackensen didn't attach much value to retaining the Sokal bridgehead. He expected 1st Army merely to pin down the enemy and guard the Bug. The Army, however, felt that it was a point of honor to defend the bridgehead, which it had captured after such great sacrifices. Therefore Puhallo ordered 46 LW ID to hold onto its present positions until the arrival of 9 ID. Then 103 ID would move on quickly to the Bug Army. Mackensen was also insisting that all of Winckler's Corps should be made available; they would be relieved by the k.u.k. 4 and German 5 CD. 11 Hon CD (also from Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps) was transferred directly to Linsingen.

On the 21st and 22nd the units of 1st Army stationed east of the Bug, especially at Sokal, repulsed numerous attacks. This was reason enough for FZM Puhallo to order on the 23rd that the Gora Sokal should be retaken; for this purpose, 9 ID was deployed on the right of 46 LW ID. On 25 July, after an hour of artillery preparation, the attack began amid a heavy thunderstorm. The enemy offered stout resistance, forcing 9 ID (reinforced by Hassenteufel's Group) to continue their efforts throughout the night and the next morning. At 1:00 PM on the 26th the flat summit finally seemed to be in the hands of the attackers. In the afternoon, however, it was discovered that the highest elevation, point # 254, was still held by the enemy. Another attack was launched that night, and conquered this point. Farther to the south the old line was also recovered.

Brussilov, however, didn't give the exhausted attackers time to rest. Already on the 27th he sent the XII and VIII Corps ahead to counterattack, at first in vain. Finally on 28 July the larger Russian force was able to take the much-contested Gora Sokal once again from the tired and inter-mingled detachments of Ist Corps. 1st Army HQ had to abandon any thought of another
attempt because of the heavy casualties that had been suffered. Fortunately the enemy didn't continue their thrust. 9 ID, reduced to just 2100 men (including Hassenteufel's Group it commanded 3800) wouldn't have been able to parry another blow. Between 25 and 31 July the Division had lost 99 officers and 4443 men.

Thus the situation of 1st Army was quite critical at the end of the month. It had 35,000 riflemen and 3600 horsemen (5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) to confront at least 9 Russian infantry and 4 cavalry divisions. Four of the enemy infantry divisions were pressing against the Sokal bridgehead. The Army could expect relief only from the thrust which GdK Böhm-Ermolli was planning toward Radziechow. Meanwhile, 1st Army hoped to shorten its front and save manpower by pulling its right wing back near Zubkow.

2) Böhm-Ermolli's Army clears the west bank of the Bug, 20-26 July

In continuing the advance toward the Bug between Sielec and Kamionka-Strumilowa, on 20 July the inner wings of 1st and 2nd Armies (13 LW ID, 31 ID and 43 LW ID) neared the river. In the open terrain in front of Dobrotwor, Strychanka and Zawonie they came up against well prepared and strongly occupied Russian positions. The attack would be carried out the next day after the artillery came up. Only the left wing of 13 LW ID was able on the 20th to reach the east bank of the Bug east of Sielec and to hold the point where it crossed against Russian counterattacks. In GdK Ziegler's Group, the 9 ID and 32 ID on its right began the technical preparations to cross at Kamionka-Strumilowa.

However, as noted above the 9 ID had to leave 2nd Army, whose mission was reduced to just clearing the west bank of the river. In the night of 20-21 July the Russians voluntarily evacuated their positions on this bank north of Kamionka-Strumilowa. Therefore GdK Böhm-Ermolli told GdK Ziegler to establish a bridgehead over the Bug at Kamionka-Strumilowa. To replace 9 ID, he sent Ziegler the Army's reserve which had been stationed at Zoltance; this was a brigade-sized group of troops from XIX and V Corps under GM von Lauingen. IR # 72 now took their place in reserve.

Meanwhile, 31 ID stormed Dobrotwor on the 21st; however, a counterattack by the north wing of XXVIII Russian Corps recovered
the town before the Budapest Division received some promised support from the k.u.k. II Corps. Preparations of 31 ID on the 22nd and 23rd for a new thrust at Dobrotwor were frustrated by the enemy. 13 LW ID also had to repulse Russian attacks east of Sielec, as did IV Corps at Tawanie and Derewlany. 31 ID finally secured Dobrotwor on the night of 23-24 July, and took Strychanka from the enemy on the 25th.

While 31 ID along with 1 Lst Huss Bde were still trying to drive the enemy out of their entrenchments at Zawonie, on 26 July the 32 ID and 43 LW ID opened their attempt to cross the Bug at Kamionka-Strumilowa. Despite careful artillery preparation, they were unable to overcome stubborn enemy resistance. GdK Ziegler was already about to declare the operation "hopeless" when a company from the Hungarian IR "Baden" # 23 was able to win the eastern bank toward 3:00 PM. Ziegler now ordered the action to continue. Four companies had crossed the river by 6:00 PM, the entire 32 ID by 9:00 PM; they were followed during the night by Lauingen's Group. Around midnight the days' success was crowned when the stubborn defenders of Zawonie were driven out.

Originally it was planned to advance the new lines east of Kamionka-Strumilowa as far as Jazienica; however, because of Russian counterattacks the troops under FML Willerding on the eastern bank had to be content with a bridgehead about 3 km deep. For this reason the AOK didn't agree with Böhm-Ermolli's plan to continue the attack to Radziechow; 2nd Army wouldn't have sufficient strength until the arrival of the XIIIth wave of March Battalions. Anyway, by the end of the month the Russians had been cleared from entire western bank of the Bug except for two positions northwest of Busk, and a base east of the river was established at Kamionka-Strumilowa. The leader of this successful operation, GdK Ziegler, died on 1 August from cholera. His Group HQ was disbanded; FML Willerding temporarily took over XVIII Corps, which now consisted of 32 ID and Lauingen's Group.

3) 13th Russian Army retreats behind the Luga, 1-4 August

Although the allied high commands found it difficult to guard the right flank of Mackensen's Army Group as it advanced to the north, it was much more difficult for the Stavka to prevent a gap from developing between the Russian Southwest Front, standing its ground behind the rivers of east Galicia, and the southern part of the Northwest Front which was falling back to the north. After Linsingen broke through at Strzelce at the end of July, the Russian 13th Army retreated north, abandoning the west bank of the Bug. Its commander, General Gorbatovsky, decided to next
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

give up the advanced position on the Bug between Zdzary and Ustilug. This was consistent with Alexeiev's orders of 30 July, and would free some troops for employment elsewhere.

Early on 1 August the alert horsemen of Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps, stationed on the Bug between Krylow and the mouth of the Huczwa, noted that the enemy had pulled back. 40 Hon ID made the same discovery around 9:00 AM. The cavalry divisions (k.u.k. 4 CD and German 5 CD) immediately began to pursue with mixed detachments; the divisions' main body followed soon afterwards. By evening the cavalry reached the Studzianka; the enemy had apparently prepared a new line of resistance on its eastern bank. Szurmay's Corps, while still holding onto Zdzary, also moved east in conjunction with 5 German CD.

On the 2nd the Cavalry Corps won a firm foothold east of the Studzianka. In order to reinforce the pending thrust to Vladimir Volynsky with infantry from Szurmay's Corps, 9 ID (which had left the Sokal bridgehead on the evening of 1 August) relieved the southern wing of 7 ID in the night of 2-3 August.

Meanwhile the 13th Russian Army was hardly able to continue to maintain a continuous front with its neighbors due to the recent setbacks between the Vistula and Bug. They began to retreat on the night of 3-4 August. As ordered by Northwest Front HQ, their new line of resistance ran from Opalin along the Neretwabach and the upper reaches of the Turya as far as the town of Turya; then it ran along the Luga between Zytanie and Poryck. This would cover the roads leading from the eastern bank of the Bug toward Brest-Litovsk and Kobrin. Brussilov ensured that his 8th Army maintained its connection with the 13th by sending XXVIII Corps to Poryck and by stretching the lines of XII Corps.

Once again it was Heydebreck's cavalry who first noticed the enemy withdrawal, early on 4 August; they immediately advanced toward Vladimir-Volynsky and Ustilug. At 7:00 AM, FZM Puhallo ordered Szurmay's Corps to envelop the north wing of 8th Russian Army, which was stationary at Iwaniczy; 40 Hon ID would be available to either thrust to the east or to support Heydebreck. Meanwhile the German 5 CD entered Vladimir-Volynsky without fighting; they sent one brigade another 10 km farther to the north. GM Berndt took firm control of Ustilug with his 4 CD plus an infantry regiment from 103 German ID which had been attached to his command for several days. FZM Puhallo's planned thrust to the east, however was canceled because Mackensen instead ordered 1st Army "to hold the bridgeheads established east of the Bug

460 Danilov, p. 528
while occupying the Luga line with its left wing." They would also relieve the units of the Bug Army which were guarding that river down to Dubienka; for this purpose, 11 Hon CD joined 1st Army.

As ordered, Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps took up a covering position on a 42 km long stretch of the Luga. Bridgeheads over the river were established at Ustilug and Vladimir-Volynsky, both of which received infantry garrisons. Farther south, 40 Hon ID was on the west bank of the Luga in a thin line as far as Markostaw. 7 and 9 ID guarded the watershed between the Luga and the Bug. As his Army reserve, FZM Puhallo asked the AOK to give him 13 LW ID. This request was granted; the Landwehr were relieved on the northern wing of 2nd Army by 1 Lst Inf Bde, and moved to Opulsko. In turn, 2nd Army received 1 CD from the South Army. Meanwhile the Russian 13th Army stayed in place a day's march beyond Vladimir-Volynsky. Its left wing was anchored on the stretch of the Luga between Zytnanie and Markostaw while its right was on the Bug. Soon its main force would be shifted toward the right.

4. From the middle Vistula to Brest-Litovsk

a. Command decisions on both sides at the start of August

The allies

On 4 August, when the Russian rear guards left the west bank of the Vistula at Warsaw and Ivangorod, the iron ring with which the allies enveloped the Russian center in east Poland stretched from Ostrolenka to south of Wlodawa. The arc of this line was already becoming somewhat flat. Nonetheless, there still seemed to be a chance that pressure exerted on the ends of the half circle might cut off substantial parts of the enemy Armies between the Vistula and the Bug. Thus the Pripyat swamps might become "the grave of the Russian military forces", as their General Staff ha already feared before the war.\footnote{Volkmann, p. 71} However, this goal would entail a wide-ranging campaign of envelopment which would take time. This would be inconsistent with the plan which Falkenhayn had already developed for the overall conduct of the war, and which was based on limited objectives.

Already on 3 August, the day before the capture of Warsaw and Ivangorod, Falkenhayn had written GO Conrad to state that on the
German side the current operations "would be considered complete as soon as the enemy was driven behind the Bug and to a line running roughly from Brest-Litovsk to Grodno. When this goal is met, if not sooner, German troops will be moved to other fronts. Only enough strength will be left in the East to hold the area already conquered." Falkenhayn also urged that the Aus-Hung. forces should follow his example. As the border between the operational areas of the two allies he proposed a line that ran along the lower Wieprz and Tysmienica, then through Ostrow and Uhrusk on the Bug, and finally along the Pripyat.

Conrad agreed with the proposed objectives and the dividing line between the two commands. Twelve days earlier, when the armies were still two days' march away from Cholm, Lublin, Ivangorod and Warsaw, he had gone even further than Falkenhayn. At that time he sent a memorandum to the Foreign Minister (Baron Burian), to the Emperor's Military Chancellery and to the German OHL in which he urged that the military successes to date should be exploited by the diplomats to attain a separate peace with Russia. A "golden bridge" should be constructed for the Russians. Furthermore, the Chief of the General Staff proposed - as so often before - that every possible method should be used to obtain Romania's adherence to the Central Powers. One such method would be to take advantage of the favorable military situation by indicating to the Romanians that if they didn't enter the war to seize the coveted province of Bessarabia the allies could occupy that area without Romanian assistance. Although this wouldn't be a real objective of the Central Powers, sham troop movements might convince Romania that it was a possibility. At the same time that he released his memorandum, Conrad sent a private letter to GdI Bolfras outlining his view of the international situation. After peace with Russia, the Monarchy "could successfully deal with Italy." Active operations against Serbia, however, "could either be postponed until later or made unnecessary by political moves leading to a peaceful merger of Serbia with the Monarchy."

Falkenhayn agreed completely with Conrad's memorandum, and passed it on to the German Imperial Chancellor. On 26 July Conrad had an opportunity to confer with the Aus-Hung. Foreign Minister. Baron Burian felt that the Ukrainian question was the chief stumbling block to seeking an accommodation with Russia. He also pointed out that no channel for negotiations with the Russians existed; Germany had twice sent peace feelers through Copenhagen, but without any result.

Thus it would be necessary to continue the offensive against
Russia at least as far as the line chosen by Falkenhayn. However, Conrad also felt "that it would be impossible to allow the Russian front to remain on the Bug at Kamionka-Strumilowa, just 40 km from Lemberg. [Therefore he] would strive to move the Aus-Hung. lines ahead in this sector, either as part of the current operation or in a subsequent campaign."

Falkenhayn had also proposed that Kövess' Armeegruppe should trade places with the German divisions of South Army, and Conrad in general was in agreement. However, if each Aus-Hung. division occupied a front of 10 km, the sector between Czernowitz and the Pripyat which was envisioned for the k.u.k. armies would use up even more troops than were currently serving in the Northeast. Thus no units would become available for an attack on Italy, the project that was still so dear to Conrad's heart.

Conrad was glad to leave the initiative to his Imperial German colleague regarding plans for a campaign against Serbia to open a land route to Turkey. Falkenhayn had already announced on 27 July that the Bulgarian Colonel Gantschev had arrived to discuss a military convention with his country. The objectives were an attack on Serbia and increased pressure on Romania, in cooperation with Turkey. Falkenhayn suggested that Germany and Austria should each commit six full-strength divisions; Conrad concurred, but only if the war with Italy continued to go favorably. "If our defenses in the southwest are breached and an Italian offensive should threaten the vital interests of the Monarchy, it would be impossible for me [Conrad] to employ six Aus-Hung. divisions on the Serbian front."

On 3 August, Falkenhayn sent Conrad the draft of his convention with Col Gantschev; it stated that Austria-Hungary and Germany promised to send twelve divisions to the Sava-Danube front within 30 days after the document was finally signed. Although the signing date was still undetermined, time was pressing for the two Chiefs of Staff to reach the objectives they wanted for the offensive against Russia. They had to create the front along the Bug and Niemen quickly so that the units designated to fight Serbia could leave for Syrmia and the Banat.

Thus the two major Aus-Hung. operations of the fall - the thrust through Kovel toward the southeast (designed to further push back the Russians in east Galicia) and the offensive against Serbia - were already outlined in the first days of August.

However, the immediate priority for the leadership both at Teschen and Pless was to continue the advance on the Bug and the
On 4 August, Kövess' Armeegruppe had taken the Ivangoord forts on the west bank of the Vistula. This led Conrad on the same day to propose to Falkenhayn that Mackensen's Army Group should shift its direction more toward the northeast - 4th Army would move through Parczew, the German 11th to Wlodawa, and the Bug Army on the east bank of the Bug. Falkenhayn, however, didn't agree. He pointed out "that Mackensen is now prepared to exert all his strength to initiate a profitable advance; new directives would hinder him." Mackensen's orders that 4th and 11th Armies should thrust due north weren't altered. Falkenhayn also raised objections to moving the Bug Army to the eastern bank of that river. However, he didn't object to having all available units of Kövess' Group leave Ivangoord and join the rest of Woyrsch's forces, which were already east of the Vistula. Then Woyrsch would advance in the general direction of Siedlec and Lukow. On the next day, after another proposal by Falkenhayn, Woyrsch's Army was taken from the control of the k.u.k. AOK. Along with the weak 9th German Army (which now had just 3 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions), it would make up an Army Group under Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Directly under the orders of the German OHL, the Prince would be responsible for the offensive toward Siedlec.

Thus GO Conrad had been unsuccessful in getting the HQ at Pless to change the direction of Mackensen's advance. However, after he got the impression that Seeckt (Mackensen's Chief of Staff) also believed that the Army Group's right wing was somewhat too weak, Conrad took measures within his own sphere of command to divert more strength toward the east. This was also necessary because the attacks of 1st Army at Sokal and Kamionka-Strumilowa had drawn substantial enemy forces to this area. Therefore on 5 August Conrad ordered 4th Army that after the k.u.k. X Corps (2 and 24 ID) had successfully completed its current attack (to be described below), the Corps should march on foot on the 6th to join 1st Army. This would be feasible because the concentric attack of Prince Leopold's Army Group and 4th Army toward Siedlec was narrowing the front in this sector.

Under current orders, GFM Hindenburg would send the units which had already crossed the Narew farther to the southeast; he was also supposed to quickly encircle and take the fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk. However, he hadn't given up his old plan of a wider-ranging envelopment through Kovno and Vilna. To prepare for this operation, the Germans opened their attack on Kovno on 8 August, when heavy batteries bombarded the western side of this
The Russians

Since mid-July the Russians had been under attack from the northwest (over the Narew) as well as from the south. However, with considerable skill and stubborn resistance they had given ground only gradually under pressure against both flanks from Mackensen's Army Group and Gallwitz's Army. The units west of the Vistula had been able to safely pull back over the river between Warsaw and Ivangorod. On 3 August, Alexeiev now felt obliged to carry out the further retreat that had already been envisioned by the orders issued at Siedlec back on 5 July. The Armies which had been pushed into the area between the Narew, Vistula and upper Bug would deploy on the line Ossoviets-Lomza-Ostrow (south of Lomza)-Brock-Wegrow-Jedlanka-Kock-Ostrow (northeast of Lublin)-Opalin-Turyjsk. This maneuver would be "gradual and orderly." It would be covered on the north by the 12th and 1st Armies, which first would fall back to the prepared positions on the line Nowogrod-Wyskow-lower Bug. 2nd Army had already been instructed on 2 August to withdraw its main body on the following night to the east bank of the Vistula and to leave only rear guards along the line of the old fortifications of Warsaw. The 2nd and 4th Armies completely evacuated the west bank on the night of 4-5 August; then they were supposed to pull back to their new front in three short night marches. 1st Army would keep pace with this movement by bending back its left wing. 463

The Stavka was greatly concerned that a gap would develop between its two Fronts. For Alexeiev was planning nothing less than to move 13th Army back to the line Wlodawa-Ratno, leaving the area farther south around Luboml-Kovel covered only by cavalry. This also meant that the Armies on the left of Northwest Front (3rd and 13th) might also become separated. To prevent gaps from appearing either to the right or left of 13th Army, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo insisted that most of that Army should stay on the Bug. Alexeiev therefore would have to be content with a much shorter retreat. However, the commander of the Southwest Front, General Ivanov, was concerned that his link with 13th Army could also be severed if the enemy forced 8th Army to retreat, and was taking preventive measures. Apparently aware of the extent of the retreat which Alexeiev was advocating for 13th Army, on 1 August Ivanov instructed Brussilov to assemble a force of cavalry reinforced by an infantry brigade on his north wing by Poryck and

462 Schwarte, "Der deutsche Landkrieg", Vol. II, p. 216
    Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 83
Milatyn. This would make it easier for Brussilov to extend this wing.

Alexeiev was also quarreling with the Stavka regarding the north wing of the Northwest Front in Courland. The President of the Duma (Rodzyanko) intervened in this discussion because he was concerned for the security of Riga. General Danilov, the General Quartermaster of the Stavka, wanted to set up as straight a line as possible from Riga through Kovno and Bialystok to Brest-Litovsk. Alexeiev, on the other hand, wanted to retain a "forward position" on at least part of the western bank of the lower Bug. This would permit the Russians to still threaten to envelop part of East Prussia. These differences of opinion were one of the principal reasons why the Grand Duke's HQ at Baranowicze was already thinking of dividing the overly-large Northwest Front. They intended to separate its northern wing as a separate front under General Ruszky. For the present, however, Alexeiev would direct the retreat of all eight armies of the Northwest Front.

b. The Battle of Lubartow, 5-8 August

5-6 August

From Ivangorod through a flat rise in the ground south of Michow to Lubartow lay the well-prepared positions in which the Grenadier, XXV and XV Corps blocked the advance of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's troops. Then the riflemen of VI Siberian Corps were dug in on the other side of the Wieprz upstream as far as Russka Wola and on the heights farther east.

On 4 August, Mackensen had ordered 4th Army "to continue to advance toward the Wieprz in the current direction and to quickly capture Lubartow." Now 4th Army HQ ordered the attack to resume on 6 August. They planned to break through the front of XV Russian Corps southwest of Lubartow and then to roll up the enemy line toward both the east and west. The decisive thrust would be launched by the inner wings of XIV and IX Corps under the command of FML Roth, who was also given 21 and 45 LW ID, 11 ID, the artillery of 4 ID, and the heavy batteries from XVII Corps. Further west, X Corps would advance with a strong left wing at Wielkolas; VIII Corps would attack toward Baranow. Because of

464Zayontschovsky, "The Mobile War of 1914 and 1915", p. 343
465Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 84
466TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - The original says "toward" Wielkolas rather than "at"
the altered situation, 47 Res ID had been returned to the latter Corps. 4 and 10 ID, which like 11 ID had been relieved on the west bank of the Wieprz by troops from X German Corps on 5 August, were held in readiness north of Lublin, behind the main attacking group.

FML Roth directed the attack of his group toward the 7 km wide front between Heights # 183 (southwest of Lubartow) and Siedliska. He wanted to actually break through in a narrower sector just 4 km wide on Heights # 183 and the area to its west. The task was entrusted to 26 and 21 LW ID under the leadership of FML Lischka; for this purpose the 21 LW ID was inserted in line between 3 ID and 26 LW ID. As they advanced, Lischka's group would be joined by 3 ID on the right and by 41 Hon ID (reinforced by half of 106 Lst ID) on the left; they would neutralize the neighboring enemy units during the decisive attack. After the Russian position was breached, 11 ID (following behind Lischka's group) would capture the heights northwest of Lubartow. This would enable 21 LW ID and 3 ID to pivot toward Lubartow while 26 LW ID faced toward the west. 45 LW ID would cover the flank on the Wieprz from the railroad to a point opposite Russka Wola, where it linked up with X German Corps.

At dawn on 6 August, the artillery of Roth's Group began their destructive work against the Russian positions between Lubartow and Siedliska. Lischka's Group launched their storming attack in early afternoon, but it was shattered by the stubborn defense of the enemy, who were unbroken by the artillery bombardment and had been steadily reinforced. To add more impetus to the stalled offensive, FML Roth sent a brigade of 11 ID to Lischka's Group and ordered 45 LW ID to attack toward Lubartow between the railroad and the river as soon as troops became available from its right wing due to the advance of the Germans south of the Wieprz. After renewed artillery preparation against the positions on Heights # 183, 21 LW ID moved forward again just after sunset and punched their way into the enemy trenches in heavy fighting. To solidify and exploit this success, FML Roth had the second brigade from 11 ID follow 21 LW ID onto Heights # 183.

The other sectors of 4th Army had been unable to penetrate the enemy lines. Under X Corps, 37 Hon ID (reinforced by parts of 24 ID) attacked at Wielkolas; they worked their way closer to the enemy positions but couldn't assault them. Under VIII Corps, 47
Res ID was to make the main attack from Zagrody to Baranow, supported by the inner wings of 62 and 2 ID. However, the return of 47 Res ID from Novo Alexandriya was delayed, so the attack was postponed until 7 August.

The actions between the Wieprz and Bug on 5 and 6 August, like those of 4th Army, hadn't brought a decision although there were some local successes. In the evening of 6 August the left wing of 11th Army had driven the Russians off the heights east of Russka Wola, which had been bitterly contested since 5 August. This victory didn't bring any perceptible relief to the heavily engaged right wing of 4th Army, because the Siberian riflemen rallied to again offer stubborn resistance just a few paces farther north, in strong positions on the edge of a forest.

The actions on 5 and 6 August gave GFM Mackensen the impression that the enemy would leave strong rear guards to cover their retreat to a position which aerial scouts had spotted between Kolacze and Ostrow. To break through this new line as quickly as possible, the Bug Army was to capture Wlodawa and the road leading to Parczew. 11th Army would attack in three groups: . GdI Plettenberg with the Guards and 22 ID to the area east of Parczew . GdK Eugen von Falkenhayn with his own XXII Res Corps plus Arz's Corps directly toward Parczew, and . GdI Emmich with X and X Res Corps plus the Guard Cavalry to the area west of that town.

While Falkenhayn's and Plettenberg's groups finished preparing for their attack, Emmich's group "would continue to advance to the north, to do as much damage as possible to the enemy units which were crossing the Wieprz toward the east." 4th Army was ordered "first to continue the attack on Lubartow, and then to move units to the eastern bank of the Wieprz behind Emmich's Group; then they can move north to open the way forward in the Wieprz sector." In the evening, GFM Mackensen said that he expected "that 4th Army will succeed on 7 August in clearing the southern bank of the Wieprz, since we don't expect to encounter serious resistance in front of the strong Wieprz defensive sector." Again he emphasized the need to have the right wing of 4th Army cross the Wieprz, thus making it possible for the left wing and center of 11th Army to advance.

7-8 August

To carry out these orders, 4th Army HQ planned to attack along their entire front on 7 August. 10 ID, which during the 6th had come up to Niemce, was placed under FML Roth to help exploit his
success. 4 ID, which together with 41 Hon ID now made up XVII Corps, began to march toward Dabrowka.

During the night of 6-7 August, the Russians sought to recover their lost positions southwest of Lubartow with strong counter-attacks. However, 21 LW ID - along with parts of 11 ID - held firm against all thrusts. During this fighting, parts of 3 ID and of 45 LW ID, which had been attacking since afternoon the day before, broke into the Russian trenches on both sides of Lubartow railroad station and established a firm foothold. Therefore Lischka's Group could resume their offensive against the Russians on a broad front rather early on the 7th; they were joined on the right by 3 ID and 45 LW ID, on the left by 41 Hon ID. Toward 10:00 AM, the 26 LW ID and the right wing of 41 Hon ID penetrated the Russian lines. The right wing of Roth's Group drove the Russians from their second position. Around 11:00 AM, the attacking divisions had already crossed the Lubartow-Siedliska road. The city of Lubartow itself fell shortly thereafter. Farther east, 45 LW ID was still heavily engaged with the enemy, who were holding the stretch of railroad north of Lubartow, facing toward the south.

All the evidence showed that the beaten Russian XV Corps was retreating in great disorder toward the north. Intercepted radio broadcasts indicated that the higher Russian HQ were pulling back. A great success seemed to be imminent. In the morning, 4th Army HQ had already ordered that detachments should pursue the wavering enemy as far as the Wieprz, while the main body of the Army aimed for the line Firlej-Baranow. Per Mackensen's orders, the main body of Roth's Group were now to thrust on the eastern bank of theWieprz toward Russka Wola.

To pursue the defeated enemy, FML Roth sent three divisions (45 LW ID, 3 and 11 ID) to the north; he sent only 10 ID east of the Wieprz. He held 21 and 26 LW ID back at Lubartow. XVII Corps HQ took over the front between XIV and IX Corps; they ordered 41 Hon ID to advance in the area west of Firlej and 4 ID to march behind the Honveds' left wing. By the evening of 7 August the front-line divisions of Roth's Group and of XVII Corps reached their goals for the day, despite resistance in many places from stubborn Russian rear guards. 10 ID had marched on the eastern bank of the Wieprz to a point just east of Russka Wola; actually this was the sector in which it had already been stationed on 4 August. It had never engaged in action during its brief trip to the western bank.

The advance of Roth's Group and of XVII Corps eased the situation
of the right wing of IX Corps. These troops, working closely with 41 Hon ID, reached the Minimabach, which the Russians defended very stubbornly. Late in the evening the Polish Legion were able to cross the brook, but only at one point. Under X Corps the 24 ID had taken the village of Michalowka from the Russian Grenadiers after bitter hand-to-hand fighting; 37 Hon ID had to repulse a strong Russian counterattack in the early morning hours, and then stayed in their original positions. The fighting on the Army's left wing was more successful. 47 Res ID stormed the town of Zagrody and held it against a strong enemy attack. By nightfall all three divisions of VIII Corps had advanced west, north and east of Zagrody; however, they couldn't reach Baranow, their objective for the day.

4th Army had torn a 20 km gap in the Russian front northwest of Lubartow, into which they advanced 15 km while taking 2000 prisoners. It seemed possible that continued pressure would due substantial damage to the enemy. For this purpose, 4th Army HQ issued orders in the night of 7-8 August for the advance to continue in the same direction; in particular, they instructed 4 ID to strike toward the rear of the Russians. The only question was whether this operation was already too late to win a decisive success, for Russian broadcasts revealed that their higher HQ (such as those of VI Siberian and XXV Corps) were already pulling back.

In fact, during the night the Russians already pulled back to the slopes north of the Wieprz, leaving just rear guards behind. The VIII, IX and XVII Corps followed them, and reached the river after little or no fighting. As ordered, FML Roth's Group made preparations to intervene with their main body in the attack by X German Corps. However, this wouldn't happen on 8 August, since the Russians east of the Wieprz had also withdrawn in the night - to a line north of Tarlo and Ostrow. 10 ID advanced in the Wieprz valley and by evening was ready to attack on the heights northeast of Lubartow, where it was next to the German 19 ID. 45 LW ID followed behind 10 ID on the eastern bank. 26 and 21 LW ID stayed by Lubartow. X Corps (2 and 24 ID) was pulled from the front and assembled at Kurow and Garbow; as ordered by the high command on the 5th, they would move to 1st Army.

c. The fighting on the Ostrow position, 8-11 August

8 August

The 11th and Bug Armies spent 8 August mainly in regrouping their forces. At the same time, however, along the entire front they
brought their advanced troops right next to the main position on which the Russians apparently were going to offer sustained resistance.

In the morning Emmich's Group, to the immediate left of 4th Army, found that the enemy rear guards had disappeared from their front. His divisions thus could advance toward the Russians' advanced positions on the heights north of Tarlo and south of Ostrow; by evening they had captured some of these outposts. The Gd CD left the front in the evening.

In the center of 11th Army, Falkenhayn's Group used 44 Res ID to relieve the right wing division of Emmich's Group (119 ID) by early morning of 8 August; 44 Res ID then followed the retreating enemy as far as Krasne. The k.u.k. VI Corps had shifted to the west after the indecisive fighting at Tarnow (on 4 and 5 August); in the afternoon of the 8th they reached the area west of Krasne after a strenuous march. In the evening they began to relieve 20 and 101 ID south of Ostrow; thus by early on the 9th the Corps was deployed at the front with 12 ID on the left and 39 Hon ID on the right. This completed the organization of Falkenhayn's group.

Farther to the east, Plettenberg's group moved ahead during the 8th to the line Krasne-Zalucze. On Plettenberg's left, 103 ID took the place of 1 Gd ID. In 11th Army's reserves, 1 Gd ID and 43 Res ID were around Leczna, and 119 ID at Zawieprzyce.

In the Bug Army, the Beskid Corps (next to Plettenberg's group) reached the Zalucze-Wojciechow sector. Gerok's XXIV Res Corps was on the edge of the woods on both sides of the highway north of Sawin, and the left wing of XLI Res Corps (82 Res ID) was on the north bank of the Ucherka. 81 Res ID was south of the Bug, holding the line as far as Dubienka. 1 ID, in the Army's reserve, came to Cholm. Thus the Bug Army had finished its shift to the west and its redeployment; it was ready to attack on the 9th.

9 August

The mission of Mackensen's Army Group was now to break through the units guarding the southern flank of the Russians' hitherto orderly retreat from the Vistula, and to roll up their line. To the high commands it still seemed possible to cut off parts of the substantial enemy forces on the Wieprz as well as those pulling back farther to the north, if Mackensen could thrust quickly through Parczew and take the Wisznice-Slawatycze road.
At the moment 4th Army was in motion; the Bug Army, but not the 11th, was ready to attack. Therefore on the 9th the Bug Army was supposed to begin the assault on the main enemy position while 4th Army crossed the Wieprz. 11th Army would take the enemy's forward positions, so that they could open their major offensive in full strength on 10 August.

Thus 4th Army started to attack early on the 9th. Army HQ ordered both flanks to thrust ahead: simultaneously, VIII Corps would turn northeast to reach the Grabow-Baranow area with a strong left wing while XIV Corps attacked east of the Wieprz in conjunction with Emmich's Group. In the center, XVII and IX Corps would just hold the Wieprz line.

On the Army's left, VIII Corps encountered only minimal resistance from Russian cavalry who were covering the retreat; in the evening they reached the day's objective. Because of the weak Russian reaction, all of IX Corps and the left wing of XVII Corps were able to reach the north bank of the Wieprz. On the other hand, XIV Corps came up against part of the Russians' main position; in the morning only the Corps' 10 ID was engaged in the narrow area between the river and a point north of Tarlo. When the rest of the troops came up, they still couldn't make much headway, since the 11th Army wasn't going to attack the heart of the Russian line until the next day. Moreover, heavy fog interfered with visibility and thus limited the effectiveness of the artillery.

The Bug Army's attack in the morning suffered under the same hindrances; their whole line was engaged by afternoon. Once again the Russians had decided to offer sustained resistance in a strong position. However, the Germans won some significant success during the day. The inner wings of XLI and XXIV Res Corps (82 Res ID and 107 ID) took the enemy works at Lukowek, while farther west 11 Bav ID took Petrylow. To the west of the Bavarians, the right wing of the Beskid Corps (35 Res ID) advanced toward Hansk and the left (4 ID and 25 Res ID) toward Wytyczno. The Corps reached another Russian position which had been constructed behind the swamps. In all sectors, the ground gained had to be held against heavy counterattacks.

10 August

On 10 August the Russians increased their efforts to recapture their lost trenches. Repeated and especially strong assaults were repulsed on both sides of the main road leading to Wlodawa. Here, and also in the sector of 25 Res ID, the Germans moved
their lines forward several kilometers to the north. Their 4 ID, however, was unable to capture the enemy position at Wytyczno on the 10th and again on the 11th.

While 3rd Russian Army was thus successful in fending off Mackensen's right wing south of Wlodawa, their main body was accelerating the retreat from sector to sector between the Wieprz, Vistula and Bug. Therefore Prinz Leopold's Army Group made rapid progress after crossing the Bug, as did 4th Army on Mackensen's left wing.

It had already become clear on 9 August that the enemy didn't intend to pause for long on the Wieprz. In the first hours of the morning of the 10th, the Russians began to retreat again in front of 4th Army and Emmich's Group. The pursuit began at the same time. Meanwhile orders had arrived from Teschen that 62 ID and 47 Res ID were to leave the front. Therefore VIII Corps halted in the Adamow area and IX Corps was ordered to extend its left wing; this was easy since their own front was narrowing with every forward step they took. The columns of IX Corps didn't come up to the enemy rear guards on the Bystrzyca mala until late in the afternoon; they threw the Russians over this brook and occupied the southern edge of the low ground. The advanced detachments of XVII Corps also reached the Bystrzyca; the main body of its three divisions were resting somewhat further to the southwest. Farther east, XIV Corps was moving forward on both sides of the Lubartow-Parczew road with 45 ID and 21 LW ID; they reached the Tysmienica shortly before noon. Here the valley was overflowing since the Russians had drained water from the ponds in the area; they had also blown up the bridges and were drawn up in strength on the opposite bank. During the day, FML Roth deployed 10 ID and 26 LW ID behind the right wing, 3 ID behind the left. Meanwhile Emmich's Group on his right also followed the retreating enemy. In the evening, their X Res Corps reached the Tysmienica on both sides of the rail line to Parczew, and crossed it with small detachments in several locations. X German Corps and the Gd CD were held behind the front, ready to roll up the Ostrow position by crossing the Tysmienica; if this wasn't necessary, they would be transferred to the Bug Army.

Meanwhile the 11th Army again had to postpone its attack. Although 12 ID of the k.u.k. VI Corps had already taken the forward positions 4 km south of Ostrow on 9 August, they now discovered strong fortifications on the south and west edges of this town. The Russians had also flooded the valley, creating a swamp. To avoid a frontal assault through this difficult terrain, 39 Hon ID had to shift farther south to gain the eastern
bank of the Tysmienica. Here they advanced along with 44 Res ID; the allies drove away the enemy advance guards and were approaching the Russian main position 6 km southeast of Ostrow. Between 44 Res ID and the Beskid Corps, Plettenberg's Group had also worked their way up to the enemy position northwest of Wola Wereszczynska on the 9th. Although 11th Army had reached its assigned jump-off points for the offensive along its entire front, they were hindered by the great difficulty of providing sufficient artillery ammunition. Therefore the attack was postponed until 11 August. The advance of 4th Army and Emmich's Group during the 10th didn't seem to affect the Russians' determination to defend Ostrow and the lines reaching farther east. The day passed with only artillery activity on most of 11th Army's front. The only exception was on the Army's right, where the Russians evacuated several advance positions in front of Plettenberg's Group because of pressure from the Bug Army.

11 August

The attack by the center and right wing of 11th Army on 11 August was now supposed to aid the hard-fighting Bug Army and lead to a decision. If the enemy fell back - either willingly or involuntarily - they were to be immediately pursued; the Hola-Parczew road should be reached if possible. The Bug Army was ordered to continue their powerful thrust to the north. 4th Army would follow the enemy in the direction of Miedzyrzecze. Plettenberg's Group replaced 22 ID (which had transferred to the Bug Army) with 1 Gd ID. 11th Army's reserves now consisted of 119 ID (from Plettenberg) and 43 Res ID (from Falkenhayn's Group); they were following the front line troops through Jagodna and Krasne, respectively.

Meanwhile the Russian troops who'd withdrawn over the Tysmienica deployed there in strong and long-prepared positions which linked up with the units already opposing 11th Army at Ostrow. They offered stout resistance on 11 August. Only the left wing of 4th Army was able to continue the pursuit. The Army HQ saw little prospect of success by sending their right on a frontal assault through the swamps of the flooded valley. Therefore they had 45 LW ID (which had just been relieved by 3 ID) move west to the mouth of the Tysmienica; here they would build a military bridge in the sector of XVII Corps. However, conditions in the Bystrzyca valley in front of the right wing of XVII Corps weren't much better than those on the Tysmienica. Only 41 Hon ID on the Corps' left, which had reached the Ossowinska Wola area in the night of 10-11 July, was able to advance during the day. In cooperation with IX Corps, they moved ahead from their camp sites
to Ulan on the Bystrzyca.

In front of IX Corps, the enemy evacuated the south bank of the Bystrzyca mala in the night, and the north bank in the morning. 106 Lst ID thrust ahead of the Polish Legion toward the northeast, and by noon had already reached the Bystrzyca between Ulan and a point west of Sobole. Somewhat later the leading troops of 37 Hon ID also reached the brook; its main body, along with the artillery of both divisions, came up during the evening (they had been delayed by destroyed bridges). 45 LW ID, as the Army's reserve, followed XVII Corps; the XIV Corps was supposed to provide another division for the reserves.

Like the right wing of 4th Army, Emmich's Group (which now had just X Res Corps at the front) stayed on the west bank of the Tysmienica. The enemy on the east bank was prepared for a purely defensive battle. Neither at the town of Tysmienica nor at Bojki was it possible to bring large units over the broad and swampy valley on the 11th. Therefore 101 and 105 ID postponed further crossing attempts until darkness fell.

11 August was a day of heavy fighting for the main body of 11th Army and for the Bug Army. The k.u.k. 12 ID, deployed south of X Res Corps in an arc on the western and southern edges of Ostrow, fought all day to laboriously cross the swampy low ground with small groups. In the night they were supposed to assist the renewed attempt by 105 ID to cross the brook. 39 Hon ID and the German 44 Res ID were also engaged all day, in bloody actions around the positions southeast of Ostrow which they couldn't wrest from the enemy. In the evening, VI Corps brought parts of 12 ID to the east bank of the Tysmienica; they were supposed to attack Ostrow from the east as soon as 39 Hon ID had overcome the enemy's defenses. Further east, Plettenberg's Group fought hard on the stubbornly defended positions at Orzechow; in the afternoon the 2 Gd ID was finally able to break through south of the town.

The actions of the Bug Army were just as difficult. To give new impetus to the attack in the decisive direction (toward Wlodawa), in the night of 10-11 August the 1 ID entered the front east of the road between XLI and XXIV Res Corps. They were ordered to deliver the main assault on the 11th, but the Russians defended themselves energetically throughout the day. In bitter fighting that lasted into the night, 82 Res ID and 1 ID were only able to make limited progress between the rail line and road running from Cholm to Wlodawa; Gerok's Corps was engaged west of the road, with similar results.
d. The German eastern front, 5-11 August

1) **Prince Leopold's Army Group advances to Lukow and Siedlec**

The assignment of Woyrsch's Army, now under the German high command, was to thrust ahead from the banks of the Vistula to Lukow-Siedlec. First the units had to be regrouped. On 4 and 5 August the 7 CD relieved the right wing of the LW Corps, which through the 6th was gaining further ground toward Sobolew. 16 ID left the task of guarding the Vistula to just one Common Army and two Landsturm regiments, and made 32 Inf Bde available to join König's Corps. The k.u.k. 9 CD, which had mostly been dismounted since the end of July, regained their horses. However, there was no overall HQ to control the large cavalry group; on 7 August the 2 CD and German 9 CD made up Frommel's Cavalry Corps and were sent over the Pilica to the right wing of 9th German Army.

Woyrsch was planning to open a general offensive on the 9th that would include most of the k.u.k. XII Corps. However, the enemy evacuated their positions on the morning of the 8th. The General-Oberst immediately took up the pursuit with Kövess' Group south of the Sobolew-Zelechow road and König's reinforced Corps north of the road. 7 CD, which was again placed under GdI Kövess, guarded the right flank and was instructed to make contact with the k.u.k. 4th Army; the German (4) LW Cav Bde secured the northern wing of the advance in the direction of Garwolin. The k.u.k. 9 CD was also supposed to protect the northern flank and its link with the 9th German Army, but it was delayed. Because of high water on the Vistula the horsemen could only use one bridge, and by evening they had only reached Laskarzew.

On the right wing, 7 CD crossed the major Riki-Garwolin road at Zabianka and rode through Dudki almost unopposed by the Russians. The LW Corps had to fight some rear guards, but also crossed the road and by night held a line that formed an arc stretching up to Garwolin. Only the main body of XII Corps hung back somewhat. In accordance with the original plans for a prepared attack, its 35 ID had to move during the night of 7-8 August to the railroad at Zyczyn; for some units this entailed a march of 50 km. 32 Inf Bde was delayed by a bottleneck at the only bridge over the Vistula, and didn't reach its goals (Maciejowice and Papirotnia) until the morning of the 9th.

---

After extensive demolitions, on the 8th the enemy had evacuated the citadel of Ivangoord on the east bank of the Vistula. Therefore the rest of 16 ID could now cross the river; they occupied the remainder of the Ivangoord fortifications and made contact with the units already on the eastern bank.

The 9th German Army had also crossed the Vistula. Prinz Leopold was ordered by the OHL to carry out a relentless advance as soon as it was clear that he was opposed by just relatively weak Russian forces. On the 9th, Woyrsch moved forward skillfully; Kövess followed in echelon on his right and made contact with the left wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army, which had crossed the lower stretches of the Wieprz and was moving northeast in the area just south of the Ivangoord-Lukow railroad. On the 10th, Kövess was first supposed to bring up his 16 ID; then he would have 7 CD and 35 ID move around the enemy position which had been discovered north and south of Stanin. Similarly, König's LW Corps would outflank the Russian line running along the upper Jedlanka to Oleksin. Already in the evening of the 9th, the 35 ID together with Bredow's Division stormed a forward position at Jedlanka; the Silesian Landwehr were able to overcome the resistance of the southern wing of 2nd Russian Army on the 10th.

The HQ of Prinz Leopold's Army Group intended to attack through Lukow on the 11th with a strong right wing and to throw the enemy back. A full-scale storming attack on the Russian position proved to be unnecessary for the two divisions of XII Corps, because the Russians pulled back toward Lukow during the night; however, they thwarted every attempt to occupy that important railroad junction on the 11th. North of the town the allies reached the road to Siedlec. The enemy was still covering this communication center also. 9 CD on the left wing of Woyrsch's Army had to fight for their night quarters, just as on the day before; their batteries were able to support the southern wing of 9th German Army, which advanced through the Kostrzyna sector toward Siedlec. The Army's northern wing - Frommel's Cavalry Corps - moved ahead by Wegrow.

2) Hindenburg advances past Ostrow and Lomza

Hindenburg's efforts were still directed mainly toward a wide-ranging envelopment through Kovno. However, he also had to carry

---

468 Falkenhayn, p. 105
469 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - Mackensen and Hindenburg were engaged during these same days around different towns named Ostrow. The Ostrow in Hindenburg's section is located southeast of Ostrolenka on the Narew.
out the orders of OHL by continuing the advance of the right wing of his Army Group. An attack directly east from Warsaw wouldn't win any great success because the Russian retreat was already in full swing in this area. Therefore the General-Feldmarschall concentrated a powerful attacking group east of Ostrolenka, on the inner wings of the 12th and 8th Armies. One of the two divisions which had been transferred from the West joined this group.

On 4 August the attack opened toward the Wyszkow-Ostrow-Lomza sector; the main effort took place initially on both sides of the Ostrolenka-Sniadowo railroad. The inner wings of 1st and 12th Russian Armies were thrown back in heavy fighting; the Germans took Wyszkow and Ostrow on the 8th and the fortifications of Lomza on the 10th. The advance continued on the 11th, when a tightly-concentrated force pushed to the east, a day's march past Malkin. South of the Bug, mounted detachments of 12th German Army established contact with the k.u.k. 2 CD of Frommel's Cavalry Corps north of Wegrow. Thus the right wing of Hindenburg's Army Group was deployed on a front facing directly to the east. They were no longer in a position to damage the enemy with an envelopment attack, although Frommel's horsemen found that strong parts of 1st Russian Army were still south of the Bug. After the usual consultation with OHL, Hindenburg ordered Gallwitz's Army to advance toward the east, with their right wing moving through Ciechanowiec toward Bielsk. Thus the concept of encircling parts of the Russian armies between Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk was "abandoned by the leadership; the period of pressing toward the south was over."\[471\]

The fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk was completely surrounded by the Germans on 8 August. They prepared to attack the works here as well as those on the western side of Kovno.

e. Further measures of the opposing commanders

1) The allied high command and Mackensen's army group

The high command HQ

GFM Mackensen's thrust directed mainly toward Parczew was based on the assumption that the enemy would offer sustained resistance on the Vistula and the Wieprz. In these circumstances, the


\[471\]Gallwitz, p. 327
offensive could have won a major success. However, since the end of July it had seemed to GO Conrad that this offensive in a generally northern direction wasn't as effective as had been anticipated. He had sought several times, although in vain, to have Falkenhayn agree to shift the main effort more toward the east. With regret, Conrad saw how the transfer of the main body of Mackensen's Army Group toward the west had used up valuable time, and caused his eastern wing to lack the necessary strength. Now it was clear that the Russians were pulling their armies back much more quickly than anticipated toward the northeast, due in no small measure to the effects of the victory of 4th Army at Lubartow. Therefore the hope of achieving a decisive success was growing ever dimmer. Only if the main body of Mackensen's attacking group shifted more toward the northeast with a strong right wing would there be a chance that parts of the enemy forces might be cut off and destroyed before reaching safety beyond the line Bialystok-Brest Litovsk-Wlodawa. Therefore Conrad once more urged that Mackensen should change direction; for this purpose, on the 10th he made 47 Res ID available from 4th Army.

However, at Pless the OHL held to their conviction that

. the advance of the inner wings of 4th and 11th Armies would be sufficient in itself,
. any new disposition would be a waste of time, and
. the Bug Army would be best employed by having it move as quickly as possible along the Bug directly toward the north.

At a conference of the two Chiefs of Staff at Pless on the 10th, it did seem for a while that Conrad's arguments were finally leading to at least a partial change of plan. It was decided that Mackensen would have 4th Army's left wing move through Radzyn through Biala and 11th Army's left move through Parczew toward Lomazy.

This change of direction, however, wasn't large enough. The situation which had meanwhile developed - the withdrawal of the Russian center while its eastern wing stood fast - favored Conrad's original and much more radical concept of having 4th Army roll up from the west the enemy units confronting the 11th and Bug Armies. Mackensen was acting in the same sense when he placed X German Corps behind X Res Corps on the 11th for an eventual thrust into the rear of the Ostrow position.

Nonetheless, there was still no general shift toward the northeast; instead the 11th and 4th Armies were making their main effort with their centers rather than with their left wings. On 11 August, as Prinz Leopold's Army Group approached Lukow, the railroad between this town and Brest-Litovsk was designated the boundary between the wings of Woyrsch's and 4th Armies.
This was the last time that the k.u.k. AOK sought to influence the developing campaign toward Brest-Litovsk. Now they turned their attention to new plans in east Galicia, for which they would need to free units as soon as possible. Already on the 10th they ordered Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to have 62 ID follow the k.u.k. X Corps to 1st Army. 47 Res ID, on the other hand, was given to Mackensen to strengthen his right wing; initially it would follow Emmich's Group.

Mackensen's HQ

To the HQ of Mackensen's Army Group this assembly of forces on their eastern wing was very opportune. This was because intercepted radio broadcasts on 10 August revealed that three corps HQ of Russian 13th Army were being sent toward the Bug, which seemed to substantiate earlier fears that the enemy would attack from the east. On the night of 10-11 August, GFM Mackensen also felt compelled to order 1st Army to open an offensive if the Russian 13th Army fell upon the right flank of the Bug Army along the Kovel-Cholm railroad and farther north. In the Vladimir-Volynsky area, 1st Army would also have to stay on guard toward the east. If, on the other hand, the Russians attacked toward the southwest from Kovel, 1st Army was to hold its ground in the Luga-Bug sector, while Linsingen's Army would help out by striking over the Bug toward the east. GFM Mackensen also directed his attention toward the danger of a Russian thrust through Sokal toward Belz. FZM Puhallo reported that until X Corps arrived his north wing would have to stay on the defensive. The units currently stationed there - 13 LW ID, 40 Hon ID and parts of Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps - weren't sufficient to mount an attack. Therefore the AOK, which was also concerned for the security of Sokal, on the 12th ordered 10 ID and 26 LW ID along with IX Corps HQ to transfer from 4th to 1st Army.

Since the offensive was progressing in the same direction, Linsingen's Army would soon be entirely committed to guarding the ever-longer flank along the Bug. They would be reinforced by 22 ID from 11th Army. The X German Corps would also join Linsingen as soon as the situation at Ostrow permitted. Thus the right wing of Mackensen's attacking group would be strengthened as Conrad had desired.

2) The Russian commanders

The Russian leadership at this time was equally concerned about: 
. Events in Courland, where the Germans had advanced to
Mitau on 1 August, and
. The pressure from two directions felt by the wings of the
portion of Northwest Front still engaged in the "forward
theater of operations" - these were held by 12th Army east
of the Narew and 3rd Army between the Wieprz and Bug.
Since there were no plans to strengthen either 3rd or 12th Army,
Alexeiev decided on 10 August to pull back 12th, 1st, 2nd, 4th and
3rd Armies to a shorter line. Running from Ossoviets through
Wizna to Ciechanowiec, then along the Bug to Drogiczyn-
Miedzyrzece-Wlodawa, this line could be held with a smaller
number of troops. However, 3rd Army wasn't supposed to give up
its current positions, or the line Parczew-Kolacze-Sobibor, until
it became absolutely necessary. This decision meant that the
defense line envisioned in the July conference at Siedlec was
finally abandoned.

Now it was also necessary to decide what to do with 13th Army.
The Stavka still believed it was possible for this Army to hold
the Bug and thus ensure that the connection between the Northwest
and Southwest Fronts remained firm. Therefore they didn't want
to let 13th Army retreat to the line Opalin-Turyjsk or even the
line Wlodawa-Ratno unless it came under extreme pressure.
Although Alexeiev had therefore ordered on 10 August that the
Army should hold the line of the Bug, he was still convinced that
it would be impossible for it to stay on the river indefinitely.
It lacked the strength to keep extending its front, and anyway
would soon lose its connection with the other Armies. He wanted
to preserve it for the important task of protecting the lines of
communication leading to Brest-Litovsk east of the Bug.
Moreover, the troops that would be needed to hold Brest itself
could only come from 13th Army. Therefore the commander of the
Northwest Front built fortifications along the two lines
mentioned above so that the Army would be able to withdraw.

On 12 August, the Stavka gave in to Alexeiev's views regarding
13th Army. Although it would continue for now to guard the Bug,
the Army was also supposed to guard the rail lines and roads
leading back to the lines Brest Litovsk-Kobrin and Pinsk-
Luniniec, while maintaining the connection with Southwest Front.

This meant the end of the concept of a large-scale offensive
against the eastern flank of Mackensen's Army Group. Alexeiev
and Ivanov also rejected as unrealistic a plan developed by their
subordinates to attack the Aus-Hung. front between Poryck and
Ustilug, even though they recognized that it was weakly held.
The Russian officers in this sector had intended to attack mainly

472Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 93
with cavalry, which would operate against the rear-area lines of
communication after breaking through the Austrian trenches.\footnote{Nesnamov, Vol. IV, pp. 95 ff. and 87 ff.}

\section*{f. The advance toward Brest-Litovsk, 12-17 August}

The difficult actions of 11 August had not been in vain. Under
the Bug Army, an attack launched toward midnight by 1 ID proved
to be the last blow needed to finally capture the enemy's
position. The Russians started to evacuate all their
entrenchments in front of the Bug and 11\textsuperscript{th} Armies before dawn.

\subsection*{12 August}

The allies were in full pursuit along the entire front during the
12\textsuperscript{th}. The Bug Army didn't encounter rear guards until the
afternoon, along the line Kossyn-Hansk-Bruss-Woloska Wola. In
almost all sectors these rear guards were driven back by a
powerful attack in the evening and night. 11\textsuperscript{th} Army was now also
able to reap the benefit of its efforts. Plettenberg's Group had
been reinforced the evening before by 119 ID to exploit its
success at Orzechow; along with Falkenhayn's Group, Plettenberg
pushed ahead to the line Gorki-Ostrow during the first hours of
the morning. Large parts of X Res Corps were able to take the
eastern bank of the Tysmienica in the night.

After temporarily shifting sharply toward the northeast,
Mackensen's HQ now ordered 11\textsuperscript{th} Army to advance with its right
wing toward Slawatyzce, with its left toward Parczew-Lomazy.

As 11\textsuperscript{th} Army advanced, its front was narrowing; therefore
Falkenhayn's group was halted in the area east of Ostrow and at
Orzechow. The Army deployed in two lines - VI Corps followed X
Res Corps and XXII Res Corps (reunited by the return of 43 Res
ID) followed Plettenberg's Group. The Group HQ of Falkenhayn and
Emmich were dissolved. The Army's left wing consisted only of X
Res Corps, which was directly to the left of Plettenberg. X
Corps was sent to march through Leczna to Cholm, where it would
join the Bug Army. The Gd CD had already been sent to Cholm the
day before. Meanwhile the leading divisions of Plettenberg and
of X Res Corps conducted an energetic pursuit; in the evening
they were engaged on a line running from a point west of Woloska
Wola to the south edge of Parczew. Their opponents were rear
guards, whose resistance was soon broken. X Res Corps took
Parczew during the night. Arz's Corps camped for the night at
Ostrow. Farther west the 47 Res ID would also follow the Army's
left wing on the 13th.

Opposite the left of 4th Army, the enemy evacuated their positions north of the Bystrzyca on 12 August. They remained entrenched only opposite XIV Corps on the north bank of the Tysmienica between the bend in the river and the railroad. To strike this position from the east, 10 ID sent a brigade around the lake south of Siemien. This brigade advanced along with 105 ID of X Res Corps; however, by evening they had only reached the low ground between Parczew and Siemien. Under XVII Corps, in the beginning only 41 Hon ID on the left wing found the eastern bank of the Bystrzyca free of enemy troops. When the Honveds pushed ahead toward Radzyn in the afternoon, however, the Russians also pulled back in front of 4 and 11 ID. These units crossed the Bystrzyca, and shifted their pursuit toward the east; they advanced fighting and reached the Bialkabach between its mouth and a point southwest of Radzyn. Meanwhile 41 Hon ID worked its way up to the Russian position which covered Radzyn toward the west; they had to postpone their attack here because of gathering darkness.

On the Army's left wing, IX Corps HQ left to transfer to 1st Army. Command over its troops - 106 Lst ID (with the Polish Legion attached) and 37 Hon ID - was given to VIII Corps HQ. The two divisions soon secured the north bank of the upper Bystrzyca in early morning. Then they operated with the right wing of Woyrsch's Army in an advance south of Lukow, toward the northeast. By late afternoon 106 Lst ID was at Paskudy while 37 Hon ID was already engaged north of the railroad leading from Lukow to Parczew. 45 LW ID followed behind the inner wings of VIII and XVII Corps. 26 LW ID and 10 ID were ordered to march through Lublin to join 1st Army; the latter unit therefore left the front on the 13th.

Operations on 13 August

The pursuit continued in full force on 13 August. The victorious divisions moved on through the areas evacuated by the Russians; here and there they were temporarily held up by weak enemy detachments, but overall they quickly overcame any resistance.

4th Army had already taken several strong points northwest and south of Radzyn during the night. Between 4:00 and 5:00 AM the enemy gave up the positions they had still been stubbornly contesting the day before along the entire front. 4th Army was now in pursuit almost due east. 37 Hon ID, marching with its left wing along the rail line leading to Brest-Litovsk, came upon
stronger resistance in the afternoon north of Grabowiec. Farther south, 106 Lst ID hurled back the Russian rear guards; the division's center and right wing reached Szostka and Ostrowki without meeting opposition; the first enemy detachments were encountered north and east of Szostka. The Polish Legion, in reserve of VII Corps, reached the area south of Grabowiec. XVII Corps came up to the area 10 km northeast of Wohyn, with 41 Hon ID on the left and 4 ID on the right; leading elements of the latter division clashed on the main highway with enemy troops who'd again dug in at and south of Kamarowka. South of the highway, 11 ID reached Rudno, where they made contact with X Res Corps. Aerial reports indicated that the Russians were taking up a new position on the line Polubicze-Kamarowka-west edge of Miedzyrzecze. It was noted that they were bringing up reinforcements and increasing the activity of their artillery, so serious resistance was expected. Therefore 45 LW ID, which reached Radzyn during the day, was earmarked by Army HQ to reinforce VIII Corps if necessary.

The latest advance by 4th Army had narrowed its front, and this trend would continue in the next few days. Thus it was possible to pull another corps, XIV, from the line. Its 3 ID and most of 21 LW ID assembled north of Parczew; only one regiment of the Bohemian Landwehr division would still take part in the pursuit.

The 11th and Bug Armies also reported substantial progress. Without major fighting, X Res Corps advanced on both sides of the Parczew-Slawatyczce road to Paszenka; 103 ID and 2 Gd ID of Plettenberg's Group still had to deal with rear guards north and east of Podedworze; 1 Gd ID reached Pogorelec.

Farther to the east, the Bug Army had to break enemy resistance at noon in the area of Luta and Sobibor, and in the evening south of Wlodawa; the Beskid Corps reached the Ladzk area, XXIV Res Corps the Bug between Rozanka and Wlodawa; 82 Res ID of XLI Res Corps deployed on the river south of Rozanka. The Army Group now had a strong reserve force - 119 ID, XXII Res Corps, k.u.k. VI Corps, and 47 Res ID. These units followed the first line up to the area east and southwest of Parczew.

On 11 August GFM Mackensen had designated the Lukow-Brest Litovsk rail line as the border of his advancing troops on the left. Therefore, early on 13 August he ordered that 4th Army would stop its offensive when it reached the area of Biala. As soon as the inner wings of 11th Army and of Prinz Leopold's Army Group came together north of Piszczac, the 4th Army would be released for service elsewhere.
**Plans and prospects on 13 August**

Meanwhile the German OHL had recognized that because the enemy's retreat was almost accomplished there was no longer any hope of interfering with this operation. There was still a possibility that heavy damage could be inflicted on the Russians "by having Mackensen's Army Group drive them back to the north on both sides of Brest-Litovsk while 12\textsuperscript{th} Army advanced through Bielsk into their flank and rear."\textsuperscript{474} The result would be a small-scale "Cannae" in front of the vast swamps of the Bielowieszkaja Puszcza. Therefore GdI Falkenhayn issued new orders on 13 August, without any input from the k.u.k. AOK. While guarding in the direction of Brest-Litovsk, Mackensen would move the left wing of 11\textsuperscript{th} Army ahead through Lomazy-Biala to Janow. The right wing of Prinz Leopold's Army Group would thrust through Rogoznika to Niemirow, the left wing to Kleszczeli; thus by pivoting to the right they could strike the rear of the enemy units as they withdrew over the Bug. Falkenhayn also stated that it would be desirable to mount operations against the roads leading to Brest-Litovsk from the east.\textsuperscript{475}

Mackensen's HQ therefore instructed the Bug Army to advance to the line Zbunin-Miedzyles and to assume responsibility for guarding the Bug toward the east. They would also study the suggested operation against the roads east of Brest-Litovsk. Under 11\textsuperscript{th} Army, Plettenberg's Group would guard the Bug from Zbunin downstream to the Koden-Dobrynka area; X Res Corps would first thrust north to Perkowice and Biala, but then face east on the line Gorbow-Janow. This would open a gap between Dobrynka and Gorbow, into which VI Corps would be inserted after it marched up through Wisznice.

4\textsuperscript{th} Army was instructed to move ahead past the line Biala-Rogoznika to the Bug in the small area between Prinz Leopold's Army Group and 11\textsuperscript{th} Army. However, because of the narrowness of the sector they could dismiss any units that they no longer needed.

Meanwhile the Russians were devoting all their energy to ensuring that their retreat remained orderly. Since 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 4\textsuperscript{th} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armies had finished evacuating the Vistula valley, the southern half of Northwest Front now occupied an almost straight line from Ossoviets down to a point east of Lukow (as desired by General Quartermaster Danilov). The Russians wanted to delay for as long

\textsuperscript{474}Falkenhayn, p. 106
\textsuperscript{475}Schwarte, "Der deutsche Landkrieg", Vol. II, p. 169
as possible the march of the allies between the Bug and Krzna (and especially between the Bug and the line Parczew-Lomazy), which was menacing their flank.

14 August

Thus when Mackensen's armies followed their orders on the 14th and advanced past the Sławatyczce-Polubicze road, they encountered extremely heavy resistance from Russian units in prepared positions. It was impossible to continue the attack without the support of heavy artillery, most of which had been left behind during the recent quick marches. Under the Bug Army the Beskid Corps south of Ladzk and XXIV Res Corps northwest of Rozanka gained a few successes in heavy fighting, but couldn't move any further. There was an attempt to establish a bridgehead east of the Bug at Włodawa, but only small groups were able to reach the opposite bank of the river.

The situation was similar for Plettenberg's Group. His Prussian Gd Corps captured a Russian strong point north of Grabowka from the Russian Guards in stubborn fighting in the morning; thereafter, however, the Corps could only gain ground slowly toward the northeast, even though 119 ID entered the line between the 1 and 2 Gd ID. They couldn't finally break the enemy's resistance. X Res Corps was able to push back weak Russian forces in front of the line reached the day before, but by evening still couldn't capture the line Gorodyszce-Polubicze.

The Russians also conducted a vigorous defense against 4th Army, although they pulled back over the Krzna the troops they had left north of Grabowiec the evening before. Once again the enemy deployed a strong force of heavy artillery. The attackers, on the other hand, hadn't brought up their own heavy batteries immediately because so many bridges had been destroyed along the roads; the k.u.k. infantry suffered substantial casualties. Army HQ already recognized during the morning that the strength of the two corps at the front wasn't sufficient to quickly overcome enemy resistance, and placed XIV Corps under GdI Kritek. Its components, 3 ID and 21 LW ID, were immediately sent through Rudno to the Army's right wing; together with 11 ID they would make the decisive attack between Polubicze and Kamarowka. XIV Corps was ready to attack in this sector in the late afternoon. Meanwhile to the left of 11 ID the main body of XVII Corps had brought their skirmishing line up to within a few hundred meters of the enemy position. However, the attack in the evening failed to break through; parts of 4 ID, along with the adjacent wings of 11 ID and 41 Hon ID to their right and left reached the Russian
barbed wire entanglements despite overwhelming artillery fire, but had to postpone their main thrust until the next day.

VIII Corps was also heavily engaged throughout the day. After a difficult action, 106 Lst ID broke into the Russian position at Luzk in the afternoon, but continued to meet serious resistance here and farther to the northwest. In the morning, 37 Hon ID quickly followed the enemy up to the Krznabach, but couldn't cross the road leading south from Miedzyrzece.

15 August

However, the enemy had been hard pressed by the allied attacks. In the night of 14-15 August they gave up most of their positions. In the morning the allies again took up the pursuit.

The Bug Army thrust ahead with 107 and 4 ID to the Slawatycze-Miedzyyles road, where they again encountered the enemy at the edge of the woods lying to the east. Because the front of the Army was narrowing very quickly, most of the Beskid Corps was placed in the second line. 11th Army also delivered powerful blows to the Russians, and crossed the Wisznice-Slawatycze road around noon. Plettenberg's Group didn't come up to the Russians again until evening, upon reaching the line Miedzyyles-Bokinka. X Res Corps moved especially far ahead. Its 105 ID reached Biala late in the night, after a strenuous march; on the next morning 101 ID and 47 Res ID were on the stretch of railroad running east of the town. VI Corps, after a long march, entered the front in the gap between Plettenberg's Group and X Res Corps. On the 15th they reached the area east of Lomazy with 12 ID, and Wisznice with 39 Hon ID. XXII Res Corps was still in the Army's reserve.

4th Army found it unnecessary to mount the assault they had planned the evening before, since the enemy evacuated their positions during the night. Following orders from Mackensen's HQ, the 4th now shifted north, just like 11th Army. Without hindrance, VIII Corps reached the Krzna southeast of Rogoznika in the evening and sent its forward troops over to the north bank, which had already been abandoned by the Russians. XVII Corps was held up several times in the morning by enemy rear guards, and thus only a few of its soldiers reached the Krzna by evening; the main body had paused to rest somewhat farther south. XVI Corps (3 ID and 21 LW ID) were held in place south of Kamarowka for employment elsewhere.

16 August
On 16 August the Russian rear guards avoided any further combat. It had momentarily seemed that they wanted to tarry in front of 4th Army on the Klikawka. However, when the Aus-Hung. divisions reached this line in the afternoon they found that the banks of the stream had already been evacuated; they could push their advanced troops forward for another two hours' march. VIII Corps camped for the night in the vicinity of Worgule, XVII Corps northwest of Biała. In the Army's reserve, 45 LW ID followed VIII, 4 ID followed XVII Corps; both stopped for the night south of the Krzna. Farther to the east, opposite X Res Corps, aerial scouts reported that large masses of enemy troops were being pressed together in the area between the Krzna and Bug, so a quick thrust in that direction would be profitable. However, the troops on the railroad east of Biała were exhausted from the strenuous marches of the day before; the divisions of X Res Corps were only able to reach the line Grud-Woskrzenice.\footnote{Schwarte, "Der deutsche Landkrieg", Vol. II, p. 171} Under VI Corps, 12 ID reached the area northwest of Piszczał while 39 Hon ID was southeast of that town; they had several skirmishes with the enemy, but were able to bring their leading troops up to the line Gorbow-Dobrynka. Their neighbor, Plettenberg's Group, took Kopytów and Koden with 103 ID and the Guards. 119 ID had been transferred to the Bug Army; it guarded the Bug between Koden and the positions of 107 ID north of Slawatyce.

The Bug Army was now stationed along the river facing east (except for the Beskid Corps, which was in reserve behind the north wing); they held a 100 km front on the western bank from Dubienka to Koden. They noticed that the enemy forces on the eastern bank were being considerably reduced as units left to move farther north. Thus concerns for the Army Group's eastern flank became less pressing. To ensure that the flank remained secure, and to prepare for the operation which German OHL wanted to mount to the area east of Brest-Litovsk, it would be necessary to occupy the eastern bank of the Bug as soon as possible. Therefore on the 15th and 16th the X German Corps, which meanwhile had arrived through Cholm, entered the line on the Bug between Dubienka and the mouth of the Ucherka. They relieved 81 Res ID, which shifted north to a new position on the river.

The inner wings of 82 Res ID and 22 ID had already made efforts on the 14th to establish a foothold east of the Bug at Wlodawa; they were finally able to secure a firm bridgehead on the 16th, and held it against sharp Russian counterattacks. North of Wlodawa the 1, 11 Bav and 107 ID were still guarding the western bank as far as Slawatyce.
17 August

Meanwhile on the 16th Plettenberg's Group and VI Corps had already almost reached the southern front of the Brest-Litovsk fortifications. Most of the troops were within range of the guns of the fortress. Therefore on the 17th they only moved slightly forward. On the other hand, X Res Corps continued to advance to the Bug at Janow and farther northeast; they were preparing to thrust over the river as planned by Army Group HQ. Only their 47 Res ID encountered stubborn resistance north of Rokitno. XXII Res Corps, which had reached the Lomazy area on the 16th, re-entered the line on the 17th between X Res and VI Corps; their mission was to blockade the northwestern front of the fortress while X Res Corps crossed the Bug to invest the northern front. By evening the 43 Res ID of XXII Res Corps reached the area northwest of Gorbow and 44 Res ID was at Rokitno; both were in contact with the enemy.

Like X Res Corps, the 4th Army was able to advance to the Bug without difficulty on 17 August. In the first hours of the morning, the troops reported that there were no Russians south of the river. The advance guards of VIII Corps reached the bank south of Niemirow and farther west, and linked up with detachments of Kövess' Group who were also arriving on the Bug. They sighted the enemy on the other side, holding two well-constructed parallel positions. By evening the southern bank of the Bug between Janow and a point west of Niemirow was mostly occupied by the forward elements of XVII and VIII Corps. The main bodies of their divisions were several kilometers to the rear.

g. The German eastern front, 12-17 August

On 12 August both Prinz Leopold's Army Group and Gallwitz's Army (the latter along with the south wing of 8th Army) were pursuing the Russians toward the east. The right wing of Woyrsch's Army was advancing north of the Lukow-Brest Litovsk railroad. Since the frontage of the troops was narrower as the Germans approached Siedlec, the k.u.k. 9 CD was no longer needed to cover gaps in the line and was sent to join Frommel's Cavalry Corps, which had instructions to move through Wegrow and Sokolow to the Bug.

On the other side, the 12th, 1st, 2nd and 4th Russian Armies were being pressed together as they pulled back in stages to the new line of resistance as ordered by Alexeiev on 10 August. They retreated slowly to cover the evacuation of military equipment on
the railroads as well as the movement of a large number of supply trains which, as noted by allied pilots, clogged the road south of Drogoczyn. Early on the 12th the Russians did evacuate Lukow (which was occupied by 16 ID) and Siedlec, but then dug in east of both places, supported by strong artillery. Woyrsch thus couldn't reach his goal, the line Misie-Hadynow; he had to be content with the line Strzyzew-Mikluszy-Radzikow. 9th Army had its right wing east of Siedlec on the Liwiec and its left in front of Sokolow. Gallwitz's Army was engaged two days' march east of Ostrow.

Early in the morning of the 13th, 16 ID pushed the Russians back along the railroad; however, the enemy withdrew only a slight distance toward the east, to the line Misie-Hadynow. Therefore Woyrsch's Army had to launch an attack along the entire front. 16 and 35 ID pushed the Russians through Misie. 7 CD, which had entered the line the day before between 35 ID and Bredow in order to thrust down the Siedlec-Miedzyrzecze road, had to restrict its activity to supporting the neighboring infantry divisions. Farther north, the inner wings of Woyrsch's and 9th Armies crossed the Liwiec. In front of Frommel's Cavalry Corps, which had now been reinforced by the k.u.k. 9 CD, the Russians retreated from Drogiczyn upstream along the Bug. In front of Gallwitz they gave ground east of the line Ciechanowiec-Wizna.

For the 14th, Prinz Leopold directed the advance of his Army Group toward the northeast to coordinate with the operations of Mackensen. The border of Woyrsch's right wing as he advanced would be the line Miedzyrzecze-Rogoznika-Niemirow; within his Army, the border between Kövess' troops and the LW Corps was the line Lukowisko-Kornica-Mielnik. Although Woyrsch had stated the evening before that he was facing only rear guards, in fact the Russians held their ground stubbornly and gave up a minimum amount of terrain. They were driven from a town just west of Miedzyrzecze, but still held onto the latter town against the combined efforts of 16 ID and 37 Hon ID (of 4th Army, which was attacking from the south). XXV Res Corps of 9th Army pursued the Russians up to the line Biernaty-Duplewice; Hauer's 9 CD, guarding the left flank, intervened to support this action.

On the other hand, the LW Corps won some success on the evening of the 14th. Then all of Prinz Leopold's Army Group moved forward smoothly on the 15th and 16th; the Russians didn't hold their position on the Klikawka, and soon gave up their line on the Toczna. On the evening of the 16th, Kövess' leading troops and the main body of the German units were on the Bug. GdK Frommel had already crossed the river early in the morning. He
urgently ordered 9 CD to also cross the Bug immediately, since the German OHL emphatically wanted to reach the Kleszczeli area as soon as possible. Therefore some of Hauer's horsemen forded the river at Drogiczyn to join their German comrades. The k.u.k. 2 CD stayed in contact with Gallwitz's Army, which moved past Briansk on the 16th. The right wing of 8th Army was in front of Tykocin, and threatening the fortress of Ossoviets from the south.

On the next day (17 August) GO Woyrsch was already getting ready to cross the Bug. However, his men would have to rely on local resources, since the bridging equipment was still coming up; due to the strength of the enemy positions on the opposite bank, this was a bold plan. Woyrsch wanted his right wing to advance on the line Niemirow-Tokary; XII Corps would deploy on the Bug along a front of 8 to 10 km between Niemirow and Melnik.

The 17th was spent in scouting the enemy positions and preparing for the assault. Kövess pulled 7 CD out of the line, since 4th Army was coming up to the Bug next to his left. Woyrsch decided to postpone attacking until the Russians were affected by pressure from 12th and 9th Armies. In the morning, XXV Res Corps of 9th Army was already over the river at the point where it was crossed by the railroad from Siedlec. They pushed back the Russians on the north bank, whose front was thus bent back at a right angle near Siemiatycze, since they were still engaged with Frommel's Corps attacking from the west. Hauser's 9 CD had joined the right wing of Frommel's assault. However, his horsemen were soon pulled from line again; they rode north behind the front to support 2 CD on the other end of Frommel's front. Both 2 and 9 CD would intervene to help the southern wing of Gallwitz's Army, which was threatened by a Russian counterattack. Farther to the north, the inner wings of 12th and 8th Armies were also in trouble and had been unable to gain ground. On the other hand, glad tidings arrived in the evening of the 17th – the fortress of Kovno had fallen. GdI Litzmann and XL Res Corps had taken the place by storm. Thus Hindenburg's plan for an envelopment offensive toward Vilna was off to a good start.

h. Preparations of the allies, 14-19 August

While the allied divisions were approaching the principal Russian position at Brest-Litovsk, there were renewed discussions between Teschen, Pless and Mackensen's HQ (now at Lublin) regarding the further course of the offensive in the East. The first goal was to push the enemy behind the line Bug-Brest Litovsk-Grodno, which
Falkenhayn had designated as the principal objective on 3 August. Then Conrad wished to initiate his campaign toward Rovno that would fully liberate eastern Galicia from the enemy.

For the first goal, on 16 August the line Niemirow-Lumno-Wolkowiczy was selected as the border between the inner wings of the Army Groups of Mackensen and Prinz Leopold. Mackensen moreover was ordered to envelop Brest-Litovsk, beginning on the left but later also from the northwest by moving from the north bank of the Bug.

Conrad predicted that the Russians would retreat generally along three rail lines: Brest Litovsk-Baranowicze, Siedlec-Wolkowisk and Bialystok-Grodno. Therefore the Aust-Hung. Chief of Staff didn't expect that the frontal assault by Mackensen's Army Group and Woyrsch's Army would substantially interfere with the enemy withdrawal. More damage could be done by a strong push to the east by the German 12th and 8th Armies, and therefore Conrad recommended to Falkenhayn that these Armies should be reinforced by further German units.

On the 16th there were few Aus-Hung. units still serving in Mackensen's Army Group as it advanced to the northeast - these were 4th Army (with VIII and XVII Corps) and VI Corps (in 11th Army). Thus the allied order of battle was already approaching the situation envisioned by GdI Falkenhayn on 3 August, in which the border between the Aus-Hung. and German armies would be at the mouth of the Ucherka. Some units would have to be shunted between the two allies to complete the separation. It would soon be possible to remove 4th Army from the front; when this occurred, Conrad said that 4th and 1st Armies would no longer be under Mackensen's Army Group. However, he also announced that to avoid complicated movements and to save time he was prepared to leave Kövess' Group (16 and 35 ID, 7 CD) plus 2 and 9 CD under Prinz Leopold's Army Group, if the Germans' 3 Gd ID and 48 Res ID stayed under South Army, while their 5 CD stayed under 1st Army.

Conrad's new plan of attack

Meanwhile it was becoming more evident that a gap was developing in the enemy's line north of Vladimir-Volynsky. Conrad intended to take advantage of this situation. At the end of his memorandum to Falkenhayn on 14 August, he indicated that his next move would be "to build an attacking group from 4th and 1st Armies. They will thrust toward Kovel while the Russian Northwest and Southwest Fronts are separated, then envelop 8th Russian Army from the north. At the same time the inner wings of
2nd and South Armies will attack through the heights south of the Krasne-Brody railroad."

In broad outlines, this was Conrad's plan for driving the Russians out of the last corner of east Galicia. Falkenhayn had reservations about this offensive in the direction of Rovno, which would take place "without the aid of German troops in very difficult terrain." However, he hoped that "even a partially successful operation would substantially boost the self-confidence and combat potential of our allies and make a strong impression on our opponents."\textsuperscript{477}

Meanwhile the X Corps was on its way to reinforce 1st Army, and on the 16\textsuperscript{th} it reached Vladimir-Volynsky and Ustilug. Mackensen had ordered Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps (5 German and 4 Aus-Hung. CD) to shift north to relieve X German Corps. 62 ID and IX Corps were marching through Krasnostaw toward the east, XIV Corps through Parczew in the same direction. Mackensen now planned to have XIV Corps join the Bug Army north of Wlodawa to help guard the flank toward the east; here they would relieve Gerok's Corps so that it could thrust over the Bug downstream from Brest-Litovsk. Mackensen's instructions, however, contradicted Conrad's orders of 16 August, under which XIV Corps (rather than Heydebreck) would relieve X German Corps and the Gd CD on the Bug between Dubienka and the mouth of the Ucherka. Conrad's plan was to have most of the Aus-Hung. units assemble south of the intended border with the German fronts, and then to have Roth's XIV Corps serve as the northern column for the thrust toward Kovel during the offensive to the southeast. The actual result was that Heydebreck's cavalry relieved X German Corps on 17 and 18 August while Roth's Corps deployed behind them on the Bug south of the Ucherka.

The troops in eastern Galicia had generally enjoyed quiet since the end of the Dniester Battle and of the fighting at Sokal. While they worked on their entrenchments, their combat strength increased since the number of arriving replacement troops greatly exceeded the light casualties. On 6 August, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin believed that the Russians might be reducing the strength of their garrison in the Czernelica bridgehead, and ordered XIII and III Corps to launch probing attacks to determine if this was correct. However, the commander of the Graz III Corps, FML Krautwald, decided to go a step further and instructed his two divisions to capture the bridgehead. On the 8\textsuperscript{th}, GM Schön's 22 LW ID launched the first attack; he took the Russians by surprise and opened a substantial hole in their line southwest of

Czernelica. On the next day, GM Hinke's 28 ID made the decisive thrust. In a smartly-executed offensive, the often-distinguished Inner Austrian regiments of both divisions wrested the entire bridgehead from XXXIII Russian Corps (which also consisted of two divisions). The defeated enemy was able only to retain a small foothold along the bend in the Dniester north of Czernelica; in the two days of fighting they had lost 2760 men taken prisoner as well as large numbers killed or wounded. This was the last feat of arms of the "Iron Corps" on the Russian front. On the 12th the AOK ordered them to transfer to the Isonzo, and on the 13th they began to entrain at the Kolomea and Horodenka stations. 5 ID shifted to the east to take over the positions of III Corps. Because the situation on the upper Isonzo was growing critical, on the 16th the AOK selected 13 LW ID of 1st Army to also move to the Italian front, and ordered the Division to march to the railroad station at Belz.

Meanwhile, on 10 August GO Conrad instructed GdK Böhm-Ermolli to begin top secret preparations for an attack through Gologory to Zloczow; this undertaking would be coordinated with the envelopment attack by 1st and 4th Armies.

On 17 August, Heydebreck's active Cavalry Corps reported that the Russians were withdrawing in front of the left wing of 1st Army toward the upper Turya and behind the Naretwa. Radio broadcasts indicated that only the XXXI Corps of 13th Russian Army was still deployed in front of Kovel, and that Ivanov had moved his HQ from Rovno back to Berdichev. All this data indicated to Conrad that the time had come to begin his offensive to the southeast.

Orders for the thrust to Kovel

On the next day, Emperor Wilhelm and the leaders of the two allied high commands met as guests of Archduke Friedrich at Teschen to celebrate the birthday of the aged Emperor Franz Joseph. Here Falkenhayn withdrew his objections against the offensive to Rovno. He was motivated in part by the completion of the long and difficult negotiations that would bring Bulgaria into the war (about which more will be said below); the Bulgarians might indirectly benefit from a victory over the Russian Southwest Front because of its influence on the attitude of Romania. Also on 18 August, FZM Puhallo received an order through Mackensen's Army Group HQ to thrust toward Kovel with Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps. The operation would be supported by the k.u.k. X Corps (standing guard between Vladimir-Volynsky and Dubienka) and by 62 ID.
Thus the two Chiefs of Staff had arrived at a basic agreement on the 18th; in the next few days they exchanged notes to govern the troop movements necessary to implement Conrad's plans. The seven divisions already being transferred from 4th to 1st Army were now to be joined by 4 ID and 45 LW ID, which would march through Cholm under the command of FML Smekal. The remaining units in 4th Army (37 and 41 Hon ID, 11 ID, 106 Lst ID and the Polish Legion) would leave the front - at the latest - after reaching the railroad from Brest-Litovsk to Bialystok, and move to the southeast. Thereafter the German 11th Army and Woyrsch's Armeeabteilung would be immediate neighbors. For the next operation, Conrad intended to place 4th and 1st Armies under the command of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Finally he proposed to Falkenhayn (in contrast to his suggestion of the 14th) that the k.u.k. 7 CD should be swapped for 5 German CD. The German Chief of Staff approved all these proposals. Conrad had also offered to reinforce Kövess' Armeegruppe with VIII Corps (37 Hon ID and 106 Lst ID) if this would allow German troops to be shifted from Prinz Leopold's Army Group to reinforce 8th and 12th Armies. However, Falkenhayn didn't intend to strengthen these Armies, and turned the offer down. 478

At this point (the evening of the 19th), more detailed instructions were provided to FZM Puhallo. His task "after securing Kovel and providing security toward the north, was to attack and envelop the right wing of the Russian Southwest Front." Puhallo would open the offensive with 1st Army, as the troops of 4th Army began to arrive. Conrad would announce the starting date for the envelopment offensive at some point after the capture of Kovel. Also, he wanted the three armies in east Galicia to go over to the offensive in the next few days in conjunction with the flank attack from the north.

i. The thrust through Kovel, 19-26 August

As ordered, G.Lt Heydebreck opened the advance to Kovel early on 19 August; 4 CD moved ahead from Dubienka and 11 Hon CD rode along the railroad toward Luboml. To support the horsemen, the commander of X Corps (FML Martiny) sent a reinforced regiment of 24 ID under GM Ritter von Unschuld from Vladimir-Volynsky toward Turyjsk; two smaller detachments (one each from 2 and 62 ID)

478TRANSLATOR's NOTE - At issue here was Ludendorff's insistence that a major envelopment offensive by 8th and 12th Armies could still win a decisive victory in the East; Conrad also advocated this idea. Falkenhayn wished merely to end major fighting in the East to free units for employment elsewhere.
advanced from Ustilug toward Rastow and from Dubienka toward Olesk. Behind the left wing of 24 ID, which was deployed at Vladimir-Volynsky facing east, Martiny placed the main body of 2 ID; they would be available to thrust either north or east as the situation developed.

After light actions with Russian cavalry, on the 19th the advanced troops of X Corps and the two cavalry divisions had already reached Ruda (on the Turya), Olesk and Luboml. A stronger enemy force was located on both sides of Mokrec; they were attacked unsuccessfully by GM Unschuld's mixed detachment on the 20th. Coming up from Ustilug, the German 5 CD arrived on the battlefield in the evening and stormed Bobly. West of the Turya, on the same day 4 CD and 11 Hon CD advanced to the line Perewaly-Chworostow, where the Russians made a stand. In the night the enemy evacuated Mokrec.

This was the situation on the morning of the 20th when FZM Puhallo reported his further intentions to Teschen. He wanted next to shift the main body of X Corps (2 and 62 ID) to Turysjk. Then he would deploy IX and XIV Corps behind 24 ID in the area north and northeast of Vladimir Volynsky. One division of FML Smekal's group would go to Ustilug and the other to the rear of Szurmay's Corps. After Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps took Kovel and Smekal's Group arrived, Puhallo would attack toward the east between Sokal and Vladimir Volynsky with six infantry divisions - II Corps (25 ID)\textsuperscript{479}, I Corps (46 LW ID and 9 ID), Szurmay's Corps (7 ID and 40 Hon ID), plus one division from Smekal's Group. Five infantry divisions would make the main attack to the southeast between the Luga and the Turya to envelop the enemy's north wing - 24 ID, XIV Corps (3 ID and 21 LW ID) and IX Corps (10 ID and 26 LW ID). The remaining division from Smekal's Group would follow through Vladimir-Volynsky as the Army's reserve. The main body of X Corps would guard the Kovel area; depending on the situation it could either advance southeast through Mokrec, Kisielin and Zaturcy or move farther east.

GO Conrad disagreed completely with FZM Puhallo's intentions. He reckoned that the enemy might withdraw their entire front, and therefore wanted the attack to develop more quickly. Also he wanted 1st Army to thrust east from Kovel with a strong left wing. Therefore on 20 August he ordered FZM Puhallo to attack as soon as possible, at the latest after the arrival of XIV Corps. The main thrust would be made from the line Vladimir Volynsky-Kovel in the general direction of Luck. To cover the operation,

\textsuperscript{479}The other division of II Corps - 13 LW ID - had moved to Belz on 16 August for possible shipment to the Italian front.
Kovel should first be firmly secured by Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps plus one division from X Corps. For the attack on Luck, X Corps would march east and north of Vladimir-Volynsky and IX Corps at and south of Turyjsk. XIV Corps, however, should first move through Luboml to Kovel. 4 and 45 LW ID would be available as the Army's reserve.

On the next day (21 August), the high command also issued a general order. 1st Army would be relieved from Mackensen's Army Group on 22 August to open the offensive against the Russians' northern flank. At the same time the inner wings of 2nd and South Armies would break through the Russian center at Gologory and Dunajow. 7th Army would join the offensive, beginning on its left wing, as soon as South Army made progress.

Consistent with these orders, when IX Corps arrived in the area west of Ustilug they were sent ahead by FZM Puhallo to Mokrec, where they were to arrive by 22 August. 62 ID, which had been guarding the Bug between Horodlo and Dubienka, first went to the area northwest of Vladimir-Volynsky and then left, next to 24 ID, to Werba. XIV Corps, marching from Cholm toward Luboml, was supposed to reach Kovel on the 24th.

Meanwhile the advance to Kovel had stalled. The German 5 CD, which had won its way over the Turya by a quick thrust at Solowiczy, was checked by a strongly-entrenched enemy force. They were unable to break through on the following day, even though they got some support from 2 ID as it came up through Mokrec. Similarly the 4 CD and 11 Hon CD, which had enemy detachments facing their northern flank, didn't gain any substantial ground. FZM Puhallo now had 26 LW ID, which was arriving at Mokrec, continue toward the northeast; their orders were to join 2 ID in an attack the enemy positions at Ratow early on the 23rd.

Meanwhile, however, the Russian XLI Corps was menaced in the rear by the advance of the Bug Army, and was already withdrawing from Kovel toward the north. The rear guards which had been covering this operation between Turyjsk and Macijow joined the retreat during the night of 22-23 August. On the next morning, Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps and 2 ID took up the pursuit of the withdrawing Russians. In the afternoon the 4 CD and German 5 CD arrived in front of Kovel. During the evening they were unable to push ahead into the city, which was still defended by the Russians, and awaited the arrival of 2 ID. Again the enemy evacuated their positions under cover of darkness. On the morning of the 24th Heydebreck's horsemen entered Kovel; soon
thereafter 2 ID established a firm foothold on the east bank of the Turya, which ran through the city.

In places following closely behind XLI Russian Corps as it pulled back to Ratno, the German 5 CD and 11 Hon CD came up almost to the line Nieszuchowie-Myzowo during the 24th. Scouts from 4 CD reached Lubitow, where they encountered a regiment from Russian IV Cavalry Corps which was apparently retreating to the north. At the same time it was determined that the Russian horsemen between Luga and Turya, who hitherto guarded the north flank of 8th Russian Army, had pulled back to the east.

Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps (German 5 CD and 11 Hon CD) drove the rear guards of XLI Russian Corps into the swamps along the Pripyat; at midnight of 25-26 August the Corps was once again placed under the Bug Army. Meanwhile Puhallo assembled his divisions between Vladimir-Volynsky and Kovel for the drive to Luck. On the evening of the 23rd he'd been instructed by Teschen to keep his northern wing as strong as possible. Smekal's Group (approaching from 4th Army) and 7 CD were to join the attacking wing by marching on the shortest way through Kovel. 13 LW ID hadn't been sent to Italy; it was placed once more under 1st Army and was to move from Belz to Vladimir-Volynsky. This order from the AOK ended with the sentence: "The offensive must be prepared so that after it begins the advance will continue without interruption to the area of Luck."

Thus FZM Puhallo was sending the left wing of his Army into the large gap that had developed between the Russians' 13th Army, as it moved to the north, and their 8th Army which had stayed on the upper Bug. By 26 August the X Corps (24 and 62 ID) and IX Corps (10 ID and 26 LW ID) were supposed to reach the line Zimno-Turija (town)-Swinarin; 4 CD and XIV Corps (21 LW ID and 3 ID) would advance from Kovel along the railroad toward Luck, as far as the Holoby area. 2 ID would stay on guard by Kovel for the time being. Puhallo's march was the beginning of the great offensive that would soon strike the entire Russian Southwest Front from Volhynia to the Dniester. However, it wouldn't fulfill the hopes of the high command.

j. Mackensen's wings cross the Bug; Brest-Litovsk is enveloped on both sides, 18-23 August

According to the guidelines issued by the k.u.k. AOK on 16 August, Mackensen's Army Group would advance south of the line Niemirow-Lumno-Wolkowicz; they would first invest Brest-Litovsk
from the left (west and south) bank of the Bug, then from the right (north) bank. It was left to GdI Falkenhayn to expand these guidelines with more specific orders. After the selection of the line Brest Litovsk-Grodno as the termination point for the offensive it was clear that there was no prospect of encircling substantial Russian forces, and Conrad had no further interest in the course of the campaign toward the northeast. Under the orders of the German OHL, Mackensen's Army Group would now strengthen their positions along the Bug and in front of Brest-Litovsk; this would make units available for a renewed offensive. They would deploy in echelon behind the left wing, then cross the Bug to thrust against the fortress from the northwest. Falkenhayn reiterated that the pursuit wouldn't continue past the line Brest Litovsk-Grodno, but he was confident that a short thrust would reap substantial advantages. For the same reason he ordered that only small-scale operations would be conducted against the roads leading east from the fortress.

Thus the principal new task of Mackensen's Army Group was to group the forces west of Brest-Litovsk for the attack toward the north by the strengthened left wing. This would be the mission of 11th Army; to relieve that Army of responsibility for investing the fortress from the west, control of the front between the Krzna and the Bug was transferred to the Bug Army. The Beskid Corps of the latter Army relieved Plettenberg's Group between Koden and Dobrynka on the 17th and 18th, and VI Corps came under Linsingen's command on the 18th. XXII Res Corps of 11th Army, followed by 119 ID of the Bug Army at the mouth of the Krzna, would also take part in the investment of the fortress' west side. X Res Corps, however, had been designated to take part in the thrust to the north; they would be followed by Plettenberg's Group (the Gd Corps with its two divisions, plus 103 ID and Gd CD). The thrust also involved 4th Army between Janow and Niemirow. At this point 4th Army had just four divisions at the front (11 ID, 106 Lst ID, 37 Hon ID and the Polish Legion). The other three (41 Hon ID, 4 ID and 45 LW ID) had halted north of Biala where they could intervene to help 11th Army if, as Falkenhayn feared, the enemy might mount a counterattack from the fortress "like in the Battle of the Marne" against the flank of the allied units downstream from Brest-Litovsk.480

18-19 August - 4th and 11th Armies

There were no significant events involving Marschall's or Arz's Corps on 18 August. However, XXII Res Corps and the right wing

480Foerster, pp. 141 ff.
of X Res Corps (47 Res ID) had to fight hard to reach the line Kijowiec-Lipnica-Tielesnica.

105 ID of X Res Corps and the divisions of 4th Army on the Bug were trying to cross the river. However, all their attempts during the day were shattered by the active and watchful defenders, even though the Russians pulled back in front of Kövess' Group, the neighbors of 4th Army on the left. Parts of 105 ID were finally able to establish themselves over the river in the evening.

Since the enemy were still standing their ground against 4th Army that night, XVII Corps was ordered to halt their attempts to cross the river until they could join the offensive by X Res Corps. VIII Corps, if it couldn't break through with a frontal assault, would shift units to the left to cross the Bug behind 16 ID of Kövess' Group.

However, during the night of 18-19 August both VIII and XVII Corps were able to bring several battalions over the river. The advanced troops of VIII Corps took Niemirow and by noon had nearly reached the major road west of Wolka. Under XVII Corps, the main body of 11 ID was covered by its outposts as they crossed the river in the morning on a bridge constructed north of Janow; in the early afternoon they advanced northeast toward the Koterka and the Pulwa. They found that the Russian XV Corps had dug in on the hills that lay ahead of the west banks of these streams, on the line Dubowoje-Zalesie-Tokary. Late in the afternoon the VIII Corps as well as 11 ID attacked this position. The enemy gave up their advanced trenches west of Zalesie and tried to hold onto the heights directly west of the Koterkabach. However, they could not stand up to the heavy Aus-Hung. attack. Toward twilight the 37 Hon ID stormed the heights south of Tokary and 106 Lst ID those east of Zalesie; thereafter the Russians withdrew in several places to the east bank of the Koterka. 11 ID was also able to push the enemy over the brook and to reach the western bank with its foremost troops. In the evening the Division's main body made contact with the first elements of 105 ID southwest of Dubowoje. This unit had made its way over the Bug in the morning, but couldn't progress any further against parts of VI Siberian Corps. X Res Corps intended to commit 103 ID on 20 August to give new impetus to its offensive. The Gd Corps (including the Gd CD) was also available for this purpose; after all their troops were relieved by the Bug Army the Corps was on its way to Janow.

Meanwhile heavy fighting flared up south of the Bug on the 19th
involving XXII Res Corps (reinforced by 119 ID) and the main body of X Res Corps (47 Res ID and 101 ID). The Russians made desperate attacks with infantry and cavalry to cover the withdrawal of the masses of troops and supply wagons in front of the fortress. The Germans, supported by artillery fire from Arz’s Corps, finally made progress toward the northeast in the evening, although X Res Corps was still bogged down.

By now 11th Army had sufficient troops in line opposite the fortress, and didn't need help from the three divisions of 4th Army which had been in reserve by Biala. Therefore during the 19th the 41 Hon ID was sent to XVII Corps; 4 ID and 45 LW ID were ordered by the k.u.k. high command to march through Cholm to join 1st Army.

19-23 August - on the Bug

On the front of the Bug Army opposite Brest there were no actions on the 19th involving either the VI or Beskid Corps, although the enemy artillery in the fortress was active. Upstream on the Bug, however, there was a significant success. The enemy had already evacuated the eastern bank south of Wlodawa, where the Germans had established a bridgehead. On 19 August the 1 ID broke through the enemy positions around this foothold and immediately thrust ahead to Pilszcz, where they again encountered the Russians in the evening. On 20 and 21 August there was continuous fighting in this area; meanwhile the 22 ID, 11 Bav ID and right wing of 107 ID also came over to the eastern bank between Wlodawa and Slawatyzce, where it had been evacuated by II Caucasian Corps. On the left of 1 ID they attacked and forced the enemy to withdraw to the line Pilszcz-Dubok-Czersk-Leplewka. To add weight to this offensive and facilitate the advance against Brest-Litovsk on the eastern bank of the Bug, GdI Linsingen sent XLI Res Corps over the river at Wlodawa on the 21st; they were told to join the fighting to the right (south) of 1 ID. On the next day the Corps advanced north and south of an area of swamps and lakes and reached more open ground at Szacz. At the same time, 1 and 22 ID overcame the enemy resistance at Pilszcz and Chrypsk in heavy fighting and reached Oltusz and Radez. On their left, by evening the 11 Bav ID advanced to Czersk and the area farther east. However, on the next day (the 23rd) only the wings of the force fighting east of the Bug could gain ground: XLI Res Corps at Oriechow and XXIV Res Corps at Otiay and northeast of Leplewka. The center (1 and 22 ID) were still pinned down in heavy fighting at and northwest of Oltusz.

20-21 August - the approach to Brest
Meanwhile on 20 August the 11th Army made further progress in the blockade of the fortress from the west. 43 Res ID and 119 ID of XXII Res Corps thrust to the northeast and pushed the enemy back to a point 6 km from the mouth of the Krzna. Since this shortened the Corps' front, 44 Res ID became available to attack toward the north.

Because XXII Res Corps was gaining ground, on the 19th the neighboring VI Corps prepared to have its left wing join the advance. On the afternoon of the 20th Arz's entire Corps moved forward - 12 ID to Dobryn and 39 Hon ID to Dobrynka. After darkness fell the Beskid Corps also moved up its left wing.

Like the left wing of XXII Res Corps, the X Res Corps could now concentrate its whole attention on the northern bank of the Bug. On the morning of the 20th its 101 ID followed the enemy as they withdrew to Derlo. Since 43 Res ID and 119 ID of XXII Res Corps were pushing toward the east, in the afternoon the 101 ID was able to cross the Bug at Derlo; thus they were able to help 105 ID, which had been heavily engaged all day on the heights west of Stawy. The 105th had been unable to break the enemy's stubborn resistance west of the lower Pulwa, even though they were supported by Gd CD (temporarily deployed on their left wing), parts of 41 Hon ID (which 4th Army sent into the fight from the area north of Dubowoje) and the artillery of 101 ID (stationed on the south bank of the Bug). Therefore 47 Res ID, which was no longer needed at Rokitno, also moved to this area.

The 4th Army also encountered stubborn resistance on the Koterkabach, in places even on the western bank. In the afternoon, however, 11 ID (reinforced by parts of 41 Hon ID) pushed the enemy back to the east bank after bitter fighting. Under VIII Corps, 106 Lst ID advanced over the Koterka south of the main highway. 37 Hon ID took Tokary in the morning, but encountered another enemy position just a few kilometers farther east; they postponed their further advance until the next day to give the heavy artillery time to come up.

Mackensen's HQ instructed their northern striking group - 4th Army and X Res Corps - to continue the advance to the heights in front of Kustyn and Wysoko-Litovsk; from this line they would move right in a northeastern direction to Kamieniec-Litovsk. However, on 21 August only 4th Army was able to gain further ground, in cooperation with Kövess' Group. The enemy in their sector began to retreat in the morning, although they renewed
their resistance west of Wysoko-Litovsk. VIII Corps immediately began to pursue toward the northeast; in the afternoon they launched a powerful attack which threw the Russians out of their new position. In this action the 37 Hon ID stormed a strongly occupied height southeast of Lumno; following closely after the defeated enemy, they pushed over the Pulwa northeast of the town. Farther south, 106 Lst ID pushed the enemy back toward Wysoko-Litovsk and fought their way into the town. By evening the Russian rear guards had been driven from the railroad in the entire sector of VIII Corps; the enemy was prepared to fight again on a line between Gola and Riasno.

Under XVII Corps, the 11 ID advanced quickly past the confluence of the Koterka and the Pulwa. The enemy troops who fell back from 11 ID joined the others guarding the east bank of the Pulwa between Riasno and a point north of Stawy; farther south, the Russians were still offering stubborn resistance to 105 ID on the lower Pulwa. After difficult fighting, this Division was able to establish a firm foothold on the east bank of the brook south of Stawy; farther north, however, they spent the whole day in bitter and unsuccessful actions in the low ground along the Pulwa. The advance of 101 ID through Derlo toward the north did nothing to alleviate the situation, especially since the enemy themselves opened a counterattack at Stawy in the evening. To finally win a decision on the next day (the 22\textsuperscript{nd}), 47 Res ID was to intervene toward Stawy from the northwest; on their left they would be supported by a brigade of 41 Hon ID plus the entire artillery of the Honved Division.

**Actions on 22–23 August**

Nonetheless, the stubborn fighting north of the Bug dragged on; the anticipated success wasn't won on either the 22\textsuperscript{nd} or the 23\textsuperscript{rd}. The inner wings of 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Russian Armies had apparently been reinforced; they had substantial heavy artillery with plenty of ammunition, and fought fiercely for every foot of ground. 44 Res ID on the left wing of XXII Res Corps was able to bring infantry to the north bank of the Bug 5 km east of Derlo, but all attempts to advance further to the north were thwarted, as were those of the neighboring 101 ID to the left. X Res Corps, though now attacking with three divisions, could only gain ground slowly and with difficulty. 105 ID still wasn't able to break through the stubborn enemy on the east bank of the Pulwa at Stawy; meanwhile 47 Res ID and 103 ID fought on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} in the area south of Wolczyn but neither on this day nor on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} could they overcome Russian resistance southeast of the town. Therefore the Germans intended to also deploy the Gd Corps on the 24\textsuperscript{th}, next to
101 ID.

4th Army had just as much trouble. On its right, 41 Hon ID was heavily engaged on 22-23 August east and northeast of Wolczyn, but without success. Farther north the 11 ID and VIII Corps expanded the area they had gained on the 21st, but didn't win a major breakthrough. Thus on the 23rd the 11 ID and 106 Lst ID were heavily engaged on the heights south of Wysoko-Litovsk; they worked their way almost up to the enemy's main position, which they were even able to penetrate at several points during the night. Then, however, the Russians mounted strong attacks; throughout the 23rd the fighting raged back and forth on the heights.

North of Wysoko-Litovsk, the 37 Hon ID and Polish Legion pushed over the railroad on the 22nd; the Honveds stormed Wolkowiczy as well as the heights north and south of the town, forcing the Russians to flee in disorder. Soon, however, the enemy reinforced this sector. Their resistance couldn't be broken, even though the attack north of Wolkowiczy continued in cooperation with 16 ID of Kövess' neighboring group; the troops were able, however, to win some ground and they took 1250 prisoners. The prisoners came from seven different Russian divisions, which indicated that the enemy's order of battle was improvised.

Meanwhile the allied lines south of the Bug were moving ever closer to Brest-Litovsk. On the 21st, XXII Res Corps took the entire west bank of the Krzna up to the heights directly opposite it mouth. VI Corps and the left wing of the Beskid Corps inched ahead to the enemy's outermost fortifications. These well-constructed works ran through the centers of the towns of Dobryn and Wolka Dobrynyskaja and through Dobrynka, and included several half-permanent strong points.

VI Corps opened an attack on 22 August. Bad weather postponed the artillery preparation until noon; then the Corps' heavy batteries began their work of destruction while the infantry of both divisions slowly worked their way up to the enemy positions. For the time being they couldn't push any further. An especially well-built strong point between Wolka Dobrynyskaja and Dobryn dominated the entire area. It would have to be suppressed by trench mortars, and therefore the attack was postponed until the 24th. This sorely tried the patience of the commanders, all the more so because XXII Res Corps and the Beskid Corps were also unable to make headway during these days and because reports from aerial scouts and spies both indicated that the enemy was
meanwhile continuing their retreat to the east as planned. The Russians seemed to be reconciled to giving up their fortress.

**k. Prinz Leopold and Hindenburg continue their offensive, 18-23 August**

Under Prinz Leopold's Army Group, GO Woyrsch already on 18 August found that, as he had expected, the Russians were withdrawing because of pressure from 9th and 12th German Armies. The enemy, pulling back from these Armies, abandoned the defense of the north bank of the Bug at Niemirow. GdI Kövess brought four battalions over the river by evening of the 18th, and built bridges where the river bends southwest of Sutno. Farther to the left, König's LW Corps was over the Bug and advancing to the northeast, and 9th Army was approaching the upper Nurczyk. Gallwitz's goal was the lower reaches of that stream; northwest of Bielsk he was already threatening the railroad between Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok.

On the 19th, however, Woyrsch's Army after a brief advance came up against a new Russian defensive front running from Tokary through Siemichocz to Nurec, and had to pause to prepare an assault. König was able to capture Siemichocz, but couldn't overcome the enemy's line of resistance two kilometers beyond the town. The Russians defended the line of the Nurczyk very stubbornly; only Frommel was able to establish a small bridgehead on the opposite bank east of Pokaniewo. Gallwitz took Bocki. Behind his front the fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk surrendered after a siege of just two weeks; the Germans captured 85,000 Russians and 700 guns.

Prinz Leopold's plan of reaching the railroad between Wysoko-Litovsk and Kleszczeli on the 20th foundered due to Russian resistance. On the right wing of Kövess' Corps, 16 ID along with 37 Hon ID (of 4th Army) did storm Tokary; however, all efforts by XII Corps to conquer some dominating high ground southwest of Klukowiczy were in vain. The enemy was still also holding 9th German Army in check on the Nurczyk. On the other hand, Gallwitz took the town of Nurec (on the north bank of the river of the same name) as well as Bielsk and all of the rail line leading north from Bielsk to the Narew.

In Prinz Leopold's next order to Woyrsch's Army, he instructed them to make the main effort on their right wing, along the line Lumno-Jasieniewka-Rusily; thus they would shift direction to due east. While the XII k.u.k. Corps took the heights by Klukowiczy
in the night of 20-21 August, the enemy pulled back from Prinz Leopold and from Gallwitz. They moved behind the railroad to Bialystok, which was now crossed by Woyrsch between Lumno and the Czeremcha station as well as by large portions of Gallwitz's 12th Army. On the 21st, GdK Frommel occupied Kleszczeli, although the enemy still held an arc-shaped line east of the town. At this point Frommel had lost 9 German CD (which moved to 12th Army) and therefore commanded two Aus-Hung. cavalry divisions (2 and 9), plus temporarily the 5 German Res ID.

The Russians dug in on the heights east of the railroad and once again demonstrated their gift for delaying actions. Prinz Leopold ordered an attack that was supposed to drive the enemy into the Bielowiese Forest on the 22nd, but it didn't win any decisive success. In a difficult action in the swamps around Wierchowiczy, XII Corps did drive the enemy back to the line Dolbizna-Jasieniewka and took almost 1000 Russian grenadiers as prisoners. 9th Army and the LW Corps enlarged the area they held east of the railroad, but not in the area north of Kleszczeli, where there was still bitter fighting on the heights. The right wing of 12th Army also reached the heights east of the railroad; on both the 21st and 22nd they were supported by the batteries of GdK Hauer's 9 CD, firing over the Nurec.

8th Army secured the fortress of Ossoviets on the 22nd; in the subsequent advance they took Tykocin on the Narew.

On the 23rd, König's Corps broke through the enemy line and took 3000 prisoners, while Kövess' Corps had to repel repeated counterattacks. Therefore Woyrsch wanted König to help Kövess by pushing ahead into the rear of the Russians who were fighting XII Corps; however, the German Landwehr were unable to advance any further through Dolbizna. The Russians also stood their ground in front of Gallwitz's Army.

Apparently because of the rapid capture of Kovno, GdI Falkenhayn now felt that it was more important to reinforce 10th Army than to shift troops to 12th or 8th Army as Conrad had suggested; he explained this in a wire sent to Teschen on 19 August. However, the German Chief of Staff still hadn't decided whether to take advantage of the fall of Nowogeorgiewsk (which occurred later that day) by sending some of the troops who had fought there to join 10th Army. Hindenburg's staff meanwhile realized that the prospects for their long-planned envelopment attack through Vilna were diminishing daily as the operation continued to be postponed. 481 Therefore on the 19th they issued orders that 10th

481Ludendorff, "Kriegserinnerungen", p. 129
Army should advance its left wing to Vilna while the Niemen Army covered the flank of this offensive in the direction of the Dvina; 12th and 8th Armies would attack to the northeast. By evening of the 23rd, the north wing of GO von Eichhorn's 10th Army had advanced two days' march past Kovno toward the east, and his Army's center kept pace with this thrust. Only at Augustow did the German eastern front still run through its old positions opposite a stationary enemy.

1. The capture of Brest-Litovsk, 24-26 August

The events since mid-August had also compelled the Russian leadership to take new measures. General Alexeiev had hoped, as indicated by his orders on 10 August, that he could maintain prolonged resistance on the line Ossoviets-Ciechanowiec-Miedzyrzecze-Wlodawa, but his hopes were in vain. Heavily assaulted in continuous combat, in the next week his Armies had been pushed back far past this line - to Brest-Litovsk, behind Bryansk and toward Tykocin. The concern of the Russian commanders about the German thrust in Courland was undiminished, and now they confronted by new danger after the fall of Kovno. These events forced Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch to divide the Northwest Front into a North and a West Front, as he had been planning for weeks. The new order of battle would be effective on 31 August. The West Front would be placed under General Alexeiev. Its sector would extend north to the line Augustow-Molodieczno, and its main task would be "to cover the roads leading to Moscow from the theater of operations" by "strongly holding the sector Grodno-Bialystok-upper Narew-Brest Litovsk." Prolonged resistance on this front, and especially at the fortress of Brest-Litovsk, was rightly seen as necessary to thwart the Germans' threatened attempt to thrust from Kovno to Vilna against 10th Army. The other mission of the West Front, to cover the roads leading east of the Bug on the axis from Brest-Litovsk through Kobrin to Pinsk, was of lesser importance. The instructions from the Stavka lead to the conclusion that they were not concerned about having their front lines separated by the Polesie [the Pripyat Marshes].

The North Front would be given to General Ruszky. Its mission was to guard the lines of communication leading from East Prussia and the Baltic Sea to St Petersburg. To ensure the immediate security of Vilna, however, Alexeiev already had to send the

---

482 Gallwitz, p. 340
483 Nesnamov, Vol. IV, p. 99
Guard Corps from 3rd Army; it would be followed by two corps from 13th Army. The HQ of 13th Army would also leave the Pripyat sector, at the latest on 25 August; the troops they left behind would be assigned to 3rd Army. 12th Army would be dissolved and its units assigned to 1st Army; then General Gorbatovsky, erstwhile commander of 13th Army, would form a new 12th Army from the corps which were being sent to the Vilna area. On 18 August, however, the Stavka altered Alexeiev's instructions - the new 12th Army would be formed at Riga and Mitau rather than Vilna; 10th Army would take over responsibility for the defense of the Vilna area. 484

After these changes were implemented, the West Front would thus consist of 3rd, 4th, 2nd and 1st Armies. General Ruszky's North Front would have 10th, 5th and 12th Armies in the line; he would also command 6th Army (still stationed by St Petersburg) and the Baltic Fleet.

The allied advance to the Bielowiese Forest

Early on 24 August the troops of 11th German Army north of the Bug moved ahead to drive the enemy from the lower Pulwa; however, they found that the trenches which had been so stubbornly defended were now empty. The Russian 4th Army, which in the last few days had been increasingly outflanked by Kövess' Group and the k.u.k. 4th Army, had begun to retreat the night before.

Mackensen's HQ instructed X Res Corps and 4th Army to continue the pursuit to the area south and north of Kamienieck-Litovsky. They had already issued orders on the 20th for the blockade of the north and northwest sides of the Brest-Litovsk fortress from north of the Bug. Under these orders, the left wing of XXII Res Corps (44 Res ID) was to hold the sector between the Bug and Motykaly; from here the Gd Corps would deploy as far as the Lesna at Kozlowicz. The enemy's stubborn resistance on the lower Pulwa and farther east on the Bug had prevented implementation of the blockade until this time. Now the advance could finally begin as ordered. 44 Res ID reached Kolodno on the 24th and the area south and southeast of Motykaly on the 25th. To their left, the Gd Corps was at and north of Niecholsty on the 24th. On the next day one of the Guard divisions fought its way south in the sector east of the railroad while the other thrust east to the Lesna.

Meanwhile, to the left of the Guards the X Res Corps with three divisions followed close behind the enemy as they withdrew to the

line Kustyn-Barszczewo. On the 25th the Germans drove the Russian rearguard east of this line and reached the Lesna between Ostromiczewo and the road leading south from Wysoko-Litovsk to Kamieniec-Litovsky.

The enemy also withdrew from 4th Army on the morning of the 24th. XVII Corps reached the area north of Barszczewo and VIII Corps the area east and north of Riasno; then, however, both corps came upon strongly-occupied positions that couldn't be quickly taken. In the afternoon there was hard fighting southwest of Jasieniewka, in which 37 Hon ID and the Polish Legion had to repel a heavy counterattack before they could gain the upper hand.

The two corps launched a combined attack early on the 25th; the main thrust was along and south of the road to Kamieniec-Litovsky. The north wing of XVII Corps broke into the enemy position southeast of the road around 5:00 AM; quickly brushing aside some weak cavalry detachments, they reached Wojska by noon. This victory also forced the retreat of the enemy units who'd still been resisting VIII Corps. All of the pursuing troops stayed right on the Russians' heels, but in the afternoon came up to another well-prepared and strongly-held position, this time on the heights southeast and northeast of Wojska. By evening the attackers had moved up close to the Russian trenches.

Prinz Leopold's Army Group intended on the 24th to have Woyrsch's Army attack with its right wing through Rusily-Dmitrowiczy and with the left to make the main effort from Czeremcha through Dolgobrodskozhe. Meanwhile, however, the Russians began to give ground along the line as far as the south wing of 12th German Army. Moreover, Falkenhayn ordered that the attack should proceed only to the western edge of the Bielowiese Forest; then the allies would block the routes leading from the Forest while making an envelopment attack toward the south. Therefore GO Woyrsch told Kövess' Group to advance with its right wing from Rusily to Gorodyszcze and the LW Corps to advance on a broad front to the Policznabach. The latter would later take part in the advance through Dmitrowiczy. By shifting through Gorodyszcze to the southeast, Woyrsch wanted to come behind the enemy units standing in front of Mackensen.

Halted several times by rear guards, Kövess' troops fought their way to the Wierchowiczy area; Bredow's Division and the right wing of König's Corps had already moved in this direction. The other units of Prinz Leopold reached the upper reaches of the

Policzna and Orlanka, where they were in contact with Gallwitz's Army. The path of the enemy retreat could be made out clearly from aerial reports. After crossing the bend in the Narew west of Bialystok, 8th Army was already threatening this rail junction. 10th Army was pushing ahead along its entire line into the Russian's northwest flank.

By the evening of the 25th, Kövess with 16 ID and König with 4 LW ID reached a line running from Januszy to the south, and thus had penetrated the original enemy defensive position east of the railroad to Bialystok. 35 ID and Bredow's Division had been left behind because Woyrsch's front had become so narrow. The German 9th and south wing of 12th Army had meanwhile pushed the defenders' line back considerably toward the large forested area and over the Orlanka.

Operations south and southeast of Brest-Litovsk

On the right wing of Mackensen's Army Group, the portions of the Bug Army east of that river were pushing the II Caucasian and XXIII Russian Corps back to the north and northeast step by step in lively actions. On the 24th there was heavy fighting on the line Zburaz-Boguslawy [Boguslawcy]. On the next day the XXIV Res Corps and 22 ID came up to the Spanowkabach from Miedna to a point east of Rogozna. On the extreme right, 1 ID and XLI Res Corps fought their way ahead to Zburaz and Mielniki.

Meanwhile the 1st Army had captured Kovel on 23 August. As a result, the Russian XXXI Corps and IV Cavalry Corps were in rapid retreat north toward Ratno to link up with the main body of 3rd Army; however, this area was already threatened by the Bug Army. Heydebreck's Cavalry Corps struck the withdrawing enemy on the 24th and 25th - with 11 Hon CD through Bucin along and west of the highway, with German 5 CD through Mielcy. Thus they were approaching the Bug Army, and indeed in the night of 25-26 August were reassigned to that HQ. The k.u.k. 7 CD, formerly of Kövess' Group, had begun moving on the 20th through Cholm to join Heydebreck.

The fall of the fortress

Meanwhile the fate of Brest-Litovsk was being rapidly sealed. After the brief pause in action on the 23rd which was necessary for new artillery preparations, VI Corps opened its attack again on the 24th with full force. 12 ID was able to approach the enemy positions on both sides of Dobryn very slowly, and in part only by toilsome sapping attacks. However, the south wing of 39
Hon ID stormed the trenches northeast of Dobrynka and thrust ahead another 2 kilometers. 25 Res ID of the Beskid Corps was also able to move its lines ahead somewhat. In the night of 24-25 August the defenders - III Caucasian, X and parts of XIV Corps - abandoned their forward field positions opposite Arz's Corps and 43 Res ID.

More than these local successes of the allies, it was the advance of Prinz Leopold's Army Group past the Brest Litovsk-Bialystok line, and perhaps even more the ground gained by the right wing of the Bug Army east of that river, which compelled the Russian leaders to decide to evacuate Brest-Litovsk. If their troops continued to occupy the fortress for several more days, they could easily suffer the same fate as the garrison of Nowogeorgiewsk. The Russians couldn't afford to again suffer such a great loss of prestige, as well as of thousands of soldiers. Since the retreat of Alexeiev's forces north of the Pripyat was in general toward the northeast, on the 25th that general decided to pull back the inner wings of 12th and 1st Armies, which were still posted ahead up to the bend in the Narew at Suraz and threatened with envelopment, back to the shorter line Bialystok-Bielsk. The 2nd and 4th Armies had already fallen back to a line running from east of Bielsk through Januszy to Demianczyczy. 486 3rd Army, which was in an even more precarious situation, was "ordered to hold the Lesna and the road leading to Pruzany, to reinforce its right wing, and to quickly pull back its left." This withdrawal of 3rd Army's left meant that the fortress of Brest-Litovsk would be given up.

Intercepted radio broadcasts had already made the allies fully aware of the Russians' intentions. They knew that the enemy's 4th and 3rd Armies had received orders to move their main bodies back to the line Gajnowka-Stoczok-Soloducha-Wola Zabinka during the night of 25-26 August. Radio traffic also revealed by the 26th that Alexeiev had decided to pull his Armies back in two or three days of marching to the line Grodno-Szereszowo-Kobrin. It was significant that the Russian high command had exhorted their commanders to enforce strict discipline and to address morale problems by harking back to the victories of 1812.

The mission of the Army Groups of Mackensen and Prinz Leopold was now to push forward everywhere with the greatest speed to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. The line of forts

486 According to Nesnamov (Vol IV, p. 98) the withdrawal to the line Bielsk-Demianczyczy was to affect only 4th Army, while 2nd Army pulled back to Bialystok and the area east of Bielsk. According to all other sources, and also to another part of Nesnamov's work (Vol. IV, p. 93) the units involved were the inner wings of 12th and 1st Armies.
around Brest-Litovsk in particular should be stormed soon. The latter task was assigned to the k.u.k. VI Corps. The enemy held strong positions among the permanent works at Kobylany and Koroszczyn, and between these two towns. In the evening of the 25th the Aus-Hung. troops were in position directly in front of the works, which were being pummeled by fire from heavy artillery; great fires were raging in the forts as well as in the city behind them. Explosions were thundering into the air over a wide area. Despite these unmistakable signs that the fortress would soon be evacuated, however, the enemy was still offering stubborn resistance. The regiments of VI Corps made their way through the enemy's barbed wire obstacles, suffering substantial casualties from exploding mines.487 As night fell, the Honveds drove into the work at Kobylany, and farther northeast the 12 ID stormed another fortification. The ring of defenses was broken; the victorious regiments pushed further east during the night. They found that the inner ring of forts had already been blown up and abandoned. At 3:00 AM on the 26th the advanced battalions reached the southern end of the inner defenses, as well as the burning highway bridge over the Bug. A plank bridge was hastily prepared so the troops could cross the river.

The German divisions which bordered the Corps on both sides joined the attack during the 25th. Now they also pushed east into the inner parts of the fortress zone. Parts of XXII Res Corps (43 Res ID) joined VI Corps as they advanced into the citadel and then into the burning city; 119 ID gradually occupied all the works on the north side of the fortifications. Another of the most significant points in the theater of operations had fallen into the hands of the allies. Although the Russians had ruthlessly carried out destruction in the city and fortress, enormous amounts of food supplies and ammunition could still be saved.488

Meanwhile the Beskid Corps thrust over the Bug south of the fortress and moved east between the abandoned forts of its southern front. In the afternoon the Bug Army was ordered to have its left wing pursue along the Brest Litovsk-Kobrin road. The attack was supposed to be powerful enough to keep the enemy in front of the Army's right wing from retreating to the north; instead they would be driven into the forests and swamps farther south. After 12 ID had advanced through all of Brest-Litovsk and 39 Hon ID assembled in front of the Bug bridges, the victorious VI Corps was halted and again placed under 11th Army. The XXII Res and Beskid Corps, however, continued to push east from the

487Arz, p. 90
city; by evening they reached the line Raczki-Szebrin.

The pursuit of the Russians on 26 August

In the forests and swamps south of Brest-Litovsk there was still heavy fighting on the evening of the 25th on the Spanowka and at Zburaz and Mielniki; in the night, however, the Russians also abandoned all their positions here. In a wide-ranging pursuit on the 26th, GEROK's Corps (107 and 11 Bav ID) came up to the line Podlesie-Radwaniczy, 22 ID to Wielikoryta, and XLI Res Corps to Mokrany; 1 ID was now following behind the south wing of the latter corps. On this day Heydebreck's cavalry, while pursuing XXXI Russian Corps, approached the town of Ratno.

Just as in the area of the fortress, the enemy in front of the main body of 11th Army and in front of 4th Army abandoned their positions on the night of 25-26 August. The Guard and X Res Corps pushed east over the Lesna without encountering resistance; by evening they stood alongside XXII Res Corps on the line Rudka-Podlesie-Pruska.

4th Army was also in full pursuit from early in the morning. Parts of 11 ID and of 41 Hon ID crossed the Lesna around noon by Kamieniec-Litovsk, without any opposition from the enemy; then they moved through the burning town and onto the heights lying to the east. In echelon to the left they were followed by 37 Hon ID, 106 Lst ID and the Polish Legion.

Thus 4th Army had reached the goal for which it had been retained in this portion of the battle front. They sent just one brigade each of 41 and 37 Hon ID to establish a bridgehead on the heights west of Pruska; Prinz Leopold's Army Group would continue the pursuit from this position, in cooperation with 11th Army.

Mounted patrols that set out from Kamieniec-Litovsk to the east and southeast didn't find any enemy troops in a radius of 15 km; pilots spotted the Russians marching in thick, jostling groups back to Kobrin and Pruzany. The other parts of 4th Army (the main bodies of VIII and XVII Corps) assembled west of the Lesna; the former would move to Ivangojrod, the latter to Cholm.

North of 4th Army, the foremost divisions of GO Woyrsch could also advance to the east on the 26th; by evening the 16 ID had crossed the Lesna north of Kamieniec-Litovsk, established a firm foothold on the opposite bank, and was in communication with the troops in the bridgehead carved out by 4th Army. König's Corps had likewise reached the river next to the k.u.k. XII Corps, and
were striving to force their way across at Kamieniki.

As instructed, 9th Army was blocking the routes out of the south and west edge of the Bielowiese Forest up to Gajnowka. GdK Frommel had also sent 9 CD toward Gajnowka, so that they could assist the advance of 12th Army along the rail line to Wolkowisk by extending the screen opposite the Forest. 2 CD was still staying by Kleszczeli. Gallwitz had left the Orlanka sector behind him; he was ready to thrust between the rail line to Wolkowisk and the line leading from Bialystok and Grodno to the northeast. 8th Army, facing due east, reached the line Bialystok-Suchalowa. 10th Army held a front of 240 km running from southeast of Augustow through Wilnuszki to Wilkomir, and was watching toward the southeast. To their left, the Niemen Army held an equally long front which stretched in an arc through the area west of Ponedeli-Mitau up to the Gulf of Riga, 30 km in front of that city.

5. Summary of the campaign of summer 1915

The great allied offensive didn't come to an end with the capture of Brest-Litovsk. However, it had reached a very important geographical feature, the west edge of the area called the "Polesie" or Pripyat Marshes. This was a territory of woods and swamps several days' march wide, which now lay in the center of the theater of operations. Before the war both friends and foes agreed that it was impossible to maneuver large bodies of troops in this sector.

Phases of the summer campaign

When they decided in April 1915 to attack at Gorlice, neither Falkenhayn nor Conrad - the former even less than the latter - envisioned an operation on as vast a scale as that which actually lay before the allies. It is true that Conrad was still fully determined to eventually destroy the Russians, but in his memorandum of 7 April he indicated that he believed that a decisive stroke against the Tsar's armies could be achieved only by wide reaching envelopment attacks from the Carpathians and from East Prussia. When he had suggested an attack at Gorlice to GM Cramon a few days earlier, he had in mind just a tactical operation to relieve the pressure on the Carpathian front. From the beginning, Falkenhayn wanted to achieve a greater effect from the breakthrough at Gorlice, but still was aiming for a limited goal, such as for instance the San River. Both Chiefs of Staff had to keep making new and often difficult decisions before the offensive developed to its full potential. The extremely heavy
responsibility which Conrad assumed in the days when Italy was declaring war is just one example of this process.

From the standpoint of the highest leadership, the great campaign fell into two sharply divided phases. In retrospect, the thrust from the Dunajec through Przemysl to Lemberg was the direct strategic result of the breakthrough at Gorlice. One obvious question is whether the success of this offensive might have been even greater if the leaders of the Central Powers had set the recovery of the capital of Galicia as a goal from the start. In this case the reinforcements which were gradually committed by Falkenhayn would have been available earlier. Also efforts would have been initiated more quickly to overcome the difficulty of bringing up supplies, which in this theater was compounded from the start by the destructive measures of the enemy and became more of a burden with every step the armies took further from their initial positions. In the event, the Russian retreat from Mackensen's attacking group was very dangerous and costly, but nonetheless their front was never broken.

At the end of June 1915, the strictly strategic situation was quite similar to that of summer 1914, and thus for the second stage of the campaign the allied leadership was confronted by the same tasks as those which had faced the Aus-Hung. high command the previous year. Therefore the decisions taken - against an enemy already reeling from heavy blows - were similar to those discussed by the Imperial General Staff since the times of FM Hess and advocated by Conrad at the start of the war. It must have given the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff some satisfaction to see that the war was finally taking the course which he had consistently wanted from the outset.

However, as Mackensen's Army Group moved north, the deliberations of the high commands were troubled by the same two basic questions which had bedeviled the initial offensive of the Aus.-Hung. armies in 1914:
. How could the main attack be protected against Russian interference from the east?
. How could the operation of the units coming from Galicia be coordinated with those coming from East Prussia?
Conrad initially addressed the former question at the start of July when he let the armies fighting immediately east and

southeast of Lemberg thrust ahead to the lower Bug and the Zlota Lipa. Then he suggested that Mackensen's further progress toward the north should be covered by a mobile flank-protection force. Falkenhayn, on the other hand, asserted that it was more feasible to construct a network of trenches behind Mackensen's eastern flank and to extend it day by day toward the north.

Meanwhile in the first week of July Mackensen's Army Group was on the line Hrubieszow-Jozefow; thus they had already reached the point at which the attack of the k.u.k. northern army had culminated at the end of August and start of September 1914. At that time the Austrians had been forced to give up their offensive, mainly because of the misfortune suffered by the right wing. Even without this factor, however, the armies of Auffenberg and Dankl could hardly have won a decisive success, because the Germans hadn't attacked over the Narew as Conrad had hoped. His own strength was insufficient to make up for the absence of the Germans.

Now at the start of July 1915, on the other hand, Falkenhayn very willingly adopted Conrad's suggestion that Gallwitz's Army should advance over the Narew; their objective, Siedlec, was one which had long been advocated by Conrad. Hindenburg and Ludendorff strongly objected to this operation, since they wanted to attack farther north in the general direction of Minsk. This difference of opinion about Siedlec versus Vilna, which was settled by the German Emperor in favor of Falkenhayn, deepened the long-standing mistrust between the two German HQ, which was now irreconcilable. For purposes of this study, it is sufficient to note that Conrad continued to advocate setting Siedlec as a goal as long as the Russians were still holding their ground west of the Vistula. After the Russians had retreated over the river, he supported the ideas of Hindenburg and Ludendorff regarding further attacks. At the same time - after the fall of Ivangoord and Warsaw - the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff opposed the plan to have Mackensen just push the Russians east from Siedlec toward Brest-Litovsk. Rather, he preferred to seek a victory of annihilation by attacking in a direction that could menace the enemy's rear. His ideas, however, including a suggestion that Hindenburg's armies should be reinforced as soon as possible, were rejected by Falkenhayn. On 9 August the German Chief of Staff wrote in the margin of a note from his Aus-Hung. colleague in his opinion it was "much less important where the 11th

and Bug Armies break through, as long as they actually manage to break through somewhere."\(^{492}\) In an even more significant statement regarding the basic problems of the war, Falkenhayn wrote four days later, in opposition to Hindenburg, that "We can never hope to destroy the enemy in the current operations in the East...Large-scale destruction in the present instance is not my intention...and has never been my goal. The conditions for such an objective simply don't exist."\(^{493}\)

**Strategic methods of Mackensen's Army Group**

Falkenhayn's premise that it didn't matter where the allies attacked the enemy, as long as they were successful, in a certain sense was also adopted by Mackensen's armies in carrying out the campaign. While one army which was in a tactically favorable situation attacked and pushed ahead, the other parts of the Army Group would hold back until their own hour came again. Thus at the end of June a thrust by 11\(^{th}\) Army, intended as a prelude to a larger scale offensive, forced the Russians opposite 4\(^{th}\) Army to finally retreat behind the broad Tanew valley. Shortly thereafter most of 11\(^{th}\) Army was once again pinned down to guard the flank toward the east, and couldn't renew its offensive until the arrival of expected reinforcements. Therefore it was the turn of 4\(^{th}\) Army to take another step forward; in the ten bloody days of the "II Battle of Krasnik" they drew most of Alexeiev's reserves in their direction. Thus they prepared the way for the next thrust by 11\(^{th}\) Army on their right. The pattern of having different parts of the war machine in motion at different times continued after the new Bug Army entered the line on the side of the two original armies. Eventually this method - basically frontal assaults at fluctuating points of the line - led to a deep penetration of the enemy front.

Surely the method wasn't always the result of the free choice of the leadership, but in many instances was driven by various external circumstances. At the end of June, Mackensen's Chief of Staff GM Seeckt would have preferred to throw substantial units over the Bug and from there to support the advance of the main striking forces with a flank attack! With this plan Seeckt came close to Conrad's idea of creating a mobile force to cover the flank. However, the concept had to be abandoned for various reasons explained above. Mackensen's HQ once again contemplated a major operation east of the Bug when Puhallo's advance over the

---

\(^{492}\)Foerster, p. 139. TRANSLATOR's NOTE - For a more recent analysis of this comment, by an author who consistently espoused Falkenhayn's thinking, see Stone, p. 178.

\(^{493}\)Foerster, p. 140
river was prospering in mid-July. Reports that the Russians were receiving substantial reinforcements between the Vistula and the Bug, and that they were stiffening their resistance on this primary front, once more compelled the Army Group to change its plans, and on 18 July the k.u.k. 1st Army was ordered to halt.

It was only in the middle of August that the situation had developed so far that there was no longer any great danger in attempting a wider penetration toward the east; therefore the Bug Army began to advance east from the river after which they were named. Once again consideration was given to the idea of assembling a stronger attacking force on the right wing for a thrust deep into the mass of Russian troops who were withdrawing in confusion. However, it was considered too risky to make a major effort in the area of swamps and lakes southwest of Wlodawa. The main attack of the Bug Army was directed farther to the left, in the direction of Parczew. Whenever the allies shifted more to the west, they made it easier for the Russians at the last minute to escape the risk of envelopment from which they had so long suffered.

The belief that the Pripyat swamps weren't suitable for the deployment of large bodies of troops was later proven to be false. This wasn't the only reason, however, why the allies eschewed a strategy that might have reaped greater success. Another factor was continuing apprehension that the Russians could assemble forces in their vast territories stretching to the east and unleash them against the flank of our advance.

Logistical problems and casualties

The railroad network in the theater of operations was quite thin considering the size of the area. Moreover the Russians heavily damaged the system as they pulled back, and evacuated the rolling stock. It took a great amount of time to repair the tracks and to change their gauge to the standard central European size. Therefore it was increasingly difficult to bring up supplies. It is amazing that the k.u.k. troops engaged at Brest-Litovsk nonetheless received adequate sustenance although they were 150 km (in a straight line) from their rail heads west of the Vistula.

The military situation made it necessary to stay on the heels of the retreating enemy, despite the difficulty of assembling and supplying large units. It should never be forgotten that as the enormous campaign developed, the greatest demands were made on the troops. A true description was provided by Hermann
Stegemann, a bard of the world struggle whose work "Geschichte des Krieges" remains unsurpassed today: 494

"The campaign had torn deep holes in our ranks. Every day brought bloody casualties, while dysentery and typhus broke out. Corpses of thousands of horses littered the Polish roads and countless supply wagons had been destroyed. The reconstruction of rail lines, roads and bridges cost much time and used up a great amount of expensive equipment which was expended for military purposes in this foreign land. The lines of fighting troops became thinner and thinner as more men were siphoned off to serve on the lines of communication. The soldiers were overworked, tired and insufficiently supplied; they suffered under the brooding sun, from gusty bursts of rain, and from suffocating sand storms."

In the four months of fighting since Gorlice, the Aus-Hung. northern armies had suffered casualties of about 500,000 men (dead, wounded or taken prisoner).

These difficulties and casualties were caused by the fact that the allies didn't conduct a campaign of maneuver. They waged war in rather simple fashion through the forests, sand hills and swamps of Poland and Volhynia. The Russians defended themselves ably. At the start of July the center of the Tsar's armies was still bulging far to the west; the front was then pulled back without breaking, even though subject to heavy blows. The arc in the Russian front gradually became a straight line which finally ran almost due north-south after the fall of Brest-Litovsk. Nevertheless, the Russians since the start of May had lost 100,000 men killed, 500,000 wounded or sick, and at least as many taken prisoner. 495 They also lost 2600 guns, 1950 machine guns and a great amount of military equipment; these losses were particularly hard to bear because for the most part the Russians became dependent on their allies to provide replacements. Human casualties, on the other hand, could still be replaced from an


495 "Russia in the World War 1914/18 in Statistics", prepared by the state Central Statistical Department (in Russian, Moscow, 1925), p. 30. This publication says that 457,288 soldiers were taken prisoner; the allies, however, asserted that the total was 1,007,332. TRANSLATOR's NOTE - The question of Russian casualties in the war is one that will presumably never be resolved. An analysis of the differing sources of evidence regarding prisoners of war is provided by N. Golovin, "The Russian Army in the World War" (London, 1931), pp. 87-92. Golovin's opinion was that the figures provided by the Central Powers were closer to the truth than those appearing in the Soviet statistical studies.
almost inexhaustible pool of reserves. The Russians had also preserved their command and supply apparatus virtually intact, since the armies of the Central Powers had been unable to cut off any large bodies of troops.

The war with Russia goes on

Therefore the problem of winning a war in Russia, which a hundred years earlier had tarnished the military glory of Napoleon, was still a heavy burden on the shoulders of the allied commanders. From May to August, in barely four months, their armies had advanced from Gorlice through Przemysl and Lemberg to Brest-Litovsk. They crossed a battlefield 520 km deep in unparalleled fighting. With 13 armies (120 infantry and 20 cavalry divisions) they pushed back 11 Russian armies (about 125 infantry and 35 cavalry divisions). The movement of these gigantic forces dwarfed Napoleon's Russian campaign, in which the French army did advance twice as far, but was only 500,000 strong (at the outset). The great allied victory ended for the time being any danger of a Muscovite invasion of central Europe. They had also captured wide expanses of Russian territory whose economic wealth could be exploited by the Central Powers, already suffering from the effects of the English blockade.\(^{496}\)

However, these successes, won with considerable sacrifice, in no way had decided the war. Neither the Central Powers nor Russia were willing to give up their claims on Poland; indeed the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were already squabbling about their respective share of the booty. The allies were as far as ever from building a "golden bridge" to negotiate with Russia, about which Conrad had spoke to Burian.

The war in the East continued on its relentless course.

**K. The summer battles against Italy**

1. The 1st Battle of the Isonzo, 23 June to 7 July

The orders of battle for the two sides on 23 June were as follows:\(^{497}\)

\(^{496}\)TRANSLATOR's NOTE - The original refers to a "Hunger-Blockade", which was what contemporary German-speakers normally called the English economic measures.

\(^{497}\)In the original, this material is on Beilage 37. IV Italian Corps was briefly independent rather than under 2\(^{nd}\) Army as of 23 June, but its
Austro-Hungarian 5th Army (84 bns, 13 sqdns, 90 batteries)...
. XV Corps (or Sector I) = 50 ID [3, 8, 15 Mtn Bdes], 1 ID [7 Mtn Bde only]; corps reserve of 3 bns; farther back were March formations of 50 and 1 ID
. XVI Corps (or Sector II) = 18 ID [13 Mtn Bde, 1 Mtn Bde plus 2 bns of 12 Mtn Bde], 58 ID [4, 5 Mtn Bdes]; corps reserve consisted of 2 more bns of 12 Mtn Bde
. HQ of 57 ID (or Sector III, "Goiginger's Group") = 93 Inf Div, 2 & 6 Mtn Bdes; 185 Inf Bde in reserve
. 94 ID (or Sector IV) on coast defense southeast of the battlefield
. Army reserves = Half of 44 LW ID; March units of 18, 48 and 58 ID (which soon became 16 March Bde)

Italians
. 2nd Army (160 bns, 21 sqdns, 136 batteries) = IV Corps (Bersaglieri Div; Alpini Groups A and B; 8 and 7 ID), II Corps (33, 32, 3 ID), VI Corps (4, 11, 12 ID plus 22 ID in reserve); 29 ID was arriving in Army reserve
. 3rd Army (65 bns, 90 sqdns, 76 batteries) = XI Corps (21 ID only), X Corps (19 ID in line, 20 ID in reserve), VII Corps (14, 13 ID); Cav Corps (2 & 3 CD), independent 1 CD
. Reserves under supreme command = XIV Corps (27, 28 ID).

a. Artillery preparation and scouting actions, 23-29 June

After the Italian army completed their initial deployment, and their divisions had moved up to the Aus-Hung. Isonzo front, General Cadorna finally ordered on 21 June (a month after the declaration of war) that his two right-wing armies should open a decisive attack. Under 3rd Army on 23 June, the VII Corps and the newly arrived X Corps should "thrust to the edge of the plateau [of Doberdo] between Monfalcone and Sagrado." The Army's XI Corps (without 22 ID) should just demonstrate between Sagrado and the mouth of the Wippach. Under 2nd Army, the VI Corps was given the Görz bridgehead as its goal; it would be supported by 22 ID from XI Corps. The II Corps should cross the Isonzo and take Kuk Heights # 611. 29 ID of VIII Corps was assigned as a reserve to 2nd Army. XIV Corps (27 and 28 ID) was in the supreme command's reserve, and held in readiness between Cormons and Medea.498 In the north, the independent IV Corps would attack the fortifications of Tolmein.499

498 Italian official history, Vol. II, Documents, p. 177
499 Tosti, p. 73. Zingales, pp. 231 ff. It isn't possible to determine from
23 June

Despite their numerical preponderance, the Italians didn't plan to capture the Austrian positions with a quick attack. They envisioned a slow and methodical operation accompanied by a heavy bombardment. Accordingly the Italian guns first began to fire on the 23rd. Their fire started against the edge of the Doberdo plateau in early morning, and was extended to the Görz bridgehead around noon. However, the Italians had no idea how to concentrate a destructive bombardment on the points selected for the infantry advance. Instead they covered the entire defensive position with a rain of shells which achieved very little considering the amount of ammunition expended.

To analyze the effectiveness of their bombardment, the Italians undertook small-scale thrusts at several points along the Doberdo heights as the sun went down on the 23rd. All were repulsed, even by small detachments which were stationed in front of the main defensive position - for example by an infantry platoon at the church of Porto Rosega and by a company which had been pushed ahead toward Sagrado and Sdraussina. The two last-named towns had been held against all Italian attempts to cross the river since 9 June; now, however, the defending detachment was pulled back to the main position so as no longer to endanger its troops. Therefore in the night of 23-24 June the 21 Italian ID of XI Corps was able to establish themselves on the edge of the heights between Sagrado and Palazzo. 22 ID of the same Corps occupied the river bank farther northeast, between the mouth of the Wippach and Lucinico.

HQ of 2nd Italian Army sent VI Corps (11, 12 and 4 ID) into a frontal attack on the Görz bridgehead; their II Corps (3 and 33 DI) was supposed to advance from Plava over Kuk # 611 against the Mt Santo monastery and thus reach the rear of the defenders of Görz from the north.\textsuperscript{500} Since the advance was to be methodical, initially just one brigade apiece from the three divisions of VI Corps attacked the Podgora-Pevma-Oslavija front; their efforts on the first day were ineffective. At Plava, a brigade from 33 ID attacked eight times, but couldn't gain an inch of ground on Heights # 383 from the defenders, a battalion of 1 Mtn Bde.

IV Italian Corps restricted their activity to a useless

\textsuperscript{500}Zingales, pp. 231 ff.
bombardment of the positions of the k.u.k. XV Corps.

Based on the events of the first day, GdI Boroevic got the impression that the Italians were preparing a massive attack on Sector III (Goiginger's Group) and took immediate measures to have reinforcements available in this area. Most of 187 Inf Bde (from 94 ID) was quickly moved to Mavhinje and Sistiana. From the March units of XVI Corps (18, 48 and 58 ID) a new 16 March Bde was created under Col. Mitlacher\textsuperscript{501}; this Brigade, with three regiments, was sent to Merna. Both 187 Inf and 16 March Bdes were placed under FML Goiginger. Behind the Görz sector, which was also endangered, there were just ten reserve battalions (11 Mtn Bde from 48 ID and 44 LW ID).

It was fortunate that thus far the Italian fire was relatively ineffective, since it was impossible to use artillery in anywhere near the same strength for counter-battery work. The defenders lacked heavy long-range guns in particular. Only two 30.5 cm mortars which had been moved to the foremost lines were able to reach the Italian heavy batteries. Cadorna himself, however, felt that his own heavy artillery was insufficient to suppress the "formidable" Austrian positions.\textsuperscript{502}

Artillery action continues

The unsatisfactory result of the Italian artillery fire on the first day of the battle compelled the enemy commanders to continue firing on the following days. Many times the bombardment was accompanied by small-scale infantry thrusts. These attacks, however, didn't resemble decisive storming attempts, but apparently were designed only to reconnoiter, to interfere with attempts to rebuild damaged positions, and to win a few areas that would serve as jumping-off points for the future main offensive. The actions in the last week of June involved mainly three areas: the edge of the plateau between Monfalcone and Sdraussina, the Görz bridgehead, and Plava. Both sides restricted their activity in the intervening areas to observation. The defenders of the Tolmein bridgehead and of the positions on the heights next to the Krn also enjoyed relative peace until the end of the month.

On the Karst plateau, two battalions of the Italian 19 ID attempted on the 24\textsuperscript{th} to take the walled farm of Castello (half way between Ruins # 143 and Sagrado) in a surprise attack from

\textsuperscript{501}Col. Mitlacher had been commander of 60 Mtn Bde, whose troops never actually assembled.

\textsuperscript{502}Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, p. 118
Polazzo; they were repulsed. Once again the Italians attempted to build a military bridge at Sagrado, but it was shot up. Finally they were able to send a substantial infantry force over the river by making some repairs to the destroyed permanent bridge. Then the Duke of Aosta was able to order XI Corps and the north wing of X Corps to attack Mt S Michele; the first objective, however, was Ruins # 143. The main body of X Corps were supposed to take Heights # 118.

On the next four days, the attacking Italian groups cautiously moved closer to the Austrian positions under the encouraging protection of artillery fire; the defenders' works suffered significant damage from the bombardment. The enemy directed their fire not only against the edge of the heights between Point # 121 and Sdraussina, but also on the assembly areas farther behind the front; however, this didn't have much effect on the reserve troops because there many places on the plateau where they could take shelter. The artillery continued to fire during the night, which hampered the work of repairing damaged defenses, possible only after darkness fell. On 26 June, FML Goiginger got the impression that the Italians were about to launch a massive assault. To meet this threat, during each night he stationed a regiment of 16 March Bde at the fork in the road southwest of Merna; because of torment from lack of water in this area, however, the regiment had to march back to the Wippach during the day. The battalions in the foremost battle line declined an offer to be relieved, since they wished to take part in the defense against the eagerly anticipated Italian attack. Therefore the only change to the troop disposition was to bring some order to units which had become intermingled; June 28 was a rainy and therefore somewhat quiet day, which simplified the task.

The Italian artillery fire swelled powerfully on the 29th, and struck with particular strength on the area west of Mt S Michele, then on the heights directly east and north of Monfalcone. HQ of Sector III became increasingly concerned; they now placed two battalions from 185 Inf Bde and a March Regiment under GM Boog and a second March Regiment under GM Lukachich. These troops were moved up closer to the front lines.

On the 24th the Italians had also continued to bombard Görz and the field works covering its bridgehead; they heavily damaged the positions, and put the monastery of Mt Santo on fire. Clearly marked hospitals were also targets of a rain of shells. In the evening and the night the enemy thrust against the Podgora ridge, covered with vineyards and acacia bushes; their attack was
shattered by the gallant and unyielding defenders. This pattern of bombardment by day and infantry probes by night continued until 29 June. Gradually the Italians were moving closer to our positions, and the danger of a mass offensive increased. Therefore in the evening of the 24th GdI Boroevic had already authorized XVI Corps HQ to call up 11 Mtn Bde, stationed east of Görz in the Army's reserve, if necessary.

One brigade apiece of 3 and 33 ID attacked at Plava on the 24th. They were trying to envelop the defenders of Heights # 383 from the north, but were driven back to their starting point after suffering murderous losses, particularly among the officers.\textsuperscript{503} II Italian Corps experienced the same fate when they renewed the attack amid heavy rain on the next day. The Italians made a feeble attempt on the 26th, but once again were beaten back by the hard-fighting 1 Mtn Bde.

**Plans and prospects of the defenders**

Until now the gallant fighters of 5th Army had been able to restrict the enemy's gains to an extremely small amount of territory. Army HQ, however, was quite aware that the decisive attack was yet to come, and that it would have to be met with a heavily outnumbered force. XV Corps (Sector I) with its 20 battalions was facing the 60 battalions of IV Italian Corps, which had been reinforced by Alpini and Bersaglieri. However, the mountainous character of the terrain in this area canceled much of the enemy's otherwise overwhelming numerical advantage. XVI Corps (Sector II) had 26 battalions; GdI Boroevic estimated that the opposing II and VI Italian Corps, including some mobile militia brigades, had 80 battalions. The defenders of the Karst plateau (Sector III) with 40 battalions were facing about 75 battalions under XI, X and VII Italian Corps. These figures don't include the two enemy cavalry divisions which had already been identified on the Isonzo and some of the supreme HQ reserves. Therefore both Sectors II and III needed additional men. All GdI Boroevic had available as reserves, however, were three more March battalions at Merna, four battalions and six batteries of 48 ID (which had already been promised to XVI Corps) southeast of Görz, and 44 LW ID which had just five battalions.

The last-named division wouldn't be under Boroevic's command much longer. The unfortunate result of the fighting on the Krn had just made it clear that the troops and commanders of 20 Hon ID weren't ready for warfare in the high mountains; they had insufficient training and equipment, and their personnel from the

\textsuperscript{503}Tosti, p. 74
Hungarian plains had no experience of the high lands. Therefore on 24 June GdK Rohr suggested to Southwest Front HQ that this Honved division should be exchanged for a unit with mountain experience. This forced Archduke Eugene to the difficult decision that the only such unit available, 44 LW ID, would have to move from the reserves of 5th Army. Although it was correctly assumed that heavier fighting would open in a few days, the troops were exchanged between the two threatened fronts - the Isonzo and Carinthia - in groups. On 28 June the 44 LW ID was sent to Carinthia, shortly after the first 4 ½ battalions and 5 batteries from VII Corps arrived in Dornberg.

For the moment, therefore, Boroevic had just 10 ½ battalions and 11 batteries in the Army's reserve, although he held a land front of 80 km and was also responsible for the 30 km long stretch of coast between Duino and Rovigno. He couldn't take his eyes off the latter area; the location of some of the Italian reserve units was unknown, and it was still possible that the enemy would make an amphibious landing on the defenders' flank.

The Italians had a 2:1 advantage in infantry, and an even greater advantage in artillery. Intelligence estimated that the 300 light and 54 heavy guns of 5th Army were opposed by 600 field and 100 heavy pieces; actually the Italians' strength was underestimated by about 50 field guns and several pieces of heavy artillery.

More encouraging was the fact that casualties had been relatively light thus far. From 23 to 29 June, Sectors II and III lost a total of about 300 dead and a little more that 1000 wounded.

b. The decisive days of the battle, 30 June to 7 July

After the seven days of bombardment - which for this period of the war was an unprecedented length - the Italian 3rd and 2nd Armies launched their main attack on 30 June. 3rd Army sent VII Corps against the southwest edge of the Karst plateau and X Corps toward Mt S Michele; XI Corps apparently was restricted to holding actions. Under 2nd Army opposite the Görz bridgehead, a key role was assigned to 33 ID; it would advance from Plava over the Kuk toward Mt Santo. Since Cadorna was no longer concerned about an Austrian attack from Tyrol, he moved more of his reserves to Friauli; 29 ID, formerly in VIII Corps, joined VI Corps to reinforce its southern wing.

504Zingales, p. 233
30 June to 2 July

Despite the large forces on the scene, the Italian VI Corps made only weak infantry attacks against Mt Sabotino and the Podgora Heights on the 30th. However, there was heavy fighting along the Karst plateau. During a rain storm the preceding night, 19 ID had mounted an unsuccessful surprise attack at Redipuglia; in the morning the artillery fire mounted to an extraordinary intensity. The defenders' forward position at the foot of the heights east of Sdraussina were rendered untenable and had to be evacuated. The main position running to the southwest as far as Ruins # 143, held by the left wing of GM Boog's 93 ID, was completely smashed; its decimated defenders pulled back 200 to 300 paces to the east to a new position on the open plateau. Fortunately the enemy artillery didn't seriously strike this makeshift line. Farther south, GM Lukachich's 2 Mtn Bde was attacked in the afternoon, first by isolated battalions and then by the entire Italian 20 ID which had been reinforced by a Bersaglieri regiment. However, the strength of the enemy main body was already considerably reduced by the time they reached the obstacles; some detachments tried to push down the Selz-Doberdo road, but were thrown back by a brilliant counterattack by three Austrian battalions. 13 ID tried to send a regiment against Height # 121, but the action ended in fiasco; only one wretched battalion actually advanced against the right wing of Col von Hellebronth's 6 Mtn Bde, and was beaten.

In the first two days of July, the Italians opened a gradually increasing fire against the Tolmein bridgehead, and lively troop movements were observed in this sector. Although activity declined near Görz, the Duke of Aosta wasn't letting up along the Karst plateau. From the earliest morning hours on both days, the enemy artillery pounded this entire area with shells to prepare for an infantry attack toward evening. On 1 July, about three regiments of X Italian Corps attempted in vain to advance between Redipuglia and Polazzo; on the next day, seven or eight regiments of the same Corps attacked the Selz-Sagrado sector at 5:00 PM, but the offensive broke down into several local actions. Finally the battalions of Generals Boog and Lukachich drove the enemy back with fire and counterattacks to the foot of the heights. Only by Redipuglia were the Italians able by bringing up reinforcements to establish themselves about 300 paces in front of the defenders' obstacles.

These successes greatly increased the confidence of the troops, but it was also obvious that they were very tired. The battalion commanders understandably wanted their units to be relieved.
However GdI Boroevic, who had already placed the third regiment of 16 March Bde at the disposal of Sector III, wasn't willing to give up his last reserves for this purpose until the situation was further clarified. (The reserves in question were four and a half battalions of VII Corps plus four battalions east of Görz.)

3-4 July

After these setbacks, the Italian leadership realized that they couldn't capture the Karst plateau with their current disposition. Therefore on the evening of 2 July the Duke of Aosta ordered that XI Corps should join the attacks by striking toward Mt S Michele.\footnote{Tosti, pp. 78 ff.} On 3 July more than two divisions of X and XI Corps stormed the inner wings of the sectors led by Generals Boog and Lukachich. About three regiments launched a massive thrust at Redipuglia; after a furious struggle one of them broke into the Austrian position. However, Col. Mitlacher, commanding the right wing of GM Lukachich's group, quickly assembled five battalions and threw the enemy not only out of the position, but also far over the edge of the plateau.\footnote{Tosti, p. 79. Zingales, p. 233} King Victor Emanuel II had come up from his headquarters at Udine to Turriaco and was watching the action from a church tower; he witnessed the misfortune of his troops.\footnote{Tosti, p. 79} Because of the seriousness of the situation on the Karst, GdI Boroevic dipped into his sparse reserves; he sent the available 4 ½ battalions of VII Corps to FML Goiginger, who in turn ordered them to GM Lukachich's central sector.

On 3 July action also increased on the northern wing of the Isonzo front. IV Italian Corps, which had been making preparations since 30 June, began to attack. They wanted to complete the conquest of the Krn massif by taking the ridge leading through the Mrzli vrh to Tolmein as well as the two hills near the bend in the Isonzo south of Tolmein, which made up the key to the Austrian bridgehead west of the river.\footnote{Tosti, p. 79. Zingales, p. 233} Alpini companies from Krn started to advance early in the day, but were defeated in a hand-to-hand action by the Croats of Bn IV/53; the 8 ID, which joined the offensive farther south as far as the Mrzli vrh, was stopped cold before it was within 1000 paces of the outlying obstacles. The Alpini tried again in the Krn sector on 4 July, but were repulsed by hand grenades and thrown stones.

\footnote{Tosti, pp. 78 ff.}
\footnote{In these actions, Captain Stephan Inselt von Gölle, commander of III Battalion of IR # 38, was distinguished by personal bravery and decisive leadership; he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria-Theresia Order.}
\footnote{Tosti, p. 79}
South of Tolmein the 7 ID, reinforced by Bersaglieri, tried its luck, but was repulsed with heavy casualties. Now IV Italian Corps canceled its offensive, which had hardly gotten off the ground.

Meanwhile the fighting raged on at the Karst plateau on 4 July. Strong Italian units in deep formations attacked between Sdraussina and Selz at 2:00 PM. The first blow was struck by 21 ID of XI Corps toward Mt S Michele. After two hours of bitter fighting they were hurled back by Boog's troops. Farther south the 31 ID of XIII Corps had already reinforced the badly reduced ranks of X Corps; 14 ID and parts of 13 ID were also engaged. The fighting in this area centered on Redipuglia and Selz; after strenuous efforts the last Italian troops who'd entered our positions were thrown out. Several completely destroyed stretches of the front which were hopelessly exposed to Italian artillery fire had to be abandoned; a new line was held 100 to 200 paces behind them.

Despite the heavy losses and exhaustion of Goiginger's troops, GdI Boroevic was still reluctant to release his last reserves (four battalions of 48 ID) to the Karst. However, he expected that on 6 July he would gain two more battalions of VII Corps plus the first troops of 10 Mtn Bde (from 61 ID), which the high command was sending from the Balkan front.

5 July - the battle's climax

Although the fighting at Tolmein died down, all hell now broke loose on the central Isonzo while on the lower river the unbroken attacks against the plateau of Doberdo continued. VI Corps was ordered to mount a decisive attack toward Görz. One brigade of 3 ID attacked Mt Sabotino; 4 ID struck at Oslavija and Pevma; 11 and 12 ID were supposed to overrun the Podgora Heights, while 21 ID from the south took the fortified bridge at Lucinico. However, the Italian infantry moved hesitantly, in poor order, and without elan; in many cases they had to be driven forward by blows from their officers. Therefore the 8 ½ battalions defending the bridgehead, though outnumbered 6:1, broke the Italian attack and inflicted heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{509} HQ of 58 ID estimated that the enemy lost about 4000 men; their own casualties were 65 dead and 650 wounded.

The battle reached its climax in the actions on the Karst plateau

\textsuperscript{509}On 5 July the Aus-Hung. radio stations intercepted an Italian broadcast in which Cadorna strongly reproached 2\textsuperscript{nd} Army for its failure to support 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army's attack against the Karst plateau.
on 5 July. After several thrusts the night before, the Italian X Corps (reinforced by half of 22 ID from XI Corps) had already pushed back the northern wing of GM Lukachich's group at 8:00 AM. The situation at Redipuglia, however, was restored after the arrival of Hon IR "Szekesfehervar" # 17 of VII Corps. At Polazzo the IR # 46 intervened to help, although the attack wasn't finally halted - with heavy losses - until evening. The defenders also were at the end of their strength; most battalions had been reduced to half or often even a third of their authorized size. The reports of FML Goiginger caused GdI Boroevic even more concern, because Italian deserters revealed that 28 ID had arrived at Cormons and two other divisions at Villa Vicentina. Aerial scouts confirmed that camps had been established for new units in both these towns. Therefore it was anticipated that the Italian offensive would continue. Boroevic decided to reinforce Sector III with the HQ of 12 Mtn Bde, five battalions of 48 ID, and the newly arrived Hon IR # 1 (with two battalions, from VII Corps). He hoped to weather the new storm with the help of these troops, 10 Mtn Bde, and also 14 Mtn Bde which had been called up from Pola. The first troops of the latter Brigade reached 5th Army's sector during the 6th.

The battle dies out

However, the 1st Battle of the Isonzo had essentially been won with the collapse of the Italian attack on the 5th. Although new fighting broke out in several places in the next few days, it was not nearly as intense as during 5 July. Thus three Alpini battalions attempted on the 6th to advance in the Krn sector, but were repulsed again by the well-tried defenders of the heights; our troops here were now enjoying effective artillery support from 44 LW ID, which had already arrived at Flitsch. At Görz the VI Italian Corps showed little inclination to renew the offensive which had already cost it so many casualties for no purpose. There were only a few unsuccessful thrusts against the south wing of the bridgehead by 12 ID on the 6th and by 29 ID on the next day. Although 3rd Italian Army had brought several new units up to the front, they also showed little inclination to attack. In the evenings of 6 and 7 July the 21 ID thrust at Sdraussina, Polazzo and Redipuglia, but these were the only Italian efforts directed against the Karst plateau.

In the night of 7-8 July, while the entire Isonzo front was completely quiet, measures began in Sector III to relieve the front-line units. This had been planned since the 5th, but couldn't be carried out until the situation was completely stable. First the 14 Mtn Bde and then the available parts of VII
Corps were placed in line.

On 5 July the high command had already approved the transfer of the second brigade of 61 ID (16 Hon Mtn Bde) and the Division HQ from Slavonia to the Isonzo; for security service on the Sava, this force was replaced by the newly-formed k.u. 19 Lst Mtn Bde of five battalions. By moving 61 ID from the Balkans the AOK reduced its mobile troops there by a third; however, they were willing to take this risk because of the great importance of ensuring the defeat of the Italians. At this time they didn't want to weaken the Russian front, where the allies were embarked on a victorious offensive. Meanwhile the HQ of Southwest Front answered the request of 5th Army HQ for a cohesive unit to defend its south wing (the Karst plateau) by approving the concentration of all of VII Corps in that area. The exchange of 44 LW ID for 20 Hon ID had already been completed; on 10 July it was followed by the exchange (in installments) of 48 for 17 ID.

**Situation at the end of the battle**

When the battle died down, there were eight Aus-Hung. divisions stationed between Krn and the Adriatic; they had 92 battalions, 300 field and 56 heavy guns. They were opposed by the equivalent of eighteen Italian divisions (including Alpini and Bersaglieri) with 225 battalions and about 700 guns. (The figures for both sides don't include army-level reserves behind the fronts.) The Italians had gained almost no ground in the two weeks of fighting: they now occupied the westernmost outlying features of the Karst plateau between Sagrado and Ruins # 143 and had footholds on the heights at Redipuglia, Vermegliano and Selz. This had at least given them some room to deploy batteries from which they could now also fire against Mt San Michele from the south. The ground had been won at a heavy cost, for the Italians had lost 1916 dead, 11,495 wounded and 1536 missing or taken prisoner.\(^{510}\) The k.u.k. 5th Army lost 8800 men dead or wounded, and 1150 were missing.\(^{511}\)

It's noteworthy that the Italians considerably modified their operational plans during June and the first week of July. Originally they intended to capture the Bainsizza plateau; because it proved impossible to cross the upper and middle

---

\(^{510}\) Italian official history, Text, Vol. II, p. 225. The casualties amounted to 5.95% of the total strength of 2nd and 3rd Italian Armies.

\(^{511}\) Sector I had 850 casualties (dead, wounded and missing), Sector II had 2300, Sector III had 6800. From 29 June to 5 July ammunition was expended as follows - Sector I fired 240,000 bullets and 3100 artillery rounds; Sector II fired 410,000 bullets and 10,840 rounds; Sector III fired 1,800,000 bullets and 40,100 rounds.
Isonzo, however, they gradually shifted their main effort toward the south. Finally - in a complete reversal of the original concept - the principal attack was launched against the Doberdo plateau. Cadorna later admitted with resignation in his memoirs that the failure to immediately occupy the upper Idria valley had made it impossible to quickly advance into the Laibach basin without meeting major resistance.\(^{512}\)

The k.u.k. 5\(^{th}\) Army had won a tactical victory, and their morale was considerably enhanced after they were able to retain almost the entire position during the battle. Since the first bold attempt had succeeded in halting the much larger enemy forces near the border, confidence was growing in our ability to withstand further attacks. This was the foundation for all the later battles which broke out on the Isonzo in the next 18 months. The defensive victory in the Ist Battle of the Isonzo also raised the general prestige and standing of the Aus-Hung. armed forces and of the Monarchy as a whole. The increased confidence of the military leaders in the battle zone was reflected by the fact that they ceased work on construction of fall-back positions 10 to 16 km west of the upper Sava. The workers were transferred from this area to the current foremost lines.

These additional laborers were of course welcomed by the front-line units. However, the deficiencies of the defensive position couldn't be fully overcome in the short time before the next battle opened. In Sector I the rocky soil of the mountains was the chief obstacle to construction; in Sector II (XVI Corps) the great length of the front prevented rapid completion of the task. The most difficult situation was that of Sector III (Doberdo plateau), where the naked stone resisted attempts to build trenches and secure dug-outs. The troops here were also tormented by lack of water; four more months would pass before the Army's support services were able to construct sufficient water pipes.

2. The II Battle of the Isonzo, 18 July to 10 August

a. Preparation of the units and initial actions on the high Karst plateau and in front of Görz, 18-19 July

After the Ist Battle died down, the Italians allowed the

\(^{512}\)Cadorna, "La Guerra", Vol. I, p. 124
defenders of the Isonzo front a rest period of just two weeks. Then they moved forward again to the attack.

The Austrian preparations

Correctly anticipating that there would soon be another enemy attack, the Aus-Hung. commanders hastened to bring up reinforcements for 5th Army and began to relieve units as necessary. The organization of XV Corps wasn't altered. In XVI Corps, the 10 Mtn Bde of 61 ID (which arrived from Syrmia) was deployed in the northern part of the Görz bridgehead. Although 12 Mtn Bde of 48 ID had been ordered to move to Carinthia, it was still in reserve south of Görz when the II Battle began. On the Karst plateau, VII Corps HQ took over Sector III on 10 July. They had 20 Hon ID on the right wing, 61 ID [14 Mtn and 16 Hon Mtn Bdes] in the center, and 57 ID [6 Mtn Bde plus 187 Inf Bde of 94 ID] on the left wing. 2 Mtn Bde of 57 ID and the 17 ID - which was still arriving - made up the Corps' reserve. 93 and 94 ID were reorganized. 93 ID was placed in the Army's reserve in the Wippach valley and received 8 ½ of the more battle-ready March battalions. 94 ID, consisting of Landsturm and coast defense detachments, was responsible for watching the coast.

When 17 ID arrived, GdI Boroevic wanted to place it in the front instead of 61 ID; he'd shift the 61st (along with just its 16 Lst Mtn Bde)513 to XVI Corps where it could join its other organic unit, 10 Mtn Bde. 14 Mtn Bde would become the reserve unit of VII Corps. The necessary orders for these changes were issued on 16 July, but the Italian attack opened before they could be implemented.

On 18 July the 5th Army (not counting 12 Mtn Bde, which was about to be sent to Carinthia, the arriving 17 ID, or the various March and coast defense formations) consisted of 105 battalions (103,000 riflemen and 236 machine guns), plus 1850 cavalry and 431 guns. The order of battle was:

. XV Corps = 50 ID [3, 8 Mtn Bdes], 1 ID [15, 7 Mtn Bdes]
. XVI Corps = 18 ID [13, 1 Mtn Bdes], 58 ID [10, 4, 5 Mtn Bdes]; in reserve were 12 Mtn and 16 March Bdes
. VII Corps = 20 Hon ID [39, 81 Bdes], 61 ID [14, 16 Mtn Bdes], 57 ID [5 Mtn, 187 Inf Bdes]; in reserve were 2 Mtn Bde and the arriving 17 ID
. Directly under Army HQ = 94 ID (or Sector IV, coast defense), 93 ID.

513Since 1 Hon Mtn Bde consisted solely of Hungarian Landsturm troops, from this point it was designated the k.u. 16 Lst Mtn Bde.
The Italian preparations

Cadorna planned to renew his offensive with the main blow against the Karst plateau, especially toward Mt S Michele and the Heights # 118 (Mt dei sei Busi). After the capture of both these corner stones of the Karst position the next step would be to take the Görz bridgehead. Cadorna's order of 15 July gave the first assignment to 3rd Army. Meanwhile the 2nd Army was supposed to pin down the enemy between Plava and the mouth of the Wippach by attacking; in particular they were to prevent the Austrians from transferring any artillery to the Karst.

The 3rd Italian Army HQ in turn issued orders to implement these directives. The main effort would be the capture of Mt S Michele and the village of San Martino lying to its southwest; XI Corps would attack with 19 and 21 ID in the first line, 22 ID in the second. The southern bulwark, Mt dei sei Busi, was the target of VII Corps (13 and 14 ID); to support this effort, 27 ID was placed behind the Corps in the Army's reserve. Between the two groups making these attacks was X Corps which consisted of just one division (20 ID); they would advance in step with their neighboring corps. The 1, 2 and 3 CD were used partly on coast defense, and partly in the Army's reserve between the Sdobba and the Aussa.

2nd Army HQ ordered VI Corps (12, 11 and 4 ID) to carry out a methodical advance to capture the Görz bridgehead; II Corps (3 and 32 ID), stationed in front of Plava and Canale, was given a free hand to attack as they chose. IV Corps had already been preparing for several days to envelop the Tolmein bridgehead from the north. In accordance with instructions from Cadorna, half of 29 ID was deployed on the Isonzo south of Lucinico; they would pretend to cross the river while connecting the inner wings of 3rd and 2nd Armies. The other half of 29 ID and all of 23 ID, stationed northwest of Cormons, made up 2nd Army's reserve.

XIV Corps (28 and 30 ID) was the reserve unit of the high command, and was stationed behind the middle of 3rd Army. Finally, a considerable amount of heavy artillery was concentrated for 3rd Army and VI Corps.

Thus the Italian order of battle on 18 July was:

- 2nd Army = IV Corps (Bersaglieri Div, Alpini Groups A and B, 8 and 7 ID; 33 ID in reserve), II Corps (32, 3 ID), VI Corps (4, 11, 12 ID); half of 29 ID was on the right, directly under Army

---

HQ; the other half of 29 ID and all of 23 ID were in reserve.
3rd Army = XI Corps (21 and 19 ID in line, 22 ID in reserve), X
Corps (20 ID only), VII Corps (13, 14 ID); in Army reserve were
27 ID and 1, 2 & 3 CD
Supreme HQ reserve = XIV Corps (29, 30 ID).

18 July
The plans of the commander of 3rd Army, the Duke of Aosta, were
completely consistent with those of the Commando Supremo. Aosta
first wanted to gain a deployment area on the edge of the heights
between the Isonzo northeast of Sdraussina and the Karst hill
# 118, which would be his base for the envelopment attack against
the flat summit of Mt S Michele. The initial operation was a
powerful artillery bombardment, which included numerous heavy
batteries, to prepare the way for the infantry onslaught.
Therefore the battle opened on 18 July with a massive fire on the
entire Karst plateau. At the same time the 2nd Army fired its
guns on the southern and central part of the Görz bridgehead;
only a moderate bombardment, dampened by a heavy storm, was
directed against XV Corps.

The artillery fire on the positions of 61 ID and 20 Hon ID on the
plateau of Doberdo opened around 4:00 AM and increased to its
greatest intensity around noon. The defenders of the foremost
line suffered significant casualties and their positions, mostly
constructed only of piled stones, were severely damaged.

Unlike the Ist Battle of the Isonzo, in which the disjointed
Italian artillery preparation lasted several days, in this
engagement their 14 ID was attacking already around 11:00 AM on
18 July, the XI Corps around 1:00 PM and 20 ID around 2:00 PM.
These thrusts soon developed into a series of bloody hand-to-hand
actions, often settled by the bayonet. The result was that only
in one sector – held by two companies of 20 Hon ID east of
Sdraussina – were the defenders pushed back about 200 paces. The
Italians repeatedly attacked all along the line until darkness
fell, but couldn't alter the situation; 33 Inf Bde of 17 ID
joined 20 Hon ID in fending off these attacks. 2 Mtn Bde
deployed behind 14 Mtn Bde, because the casualties of the
brigades at the front were substantial. The Hungarian Landsturm
regiments of 16 Lst Mtn Bde had particularly heavy losses.515

The attacks on the Görz bridgehead and the positions east of
Plava were merely demonstrations; they were easily repulsed.

515The Italian official history (Vol. II, Text, p. 239) claims that on 18 July
the 3rd Army took 2500 prisoners, and only had 1000 casualties itself.
The day's events gave the k.u.k. 5th Army HQ the impression that the operation already in progress against Sectors II and III was only beginning, and that it would be reinforced by reserves moving nearer to the battle. The only reserves available to GdI Boroevic's Army HQ, on the other hand, were the weak 93 ID plus 12 Mtn Bde. (The AOK had allowed him to retain the latter unit.)

19 July

At daybreak on 19 July the VII Italian Corps thrust along the Vermegliano-Doberdo road and quickly gained ground. Reserves of 61 ID and detachments brought quickly up from 6 Mtn Bde farther south were finally able to halt the enemy at 8:00 AM. The northern sector of the plateau lay under the iron hail of the overpowering Italian artillery from the early morning; in this area the right wing of XI Italian Corps (reinforced by half of 22 ID) and X Corps began to advance at 4:00 PM. This attack was shattered; only a small stretch of trench near Ruins # 143 remained in the enemy's hands. As the sun went down, the VII Italian Corps also sought to break through toward Doberdo with several successive stubborn assaults. They were all in vain; as each thrust collapsed, the accurate artillery of 61 ID cut bloody furrows in the ranks of the Italians as they streamed back.

The Görz bridgehead was also threatened by a serious attack on the 19th. After a heavy bombardment, the VI Corps stormed ahead with three divisions. The bitter fighting lasted until 4:00 PM before the last Italians were thrown out of the badly damaged obstacle zone. The offensive was resumed at 5:00 PM and suffered the same fate. The feint attacks launched by II Italian Corps on the deep slopes of the Isonzo valley were easily repulsed by 1 Mtn Bde.

In the two days of fighting the Italians had gained no ground from the k.u.k. XVI Corps, and only a little from Archduke Joseph's VII Corps. The latter command, however, had suffered shockingly high losses - about 5500 dead, wounded and missing. 20 Hon ID had been hit the hardest, even though its northern wing had enjoyed relative quiet on the second day of the battle. The Division had entered the action on the 18th with 6000 riflemen, but had been reduced to no more than 2000 emotionally-drained men. To enable VII Corps to continue its resistance, 5th Army HQ didn't hesitate to give them 93 ID, which the Archduke brought up to the area between Doberdo and San Martino. GM Boog, the commander of the 93rd, had already taken over the sector between the Wippach and Polazzo; he intended to pull 81 Hon Inf Bde,
which was particularly in need of rest, out of the fighting as soon as possible.

The AOK was also greatly concerned about the unusually high casualties of VII Corps. If the same pattern persisted for the rest of the battle, whose high point still hadn't been reached, success would be doubtful. The high command, however, was counting on the defensive front on the Isonzo to provide strategic cover for the decisive battles then unfolding in front of Ivangorod, Lublin and Cholm. The offensive against Russia couldn't continue if it was weakened by removing units to go to Italy. To enable 5th Army to offer prolonged resistance, the AOK therefore turned to the last remaining mobile reserves on the Aus-Hung. Balkan front, 59 ID and 19 Lst Mtn Bde. They were sent to the Isonzo on 21 and 25 July, respectively, and began to arrive in their new sectors on the 22nd and 25th.

b. Loss and recovery of Mt S Michele, 20 to 24 July

The conquest of the area around Ruins # 143 by Italian X Corps relieved the XI Corps of further concern about their right flank. Although VII Corps had not gained enough room in the south to also support the attack on Mt S Michele, on the 20th the Duke of Aosta instructed X and XI Corps to proceed with their assault on this high ground, which was of decisive importance as the key to the Karst plateau. Thus both corps would renew their attacks between the Wippach and Heights # 118 (exclusive), while VII Corps would at first just demonstrate against the latter position. Five hours of artillery preparation would precede the third day of battle.

However, before the Italian batteries began to fire, in the morning twilight GM Boog sent the battalions of 20 Hon ID and 17 ID to recover the portions of the position that had been lost the day before. While preparing for this operation during the night the troops had already suffered painful casualties from Italian artillery fire. IR # 96, for example, lost 13 officers and 600 men. Therefore the Hungarians' attack was only partly successful, and during the morning was already colliding with an Italian counter-thrust. The enemy followed this up with their main attack against Mt S Michele after the resistance of our troops was badly shaken by a massive bombardment. The Italian batteries also covered the eastern approaches with a storm of iron that made it impossible to immediately move up the 93 ID, which was already in position to support the greatly endangered

Tosti, p. 87. Italian official history, Vol. II, text, p. 250
The commanders didn't want the troops to suffer heavy casualties during the approach. However, the 93 ID, as well as 12 Mtn Bde deployed on the bend of the road southwest of Merna in the Vallone valley, were available to counterattack in case the heights were lost. Meanwhile the intermingled troops of 20 Hon ID and 17 ID were stubbornly and stoutly defending Mt S Michele, which was covered in a sea of smoke from artillery rounds, filling the air as thick as hail before they exploded. Finally the men had to give way before superior numbers. Around 5:30 PM the XI Italian Corps gained control of the flat upper portion of the hill.\textsuperscript{517} Farther south, Boog's Group, supported by well-conducted counterattacks by 14 Mtn Bde, were able to hold all their positions. 61 ID also repulsed all attacks by X and VII Corps.

The critical situation of the southern wing of 5\textsuperscript{th} Army compelled the HQ of Southwest Front to find reserve units within its own area of responsibility. There were just two regiments available, both in Tyrol: the KJR # 4 and L-Sch Regt # I; since they had long ago lost their original trained personnel, they were behind the lines to fill the ranks and to give Alpine training to the new men. They were now moved to the Isonzo with the greatest haste. Archduke Eugene also suggested to GdI Boroevic that he could weaken XV Corps, which was engaged only on the Krn, to send men to the southern sector. 5\textsuperscript{th} Army HQ, however, didn't agree because of the continuing shortage of troops around Tolmein. On the other hand, Boroevic gave VII Corps the right to incorporate the XIIth March Battalions which were being held in readiness in the upper Wippach valley.

Meanwhile, on the evening of the 20\textsuperscript{th} GM Boog made preparations to counterattack at Mt S Michele with a total of 15 battalions, drawn from 20 Hon ID, 17 and 93 ID, and from 12 Mtn Bde. The operation started the next day at 4:00 AM after two hours of artillery preparation. Boog was already able to announce the recovery of the summit at 5:15 AM. He then intended to drive the enemy back to the Isonzo, but heavy fire directed against his advancing troops prevented any further pursuit.\textsuperscript{518}

On the evening of the 20\textsuperscript{th}, Cadorna had given his strategic reserve - XIV Corps - to 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army, with the explicit order that it should only be used in its entirety for a decisive attack. However, the crisis caused by Boog's counterattack led the Duke of Aosta to send the two brigades of 30 ID to the front separately under XI and X Corps. He sent 27 ID, which had been

\textsuperscript{517}Italian official history, Vol. II, text, p. 251
directly under his HQ, to VII Corps, and the 28 ID of XIV Corps replaced it as his reserve force.\footnote{Italian official history, Vol. II, text, p. 250}

The great exhaustion of GM Boog's troops made it seem advisable to him to postpone the continuation of the attack until the 22\textsuperscript{nd}. Therefore the north wing of VII Corps moved ahead early that morning and drove the enemy back to the edge of the heights by Sdraussina. However, parts of 30 and 28 Italian ID began a counter-thrust from the northwest and were able to rob Boog's tired and much reduced units of their earlier gains. The k.u.k. troops had to pull back to and guard their jumping-off points of the morning; here the units were supposed to incorporate replacements into the ranks. This was especially necessary for 20 Hon ID, which had been reduced to no more than 1200 riflemen. However, the constant artillery fire, which also blanketed the rear areas, hindered traffic from moving by day. The troops therefore remained without rations and also without water; this was especially tormenting because of the prevalent heat.

Farther south the Italians attempted to attack on the 21\textsuperscript{st}; this gave the 61 and 57 ID an opportunity to once more demonstrate their undiminished powers of resistance. The actions of 61 ID continued until early on the 22\textsuperscript{nd}; at noon and in the night of 22-23 July the Division had to repulse new attempts to break out on the road to Doberdo.

On Mt S Michele, both sides had to lay down their arms on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} due to exhaustion after five days of bloody fighting. The reduction in the Italian fire finally made it possible to bring up rations and fresh men, and to relieve units where necessary. Thus in the evening of the 23\textsuperscript{rd} the 93 ID went back into the reserves of VII Corps; they were replaced in line west of Mt S Michele by the newly arrived 9 Mtn Bde of 59 ID. On the next day, 12 Mtn Bde was placed in reserve directly behind this height. The new commander of 20 Hon ID, GM Lukachich, took over the northern sector of VII Corps, which was still held by parts of 20 Hon ID and of 17 ID. The two regiments which had been brought from Tyrol were assembled by Selo.

The fighting was hotter on the southwest edge of the Doberdo plateau on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} and 24\textsuperscript{th}. Here the Italian VII Corps attempted on the morning of the 23\textsuperscript{rd} to penetrate our lines between Selz and Vermegliano. They were partly successful, but on the next morning they were again driven out by 61 ID, supported by parts of 2 Mtn Bde. Soon thereafter this portion of the position was once again lost, because instead of 14 Italian
ID the fresh 27 ID came up to the front and struck with its entire strength. Thus 61 ID had no rest; they had lost the majority of the casualties of the k.u.k. VII Corps on 23 and 24 July, which totaled 2800 to 3000 men.

c. Action around the Görz bridgehead, 20 to 24 July

While the battle raged on the Karst, there was also bitter fighting in front of Görz, where the VI Italian Corps made an earnest effort to implement its plan for a methodical capture of the bridgehead west of the Isonzo.

On the morning of the 20th the Italians made an unsuccessful reconnaissance thrust; this was followed in the first hours of the afternoon by an attack by the entire VI Corps, which was directed mainly against the summit of the heights directly west of Podgora. The hand-to-hand fighting raged back and forth; around 7:30 PM the Italians temporarily had gained a firm foothold along the crest. Finally however, all of the positions of GM Erwin Zeidler's 58 ID, except for a small outlying line, were retained. The Dalmatian troops were especially distinguished in these bloody actions. Mountains of corpses lay in front of and in the damaged trenches. Retention of the northern pillar of the bridgehead, Mt Sabotino, was largely due to flanking artillery fire from the eastern bank of the Isonzo.

The Podgora heights and Mt Sabotino were again the centers of bloody fighting on the next day. Three attacks by Italian 4 ID against Mt Sabotino were already shattered in the morning by the defenders' fire. On the Podgora the regiments of 11, 12 and 29 Italian ID were bled white in action against the Dalmatians, who held their trenches with heroic bravery. After this major setback the VI Italian Corps refrained from further major efforts, avoiding further useless sacrifice. Therefore on the 23rd the k.u.k. 58 ID was able to drive the last small parties of the enemy off the Podgora heights. Apparently due to frustration after their recent defeat (no other reason is given), the Italians struck at the city of Görz on the 24th with incendiary bombs.

On the 22nd it wasn't yet apparent that the Italians' offensive

520TRANSLATOR's NOTE - At this point, men from Dalmatia made up the majority of 58 ID. Their infantry units were k.k. LW IR "Zara" # 23 and "Gravosa" # 37 plus two battalions of the regular IR "Lacy" # 22.
521Alfred Krauss, "Der erste Isonzofeldzug" (Schwate, Vol. V, p. 163)
522Between 18 and 24 July the VI Italian Corps lost 463 dead, 2703 wounded and 224 missing (Italian official history, Vol. II, text, p. 260).
capability opposite the bridgehead had been broken. Therefore on the 23rd the HQ of 5th Army ordered 18 Mtn Bde and HQ of 59 ID to join XVI Corps.

d. Italian attacks in the Krn area, 19 to 25 July

There were some large-scale encounters in the high mountain terrain of the Krn. This sector was a considerable distance from those primarily involved in the II Battle of the Isonzo (the Doberdo plateau and Görz bridgehead), but the Italian attacks took place simultaneously with the offensive farther south.

The task of IV Italian Corps was to take the two heights northeast of the Krn summit - # 2041 and 1931. This would make it impossible for the Austro-Hungarians to transfer troops between Flitsch and Tolmein in the Lepenja and Tolminkabach valleys, which lay to the east of these heights. It would also initiate the envelopment of the Tolmein bridgehead from the north. The attack was launched with about three battalions from the Vrata, Krn and Kozljak summits; the other battalions of Alpini Groups "A" and "B" supported the attack with their fire. The objective of 8 ID was the Mrzli vrh. 7 ID was only supposed to help with artillery fire, while the Bersaglieri Division held the sector between Saga and Vrsic.

After an overnight bombardment of the Aus-Hung. positions on the heights by heavy guns, the Alpini struck around 5:00 AM on 19 July. Their first goals were the forward positions of the k.u.k. 3 Mtn Bde on Point # 2163 and of LW IR # 4 (of Rohr's Armee-gruppe) on Point # 2041.

When the Italians from the Vrata tried to climb out of the basin in the mountains, they were halted by the fire of the mountain troops of LW IR # 4. The enemy was able to penetrate into the positions of 3 Mtn Bde, but were thrown out again by a counter-attack involving heavy casualties for both sides. The attack of Italian 8 ID toward the Mrzli vrh was hardly even noticeable.

The enemy brought up reinforcements on the next day; after heavy artillery preparation, they renewed the attack on the 21st. Their northernmost column struck Height # 1931, but the Klagenfurt mountain Landwehr were still on the alert; their rifle fire kept the enemy at a distance. On the other hand, there was a wild man-to-man melee on Height # 2163, where the defenses had been almost totally destroyed by artillery fire. Friends and

foes used all of their usual weaponry for infighting, as well as large stones. Finally the three badly-reduced battalions of 3 Mtn Bde, which had lost about 1300 men since 19 July, had to abandon their ruined position to the enemy. They pulled back 800 paces to the east, to a strong line on Height # 2077.

The 3 Mtn Bde had just occupied their hastily-prepared new position when they had to fend off a surprise attack around midnight of 22-23 July as well as further thrusts on the next day. On the 24th the Alpini attempted another surprise attack during a storm, but this was shattered by the vigilant defenders. On the 25th the final Italian assault was fended off in hand-to-hand fighting, and the Austrians were even able to improve their positions. The Italians abandoned further attacks in the Krn area until mid-August.

The favorable situation in the defensive fighting of the k.u.k. 5th Army on 24 July, and the apparent diminution of the Italian attacks on this day, caused GO Conrad to issue orders to Southwest Front for the creation and employment of strong reserve forces once the battle ended. The two Tyrolean regiments were supposed to return to the defenses of that province; when possible, three infantry divisions and 14 Mtn Bde were to be placed in reserve behind the Isonzo front and available to the high command. These plans, however, weren't carried out because the attack which 27 Italian ID had started at Vermegliano on the evening of the 24th initiated a large new action which extended to the entire Karst plateau on the 25th.

e. The high point of the battle on the high Karst plateau, 25 and 26 July

The Italians believed that the Aus-Hung. troops on the Doberdo plateau were worn down by the recent actions and the casualties they had suffered; therefore the enemy high command decided to continue the attack to win this important sector of the battlefield "at any cost."524 For this purpose, 3rd Army was given the last corps in the strategic reserve, the XIIIth (25 and 31 ID)525, which on the 22nd had already moved from Verona to Palmanova. On the other hand, on 25 July Cadorna scolded 2nd Army for its inactivity; this became known to the Austrians through an intercepted radio broadcast. The Italian commander-in-chief demanded that 2nd Army attack on its entire front. His

524 Italian official history, Vol. II, Documents, p. 283
525 The 26 ID, one of the original components of XIII Corps, apparently had been assigned to the Carnic Group.
order, however, led merely to increased artillery fire and to isolated thrusts at Plava.

The commander of 3rd Army, the Duke of Aosta, now instructed XI Corps to again storm Mt S Michele with 21 and 22 ID, both of which had been reinforced by parts of 28, 30 and 25 ID. VII Corps would renew its assault on Height # 118 with 27 and 13 ID; the 14 ID stayed in this Corps' reserves. Between the attacking units was X Corps (19 and 20 ID, strengthened by parts of XIV Corps); it was expected to make limited gains of ground while supporting the offensive of the two corps on the wings with its artillery. The Duke held back 31 ID under his direct command. The offensive had been initiated on the evening of the 24th by the unsuccessful thrust of 27 ID. The push by all of XI and VII corps was to commence at 9:30 AM on the 25th after two hours of artillery preparation.

25 July

On the northern wing, the Italian 22 ID advanced south of the Sdraussina-S Martino road against 9 Mtn Bde, which was new to the battle and not yet familiar with the local terrain. The Bde fell back to S Martino, which exposed the north flank of its neighbor on the left, 33 Inf Bde (commanding a mixture of battalions from 20 Hon ID and 17 ID). The Hungarian Inf Bde was simultaneously assaulted from the front, and had to give up the edge of the heights. A gap developed between the two brigades, but it was plugged by the insertion of parts of 12 Mtn Bde, which numbered no more than 1600 men; thus during the heavy fighting of the rest of the day the crisis was mastered and Mt S Michele was held. The defenders were helped by the fact that the Italian 21 ID made only feint attacks from the northwest. 33 Inf Bde still had to repulse a heavy attack with hand-to-hand fighting in the evening before the battalions which had suffered the heaviest losses could be relieved by others and sent to the rear to rebuild.

Under 61 ID, the 14 Mtn Bde was able in the morning to fend off the attacks of the inner wings of X and VII Italian Corps without any assistance. In the afternoon the enemy extended their attacks to Selz, and took the edge of the heights between Redipuglia and Selz as well as the much contested Height # 118. However, the artillery fire from both sides was falling with such intensity on the heights that the Italians couldn't stay there. The position was thus unoccupied during the night. 61 ID was reinforced by I-Sch Regt # I (of 3 ½ battalions) to recapture the heights. The operation was supposed to take place during the night, but several delays forced its postponement until early on
the 26th. This difficult thrust ended with the recovery of Height # 118, but not of the trenches on either side of the position.

26 July

Therefore Archduke Joseph's k.u.k. VII Corps was in a difficult position when the Italian 3rd Army renewed its massive offensive on the 26th. The only full-strength reserve units available to back up the exhausted troops at the front were KJR # 4 (with two battalions) and one Feld Jaeger battalion from 18 Mtn Bde behind Lukachich's Group, two Landes-Schützen battalions behind 61 ID, and one line battalion on the south wing of 57 ID. Also available, but at reduced strength, were 12 Mtn Bde on Mt S Michele, two battalions behind 16 Lst Mtn Bde and four battalions of 93 ID at Merna. There were actually seven other battalions behind the front, but they were completely burnt out. However, 19 Lst Mtn Bde was arriving, and would assemble at Ranziano in the Wippach valley.526

The Italian assault on Mt S Michele was initiated from the northwest by parts of 28, 30 and 31 ID; the latter division had been reinforced by Bersaglieri battalions. Although the defenders' barbed wire obstacles were weak, they had withstood the Italian artillery and now presented an impassable barrier; the thick columns of attacking infantry were stopped cold and suffered a frightful bloodbath from the fire of the k.u.k. artillery. The brigadier commanding the assault was killed along with many staff officers, which increased the confusion.527 Finally the Italian infantry broke through the barriers and took the heights of Mt S Michele around 10:00 AM after hard fighting. At noon, however, Col Schwarzenberg led a counterattack by 12 Mtn Bde and threw them back; then our artillery fired again on the fleeing Italians, causing them further heavy losses.

Farther south, the reinforced Italian 22 ID had meanwhile broken into the defenses of San Martino, which they took after driving back the south wing of 9 Mtn Bde. After the recapture of Mt S Michele, the enemy units in San Martino were also assaulted and driven out of the burning village. Without committing any of the corps reserves, the Aus-Hung. soldiers chased the enemy toward the west.

The exhausted XI Corps now rested, but the X and VII Corps again

526The 19 Lst Mtn Bde, commanded by Col. Drennig, consisted of the Hungarian Landsturm battalions III/1, II/3, I/4, I/6 and III/12.
assaulted the Polazzo-Selz sector. The fighting by Ruins # 143 lasted until 9:00 PM; despite some dramatic turns of fortune, finally there was no substantial change to the situation. Farther south, 14 Mtn Bde lost Height # 118 around 5:00 PM, but recovered it an hour later. The positions on the edge of the heights east of Polazzo and between Vermegliano and Selz were practically obliterated, and had to be left in the hands of the Italians.

The fierce fighting of 26 July had been the high point of the II Battle of the Isonzo. The offensive capabilities of 3rd Italian Army were exhausted. The casualties were as great as the intensity of the combat. On the 26th the Italians engaged on Mt S Michele lost 2958 men. The k.u.k. VII Corps on the 25th and 26th had lost 6000 (dead, wounded and missing). Since 18 July the k.u.k. 5th Army had been reduced by 29,000 men; 25,000 of these casualties were suffered by VII Corps which had borne the brunt of the battle on the most difficult terrain of the field.

5th Army HQ sent VII Corps only a few more reinforcements: from XVI Corps the remaining two Jaeger battalions of 18 Mtn Bde, then the 19 Lst Mtn Bde (composed of inexperienced Landsturm). HQ of Southwest Front instructed the Tyrol Land Defense Command to immediately send its last Aus-Hung. reserve troops, KJR # 1 at Bozen, to 5th Army. Moreover the L-Sch Regt # II, which was moving from Galicia to Tyrol, was halted at Vienna and diverted to the Isonzo front.

f. The battle dies out

The stiff resistance which the 3rd Italian Army encountered on the 25th and 26th caused its leaders to anticipate an Aus-Hung. counter-attack, which might deprive them of even the small amount of territory they had been able to secure. Cadorna therefore on the 26th ordered 23 ID to transfer from 2nd to 3rd Army; on the next day he ordered 29 ID to do the same. 3rd Army was also reinforced by half of 26 ID from the Carnic Group and (on 29 July) by 16 ID from the Dolomite front. While awaiting the complete arrival of these units, the Italians refrained from

528Ibid., p. 281
529The Army's casualties included 4850 dead, 16,400 wounded and 8550 missing; the last figure includes wounded men who'd been captured as well as many soldiers whose deaths were never confirmed.. The commander of VII Corps, Archduke Joseph, eventually won the Commander's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order for his activity in the II, III and IV Battles of the Isonzo as well as victories he won in the Bukovina in 1916 and 1917.
530Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, p. 281
large-scale offensive operations. However, their artillery continued to fire in almost undiminished strength. Therefore when 33 Inf Bde fended off a thrust by X Italian Corps on 27 July the k.u.k. VII Corps lost another 1000 men. On the next two days the 14 Mtn Bde defended Height # 118 in difficult fighting against 27 Italian ID, and Archduke Joseph's Corps lost 2500 more men.

Despite the continuing tension, the Archduke took measures to reorganize his troops, whose strength had swollen from 32 to 74 battalions since the start of the battle. The 20 Hon ID was increased to 5000 riflemen and 17 ID to 4800 by incorporating March formations. On the 29th they re-entered the front on the northern wing, where 9 and 12 Mtn Bde, along with 93 ID (2600 riflemen) were pulled back into the Corps' reserves. In addition to 14 and 16 Mtn Bdes, the 61 ID now had attached the 18 Mtn Bde (from 59 ID) and 6 Mtn Bde (from 57 ID); on the other hand, the 61st had given up 2 Mtn Bde to 57 ID. Finally the two regiments from Tyrol (KJR # 4 was also attached to 61 ID on 31 July) were relieved from the line and placed in the Army's reserve. It was planned that 61 ID HQ along with 16 Lst Mtn Bde would later move to XVI Corps, where they would join 10 Mtn Bde to restore the Division's original order of battle.

These troop movements were delayed and prolonged by some local enemy thrusts which took place after dark on 30 July and 1 August at the most sensitive parts of the front. Thus the defenders, who suffered under heavy artillery fire during the day, also failed to get their badly-needed rest during the night. These three relatively "quieter" days cost the VII Corps about 4000 casualties.

Austro-Hungarian plans at the end of the battle

The decreasing combat activity after 26 July allowed the HQ of Southwest Front and the AOK to believe that the II Battle of the Isonzo was dying out. The two HQ agreed that it would be appropriate to continue the defensive operations that had been so successful thus far. However, it would be difficult to do so with the weak forces available to Southwest Front, especially because of the unexpectedly high losses in killed and wounded in the II Battle. To discuss appropriate measures to address this concern, Archduke Eugene went to Laibach on the 29th to visit 5th Army HQ, and to Kostanjevica to visit VII Corps. GdI Boroevic

531Actually VII Corps had commanded 80 battalions during the fighting, but by this point 6 of them had been temporarily dissolved due to heavy casualties.
and especially General Engineer Inspector FML Blenesi - who was responsible for the fortifications on the Isonzo front - believed that it was impossible to build anything but simple defenses of stone because of the rocky soil of the Karst. However, such defenses were easily destroyed by the Italian artillery, and catastrophic casualties were caused when the stone was splintered by the bombardments. On the other hand, Archduke Eugene's Chief of Staff FML Alfred Krauss demanded that drilling machines should be used to dig trenches in the granite of the Karst. Other command HQ on the Isonzo had already recognized this necessity, but there hadn't been enough time, equipment or laborers available to build trenches thus far, especially since the troops remained in close contact with the enemy.\(^{532}\)

Meanwhile the current positions on the Doberdo plateau would have to be held, at least as long as it was considered necessary to retain control of Mt S Michele. The need for more troops to man these exposed lines would constantly increase, and could be met only by finding more replacements for VII Corps. The AOK was approached for this purpose, but refused to make any binding commitments. On the other hand, they were willing to respond to the urgent requests of Southwest Front HQ for heavy artillery that could compete with the Italians in quantity and quality. The German OHL and the k.u.k. Navy also said they could provide some guns.\(^{533}\) Nonetheless, the heavy artillery which arrived in the next few weeks was only a small fraction of the amount which the local commanders wanted.

VII Corps HQ at Kostanjevica also suggested a plan to hinder the enemy envelopment of the Karst bastion by advancing their own southern wing up to the line Ronchi-Bestrigna. This would be useful because the terrain thus captured was suitable for the construction of regular trenches. Boroevic, however, declared that besides 8 ID,\(^{534}\) which was moving from Galicia to the Southwest Front, another four divisions would be needed to carry out this scheme, so it had to be abandoned. At this time the armies on the Russian front were advancing toward Brest-Litovsk, and the high command couldn't release such a large force. Even

\(^{532}\)TRANSLATOR's NOTE - FML Krauss, who had little patience with his colleagues, was quite contemptuous of Boroevic's attitude and blamed him personally for the failure to provide adequate defensive works in the first battles. (Krauss, "Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage", Munich, 1923; pp. 180-181)

\(^{533}\)On 5 July the Germans sent one battery of four 13 cm long-barreled cannon. This was the only German unit which fought on the Isonzo front prior to October 1917.

\(^{534}\)FML Fabini's 8 ID at this point consisted of 96 Inf Bde (KJR # 2 and 3), 88 L-Sch Bde (just L-Sch Regt # III), a squadron and two field howitzer batteries.
after the offensive to Brest was finished, perhaps in mid-August, the AOK didn't believe they would have enough reserves to strengthen the southern wing of 5th Army sufficiently for an attack.

**Failure of the last Italian thrusts**

Before the discussions described above were completed by telephone, and before the arrival of any additional heavy cannon, the Italian 3rd Army opened an attack on 2 and 3 August. Their goal was to cut off the bulge in the Aus-Hung. line between Heights # 197 (south of Sdraussina) and # 118. Once again blood was shed onto the gleaming hot granite, and once again the stone walls were stormed back and forth. The Italian 27 ID made the main effort against the southern pillar of the Karst front; they struck at the moment when 14 Mtn Bde was being relieved by 2 Mtn Bde. Nevertheless the mixed battalions of these two units were able to defeat the enemy effort in hand-to-hand combat. FML Gelb's 17 ID halted the Italian attack on Height # 197 with rifle fire; their opponent was XIV Corps, which had replaced XI Corps at the front. On these two days the k.u.k. VII Corps lost about 1500 men.

This latest misfortune compelled the Commando Supremo on 3 August to order a halt to the offensive on the central and lower Isonzo. Nevertheless the Duke of Aosta told his troops to continue moving forward slowly and methodically; thus the battle dragged on for several more days, but without any other major events.

The Italian General Staff later wrote as follows about the results of the II Battle of the Isonzo:

"The [Aus-Hung.] armor was dented here and there, but not broken. The resistance by the enemy's reinforced Julian front had proved superior to the means employed by the Italian high command to destroy it. Although our resources were larger and better organized than those expended in the Ist Battle, they were still insufficient. The results of the battle were the widening of the strong point on Height # 170 [lying 800 paces west of Mt S Michele], the climbing of the western edge of the heights around the plateau at Doberdo, and the advance of our line up to Mt dei sei Busi [Height # 118]."

---

535Tosti, p. 90
536Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, p. 286. Tosti, p. 91
538Actually the Italians had gained only a strip of ground about 200 to 600 paces wide, running from Height # 197 to Height # 118 (exclusive).
This frank assessment makes it clear that the battle had been a complete defeat. However, it can also be recognized that the Italian Commando Supremo would still attempt to carry out the fighting on the Isonzo in battles of attrition, whose frightfulness would always increase.

The 5th Army had suffered unusually heavy casualties - 46,640 from 15 July to 15 August. They included 7721 dead, 26,629 wounded and 12,290 missing; in this period the Army also lost about 6400 men due to illness. Italian casualties between 18 July and 3 August had been 41,866 men; presumably by mid-August they became as great as the losses of the defenders.\textsuperscript{539}

Considering the fact that 129 Aus-Hung. battalions had fought against about 260 Italian, however, the casualties of 5th Army were proportionateley twice as large as those of the enemy.

Aftermath of the battle

After the II Isonzo Battle ended, the Italians stopped their infantry attacks in August. The artillery fire, which normally never paused on the Isonzo front, continued to inflict painful casualties. Nevertheless, the relative quiet gave 5th Army HQ an opportunity to improve its defensive measures.

In the order of battle, all four Kaiser Jaeger Regiments were united under 8 ID (58 Mtn and 96 Inf Bdes). 93 ID, after absorbing most of its new troops, consisted of 185 Inf Bde (L-Sch Regt # I plus three March battalions) and 88 L-Sch Bde (L-Sch Regts # II and III).

In deploying his reserves, GdI Boroevic addressed the fact that the Italians had targeted two areas for their main attacks - the Görz bridgehead and Mt S Michele. The latter point in particular seemed to be threatened once more; aerial reconnaissance reported heavy traffic on the railroad through Latisana to Monfalcone, while ground observers noted considerable enemy activity near the coast. Therefore Boroevic shifted his reserves so they could oppose a renewed attempt to break through on the Karst as well as a possible Italian amphibious strike against Trieste. 61 ID, again consisting of 10 Mtn and 16 Lst Mtn Bdes, was east of Görz behind 58 ID. On the Karst plateau there were two mountain brigades and 93 ID behind the four divisions at the front (17, 57 and 59 ID plus 20 Hon ID). Boroevic held 8 ID under his

\textsuperscript{539}Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, p. 287. Zingales, however, estimates the losses as just 37,000 (p. 242). According to Trosti they were only 33,717 (p. 91).
immediate command at Vogersko and Cernizza. 12 Mtn Bde of 48 ID had already begun to move to Carinthia, but now was held for a brief pause at Temnica and Lipa. The 58 Mtn Bde of 8 ID was temporarily attached to XV Corps, which enjoyed a degree of autonomy regarding how it could deploy its troops.

Finally, after further consultations which created a degree of ill-feeling between the HQ at Laibach and Marburg, construction was begun to improve the forward positions, especially on the Karst.

Cadorna believed that the Italian Army wasn't fully prepared to resume its assault on the Austrian Isonzo front. Major fighting wouldn't erupt again in the coastal lands until October.

3. The Carinthian Front from the start of July to the Middle of August 1915

a. New orders of battle and construction of positions by both sides

After the unsuccessful attempts by the Austro-Hungarians to regain the Promos and the Krn, the process began of exchanging the troops of VII Corps for those of 44 LW ID and 48 ID. This involved almost the entire front of Armeegruppe Rohr and lasted for over three weeks (until 20 July). Nevertheless, the exchange couldn't be carried out in its entirety because 12 Mtn Bde stayed on the Karst due to the outbreak of the II Battle of the Isonzo; therefore parts of 17 ID had to stay in Carinthia.

At the same time the Armeegruppe was sub-divided into four Sectors (# I to IV). At the start of August they were arranged as follows:

. Sector I lay between the western border of the Armeegruppe (at Steinkarspitz) and the Stranig Spitz; it was led by the HQ of FML Gabriel's 48 ID and consisted of 11 Mtn Bde, parts of 59 Mt Bde, and some troops of 17 ID; the sub-groups were led by Col Fasser, GM Lawrowski (HQ of 11 Mtn Bde) and Col Henneberg (HQ of 57 Mtn Bde).

. Sector II extended east along the border up to and including the Schinouz; it was commanded by GM Fernengel (with HQ of 59 Mtn Bde) and consisted of battalions from his brigade and from 17 ID.

. Sector III ran south to the Rombon; it was equivalent to FML Langer's 92 ID, with its troops jumbled up; the sub-groups were led by GM Jaschke (HQ of 184 Inf Bde) and Col Reindl.
Sector IV extended up to the junction with 5th Army at the Krn; it was equivalent to GM Nemeczek's 44 LW ID; the sub-groups were led by Lt Col Lanna, GM Jellenchich (HQ of 87 Inf Bde) and GM Gössmann (HQ of 183 Inf Bde).

The Armeegruppe HQ had been stationed at Villach since 3 July. At the start of August it commanded 45 battalions (including 8 of volunteer riflemen), 5 ½ squadrons and 46 ½ batteries. Total strength was 42,000 riflemen, 150 machine guns, 605 cavalry and 281 guns (not counting those in fixed positions).

Organization of the volunteer units

Another important area which had to be quickly addressed was the question of the organization and use of the volunteer rifle units raised in the Alpine lands. At the outbreak of the war they had been formed under the slogan "People and Homeland in Danger" to guard the threatened borders. They were loyal men who provided an important reserve force, but they lacked military training, equipment, and leaders with wartime experience. Thus they weren't ready for battle. The HQ of Southwest Front had at first ordered individuals from all the volunteer formations who were completely untrained or very young soldiers to be weeded out and sent to a training camp at Wolfsberg in Carinthia; this was the first step in turning the force into a new and militarily more effective resource. The reorganization took its course during July, directed by the high command based on the suggestions of Rohr's Armeegruppe HQ; it was completed by mid-August.

From the men of the original four Carinthian volunteer rifle regiments who were fit for front-line duty, the "k.k. Carinthian Volunteer Rifle Regt" was created, with a HQ and Bns # I-IV; its strength was 2000 riflemen. The under-age troops made up "Jung-Schützen" (Young Rifle) companies at Wolfsberg. Men suitable for guard duty created four Ersatz commands; each command backed up one of the line battalions and was responsible for watching the installations in rear areas and the railroads. There was also a "HQ for the k.k. Carinthian Volunteer Rifles" at Klagenfurt, which controlled the Ersatz commands and guard units.

In similar fashion the men fit for front-line service from the six Salzburg rifle battalions were split up under the new 1st and II k.k. Salzburg Battalions. Later (in August) they were further reduced to one battalion of six companies.

There was an incomplete k.k. Styrian Volunteer Rifle Regt; it was reduced to just one company of men fit for front-line service,
and a company which joined the rear-area "Graz Volunteer Bürger und Schützen Corps" and trained initially at Wolfsberg.

The men from the Salzburg and Styrian rifle units fit for front-line service made up Ersatz commands and Watch battalions; they were used like the Carinthian Ersatz commands. The higher HQ of the Salzburg and Styrian volunteer rifle units were dissolved.

The Upper Austrian rifle units were placed under the Innsbruck District HQ and sent to Tyrol for training. The volunteer rifle formations from Lower Styria, with several companies of riflemen from Carniola and the coastal lands, were placed under 5th Army HQ.

The Armeegruppe had thus substantially increased its forces by placing the various elements of the original volunteer levy into units which were either ready for the front, available for guard duty, or in training. Once their organization was complete, the front-line volunteer rifle battalions began to go to the front in September. Under the leadership of veteran commanders they were soon able to meet all the demands of defensive warfare.

Positions of the two sides

The Italian Carnic Group opposite Armeegruppe Rohr also had to spend time repeatedly in shifting troops due to events in the neighboring sectors. On 18 June they were pleased to receive the 26 ID as reinforcements from Commando Supremo; on 3 July, however, they had to give up one brigade apiece from 23 and 24 ID to 2nd Army at the high point of the 1st Battle of the Isonzo. At the end of July, during the II Battle, half of 26 ID was sent to 3rd Army. At the start of August the Carnic Group (into which HQ of XII Corps had merged) consisted of two divisions with new orders of battle:

- 24 ID (Fella Sector) over Bde Aosta, 2nd Alpini Bde, and Bde Piemonte
- 26 ID (But-Degano Sector) over 1st Alpini Bde and Bde Catania.

Including the mountain troops that had been stationed here since the start of the war, the Italians thus opposed Armeegruppe Rohr with a force of about equal strength - 43 battalions and 47 batteries.\(^{540}\)

\(^{540}\)Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, pp. 376 ff.

TRANSLATOR’s NOTE - However, the strength comparison depicted by the original is incorrect. The Italian Carnic Group was opposite only Sectors I to III of Rohr; his Sector IV was opposed by parts of IV Italian Corps (roughly the Bersaglieri Division and 33 ID plus Alpini). Thus the Italians actually had a numerical preponderance. (See Beilage 39 of the
In the fighting thus far, Armeegruppe Rohr had succeeded in halting the enemy on the crest along the Carinthian border; however, the highest elevations from the Wolayer Kopf to Findenigkofel - with the exception of the summit of the Klein Pal - were in the enemy's hands. Thus the Aus-Hung. troops in position on the slopes farther north suffered casualties from the flanking fire of Italian batteries on the Promos, which had unimpeded visibility over the area behind the positions as well as the routes leading to them. Our situation south of Malborgeth was similarly unfavorable because the enemy artillery could fire effectively as far as Tarvis because of their observation posts on the Mittagskofel and Mt Piper. The loss of the Krn-Vrata-Vrsic ridge was particularly unfortunate, since the enemy used it to observe not only the Flitsch and Tolmein basins and adjacent roads, but also the positions and supply lines farther to the rear. Thus they posed a constant threat to the flank and deployment areas of 5th Army.

Under these circumstances, an effective long-range defense of the Carinthian front with a minimum force would be possible only if it could be based on the most prominent slopes and ridges. Thus operations were needed to improve the portions of the front where the situation was unfavorable. Yet there was still an insufficient number of infantry units trained for high mountain fighting, and of artillery which could support difficult attacks. Therefore on 9 July GdK Rohr approached the neighboring XV Corps to discuss how to drive the Italians from the Krn-Vrata-Vrsic ridge. All plans for an offensive had to be shelved during the II Battle of the Isonzo, when Rohr's Armeegruppe on its own initiative released three battalions and five batteries, which had been left by VII Corps, to Boroevic's Army. After mid-August an offensive was still impossible because, as will shortly be related, Rohr's own eastern wing was under heavy attack.

Since the positions couldn't be improved by fighting, the HQ of Armeegruppe Rohr would have to rely on technical improvements to the defensive line. This work was hindered by the unyielding granite soil, the lack of equipment, the constant troop movements, and the distaste of combat soldiers for such labor. Moreover, in the beginning all available technical units had been sent to build a second position in the Gailtal Alps, since it wasn't certain that prolonged resistance would be possible on the border. When it became clear that the enemy had been halted on the this line, in mid-July all sectors were ordered to cease work on the positions in the rear and to concentrate on the foremost
areas. Hopefully this would add to the safety of the almost inaccessible positions. Along with trenches and shelters carved out of the granite, workers began to construct rail lines and roads, cable railways and lifts; later they built barracks, supply depots and many other buildings necessary for spending the winter in the high mountains.541

Based on experiences near Görz, the HQ of Southwest Front ordered the immediate construction of a "back-up position" lying close behind the foremost line. This would help contain local thrusts by the attackers. Such positions were forerunners of defensive systems in three lines, which were being developed in this phase of the war.

b. Actions on the Carinthian border

Between the unsuccessful attack of the k.u.k. VII Corps on the Promos and the start of the II Isonzo Battle (18 July), actions were restricted to daily artillery duels and a continuous bombardment of the works at Malborgeth and Raibl.542 There were also a few small and unsuccessful thrusts by Italian infantry.

The Italian artillery fire increased after 18 July, and was joined by guns on the Neveasattel which fired upon the barricades at Flitsch and the town of Raibl.

Our artillery attempted to interfere with the observation point on the border crest on the Prevalascharte, from which the enemy could spy on the Flitsch basin and the areas behind our positions. 

541 An especially important project was construction of a usable route from the road and rail line in the Wurzener Sava valley at Kronau over the Mojstrovka Pass (elevation 1611 meters) to the upper Isonzo valley. This had already been contemplated in peacetime. It was needed so that the rather isolated Sector IV wouldn't have to depend on the Predil road, which was within range of the enemy's guns as it passed directly behind the front. Fortunately the traffic on this road through the Koritnica valley, although visible to the enemy, wasn't disturbed through mid-July. For the same reason, tunnels were dug and enlarged leading from the Koritnica valley at Breith to the Seebach valley at Raibl; they could be used by traffic (especially carrying wounded soldiers or supplies) when necessary to avoid heavy enemy fire on the Predil road. Work was started to extend the rail line in the Gall valley from Hermagor to Kötschach-Mauthen and to build at least a road leading west from the latter town.

542 By mid-July, the defenders of Fort Hensel at Malborgeth had counted 2267 shells of 21 cm caliber or more which had hit their position; their total weight was about 350 tons of iron. The work had thus been reduced to a heap of ruins. However, some heroic artillerists continued to fire back from one intact gun turret (the other artillery pieces and machine guns had already been moved to nearby field fortifications); thus they tricked the Italians into continuing to waste ammunition on the virtually empty Fort.
on both sides of the Isonzo; however, the guns couldn't fire far enough. Therefore the Austrians brought a mountain cannon up to the Rombon. On 23 July some brave scouts penetrated behind the enemy outposts north of the Bramkofel and established their own observation point on the heights; they made it possible to bring the annoying Italian batteries in the Dogna valley under accurate fire.

Apparently the Italians noticed that troops were moving from Carinthia and Tyrol during the II Battle of the Isonzo. On 30 July they began some operations against Armeegruppe Rohr to hinder further troop transfers. Thus several Italian battalions thrust against the positions of 11 Mtn Bde on the Klein Pal. They penetrated the entrenchments, but were thrown out after stiff fighting; the result was that our own lines were extended forward. Farther east, the enemy established themselves on the Hoher Trieb, but were repulsed in Lodinut Pass (west of the Findenigkofel). On the same day there was serious fighting in the sector of 92 ID on the eastern Zweispitz and around the Piperscharte. Here several Alpini companies attacked after a nine-hour bombardment which had hindered the deployment of reserves. Each point was held by just half a company apiece drawn from FJB # 9 and IR # 27, but they defended themselves heroically before finally succumbing. Plans to recover the lost sectors had to be abandoned because of bad weather and the extremely difficult terrain.

In the next few days, Italian thrusts against the Hoher Trieb and the Freikofel were fended off. Nonetheless, GdK Rohr was concerned by the activity of the enemy on the Carinthian crest, where conditions favored them, as well as by their bombardment of places in the Gail valley. He couldn't attempt to improve his situation in the Plöcken area until the arrival of 12 Mtn Bde (which was still needed on the Isonzo) and of some heavier artillery.

On the Armeegruppe's western wing, on the other hand, some bold scouting detachments from 48 ID and the Pustertal Division were able to occupy the line Pala di Sterpe-Mga. Chivion. This added to the security of the outposts on Mt Peralba against possible attacks from the west. On 7 and 8 August, four Italian companies tried to attack Mt Peralba from the south and east, but were completely defeated.544

543The Italians had already occupied the western summit of the Zweispitz ("Two-Summit Mountain") without fighting in the first days of the war. 544Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, pp. 281 ff.
Besides worrying about the Carinthian crest, the Armeegruppe HQ at Villach was increasingly concerned about the Flitsch basin and the area south of Malborgeth, where the enemy was intensifying their artillery fire toward the east. To GdK Rohr it seemed necessary to capture the Italian artillery observation posts in the Mittagskofel area. For this purpose he wanted to use the mountain LW IR # 4, which was to be relieved from its present position by mountain LW IR # 27, arriving by train from Russia. Before this could take place, however, Italian artillery fire increased on 12 August against both of the eastern sectors of Armeegruppe Rohr, and initiated heavy fighting on the upper Isonzo.

c. Actions on the upper Isonzo in the second half of August 1915

1) The Italian plan of attack; relative strengths

After Cadorna saw that his plan to break through the Aus-Hung. front between Plava and the sea had been bloodily defeated in the first two battles of the Isonzo, he restricted further operations on the central and lower reaches of the river to an almost continuous series of local thrusts to pin down enemy units. At the same time he placed greater emphasis on attacking in the area Tolmein-Krn-Flitsch before the beginning of cold and wet weather; he hoped that an offensive here with limited objectives could make up for the setbacks on the Karst and at Görz. The strengthened left wing of 2nd Italian Army, with parts of the Carnic Group, would first capture the entire Krn massif, then attack the Tolmein bridgehead and occupy the Flitsch basin.\(^{545}\)

By conquering the "two sally ports at Tolmein and Flitsch", the Italians would put an end to a constant menace to the left flank of their Isonzo front while giving their troops favorable points from which they could invade Inner Austria.\(^{546}\) It was planned that immediately after the bridgehead at Tolmein had been taken, the main body of 2nd Italian Army would strike from the north toward Plava and Görz.\(^{547}\) At the same time the occupation of the Flitsch basin would be followed by a general attack against the Carinthian front from the west, south and east.

\(^{545}\)Once all the high ground around Krn was secured it would be easier to occupy the other two positions. A similar thrust had already been attempted during the II Isonzo Battle, but had been repulsed.

\(^{546}\)Italian Official History, Vol. II, Text, p. 289

\(^{547}\)Cadorna, "La guerra", Vol. I, p. 144
Implementation of the various phases of this operation had been planned earlier, but couldn't be carried out due to lack of sufficient force, especially of heavy artillery. Now the offensive couldn't be postponed any longer because the season in the high mountains was already getting late.

Control of the attack was entrusted to the commander of IV Italian Corps, G.Lt Nicolis di Robilant. To reinforce his Corps, he was given especially skilled troops from neighboring sectors who were familiar with mountain conditions. Robilant planned to attack the southern part of the Tolmein bridgehead (from the Isonzo at Selo to a point west of Sv. Maria) with 7 ID. Alpini Groups A and B, each about one brigade strong, would strike along both sides of the river against the northern part of the bridgehead as well as the Vodil vrh. The reinforced 8 ID and the right wing of 33 ID would thrust against the medium and high elevations of the mountain ridge (Mrzli vrh-Sleme-Maznik) which stretches from the Isonzo toward Krn; they were supposed to reach the valley of the Tominski potok, which runs down to Tolmein from the north.

The second part of the operation - the capture of the Flitsch basin and an envelopment attack against the Carinthian defenses, was supposed to start almost simultaneously. For this purpose the left wing of the reinforced 33 ID, stationed on the Krn, and the main body of the Bersaglieri Division were to capture the heights east of Flitsch (Javorcek and Lipnik). Then they would advance out of the Soca valley - either south around the Krn massif or north to outflank the Carinthian defenses. Some of the Bersaglieri would break out of the bend in the valley at Saga and occupy the basin itself.

Moreover, parts of the Carnic Group were also ready to attack:  
. A combined detachment in brigade strength under GM Giardina from the Resia valley and the border crest of Mt Canin toward the heights north of Flitsch (Rombon), and  
. The right wing of Italian 24 ID from the Raccolana valley through the Nevea Pass.  
East of Caporetto five Alpini battalions were stationed as IV Corps' reserve; they would be ready to move against either Tolmein or Flitsch.

On our side, XV Corps was still responsible for Sector I of the Isonzo front. Their neighbor farther north was 44 LW ID (in Sector IV of Armeegruppe Rohr), stationed on the Krn massif.

Fighting started around both basins on 12 August. In places — such as at St Luzia, on the Mrzli vrh, on the Vrsic and at Flitsch — the actions were as fierce as those earlier on the Doberdo plateau. With some pauses, they lasted almost seven weeks. Despite significant casualties, the attackers continued to throw themselves against the points mentioned above with truly astounding stubbornness. However they failed to win significant success.

2) Actions at Tolmein, 12-20 August

The fighting opened on the 12th and 13th with a heavy artillery bombardment of the Aus-Hung. positions between Selo and Flitsch; as planned, the villages behind the front were destroyed. Until 20 August numerous attacks were launched against XV Corps and the left wing of 44 LW ID. These attacks involved individual sectors and didn't occur at the same time, so there was no general offensive; however, the thrusts were powerful and continuous, occurring both at day and night. They were always strongly supported by artillery.

The first Italian infantry assault took place on the morning of the 14th. It was directed against the granite peaks and ridges east of the Krn summit and against the Maznik-Sleme-Mrzli-Vodil ridge leading to the south. The attacking troops from 33 and 8 ID, as well as from Alpini Group A, were unsuccessful. Most of their thrusts broke down with great casualties in front of the obstacles covering 3 and 15 Mtn Bdes.

There was less fighting north of the Isonzo on 15 and 16 August; some of the attackers pulled back to their initial positions. Farther south, the reinforced 7 ID moved against the Tolmein bridgehead on the 16th. Their goal was to overrun Height # 588 and Sv. Maria in the bridgehead, and then to take the town of St. Luzia just east of the Isonzo, where the Idria, Wochein and Isonzo valleys came together.549

The offensive here was almost completely repulsed by the afternoon. Only on the western slope of Height # 588 was the enemy able to penetrate the positions of two companies of a battalion of 8 Mtn Bde, which was being relieved. Later in the day and on the 17th the Austrians attempted to recover the lost ground, but they had only weak reserve forces available. The counterattacks had just limited success, in part because the higher command HQ still didn't have a clear understanding of the

549Zingales, p. 400
situation in the Selo-# 588 area.

The scanty reserves of XV Corps had been committed to action in the last two days, and the front was only thinly held; therefore the Corps' overall situation seemed perilous and an enemy breakthrough was possible. If the Italians continued their attack at Tolmein they could envelop or move around the positions on the heights; the Corps might lose the Wochein railroad, which was essential for movement of its supplies. The alternative routes were very poor - 50 ID would have to rely on the road over the Podbrdo Pass and some barely-usable paths leading out of the Wochein valley; 1 ID would need to bring supplies over the Kirchheim ridge. There was also concern that the Italians might even break through the second position east of the Isonzo, since there were no further reserves.

The Army commander, with his iron will, relieved the subordinate generals of responsibility for difficult decisions. GdI Boroevic ordered that the high ground next to the narrow valley at Tolmein should be held indefinitely, ordered up March formations to replenish the ranks of the defenders, and instructed XVI Corps to help out with powerful artillery support. Moreover he sent 58 Mtn Bde\(^550\) of 8 ID, which had been stationed at Dornberg in the Wippach valley in the Army's reserve, to march through Chiapovano\(^551\) to join XV Corps. The first elements of this Brigade began to arrive in the evening of the 18\(^{th}\).

In this threatening situation, in the afternoon of 17 August the commander of 50 ID (FML Kalser) placed his divisional reserve battalion (IV/37) and members of his staff at the disposal of XV Corps HQ to help restore the situation of 1 ID, even though new attacks had begun against his own division.

Meanwhile the situation on the southern wing of 8 Mtn Bde was clarified on the morning of the 18\(^{th}\). We were still in firm control of the strong point of Selo; although completely isolated, its gallant garrison had repulsed all enemy attacks. Farther north the small Italian penetration had been sealed off and our line was intact. Reserves had been pulled back from the front, and the redeployment and reinforcement of the artillery in

\(^{550}\) The military units of the 58 Mtn Bde consisted of KJR # 1 and 2. It had been infected with cholera and therefore was supposed to stay in reserve for a long time. Also it had been planned that after further reinforcements arrived on the Isonzo, these mountain-trained Kaiser Jaeger would be employed on the borders of Tyrol.

\(^{551}\) The critical situation of XV Corps upset these plans, and therefore the Brigade was engaged by Tolmein until the start of October.

The town of Chiapovano was more frequently called "Cepovan", since the population of this area was entirely Slovene.
the Tolmein basin was nearly complete. The crisis had been weathered. Prisoners, however, reported that new attacks were imminent, and it was observed that the enemy was bringing up reinforcements.

After strong artillery fire, about four Italian battalions made a new thrust against the heights at Sv. Maria and Point # 588 in the afternoon of 18 August. However, all of the enemy's attempts to expand the small piece of terrain they had captured on the 16th were in vain.

Early on the 19th, a well-planned counterattack by Bn IV/37 finally expelled the Italians from the crest between Selo and Height # 588. Thus the only ground captured by the enemy in their prolonged and very costly attacks was a stretch of the trenches on the western slope of Height # 588.

The offensive against the bridgehead in the last two days had been accompanied by strong thrusts against the Krn and the Mrzli vrh; however, the high point of the actions in these sectors had already past. Powerful artillery bombardments and local infantry attacks were unable to improve the situation of the Italians, who had little to show for their efforts during this phase of the fighting. Meanwhile XV Corps received some medium and heavy guns which began to strike back against the pesky Italian batteries stationed high over the Tolmein basin along the border crest of the Kolowrat.

In six days of combat the attackers, despite all their courage and endurance, had won nothing other than the small stretch of trenches mentioned above. Infantry in the strength of about seven brigades, supported by a large group of artillery, had attacked in vain against XV Corps (commanded since the end of July by FML Stöger-Steiner), which was only half their strength. The Italians' casualties had been disproportionately large.

3) Fighting around the Flitsch basin

At virtually the same time as the offensive at Tolmein, the Italians opened a series of attacks in mid-August against XV Corps' neighbor to the north, 44 LW ID. Their objective was to capture the Flitsch basin and the defensive works lying on its northeastern edge.

Except for a small detachment in the valley east of Flitsch, the defending troops were deployed in widely separated positions on
the high mountains, which were difficult to reach for both sides. After the crest along the line Vrsic-Vrata-Krn had been lost in the first weeks of the war, there had been no change to the front lines. The Austrians held an advanced position on the ridge running northwest from the Vrsic; it covered their main defenses on the Lipnik and Javorcek and was a useful observation point. Similarly there were only small scouting and security detachments covering the front in the valleys of the Slatenikbach and Isonzo, west of Flitsch, and on the southwest slope of the Rombon. Until the start of August the enemy west of the Flitsch basin hadn't passed the high mountain ridge which included Mt Canin. Farther south they had already reached the narrow part of the Isonzo valley northeast of Saga and the Polounik ridge at the end of May, but then had remained inactive in this sector. The defenders were aware of almost the tiniest details of the Italian plans and deployment, thanks to tapped phone calls and information from prisoners and deserters. Thus they couldn't be taken by surprise. However, there were only limited resources available to defend the Rombon, which dominated the entire basin: at first the garrison at the summit was reinforced by a handful of troops and one mountain gun.

Fighting centers on the Vrsic heights

On 3 August Italian scouting detachments began to make their way from the west (over the border crest) and the south toward Flitsch. Since the enemy had built a road from the Raccoalana valley over the Prevala pass into the Isonzo valley, it was clear that they would also send forces in this direction. Batteries of all calibers, deployed in a half-circle from Nevea Pass through Saga, Serpenizza and Ravna, fired on the positions and pre-war fortifications at Flitsch. On 12 August they began a destructive fire against the positions from the Rombon to the Krn, which continued in varying degrees during the day and night and expended a great amount of ammunition. The Italian infantry struck two days later, but by the end of the 14th their attack had already been shattered with great loss by the north wing of the k.u.k. XV Corps, supported by the artillery of 44 LW ID. On the 15th the Italian IV Corps also began stubborn assaults north of the Krn, which were often repeated through 20 August.

The offensive was first directed against the forward position on the Vrsic, which was held by just one battalion of the Lower

552These fortifications, which were first bombarded on 18 July, consisted of the "Hermann", an obsolete work, and barricades on the road. The guns, except for two armored howitzers, and most of the machine guns had been moved to nearby field entrenchments. Thus the main role of the pre-war fortifications, as in other sectors, was merely to draw enemy fire.
Austrian LW IR "St Pölten" # 21; it was attacked on the 15th and 16th by Bersaglieri detachments. Although heavily outnumbered, the gallant Landwehr battalion threw the enemy back with bloody losses. The Italians renewed their attack at this rocky point on 17 August, once more without any success. Then there was a two-day pause in the action, which gave the defenders an opportunity to fill their much-diminished ranks with new men.

On the evening of the 19th the destructive fire increased against the main positions of 87 LW Inf Bde. It continued throughout the night into the 20th, and reached its greatest intensity in the early morning on the Vrsic position. By 8:00 AM the shelters and barricades had been blown away from the granite, as the Bersaglieri and infantry renewed their attack in great numbers and with admirable elan. Wave after wave of troops hurled themselves on the Austrian positions for four hours. Twice they managed to break into our lines along the crest, but then were hurled back. Parts of the Carinthian LW IR # 4 stationed on the neighboring summit of the Lipnik helped out with flanking fire. They watched as the gallant garrison of the Vrsic, despite a hail of fire, threw hand grenades and blocks of granite on the advancing Italians, then fended them off with the bayonet in a wild hand-to-hand action.

Toward noon the enemy troops were finally exhausted; suffering from heavy damage, they gave up the fruitless offensive and returned to their jumping-off points, pursued by fire from a few artillery pieces and machine guns that had remained undamaged. Embittered by the defeat, the Italian guns hammered the entire sector of 87 LW Inf Bde with shells of all calibers until the sun began to sink. Then the infantry attempted another assault. However, their elan was broken. When darkness fell all parts of the position were still firmly held by the heroic defenders.

The expected resumption of the attack was temporarily postponed. In the next few days the enemy east of the upper Isonzo sought only to make their way forward from the west and south through the Slatenik valley to the foot of the Javorcek with small detachments.

**Actions on the Wischberg and the Rombon**

While the Italian offensive was carried out in a narrow space on the mountain ridges between the Isonzo and the Krn, the battalions of General Giardina and the Bersaglieri Division which were supposed to capture Flitsch were slowly crossing the slope of the Canin massif and pushing north from the valley at Saga.
Without fighting, they reached the south and west edge of the Flitsch basin on the 14th, and stayed there for six days. Meanwhile the Italian batteries continued to pour their shots upon the Austrian barricades and positions. The enemy advance resumed on the 20th, and our advanced troops pulled back slowly to the main position while skirmishing. Since the Italians were now coming up against the barricades and artillery fire, they moved very hesitantly; the events at Görz and the Doberdo plateau had made them cautious. The force advancing from the Krn toward the Rombon consisted of 20 battalions, supported by 17 ½ batteries. They were opposed by the 9 battalions and 8 ½ batteries of 44 LW ID.

By the evening of 22 August the Italians were on the western slope of the Rombon and south of Flitsch. On the next morning they took by surprise an advanced strong point on the southwest slope of the Rombon. Only two companies and four guns were stationed on this mountain, the key to the defenses of the Flitsch area; to prevent a further advance of the Alpini, they were reinforced by another company.

Meanwhile some Bersaglieri detachments had occupied the town of Flitsch (which had been left undefended in front of our lines) and were approaching the Austrian position in the valley. Prisoners claimed that the Italians would attack on the 24th, but the enemy stayed in place on the Rombon slopes throughout the day. Some troops did try to attack the valley position from Flitsch, but they were hit by the artillery of 44 LW ID and fled back. The same fate befell a battalion that tried to attack here two days later.

In connection with the operation against Flitsch, on the 23rd several battalions of the 2nd Alpini Brigade (under 24 ID farther north) crossed the Austro-Italian border between the summit of the Confin and Somdogna Pass; on the 24th they struck against the precipitous massif of the Wischberg. After capturing the mountain they planned to enter the Seebach valley, which would make it easier for General Giardina to attack the Rombon and envelop the barricades near Flitsch. The Austrian positions near the border at the Wischberg were held only by Landsturm troops from 92 ID; however, all the Italians' attempts to break through the line were thwarted, primarily by the action of our vigilant artillery. A strong thrust which reached the southern slope of the Wischberg was repulsed by the infantry in their trenches.

Meanwhile the defenders noticed that fresh enemy units were marching over the Nevea Pass; their deployment between the Confin
and Rombon threatened the left wing of 92 ID. Everything indicated that the attackers were still preparing a major operation against the positions between the Rombon and the Isonzo, preceded by a large artillery bombardment. This theory seemed to be confirmed by the enemy deployment, another attack against the valley position east of Flitsch, and also one against the Rombon from the west. To defeat the Italians' strategy it was above all necessary to ensure that the Rombon was held. Therefore the HQ of Southwest Front sent the mountain troops of LW IR # 27, which were arriving by train from the Russian theater, to this sector. The first battalion arrived on 27 August and entered the line between the inner wings of 92 ID and 44 LW ID. GdK Rohr held back the other two battalions under his own command at Raibl.

On the same day, the long-expected attack on the Rombon began. Two Alpini battalions, supported by several mountain and heavy batteries, struck from the west, southwest and south against the rugged mountain summit. According to prisoners, they had orders to take the position regardless of casualties. These specially chosen, well-trained mountain troops were in fact able to establish themselves temporarily on the summit. However, a counterattack by local reserves drove them back by noon. The Italians also attacked on the slope leading down from the Rombon to the road into the Koritnica valley; they were able to push back our line somewhat, but a small reserve force re-established a firm position on the slope. The Austrian artillery intervened effectively in this fighting, especially the mountain cannon stationed on the Rombon. At the end of this eventful day all attacks had been repulsed and the hotly-contested mountain was still ours.

4) Events in the last days of August

While the fighting on the Rombon declined into skirmishing, the Italians attempted at midnight on 27-28 August to take the Vrsic position by a major surprise attack. Thanks to the vigilance of the defenders, this night offensive was fended off through dawn. Around 6:00 AM a second attack was launched and failed. As revenge for this setback, the Italians pounded the gallant soldiers of LW IR # 21 with artillery fire for several hours thereafter.

The enemy made one more thrust against the main position on the Rombon on 29 August, and in the evening of the 30th struck the valley position. Both attacks failed, and ended the Italians'
unsuccessful August campaign in the Flitsch area.

After a short pause in the actions south of Krn, there was renewed action in front of the Tolmein bridgehead; the Italian 7 ID, reinforced by Alpini, directed its attacks mainly against 8 Mtn Bde in an attempt to secure the much-contested heights of Sv. Maria and # 588. In repeated thrusts during the night of 21-22 August, however, the enemy was unable to advance beyond the obstacles in front of the defenders' positions. In the morning of the 22nd the Italians directed a massed fire by about 15 batteries against this sector of the front, just 1 ½ km wide; it lasted until darkness fell. During the night their infantry tried several times to break through, but were completely defeated; the Austrian artillery played a major role in this success with effective fire from the Lom plateau and against the enemy flanks. After 23 August, Italian activity was restricted to operations by sappers against the Aus-Hung. positions plus artillery bombardment.

They tried again to take the Tolmein bridgehead in the last days of August, this time from the north. After a stronger artillery preparation, on the morning of the 28th they launched five assaults in succession against 3 Mtn Bde on the Mrzli vrh, the Sleme ridge, and in the Isonzo valley at Dolje. 8 ID, reinforced by Alpini and Bersaglieri, suffered heavy casualties. In the afternoon the enemy fire against the Krn-Selo front increased to an unprecedented intensity. Directed mainly against the positions on the heights, it blew away the barbed wire obstacles and destroyed all the trenches. After dark, around 8:00 PM, four regiments made a full-scale assault, and managed to penetrate some of the positions. Local reserves and a Bosnian battalion were able to drive the enemy out of all sectors in difficult counterattacks during the night. The enemy detachments that didn't withdraw in time were cut off within our lines and destroyed by the embittered Bosniaks. After this defeat the Italians remained relatively quiet until they renewed their offensive in September.

5) Events in the western sector of Rohr's Armeegruppe

While the left wing of Armeegruppe Rohr, especially 44 LW ID, was hard pressed during the fighting on the upper Isonzo, the front on the Carinthian crest enjoyed almost complete quiet. This made it possible to make some changes to the order of battle in late August.

Between 24 and 27 August, the 12 Mtn Bde arrived at Oberdrauburg
from the Doberdo plateau. In exchange, the 2 ½ battalions of IR # 43 which had remained with GM Fernengel's Group, along with two March battalions of 92 ID (X/IR # 27 and IX/LW IR # 3), were given up to 5th Army. While they departed, 12 Mtn Bde joined 48 ID at the start of September. At the same time the borders of the reorganized sectors were altered: 57 and 59 Mtn Bde both came under GM Fernengel's Sector II. Simultaneously the majority of the troops from the Carinthian Volunteer Schützen Regiment were entering the front lines. GdK Rohr received further useful reinforcements in the form of two heavy and two mountain batteries as well as several small caliber naval landing guns that were particularly suitable for mountain warfare. Since it was intended to hold the present lines indefinitely, a number of obsolete but still serviceable cannon (M.75/96) were brought up from the rear areas and installed as stationary pieces in the foremost lines. Although their range was limited, they provided direct fire support to the nearby infantry.

This period of relative calm, which had lasted since mid-July, also enabled the units to fill their ranks; by the end of August two-thirds of the battalions had reached their full authorized wartime strength. Only the heavily engaged 44 LW ID remained far below this level.

4. The summer fighting in Tyrol

a. The Italian Dolomite offensive

When the first Italian attack against the Dolomite front ended after its defeat on 18 June, General Nava's 4th Army initiated a pause in the fighting. Meanwhile they brought up heavier guns from the Italian fortresses while preparing for a new offensive. The goal of this attack, which was to start on 5 July, was the occupation of the area bounded by Toblach and the Sella Group. The Italians decided that their first step would be to suppress the permanent works in this area.

The July fighting

The IX Corps had already been able to advance nearly up to the works at Ruaz, Corte and Tre Sassi in their first offensive. Ist Corps now had to bring their line up to Plätzwiese, Landro and Sexten. For this purpose, 10 ID deployed in the wide area between Mt Peralba and the Popena valley. 2 ID, on both sides of Cortina d'Ampezzo, would thrust northwest toward the Rau valley.
IX Corps (17 and 18 ID) would send one column apiece against the works at Tre Sassi, the Settsass height, and the Col di Lana; apparently the purpose of this thrust was to break into the Abtei valley.\textsuperscript{553}

On 5 July the artillery of 4\textsuperscript{th} Italian Army began to bombard the Austrian defenses. The infantry advanced on the 7\textsuperscript{th}.

The right wing of 10 ID made several unsuccessful thrusts against the Königswand, which lies 5 km west of the Tiliach Joch; the fighting started on 9 July, and halted temporarily on the 12\textsuperscript{th}. On the 18\textsuperscript{th} the Italians renewed their attack between the Wildkaarleck and the Eisenreich amid fog and a snow storm; they reached the barbed wire of the defenders, but here were stopped by the alert garrison - Standschützen and gendarmerie of 56 Mtn Bde, plus some reserves from the German Alpenkorps.\textsuperscript{554} The Austrians' forward position in the Sexten valley didn't come under attack, and remained connected with the main defensive line.

There was livelier fighting on Mt Piano, which overlooked the Höhlenstein valley and blocked the Italian approach toward Forts Landro and Plätzwiese. In eight days of combat (15 to 22 July), the western column of 10 Italian ID tried to secure this mountain. On the 18\textsuperscript{th} they were able to break into a position on the western slope; on the 20\textsuperscript{th} they circled farther north and advanced up to the Austrian guns. However, the Italians were again pushed back in heavy hand-to-hand fighting by fortress detachments of IR # 14 and the Landes-Schützen.\textsuperscript{555} The enemy tried again on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} but were defeated again; then they felt that further efforts would be fruitless and stopped attacking.

Meanwhile volunteer "Alpine detachments" had been created from the Landes-Schützen detachments; in a brilliant mountain-climbing feat they established themselves on the northern slope of Mt Cristallo. This secured the western flank of the Mt Piano position, and made it possible for our troops to use the road between Schluderbach and Rufredo.

Farther west, the Italians were trying to take the Travenanzes sector, which was defended by the garrison at Tre Sassi (three Landsturm and four Standschützen companies) and a battalion of the Bavarian Leib IR. The Italian 2 ID of Ist Corps attacked the Tofana ridge from the east. 17 ID of IX Corps advanced from the

\textsuperscript{553}Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, pp. 337 ff. 
\textsuperscript{554}"Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege 1914/1918" (Munich, 1923), p. 214 
\textsuperscript{555}Feuerstein, "Dolomiten-kämpfe" (Mil. wiss. Mitt. for 1925, p. 491)
south toward the difficult mountain paths leading from Val Costeana into the Travenanzes valley, as well as against Tre Sassi. In stubborn actions which lasted from 7 to 10 July, both sides had to use the skills of high Alpine climbing. The Italians were able to establish themselves on Tofana III and II, and on Height # 2547 (Cima di Falzarego).

18 ID advanced into the wide sector between the Buchenstein ruins and the Coda Grande (11 km northeast of Fiera di Primiero), making their main effort on the right wing. Between 7 and 9 July, several battalions stormed the forward position of the Col di Lana; others attacked the Sasso si Stria and the neighboring Lagazuoi position on the 9th and 10th. Although these efforts failed, they forced the defenders to reinforce the weak garrison of the Buchenstein area (three German Jaeger and four Standschützen companies plus some gendarmerie) with reserves. Moreover, on 11 July the entire sector of 51 Mtn Bde was placed under the commander of the 1st Bavarian Jaeger Brigade (GM Ritter von Tutschek), while the defenders pulled back in the western part of the zone. Aided by fresh troops, the garrison of Col di Lana repulsed all the daily attacks which occurred from 15 to 20 July. Then the Italians were systematically driven from the Travenanzes valley, an operation which was completed on the 27th. The recapture of the Cima di Falzarego was postponed due to a lack of artillery; later this project was completely abandoned.

Since the Col di Lana was almost surrounded on three sides, GdK Dankl again returned to his plan to shorten the long front along the Pordoijoch by advancing somewhat to the east. Complete implementation of this idea was still impossible due to political considerations (the proximity of the Italian frontier limited the employment of the Alpenkorps). However, on the foggy afternoon of 29 July the troops were at least able to move ahead to the line Sasso di Mezzodi-Cherz without fighting. This made it possible to use the road leading from the Pordoijoch through Arabba into the Gader valley and provided space for the deployment of batteries.

The August fighting

Although two Italian attacks - the first on 5-11 July, the second from the 15th to the 20th - had failed, 4th Army opened a third attempt on 31 July to reach its objectives. This attack caught the Tyrol Land Defense command in an especially critical moment, because all the Aus-Hung. reserve troops had been sent to the

Isonzo. 8 ID, moreover, which had been moving to Tyrol, was diverted to 5th Army.

The Italian operation was initiated by heavy artillery fire against the old works at Landro and Corte; they reduced the latter fort to a pile of ruins. The main objective was once more the forward bastion of the Dolomite front, the Col di Lana. Yet on 2 August some German Jaeger companies repulsed the attack of 18 Italian ID. The defenders' batteries, which had moved forward after the front advanced to Arabba, effectively supported the action from a flanking position. In the evening of 4 August, after a powerful bombardment, the Italian battalions again rushed against the ruined trenches. They entered the position, but were driven out in a wild hand-to-hand action. After this bloody night, the Italians called the Col di Lana the "Col di sangue" ("Blood Mountain"). The weakened Italian detachments dug in 200 paces from the defenders' position; here they rested while their heavy guns continued their destructive work. At this point the work at Ruaz suffered the fate which earlier had befallen Fort Corte. Ruaz was mostly evacuated, but maintained as a decoy, which afterward often caused the enemy to waste ammunition. On 9 and 15 August the Italians thrust against the position on the ridge between the Col di Lana and Mt Sief, but without success.

Farther east, on 3 August the Italian 17 ID pushed back the defenders of the passage between the Tofana I and II, which endangered the supply line to the already hard-pressed troops in the Travenanzes valley. On the 20th, the 17 ID attacked again; this was an attempt to widen the area already won on the Cima di Falzarego toward the north, which resulted only in heavy casualties.

The Ist Italian Corps again sent 2 ID toward Mt Piano during August. After two diversionary thrusts on the 2nd and 4th, they launched a strong attack on the 11th against the Austrian position in the Popena valley. In the evening they broke through on the western slope of Mt Piano. On the next day the Italians tried to exploit this success, which placed the defenders in a critical situation. After some tense actions, on the 13th the detachments of the Kaiser Jaeger, IR # 59 and Standschützen recovered their position by counterattacking. The Italians attacked twice more on the 15th, but couldn't alter the situation.

Between the Höhlenstein and the Sexten valley, several Alpini

558 Pichler, p. 59
559 Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, p. 356
battalions of Ist Corps fought a series of difficult, continuous actions from 14 to 17 August; they were able to capture the advanced position in front of the granite peaks of the Drei Zinnen massif. On the 17th and again on the 19th they attacked the main position of the XI March Bn/L-Sch Regt # III on the Tobling Pass, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

The right wing of 10 ID, reinforced by parts of the Army's reserve (1 ID), attacked on 4 August in the Sexten sector, after powerful artillery preparation that covered the area up to the village of Sexten. They struck north of the road toward the Seikofl Heights and Rotheck. However, detachments from IR # 14 and the Bavarian Leib IR, plus Innsbruck Standschützen, gave the Italians such a bloody reception that they refrained from further attacks until September. Nonetheless, the enemy's artillery fire continued; it was directed mainly against the hamlet of Sexten, which by mid-August was only a smoking pile of rubble.

Despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of 4th Italian Army, and the self-sacrifice of many of its individual soldiers, at the end of August they still hadn't achieved their objective, the Puster valley railroad. This was due to the heroic action of the defenders of Tyrol, reinforced by German battalions.

b. The Italian attack in Val Sugana and on the plateau of Folgaria-Lavarone

Although at this point Cadorna didn't fear an Austrian thrust out of south Tyrol, the danger of such an operation wouldn't be totally laid to rest as long as the Austrians were in possession of the fortified assembly point at Folgaria and Lavarone. The Italians' first offensive push hadn't overcome these works. Now they were supposed to be subdued, and the northwest edge of the plateau would be taken up to the line Cimone # 1528 (south of Caldonazo)-Sommo alto (southeast of Folgaria).\(^{560}\) This task was entrusted to V Corps of 1st Army; its 15 ID would attack into and on both sides of the Val Sugana, while 34 ID thrust toward Lavarone and 9 ID toward Folgaria.

The strength of the unit defending the Val Sugana, 52 Half Bde, hadn't changed since May. 180 Inf Bde, stationed on the plateau, had been reinforced by a March battalion and two Upper Austrian Rifle Battalions which consisted of very young volunteers. Also the sector held by this Brigade had been sub-divided; the eastern

portion was placed under Col. Ritter von Ellison of the Engineering Staff.

The advance of 15 ID was supposed to divert the attention of the defenders from the main attack against Lavarone and Folgaria. It began under the protection of a mass of artillery and was carried out by four groups (on Mt Lisser, at Cast. Teino, on the Agaro, and in the Vanoi and Cismon valleys). Without fighting, the Italians reached the Civaron heights (southeast of Borgo) and the villages of Strigno and Bieno by August 16; any further advance would be outside the range of their fixed artillery. Perhaps because of the active screening operation of the k.u.k. covering troops the enemy had no idea that the main Austrian defensive line lay much further west, on the heights of Sommo, Panarotta and Kreuzspitz.

On 15 August the Italian artillery also began a destructive bombardment against the works on the plateau; Cimma di Venezza was reduced to rubble and Lusern was heavily damaged. However, the artillery and other assets of these forts had already been moved to well-constructed caverns in the same area; these were much more secure defensive positions which could withstand bombardment.

9 ID began its attack on 17 August, but was immediately pinned down in front of two observation posts - one on the Coston (manned by half a company) and the other by Mga. Milegna (held by about 40 men). Supported by the invulnerable artillery which had been moved from the forts, these posts heroically resisted all the attacks of the overwhelming enemy force through the 19th. Then the handful of Landes-Schützen and of Kufstein Standschützen fell back as ordered from the Mga. Milegna to Mt Maronia; on the next day the Alpini stormed the empty Mga. Milegna. The outpost on the Coston, however, remained secure despite an attack by two battalions on the 20th.

After a pause of four days, the entire Italian V Corps made a new attack. In the Sugana valley, 15 ID occupied the Armenterra ridge, Borgo and the Salubio on 24 August without fighting. 34 ID thrust against the works of Cima di Vezzena and Verle, which they believed had been neutralized by the strong bombardment, and the field fortification at Basson. In a vicious fight that lasted all night and into the next morning, the Italians suffered a complete defeat.\footnote{The enemy broke into the strong point at Basson, but were driven out personally by Col. Otto Ritter Ellison von Nidle and just five officers of his staff. The Colonel received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria}
Upper Austrian battalions endured their baptism of fire in glorious fashion. The Italian 9 ID had to be content with moving their lines forward slightly in front of Mt Maronia.

By the end of August it was clear that the Italian offensive against the plateau of Folgaria-Lavarone had been repulsed. This defensive victory was due primarily to the extraordinary steadfastness and bravery of the handful of defenders. However, they were aided by the fact that the Italians undertook their attacks against their various objectives at different times. This permitted the defenders to move their weak artillery to all of the threatened points as needed. The lessons learned in these actions led the Tyrol Defense Command to transfer the artillery out of all the remaining Tyrolean forts - even the most modern - so that the guns could be protected by nearby field works.

c. Events in the Etsch valley and on Tyrol's western front

During the summer the Italians displayed the greatest caution in the Etsch valley, in front of Riva, and in the Judicarien. This was especially evident in the last-named sector, where 6 ID remained outside the range of the Austrian guns. The great distance between the two positions offered opportunities for brave high mountain detachments to carry out patrols and raids, which centered mainly around good spots for observation and artillery spotting. Only Rovereto became a target; although it was a center of irredentist sentiment, the Italian artillery bombarded it so powerfully that the population had to evacuate the town.

The 5 Italian ID was more active. They had been ordered by III Corps HQ to capture the Tonale Pass, then the Gross Naglerspitze and Mt Scorluzzo in the Ortler sector.

After six days of bombardment (15 to 20 August), the Italian infantry and Alpini struck the position at the Tonale Pass on the 21st. Three battalions made the main assault on the pass itself on a wide front, while on the flanks other groups moved against the C. di Bedole, Lake Presena, and the Laghetti Heights. Thanks to the hard-fighting 54 Half Bde, the Italian offensive was stopped soon after it had begun. The defenders were supported by effective fire from the fixed guns, despite the heavy damage which had been done to the forts.

Theresia Order as a reward for this extraordinary deed of heroism.

The offensive in the Ortler sector never actually got started.\footnote{Italian official history, Vol. II, Text, p. 336}

At the end of August 1915 the defenders of Tyrol could boast that they hadn't lost an inch of their territory to the enemy in the summer fighting. On the contrary, in several places (south of the Stilfserjoch, on the Folgaria plateau, east of the Pordoijoch, on Mt Piano and at the Kreuzberg Pass) our own lines had been moved forward. This defensive success is all the more remarkable because the troops in Tyrol consisted of just 44 ½ battalions,\footnote{24 of the battalions had just 3 companies; however, several battalions had attached gendarmerie organized as companies or platoons.} 132 Standschützen companies, 42 ½ mobile field and mountain batteries, 3 heavy batteries and 559 fixed guns.\footnote{Two thirds of the fixed guns were old pieces dating from the years 1861 to 1880.} On the other side, the Italian 1\textsuperscript{st} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Armies had 283 battalions, 81 field batteries, 25 mountain batteries, and more than 8 heavy batteries.\footnote{These figures are based on the Italian order of battle at the start of the war. However, by the end of the August many heavy guns had been brought up from fortresses in the interior; their number is unknown.} Despite their enormous numerical superiority, the enemy had never been able to break through the defenses.

5. An analysis of the first campaigns against Italy

The later course of events on the battlefields doesn't change the fact that the intervention of Italy in the war represented a deadly danger to Austria-Hungary. Unlike works such as those of Prussian General von Kuhl,\footnote{Kuhl, Vol. I, pp. 210 ff.} the present volume will not consider the political and ethical aspects of the actions of our former ally - the reasons why the Italians at first were neutral and then went over to the enemy's camp. As was true in our treatment of other topics, we discuss political questions only when they have direct impact on the conduct of the military leadership. For the same reason, we aren't addressing the issue of whether the Central Powers might have been able to persuade their former ally to pursue a different course. However, we did find it necessary in an earlier chapter to cite the evidence of eyewitnesses regarding the reaction of the leaders and population of the Danube Monarchy in the hour of the greatest emergency, when Italy entered the war at Pentecost in 1915. The proud and bitter determination with which the troops conducted the defensive fighting against the new enemy cannot be understood without bearing in mind this initial popular reaction.
The first goal of the de facto commander of the Italian armies, G.Lt Cadorna, was to advance over the borders immediately after issuing the official mobilization orders and after the declaration of war. Since the Italians had been making their preparations for over nine months before entering the war, it is understandable that their new allies weren't being overly optimistic when they hoped that Italy would make a quick thrust that might decide the entire struggle. By the same token, the concerns of the leading personalities of the Central Powers, especially of Austria-Hungary, regarding the approach of their new opponent were justified. The fact that neither the hopes of the Entente nor the fears of the Austrians were realized is one of the greatest mysteries which have been analyzed by later students of the World War.

Cadorna's hesitation at the beginning

Certainly it must be conceded that despite the long period of preparation the readiness of the Italian army left much to be desired when the war broke out. On 26 May — the day when the Italians had promised the Entente they would enter the fighting — barely half the divisions stood on the border, prepared to attack. The lack of wartime experience also compelled the Italian leaders to be cautious when approaching an enemy that had become accustomed to fighting. Nonetheless, based on our present knowledge of the situation there is no doubt that a bolder and less methodical commander than Cadorna would have been able to overrun the defenders at any given point. At Pentecost he had 400,000 combat troops on the Venetian border, and this number would double in the next three weeks. The Italians were initially opposed by 100,000 Landsturm soldiers, whom they could have defeated before the arrival of veteran Austrian units from other fronts. The prospects for success were as favorable as those enjoyed by any commander in world military history. The deliberate Italian general, however, let the moment pass.

It is conceivable that from the outset Cadorna was oppressed by the strategic difficulties imposed by the geography of the theater of operations. The Italian Army saw itself in a deep sack, with the sea on one side and the Alps on the other. The Austrian bastion of south Tyrol menaced the rear of the large forces mobilizing in Venetia. Although the insufficient railroad net in the Alps made it impossible for the Austrians to quickly assemble many units in Tyrol, the danger couldn't be

568Besides the works already cited in this volume, see also Alberti, "L'azione militare", pp. 31 ff. and 47 ff.
Therefore it is understandable that Cadorna was worried about the security of his offensive on the Isonzo against a counterattack from the flank or rear. Nevertheless it may be questioned whether the Italian commander was therefore correct to deploy two of his four armies "in cordon positions to cover the entire front, with only half his available strength on the Isonzo." In this connection Clausewitz had remarked: "War...always has some of the characteristics of a game of chance. The commander who has no taste for taking any risk and therefore chooses to stay behind the line has less chance of winning any military victory than he realizes."

**Cadorna's choice of an objective**

The most important task which Cadorna initially assigned to his army was the capture of the Adriatic metropolis of Trieste. The motivation behind this decision was primarily political. Perhaps it was also due in part to the military convention of 16 May between Italy and Russia, in which the former power pledged that its army would seek to link up with the Serbs in southwest Hungary. The capture of Trieste, especially if accompanied by an amphibious operations farther south on the Adriatic coast, would indeed have been a powerful blow to the Monarchy. Nevertheless, it must be considered whether another direction of attack might have led to a quicker and more complete military victory.

Actually Cadorna's first offensive in the Karst area was accompanied by two other operations - their respective objectives were the Puster valley at Toblach and the Tarvis-Villach area. General Alberti feels that Toblach was the only goal that could have led to a quick decision from a purely theoretical viewpoint. However, there were grave strategic and tactical drawbacks: the threat of a flanking counterattack from Tyrol and the difficult terrain. Therefore Cadorna was correct not to make his main effort in this area. Alberti is also in error when he states that the failure to advance into the Pustertal at the start of the war forced the Italian Army to pursue an attrition strategy thereafter. It is true that Archduke Eugene and Boroevic were building a stronger defensive front on the Isonzo

---

569 In his farewell speech to the Austrian National Assembly on 10 September 1919, the German-speaking delegate from south Tyrol, Reut-Nicolussi, was partly correct when he referred to the "historical fact" that during the World War "the entire Aus-Hung. armed forces made three attempts" to mount a decisive attack from south Tyrol against the Italians' flank and rear, but failed each time. (Reut-Nicolussi, "Tirol unerm Beil" (Munich, 1928), p. 29)


571 Alberti, pp. 47 ff.
by mid-June and that a quick blow in this sector would no longer have broken the Austrian line. But there were still possibilities of success in the direction of Tarvis and Villach; if the weak forces holding the border here had been driven away, the Isonzo front would also have collapsed. In 1797 Napoleon had selected this route and had quickly reached Leoben. Unfortunately for Cadorna, the operation which he initiated in this sector in the first weeks of the war lacked the necessary impetus. Meanwhile the thrust toward Toblach never really got started.

Conrad's strategy

While Cadorna's daring left something to be desired, Conrad displayed that he had more than enough of this characteristic. In the days leading up to the war he refused to yield to pessimism. His first plan was to let the Italians pass over the Karst and the Julian Alps along the border, but then he would hit them as they emerged from the mountains using 20 divisions which would meanwhile have been assembled. Such a plan was the natural product of a commander who never allowed the enemy to keep the initiative for a long period. However, the suitability of this concept has almost unanimously been criticized. Kuhl, in particular, raised the valid point that the cautious Italians would have crossed up the plan by failing to move out of the mountains to meet the Central Powers' units lurking at the other end. The result would have been as predicted by Falkenhayn in his memoirs: "By concentrating forces for an ambush in the mountain basins [of Laibach and Villach-Klagenfurt], we would have made it impossible to achieve anything decisive against either Russia, Serbia or Italy, since the enemy would be unlikely to advance as we wanted them to." Moreover, it is also questionable whether a considerably-weakened front in Russia would have been able to hold out long enough for a victory to be won by the army sent against Italy. In the event, the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff finally conceded the worth of the arguments of his German colleague and instead brought corps from the Balkans to the Isonzo.

A war of attrition begins in the southwest

The Italians didn't make their first great attack until a week after the k.u.k. 5th Army completed its deployment by Görz and in Friaul. Although the attackers still enjoyed a substantial numerical superiority, they lacked wartime experience; this was a major reason why the defenders were able to repulse the offensive.

572Falkenhayn, p. 80
without enduring any strain. However, the II Battle of the Isonzo, in which the Italians attacked with elan under the leadership of resolute officers, was already much more difficult. There were critical hours in which the outcome of the fighting seemed to hang by a thread. Finally the incomparable bravery of the Aus-Hung. troops was sufficient to halt the enemy despite their enormously larger forces.

At the start of August the exhausted combatants on the central Isonzo and in the wilderness of the Karst at Doberdo laid down their arms. It was clear to both high commands that this part of the front, where their main forces were now committed, would require special strategic and tactical methods. This was due to its constricted size, which made large-scale maneuvers impossible, and its unique terrain.

Under these conditions, Cadorna was glad to abandon any thought of an offensive with wide-ranging goals and to adopt a strategy of toilsome attrition. Such a strategy was anyway more consistent with his way of thinking. The decision was all the easier for him, since time — at the very least — wasn't working against the Italians. They had a vast reservoir of reserve manpower on which to draw, backed up by the industrial resources of almost the entire world. On the other hand, by 1917 the condition of the Italian Army would prove that the attrition strategy had very harmful effects on its morale.

The Aus-Hung. leadership also drew the necessary conclusions from the events thus far. GdI Boroevic, the commander on the main battlefield, rather easily decided that the next actions would also have to be fought strictly on the defensive; he expected to prevail as long as he was given only the most necessary reinforcements. Since III Corps was being sent to him by rail, he could look forward to the next round with confidence. On the other hand, GO Conrad as well as the HQ of Southwest Front were unhappy about sending further divisions into the all-consuming inferno on the Isonzo without winning anything but defensive victories. The Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff never abandoned the idea of a counterattack in grand style, but its implementation was still in the future. First he would have to bring the gigantic campaign against Russia to a decisive conclusion. Also the tense situation on the Dardanelles made it desirable to prepare an offensive against Serbia, by which the Central Powers and their new Bulgarian allies hoped to open the way to the Golden Horn.

L. Appendices to the Second Volume
# 1 - Regarding Italian intentions in 1914

In Section G-1-b-(1) ("Italy's military forces and plans") we have included a telegram of Italian Chief of Staff Cadorna that in fact didn't exist in the form shown. FM Conrad included it in the IV Volume of his memoirs (p. 176), and obtained it from the Aus-Hung. "Red Book" (p. 35). Actually Cadorna had replied to Conrad's letter of 1 August 1914 ("Aus meiner Dienstzeit", Vol. IV, p. 158) only with a letter of his own, dated 3 August. It appears in Alberti's study "General Falkenhayn" (German translation published in Berlin, 1924 - p. 93). Cadorna actually replied that because his government had declared its neutrality he was unable to answer Conrad's questions "at this moment."

However, on the same day in which Cadorna sent his reply to Conrad he had a conversation with the Aus-Hung. Military Attaché Col. Graf Szeptycki; the latter reported the discussion both by telegram and in writing to Vienna. His telegram appears in the Aus-Hung. red book and thus also in Conrad's book (Vol. IV, p. 176), erroneously attributed to Cadorna. It reads:

"The reply to [Conrad's] letter [of 1 August] includes a refusal because of neutrality. The classes of 1890, 1889 and the rest of 1891 called up today, goal lightly armed neutrality. Have received personal assurance from the Chief of the General Staff that, if Lovcen and the balance of power in the Adriatic Sea are respected by Austria-Hungary, Italy will never turn against us."

Szeptycki's written report to Vienna states:

"The call-up of the classes of 1890, 1889 and the rest of 1891 is intended to bring the Army up to its normal strength, which has been so greatly reduced by the Libyan sickness [i.e. by the campaign in Libya]. For now there is no intention to call up further classes of draftees. Italy doesn't consider itself to have left the Triple Alliance, but feels that this war isn't a casus foederis. I asked why there would be armed neutrality, and against whom were the arms directed. Were they directed against us? The answer was: "No, because we would never utilize an opportunity to seize provinces from Austria-Hungary in a moment when it was busy elsewhere. However, if Austria-Hungary should occupy the Lovcen or disrupt the balance of power in the Adriatic to our disadvantage, we then - and only then - would ask why this had occurred. Since Austria-Hungary had enough to do with Russia and Serbia, the Lovcen won't be an issue and the Adriatic balance of power won't be upset." I asked further, "Could Your Excellency give me an assurance, that if we
remove troops from Tyrol Italy won't stab us in the back?"
The answer: "That will never happen; you can tell your
Chief that the troops can leave Tyrol without worry. How
can you address such a question and cast so much doubt on
our loyalty?" (My question had been intentionally
sharp)..."

Szeptycki's report ended with his impressions and interpretation
of the situation. Besides the sources already mentioned, further
information about this matter appears in the Vienna
"Fremdenblatt" of 24 July 1915.

# 2 - Regarding the initial fighting on the Isonzo

Section I-4-c ("First fighting between Plava and the sea") raises
an issue regarding whether or not the Italians were able to
maintain two battalions east of the Isonzo at the close of their
fight with 1 Mtn Bde on 9 June. The Italian official history
(Vol II, Text, p. 102) states that they did, but Aus-Hung.
reports dating from that time state that they didn't. Now it
appears that the Italian official history is correct, based on
the testimony of an eyewitness, Lt Col Seifert of the Deutsch-
meister IR (in "Deutschmeister-Zeitung", July 1931). See also
Hoen, Waldstätten-Zipperer and Seiffert, "Die Deutschmeister",
pp. 542 ff.

# 3 - Major troop movements by rail, May to August 1915
(In the original, this material makes up Beilage 21)
Months shown are those in which the movement was initiated

MAY 1915
. Arrival of German units for Gorlice offensive
   . 19 ID - From Petrikau to E of Cracow (64 trains)
   . 20 ID - From Opatowitz to E of Cracow (64 trains)
   . 56 ID - From Kadrzin to E of Cracow (65 trains)
. Transfer of units from center of our eastern front to the two
   wings
   . III Corps (22 & 28 ID) - From Bartfeld to Kolomea (152
      trains)
   . Bolzano's Bde - From Jasliska to Lawoczne (9 trains)
   . 21 ID - From Mezőlaborcz to Tarnow (66 trains)
   . 37 ID - From Ungvar to Tarnow (45 trains)
   . VII Corps HQ and 41 ID - From Ungvar to Szczucin (67
      trains)
. Arrival of German unit in the Balkans
. 101 ID - From Oderberg to Versecz (55 trains)
. 103 ID - From Oderberg to N. Becskerek (56 trains)
. 105 ID - From Oswiecim to Ujvidek/Essegg (63 trains)
. Building the Italian front
. 57 ID - Sid to the Isonzo (60 trains)
. 59 Mtn Bde - Cracow to Ober-Drauburg (7 trains)
. VII Corps (20 & 17 ID) - Mezőlaborcz to Villach (145 trains)
. XV Corps HQ - Peterwardein to Tolmein (32 trains)
. 50 ID - Indjija to Tolmein (68 trains)
. 1 ID - Ruma to Pragerhof (81 trains)
. XVI Corps HQ - Brcko to Görz (38 trains)
. 58 ID - Brcko to Görz (73 trains)
. 18 ID - Sid to Görz (73 trains)
. 48 ID - Alt-Pazua to St Daniel (73 trains)
. Various assets of 5th Army - Bosnia to Laibach (97 trains)
. German Alpenkorps - Rosenheim to Brenner Pass (181 trains)
. 14 Mtn Bde - Ruma to Pola (10 trains)

JUNE 1915
. Arrival of German units for Lemberg campaign
. 22 ID - From Oswiecim to Jaroslau (64 trains)
. 8 Bav Res ID - From Oderberg to Jaroslau (53 trains)
. 44 Res ID - From Oderberg to Jaroslau (65 trains)
. 107 ID - From Oswiecim to Jaroslau (44 trains)
. Movement of German units from Balkans to eastern front
. 101 ID - From Ruma to Stryj (77 trains)
. 105 ID - From Ujvidek to Lawoczne (67 trains)
. Departure of German units from the Aus-Hung. eastern front
. 56 ID - 61 trains
. 8 Bav Res ID - 53 trains
. Reinforcements to Italy
. 44 ID - Mezőlaborcz to the Isonzo (39 trains)
. Shifts behind Italian front
. Parts of VII Corps - Carinthia to Görz (19 trains)
. 44 ID - Dornberg to Villach (20 trains)

JULY 1915
. Arrival of reinforcements in the East
. 103 German ID (from south Hungary!) - From Palanka to Lemberg (55 trains)
. German Gd CD - From Oderberg to Jaroslau (35 trains)
. 202 Hon Inf Bde - From Szaszregen to Kolomea (8 trains)
. 3 CD (from German eastern front) - From Oderberg to Kolomea (57 trains)
. Shifting of 1st Army from the Vistula to the Bug
. 46 ID - From Tarnobrzeg to Kulikow (83 trains)
. 25 ID - From Ostrowiec to Lemberg (69 trains)
. 1st Army HQ, I & II Corps HQ, and 4 ID - From Tarnobrzeg to Lemberg (187 trains)
. Reinforcements to Italy
  . 10 Mtn Bde - Ung.-Weisskirchen to Görz (10 trains)
  . 14 Mtn Bde (from garrison) - Pola to Görz (10 trains)
  . 61 ID - Brcko to Görz (54 trains)
  . 59 ID - Initially from Brcko to Ruma (66 trains), then Ruma to the Isonzo (59 trains)
  . 19 Lst Mtn Bde - Gunja to Prvacina (15 trains)
  . 88 L-Sch Bde - Kolomea to the Isonzo (8 trains)
  . 8 ID - Krasnik to Prvacina (41 trains)
. Shifts behind Italian front
  . 20 ID - Kronau to Prvacina (13 trains)
  . Half of 48 ID - Reifenberg to Ober-Drauburg (25 trains)
  . 17 ID - Ober-Drauburg to St Daniel (60 trains)

AUGUST 1915
. Reinforcements to Italy
  . III Corps (22 & 28 ID) - Horodenka to the Isonzo (155 trains)
. Shifts behind Italian front
  . 12 Mtn Bde - Nabresina to Ober-Drauburg (27 trains)
  . 93 ID - Nabresina to Caldonazzo (23 trains)
. Moved from Italy to the Balkans
  . 61 ID - Versecz to Brcko (71 trains)