AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S LAST WAR, 1914-1918

(ÖSTERREICH-UNGARNS LETZTER KRIEG, 1914-1918)

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OUTBREAK OF WAR TO THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE OF LIMANOWA-LAPANOW

With 27 leaflets and 56 sketches

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I. Arming for the Great Trial of Arms

*(see volume 1 leaflets 1-5)*

A. Preparations in Peacetime

1. Measures taken for the various war possibilities

Of all the countries which bordered Austria-Hungary, it had been obvious since at least 1909 that three were open enemies: Russia and its two Balkan client states Serbia and Montenegro. However, the Austrian General Staff could not restrict its wartime planning merely to these three states. There was a possibility of war with two other neighbors. Italy, like Austria, had been a member of the Triple Alliance since 1882, but its adherence to the alliance had been dubious since at least the turn of the century. Romania had concluded a secret military convention with Austria-Hungary in 1883 and had renewed it several times, but since the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 it had begun to change sides. As recently as December 1912, GdI Freiherr von Conrad had visited Bucharest to conduct negotiations regarding a common Austro-Romanian campaign against Russia. However, since the summer of 1913 his hopes of such assistance were considerably lessened. He had even less hope in the fulfillment of the agreements concluded in the winter between the Central Powers and Italy; these involved the use of three Italian corps and two cavalry divisions in Alsace in the event of a Franco-German war.

Surrounded by spiteful and covetous enemies and by unreliable friends, the Danube Monarchy had only one certain ally—Germany, which for its part regarded the Monarchy as its own only reliable supporter. In this difficult situation, Conrad since 1907 had been proposing a desperate solution: to break through the ring of enemies at a favorable moment by launching a preventive attack against at least one of them before the threatened encirclement of the Central Powers was complete. However, Conrad's plans had not been adopted by the peace-loving

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3 Ibid., Vol III p. 85 ff.
Emperor Franz Josef I, the heir apparent Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and other responsible statesmen.

As these dangerous storm clouds gathered on the political horizon of the Danube Monarchy, the Aus-Hung General Staff did not make technical preparations to resist a simultaneous attack from three directions (Russia, the Balkans and Italy). It felt that the Monarchy simply could not cope with such a situation, and hoped that the diplomats would be able to avoid it. As Conrad surveyed a series of international setbacks, however, he began to mistrust his diplomatic colleagues. Meanwhile the crises of 1908-09 and of 1912-13 had made it clear that regardless of whether either Great Power (Russia or Italy) would make war on Austria, it was certain that Serbia would join any enemies of the Habsburg Monarchy. Therefore both war plans "R" (for Russia) and "I" (for Italy) had to include a contingency plan "B" (for the Balkans). Moreover, since the conclusion of the Peace of Bucharest (1913) the planners also had to reckon with the adherence of Romania to either Russia or to the two Serbian kingdoms. In the following narrative, only plans "R" and "B" are discussed in detail, since plan "I" was never carried out. The actual deployment of our armies against Italy in 1915 took place under completely altered circumstances that could not have been anticipated in peacetime. Warlike preparations against Romania were restricted to setting up a security force in Transylvania to hold this border land at all costs during implementation of plan "R."

Since 1909, Conrad had been in agreement with the German Chief of the General Staff, GO von Moltke, that in a two-front war Germany would first direct the bulk of its army against its enemies in the West. Moltke hoped to be able to conquer France in the quickest possible time, approximately six weeks from the start of operations. Then the Germans could send powerful forces to the Eastern Front. Until that time Austria-Hungary - perhaps together with Romania - would have to bear the brunt of the anticipated Russian offensive. The only first-line German

5 Conrad, op. cit., I - 383, 387
6 See the written agreements between GdI Conrad and the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Alexander Averescu, on 30 November 1912 (Conrad, ibid., II - 363 ff.). As part of plan "R", the Romanian Army would mobilize with 4 corps in the area Birlat-Focsani-Tecuciu, 1 corps by Roman, 3 or 4 reserve divisions by Buzeu, and 1 reserve division in the Dobruja.
forces available in the East at the outset would be 12 to 14 divisions, supported by 5 infantry divisions of the second line.

These agreements between the allies meant that under plan "R" the main body of the Austro-Hungarian army - every available man - would be used against Russia. However, the crises of 1908-09 and 1912-13 had shown that it was possible that if Austria-Hungary made war on Serbia, Russia might willingly or unwillingly remain neutral at the outset, giving the Habsburg Monarchy an opportunity to send greater forces against its enemies in the south. The extent to which it would be possible to utilize this opportunity depended to a large extent on the configuration and capacities of the railroad net.

**Austria-Hungary's Railroad Net**

The Austrian railroads had proved their usefulness already in the campaigns of 1859, 1864 and 1866. The Railroad Bureau of the General Staff had been created in 1865. Nonetheless, prior to passage of legislation in 1912 the legal basis for coordination between the General Staff and the various railroads (in peace or wartime) was uncertain. Naturally the railroad companies built their lines for the convenience of peacetime passengers and freight rather than for military considerations; the responsible government authorities were also very seldom willing to commit large funds for purely strategic railroads. The rivalry between the two halves of the Monarchy played a part here, for example in the failure to establish rail links between Dalmatia and the rest of cis-Leithania, and in the dispute regarding a direct line between Prussian Silesia and Hungary. The result was that in 1914 there were 54 rail lines leading to Germany and Switzerland, 5 to Italy, only 4 apiece to Russia and Romania, and just 1 to Serbia. The coast of Croatia and Dalmatia, although 500 km long, was not served by a single major railroad.

Despite these obstacles, the military railroad officials were determined to plan for the quickest and smoothest possible mobilization and initial deployment of forces. In this effort they were always supported by the understanding officials of the k.k. Railroad Ministry in Vienna and the k.u. Trade Ministry in

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7 Saurau and Meister-Keutnersheim, "Unsere Eisenbahnen im Weltkriege" (Vienna, 1924), p. 8 ff. Also Meister, "Geschichte des Eisenbahnbureaus" (Mitteilungen aus dem Eisenbahn- und Schiffahrtswesen im Weltkriege - Vienna 1918, September and October)
Budapest. The necessity for large-scale transfers of troops by rail after the initial mobilization was only a secondary concern. However, when the time came the railroad officials would soon prove successful in this endeavor also.

Until the turn of the century, the General Staff's preparations for war were geared almost entirely to hostilities with Russia. The energetic measures of the Chief of Staff at that time, FZM Freiherr von Beck, made possible the construction of important strategic lines to the northeast, without which the defense of the Carpathians would have been almost impossible. His successor GdI Conrad also turned his attention to Italy, and a relatively large number of lines were built into south Hungary. However, Hungary successfully resisted the construction of adequate rail connections to Bosnia-Herzegovina-Dalmatia (BHD), despite the fact that the two Balkan crises had demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing connections to those provinces. The failure to build railroads to Bosnia (and the inadequacy of the lines to Galicia) is in sharp contrast to the strong efforts of Russia - supported by French money - to increase its rail network. Especially in the southeast, Austria-Hungary would find the unfavorable railroad situation a handicap in the upcoming campaign.

The Mobilization Variants

The different possible openings of a conflict with Serbia and Russia forced the General Staff to devise a system of alternate mobilization plans. The 1100 battalions of the field army (along with supporting cavalry and artillery) were divided for planning purposes into 3 groups. The first, called the "A" group, was the most powerful; it consisted of 28 1/2 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions plus 21 Landsturm infantry and March brigades:

1. From Ist Corps District (Cracow) - 5 and 12 ID, 46 LW ID, 7th Cav Div, 106 and 110 Lst Bdes, 1st March Bde
2. From II Corps District (Vienna) - 1st and 4th Army HQ, 4 and 25 ID, 13 LW ID, 3rd Cav Div, 2 March Bde
3. From III Corps District (Graz) - 6 and 28 ID, 22 LW ID, 105 and 112 Lst Bdes, 3 March Bde
4. From V Corps District (Pressburg) - 3rd Army HQ, 14 and 33 ID, 37 Hon ID, 2 Cav Div, 100 Lst Bde; 5 March Bde; 7, 8

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8 Kiszling, "Österreich-Ungarns Kriegsvorbereitungen" (Militärwissenschaftliche und Technische Mitteilungen" (Vienna, 1922; p. 273 ff.)
This entire force was earmarked to fight Russia, and would be sent to Galicia during mobilization. The goal was to have the railroad deployment of this group completed by the 18th day of mobilization. (Under the mobilization order, a certain date would be selected as the first day of the deployment, and all other dates would be reckoned from this starting point.)

The second operational group envisaged in the mobilization plan was the "Balkan Minimal Group" of 8 infantry divisions plus 7 Landsturm and March Brigades. In every contingency its mission was to confront the two south Slav kingdoms, and it was strong enough to defend the borders using its own resources.

A third operational group, the "B" group, consisted of most of
the other army units. In the event that Russia remained neutral during a Balkan conflict, group "B" would be reinforced by two cavalry divisions from group "A" and would mobilize on the Serbian border. Its strength would ensure that the southern enemy would be decisively crushed. However, if the Tsar's Empire entered the fray immediately, group "B" would go to Galicia. In this contingency it would be available only after the 18th day of mobilization, since group "A" would have priority on the railroad net. The units for "B" were chosen from certain recruiting areas in such a way that if war was confined to the Balkans the borders against Russia, Romania and Italy would not be completely denuded of troops. Also it was planned that roughly equal numbers of cis- and trans-Leithanian troops would take the field for any partial mobilization. The "B" group consisted of 12 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions plus 6 Landsturm and March Brigades.

. From IV Corps District (Budapest) - 31 and 32 ID, 40 Hon ID, 10 Cav Div; 4 March Bde, 1 and 2 Hon March IR
. From VII Corps District (Temesvar) - 17 and 34 ID, 23 Hon ID; 102 Lst Bde, 7 March Bde; 3 and 4 Hon March IR
. From VIII Corps District (Prague) - 9 and 19 ID, 21 LW ID, 8 March Bde
. From IX Corps District (Leitmeritz) - 29 ID, 26 LW ID, 9 March Bde

In addition to the three operational groups, there was a small contingent called the "AOK Reserve." Its principal components were 10 ID (IX District) and 95 Lst Bde (VIII District); in a Balkan war they would stay in their Bohemian garrisons, but in a war with Russia they would proceed to Galicia. The other components were the 1, 40 and 103 Lst Bdes, 12 March Bde, and 9 and 10 Hon March IR. The latter units would act as a security force in Transylvania during a war with Russia.

The result of these dispositions was that in a war restricted to Serbia and Montenegro the Monarchy would deploy 20 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions plus Landsturm and March formations, about one third of the entire Army. If the war also involved Russia, only 8 infantry divisions and some smaller formations would go south, while the north front would receive 40 1/2 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions.

The Navy's task in the event of a war would be mainly to guard the coasts and thus the flanks of the land forces, as well as sea routes along the coasts. It would be based at the strongly fortified harbors of Pola and Cattaro, as well as at the
secondary harbor of Sebenico (which was in an important geographical position, although not fortified). The Navy would take the offensive only if Italy entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Although the k.u.k. naval command had little faith in such cooperation, it was the basis of a "Marine Convention" which was concluded between the Triple Alliance partners on 1 November 1913. According to this Convention, in the event of war with France or both France and Great Britain, the Austrian and Italian fleets - along with the German Cruiser Division in the Mediterranean - would come under the command of k.u.k. Admiral Haus. The ships would assemble in the area Taranto-Augusta-Messina prepared to attack one or both of the enemy powers in the Mediterranean. If Italy remained neutral - as actually happened - the k.u.k. fleet would be heavily outnumbered by the Entente Mediterranean squadrons, and would have to remain on the defensive. Moreover, it would have to be prepared for the possibility that its dubious "friend" over the Adriatic would overnight become an enemy threatening the Monarchy's coasts.

Some Concerns Involving Mobilization

A worrisome possibility which entered into the calculations was that Russia's attitude in a conflict between Austria and Serbia might initially be unclear, but that it would attack the Habsburg Monarchy during mobilization. If this happened, the third group of forces, the "B" group, would have already been sent to the southeast but would have to be recalled. Once the "B" group had actually entered combat on the Sava River, it would be difficult to pull it from the front before achieving a significant victory over Serbia. In such an eventuality the generals in the northeast would have to carry on for some time with only the forces of the "A" group. However, GdI Conrad was determined nonetheless to persevere with the plan for an offensive even with minimal forces, if it was necessary to assist the German eastern army.

In conclusion, one can say that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff in preparing for war was concerned to utilize the advantage of the "interior lines" to the greatest possible degree, and that its plans lacked nothing in resourcefulness and flexibility. Their foresight was superior to that of the Russian General Staff, which was unable to honor Tsar Nicholas' request - on political grounds - to mobilize only against Austria-Hungary because no plans for such partial mobilization
existed. Even the Germans, with their incomparably better railroad network, had only a single mobilization plan available after spring 1914; when Kaiser Wilhelm II asked Moltke whether he could send his main force against Russia rather than against France as had been planned, Moltke was simply aghast.

This is not to deny that a complex system like the Austrians had created did not contain certain dangers. No matter how hard one tried to prepare for every eventuality, warfare would always lead to unseen complications. As will be shown, this unpleasant lesson was also in store for the k.u.k. General Staff. Yet it remains true that the careful mobilization and deployment plans served the fatherland, threatened on three of its four borders, as well as possible; no other General Staff surpassed it in richness of ideas or careful foresight.

2. Deployment and Operational Plans

The Balkan Front

In case war would be limited to the Danube Monarchy and the two south Slav kingdoms, the goal would be to crush Serbia as quickly as possible to restore full freedom of options in dealing with other potential foes. The method by which Serbia would be brought to heel would depend on several contrary considerations.

In general, the best avenue for an offensive would be up the valley of the Morava River, which for centuries had been on the principal land route between the Occident and the Orient. Indeed, in the campaign of 1915 the Central Powers did eventually follow this historic route. However, at the beginning of the war, with all of its political and military uncertainties, other factors entered into the calculations. Any strategic planning had to take into account the security of Bosnia and its connections with the Adriatic coast, areas which were the primary targets of the enemy's ambition. Perhaps this security mission could be best carried out by an overwhelming attack on the Serbian Army in the Belgrade sector. The problem was that sudden demands from other fronts might force Austria to

9 Dobrorolsky, Mobilmachung der russischen Armee 1914 (Berlin, 1922)
10 Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe und Dokumente 1877-1916 (Stuttgart, 1922), p. 19
go over to the defensive. Defending the long front between Cattaro and the Iron Gates, with poor communications behind most parts of the border, would be extraordinarily difficult. The best defensive position was on the left flank, along the Danube and Sava Rivers. The Drina River, on the border between Bosnia and Serbia, was on the other hand only a minor obstacle. Therefore for geographical reasons the main concentration of a defensive force would have to be in Bosnia, on the central and lower Drina (there were also political reasons behind this conclusion).

This factor (and the layout of the rail lines) would affect the deployment not only of the "Balkan Minimal Group", but also of the "B" group. This was because the "B" group would not be a certain resource for the Minimal Group during the deployment; if Russia entered the fray the "B" group could at any moment be redeployed from the Sava to the Dniester. Thus the "B" group would have to go to an area where its possible disappearance would not impact on the Minimal Group's ability to carry out a successful defensive operation. Although parts of the "B" group were earmarked to help the Minimal Group directly in Bosnia, and others - the so-called Banat force - would deploy on the Danube northeast of Belgrade, the main body of the group would be sent to Syrmia, on the lower Sava. From this area they could most easily be sent to the north if the Russians attacked, without disturbing defensive preparations by the Minimal Group.

This necessary contingency in the deployment plan, designed to enable the high command at any moment to go over to the defensive in the southeast and thus free the "B" group for other employment, of course had considerable impact on the offensive planning. The first goal of the attackers would have to be northwest Serbia rather than the Morava Valley. Responsibility for carrying out the initial offensive would fall to the 5th Army, deploying on the lower Drina, and on the right flank of the 2nd Army west of Sabac. Once a lodgment was made in the northwest corner of Serbia, the way would be clear for the left flank of 2nd Army to cross the broad reaches of the lower Sava. Also at this point the Banat Group, whose first mission was to make the Serbs believe that the Austrians were planning to invade the Morava Valley, would also move to Syrmia. The 6th Army would deploy at the outset in southeast Bosnia; then it would send the largest contingent possible against Serbia, while leaving weaker forces - supported by fortifications - on the defensive against the Montenegrins. Because of the poor quality of the Bosnian railroads, 6th Army could not be ready for action until a week after 5th Army; this was the reason why its
participation in the opening battle was not anticipated.

The primary objective of the offensive into northwest Serbia was the Kolubara valley and the rail line which led through it. The main direction of the attack must be from west to east, although this movement would be perpendicular to the scanty transportation arteries, because it was always possible that the 2nd Army would have to be withdrawn. If this happened, the other two armies would still be in a good position to directly defend Bosnia, and indirectly to defend Syrmia and Hungary. Since the summer 1913 it had been hoped that once the Kolubara was secure the Bulgarians would enter the war against their hated Serb rivals, sealing the fate of both Serbia and Montenegro 11.

The Russian Front

The planning for war with Russia was based on discussions between GdI Conrad and GO Moltke, which they had carried out in writing and in occasional meetings since 1 January 1909. Both commanders calculated that the Russia would deploy just two armies (about 16 to 20 divisions) against the eastern and southern borders of East Prussia, and the bulk of its forces against Austria-Hungary. In the winter of 1913-14 the k.u.k. General Staff expected the Russians to deploy the following groups...

- A strong force between the Vistula and Bug Rivers (14 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions by the 20th day of the Russian mobilization; a total of 24 infantry divisions by the 30th day),
- One army by Rovno (7, later 12, infantry divisions and 4 cavalry division),
- One army by Proskurow (10, later 16, infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions), and
- Only weak forces between the Dniester and Pruth (4, later 8, infantry divisions plus 1 or 2 cavalry divisions).

Therefore, by the 20th day of mobilization the Russians would deploy 35 infantry and 12 or 13 cavalry divisions against the Danube Monarchy; the number of infantry divisions would increase to 60 by the 30th day. It was impossible to say whether the Russians could deploy faster based on their numerous trial mobilizations and on special measures they could take to anticipate formal mobilization during an international emergency. The only certainty was that the enemy planned to

evacuate the territory west of the Vistula at the outset of hostilities.

GdI Conrad had prepared the outlines of the plan for war with Russia in 1909, and had not subsequently made any major alterations. We do not know if his concepts were based on earlier plans. In the crisis of 1854-55, FM Freiherr von Hess had envisioned fighting Russia by an offensive from east Galicia to the north; this was also the basis of plans which FM Archduke Albrecht had discussed during negotiations with the Germans in 1882. GdI Conrad had something similar in mind. His left wing, consisting of 1st and 4th Armies, would be ready for action earlier than the other troops, and would advance north between the Bug and the middle Vistula. This would relieve the Austrians of the danger of being encircled from Russian units deploying in the area. Then these two armies would swing to the east; together with the right wing (2nd and 3rd Armies), which would by this point be fully operational, they would defeat the Russian main body by Proskurov and Rovno. If this plan succeeded, the lines of communication leading out of the Pripyat Marshes would be taken, and the main body of the southern Russian armies would be forced back to the Black Sea or to Kiev.

The realization of this plan would depend on energetic cooperation of the German eastern army. The operation would succeed only if the Russian force on the Narew, on the central Vistula, and on the northern borders of Galicia were simultaneously taken in the flanks from the south and north (that is, from Galicia and East Galicia). The Germans must therefore commit their main strength, according to Conrad's reckoning, to an advance over the Narew in the general direction of Siedlce (or Siedlice) to support the offensive of the k.u.k. left wing between the Vistula and Bug. Such an advance by the Germans, who would certainly be outnumbered, would have to overcome serious difficulties. Nevertheless, GdI Conrad believed that he had numerous oral and written commitments from GO Moltke that the advance to Siedlce would be attempted. The first of these was a note dated 19 March 1909, the contents of which were never contradicted by Moltke in the years leading up to the war. In this note the German Chief of Staff said:

However, I will never hesitate to open an attack to support

12 Kiszling, Feldmarschall Conrads Kriegsplan gegen Russland (Militärwissenschaftliche und Technische Mitteilungen, Vienna 1925, pp. 469 ff.)
the simultaneous Austrian offensive. Your Excellency can rely on this promise, made after due deliberation. The movements of the allies must be initiated and carried out together. If for some reason the initiative of one of the allies cannot be carried out due to enemy action, its partner must be notified immediately, for the security of each depends on both working together. 13

When the fighting started, GdI Conrad went to the field with the belief that this agreement was still in force. When it became apparent that the German High Command had other ideas, he suffered one of his most serious disappointments of the war.

As of the winter of 1913-14, the revised war plans envisioned that after the deployment of the "A" and "B" groups against Russia the foremost infantry units of the eastern armies (from right to left the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 1st) would have reached the line Buczacz-Zborow-Zloczow-Zolkiew-Sieniawa-mouth of the San. An additional group would be created from several Landsturm brigades plus cavalry and would deploy near Cracow. At this point the bulk of the cavalry divisions would be one day's march ahead of the infantry, while the gendarmerie, finance guards and some Landsturm watched the borders.

However, this deployment relatively close to the Russian border was becoming less likely as it became more questionable that Romania would assist in the campaign, especially after the summer of 1913 when Romania regarded Austro-Hungarian intervention on behalf of the shattered Bulgarian Kingdom as a hostile act 14. At this point the General Staff at Vienna prepared an alternative plan under which the general mobilization strategy would proceed as before, but the troops would leave the trains farther in the rear than originally envisioned. This meant that the eastern flank forces would not be endangered by a sudden Russian offensive during mobilization, made possible by Romania's defection. Concerned over this issue, GdI Conrad commissioned a study of all the possibilities, and determined that a deployment on the San-Dniester line was preferable to approaching too closely to the eastern Galicia border. A few months later, when the murder of the Archduke in Sarajevo made war with Serbia probable and war with Russia possible, Conrad ordered on 1 July that preparations for war in the northeast would proceed on the basis of this study. The actual unloading areas of the troops had little impact on the

13 Conrad, op. cit., Volume I, p. 404
work of the railroad bureau, so that this change would not cause any difficulties once mobilization actually began.

Use of Rail Lines for Mobilization

Four principal rail "lines" were earmarked for the deployment in the southeast, and seven for Galicia. In General staff jargon, each "line" was not an individual line of tracks, but rather a system of several lines which would be used to send troops to certain portions of the area of operations.

Three of the "lines" to be used for a war restricted to the Balkans (I.B to III.B) began respectively in Prague, Theresienstadt and Budapest, and ended on the Sava and Danube Rivers. The fourth such "line" (see volume 1 leaflet 5 blue drawn line) would bring men and equipment from all parts of the Monarchy - except for the Alpine lands - to BHD. Together the four "lines" could theoretically handle 135 trains per day. However, the planners kept 23 trains in reserve for unforeseen circumstances. The actual deployment would be 31 trains on the 3rd day of mobilization, followed by 42, 52 and 73 on the 4th through 6th days (respectively), and 112 trains daily from the 7th day on. (The 112 trains included 7 postal trains and a few others for miscellaneous transport.)

The seven lines leading to Galicia (I.R to VII.R) served all the Corps Districts except for those earmarked for the Balkan minimal Group (i.e. the XIII, XV and XVI Districts in Croatia-Slavonia and BHD). Potential bottle necks had to be avoided in the Carpathians due to the small number of railroads in the mountains; once the military lines reached the relatively ample rail network of Galicia itself the planners could enjoy greater flexibility. The theoretical limit to the lines was 165 trains daily; the actual plan was to run a maximum of 140 trains daily (of which 8 would be postal trains). The mobilization would gear up gradually, with just 40 trains on Day 3, then 55, 66, and 92 on Days 4 to 6; finally 140 trains would roll each day beginning with Day 7.

Special accommodations existed in case the 19th Infantry Division would go to the Balkans; it would be sent by train to Trieste, then on ships to Metkovic. Therefore this Division would leave for the front a little later than the others. The 95th Landsturm Brigade would follow it from Prague by the same route.

If all went according to schedule, in the event of a purely
Balkan war the full troop strength would be achieved on the 16th day of mobilization. In the case where only the Balkan Minimal Group went south, full strength would be achieved 4 days earlier. In the northeast, the combat troops of the left wing (1st and 4th Armies) would be ready on the 23rd day; those of the right wing (2nd and 3rd Armies) would be ready on the 27th day.
B. Mobilization and the March to the Front - 1914

(see volume 1 leaflet 6)

1. The initial deployment against Serbia and Montenegro

The successor to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was murdered along with his wife, Duchess Sophie von Hohenberg, at Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Since there were many indications that the murders were planned by the Kingdom of Serbia, the Vienna government sent the Serbs several demands on 23 July, requiring a response in 48 hours 15. Since Belgrade's response to this note was unacceptable, the Danube Monarchy, facing a threat to its very existence, decided to resort to arms to bring its small neighbor to reason.

From the beginning, the attitude of Russia to the crisis was of decisive significance. Vienna knew that in the prior Balkan crises Serbia backed down only because it did not expect help from Russia. The fact that this time Serbia had picked up the gauntlet made the Austrians cautious, especially in view of disturbing rumors from St Petersburg. The k.u.k. General Staff certainly had reason to wonder whether it should for the time being leave Serbia alone and immediately send as strong a force as possible against the Tsarist empire. Political considerations, however, spoke against this option. The responsibility that the Habsburg Monarchy already bore for initiating hostilities against Serbia - no matter how justified - was already heavy enough. If it now turned against Russia without further ado, this responsibility would only become heavier. It must also be remembered that Austria-Hungary's treaties with its allies obliged them to only enter a defensive war; the two southern allies - Italy and Romania - were only too eager to find a reasonable pretext to avoid fulfilling their treaty responsibilities. Finally, Germany also warned its ally to avoid any action that would brand it as an aggressor! Therefore the Danube Monarchy mobilized only against Serbia, and for five long days all military measures were directed solely against this opponent, even as the menace from Russia grew ominously greater hour by hour.

The order for partial mobilization which Emperor Franz Josef signed on 25 July called to arms the troops of the "Balkan

15 Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges (Vienna 1919), pp. 91 ff.
Minimal Group" and those of the "B Group" (the latter strengthened by the 1st and 11th CD). The entire mobilized force would thus consist of 20 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 Landsturm brigades, and various March and garrison units. The AOK also mobilized the III Corps (Graz) as a strategic reserve which would initially stay in its district. However, it would be on hand to either fill gaps in the ranks of the field armies, deal with possible political unrest in Bohemia, act as flank protection against the untrustworthy Italian neighbor, or to go in its entirety to the Balkan front after the railroads were cleared on the 14th day of mobilization.

Thus under the partial mobilization the following land forces were on a war footing: 3 army HQ, 8 corps HQ, 23 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 8 Landsturm brigades, 6 March brigades, and 8 Honved March regiments. Four of the infantry divisions were equipped for mountain warfare, and commanded a total of 14 mountain brigades. The first "alarm day" would be 27 July, the first mobilization day would be 28 July.  

At sea the operational fleet was already on a war footing since it had just completed its summer maneuvers. It consisted of two battleship and one cruiser divisions plus a torpedo boat flotilla. There were 6 battleships, 7 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats, supported by a number of mobilized depot and supply units. The 2nd Battleship Division (which consisted of 3 battleships, 1 fast cruiser, 4 destroyers and 4 torpedo boats) was ordered on 26 July to work directly with the land forces in south Dalmatia; for this purpose it was placed under command of the 6th Army.

On the Danube the river flotilla was mobilized with 6 monitors, 4 patrol boats, and a number of supporting vessels. It was placed under command of 2nd Army.

The Army Inspector GdI Archduke Frederick was appointed commander of all units mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro, collectively called the "Balkan Forces"; GdI Conrad was his Chief of Staff. The commander planned to establish his headquarters in Kamenitz (Kamenica) near Peterwardein. The fact

16On an "alarm day", regular troops would take up positions along the border, although still at peacetime strength, and would be aided by local Landsturm Gendarmerie troops; Landsturm railroad detachments took over railroad security duty. Several other measures preparatory to the actual mobilization were also initiated on this day.
that these two leading figures of the Army were fully involved in planning for hostilities in the southeast shows the extent to which in the first 48 hours after the break with Belgrade it was anticipated that a campaign against Serbia could be carried out without Russian intervention.

The following is a summary of forces mobilized in the southeast by August 12:

- 5th Army (GdI Ritter von Frank)
  - VIII Corps (GdK Frh von Giesl) = 9 and 21 ID
  - XIII Corps (GdI Frh von Rhemen) = 36 and 42 ID; 13 Inf Bde, 11 Mtn Bde
  - Still arriving - 13 March Bde, 104 Lst Bde
  - STRENGTH = 79.5 bns, 14 sqdns, 39 batties

- 6th Army (FZM Potiorek) (by 12 August this HQ was also in charge of all the Balkan Forces)
  - XV Corps (GdI von Appel) = 1 ID (7 & 9 Mtn Bdes), 48 ID (10 & 12 Mtn Bdes)
  - XVI Corps (GdI von Wurm) = 18 ID (4, 5, 6 & 8 Mtn Bdes), independent 1, 2 & 13 Mtn Bdes
  - Independent - 40 Hon ID, 47 ID (latter with just 14 Mtn Bde); 3 Mtn Bde, 109 Lst Bde
  - STRENGTH = 94 bns, 5 sqdns, 53 batties

- 2nd Army (GdK von Böhm-Ermolli) (HQ left on 18 August for the northeast front)
  - IV Corps (GdK von Tersztyansky) = 31 and 32 ID
  - VII Corps (GdI O. von Meixner) = 17 and 34 ID
  - IX Corps (GdI von Hortstein) = 29 ID (only)
  - Independent - 23 Hon ID, half of 7 ID; 10 CD; 7 and 8 March Bdes, 107 Lst Bde; security force at Peterwardein
  - STRENGTH = 135 bns, 43 sqdns, 56 batties
  - (Of the 2nd Army units, the following stayed in the southeast: 29 ID, the half of 7 ID, 107 Lst Bde, 8 March Bde, and the security force at Peterwardein)

2. The Danger of War With Russia - General Mobilization

On 25 July, Austria-Hungary had called up two fifths of its armed forces; it hoped to use these troops to deal with its opponents in the southeast as quickly as possible. The Danube Monarchy had no interest or intention of meddling with other powers. Thus the Galician regiments remained quietly in their quarters, and the corps on the borders of Romania and Italy were advised to avoid any actions that would disturb these neighboring states. Great care was even taken to avoid provoking Montenegro, although that state was already displaying
hostile intentions. All military measures were directed toward a local war against Serbia.

However, Russia had already indicated on 24 July that it would not stand aside in the developing conflict in the Balkans, and this caused great concern. On 25 July, word arrived in Vienna that the Russian Military Districts of Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and probably also Kazan had received orders to begin preparations for mobilization. Other reports indicated that cadets were being graduated early from the military schools, and that four yearly classes of reservists were being called up in the Kiev, Moscow and Odessa Districts. GdI Conrad, with depressed spirits, asked the Foreign Minister (Count Leopold Berchtold) on 28 July— the day war was declared on Serbia— to clarify the position of Russia. For if Russia was on the march, it was high time to divert the "B" group to the north. Two days earlier the Chief of the General Staff had figured that 4 or 5 August were the latest dates on which this diversion could take place without losing any time; now, however, he believed that 1 August was the last such date. However, it would soon be apparent that even 1 August would already be too late to divert the entire "B" group without first deploying most of it in Syrmia before the transit to Galicia.

In the evening of 29 July, the k.u.k. Military Attache in St Petersburg, Captain Prince Franz Hohenlohe, reported that Russia feared that Austria-Hungary would gain too much power by conquering little Serbia, and therefore was resolved to mobilize the four Military Districts which bordered the Danube Monarchy. The measures being taken by the Tsarist empire, however, seemed to already exceed such a partial mobilization. Although Vienna stood in imminent danger from Russia, war was not yet certain on these two days (29 and 30 July), because the German and Russian Emperors were exchanging notes that could perhaps still lead to localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict. Also, Berchtold was still trying to reassure the Russians in the matter of the demands being made on Serbia. Germany was relying on the honorable and peaceful intentions of certain parties in Russia and other states and therefore in these 48 hours left no stone unturned in its attempt to stave off war between the Great Powers.

On 30 July the Imperial German Chancellor notified his ambassador at Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, that Germany was indeed ready to fulfill the terms of its

17 Conrad, op. cit., IV—pages 132 and 137
alliance. However, it must not let Vienna "light heartedly start a world conflagration without heeding Germany's counsel." Bethmann-Hollweg sent this message because he had just heard that the Ballhausplatz had severed all diplomatic relations with St Petersburg. Since this rumor proved to be unfounded, Tschirschky didn't forward the complete German warning to Count Berchtold. Nonetheless, it was obvious at this point that Germany did not want to give the slightest appearance of trying to provoke Russia. This was also the impression of the Austrian Chief of Staff. On 30 July the Emperor had returned from Ischl to Schönbrunn, and met with Conrad, Berchtold and the War Minister (FZM Ritter von Krobatin); he asked Conrad when, at the latest, general mobilization should be ordered. The Chief of Staff responded: "Best if ordered tomorrow; however, there would still be time on 1 August." The next few hours, however, would demand an earlier decision.

The Vienna cabinet had little faith in the political activities then in progress, since they didn't want the crisis to end in a diplomatic defeat for Austria. Even Germany, which for the last 48 hours had been restraining its ally, suddenly at this point began to become uneasy about Russia's attitude. The German General staff asked the Austrians not to waste any time, but to answer the increasingly menacing measures of Russia with counter-measures of their own. Advised in the same sense by his most trusted confidants, Emperor Franz Josef on 31 July ordered the general mobilization of the entire armed forces on land and sea. Simultaneously, Berlin learned that Russia had begun to call up its entire army the evening before. Now Germany could no longer delay its own military preparations. At 4:00 PM the German Emperor initiated the "Period Preparatory to War", during which various security measures would be taken, similar to those of the "Alarm Days" of the Austro-Hungarian forces. The next day Germany also ordered general mobilization, under which 2 August would be Day 1 of the process. In Austria, 2 August would be the first "Alarm Day", and 4 August the first day of mobilization against Russia. This mobilization thus began a full week after the mobilization of the Balkan forces.

The Problem of War on Two Fronts

19 Montgelas, "Botschafter von Tschirschky in Juli 1914" (Die Kriegschuldfrage, Berlin, VI, pp. 725 ff.)
20 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV p 151
The intervention of Russia while the deployment in the Balkans was in full swing was a particularly burdensome reminder to the Chief of Staff of the difficulties of war on two fronts. With the entry of Russia, Serbia became a minor theater of operations. Moreover, since the entry of France into the war was also a certainty, the mass of the German armies would be tied down in the West and the Danube Monarchy would have to fend the Russians off from Germany while guarding its own territory against the Muscovite hordes. To add to the tension, reports from Italy and Romania in the last few days had indicated that no help could be expected from either state for the time being. They had hastened to advise Vienna that Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia would not be recognized as a *casus belli*.

Conrad would soon learn that the failure of the Italians to support Germany in the Vosges would weaken the German army in the East. The inaction of Romania deprived the Austrian forces in Galicia of the flank protection they had hoped for on the Moldau River. This made the deployment of the largest possible force in Galicia even more urgent.

The King of Italy had promised that he would maintain "a heartily friendly attitude" toward Austria in accordance with his alliance. A Romanian mobilization in Moldavia could just as easily be directed against Russia as against Austria-Hungary. Therefore Conrad still had an opportunity to hold the armaments and garrison of the Tyrol and Carinthian borders in the southwest to a minimum, and to send the security forces of Transylvania to Galicia. However, the most urgent immediate task was to decide what to do with the "B" group. Political factors had to be considered: perhaps it would be better for prestige reasons to temporarily withdraw before the Russian Army rather than appear to falter against the small state of Serbia; also, the attitude of Bulgaria and Romania—perhaps also of Greece—would depend on the outcome of the Balkan campaign. However, GdI Conrad was advised by the Germans not to stray from

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22 The Transylvania security forces consisted of the k.k. 1st and 40th and the k.u. 103rd Lst Bdes, plus 12th March Bde and Hon March Regts # 9 and 10. In the event of a Romanian invasion, their mission was to delay the enemy advance through the border passes and then pull back to the Maros River, behind which troops from other fronts would assemble.
purely military considerations in making a decision. On 31 July he decided to send the "B" group to the front where the most dangerous foe, Russia, was to be engaged; defense of the southeast would be left to the Balkan Minimal Group. Unfortunately, events would conspire to make it difficult for Conrad, although a master at concentrating troops at a decisive point, to be fully successful in carrying out the mobilization plan.

For the last 3 days, the Chief of the General Staff had been oppressed by concern that because of political considerations, the desire to keep European peace, and the hesitation of Germany, the deployment against Russia would have to take place in the middle of the Balkan deployment; this would be the most disadvantageous time because of its impact on the railroads. Conrad's fears now came true. Two days earlier the transports for the "B" group would still have been in their marshalling places. Then they would have been available to load troops to follow the "A" group to Galicia, as envisioned in the pre-war plans. Now much of the "B" group (one fourth of the Austrian Army) was already speeding to the southeast.

The first elements of 9th ID (VIII Corps) and of 29th ID (IX Corps) had already begun to roll on the evening of 31 July. The 31st and 32nd ID (IV Corps) and the 17th and 34th ID (VII Corps) had begun to deploy in the southeast. One third of the men from the 17th and 34th ID, along with half of those from 1st and 10th CD, had already left the trains. As a further complication, the order of battle of 2nd Army when deployed in the Balkans was different from its planned order of battle against Russia. In the northeast this Army was supposed to consist of III, VII and XII Corps plus 11 ID, 20 Hon ID and 43 LW ID. IV Corps (along with 23 Hon ID) was supposed to go to 3rd Army, VIII Corps to 4th Army, and IX Corps to 1st Army.

The Deployment to the Balkans Rolls On

For the railroad technicians, diverting the "B" group was a very difficult problem. It was theoretically possible to take the trains which were rolling south from Bohemia to Syrmia and those from Budapest and Temesvar and switch them to the Galician border. Also, it was possible to reload the transports which had left men on the Sava and Danube and send them north. However, if these measures were taken, in two days the trains would have reached the meager rail lines that led over the Carpathians, where they would have become stuck in a bottleneck; no supplies would be available for feeding the troops.
stuck in this area. Moreover, the transports of the "A" and "B" groups would become so hopelessly mixed that all order would be destroyed, and the Army would arrive on the Galician plains in total disorder and much later than scheduled. The agitated chief of the Military Railroad Service, Colonel Johann Straub, described these dangers to the Chief of Staff. Conrad and the Chief of his Operational Detachment, Colonel Metzger, therefore decided to give up their half-formulated plan of immediately diverting the "B" group.

It was also decided not to simply stop the transports of the "B" group wherever they happened to be at the moment; this could have led to disruptions in the organization of separated units. Instead, 2nd Army and VII Corps would complete their planned deployment in Syrmia and the Banat, which would end on 11 August. They would stay in position until the "A" group had finished its deployment to Galicia, and then follow it to the northeast theater of operations. Thus the troops would remain segregated from possibly critical influences back in their home recruiting areas. The horses could receive fodder in the rich lands of the Bacska and Banat. Finally, the high command reckoned that the appearance of strong forces on the Sava-Danube line, even if they did not attack, would divert the attention of the enemy from the Austrian forces in Bosnia.

The result was that to save time for the deployment in the northeast, the Balkan deployment went ahead mostly as originally scheduled. Only a few divisions and independent brigades which had not yet started their train journeys, and the AOK reserves (III Corps, 10 ID, 95 k.k. Lst Inf Bde) were halted in their home districts and then diverted according to the mobilization

23 A hostile latter day critic of the work of the railroad experts stated, "The railway technicians often talked of their great clockwork; but it was a machine that owed something to the cuckoo." For the controversy between Straub and Conrad, see Norman Stone, "The Eastern Front" (New York, 1975), pp. 73-78

24 These units were: 19 ID, 20 Hon ID, 26 LW ID, 11 Hon CD, 36 and 102 Lst Inf Bdes, and 4, 7 and 9 March Bdes. A special case was the 1st CD, which was supposed to go to Galicia in the event of war with Russia, but to a large extent was already deployed in the Balkans. The entire division, including the parts that were already in Banat, was sent to Galicia immediately because there was a need to send as much cavalry as possible to guard the borders against surprise Russian attacks while the mobilization was in progress.
scheme against Russia.

The result of this decision was that the following units would be available on the eastern front as of 20 August:

- Armee Gruppe GdI Kummer = 95 and 106 Lst ID; 7 CD; 100 Lst Bde. Strength was 45 bns, 27 sqdns, 25 batties
  - 1st Army (GdK Dankl)
    - I st Corps (GdK Frh von Kirchbach) = 5 and 46 ID
    - V Corps (FZM von Puhallo) = 14, 33 and 37 ID
    - X Corps (GdI H. von Meixner) = 2, 24 and 45 ID
    - Independent = 12 ID; 3 and 9 CD; 1, 101 and 110 Lst Bdes; 1st and 10 March Bdes; the Polish Legion
    - Still en route = 5 March Bde, 36 Lst Bde
    - STRENGTH = 186 bns, 77 sqdns, 82 batties
  - 4th Army (GdI Ritter von Auffenberg)
    - II Corps (GdI von Schemua) = 4, 13 and 25 ID
    - VI Corps (GdI von Boroevic) = 15, 27 and 39 ID
    - IX Corps (GdI von Hortstein) = Just 10 ID; Corps HQ still en route from the Balkans; 26 ID also en route
    - XVII Corps (GdK Graf Huyn), formed on 20 August = 19 ID (other components, 2 and 9 March Bdes, still en route)
    - Independent = 6 Cav Div
    - Independent, still en route = 10 Cav Div (from Balkans), 6 March Bde
    - STRENGTH = 147 bns, 71 sqdns, 77 batties
  - 3rd Army (GdI von Brudermann)
    - XI Corps (GdK von Kolossvary) = 30 ID (only)
    - XIV Corps (GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) = 3, 8, 44 ID
    - Independent = 41 ID; 2, 4 and 11 CD; 88 L-Sch Bde; 93 and 108 Lst Bdes; 11 March Bde
    - Independent, still en route = 23 ID (from Balkans); 97 Lst Bde; 3, 4 and 14 March Bdes; 23 and 41 Hon March Bdes
    - STRENGTH = 159 1/4 bns, 100 sqdns, 63 batties
  - Armee Gruppe GdI von Kövess (command taken over on 25 August by 2nd Army, GdK von Böhm-Ermolli)
    - III Corps (GdI von Colerus) = 6, 22 and 28 ID
    - XII Corps (GdI von Kövess) = 16, 35 and 38 ID
    - IV Corps (GdK von Tersztyansky; en route from Balkans) = 31 and 32 ID
    - VII Corps (GdI O. von Meixner; en route from Balkans) = 17 and 34 ID
    - Independent = 11 and 43 ID; 1, 5 and 8 CD; 35, 40 and 105 Lst Bdes
    - Independent, en route from home districts = 20 ID; 7 and 12 March Bdes; 102 and 103 Lst Bdes
    - STRENGTH = 235 1/4 bns, 108 sqdns, 115 batties
The commander of the already fully-mobilized fleet, Admiral Haus, was charged on 1 August by AOK with the "independent command of operations at sea, in accordance with the naval convention of the sovereigns of the Triple Alliance powers." Since the attitude of Italy was still unclear on this date, it was decided that if the Appenine Kingdom did not fulfill its treaty obligation, the fleet's mission would be restricted to "the defense of the Adriatic." The cooperation of the naval forces in the Gulf of Cattaro [Kotor], which had already been ordered under the partial mobilization, would continue. On 2 August the fleet was also empowered to interdict the shipment of military supplies to Serbia and to any "other" enemies (at this point Montenegro was still neutral).

The Declarations of War

By these decisions, the final preparations were made by Austria-Hungary for the upcoming trial of arms. In the next few days the world entered the war. On 1 August Germany declared war on Russia, on 3 August on France, on 4 August on Belgium. England chose to regard the march of the German Army into Belgium as a casus belli, and declared war on Germany on 4 August. On 5 August, Montenegro declared war on the Danube Monarchy, and the Monarchy declared war on Russia. The declaration of war by Serbia on Germany followed on 6 August, by Germany on Montenegro on the 8th, by France and England on Austria-Hungary on the 12th. Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on 23 August. Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Belgium on 28 August was the last of the series.

The system of alliances and agreements had worked perfectly for the enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the first days of August the Central Powers had still hoped that their allies Italy and Romania would still rally to their side, but at least for the present these hopes were disappointed. Bulgaria, despite its hatred for Serbia, was still neutral and waited to see which side would win success in the first battles. Only Turkey was definitely siding with the Central Powers, and concluded a military convention with them in the first days of August. However, three more months would pass before the Turks actually entered the conflict.

And so in the opening battles the armies of the Central European
empires would fight alone against an alliance which consisted of two world-class powers (Russia and England), two great powers (France and Japan) and three small states (Serbia, Belgium and Montenegro).
C. The Armed Forces in 1914

1. Structure and training

The wheat fields were golden yellow as the summer sun burned hot over the land, as the farmer left his plot, the factory worker his machine, and the artisan, the merchant, the teacher and the public official their offices, all hastening to heed the Emperor's call to arms. The delay of several days in loading the trains for the northeast was not heeded by many of the men who were called up; they showed up at their depots before the first official day of mobilization. In most recruiting districts there were far, far more men present than had been anticipated. There was a lack of shelters, uniforms, weapons, even of food. All of the streets and courtyards around the barracks were full of men. Many of them slept for the night under the open sky, alongside hundreds of horses and carts. The crowds began to subside only when the active echelons of the field regiments departed for the front.

Most of the troops left their homes in a patriotic elation that made them forget – for the moment – the tears of their mothers, wives and children. As the troop trains passed through the country, the men were cheered wildly regardless of their nationality or language. The regiments made a magnificent impression. There were no painful incidents such as had occurred among the Czech reservists during the recent Balkan crises. In both the north and south, and on the flag-bedecked warships, men threw themselves upon the enemy with proud decisiveness, silencing critics who were inclined to faint-heartedness. For one more time it was as the "most Austrian" of poets (Grillparzer) had said:

Die Gott als Slaw' und Magyaren schuf,
Sie streiten um Worte nicht hämisch,
Sie folgen, ob deutsch auch der Feldherrnruf,
Denn: Vorwärts! ist ung'risch und böhmisch...

However, this Army of 1100 battalions and 1,500,000 fighters was considerably different from that which had fought in 1866, and indeed from that about which Franz Grillparzer had written poems. The army of long-service soldiers at whose head FM Count Radetzky had won his victories over Piedmont had become a people's army (or more accurately in view of Austria-Hungary's composition, a peoples' army) in the reforms after Königgrätz. Between 1867 and 1870 – years in which the Monarchy was
reorganized on a dualistic basis, in which parliaments rose to power, and which were marked by nationalistic strife - the Army was rebuilt based on universal conscription. However, Army organization was complicated by constitutional factors that did not exist in any other great powers.

Even at the beginning, it was only with great difficulty that Hungary was forced to recognize the existence of a common army as part of the Compromise of 1867. This recognition was only conceded after Hungary was allowed to create a special national militia, the "Honved." (This term means "Defenders of the Fatherland.") In the interests of parity between the two halves of the Monarchy, this meant that the "Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Reichsrat" (i.e. Austrian cis-Leithania) would also have to create a militia, the "Landwehr." Thus there were three army organizations, of which at least one - the Honved - wanted to go off in its own direction. Moreover, there were three supervisory legislative bodies: the Reichsrat in cis-Leithania, the Parliament in Hungary, and the "Delegations", a body made up of members chosen by both of the others to oversee common affairs. There were three individuals responsible for representing army interests before these bodies: a Land Defense Minister for the legislatures of each half of the Monarchy and the common Imperial War Minister for the Delegations.

The founders of the new peoples' army - FM Archduke Albrecht (the victor of Custozza), FML Freih von John, FML Freih von Kuhn and Colonels Horst and Ritter von Beck, ran into great political

25 It is obviously not possible to include a complete bibliography here for the history of the Austrian armed forces between 1867 and 1914. Alongside the laws and other official publications, the following are most useful: Anger, Illustrierte Geschichte der k.k. öst. Armee (Vienna, 1898–1900); Danzer, Unter den Fahnen (Vienna, 1889); Wrede (and Semek), Geschichte der k.u.k. Wehrmacht (Vienna, 1898–1903); Die Wehrmacht der Monarchie (Beilage zur Zeitschrift und Sport; Vienna, June 1914). To these must be added Allmayer-Beck, Die k.u.k. Armee 1848–1914 (Gütersloh, 1980) and Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, 1976). A useful more recent work on Army organization is Lucas, Fighting Troops of the Austro-Hungarian Army (New York, 1987). Memoirs that cast light on the different perspectives of the Army leaders are those by Auffenberg-Komarow (1920), Conrad (including the work "Mein Anfang", Berlin 1925), Födransperg (1894), Mollinary (1905), Wattmann-Maelcamp-Beaulieu (1903–1905) and Went von Römö (1904).
difficulties as they tried to give the Army the broadest possible base in the reorganizations after 1866. Their work, in essence, remained in place until the World War. In 1914 the common army had even fewer battalions than at the beginning of the reforms 40 years earlier. The system of Corps districts as established in the 1880's by Archduke Albrecht and FZM Beck (who had become Chief of the General Staff), was changed after 1900 only by the creation of the XVI Corps at Dubrovnik. Throughout this period the increase in the number of soldiers failed to match that of the general population. In 1870 the Army conscripted 100,000 men annually from a general population of 36 million; in 1910 it recruited just 126,000 (including the Landwehr and Honved contingents) from a population of 50 million. The new recruiting law of 1912 finally increased the recruiting base (while reducing the conscripts' time with the colors from 3 to 2 years), but by this late date such an improvement was still insufficient.

Under these circumstances, it of course cannot be said that the idea of universal military service really meant anything to the bulk of the population. The existence of an "Ersatz Reserve", in which 80,000 men spent 8 weeks of superficial training each year, did not noticeably improve the situation. When the Army was placed on a war footing in the summer of 1914, about 1/4 to 1/5 of each company consisted of "presently" serving men; all the others were reservists, Ersatz reservists, and 32-year old Landsturm troops (the latter had been called up so that the bulk of the 20-year old men could at least for the present be left behind for training). Certain regimental districts that at the beginning sent 5,000 to 8,000 men to the field eventually sent 60,000 to 100,000 more as replacements during the course of the war! It would have been unrealistic to have mobilized such hordes in each regiment in 1914. Nonetheless, the discrepancy between the numbers available for service and those who fought in the first battles is striking.

Financial and Political Difficulties

The extremely slow growth of the armed forces was caused partly by financial difficulties, such as afflicted all portions of the creaky Austro-Hungarian state system despite the robust growth of the economy. However, it was caused even more by the growing political crisis in the Monarchy. In cis-Leithania there were several German groups which in the first decades of Dualism opposed Army expansion on various grounds. The powerful press of the liberal bourgeoisie was always opposed to the demands of the military as a matter of principle. Nonetheless, successive
governments were able to patch together parliamentary groups to pass the most necessary military legislation.

The attitude of Hungary was a greater obstacle. The fanatic desire for self-aggrandizement of the Magyar ruling class, and their wish to create a separate Hungarian army as a means to secure Magyar hegemony over the other nationalities dwelling along the Carpathians, drove the parliamentary representatives of the Hungarian parties to work for the separation of the common army since the days of Koloman Tisza. They were assisted by certain issues left unclear during preparation of the Compromise of 1867. The Emperor, although occasionally willing to make some concessions to Hungarian wishes, stoutly resisted any demands for dividing the Army; he was supported by Archduke Albrecht, by Beck, and (later) by Franz Ferdinand and Conrad. In 1903 at Chlopy the Emperor announced in stirring words in an army order that he would not give up any of his "rights and privileges" in the matter of a unitary Army. This proclamation poured fire on the oil of Hungarian covetousness. After several years of crisis, Count Stephen Tisza was finally able to restore internal peace, but only after certain national concessions had been made to the Magyars.

While these events, as the War Minister GdI Freih. von Schönaich stated, threatened to cause the common Army to "wither away", at least developments in the two national guard forces increased the Monarchy's military strength. They were originally raw militia troops without supporting artillery or technical support, but this was no longer the case by the turn of the century. The driving force behind this development came from Hungary, which willingly gave the Honved the resources which it denied to the common army. For better or worse, cis-Leithania had to devote similar efforts to the k.k. Landwehr, because changes to just one part of the army were legally impossible. The peacetime strength of the Landwehr and Honved companies increased from year to year, and finally was nearly identical to that of the k.u.k. units. In some respects the weaponry and equipment of the two national guards was better than that of the common army. The mountain troops of the Austrian Landwehr were an elite force that had no equals in any other country. Landwehr divisions were placed under the army corps structure, although the peacetime Honved divisions remained independent. Finally the Landwehr and Honved obtained their own artillery. When the war began, they entered the field on equal terms with the k.u.k. Army. Their accomplishments were recognized in April 1917 when at the instigation of the k.k. Defense Minister GdI Freih. von Georgi the Austrian Landwehr units were redesignated
"Schutzen" (Rifles); from the same date the Hungarian national guards, which until that time were still called "Landwehr" in German publications, were officially to be called "Honved."

The result of this up-grading of the national guards from second-line to first-line status meant that Austria-Hungary, unlike other powers, no longer had a reserve force in its order of battle. Accordingly, the k.k. and k.u. Landsturm Infantry Brigades - created according to the military ordinance of 1888 - had to fulfill this role. However, when the war began even these units, consisting of men ranging in age from 32 to 42, also had to fight in the front lines. In the beginning many of the Brigades were of dubious quality, although some of them (such as the 1st Lst Bde and 106 Lst ID) later won an honorable place in the order of battle of the field army. In place of the Landsturm, the tasks of the third line were taken over by Landsturm Territorial, Etappen, and related formations. In a proposal of 24 December 1913, Conrad indicated that the surplus manpower which would be made available by the revised conscription law of 1912 should be used eventually to create reserve units of trained men (regiments, brigades and divisions) such as were possessed by almost all the other major military powers. The outbreak of the war made implementation of this proposal impossible 26.

Weaponry and Equipment

Financial and political problems also stood in the way of progress in obtaining weapons and equipment. After years of delay, the Army finally received modern field cannons during the crisis of 1908-09. However, the field howitzers with which it went to war in 1914 were very old, and the mountain cannon also left much to be desired 27. The artillery did lead the world with one weapon, the 30.5 cm mortar which, on Conrad's initiative, War Minister GdI Ritter von Auffenberg had

26 See also Conrad's report at the end of 1913 (op. cit., Vol. III p. 767)
27 The range of the M.5 field cannon was 1000 to 1500 meters less than that of similar weapons in other armies. The 10 and 15 cm M.99 field howitzers also had relatively short ranges, and also lacked barrel recoils and protective shields. In 1914 the military administration had just authorized a number of well tested and useful models - 7 cm field cannon, 10 cm light field howitzers, 15 cm heavy field howitzers, 10 cm heavy cannon, and motorized 15 cm cannon and howitzers - but lacked the means to quickly mass produce large quantities.
introduced in 1912 without consulting the parliamentary bodies. Some of these mortars were lent to the Germans in August 1914 and performed outstanding service against the Belgian and French fortifications. These exceptional weapons could not counteract the other weaknesses of the artillery. When the war began there were 2154 light and 112 medium field guns, 296 light mountain guns, 206 medium and 72 heavy but mobile fortress guns. These totals were considerably behind those of other armies, absolutely and relatively. Thus for example each Austrian infantry division had 18 to 30 fewer pieces in the field than divisions of other Great Powers. Therefore it would not be easy in the opening battles of the World War for the k.u.k. artillery to equal its historical achievements and glory, such as it had most recently won at Königgrätz.

Similarly, the infantry was insufficiently equipped with light machine guns, although this was not as serious as the artillery shortage since the same deficiency afflicted Austria's opponents. Most battalions carried just two of these useful weapons into the initial battles (a few battalions had four). Also, each cavalry division had 4 MG's. There were not enough small arms in reserve to equip all of the new units. Although Austrian and Hungarian factories confiscated the rifles that they were producing for foreign countries, nonetheless in September 1914 the Landsturm units sent to the Carpathian defenses were issued old single-loading Werndler models. Many of the Landsturm were clothed with old, dark-colored peacetime uniforms rather than the latest "pike gray" color; some men wore only black-yellow arm bands along with their civilian clothing. The Army did have enough small arms ammunition. On the other hand, after the first weeks of the war there was a shortage of artillery shells, especially for high-angle fire. This shortage put a great deal of pressure on the war industries that were gradually getting into gear.

The technical troops were better prepared for war. Mostly organized as "unit pioneers", their equipment, training and skill were not surpassed by the engineers of other armies. The new telegraph troops helped considerably to overcome the difficulties in communications which are inherent on the battlefield. The railroad units saw much work during the many deployments back and forth during the first months of the war. At this time the air and automobile troops were still in an embryonic stage of development, but would grow beyond all

28 Conrad, op. cit, Vol. II p 466; Auffenberg, Höhe und Niedergang, p. 178
recognition later in the war. The supply columns, partly created by combat units, partly under control of the "Train Division", were probably too long rather than too short. In the beginning they consisted partly of vehicles called "Panje carts", drawn by small but sturdy Galician horses, and partly of heavier vehicles - many of which had served under Radetzky. Although the heavy carts were soon all replaced by Panje carts, they greatly hampered mobility at the outset of the war. Thousands of wagons and horses were left lying along the roads, and during retreats they had to be abandoned to the enemy. On the other hand, pack animals performed excellent service in the Balkans and later against Italy, because they could overcome the difficult mountain terrain.

The medical service had been carefully prepared in peacetime. Its services in general fulfilled expectations, despite some instances in which organization could not cope with severe casualties; in the beginning there was a lack of surgeons. The medical staff performed outstanding service in containing cholera and other war-related diseases that threatened to erupt into epidemics in the first weeks of the war. They were honorably assisted by private organizations: the Red Cross and the two ex military orders (the sovereign Knights of Malta and the Deutschmeister). There were heavy casualties among the military officer corps in the first battles.

In the beginning there was no lack of provisions for the field army. There were instances of hunger because some troops had outmarched their supply services and did not yet have the experience needed to live off the land by foraging. Thus some units went hungry while sitting next to fields of ripe potatoes. Meanwhile the rear areas were overstocked with food. When the army had to retreat, many convoys and their contents had to be left to the enemy or destroyed. Ironically, after the peacetime years in which the Army had been subject to austerity measures, there were now so many supplies available that the soldiers became careless, and the motto "Money is no object" came to the fore. It would be many months before this notion was suppressed and reasonable cost-effectiveness became the rule in the supply services.

Training

The training which prepared the armed forces for the war was based on up-to-date military theories. In the infantry, individual training was stressed instead of drill, which was no longer of such great necessity. Conrad had prepared a manual,
"Gefechtsausbildung der Infanterie", as a handy guide which gave each fighter the greatest possible leeway in making his own decisions. Under Conrad's regime, the regulations were written in this spirit to such an extent that the Archduke-Heir Apparent began to be concerned that discipline would suffer. Training in marksmanship was considered as important as studying terrain. The importance of infantry working together with artillery was undoubtedly given too little attention, since it was not realized that artillery was essential in preparing the way for foot soldiers on the offensive, and as their shield on the defensive. The cavalry received excellent horses and was well trained in mounted service. However, the conservative spirit of many high-placed leaders prevented younger soldiers from giving the cavalry the equipment and schooling necessary to deal with the changing conditions of modern warfare. This arm was so far behind the times that it rode against the enemy in colorful and gorgeous uniforms with blue jackets and red trousers.

During the training the concept of "The offensive at any price" was paramount. This was true for theoretical instruction, for table-top war games, and for maneuvers in the field. The Austrian army was thus like other armies of the period. The devastating power of modern firearms and the strength of fortified positions received far too little attention, as was the case even among foreign armies with more recent combat experience. This guiding principle of peacetime cost the armies far too many casualties in the opening battles. Infantry attacked the foe as if on maneuver, without waiting for support from its own artillery. Some time elapsed before the troops, and especially the leadership, drew the necessary lessons. By the time this happened, in some cases officers had developed an absolute abhorrence to taking the offensive.

The high points of peacetime training were the annual maneuvers. In 1907, GdI Conrad for the first time had prescribed "freely conducted" maneuvers, in which the exercises would take place as much as possible under realistic wartime conditions; this innovation served as an example to all other military powers. Conrad was himself physically fit, a hardened hiker, rider and mountain climber; he expected his troops to show the same willingness to accept very great physical challenges. Finally the Archduke-Heir Apparent sarcastically remarked that it wasn't necessary to teach the soldiers "how to die already in

29 The sixth and final edition of this work was published in Vienna in 1917.
This maneuver system had much to recommend it; however, at the beginning of the war it also led officers to exceed their instructions and to make all too hasty attacks. On the other hand, the troops involved in mountain warfare received first class training. In this area the Army would win glory that no other country could rival.

The Generals and the General Staff

The generals and General Staff were involved yearly in elaborate war games and inspections that took several weeks; the emphasis of these sessions was on leadership on the battlefield rather than on maneuvers in the enormous areas that make up a modern theater of war. The same emphasis appeared in the rich Austrian military literature, which included a large number of useful tactical studies, but almost nothing about the problems of leadership on the highest strategic level. The offensive triumphed over the defensive in all the table-top war games. As the possibility of war with Italy became greater, there was increased study of breakthrough operations and large-scale encirclement operations. In the last years before the war, the personal influence of the Chief of Staff led to greater concentration on logistical questions. The creation of a Line of Communication Office in the General Staff and the introduction of logistical issues into war games were results of this trend. The usefulness of this aspect of Conrad's training became apparent during the war.

The officers of the General Staff, well schooled in operational service and in staff techniques, were industrious helpers to the generals. They were products of the general staff school, which any young officer could join if he had completed a relatively short period of active service with the troops and had passed the entrance examination. The selection of officers for the school was almost never based on the family or other connections of the applicants. As often as possible the members of the General Staff were to be sent back to direct service with the troops. Conrad himself set an example in this regard, since in the first years of his service as Chief of Staff he personally led the maneuvers of some of the army corps.

In accordance with regulations, during wartime the chiefs of staff at the corps level and above shared responsibility with the unit commanders. This practice followed the Prussian-German

30 Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Ferdinand (Neue österreichische Biographie 1815-1918), Vienna 1926, Vol, III p. 29
example, and caused the development of two officers' hierarchies: one for the commanders and one for the chiefs of staff. There were of course drawbacks to this dual-command system; in some cases, there were generals who dumped all of their duties off on their staff chiefs. In general, however, the Austrian staff officers, unlike their counterparts in other armies – especially the German Army – had their own important responsibilities but did not make the final decisions (to be later rubber stamped by nominal commanders).

The great majority of the general staff officers did their best during the war to earn the confidence of the troops with which they worked. However, even in peacetime the troops had had little enough sympathy for the staff as a whole. They accused it of being alienated from line soldiers and of being a separate caste, and made numerous specific complaints about staff officers. The extent, if any, to which these criticisms were just lies outside the scope of this brief study. The German GO von Seeckt, who commanded several Austrian General Staff officers during the war, seems to have had a much more favorable impression 31. Surely, as the war went on, it became pointless to transfer staff officers to front service, as had been planned. In most cases this would have contradicted the attempt to simplify the command structures. It should also be noted that considering the special nature of their service, no small number of staff officers were killed by the enemy, and that the casualties among such officers who did transfer to combat units were in no way less than those of their comrades from other branches of service.

Besides the General Staff, there was an Artillery Staff, an Engineer Staff, and a "corps" of officers with the Military Board of Management (for economical affairs). These staffs worked with several auxiliary services and technical personnel to keep the enormous wheels of the military bureaucracy turning. Simplification of organization and more careful specialization of functions soon became important in these areas. Economic considerations and, as time went on, the necessity to counteract the losses in personnel and material by more careful allocation and supervision of resources, led nonetheless to a noticeable expansion in these supporting services. This in turn was resented by the front-line soldiers, and had an adverse affect on morale.

31 Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldates (Berlin, 1929), p. 160
2. The Peoples of Austria-Hungary Under Arms

Through the centuries, the 11 or 12 nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy had contributed soldiers to the old professional army which - like all armies - had won glorious successes and suffered some severe setbacks. Undoubtedly the organization, leadership and spirit of the old army were of German origin. In this German-trained and German-led army, however, the Hungarian hussars, Croatian and "Wallachian" border troops, Bohemian gunners and Polish uhlans had all served unhindered in their own national style. The professional army as a whole, since it contained sons of all the peoples of the Monarchy, developed a noticeably "black-yellow" type of Austrian soldier from all of the different national characteristics. The homeland of this Austrian soldier was the regiment, in whose ranks he spent year after year the greater part of his life, always commanded by the same officers. During this time he would have travelled once, twice or thrice throughout most or all of the Habsburg Empire, in all directions of the compass. Separated almost entirely from family and nationality, the soldiers served their time under the Imperial standards just like the Landesknchechte of the Renaissance, sometimes suffering privations, sometimes content, but always with a certain amount of romanticism.

This style of soldiering was almost wholly destroyed with the introduction of universal service for a short period (three years and finally two years of conscription). Because the personnel were constantly changing, there were ever stronger connections between the troops and the areas and nationalities from which they had originated. Moreover, from the 1880's most units were stationed in their home recruiting areas to speed up mobilization. Later, Franz Ferdinand fought in vain against this practice, which was harmful for the development of regimental spirit and which led indirectly to a larger turnover of officers (since the officers wanted to avoid long service with regiments stationed in less attractive areas).

One of the largest of the many side effects of these changes was the language question. In the old army, because of the lengthy times of service, almost all of the personnel had eventually learned "Army-German." The founders of the new peoples' army had envisioned that at least all of the non-commissioned

32 Glaise-Horstenau, Alt österreichs Heer in der deutschen Geschichte (Öst. Wehrzeitung for 1924, sections 19, 24, 25, 27 and 30
officers would learn German. However, there were soon many regiments in which entire companies, squadrons or batteries used no German except for the official 80 words of command. This trend would become even clearer in wartime, when large numbers of reserve and Landsturm soldiers entered the ranks directly from civilian life and further outnumbered the older type of professional soldiers.

Nonetheless, until the last days of the Monarchy the soldiers remained useful servants of the realm. Most of them still stemmed from agrarian areas. Farmers and peasants made good soldiers, regardless of whether they came from impoverished areas where back-breaking labor was needed to bring in the harvest or from the fruitful plains of the Danube or the Bohemian valleys. Youths who came from areas with extremely harsh natural conditions, such as the stony wastes of the southeast or the Carpathian forests, were used to hunger and bitter living and thus tended to be more accepting of the privations of military life. Moreover, in Austria as elsewhere it was not always true that soldiers from the factories and great cities were less proficient than those from the peasantry. To give one example, the k.u.k. regiments from the cities of German Bohemia were second to none in soldierly virtues. Soldiers from the factories and workshops may not have been as physically strong as farmers, but they possessed intelligence and moral tenacity.

When the initial enthusiasm for the war had passed and signs of dissatisfaction appeared, they were most evident among the soldiers from the eastern territories, who were less sophisticated and more easily susceptible to depression; it was the duty of the officers, especially the lieutenants and captains, to counteract these attitudes by personal example. Among all the nationalities, the influence of religious feeling was useful in overcoming the depression caused by the war. The chaplains, who stood by the combatants amidst privation and death, played an important role in keeping the army together.

33 The military chaplains suffered relatively high casualties. Winkler states that 1 out of every 20 chaplains was a casualty on the battlefield (see Berufsstatistik der Kriegstoten der öst.-ung. Monarchie – Vienna, 1919; p. 9). A tablet in the St Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna bears the names of 51 chaplains who were killed in action. While it is no doubt true that many chaplains were true to their calling, however, cynics noted that others never stirred from safe billets in the rear. As noted by Jaroslav Hasek (the creator of the good
An understanding of how the squabbles of the nationalities affected the Austro-Hungarian armed forces in their last decades is of course of great importance in judging their performance. The creators of the army under universal service paid great attention to this problem. Although Hungary received its own national troops, the Honved, efforts were made to give the common army and the cis-Leithanian Landwehr a constitution that would minimize the destructive influence of national conflicts as much as possible. Generalissimo Archduke Charles had already, in the first article of his excellent regulations, decreed that a soldier should receive no anti-military temptations from his religion or nation. This spirit was supposed to be carried over to the peoples' army under universal conscription. The rule was established that each soldier should be able to converse with his superiors up to the rank of company commander in his own mother tongue. The German "Kommando-sprache" - the 80 words which by regulation were used to order maneuvers and attacks - and the German "Dienst-sprache" - the use of German for verbal and written communication within the higher commands - were not used for political reasons, but solely as a technical necessity. The great majority of the nationalities and their leaders recognized them as such, and did not complain as long as the rules for use of German were not broken. (However, Magyar was the "Dienst-sprache" for the Hungarian Honved, and Croatian served the same purpose in the 42nd Honved [or Domobranen] Division.)

All responsible army leaders from Archduke Albrecht through Franz Ferdinand and Conrad resisted Magyar efforts to divide the armed forces. Their resistance was based on their conviction that the common unified army was the most important and final bulwark of the Monarchy's great power status, and that to openly accept the claims of one nationality would encourage demands from all the others. The very existence of a dual monarchy was already having adverse effects for this reason. The Czechs laid claim to all the rights of the lands of the Crown of St Wenceslaus using the same historical arguments which had been recognized in the case of the Hungarians. The South Slavs and Romanians were embittered when the Magyars - whom they had fought in 1848 as loyal subjects of the Emperor - received a privileged position. These peoples were prepared to accept a soldier Schweik), "The shambles of the Great War would have been incomplete without the ministrations of the clergy."
unitary centralized army command, but not one based on the pre-
eminence of two nationalities. Moreover, in the final decades
the Crown was forced to make further concessions to Hungary's
national aspirations, such as greater use of the Magyar language
in training officers. Even greater concessions might have
followed, but the outbreak of the war intervened.

The influence of the nationalistic in-fighting was much less
noticeable in purely internal Army policies. Until the turn of
the century the Army was all but completely undisturbed by such
squabbles. The only exception were the occasions in which
troops of one nationality were used to prevent political
violence by citizens of another nationality. This sometimes
exacerbated nationalistic tensions, as during the so-called
"Badeni Incident", which caused great bitterness in German
provincial cities against the officer corps, which was only
carrying out its orders 34. It is not true, however, that such
events were leading to a "politization" of the army.

In the last two decades, however, there were small but
unmistakable signs of the beginning of nationalistic tension in
the ranks. This was mainly the work of the Czech "National
Socialists" 35. They began to agitate in the "Zde Affair", in
which the issue was whether soldiers who were being called up
but not yet sworn could answer "here" in Czech ("Zde") rather
than in German ("Hier") during roll call. The Young Czechs soon
gained influence in the barracks of units in their home
territories, and they carried on an anti-military and pacifist
as well as a nationalist propaganda. The first fruits became
apparent in the partial mobilization of 1912-13 when reservists
of the Bohemian IR # 18 and 36 and DR # 8 mutinied while on the
trains. Since young Slovenian and Croatian men at this time
were also greatly under the influence of Masaryk and his
colleagues, there was also a danger that the South Slavic
regiments would follow the Czech example. The various
irredentist movements - Italian, Romanian and Ruthene - followed
the same course, and other peoples began to agitate among
soldiers of their nationalities. GdI Conrad felt that the bulk
of the Army was still untouched by such dangers, but he could
not say how long this relatively favorable situation would

34 The "Badeni Incident" involved disturbances in some German-
speaking areas in April 1897, as a result of agitation against
pro-Czech language laws that were supported by Minister
President Count Badeni.
35 Molisch, Vom Kampf der Tschechen um ihren Staat (Vienna 1929),
pp. 28 ff.
continue.

The Social Class Question

Social problems were considered less serious in military circles than nationality problems. Although Czech and Polish socialists attempted to carry their fight against the government into the army, and some other nationalities also had socialist representatives, only the German Social Democratic Party was a powerful group. In theory the Party was a sworn enemy of any professional army and demanded creation of a militia army such as envisioned by Jaures' "New Army", while denouncing the "military Moloch." However, in the last decades before the war, the Social Democrats had more or less entered into an armistice with the army, as they had with the rest of the government and the bureaucracy. The position of the Socialists regarding the Austrian nationality problem, as enunciated in the Brünn Program of 1899 had much in common with the predominant "Great Austrian" feeling in the officer corps, which in turn was similar to that of Lueger's Christian Socialists. In the summer of 1914 the attitude of the Social Democrats to the war was identical to that of the other German parties. If the socialist leaders had any qualms about the war, this was not the case with the mass of German Austrian workers. The belief that the war was a campaign against "ultra-reactionary" Tsarism also helped to salve consciences. As in other countries, the socialist question temporarily ceased to exist when war began and xenophobia triumphed over international ideals. Only a small group of radicals dissented 36.

National Attitudes toward the War

The nationality problem also seemed, at least for the moment, to have disappeared. The memory of the enthusiasm for the army in August 1914 should not be obscured by the effect of later events 37. Although it is true that the power of the state would have crushed any dissent, the fact remains that the great majority of the Habsburg communities rallied behind their

36 Brügel, Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, (Vienna 1925), Vol. V p. 176 ff; Friedrich Adler, Vor dem Ausnahmeggericht (Jena, 1923), p. 44 ff
gravely threatened common state and willingly sent their sons off in uniform to the front. It must be understood, however, that each of the individual nationalities had its own reasons for supporting the state, and that some of these reasons were contradictory. The Germans of Austria were fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Germans of the Hohenzollern Empire to maintain the Danube Monarchy as a great power. The Magyars were protecting their outlet to the sea against Serbia, their homeland against Russia, and their pre-eminence in the Monarchy against the other Habsburg nationalities. The Croats disregarded all Yugoslav considerations to rally behind their Emperor and King, and the Slovenes and Slovaks followed their example; all these nationalities hoped to gain greater political autonomy as a reward for military achievements. The Poles of Galicia - except for a small Russophile minority - looked forward to victory over Russia as a decisive step toward the reunification of their divided nation. The nationalities already mentioned made up a considerable majority of the Habsburg family of peoples. The four Slavic groups among them put aside for the moment any consideration that they might be fighting on the side of Germans against their Slavic brothers. They placed their hopes and ideals in support of the Habsburg concept of the state.

The first Slavic nationality of Austria-Hungary which began to fear that the war was a threat to their own well being were the Czechs. However, even among them none but a tiny group of intellectuals were planning the destruction of the state, which had given them political freedom and rich economic and cultural development. Among the Ruthenes (Ukrainians) of east Galicia, the Serbs of south Hungary, Syrmia and Bosnia, and the Italians of the coast lands and south Tyrol, there had been irredentist movements during peacetime, all more or less sponsored from outside the Monarchy's borders. The result was some hostile actions against the Army in east Galicia at the beginning of the war, although they were not nearly on as large a scale as the troops believed. For that matter, the Ruthenes also had an active black-yellow party which showed their good will by recruiting a Ukrainian Legion, although on a much smaller scale than the Polish Legion.

This brief outline of the position of the nationalities to the state in its hour of need shows that for the Habsburg Monarchy the war was a more hazardous venture than it was for nationally homogenous countries. Nonetheless, it is of course impossible to determine the exact percentage of soldiers who were not in favor of the Habsburg cause. Perhaps in 1914 there was at most one man out of four who did not fully identify with the
Emperor's war aims. This is based on the fact that out of every 100 soldiers of the k.u.k. Army, there were 25 Germans, 23 Magyars, 13 Czechs, 14 Slovaks, 9 Serbo-Croats, 8 Poles, 8 Ruthenians, 7 Romanians, 2 Slovenes, and 1 Italian. Dissatisfaction grew, however, as the war dragged on and in the last weeks of the war few of the soldiers identified themselves any longer with the Imperial cause.

Military Performance as Indicated by Casualties

It is tempting to attempt to judge the contributions of the soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces in rank order. The military scholar Colonel Dr. Georg Veith, for example, wrote that the Germans, South Slavs and Magyars were in the front rank in displaying soldierly virtues. Some statistics bolster this statement, at least concerning the Germans and Magyars. In the German-Austrian lands, 29 persons out of every 1000 inhabitants fell in the war; in the Magyar lands and mixed Magyar-German lands, the figure was 28 out of every 1000. The heaviest losses were among men from the Alpine areas, the mountains surrounding Bohemia and Moravia, and the Hungarian plains. In cis-Leithania, there were 44 dead for every 1000 inhabitants in German Moravia, 37 in Carinthia, 34 in German Bohemia; 34 to 30 in Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg and Styria, 27 in Upper Austria, and 22 in Lower Austria. It is no exaggeration to say that the German Austrians had the glory of maintaining with their last strength the existence of the state which they above all others had founded and sustained through the centuries. In their sacrifices they were unsurpassed by any other peoples in the Monarchy, and indeed by the other Germans of the Hohenzollern Empire.

It is strange that among the South Slavs the Croats had only 20

39 Winkler, Die Totenverluste der öst.-ung. Monarchie nach Nationalitäten (Vienna 1919), pp. 4 ff. In Section C.5 of this translation of Volume I we have added a summary of Winkler's statistics, with some further comments from on the relative ranking of "soldierly virtues" based on its contents.
40 Despite the excellent performance of the Lower Austrian regiments, their land had a much smaller percentage of fatal casualties. This was partly due to the large number of men in the great city of Vienna who were medically unfit for service, and to the relatively large percentage of individuals who were exempt from service because of their professions.
fatalities per 1000 inhabitants, despite their service in both the northern and southern theaters of operations. This is in large measure due to the fact that the figures are based on the total number of inhabitants, not the number of men called up for the Army. Despite the figures, there can be no doubt that until the end of the Great War the Croatians sent soldiers to fight for their Emperor and King who were worthy of the traditions of the old Military Borders.

The military accomplishments of the Slovenes of Inner Austria and the Slovaks of northern Hungary were nearly as great as those of the Croats. However, the Serbs also made great contributions, both in the early period of the war and later against Italy; some of them fought their fellow-Serbs from the other side of the Drina with great bitterness. The Poles of Galicia did not achieve as much; their ardor was no doubt lessened because of the direct danger of Russian invasion. Therefore it is pointless to try to differentiate the performance of the purely Polish regiments of the west from that of the mixed Polish-Ruthene regiments of central Galicia. The occupation of much of east Galicia by Russian troops severely depressed the troops who were recruited there; however, they had not been very successful even in the opening battles.

In the old professional army the Czechs had gained an excellent reputation, and certain specialties (such as the artillery) were predominantly their domain. This was not the case in the World War. Perhaps this was due initially more to anti-militaristic sentiments than to political and national aims. Despite such sentiments, the initial mobilization and deployment of the Czech regiments went smoothly, as did their first actions (with some exceptions). IR # 28 from Prague, which was part of the 3rd ID, matched the deeds of the finest troops from the Alpine lands; IR # 102 from Beneschau was one of the first units to be cited in official reports. Although the conduct of the Czech battalions of the 21st Landwehr Division during the botched initial offensive on the Drina became a matter of official investigation, later writings (including the Serbian Official History) have tended to exonerate them. Trouble began after the

41 Although the original text does not say so, an obvious reason for the low percentage of Croatian fatalities is the fact that they contributed a disproportionate number of recruits to the Navy rather than to the Army, and naval casualties were much lower. At least one more recent Croatian historian has also claimed that fewer Croatians were killed because they were smarter soldiers than the others!
enormous casualties among the professional officers and regular rank and file, when too many new soldiers were pressed into the Czech units; even so, not all of the regiments were failures. In the purely Czech territories of Bohemia, there were 22 fatal casualties to every 1000 inhabitants. Many Czechs were willing to hazard even their lives in the war against the Entente.

The Romanians of Transylvania showed little elan when they were called up. The difficult early fighting east of Lemberg did nothing to increase the self-confidence of the common Romanian soldiers of the XII Corps, who like the east Galicians were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, in later actions some regiments of Transylvanian Romanians were quite successful. Their number of war deaths per 1000 inhabitants was 23 after the four years of fighting were done.

Among Italian-speaking Austrians, the men from south Tyrol took part in the glorious deeds of the Kaiser Jaeger Regiments when the war began. After Italy entered the war, these soldiers were gathered together in special detachments and left on the northeastern front. 19 men were killed for every 1000 inhabitants of Italian south Tyrol; the figures for the Görz area were 15, and for Istria only 6 per 1000. These figures are consistent with other evidence of relative military effectiveness.

Obviously these summaries of the various contingents are of limited general application. Regiments and other units are not machines, any more than are their soldiers, and they did not always perform the same in similar situations. Many units and individuals fought very well at some times and poorly at others. Certain nationalities performed better on the offensive than the defensive; others performed well when arrayed closely together in ranks but could not continue to fight when left to their own devices. Some men could easily overcome surprises and panics, others could not be brought back to order and self-control after such occurrences. Some units could endure extraordinary casualties, others easily lost their composure. Such differences can be found in all armies; even in nationally homogenous forces the local characteristics of the troops play an important role. Because the armed forces of Austria-Hungary were so heterogenous, the effects of such differences and the corresponding demands on the leadership were much greater. This is why the role of the leaders – both commissioned and non-commissioned officers – was of such great importance in Austria.
3. The Austro-Hungarian Officers

The officer corps of the Habsburg Army also underwent considerable changes after Königgrätz. The inner structure of the group was completely revised in a few years. On the one hand, the number of officers who had risen from the ranks considerably decreased. On the other hand, with the disappearance of the "Inhabers' rights" and other relics of aristocratic privilege, most of the great nobles left the army for other areas of government service where they could wield more influence. The majority of officers were men who stemmed from families already involved in the military or civil service, along with representatives of the lower middle class or, in a few cases, even the working class. As the list of commanders in the World War indicates, an officer could reach the highest ranks regardless of his class origin, as long as he had some General Staff experience. Only a few of the cavalry regiments still had a significant number of aristocratic officers.

The great importance which the army laid on the training of officer recruits was based on the correct observation that as time went on even the simplest private soldiers could distinguish between well- and poorly-prepared leaders. On the eve of the war, almost all officers had received some practical education in a military academy in addition to their middle school training. Austria-Hungary possessed a great number of cadet schools, military secondary schools and other academies where officer candidates could be isolated from political agitation early in their careers. Senior first lieutenants who did not enter the General Staff were still required to attend a corps officers' school, and as they advanced further in the hierarchy underwent numerous tests and examinations. The intellectual attainments of the Austrian officers did not lag behind those of other armies. At times some of the leaders in the scientific and cultural life of all nationalities of the

42 Besides the general sources already listed above, the following have information about the officer corps: Rieger - Kriegersitte (Vienna 1891); Auffahrt - Inhalt und Form. Das Buch vom Offizier (Vienna 1910); Gerard - The Austrian Officer at Work and Play (London 1913); Auffenberg - Aus Österreichs Teilnahme am Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1920 - p. 57 ff.). An excellent later study is Deak - Beyond Nationalism: A Social & Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps (New York, 1990)
Danube Monarchy were wearing officers' uniforms. Even if such intellectual achievements had no direct bearing on military affairs, they indicated the high intelligence of the officer corps. Perhaps this was due in some measure to a wandering life spent in an Empire full of amazing geographical, national and cultural contrasts, and in small isolated garrison towns which were conducive to spending time in study.

The opposite side of this picture is the fact that officers in garrison were often a small isolated group. Especially in the infantry, the junior officers were burdened with large amounts of work, since the professional non-commissioned officers - a major part of the hierarchy of the old army - had mostly disappeared. In many companies in 1914, there were only a handful of regular NCO's, so that the lieutenants had to perform many of the training and command functions formerly handled by sergeants. In such conditions, the group solidarity and comradeship among the officers became an essential support system. The custom whereby all Austrian officers used the familiar pronoun "Du" in addressing one another, which was borrowed from the high nobility, was not paralleled in other armies.

The living conditions of the officers were certainly Spartan enough. Their salary covered only the basic necessities of living. The expression "He has debts like a staff officer", which was current in the army, reflects the realities of this situation. Even in the few remaining aristocratic cavalry regiments there were officers who lived solely off their salaries, or off the sale of horses (which was the only form of outside economic activity they were permitted). The primary compensation was that officers in Austria-Hungary enjoyed a certain social pre-eminence, which indeed they did not realize until it was taken away from them after the war.

By maintaining old traditions, the authorities tried to minimize the changes to the corps which were caused by its shifting social composition through the decades. In general, they were successful, in part because of the continuing pre-eminence of officers within society. Despite this pre-eminence of the officers, however, Austria was never a militaristic state. Under Maria Theresia and Joseph II the military officials had

43 See Hesshaimer, Der Offizier als Kulturfaktor (Öst. Wehrzeitung, 30 Nov 1928), and Österreichs Offiziere in Kunst und Literatur (Mil. wissenschaftl. Mitt., Vienna 1929, p. 95 ff.)
technically ranked ahead of the rest of the court. Nonetheless, until the end of the Monarchy the civil bureaucracy held the leading positions in the state. This became even more evident in the final few decades, when very few of the officer corps were members of the high aristocracy. The only reason that at least at court a middle class officer was received with more respect than a noble member of the civil service, and a reserve lieutenant with more respect than a diplomat, was the personal relationship between the Emperor and his armed forces.

The Officers and their Emperor

The army had saved both the throne and Empire for the dynasty in 1848-49. Franz Joseph considered himself a soldier from his earliest youth. However, his ambition to become a field commander had ended in defeat at Solferino, and for a generation thereafter he left the actual training and tactical leadership of the Army to FM Archduke Albrecht. Albrecht was succeeded by Beck and Beck by GdK Archduke Franz Ferdinand, advised by Conrad. Although Franz Ferdinand's actual military experience was much less than that of his Imperial uncle, a year before his death he was given the powerful position of General Inspector of the entire armed forces. The Monarch himself, who no longer wanted to trust the fortunes of war after 1859 and 1866, concentrated on keeping the Army free of political influences and on maintaining its ancient soldierly spirit. Very knowledgeable in the area of military regulations, Franz Joseph laid great stress on proper bearing. The Emperor's devotion to his soldiers was expressed most obviously by the fact that he never appeared officially except in an officer's uniform.

One ideological legacy of the feudal era was the feeling of the officers that they had personally pledged their loyalty to the Supreme War Lord. Although stories in which individuals who had

44 In this connection, Radetzky on 30 September 1848 wrote the following to the War Minister FZM Theodor Count Baillet de Latour (shortly to be murdered): "The Army had no grounds to regret the fall of the old system. If it was a despotism, it was a civil rather than a military despotism, which slighted and neglected the Army. Therefore we have no objection against the enlightened institutions which His Majesty is now granting his peoples." (Kriegsarchiv, Hofkriegsrat, # 216 for September 1848)

been mortally wounded in combat spoke a last word of faith in
the Emperor before dying seem like legends, many of them were
authentic—even in the World War. The notion that the officers
were feudal vassals of their liege may not have been useful in
guarding them against attacks by other social groups, but it did
help to keep politics out of the Army. The Emperor, at least,
felt that this lord-vassal relationship was self-evident and
expressed it on many occasions. He did one other thing to
increase the popularity of the Army by resisting all efforts to
get it involved in the controversies of civilian life.
According to his notion, the Army would remain aloof from day-
to-day political concerns, but would be available as an
instrument which the Supreme War Lord could rely on in special
emergencies.

**Officers and the Nationality Questions**

Inevitably, the mental attitude of Austrian officers was
affected by the nationality questions. There are no statistics
regarding the national origins of the professional soldiers.
Attempts to supply them by using data on individuals' 
birthplaces or use of colloquial language are insufficient.
Nonetheless, it seems certain that at the turn of the century
about 75 of every 100 officers were of German origin. This
contingent still included some men who had either come to
Austria from the German "Reich" or whose immediate ancestors had
done so. Such officers had an especially fanatical love for
their adopted Austrian homeland. However, since the victory of
Bismarck and of Prussian Germany, this source of men had been
cut off; by 1900 they were increasingly being replaced by
officers of Magyar, Slavic or Romanian origin. In some uhlan
regiments, nothing was spoken but Polish, in some hussar
regiments nothing but Magyar, and in some Landwehr regiments
nothing but Czech.

Nonetheless, German speaking officers still set the tone in the
common army and in the k.k. Landwehr. These men did not,
indeed, consider themselves "Germans", but rather anational
servants of the old Austrian "black-yellow" state. Outside of
the officer corps, such an attitude hardly existed except in
small circles of the aristocracy and bureaucracy; probably it
would exist only as long as the German officers still considered
themselves—rightly—to be the foremost group in the Army. As
advocates of an "Austria" that no longer existed outside of
their ranks, most of these officers spent their lives far from
their own home districts, surrounded by persons who spoke other
languages and had other ideals, and who often regarded them as
aliens, interlopers or even enemies. Nonetheless, when given enough time these officers eventually learned the language of their enlisted men and earned their respect, showing a degree of national tolerance no longer much evident in civilian society.

For three centuries, at least since the days of Wallenstein, the Army had adopted men from diverse nationalities and gotten them to forget their respective ideologies and feelings in service of the Empire. For example, the official Army handbooks ("Militär Schematismus") contain long lists of officers with foreign names but who had adopted German titles of nobility, such as "Colloredo von Waldersee." An example among the numerous families of lower rank are the Croatian border officers, who continued to provide the Army with some of its best leadership into the World War. By 1914 the German element of the officer corps was being further weakened, and in some regiments there were signs of political agitation. Nonetheless, the old spirit of the Austro-Hungarian officer corps still held firm in most instances, and the Supreme War Lord was able to call upon their well-proven loyalty for one more sacrifice.

Officers and their Men

The adaptability of the k.u.k. officers was also evident in their relationship with the enlisted men. The very different cultural and moral backgrounds of the different nationalities added to the officers' responsibilities. In general, they discharged these responsibilities successfully to a surprising degree, and the result was a feeling of mutual trust between them and the men.

It is true that the unparalleled authority which the army was given during the war years, and its desperate attempts to maintain the loyalty of the troops, gave opportunity for some excesses in the treatment of the enlisted men. Especially in the final year of the war there were incidents of draconian punishments, although such sentences were often overturned. However, commissions established after the war by the new (German) Austrian government found few cases of actual mistreatment of the men by their officers. Among the most frequent charges against the wartime officers was that in times

46 The original text also cites some quotations from the reports. The review was completed in 1922; the results are summarized in Ratzenhofer, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Wiener Reichspost, 11 and 12 August 1926), and Wandel der Zeiten (Öst. Wehrzeitung of 31 Dec 1926 and 6 Jan 1927)
of great need they had better living conditions than their men. It must be conceded that in many commands this was the case, and was more evident than in the German Army. However, the majority of officers gladly shared their food and goods with the men among whom they lived. The small number of examples to the contrary are greatly outnumbered by stories of true comradeship between officers and men.

As in all modern mass armies, there were problems stemming from the difference in age between many of the young recently commissioned junior officers and older reservists who had just been called up from civilian life. Only great tact could overcome this difference. Similarly, as the war went on there were many non-commissioned officers who had fought bravely from the beginning, had won medals and honors, and naturally resented their subordination to youthful officers who lacked these experiences. Austria, like other countries, made efforts to counteract this problem, with varying success 47.

However, the most difficult problem plaguing the relationship between officers and men was uniquely Austrian, the language barrier. Although in peacetime it was relatively unimportant, it quickly emerged during the war and became ever greater as the fighting went on. This was because groups of men and officers were often thrown together who simply could not understand each other. This made it extremely difficult for officers to exert any influence on the men during emergencies. Personal example, as always, could work wonders; however, there were situations in which the right words of command were needed. When officers could speak with the men and give the right example, they could even win great success while commanding troops of "dubious" political, cultural or moral background. This does not mean that the high command was not glad to have a German, Croatian or Magyar division available on the battlefield, but does show how important the role of the officers was in keeping the multi-national force going through four years of war.

The Reserve Officers

On the day of mobilization, the professional officers were

47 Although the gulf between officers and men is often cited as a holdover from feudal times, in fact it had been easier for common soldiers to advance through the ranks to staff positions and even to become generals in the old professional army. Such opportunities ended after 1866 along with the long enlistment periods.
joined by numerous others who had come back from retirement (many of these individuals soon proved to be effective leaders), and some other comrades, the "reserve" officers. Because of the national, cultural and social diversity of the multi-national Empire, there were great differences in the effectiveness of the reserve officer corps. There was no united esprit de corps such as existed among the Reich German officers. There were attempts to infuse such spirit in the period just before the war, but they had little effect because of differences between the nationalities. The level of military aptitude and training also varied considerably, and little attention was paid to the reserve officers during the peacetime maneuvers and drills. Nonetheless, when the war began at least the German-speaking reserve officers quickly found their bearings and fulfilled their new responsibilities. They knew how to support the professional officers and like them successfully led platoons, companies and even battalions. Not a few of their comrades from other nationalities strove their best to emulate the success of these Germans.

There were enormous casualties among the professional offices in the first battles, including some of the best men. Moreover, a number of the older (sometimes far too old) staff officers were not able to cope with the rapid fortunes of war and were sent away from the fronts. This led to rapid promotions among the younger active offices, which compensated them for the slow course of their careers in peacetime. The lack of officers was never really made good during the war. The military schools were not able to replace the lieutenants and captains, and professional officers mostly disappeared from platoon and company commands. Many regiments also had 15 to 20 staff officers, of whom the greater portion could not or would not serve at the front. Meanwhile the reserve officers were still ranked behind professionals of the same grade, regardless of length of service. Most of them remained "subalterns"; only in 1916 were large numbers promoted as captains; few of them received the rank of major.

At any point the reserve officers could lose their positions to much younger professionals; moreover, the professionals did not always treat their associates from the reserve with proper consideration. The reservists also resented the numerous professionals who were detailed to staffs, the lines of communication, or the interior of the country; in many cases they were thus shielded from the dangers of war. After the final catastrophe, many bitter words were exchanged about these problems, since defeat had further inflamed bad feelings. On
the other hand, there were many instances of genuine comradeship forged between the two groups of officers in the trenches. These were continued after the war in veterans' groups, where everyone met to relive the experiences they had shared together. It cannot be said that the problems between reserve and active officers were more serious in the old Austro-Hungarian Army then elsewhere.

Casualties among Officers

Analyses of statistics on casualties among the active officers have led to several similar conclusions. The Viennese statistician Dr. Wilhelm Winkler said that in the first years of the war the professional officers had 119.8 fatal casualties per 1000 men, more than any other group. This showed that "In the first two years of the war almost one-eighth of the professional officers had gone to their deaths in the war. This fact proves that, as expected, the Austrian professional officer corps performed its duty in exemplary fashion." GM Kerchnawe, in an official study, found that during the entire war about 31.3% of professional officers, 16.5% of reserve officers, and 12.5% of the professional non-commissioned officers were killed. Of the former students of Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt, the foremost school of the k.u.k. officer corps, about 3000 men were killed (ranking up to field marshal). From the more recent classes, up to one third of the graduates had fallen. Can there be a more striking testimony to the spirit which motivated this unpretentious, modest officer corps?

The Peoples' Army - A Summary

In summary, this was the nature of the peoples' army which Austria-Hungary sent into the field in the summer of 1914. There is no doubt that this enormous body was troubled by certain weaknesses, both major and minor. It could hardly be otherwise in a situation where so many millions of men were gathered in a huge organization and expected to perform almost impossibly difficult tasks and to exhibit perfect obedience while risking their lives under ever increasing burdens. Future generations, more objective than the people who actually experienced these events, will judge the achievements of the

48 Winkler, Statistik nach Berufung, p. 4 ff.
49 Kerchnawe, Öst.-Ungarns Machtaufgebot (Öst. Wehrzeitung, 24 April 1921)
50 Lustig-Prean, Zur Geschichte der Neustädter 1752-1918 (Vienna, 1927), p. 23
Austrian armed forces of 1914 with proper respect. These forces had developed from the days of Wallenstein to the 20th century in forms which might seem bizarre to observers from other countries, but had always fought with honor. In the four years of the World War they stood fast against strong tides until the revolution finally undermined their position from within.

This was the army that marched in August 1914 with a proud confidence in its own strength and the noble conviction that its cause was just, to confront war-hardened adversaries in both the north and south.

4. The Army High Command (Armee Ober Kommando)

In the years leading up to 1914, the Emperor, who was beginning to feel his age and was often ill, had delegated overall command of the field armies to the Archduke-Heir Apparent. On 31 July 1914, he named a new Army Supreme Commander: GdI Archduke Frederick, a grandson of Archduke Charles and a nephew of Archduke Albrecht. Actual control of operations, as had been planned for some time, was primarily the responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff. Although Archduke Frederick himself had a long military background and was motivated by a strong sense of his duty, he restricted his role within the AOK to supporting and helping Conrad discharge his heavy tasks. He enjoyed visiting the troops and did so frequently, while Conrad as Chief of Staff visited the front only three times. Frederick also often intervened in disputes between Conrad and third parties, especially in guarding the prerogatives of AOK against its German allies. During the two and a half years they worked together, many criticisms were directed against Conrad, while the prince was always a loyal defender of the Chief of Staff. Therefore this modest and unassuming commander deserves credit for the successes which history has associated with Conrad's name.

The AOK was responsible for the field armies, the navy, and for governing the "war areas", territories which at various periods were under military administration. Operational matters and decisions on the broad outlines of organization and military-political affairs were the province of the Operational Section under Colonel Metzger. Personnel issues came under the Detail (later Presidial) Section of Colonel von Kaltenborn. Espionage and evaluation of enemy forces was handled by the Information Detachment of Colonel von Hranilovic, supported by the Evidence
Office of the General Staff, which had been left in Vienna. In the first part of the war, these three Detachments made up the "Operational High Command", alongside which there functioned a "Rear Area Command" under GM Kanik. In spring 1916 the Rear Area Command was converted into the Quartermaster Detachment, on a level with the other three Detachments, and placed under Colonel Anton Höfer. However, a general (GM Kaltenborn) continued to function as a "General Quarter Master." There was also a Chief of Field Transport (later Field Railroads: Col Johann Straub), a Chief of the Field Telegraph Service (Col Schamschula) and several other such offices, along with representatives of the k.u.k. Foreign Ministry and of the two governments. Archduke Frederick had his own personal staff. Directly under the AOK was the War Press Office of Col Ritter von Hoen, who assembled a group of the foremost journalists and artists.

Given full freedom of decision from above, within his own circle Conrad also took upon himself the full burden of responsibilities for the great questions of directing the war. The men whom he trusted could freely share with him their convictions and ideas, but the final decision was his alone. Some of them were so convinced of his authority that they had to be pressed to give their advice. So it can be said that all major decisions made in the AOK in the first years of the war were basically made by "the Chief" (as Conrad was called by his entourage). At the start of the war, his immediate subordinates in the chain of command were:

- Army HQ # 1-4 and Kummer's Group in the northeast
- Army HQ # 6 (FZM Potiorek); the 5th Army, which was also in the southeast, was placed under direct control of the 6th
- The Navy; in practice, however, the Navy was given a great measure of autonomy, except for the ships which were supporting FZM Potiorek in the Bocche di Cattaro.

GdI Conrad felt that one of the most important pre-conditions for successful decision making was to strongly defend the prerogatives of the AOK and to prevent other groups from intruding. This was clearly evident in his dealings with the central organs of Army administration. GdI Freih von Bolfras, the Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor and King,

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51 Karl Hans Strobl, "KPQ", Erinnerungen aus dem Kriegspressequartier (Reichenberg, 1928)
52 Glaise-Horstenau, FM Conrad (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 11 November 1924)
was always complaining about the laconic shortness of the reports which the AOK sent to the Supreme War Lord. The information the Emperor received was often 36 hours old, despite the existence of telephones and telegraph. Conrad did, however, send more data to Bolfras in a series of personal letters. As time went on, it became customary for either Archduke Frederick, Conrad, or the new heir apparent Col Archduke Karl Franz Joseph (who was detailed to the AOK in July 1915 as an ordnance officer) to go to Schönbrunn to give personal briefings in the palace. Nevertheless, there remained times, especially when the Army was undergoing setbacks, in which the immediate entourage of the All Highest Emperor were dissatisfied because they lacked information.

The AOK was even more uncommunicative to the Foreign Ministry, the two state governments, and the common War Ministry. The primary concern of the Chief of staff was to keep operational measures secret; however, he also wanted to avoid receiving unsolicited advice and criticism. His efforts were not always successful, as will be evident in the accounts of the Serbian and Carpathian campaigns. Anyway, the political situation of the AOK was not very favorable. Cooperation between the Army command and the two governments left as much to be desired as did cooperation between the governments themselves.

In peacetime, the only measures taken to ensure cooperation between the allies was mutual assignment of military plenipotentiaries at each others' headquarters. At the start of the war, the representative of the German Supreme Command to the k.u.k. AOK was Glt Freih von Freytag-Loringhoven, a noted military historian and writer. In January 1915 he was succeeded by GM von Cramon. The Austrian representative at the German

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54 Conrad, op. cit, Vol IV, p. 645 ff.; Tisza, "Briefe 1914-18" (Berlin 1928) Vol. I p. 153 ff. Also see Giesl, Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient (Berlin 1927), pp. 257 ff. GdK Vladimir Freih von Giesl, who was the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade until the war began, was then the representative of the Foreign Ministry at the AOK. In January 1915 he had to give up this post because of differences with the Chief of the General Staff, and was succeeded by ambassador Count Thurn und Valsassina. A second representative was the later ambassador Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner.
55 Freytag-Loringhoven, Menschen und Dinge wie ich sie im Leben sah (Berlin 1923), pp. 139 ff; Cramon, Unser öst-ung Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege (2nd edition, Berlin 1922), p. 3
headquarters was FML Count Stürgkh, who was succeeded in spring 1915 by GM Freih von Klepsch-Kloth. In the first months of the war communications between the two headquarters was carried out primarily by written letters, and to a lesser extent by wire. GM Cramon gradually assumed a major role as liaison. The first personal meeting between the leading figures of the two sides took place at the beginning of December 1914. The failure to create an overall command of the forces on the Russian front at the start of the campaign was certainly a serious omission. Nonetheless, as time went on there was close and frequent communication between the AOK and the German commanders in the East.

There were soon calls in both of the warring coalitions for the establishment of a common supreme allied command over all theaters of operations. Such a measure no doubt would have had many advantages. However, the experiences of the war demonstrated that such a command would be useful only if the political and economic forces of the allies were coordinated as well as purely military matters. The parliamentary regimes of western Europe were more successful in mutual coordination, as well as in harnessing their domestic strengths, than were the monarchies of central Europe. Even in the West, however, cooperation was achieved only after paying a high penalty in bloody defeats.

56 Stürgkh, Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier (Leipzig 1921), p. 6 ff. He was the brother of Austrian Minister President Count Karl Stürgkh

57 These issues are summarized and discussed by Colonel Liebermann in "Die Entwicklung der Frage des einheitlichen Ober-befehles im Welktrieg" (Wissen und Wehr, 1927, pp. 1 ff and 65 ff)
5. Insert – National Casualty Statistics

Reference was made above to the statistics compiled in Winkler, "Die Totenverluste der öst-ung. Monarchie nach Nationalitäten" (Vienna, 1919). This section contains further details from Winkler's work.

The tables give some idea of the relative contributions of the different nationalities to the war effort. They show the number of dead per 1,000 inhabitants for each district of the Monarchy as of December 31, 1917.

Of course, such figures are only a relative indication of fighting value. A Croatian historian, for example, has objected to using the relatively low proportion of Croatian fatal casualties as an indicator of the group's performance. His argument is that Croatians suffered fewer losses than Germans or Magyars because they were smarter soldiers. Kiszling, on the other hand, attributes the low Croatian death rate to the fact that so many Croats were serving in the Navy, which had much lower casualties than the Army.

With this caveat, the following is an attempt to measure national performance by one type of statistics.

I. Cis-Leithanian Austria

A. German Nationality

1. "Purely" German districts (i.e., over 80% German)

   - Moravia: 4 districts, 1 independent city; their population in 1910 was 229,332; as of 12/31/17 there were 10,189 dead military men; the ratio of dead per 1,000 people therefore = 44.4
   - Carinthia: 3 districts, 1 city; population = 182,933; dead = 6,847; ratio = 37.4
   - Bohemia: 32 districts, 1 city; population = 1,703,661; dead = 58,740; ratio = 34.5
   - Vorarlberg: 3 districts; population = 117,909; dead = 4,003; ratio = 33.9
   - Tyrol: 13 districts, 2 cities; population = 485,633; dead = 16,061; ratio = 33.1
   - Salzburg: 5 districts, 1 city; population = 178,098; dead = 5,535; ratio = 31.1
   - Styria: 15 districts, 3 cities; population = 848,008; dead = 25,482; ratio = 30.1
1. "Purely" Slovene (over 80%)

. Styria: 7 districts; population = 503,259; dead = 16,366; ratio = 32.5
. Carniola: 10 districts, 1 city; population = 508,739; dead = 12,153; ratio = 23.9
. Gorizia-Gradisca: 3 districts; population = 166,397; dead = 3,489; ratio = 23.1
. **Overall**: 20 districts, 1 city; population = 1,178,395; dead = 32,368; ratio = 27.5

2. "Mostly" Slovene (50% to 80%)

. Carniola: 1 district (Gottschee); population = 45,063; dead = 1,436; ratio = 31.9
. **Overall**: 2 districts; population = 106,172; dead = 3,600;
ratio = 33.9

**Slovene Overall:** 22 districts, 1 city; population = 1,284,567; dead = 35,963; ratio = 28.0

C. Czechs in Moravia and Silesia (plus a few Austrian Slovaks)

1. "Purely" Czech (over 80%)
   . Moravia: 23 districts, 2 cities; population = 1,785,914; dead = 47,670; ratio = 26.7

2. "Mostly" Czech (50% to 80%)
   . Moravia: 4 districts; population = 283,825; dead = 9,260; ratio = 32.6
   . Silesia: 2 districts; population = 125,942; dead = 2,567; ratio = 20.4
   . **Overall:** 6 districts; population = 409,767; dead = 11,827; ratio = 28.9

Czechs (outside Bohemia) and Austrian Slovaks, **Overall:** 29 districts, 2 cities; population = 2,195,681; dead = 59,467; ratio = 27.1

D. Bohemian Czechs

. "Pure" Czech (over 80%): 51 districts, 1 city; population = 4,011,921; dead = 90,458; ratio = 22.5
. "Mostly" Czech (50% to 80%): 12 districts; population = 924,998; dead = 25,271; ratio = 27.3

**Bohemian Czech Overall:** 63 districts, 1 city; population = 4,936,919; dead = 115,271; ratio = 23.4

E. Ruthenians

1. "Purely" Ruthene (over 80%)
   . Galicia: 5 districts; population = 406,341; dead = 9,049; ratio = 22.3
   . Bukovina: 3 districts; population = 145,737; dead = 2,796; ratio = 19.2
   . **Overall:** 8 districts; population = 552,078; dead = 11,845; ratio = 21.5

2. "Mostly" Ruthene (50% to 80%)
Bukovina: 2 districts; population = 163,983; dead = 3,553; ratio = 21.7
Galicia: 38 districts; population = 3,833,138; dead = 65,040; ratio = 17.0
Overall: 40 districts; population = 3,997,121; dead = 68,593; ratio = 17.2

Ruthenian Overall: 48 districts; population = 4,549,199; dead = 80,438; ratio = 17.7

F. Romanians

"Mainly" Romanian (50% to 80%), all in Bukovina: 4 districts; population = 272,942; dead = 5,248; ratio = 19.2

G. Italians/Ladins

1. "Purely" Italian/Ladin (over 80%)
   Gorizia-Gradisca: 2 districts; population = 86,879; dead = 1,284; ratio = 14.8
   Istria: 1 city (Rovigno); population = 11,804; dead = 67; ratio = 5.7
   Tyrol: 10 districts, 2 cities; population = 405,957; dead = 7,870; ratio = 19.4
   Overall: 12 districts; 3 cities; population = 504,640; dead = 9,221; ratio = 18.3

2. "Mainly" Italian/Ladin (50% to 80%)
   Trieste: 1 city (Trieste); population = 132,593; dead = 1,590; ratio = 12.0
   Gorizia-Gradisca: 1 city (Gorizia); population = 17,769; dead = 297; ratio = 16.7
   Istria: 1 district (Parenzo); population = 63,613; dead = 1,101; ratio = 17.3
   Overall: 1 district, 2 cities; population = 213,975; dead = 2,988; ratio = 14.0

Italian/Ladin Overall: 13 districts, 5 cities; population = 718,615; dead = 12,209; ratio = 17.0

H. Serbs and Croats (mostly Croats)

1. "Purely" Serbo-Croat (over 80%)
Austria-Hungary’s Last War, 1914-1918

. Istria: 2 districts; population = 80,246; dead = 680; ratio = 8.5
. Dalmatia: 14 districts; population = 638,421; dead = 11,568; ratio = 18.1
. Overall: 16 districts; population = 718,667; dead = 12,248; ratio = 17.0

2. "Mainly" Serbo-Croat (50% to 80%)

1 district in Istria (Volosca): population = 50,628; dead = 757; ratio = 15.1

Serbo-Croat Overall: 17 districts; population = 769,295; dead = 13,005; ratio = 16.9

I. Polish

1. "Purely" Polish (over 80%)

30 districts and 2 cities in Galicia: Population = 2,929,876; dead = 47,336; ratio = 16.2

2. "Mainly" Polish (50% to 80%)

. Silesia: 3 districts; population = 282,577; dead = 7,086; ratio = 25.1
. Galicia: 8 districts; population = 948,089; dead = 13,523; ratio = 14.3
. Overall: 11 districts; population = 1,230,666; dead = 20,609; ratio = 16.7

Polish Overall: 41 districts, 2 cities; population = 4,160,542; dead = 67,945; ratio = 16.3

J. Districts Without National Majorities

. Istria (Italian, Croat, Slovene): 3 districts; population = 168,617; dead = 2,461; ratio = 14.6
. Moravia (Czech & German, a few Poles): 1 district (Moravian Ostrau); population = 43,758; dead = 1,197; ratio = 27.4
. Bukovina (German/Jewish, Ruthene, Romanian): 2 districts, 1 city; population = 187,665; dead = 3,380; ratio = 17.6
. Mixed Overall: 6 districts, 1 city; population = 400,040; dead = 7,038; ratio = 17.6

K. TOTAL FOR CIS-LEITHANIAN AUSTRIA
Population = 27,922,586; dead = 649,889; ratio = 23.8

II. Hungary (Proper) (i.e., excluding Croatia)

A. Magyars

1. "Purely" Magyar (over 80%)

16 counties, 14 municipalities; population = 5,677,541; dead = 140,980; ratio = 24.8

2. "Mainly" Magyar (50% to 80%)

   . Magyar/German: 4 counties; population = 1,244,505; dead = 45,320; ratio = 36.4
   . Magyar/Other: 11 counties, 4 municipalities; population = 3,316,552; dead = 79,871; ratio = 24.1

Magyar Overall: 31 counties, 18 municipalities; population = 10,238,598; dead = 266,171; ratio = 26.0

B. Germans

"Mainly" German (50% to 80%): 1 county, 1 municipality; population = 124,548; dead = 3,083; ratio = 24.8

C. Slovaks

1. "Purely" Slovak (over 80%)

3 counties; population = 520,504; dead = 12,343; ratio = 23.7

2. "Mainly" Slovak (50% to 80%)

   . Slovak/Magyar: 2 counties, 1 municipality; population = 645,705; dead = 19,491; ratio = 30.2
   . Slovak/Other: 4 counties; population = 464,116; dead = 8,779; ratio = 18.9

Slovak Overall: 9 counties, 1 municipality; population = 1,630,370; dead = 40,615; ratio = 24.9

D. Romanians

1. "Purely" Romanian (over 80%)

1 county; population = 94,952; dead = 2,187; ratio = 23.0
2. "Mainly" Romanian (50% to 80%)

- Romanian/Magyar: 7 counties; population = 1,788,840; dead = 48,711; ratio = 27.2
- Romanian/German: 3 counties; population = 764,929; dead = 19,034; ratio = 24.9

**Romanian Overall:** 11 counties; population = 2,648,721; dead = 69,932; ratio = 26.4

E. Areas Without National Majorities

- German/Magyar: 1 county, 2 municipalities; population = 773,440; dead = 29,284; ratio = 37.9
- Serb/Other: 1 county, 4 municipalities; population = 704,362; dead = 15,245; ratio = 21.6
- Ruthene/Other: 4 counties; population = 841,711; dead = 10,390; ratio = 12.3

**Mixed Overall:** 11 counties, 7 municipalities; population = 3,420,372; dead = 84,929; ratio = 24.8

F. TOTAL FOR HUNGARY PROPER

Population = 18,062,609; dead = 464,728; ratio = 25.7

III. Croatia-Slavonia

A. Croatians and Serbs

1. Purely Serbo-Croat (over 80%)

1 county, 1 municipality; population = 303,797; dead = 8,108; ratio = 26.7

2. Mainly Serbo-Croat (50% to 80%)

5 counties, 1 municipality; population = 1,602,296; dead = 25,444; ratio = 15.9

**Serbo-Croatian Overall:** 6 counties, 2 municipalities; population = 1,906,093; dead = 33,552; ratio = 17.6

B. Mixed Areas (Croats, Serbs and Germans)

2 municipalities, 2 counties: Population = 639,655; dead = 17,815; ratio = 27.9
C. TOTAL FOR CROATIA-SLAVONIA

Population = 2,545,748; dead = 51,367; ratio = 20.2

Total for all of trans-Leithania (Hungary plus Croatia)...
Population = 20,608,357; dead = 516,095; ratio = 25.0

IV. Bosnia-Herzegovina

All administrative areas were purely Bosnian Muslim, Serb & Croat (over 80%)...
51 districts, 4 independent cities; population = 1,783,453; dead = 34,016; ratio = 19.1

V. Grand Totals for the Gesamt Monarchie

Population = 50,314,396; dead = 1,200,000; ratio = 23.9

Summary by Nationality
(The "Czech" total includes the few Austrian Slovaks; "Italian" includes Ladin; "German" includes Galician and Bukovinan Jews; "Serbo-Croat" includes Bosnian Muslims)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>8,759,334</td>
<td>255,900</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>1,284,567</td>
<td>35,968</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar</td>
<td>10,238,598</td>
<td>266,171</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>2,921,663</td>
<td>75,180</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>1,630,370</td>
<td>40,615</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>4,460,067</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>7,132,600</td>
<td>175,196</td>
<td>24.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbo-Croat</td>
<td>4,459,471</td>
<td>80,573</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthene</td>
<td>4,549,199</td>
<td>80,438</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>718,615</td>
<td>12,209</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>4,160,542</td>
<td>67,945</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Initial Orders of Battle

A. Final Disposition of the Peacetime Army, June 1914
This information is not contained in the original work. It has been compiled from two sources: the Austrian Army Yearbook for 1914, and Allmayer-Beck's "k.u.k. Armee." The following notes show the home stations of the units just before mobilization.

CORPS HEADQUARTERS

I - Cracow    II - Vienna
III - Graz
V - Pressburg (Bratislava)
VII - Temesvar
IX - Leitmeritz
XI - Lemberg (Lvov)
XIII - Zagreb (Agram)
XV - Sarajevo

IV - Budapest
VI - Kaschau (Kassa)
VIII - Prague
X - Przemysl
XII - Hermannstadt
XIV - Innsbruck
XVI - Dubrovnik (Ragusa)

INFANTRY DIVISIONS

1 ID - Sarajevo [XV]  2 ID - Jaroslau [X]
3 ID - Linz [XIV]    4 ID - Brünn [II]
5 ID - Olmütz [I]    6 ID - Graz [III]
7 ID - Essegg [XIII]  8 ID - Bozen [XIV]
9 ID - Prague [XVIII] 10 ID - Josefstadt [IX]
11 ID - Lemberg [XI]  12 ID - Cracow [I]
13 LW ID - Vienna [II] 14 ID - Pressburg [V]
15 ID - Miskolcs [VI]  16 ID - Hermannstadt [XII]
17 ID - Grosswardein [VII] 18 ID - Mostar [XVI]
19 ID - Pilsen [VIII]  20 Hon ID - Grosswardein [VII]
21 LW ID - Prague [VIII] 22 LW ID - Graz [III]
23 Hon ID - Szegedin [VII] 24 ID - Przemysl [X]
25 ID - Vienna [II]  26 LW ID - Leitmeritz [IX]
27 ID - Kaschau [VI]  28 ID - Laibach [III]
29 ID - Theresienstadt [IX] 30 ID - Lemberg [XI]
31 ID - Budapest [IV]  32 ID - Budapest [IV]
33 ID - Komorn [V]    34 ID - Temesvar [VII]
35 ID - Klausenburg [XII] 36 ID - Zagreb [XIII]
37 Hon ID - Pressburg [V] 38 Hon ID - Klausenburg [XII]
39 Hon ID - Kaschau [VI] 40 Hon ID - Budapest [IV]
41 Hon ID - Budapest [IV] 42 Hon ID - Zagreb [XIII]
43 LW ID - Czernowitz [XI] 44 LW ID - Innsbruck [XIV]
45 LW ID - Przemysl [X]  46 LW ID - Cracow [I]
47 ID - Castelnuovo [XVI] 48 ID - Sarajevo [XV]
49 ID - Vienna [II]

The 49 ID was made up of regiments from other areas temporarily stationed at Vienna; it was broken up during mobilization and the units joined divisions from their home areas. On the other hand, two new ID were created (# 95 and 106) by expanding 95 and 106 Landsturm Inf Bdes.
CAVALRY DIVISIONS

1 CD - Temesvar [VII]  
2 CD - Pressburg [V]  
3 CD - Vienna [II]  
4 CD - Lemberg [XI]  
5 Hon CD - Budapest [IV]  
6 CD - Jaroslau [X]  
7 CD - Cracow [I]  
8 CD - Stanislau [XI]  
9 CD - Lemberg [XI]  
10 CD - Budapest [IV]  
11 Hon CD - Debreczen [VII]

INFANTRY BRIGADES

1 k.k. Lst - Vienna [II]  
[# 2 was vacant]  
3 - Rzeszow [X]  
4 - Jaroslau [X]  
5 - Innsbruck [XIV]  
6 - Salzburg [XIV]  
7 - Znaïm [II]  
8 - Brünn [II]  
9 - Olmütz [I]  
10 - Troppau [I]  
11 - Graz [III]  
12 - Klagenfurt [III]  
13 - Essegg [XIII]  
14 - Semlin [IV]  
15 - Brixen [XIV]  
16 - Trient [XIV]  
17 - Prague [VIII]  
18 - Prague [VIII]  
19 - Josefstadt [IX]  
20 - Königgrätz [IX]  
21 - Lemberg [XI]  
22 - Lemberg [XI]  
23 - Cracow [I]  
24 - Tarnow [I]  
25 LW - Vienna [II]  
26 LW - Brünn [II]  
27 - Pressburg [V]  
28 - Sopron [V]  
29 - Ungvar [VI]  
30 - Miskolcz [VI]  
31 - Brasso [XII]  
32 - Nagyszeben [XII]  
33 - Grosswardein [VII]  
34 - Arad [VII]  
35 k.k Lst - Czernowitz [XI]  
36 kk Lst - Leitmeritz [IX]  
37 - Pilsen [VIII]  
38 - Budweis [VIII]  
39 Hon - Grosswardein [VII]  
40 Hon - Szatmar Nemeti [VI]  
40 k.k. Lst (# 40 was used twice) - Brünn [II]  
41 LW - Pilsen [VIII]  
42 LW - Prague [VIII]  
43 LW - Graz [III]  
44 LW - Laibach [III]  
45 Hon - Szegedin [VII]  
46 Hon - Lugas [VII]  
47 - Przemysl [X]  
48 - Przemysl [X]  
49 - Vienna [II]  
50 - Vienna [II]  
51 LW - Josefstadt [IX]  
52 LW - Leitmeritz [IX]  
53 - Kaschau [VI]  
54 - Eperjes [VI]  
55 - Trieste [III]  
56 - Görz [III]  
57 - Theresienstadt [IX]  
58 - Reichenberg [IX]  
59 - Czernowitz [XI]  
60 - Lemberg [XI]  
61 - Budapest [IV]  
62 - Budapest [IV]  
63 - Budapest [IV]  
64 - Budapest [IV]  
65 - Györ [V]  
66 - Komarom [V]  
67 - Temesvar [VII]  
68 - Fehertemplom [VII]  
69 - Gyulafehervar [XII]  
70 - Koloszvar [XII]
During mobilization, the following Bdes were dissolved: # 6, 94, 97 (regular) and 98. The 122 (regular) Bde was given new components and became 122 LW Bde. During August, 2nd Lst Bde was formed at Cattaro, but it was soon dissolved. 95 and 106 Lst Bdes were up-graded to Divisions (# 95 only briefly).

### MOUNTAIN BRIGADES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bde</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mostar [XVI]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Trebinje [XVI]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nevesinje [XVI]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dubrovnik [XVI]</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Split [XVI]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bileca [XV]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Visegrad [XV]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Foca [XV]</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sarajevo [XV]</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sarajevo [XV]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tuzla [XV]</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Banjaluka [XV]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mostar [XVI]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Castelnuovo [XVI]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MARCH BRIGADES

These were not pre-war formations, but were created during mobilization from extra troops at regimental depots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bde</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cracow [I]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vienna [II]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Graz [III]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Budapest [IV]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 12th Bde was broken up during mobilization.

FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADES

In peacetime, there were only 14 field brigades, assigned respectively to Corps HQ # I to XIV; these brigades were administrative HQ. During mobilization they were all dissolved, and a new series of Field Artillery Brigades were created, one for each infantry division (except for the mountain units - i.e. the 1st, 18th, 47th and 48th ID - and the newly created 95 and 106 Landsturm ID).

FORTRESS ARTILLERY BRIGADES

These were purely administrative HQ in rear areas, and their function did not change during mobilization.

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY BRIGADES

1 - Brixen [XIV]  2 - Sarajevo [XV]  3 - Mostar [XVI]
2nd and 3rd Bdes were broken up during mobilization; 1st Bde went to the front, but with a new OB (to command heavy artillery).

k.u.k. (line) INFANTRY REGIMENTS

Each regiment's "home town" (recruiting area) was the town where its depot was located, regardless of where the battalions were actually stationed. Most of the regiments had a detached battalion in XV or XVI Corps Districts (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The Roman numerals in brackets refer to the recruiting area.

IR Kaiser # 1 - [I] Formed 1715; HQ, II and III Bns at Cracow; 1st Bn at Mostar; IV Bn and depot at Troppau
IR Tsar Alexander # 2 - [XII] Formed 1741; Regt, with depot, was at Brasso (Kronstadt), except for II Bn at Nagyszeben
IR Erzherzog Karl # 3 - [I] Formed 1715; HQ, II and III Bns at Teschen; Ist Bn at Doboj (Bosnia); IV Bn and depot at Kremsier
IR Deutschmeister # 4 - [II] Formed 1696; HQ, II and III Bns with depot at Vienna; Ist Bn was nearby at Willersdorf, IV Bn at Konjic (Bosnia)
IR Klobucar # 5 - [VI] Formed 1762; HQ and Ist Bn at Eperjes; II Bn (detached) at Rogatica; III Bn and depot at Szatmar Nemeti; IV Bn at Kisszeben
IR # 6 (vacant) - [IV] Formed 1762; HQ, II and III Bns at Budapest; Ist Bn (detached) at Bileca; IV Bn and depot at Novi Sad
IR Khevenhuller # 7 - [III] Formed 1691; whole Regt at Graz, except for IV Bn and depot at Klagenfurt
IR Erzherzog Karl Stefan # 8 - [II] Formed 1642; whole Regt with depot at Brünn, except for III Bn at Trebinje (Bosnia)
IR Clerfayt # 9 - [X] Formed 1725; HQ, I and IV Bns at Przemysl; II Bn and depot at Stryj; III Bn at Radymno
IR King of Sweden # 10 - [X] Formed 1715; whole Regt with depot at Przemysl, except for Ist Bn at Bijelnija
IR Sachsen # 11 - [VIII] Formed 1629; HQ, III and IV Bns at Prague; Ist Bn and depot at Pisek; II Bn at Prachtitz
IR Parmann # 12 - [V] Formed 1702; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Znaim-Klosterbrück; III Bn and depot at Komorn; IV Bn at Sarajevo
IR Jung-Starhemberg # 13 - [I] Formed 1814; HQ, II and III Bns at Troppau; I Bn at Bielitz; IV Bn with depot at Cracow
IR Hessen # 14 - [XIV] Formed 1733; whole Regt with depot at Linz
IR Georgi # 15 - [XI] Formed 1701; whole Regt with depot at Tarnopol, except for II Bn at Lemberg
. Varasdin IR Giesl # 16 - [XIII] Formed 1703; Regt stationed at Vienna, except for IV Bn and depot at Belovar
. IR Milde # 17 - [III] Formed 1674; Regt stationed at Klagenfurt, except for I Bn and depot at Ljubljana (Laibach)
. IR Erzherzog Ludwig Salvator # 18 - [IX] Formed 1682; whole Regt with depot at Königgrätz, except for II Bn at Nevesinje
. IR Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand (then Erzherzog Karl) # 19 - [V] Formed 1734; HQ and II Bn at Tolmein, Ist Bn at Sesamo; III Bn with depot at Győr (Raab); IV Bn at Caporetto

. IR Prinz Heinrich von Preussen # 20 - [I] Formed 1681; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Cracow; III Bn with depot at Neu Sandez; IV Bn at Bijelnija (Bosnia)
. IR Abensberg und Traun # 21 - [IX] Formed 1733; HQ, III and IV Bns at Kattenberg; Ist Bn at Brcko (Bosnia); IV Bn with depot at Caslau
. IR Lacy # 22 - [XVI] Formed 1709; Regt stationed at Mostar, except for Ist Bn with depot at Sinj
. IR Ludwig Markgraf von Baden-Baden # 23 - [IV] Formed 1814; Regt stationed at Budapest, except for IV Bn with depot at Zambor
. IR Kummer # 24 - [XI] Formed 1662; HQ, II and III Bns at Lemberg; Ist Bn with depot at Kolomea; IV Bn at Foca
. IR Pokorny # 25 - [VI] Formed 1672; Regt stationed with depot at Losoncz, except for IV Bn at Gorazde
. IR Schreiber # 26 - [V] Formed 1717; Regt stationed at Győr, except for III Bn and depot at Esztergom
. IR King of the Belgians # 27 - [III] Formed 1682; Regt stationed at Ljubljana, except for III Bn and depot at Graz
. IR King of Italy # 28 - [VIII] Formed 1698; HQ and III Bn at Innsbruck; Ist Bn at Schlauders; II Bn with depot at Prague; IV Bn at Male
. IR Loudon # 29 - [VII] Formed 1709; Regt stationed at Temesvar, except for Ist Bn with depot at Nagy-Becskerek

. IR Schoedler # 30 - [XI] Formed 1725; Regt stationed with depot at Lemberg, except for IV Bn at Nevesinje
. IR Pucherna # 31 - [XII] Formed 1741; Regt stationed with depot at Nagyszeben, except for III Bn at Split (Spalato)
. IR Kaiserin und Königin Maria Theresia # 32 - [IV] Formed 1741; Regt stationed at Trieste, except for III Bn with depot at Budapest
. IR Kaiser Leopold II # 33 - [VII] Formed 1741; stationed with depot at Arad, except for IV Bn at Cattaro
. IR Wilhelm I von Deutschland # 34 - [VI] Formed 1733; stationed with depot at Kaschau, except for II Bn at Rogatica (Bosnia)
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IR Daublesky von Sterneck # 35 - [VIII] Formed 1683; stationed with depot at Pilsen, except for II Bn at Kulinovik
IR Graf Ulysses Brown # 36 - [VIII] Formed 1683; HQ, Ist and III Bns at Bruneck, II Bn at Niederdorf; IV Bn with depot at Jung-Bunzlau
IR Erzherzog Joseph # 37 - [VII] Formed 1741; HQ, Ist and III Bns at Agram (had just moved there from Vienna); II Bn and depot at Grosswardein (Nagyvarad); IV Bn at Bileca
IR King of Spain # 38 - [IV] Formed 1814; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Peterwardein; III Bn at Bileca; IV Bn with depot at Kecskemet (Regt had recently changed stations)
IR Conrad von Hötzendorf # 39 - [VII] Formed 1756; stationed at Vienna, except for II Bn with depot at Debreczen

IR Pino # 40 - [X] Formed 1733; HQ, Ist and III Bns with depot at Rzeszow; II Bn at Debica, IV Bn at Nisko
IR Erzherzog Eugen # 41 - [XI] Formed 1701; entire Regt with depot was at Czernowitz
IR Braunschweig # 42 - [IX] Formed 1674; HQ, II and III Bns with depot at Theresienstadt; Ist Bn at Kaaden, IV Bn at Nevesinje (in Bosnia)
IR Prinz Rupprecht von Bayern # 43 - [VII] Formed 1814; stationed at Fehertemplom, except for II Bn with depot at Karansebes
IR Erzherzog Albrecht # 44 - [IV] Formed 1744; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Budapest; III Bn with depot at Kaspovar; IV Bn at Bileca
IR Erzherzog Joseph Ferdinand # 45 - [X] Formed 1816; HQ, Ist and IV Bns at Przemysl; II Bn at Travanik, III Bn with depot at Sanok
IR # 46 (ex Fejervary, vacant since April 1914) - [VII] Formed 1762; all stationed with depot at Szeged, except for III Bn at Antovac (Bosnia)
IR Beck-Rzikowski # 47 - [III] Formed 1682; HQ, II and IV Bns at Görz; Ist Bn at Quiseca; III Bn with depot at Marburg
IR Rohr # 48 - [V] Formed 1798; HQ, III and IV Bns at Sopron; Ist Bn at Sarajevo; II Bn with depot at Nagy-Kaniszsa
IR Hess # 49 - [II] Formed 1715; HQ, I and II Bns at Brünn; III Bn at Sarajevo; IV Bn with depot at St Pölten

IR Baden # 50 - [XII] Formed 1762; whole Regt was with depot at Carlstadt, except for IV Bn at Stolac (Bosnia)
IR Boroevic # 51 - [XII] Formed 1702; HQ, II and III Bns at Maros-Vasarhely; Ist Bn at Domanovic (BHD); IV Bn with depot at Koloszvar
IR Erzherzog Friedrich # 52 - [IV] Formed 1741; HQ, I and IV Bns at Brod on the Sava; II Bn at Dubrovnik; III Bn with depot at Pecs
. IR Dankl # 53 - [XIII] Formed 1741; whole Regt with depot at Zagreb, except for IV Bn at Foca (Bosnia)
. IR Alt-Starhemberg # 54 - [I] Formed 1655 (1661); whole Regt with depot at Olmütz, except for II Bn at Jägerndorf
. IR King of Montenegro # 55 - [XI] Formed 1799; HQ, II and IV Bns at Lemberg; I Bn with depot at Brzecany; III Bn at Mosty Wielkie
. IR Leopold Daun # 56 - [I] Formed 1684; HQ, I, II and IV Bns at Cracow; III Bn with depot at Wadowice
. IR Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld # 57 - [I] Formed 1688; HQ, III and IV Bns with depot at Tarnow; I Bn at Bochnia, II Bn at Zenica
. IR Erzherzog Ludwig Salvator # 58 - [XI] Formed 1757 (1763); HQ, I and III Bns with depot at Stanislau; II Bn at Zaleszczyki, IV Bn at Foca (Bosnia)
. IR Erzherzog Rainer # 59 - [XIV] Formed 1682; HQ and I Bn at Bregenz; II Bn at Innsbruck, III Bn at Schwaz; IV Bn with depot at Salzburg
. IR Ziegler # 60 - [VI] Formed 1798; whole Regt with depot at Eger (Erlau) except for II Bn at Zwornik (BHD)
. IR Frank # 61 - [VII] Formed 1798; HQ, III and IV Bns with depot at Temesvar; I Bn at Crkvice (Bosnia), II Bn at Debreczen
. IR King Ludwig of Bavaria # 62 - [XII] Formed 1798; HQ, II and III Bns at Koloszvar; I Bn at Vlassenic (Bosnia), IV Bn with depot at Maros-Vasarehely
. IR Pitreich # 63 - [XII] Formed 1860; whole Regt with depot at Bistritz, except for Ist Bn at Mostar (BHD)
. IR Auffenberg # 64 - [XII] Formed 1860; HQ, I and II Bns with depot at Broos; III Bn at Trebinje (Bosnia); IV Bn at Abrudbanya
. IR Erzherzog Ludwig # 65 - [VI] Formed 1860; HQ, I and III Bns at Miskolcz; II Bn with depot at Munkacs; IV Bn at Bestercze-banya
. IR Erzherzog Peter Ferdinand # 66 - [VI] Formed 1860; HQ, III and IV Bns with depot at Ungvar; I Bn at Kaschau (Kassa), II Bn at Gorazde (Bosnia)
. IR Kray # 67 - [VI] Formed 1860; HQ, I, II and III Bns at Vienna; IV Bn with depot at Eperjes
. IR Reicher # 68 - [IV] Formed 1860; HQ, II, III and IV Bns at Semlin; Ist Bn with depot at Szołnok
. IR # 69 (ex-Leithner, vacant) - [IV] Formed 1860; HQ, I and II Bns at Pecs; III Bn at Castelnuovo (Dalmatia); IV Bn with depot at Szekesfehérvár

. Peterwardein IR Appel # 70 - [XIII] Formed 1860; HQ, I and IV Bns at Zagreb; II Bn at Trebinje; IV Bn with depot at Peterwardein
. IR Galgotzky # 71 - [V] Formed 1860; HQ, II and III Bns with
depot at Tretschin; I Bn at Nagyszombat, IV Bn at Pressburg.
  . IR David # 72 - [V] Formed 1860; whole Regt with depot at
    Pressburg (Poszony), except for II Bn at Teodo
  . IR Württemberg # 73 - [VIII] Formed 1860; HQ, I, II and III
    Bns at Prague; IV Bn with depot at (Bohemian) Eger
  . IR Schönaich # 74 - [IX] Formed 1860; HQ, I and II Bns at
    Reichenberg; III Bn a Sarajevo; IV Bn with depot at Jicin
  . IR # 75 (ex King of Denmark, vacant) - [VIII] Formed 1860; HQ,
    I, II and IV Bns at Salzburg; III Bn with depot at Neuhaus
  . IR Salis-Soglio # 76 - [V] Formed 1860; HQ, II and IV Bns at
    Esztergom; I Bn with depot at Sopron; III Bn at Trebinje
    (Bosnia)
  . IR Philip von Württemberg # 77 - [X] Formed 1860; HQ, II and
    III Bns at Przemysl; I Bn with depot at Sambor; IV Bn at Tuzla
    (Bosnia)
  . IR Gerba # 78 - [XIII] Formed 1860; HQ, II and III Bns with
    depot at Essegg; I Bn at Brod on the Sava, IV Bn at Petrinja
  . Ottocac IR Josef Jellacic # 79 - [XIII] Formed 1860; HQ, I,
    III and IV Bns at Fiume; II Bn with depot at Ottocac

  . IR Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach # 80 - [XI] Formed 1860; HQ, I and
    III Bns at Lemberg; II Bn with depot at Zloczow; IV Bn at
    Nevesinje (Bosnia)
  . IR Johann von Waldstätten # 81 - [II] Formed 1883; Regt was
    with depot at Iglau, except for IV Bn at Bileca in BHD
  . IR Schwitzen # 82 - [XII] Formed 1883; HQ, I, II and IV Bns at
    Vienna; III Bn with depot at Szekelyudvarhely
  . IR Schikofsky # 83 - [V] Formed 1883; HQ, II and IV Bns at
    Komarom; Ist Bn with depot at Szombathely; III Bn at Koszeg
  . IR Bolfras # 84 - [II] Formed 1883; HQ, II and III Bns at
    Krems; Ist Bn with depot at Vienna; IV Bn at Sarajevo (Bosnia)
  . IR Gudernak # 85 - [VI] Formed 1883; HQ, I and IV Bns at
    Leutschau (Locse), II Bn with depot at Marmaros-Sziget, III Bn
    at Rogatica (BHD)
  . IR Steininger # 86 - [IV] Formed 1883; HQ, I and IV Bns with
    depot at Szabadka; II Bn at Budapest, III Bn at Visegrad (BHD)
  . IR Succovalty # 87 - [III] Formed 1883; HQ, II and III Bns at
    Pola; I Bn with depot at Cilli; IV Bn was detached from Pola to
    the international peace-keeping force in Albania
  . IR # 88 (vacant, ex-Teuchert) - [VIII] Formed 1883; HQ, II and
    III Bns at Budweis; I Bn at Neuhaus, IV Bn with depot at Beraun
  . IR Albori # 89 - [X] Formed 1883; HQ, I and III Bns at
    Jaroslau; II Bn at Rawa Russka; IV Bn with depot at Grodek-
    Jagielowski

  . IR Horsetzky # 90 - [X] Formed 1883; HQ, II and III Bns with
    depot at Jaroslau; Ist Bn at Sarajevo (BHD), IV Bn at Lubaczow
IR # 91 (vacant, ex-Czibulka) - [VIII] Formed 1883 (from older Bns); HQ, II and III Bns at Prague; Ist Bn at Teodo; IV Bn with depot at Budweis (Budejovice)

IR Hortstein # 92 - [IX] Formed 1883; HQ, III and IV Bns at Theresienstadt; Ist Bn with depot at Komotau, II Bn at Kalinovik

IR # 93 (vacant, ex-Joelson) - [Ist] Formed 1883; HQ, III and IV Bns at Cracow; Ist Bn at Bihac (BHD), II Bn with depot at Mährisch Schönberg

IR Koller # 94 - [IX] Formed 1883; HQ, III and IV Bns at Reichenberg; Ist Bn at Josefstadt; II Bn with depot at Turnau

IR Kövess # 95 - [XI] Formed 1883; HQ, I and IV Bns at Lemberg; II Bn at Stanislau; III Bn with depot at Czortkow

IR Crown Prince of Romania # 96 - [XIII] Formed 1883; HQ, I, II and III Bns at Temesvar; IV Bn with depot at Carlstadt

IR Georg von Waldstätten # 97 - [III] Formed 1883 (with one older bn); HQ, I and II Bns at Belovar; III Bn with depot at Trieste; IV Bn at Carlstadt

IR Rummer # 98 - [IX] Formed 1883; HQ, II and III Bns at Josefstadt; I Bn at Perzago; IV Bn with depot at Hohenmauth

IR # 99 (vacant, ex King of the Hellenes) - [II] Formed 1883; HQ, I, II and IV Bn at Vienna; III Bn with depot at Znaim

IR Steinsberg # 100 - [Ist] Formed 1883; HQ, I and IV Bns at Cracow; II Bn at Banja Luka (BHD); III Bn with depot at Teschen

IR Drahtschmidt # 101 - [VII] Formed 1883; HQ, I and IV Bns at Nagy Varad; II Bn at Trebinje; III Bn and depot at Bekescsaba

IR Potiorek # 102 - [VIII] Formed 1883; HQ, III and IV Bns at Prague; II Bn at Mostar (BHD); II Bn with depot at Beneschau

(The following four regts recruited at large in Tyrol and Vorarlberg [XIV Corps], without respective cantons...)

IR Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 1 - Formed 1895; HQ, I, and II Bns at Trient; III Bn with depot at Innsbruck (no Bn # IV)

IR Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 2 - Formed 1895; HQ, I and II Bns at Bozen; III Bn at Meran; IV Bn with depot at Brixen

IR Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 3 - Formed 1895; HQ, II, and III Bns at Rovereto; Ist Bn with depot at Trient (no Bn # IV)

IR Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 4 - Formed 1895; HQ and II Bn at Riva; Ist Bn at Mezolombardo; III Bn at Arco; depot at Hall

Bosnia-Herzegovina IR # 1 - [XV] Formed 1894; HQ, I and IV Bns at Vienna; II Bn at Wiener Neustadt; III Bn with depot at Sarajevo

Bosnia-Herzegovina IR # 2 - [XV] Formed 1894; HQ, I, II and IV Bns at Graz; III Bn with depot at Banjaluka

Bosnia-Herzegovina IR # 3 - [XV] Formed 1894; HQ, I, II and IV Bns at Budapest; III Bn with depot at Dolnya Tuzla
. Bosnia-Herzegovina IR # 4 – [XVI] Formed 1894; HQ, I and II Bns at Trieste; III Bn with depot at Mostar (no Bn # IV)
k.u.k. (line) CAVALRY REGIMENTS

Each regiment's "home town" (recruiting area) was the town where its ersatz cadre was located, regardless of where the battalions were actually stationed.

. DR Kaiser Franz Ist # 1 - [IX] Formed 1768; HQ and II Bn at Pardubitz; Ist Bn with Ersatz Cadre at Brux (near Komotau)
. DR Paar # 2 - [VIII] Formed 1672; HQ at Tarnopol; Ist Bn at Czortkow, II Bn at Trembowla, Ersatz Cadre at Dobezan
. DR King of Saxony # 3 - [II] Formed 1768; most of Regt with Ersatz Cadre at Vienna, except for II Bn at Gross Enzendorf
. DR Kaiser Ferdinand Ist # 4 - [XIV] Formed 1672; HQ and Ist Bn at Enns, II Bn with Ersatz Cadre at Wels
. DR Tsar Nicholas Ist of Russia # 5 - [III] Formed 1721; HQ and Ist Bn at Götz, II Bn at Wind-Freisstitz, Ersatz Cadre at Marburg
. DR Mecklenburg-Strelitz # 6 - [II] Formed 1629; HQ at Przemysl; Ist Bn at Hruszow, II Bn at Grodek-Jagiellowski, Ersatz Cadre at Brünn (Brno)
. DR Herzog von Lothringen # 7 - [VIII] Formed 1663; HQ and Ist Bn at Stanislau, II Bn at Kolomea, Ersatz Cadre at Alt-Bunzlau
. DR Montecuccoli # 8 - [IX] Formed 1619; HQ and Ist Bn at Jaroslau, II Bn at Radymo, Ersatz Cadre at Pardubitz
. DR Erzherzog Albrecht # 9 - [XI] Formed 1682; HQ and II Bn at Brody; Ist Bn at Kamionka Strumilowa, Ersatz Cadre at Kolomea
. DR Liechtenstein # 10 - [VIII] Formed 1631; HQ, I and II Bns at Cracow; Ersatz Cadre at Trebon
. DR Kaiser Franz Joseph # 11 - [II] Formed 1688; HQ and Ist Bn at Brünn, II Bn at Godring, Ersatz Cadre at Stockerau
. DR Grand Duke Nicholas # 12 - [Ist] Formed 1798; HQ and Ist Bn with Ersatz Cadre at Olmütz, II Bn at Bisenz
. DR Prince Eugene of Savoy # 13 - [IX] Formed 1682; HQ and II Bn at Klettau, Ist Bn at Mies, Ersatz Cadre at Postelburg
. DR Windischgrätz # 14 - [VIII] Formed 1725; HQ and Ist Bn at Brandeis on the Elbe, II Bn at Dobrzan, Ersatz Cadre at Klettau
. DR Erzherzog Joseph # 15 - [II] Formed 1891; HQ, Ist and II Bn at Zolkiew; Ersatz Cadre at Wiener Neustadt

. HR Kaiser # 1 - [VII] Formed 1756; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Vienna, Ersatz Cadre at Grosswardein
. HR Friedrich Leopold von Preussen # 2 - [XII] Formed 1741; HQ, Ist and II Bns at Kronstadt, Ersatz Cadre at Hermannstadt
. HR Hadik # 3 - [VII] Formed 1702; HQ and II Bn at Sopron, Ist Bn at Neusiedel; Ersatz Cadre at Arad
. HR Duke of Connaught # 4 - [VII] Formed 1733; HQ and II Bn at Hermannstadt, Ist Bn at Szaszebes, Ersatz Cadre at Lugos
. HR Radetzky # 5 - [V] Formed 1798; HQ and II Bn at Komorn with Ersatz Cadre; Ist Bn at Raab (Győr)
. HR Württemberg # 6 - [VI] Formed 1734; HQ and II Bn at Klagenfurt, Ist Bn at Seebach, Ersatz Cadre at Gyöngyös
. HR Emperor of Germany # 7 - [IV] Formed 1798; HQ and II Bn at Debreczen, Ist Bn at Grosswardein, Ersatz Cadre at Budapest
. HR Tersztyanszky # 8 - [IV] Formed 1696; HQ and Ist Bn at Kecskemet; II Bn at Czegled, Ersatz Cadre at Maria Theresiopol
. HR Nadasdy # 9 - [V] Formed 1688; HQ and II Bn at Mitrowitz; Ist Bn at Ruma, Ersatz Care at Sopron; (2nd Sqdn was detached to Tuzla in Bosnia)
. HR King Frederick William III (of Prussia) # 10 - [IV] Formed 1741; most of Regt was at Budapest, except for the Ersatz Cadre at Szekesfehervar
. HR King Ferdinand (of Bulgaria) # 11 - [V] Formed 1762; HQ and Ist Bn at Lancut, II Bn at Sambor, Ersatz Cadre at Szombathely (or Steinamanger)
. HR # 12 (vacant, ex King Edward VII of Britain) - [VI] Formed 1800; HQ and II Bn at Arad, Ist Bn at Nagy Kikinda, Ersatz Cadre at Kaschau
. Jazygier und Kumaner HR "Crown Prince of Germany" # 13 - [IV] Formed 1859; HQ and II Bn at Szekesfehervar, Ist Bn at Tolna, Ersatz Cadre at Kecskemet
. HR Kolossvary # 14 - [VI] Formed 1859; entire Regt with Ersatz Cadre at Nyiregyhaza
. HR Erzherzog Franz Salvator # 15 - [VI] Formed 1701; HQ and Ist Bn at Gyöngyös, II Bn at Miskolcz, Ersatz Cadre at Nyiregyhaza
. HR Uxkull-Gyllenbrand # 16 - [VII] Formed 1798; HQ at Marburg, Ist Bn at Graz, II Bn at Radkersburg, Ersatz Cadre at Debreczen

. UR Brudermann # 1 - [I] Formed 1784; HQ and Ist Bn at Lemberg, II Bn at Mosty Wielkie, Ersatz Cadre at Cracow
. UR Schwarzenberg # 2 - [I] Formed 1790; Regt with Ersatz Cadre at Tarnow, except for II Bn at Bochnia
. UR Erzherzog Karl # 3 - [X] Formed 1801; HQ & Ist Bn at Cracow, II Bn at Bielitz, Ersatz Cadre at Grodek-Jagiellowski
. UR Kaiser # 4 - [XI] Formed 1813; Regt at Wiener Neustadt, except for Ersatz Cadre at Lemberg
. UR Tsar Nicholas II (of Russia) # 5 - [XIII] Formed 1848; most of Regt at Steinamanger; Ersatz Cadre at Varasdin; (1st Sqdn detached to Mostar in Herzegovina)
. UR Kaiser Joseph II # 6 - [X] Formed 1688; HQ and Ist Bn at Rzeszow, II Bn at Debica, Ersatz Cadre at Przemysl
. UR Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand # 7 - [XI] Formed 1758; Regt at Stockerau, except for Ersatz Cadre at Brzezany
. UR Auersperg # 8 - [XI] Formed 1697 (1718); HQ and Ist Bn at
Czernowitz, II Bn at Zacka, Ersatz Cadre at Stanislau
. (UR # 9 had become DR # 10 in 1873)
. (UR # 10 had become HR # 16 in 1873)
. UR Tsar Alexander II (of Russia) # 11 - [IX] Formed 1814; HQ and II Bn at Czortkow, Ist Bn at Tlumacz, Ersatz Cadre at Theresienstadt
. UR Huyn # 12 - [XIII] Formed 1854; HQ at Varasdin, Ist Bn at Zagreb, II Bn at Czaktoryno, Ersatz Cadre at Essegg (Osijek); (1st Sqdn detached to Sarajevo)
. UR Böhm-Ermolli # 13 - [XI] Formed 1860; Regt was with Ersatz Cadre at Zloczow, except for Ist Bn at Zborow
k.u.k. FELD JAEGER BATTALIONS
As with other units, the Depot town (not the unit station) was the home recruiting area of each Battalion.

. FJB # 1 - [IX] Formed 1808; station at Tione (Tyrol), depot at Theresienstadt
. FJB # 2 - [IX] Formed 1808; station at Lienz, depot at Königgrätz
. (FJB # 3 had transferred to the Kaiser Jaeger in 1893)
. FJB # 4 - [XI] Formed 1808; station at Braunau am Inn, depot at Rzeszow
. FJB # 5 - [I] Formed 1808; station at Tarvis, depot at Olmütz
. FJB # 6 - [VIII] Formed 1808; station at Sillian, depot at Pilsen
. FJB # 7 - [III] Formed 1808; station at Sillian, depot at Ljubljana
. FJB # 8 - [III] Formed 1808; station at Villach, depot at Klagenfurt
. FJB # 9 - [III] Formed 1808; station at Kotschach, depot at Graz

. FJB "Kopal" # 10 - [II] Formed 1813; station at Vigo di Fussa, depot at St Polten
. FJB # 11 - [V] Formed 1813; station at Gradisca, depot at Györ
. FJB # 12 - [IX] Formed 1813; station at Innsbruck, depot at Jungbunzlau
. FJB # 13 - [I] Formed 1849; station at Cavalese (Tyrol), depot at Cracow
. FJB # 14 - [X] Formed 1849 (1914); station at Mezolombardo (Tyrol), depot at Przemysl
. (FJB # 15 had transferred to the Kaiser Jaeger in 1893)
. FJB # 16 - [I] Formed 1849; station at Levico (Tyrol), depot at Troppau
. FJB # 17 - [II] Formed 1849; station at Judenburg, depot at Brünn
. FJB # 18 - [XI] Formed 1849 (1914); station at Trient, depot at Lemberg
. FJB # 19 - [V] Formed 1849; station at Klagenfurt, depot at Komorn

. FJB # 20 - [III] Formed 1849; station at Cormons, depot at Trieste
. FJB # 21 - [II] Formed 1849; station at Mitrovica, depot at Vienna
. FJB # 22 - [VIII] Formed 1849; station at Bergo (Tyrol), depot at Eger (Bohemia)
. FJB # 23 - [XII] Formed 1848; station at Pancsova, depot at
Maros-Vasarhely
- FJB # 24 - [IV] Formed 1880; station at Rovigno, depot at Budapest
- FJB # 25 - [II] Formed 1849; station at Vienna, depot at Brünn (FJB # 26 had transferred to the Kaiser Jaeger in 1890)
- FJB # 27 - [XI] Formed 1859; station at Hall (Tyrol), depot at Czernowitz
- FJB # 28 - [VII] Formed 1859; station at Kekevara, depot at Arpad
- FJB # 29 - [VI] Formed 1859; station at Monfalcone, depot at Losoncz
- FJB # 30 - [XI] Formed 1859; station at Steyr, depot at Stanislaw
- FJB # 31 - [XIII] Formed 1859; station at Bruck an der Mur, depot at Zagreb
- FJB # 32 - [VI] Formed 1859; station at Trembowla, depot at Eperjes

- Bosnia-Herzegovina FJB # 1 - [XV/XVI] Formed 1903; station at Bruck an der Leitha, depot at Sarajevo

- There also existed k.u.k. Grenz (Border) Jaeger Companies # 1 to # 6, serving in Bosnia. # 1 was from IX District, # 2 from I District, # 3 from VI District, # 4 from I District, # 5 from V District and # 6 from XIII District.

k.u.k. FELD KANONE REGIMENTS ("Field Cannon")
- FKR # 1 - [I] Formed 1885; at Cracow
- FKR # 2 - [I] Formed 1885; at Olmütz
- FKR # 3 - [I] Formed 1892; at Cracow
- FKR # 4 - [II] Formed 1885; at Vienna
- FKR # 5 - [II] Formed 1885; at Brünn
- FKR # 6 - [II] Formed 1892; at Wiener Neustadt
- FKR # 7 - [III] Formed 1885; at Ljubljana
- FKR # 8 - [III] Formed 1885; at Görz
- FKR # 9 - [III] Formed 1892; at Klagenfurt
- FKR # 10 - [IV] Formed 1885; at Budapest
- FKR # 11 - [IV] Formed 1885; at Hajmasker, but depot was at Budapest
- FKR # 12 - [IV] Formed 1892; at Budapest
- FKR # 13 - [V] Formed 1885; at Sopron
- FKR # 14 - [V] Formed 1885; at Pressburg (Bratislava)
- FKR # 15 - [V] Formed 1892; at Komorn
- FKR # 16 - [VI] Formed 1885; at Losoncz
- FKR # 17 - [VI] Formed 1885; at Miskolcz
- FKR # 18 - [VI] Formed 1892; at Eperjes
. FKR # 19 - [VII] Formed 1885; at Grosswardein
. FKR # 20 - [VII] Formed 1885; at Temesvar
. FKR # 21 - [VII] Formed 1892; at Hungarian Weisskirchen
. FKR # 22 - [VIII] Formed 1885; at Pilsen
. FKR # 23 - [VIII] Formed 1885; at Prague, except for II Bn at Elbekosteletz
. FKR # 24 - [VIII] Formed 1892; at Budweis (Budejovice)
. FKR # 25 - [IX] Formed 1885; at Josefstadt
. FKR # 26 - [IX] Formed 1885; at Hungarian Weisskirchen
. FKR # 27 - [IX] Formed 1892; at Königgrätz
. FKR # 28 - [X] Formed 1885; at Przemysl
. FKR # 29 - [X] Formed 1885; at Jaroslau
. FKR # 30 - [X] Formed 1892; at Przemysl
. FKR # 31 - [XI] Formed 1885; at Stanislaus
. FKR # 32 - [XI] Formed 1885; at Lemberg
. FKR # 33 - [XI] Formed 1892; at Stanislaus, except for 3rd Battery at Czernowitz
. FKR # 34 - [XII] Formed 1885; at Kronstadt
. FKR # 35 - [XII] Formed 1885; at Klausenburg (Cluj)
. FKR # 36 - [XII] Formed 1892; at Hermannstadt
. FKR # 37 - [XIII] Formed 1885; at Zagreb
. FKR # 38 - [XIII] Formed 1885; at Essegg
. FKR # 39 - [XIII] Formed 1892; at Semlin
. FKR # 40 - [XIV] Formed 1885; at Linz, except for 1st Bn at Wels
. FKR # 41 - [XIV] Formed 1885; at Salzburg
. FKR # 42 - [XIV] Formed 1892; at Steyr

k.u.k. FELD HAUBITZ REGIMENTS ("Field Howitzers")
. FHR Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovitch # 1 - [I] Formed 1854; at Cracow
. FHR Geldern-Egmond # 2 - [II] Formed 1854; at Vienna
. FHR Erzherzog Wilhelm # 3 - [III] Formed 1854; at Marburg
. FHR # 4 (ex Kropatschek) - [IV] Formed 1854; at Budapest
. FHR Erzherzog Albrecht # 5 - [V] Formed 1854; at Pressburg
. FHR Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand # 6 - [VI] Formed 1854; at Kaschau
. FHR Prinz Leopold (of Bavaria) # 7 - [VII] Formed 1872; at Temesvar
. FHR Kaiser Franz Josef # 8 - [VIII] Formed 1854; at Prague
. FHR Liechtenstein # 9 - [IX] Formed 1854; at Josepstadt
. FHR # 10 (ex Prinz Regent Luitpold von Bayern) - [X] Formed 1854; at Przemysl
. FHR Smola # 11 - [XI] Formed 1854; at Lemberg
. FHR King George V (of England) # 12 - [XII] Formed 1854; at Hermannstadt
k.u.k. HEAVY HOWITZER BATTLEIONS
The units were formed in 1912...
. Bn # 1 - [I] At Cracow
. Bn # 2 - [II] At Vienna
. Bn # 3 - [III] At Wippach
. Bn # 4 - [IV] At Hajmasker (depot was at Budapest)
. Bn # 5 - [V] At Komorn
. Bn # 6 - [VI] At Kaschau
. Bn # 7 - [VII] At Fehertemplon (or Hungarian Weisskirchen)
. Bn # 8 - [VIII] At Prague
. Bn # 9 - [IX] At Theresienstadt
. Bn # 10 - [X] At Przemysl
. Bn # 11 - [XI] At Lemberg
. Bn # 12 - [XII] At Hermannstadt
. Bn # 13 - [XIII] At Zagreb
. Bn # 14 - [XIV] At Vill (near Neumarkt in Tyrol)

k.u.k. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY REGIMENTS
. (# 1 and 2 did not exist in 1914)
. Regt # 3 - [III] Formed 1908; HQ, Depot, Howitzer Bn and 2 & 4 Cannon Batties at Villach; 1st Cannon Batty at Tarvis, 3rd at Tolmein
. Regt # 4 - [IV] Formed 1913; HQ with 1 & 2 Cannon Batties at Novesinje; 3 & 4 Cannon Batties at Bilac; Howitzer Bn at Spittal a.D.; depot at Budapest
. (# 5 did not exist in 1914)
. Regt # 6 - [VI] Formed 1913; HQ, Howitzer Bn, 1 & 2 Cannon Batties at Travnik; 3 & 4 Cannon Batties at Sarajevo; depot at Kaschau
. Regt # 7 - [VII] Formed 1908; Regt at Mostar, except for depot at Lugos
. Regt # 8 - [VIII - however depot was located at Brixen in XIV District] Formed 1908; HQ, Howitzer Bn and 3 Cannon Batty at Brixen (with depot); 1st Cannon Batty at Lienz, 2nd at Bruneck, and 4th at Meran
. (# 9 did not exist in 1914)
. Regt # 10 - [X] Formed in 1913; HQ with 1 & 2 Cannon Batties at Tuzla; 3 & 4 Cannon Batties at Visegrad; Howitzer Bn at Rovereto, depot at Przemysl
. Regt # 11 - [XI] Formed in 1908; HQ, Howitzer Bn and 1 & 2 Cannon Batties at Sarajevo; 3 & 4 Cannon Batties at Foca; depot at Stanislau
Regt # 12 - [XII] Formed in 1908; Regt at Tuzla, except for depot at Hermannstadt
Regt # 13 - [XIII] Formed in 1911; HQ at Dubrovnik, Howitzer Bn at Baosic; two cannon batties at Trebinje, one apiece at Gravosa and Teodo; depot at Slavonic Brod [Brood]
Tyrol and Vorarlberg Regt "Kaiser" # 14 - [XIV] Formed in 1891; entire Regt was with depot at Trient

k.u.k. HORSE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS
All were formed in 1908 except for # 9 (formed in early 1914)
Bn # 1 - [I] At Cracow
Bn # 2 - [II] At Vienna
(# 3 not used)
Bn # 4 - [IV] At Budapest
Bn # 5 - [V] At Komorn
Bn # 6 - [VI] Station at Tarnopol (Galicia), depot at Kaschau
Bn # 7 - [VII] At Kis-Szent-Miklos
(# 8 not used)
Bn # 9 - [IX] At Pardubitz
Bn # 10 - [X] At Jaroslau
Bn # 11 - [XI] At Lemberg

k.u.k. FORTRESS ARTILLERY REGIMENTS
All were formed in 1891
Regt Kaiser # 1 - [II] With depot at Vienna
Regt Beschi # 2 - [I] With depot at Cracow
Regt Kinsky # 3 - [XI - but depot was located in X District] With depot at Przemysl
Regt Colloredo # 4 - [III] With depot at Pola (Pula)
Regt Rouvroy # 5 - [From VIII and/or IX Districts, although depot was in XVI District] HQ and Ist Bn at Teodo, II Bn at Castelnuovo, III Bn at Lustica, depot at Cattaro
Regt Kollarz # 6 - [From VIII and/or IX Districts, although depot was in V District] HQ and 4 comps with depot at Komorn, 2 comps at Peterwardein, 2 at Budapest

Independent k.u.k. FORTRESS ARTILLERY BATTALIONS
Bn # 1 - [XIV] Formed 1891; at Brixen
Bn # 2 - [XII] Formed 1891; at Mostar
Bn # 3 - [V] Formed 1891; at Pola
Bn # 4 - [IX] Formed 1909; at Riva
Bn # 5 - [I] Formed 1909; at Trient
Bn # 6 - [I] Formed 1911; at Chiesa di Lavarone
Bn # 7 - [V] Formed 1911; at Male (Tyrol)
Bn # 8 - [III] Formed 1913; at Haiderschaft
Bn # 9 - [I] Formed in early 1914; at Lemberg
Bn # 10 - [III] Formed in early 1914; at Görz (Gorizia)
k.k. LANDWEHR INFANTRY REGIMENTS (from cis-Leithania)
These regiments had 3 battalions apiece, and were recruited and stationed around the towns which were part of their titles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Formed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LW IR &quot;Wien&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>[II] 1889</td>
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<tr>
<td>LW IR &quot;Linz&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>XIV 1889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW IR &quot;Graz&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>III 1889</td>
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<td>LW IR &quot;Klagenfurt&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>III 1889</td>
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<td>LW IR &quot;Pola&quot;</td>
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<td>III 1889</td>
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<tr>
<td>LW IR &quot;Eger&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>LW IR &quot;Leitmeritz&quot;</td>
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<td>LW IR &quot;Zara&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>II 1901</td>
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<tr>
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<td>XI 1898</td>
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<tr>
<td>LW IR &quot;Gravosa&quot;</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>XVI 1906</td>
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<td>Landes-Schutzen Regt &quot;Trient&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>XIV 1893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
. Landes-Schutzen Regt "Bozen" (Bolzano) # II - [XIV] Formed 1893
. Landes-Schutzen Regt "Innichen" # III - [XIV] Formed 1909

k.k. LANDSTURM INFANTRY REGIMENTS
During the mobilization in summer 1914, each of the 37 k.k. Landwehr regiments created a Landsturm IR (with the same number) at its depot. There was also a k.k. Landsturm IR # 38 (raised by VIII District). Finally, the Landes-Schutzen Regts # I and II raised the k.k. (Tyrol) Landsturm IR # I and II (respectively; the III L-S Regt did not create a Landsturm unit).

k.k. LANDWEHR UHLAN REGIMENTS
. LW UR # 1 - [XI] Formed 1885; from Lemberg
. LW UR # 2 - [IX] Formed 1885; from Hohenmauth
. LW UR # 3 - [X] Formed 1885; from Rzeszow
. LW UR # 4 - [I] Formed 1883; from Olmütz
. LW UR # 5 - [II, III and XIV Districts] Formed 1883; from Stockerau
. LW UR # 6 - [Mainly from VIII District, partly from XIV] Formed 1885; from Wels

k.k. LANDWEHR UHLAN BATTALIONS
. Dalmatia Bn - [XVI] Formed 1874 (1906); from Sinj
. Tyrol Bn - [XIV] Formed 1872; from Innsbruck

k.k. FELD KANONE BATTALIONS
All formed in 1913; numbers derived from Divisions to which they were assigned...
. Bn # 13 - [II] At Vienna
. Bn # 21 - [VIII] At Prague
. Bn # 22 - [III] At Graz
. Bn # 26 - [IX] At Leitmeritz
. Bn # 43 - [XI] At Czernowitz
. Bn # 44 - [XIV] At Innsbruck
. Bn # 45 - [X] At Przemyśl
. Bn # 46 - [I] At Cracow

k.k. FELD HAUBITZ BATTALIONS
All formed in 1909; numbers derived from Divisions to which they were assigned...
. Bn # 13 - [II] At Vienna
. Bn # 21 - [VIII] At Prague
. Bn # 22 - [III] At Graz
. Bn # 26 - [IX] At Leitmeritz
. Bn # 43 - [XI] At Czernowitz
. Bn # 44 - [XIV] At Innsbruck
. Bn # 45 - [X] At Przemysl
. Bn # 46 - [I] At Cracow

k.k. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY BATTALION
. Dalmatia Mountain Cannon Bn - [XVI] Formed 1913; at Mostar

k.u. HONVED INFANTRY REGIMENTS (from trans-Leithania)
These regiments had 3 battalions apiece, and were recruited and stationed around the towns which were part of their titles. The Honved recruiting districts, unlike their Landwehr counterparts, did not correspond exactly to the common Army (k.u.k.) districts. Units from Croatia were also called "Domobranen" IR.

. Hon IR "Budapest" # 1 - [IV] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Gyula" # 2 - [IV, VII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Debreczen" # 3 - [IV, VII, XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Nagyvarad" # 4 - [VII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Szegedin" (Szeged) # 5 - [IV, VII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Szabadka" # 6 - [IV] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Versecz" # 7 - [VII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Lugos" # 8 - [VII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Kassa" (Kaschau) # 9 - [VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Miskolcz" # 10 - [VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Munkacs" # 11 - [VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Szatmar-Nemeti" # 12 - [VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Pozsony" (Pressburg) # 13 - [V] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Nyitra" # 14 - [V] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Trencsen" # 15 - [V, VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Beszterczebanya" # 16 - [VI] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Szekesfehervar" # 17 - [IV, V] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Sopron" # 18 - [V] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Pecs" # 19 - [IV] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Nagykaniszta" # 20 - [V] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Kolozsvar" # 21 - [XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Maros-Vasarhely" # 22 - [XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Nagyszeben" # 23 - [XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Nagyszeben" # 24 - [XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Brasso" # 25 - [XII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Zagreb" (Agram) # 26 - [XIII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Karlovac" # 27 - [XIII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Sisak" # 28 - [XIII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Osijek" (Essegg) # 29 - [XIII] Formed 1886
. Hon IR "Budapest" # 30 - [IV] Formed 1913
. Hon IR "Budapest" # 31 - [V] Formed 1913
. Hon IR "Veszprem" # 32 - [XII] Formed 1913
k.u. LANDSTURM INFANTRY REGIMENTS
During the mobilization in summer 1914, each of the 32 k.u. Honved regiments created a Landsturm IR (with the same number) at its depot.

k.u. HONVED HUSSAR REGIMENTS
These regiments were recruited and stationed around the towns which were part of their titles.

. Hon HR "Budapest" # 1 - [IV, V, VII] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Debreczen" # 2 - [VII; parts of IV, XII] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Szegedin" # 3 - [VII] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Kecskemet" # 4 - [VII, part of IV] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Kassa" # 5 - [VI] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Vac" # 6 - [V, part of IV] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Papa" # 7 - [IV, part of V] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Pecs" # 8 - [IV, V] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Maros-Vasarhely" # 9 - [XII] Formed 1874
. Hon HR "Varasdin" # 10 (Domobranen Regt) - [XIII] Formed 1881

k.u. LANDSTURM HUSSAR BATTALIONS
During the mobilization in summer 1914, each of the 10 k.u. Honved Hussar Regiments created a Landsturm Hussar Battalion (with the same number) at its depot.

k.u. HONVED FELD KANONE REGIMENTS
. Hon FKR # 1 - [IV] Formed 1913; at Budapest
. Hon FKR # 2 - [VII] Formed in early 1914; at Szegedin
. Hon FKR # 3 - [VI] Formed in early 1914; at Kaschau
. Hon FKR # 4 - [V] Formed in early 1914; at Pressburg
. Hon FKR # 5 - [XII] Formed in early 1914; at Klausenburg
. Hon FKR # 6 - [XIII] Formed in early 1914; at Zagreb
. Hon FKR # 7 - [IV] Formed in early 1914; at Budapest
. Hon FKR # 8 - [VII] Formed in 1913; at Grosswardein

k.u. HONVED HORSE ARTILLERY BATTALION
. Bn # 1 - [VII] Formed in early 1914; at Debreczen
B. Initial Deployment in the Field

Preface

In the orders of battle, numbers in brackets show the number of battalions within infantry regiments, the number of squadrons within cavalry regiments, or the number of batteries within artillery regiments or battalions. Fortress artillery companies on mobile service in the field (as heavy attack artillery) are reckoned as equivalent to batteries.

**ARMEE OBER KOMMANDO**

Supreme Commander = GdI Erzherzog Friedrich
Chief of Staff of the Entire Armed Forces = GdI Franz Freih. Conrad von Hőtzendorff
Deputy Chief of Staff = GM Franz Ritt. Höfer von Feldsturm
Chief of the Operational Detachment = Col Joseph Metzger
Commander of Lines of Communication = GM Franz Kanik

Responsible for guard and security service at AOK - III Bn/IR 73

Units at disposition of the AOK (but often attached by AOK to various Army commands)
- One bridging battalion (4 companies)
- Three river mining platoons
- 28 railroad companies
- 15 air companies - # 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 14 in the Northeast, # 2 and 4 in the Balkans; # 3, 6, 9, 12, 13 and 15 still forming in the interior
- Attached from the German High Command - "Liegnitz", a military airship

A. Forces in the Balkans
Commander = FZM Oskar Potiorek
Chief of Staff = GM Eduard Böltz

From 6 August this HQ was responsible for 5 and 6 Armies, the troops in the Banat Region and the various fortresses. The 2 Army, although deployed initially in Syrmia and the Banat, was placed directly under the AOK as soon as war broke out with Russia and was no longer supposed to be committed to the fight with Serbia.

5th Army
Commander = GdI Liborius Ritter von Frank
Chief of Staff = GM Maximilian Csicsereics von Bacsany
### VIII Corps

**Strength** = 26 bns, 5 sqdns, 17 batties (93 guns), 3 technical comps

**Commander** = GdK Artur Freih. Giesl von Gieslingen

**Chief of Staff** = Col Ludwig Sündermann

- 9th ID (FML Viktor von Scheuchestuel)
  - 17 Inf Bde (GM Franz Daniel) = IR 91 [3], 102 [3]
  - 18 Inf Bde (GM Joseph Mayrhofer von Grünbühel) = IR 11 [4], 73 [3 - but with 4 MG Detachments], II Bn/IR 28
  - Div Cavalry = 2 & 5 Sqdns of DR 14
  - 9 FA Bde (GM Rudolf Laube) = FKR 24 [5], I Bn/FHR 8 [2]

- 21st LW ID (FML Artur Przyborski)
  - 41 LW Inf Bde (GM Othmar Panesch) = LW IR 6 [3], 7 [3]
  - 42 LW Inf Bde (GM Alois Podhajski) = LW IR 8 [3], 28 [3]
  - Div Cavalry = 1 & 3 Sqdns of DR 14
  - 21 FA Bde (Col Karl Hinke) = FKR 23 [4], FK Bn 21 [2], FH Bn 21 [2]

**Corps troops** = Res Sqdn/DR 14; Heavy How Bn 8 [2]; 4 & 6 Comps of SB 8; 5 Comp of PB 8

### XIII Corps

**Strength** = 33 bns, 6 sqdns, 20 batties (114 guns), 3 technical comps

**Commander** = GdI Adolf Freih. von Rhemen zu Baresfeld

**Chief of Staff** = Col Alfred von Zeidler

- 36th ID (FML Claudius Czibulka)
  - 71 Inf Bde (GM Johann Gf Salis-Seewis) = IR 37 [2], 79 [4]
  - 72 Inf Bde (GM Heinrich Haustein von Haustenau) = IR 16 [4], 53 [3]; IV Bn/IR 96
  - Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HHR 10
  - 36 FA Bde (GM Karl Hess) = FKR 39 [5]; II Bn/FHR 13 [2]

- 42nd Hon ID (Stephan von Sarkotic)
  - 83 Hon Inf Bde (GM Nikolaus Istvanovic von Ivanska) = HIR 25 [3], 26 [3]
  - 84 Hon Inf Bde (GM Daniel Kolak) = HIR 27 [3], 28 [3]
  - Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HHR 10
  - 42 FA Bde (Col Friedrich Naumann) = FKR 37 [4], HFKR 6 [4]

  (Independent) 13 Inf Bde (GM Karl Stracker) = IR 52 [3], 78 [4]; 5 & 6 Sqdns/HHR 10; 5 Can Batty/Mtn AR 13; Ist Bn/FHR 13 [2]

**Corps troops** = Heavy How Bn 13 [2]; 2 & 3 Comps/SB 13, 4 Comp of PB 9

Directly under 5 Army HQ

- 11 Mtn Bde (GM Marzell Lawrowski) = Bns I/10, IV/20, I/21,
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6th Army  
Commander = FZM Oskar Potiorek  
Chief of Staff = GM Eduard Bölitz

XV Corps  
Strength = 22 1/2 bns, 1 sqdn, 12 batties (50 guns), 4 technical comps  
Commander = GdI Michael Edl. von Appel  
Chief of Staff = Col Michael Mihaljevic

. 1st ID (FML Stephan Bogat von Kostanjevac)  
. 7 Mtn Bde (GM Otto Sertic) = Bns II/5, IV/25, II/34, II/66, II/85, III/86; Bord Jaeg Comp 3; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 12; 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 10  
. 9 Mtn Bde (Col Joseph Hrozny Edl. von Bojemil) = Bns IV/12, III/49, III/74, IV/84, IV/87; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 12; 1 Can Battery/Mtn AR 11  
. Div Artillery = 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 11

. 48th ID (FML Johann Ritter Eisler von Eisenhort)  
. 10 Mtn Bde (Col Heinrich Edl von Droffa) = Bns I/48, I/62, I/90, II/92, III/BH 1; Bord Jaeg Comp 2; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 12; 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6  
. 12 Mtn Bde (GM Franz Kalser Edl von Maasfeld) = Bns I/3, II/45, II/57, I/93, II/100, III/BH 2; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 5; 1 & 2 Can Batties/Mtn AR 6  
. Div Artillery = 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 6  
. Corps troops = 5 Can Battery/FKR 37, 4 & 5 Comps/SB 13, 3 Comp/PB 4, 4 Comp/PB 7

XVI Corps  
Strength = 33 1/2 bns, 2 sqdns, 14 batties (56 guns), 2
technical comps
Commander = FZM Wenzel Wurm
Chief of Staff = Col Paul von Loefen

. 18th ID (FML Ignaz Trollmann)
   . 4 Mtn Bde (Col Theodor Konopicky) = Bns II/52, III/69;
     LW IR 37 [3]; one zug of 1 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mntd Rifle Bn;
     1 Can Batty/Mtn AR 13
   . 5 Mtn Bde (Col Maximilian Nöhring) = Bns I/22, III/31;
     LW IR 23 [2]; March Bn/IR 22 (with a MG Det); one zug of
     2 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mntd Rifle Bn; Dalmatia Mtn Cannon Bn [2]
   . 6 Mtn Bde (GM Heinrich Goiginger) = Bns I/6, IV/37,
     III/38, IV/50, IV/81; one zug of 1 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mntd Rifle
     Bn; 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 4
   . 8 Mtn Bde (GM Felix Andrian) = Bns IV/24, III/35, IV/53,
     IV/58; Bord Jaeg Comp 4; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 12; 3 & 4 Can
     Batties/Mtn AR 11
   . Divisional units = One zug of 2 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mntd Rifle
     Bn; 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 7
   . 1 Mtn Bde (GM Guido Novak von Arienti) = Bns I/1, IV/4, I/51,
     I/63, I/102; one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 5; 2 Can Batty/Mtn AR 7
   . 2 Mtn Bde (GM Theodor Gabriel) = Bns III/8, III/64, II/70,
     III/76, II/101; Bord Jaeg Comp 6; one zug of 1 Sqdn/Dalmatia
     Mntd Rifle Bn; 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 13
   . 13 Mtn Bde (Col Anton Gf Berchtold Freih von und zu
     Ungerschütz, Frätting und Püllütz) = IR 22 [3]; III Bn/BH 4;
     one zug of 1 Sqdn/UR 5; 3 & 4 Can Batties/Mtn AR 7
   . Corps troops = 6 Comp/SB 13, 4 Comp/PB 4

Units directly under 6 Army HQ
. 40th Hon ID (FML Joseph Braun)
   . 79 Hon Inf Bde (GM Koloman Tabajdi) = HIR 29 [3], 30 [3]
   . 80 Hon Inf Bde (Col Johann Haber) = HIR 6 [3], 19 [3 -
     but with 4 MG Detachments]
   . Div cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns/HHR 8
   . 40 FA Bde (FML Ernst Karasz) = I Bn/FKR 12 [2], HFKR
     1 [4]; 1 Can Batty/Mtn AR 7, 2 Can Batty/Mtn AR 11
. 47th ID (FML Friedrich Novak)
   . 3 Mtn Bde (only; Col Martin Verkljan) = Bns IV/33, I/61,
     II/72, I/91, I/98; one zug of 1 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mntd Rifle
     Bn; 2 Can Batty/Mtn AR 13
   . Divisional troops = 1 & 2 How Batties/Mtn AR 13
   . 3 Mtn Bde (GM Heinrich Pongracz de Szent-Miklos et Ovar) = Bns
     II/18, IV/30, IV/42, III/46, IV/80; Bord Jaeg Comp 5; one zug of
     1 Sqdn/UR 5; 1 & 2 Can Batties/Mtn AR 4
   . ku 109 Lst Inf Bde (GM Johann Czeisberger) = Lst IR 17 [3],
     29 [3]; Res Can Batty 39
   . March formations of 40 Hon ID = Hon March IR 1 [Bns 29, 30,
33] and 2 [Bns 6, 19, 34; Bn # 19 had 6 comps instead of just 4]. Miscellaneous = kk Lst IR 23 [2]; BH Res Inf Bn IV (the Bosnian Bns # I-III were split up as labor detachments in the interior of the Monarchy); 44 march comps from all over the Monarchy (except for Corps Districts I, X and XI, which weren't represented); two zugs of 2 Sqdn/Dalmatia Mounted Rifle Bn

2nd Army and Banat Region
(2 Army HQ left for Galicia on 21 August)
Commander = GdK Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli
Chief of Staff = GM Artur Edler von Mecenseffy

IV Corps (HQ left for Galicia on 30 August)
Strength = 26 bns, 5 sqdns, 16 batties (92 guns), 3 technical companies
Commander = GdK Karl Tersztyanszky von Nadas
Chief of Staff = Col Adalbert Dani von Gyarmata
31st ID (FML Erzherzog Joseph)
(Began to entrain for Galicia on 30 August)
. 61 Bde (GM Aurel von le Beau) = IR 32 [4], 69 [3]
. 62 Bde (GM Blasius Dani von Gyarmata) = IR 44 [4]; BH IR 3 [2 bns - however, extra men who were originally left back in Budapest created a new Bn, the IVth, which joined the Regt during the transfer to Galicia]
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of HR 8
. 31 FA Bde (GM Adalbert von Felix) = FKR 10 [5], I Bn/FHR 4 [2]
. 32nd ID (FML Andreas Fail-Griessler)
(Began to entrain for Galicia on 31 August)
. 63 Bde (GM Eugen von Podhoranszky) = IR 23 [4], 70 [3]
. 64 Bde (GM Gustav Mallasz) = IR 6 [3], 86 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HR 8
. 32 FA Bde (Col August Kreycy) = FKR 11 [5], II Bn/FHR 4 [2]
. Corps troops (began to entrain for Galicia on 31 August) = Res Sqdn of HR 8; Heavy How Bn 4 [2]; 4 & 5 Comps/SB 4; 5 Comp/PB 4

VII Corps (HQ left for Galicia on 24 August)
Commander = GdI Otto Meixner von Zweienstamm
Chief of Staff = Col Joseph Ritter Schilhawsky von Bahnbrück
Strength = 28 bns, 5 sqdns, 14 batties (80 guns), 3 technical companies
17th ID (FML Johann Ritter von Henriquez)
(Began to entrain for Galicia on 22 August)
. 33 Bde (GM Alexander Barbini) = IR 39 [4], 101 [3]; II Bn of IR 37
. 34 Bde (GM Franz Resch) = IR 33 [4], 46 [3]
IX Corps  (To Balkans with just one Div, which stayed in the
south; Corps HQ, however, left for 4th Army in Galicia on 19
August)
Commander = GdI Lothar Edler von Hortstein
Chief of Staff = Col August Martinek
. 29th ID (FML Alfred Graf Zedtwitz)
   . 57 Bde (GM Joseph Schön) = IR 42 [3], 92 [3]
   . 58 Bde (GM Joseph Poleschensky) = IR 74 [3], 94 [3]
   . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 2
   . 29 FA Bde (GM Eduard Zanantoni) = FKR 27 [5], II Bn/
       FHR 9 [2]
. Corps troops = Res Sqdn of DR 1; Heavy How Bn 9 [2] (entrained
for Galicia on 23 August); 5 & 6 Comps/SB 9 (6th Comp, only,
entrained for Galicia on 21 August and joined XVII Corps);
5 Comp/PB 9

Units directly under 2nd Army HQ
. 23rd Honved ID (FML Heinrich Daempf)
(Began to entrain on 19 August for Galicia, where it joined 3rd
Army)
   . 45 Hon Bde (GM Rudolf Seide) = HIR 2 [3], 5 [3]
   . 46 Hon Bde (FML Lehel Festl) = HIR 7 [3], 8 [3]
   . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of HHR 4
   . 23 FA Bde (Col Alfred Unschuld) = FKR 20 [3], HFKR 2 [3]
   . Attached March formations of 23 Hon ID = Hon March
      Regts 3 [March Bns 2, 5 & 35] and 4 [March Bns 7, 8 & 36]
   . Half of 7th ID (FML Kasimir Freih. von Lütgendorf)
      . 14 Bde (Col Emil Baumgartner) = IR 38 [3], 68 [4];
         FJB 21; March IR 25 [March Bns of IR 38 & 68; March Comp of
         FJB 21)
      . Div Cavalry = 6 Sqdn of HR 9
      . 7 FA Bde (Col Wilhelm Soppe) = FKR 38 [5]; 1st Comp/SB 13
      . 10th Cavalry Div (FML Viktor Mayr)
(Began on 19 August to entrain for Galicia, where it joined 4th
Army
. 4 Cav Bde (GM Gustav Loserth) = HR 10 [6], 13 [6]
. 8 Cav Bde (Col Viktor Bauer von Bauernthal) = HR 9 [4], UR 12 [5]
. Horse Arty Bn 4 [3]
. 4 March Bde (GM Martin von Radicevic) - From Budapest went directly to Galicia, where assigned on 28 August to 3 Army; see under that Army for order of battle
. 7 March Bde (GM Friedrich Kermpotich) (Stayed at its mobilization point, Temesvar, until 1 September and then entrained for Galicia) = March IR 13 [Bns of IR 33, 39, 46, 101] and 14 [Bns of IR 29, 43, 61, 96]; Res Sqdn of HR 4 (which transferred to 102 k.u. Lst Bde)
. 8 March Bde (GM Ludwig Ritter Schreitter von Schwarzenfeld) = March IR 15 [Bns of IR 35, 75, 88; Comps of FJB 6, 22] and 16 [Bns of IR 11, 73, 91, 102]; Res Sqdn of DR 7
. Fort Arty Comps - 1 to 4 and 9 to 12 Comps of Regt 6; 1 & 2 Comps of Regt 1 (both comps of Regt 1 left for Galicia at the same time as 2nd Army and in early September arrived at Cracow); 3 & 4 Comps of Bn 10 (both comps also went to Galicia and arrived in early Sept at Przemysl)
. Technical Comps - 1 & 2 Comps/PB 4; 1 to 5 Comps/PB 5 (these five comps went to Galicia; Comps 1, 2 & 3 joined Armeegruppe Kummer); 1 & 2 Comps/PB 9 (also to Galicia - 1 Comp to XVII Corps, 2 Comp to 3 Army); 1 to 3 Comps/BH PB 15

The Banat Region Command
. FJB 23 and 28 (both with their March comps); III Bn of ku Lst IR 8; 5th Cannon Batties of FKR 19 and of FKR 21
. ku 107 Lst Inf Bde (GM Joseph Breit) = Lst IR 3 [3], 4 [3], 12 [3], 32 [3]; Res Sqdn of HR 3; Res Cannon Batty 34 (Bde reinforced at start of Sept by Lst Huss Bn 2 [3])
. 1 to 3 Comps of PB 7

Balkan Security Forces
. Fortress Peterwardein = ku Lst IR 1 [3], 6 [3]; 1 & 2 March Comps of Fort Arty Regt 6; six Lst Arty Dets and three Lst Sapper Dets; reinforced at start of Sept by ku Lst Huss Bn 1 [3]
. Fortress Sarajevo = ku Lst IR 19 [3]; half of III Bn/ku Lst IR 2; 1st active, 1st Res and 1st March Comps/Fort Arty Bn 2; five Lst Arty Dets; 3 Comp/SB 7
. Fortress Mostar = ku 1st IR 30 [2 1/2]; 3rd active, 3rd Res and 3rd March Comps/Fort Arty Bn 2; two Lst Arty Dets; one zug of 2 Comp/SB 7
. Fortress Trebinje = kk Lst IR 9 [2]; 2nd active, 2nd Res and 2nd March Comps/Fort Arty Bn 2; three Lst Arty Dets; half of 2 Comp/SB 7
. Fortress Bileca = kk Lst IR 9 [2]; 4th active, 4th Res and 4th March Comps/Fort Arty Bn 2; two Lst Arty Dets; one zug of 2 Comp/ SB 7
. Military Harbor Cattaro = kk Lst IR 37 [2], ku Lst IR 2 [2]; Res Cannon Batty 19; thirty comps (including Res and March comps) of Fort Arty Regt 5; 1st Comp/SB 7
. Kalinovik strong point = Half of III Bn/ku Lst IR 2; one Fort Arty det and one Sapper det from Sarajevo
. Fort Grad = One comp of III Bn/ku Lst IR 30; a Fort Arty det
. Fort St Nicolo = Part of kk Lst IR 23; a naval arty det
. Stolac Castle = One comp of III Bn/ku Lst IR 30; a Fort Arty det
. Military Harbor Pola...
. kk 112 Lst Bde (GM Joseph Szentgyörgyi) = Lst IR 5 [3], 26 [4]; Res Sqn/DR 4; Res Cannon Batty 6
. Also at Pola - LW IR 5 [3]; 36 comps (including Res and march comps) of Fort Arty Regt 4; 3 & 4 Comps of Fort Arty Bn 8; 1 & 2 Comps of Fort Arty Bn 10; 1, 2, 3 & 4 Comps/SB 6
. At Trieste - kk Lst IR 27 [3]
. At Fiume - IV Bn of HIR 19; IV Bn of ku Lst IR 19

Summary of the Forces in the Balkans
. The Field Forces (5, 6 and 2 Armies) = 319 1/2 bns, 60 sqdns, 142 batties (744 guns), 42 technical comps, 12 fort arty comps, 486 machine guns. After departure of 2nd Army the total was reduced to 239 1/2 bns, 37 sqdns, 101 batties (516 guns), 25 technical comps, 8 fort arty comps and 342 machine guns
. The Security Forces (including coast defense) = 36 bns, 4 sqdns, 2 batties (12 guns), 7 technical comps, 84 fort arty comps, 6 machine guns
. Therefore total strength after departure of 2nd Army = 275 1/2 bns, 41 sqdns, 103 batties (528 guns), 32 technical comps, 92 fort arty comps and 348 machine guns. (Infantry strength includes 44 extra March comps of the Inf Regts and 2 from the FJB)

The Danube Flotilla
Commander = Frigate Captain Friedrich Grund
(The Flotilla was initially under 2 Army, and then under 5 Army after the 2nd left for Galicia)
(Following ship list is based on Hans Sokol, "Österreich Ungarn Seekrieg 1914-18", p. 739 (Vienna, 1933) as well as on the original work)
. On the Danube
. 1st Monitor Group = monitors Temes [flagship of the Flotilla] & Bodrog; patrol boats "b" and "f"
2nd Monitor Group = monitors Szamos & Körös; patrol boat "c"
Pancsova Patrol Boat Station = patrol boats "d" and "g"
Train (mostly auxiliary ex-civilian vessels) = hospital ship Kulpa; mine-sweepers Bataszek & Andor; tugboats Achilles & Banhans
On the Sava – monitors Maros & Leitha; patrol boat "h"; the train consisted of hospital ship Traisen and tugboat Traun
NOTE: Besides the Danube Flotilla, at the start of the war part of the high seas fleet – the 2nd Ship Division at Castelnuovo – was also under army control (attached to 6th Army); see the naval order of battle below for its composition

B. Forces on the northern front

1st Army
Commander = GdK Viktor Dankl
Chief of Staff = GM Alfred Kochanowski Edler von Korwinau

Ist Corps
Commander = GdK Karl Freih. von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach
Chief of Staff = Col Ferdinand Demus
Strength = 29 bns, 5 sqdns, 17 batties (98 guns), 3 technical companies
5th ID (FML Karl Scotti)
  9 Bde (GM Gustav Smekal) = IR 54 [4], 93 [3]
  10 Bde (GM Richard Kutschera) = IR 1 [3], 13 [4]
  Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 4
  5 FA Bde (Col Alexander Ritt. von Truszkowski) = FKR 3 [5], Ist Bn/FHR 1 [2]
46th LW ID (FML Karl Nastopil)
  91 LW Bde (GM August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz) = LW IR 16 [3], 31 [3], 32 [3]
  92 LW Bde (GM Adam Brandner Edler von Wolfszahn) = LW IR 13 [3], 15 [3]
  Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 4
  46 FA Bde (Col Heinrich von Naumann) = FKR 2 [4], FK Bn 46 [2], FH Bn 46 [2]
Corps troops = Res Sqdn of DR 11; Heavy How Bn 1 [2]; 4 & 6 Comps/SB 1; 2 Comp/PB 10

V Corps
Commander = FZM Paul Puhallo von Brlog
Chief of Staff = Col Hermann Sallagar
Strength = 42 bns, 7 sqdns, 25 batties (146 guns), 3 technical companies
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. 14th ID (FML Hugo Martiny)
  . 27 Bde (GM Georg Schariczer von Reny) = IR 71 [4], 72 [3]; FJB 11
  . 28 Bde (GM Rudolf Ritter von Willerding) = IR 48 [3], 76 [3]; FJB 19
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of HR 5
  . 14 FA Bde (GM Heinrich Ströhr) = FKR 14 [5], Ist Bn/FHR 5 [2]

. 33rd ID (FML Karl Edler von Rebracha)
  . 65 Bde (GM Konrad von Essler) = IR 19 [4], 26 [4]
  . 66 Bde (GM Joseph Lieb) = IR 12 [3], 83 [4]
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HR 5
  . 33 FA Bde (Col Karl Wondre) = FKR 13 [5], Hon FKR 4 [4]

. Corps troops = Res Sqdn of HR 9; Heavy How Bn 5 [2]; 4 & 5 Comp/KB 5, 4 Comp/PB 10

X Corps
Commander = GdI Hugo Meixner von Zweienstamm
Chief of Staff = Col Gottlieb Kralowetz von Hohenrech
Strength = 39 bns, 7 sqdns, 24 batties (140 guns), 3 technical companies

. 2nd ID (FML Anton Liposak)
  . 3 Bde (GM Eugen Pöschmann) = IR 40 [4], BH IR 4 [2 bns plus 1 jaeger comp; 3 MG Dets]; FJB 4
  . 4 Bde (GM Heinrich Trichtel) = IR 89 [4], 90 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 3
  . 2 FA Bde (Col Julius Kramar) = FKR 29 [5], I Bn/FHR 10 [2]

. 24th ID (FML Andreas Pitlik von Rudan und Poria)
  . 47 Bde (GM Ritt. Unschuld von Melasfeld) = IR 9 [4], 45 [3]
  . 48 Bde (Col Walter Ritt. Schreitter von Schwarzenfeld) = IR 10 [3], 77 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 3
  . 24 FA Bde (GM Karl Seyferth Edl von Uhlen) = FKR 30 [5], II Bn of FHR 10 [2]

. 45th LW ID (FML Stephan Ljubicic)
  . 89 LW Bde (GM Ernst Ritt. Hörmann von Wüllerstor und Urbair) = LW IR 18 [3], 33 [3]
  . 90 LW Bde (GM Johann Edl von Sauerwein) = LW IR 17 [3], 34 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 3
  . 45 FA Bde (Col Adolf Eschelmüller) = FKR 28 [4], FK Bn 45 [2], FH Bn 46 [2]

. Corps Troops = Res Sqdn of UR 3; Heavy How Bn 10 [2]; 4 & 5 Comp/KB 10, 3 Comp/PB 10

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Directly under 1st Army

1. 12th ID (FML Paul Kestranek)
   - 23 Bde (GM Mieczislaus Edl von Zaleski) = IR 3 [2], 56 [4] and 100 [3]
   - 24 Bde (GM Godwin von Lilienhoff-Adelstein) = IR 20 [3], 57 [3]; FJB 5
   - Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 4
   - 12 FA Bde (GM Thaddäus Ritt Jordan-Rozwadowski von Gross-Rozwadow) = FKR 1 [5], II Bn of FHR 1 [2]
   - 5 Comp/SB 1, 1 Comp/PB 10

2. 3rd Cav Div (FML Adolf Ritter von Brudermann)
   - 10 Cav Bde (Col Friedrich Freih von Cnobloch) = DR 3 [6], UR 7 [6]
   - 17 Cav Bde (GM Stanislaus Ritter von Ursyn-Pruszynski) = UR 4 [6], HR 1 [6]
   - Horse Arty Bn 2 [3]

3. 9th Cav Div (FML Leopold Freiherr von Hauer)
   - 1 Cav Bde (GM Maximilian Freih von Schnehen) = DR 4 [6], 13 [6]
   - 9 Cav Bde (GM Sigmund Ritter von Micewski) = DR 1 [6], UR 6 [6]
   - Horse Arty Bn 9 [3]

4. kk 1 Lst Bde (Col Adolf Brauner) = Lst IR 1 [2], 2 [4]; Res Ssqdn of DR 6, Res Cannon Batty 42

5. kk 36 Lst Bde (Col Karl Maulik) = Lst IR 11 [4], 12 [4], 30 [4]; Res Ssqdn of DR 13; Res Cannon Batty 27

6. ku 101 Lst Bde (GM Konrad Siegler von Eberswald) = Lst IR 18 [3], 20 [3], 31 [3]; Res Ssqdn of HR 14; Res Cannon Batty 16

7. kk 110 Lst Bde (FML Wenzel Tertain) = Lst IR 16 [3], 32 [3]; Res Ssqdn of UR 1; two 12 cm cannon batties (13 & 14 Comps of Fort Arty Regt 2 from the Cracow fortress)

8. 1 March Bde (Col Wilhelm Bankowski) = Ma IR 1 [Bns of IR 3, 20, 56, 57, 100; Comp of FJB 5], Ma IR 2 [Bns of IR 1, 13, 54, 93]; Res Ssqdn of UR 2

9. 5 March Bde (Col Joseph Blum) = Ma IR 9 [Bns of IR 48, 71, 72, 76; Comps of FJB 11, 19], Ma IR 10 [Bns of IR 12, 19, 26, 83]; Hon Ma IR 7 [Bns 13, 18, 39], Hon Ma IR 8 [Bns 14, 15, 40]; Res Ssqdn of HR 11

10. 10 March Bde (GM Friedrich Freih Packenj von Kilstätten) = Ma IR 19 [Bns of IR 49, 89, 90; the Bn of BH IR 2 with just 2 comps], Ma IR 20 [Bns of IR 9, 10, 45, 77]; Res Ssqdn of UR 6

11. Independent units - Polish Legion [3 bns]; Mountain AR 8 [6]; 2 & 3 Comps/SB 9, 2 & 3 Comps/PB 3

12. Later reinforcements - 2 Comp/PB 7 (joined 29 August from Banat Region of the Balkan forces); Lst Huss Bns 5 [3], 7 [3] & 9 [3] (joined 7 September from the AOK)
Armeegruppe Kövess
Commander = GdI Hermann Kövess von Kövesshaza
Chief of Staff = Col Gottlieb Wejmelka
HQ held its sector from 8 to 25 August, then taken over by...

2nd Army
Commander = GdK Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli
Chief of Staff = GM Artur Edler von Mecenseffy

XII Corps
Commander = GdI Hermann Kövess von Kövesshaza
Chief of Staff = Lt Col Egon Freiherr Zeidler-Daublebsky von Sterneck
. 16th ID (FML Franz Paukert)
  . 31 Bde (GM Ernst Dieterich) = IR 2 [4], 82 [4]
  . 32 Bde (GM Anton Goldbach) = IR 31 [3], 64 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HR 2
  . 16 FA Bde (GM Konstanz Dobler von Friedburg) = FKR 36 [5], I Bn/FHR 12 [2]
. 35th ID (FML Viktor Njegovan)
  . 69 Bde (GM Franz Hauninger) = IR 50 [3], 51 [3]
  . 70 Bde (GM Wenzel Bauriedl) = IR 62 [3], 63 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of HR 2 (but 5 Sqdn originally stayed back in Transylvania)
  . 35 FA Bde (Col Alfred Gröschl) = FKR 35 [5], II Bn of FHR 12 [2]
. 38th Hon ID (FML Johann Freiherr Karg von Bebenburg)
  . 75 Hon Bde (GM Karl Lippner von Nagyszentmiklos) = Hon IR 21 [3], 22 [3]
  . 76 Hon Bde (Col Adalbert Benke von Tardoskedd) = Hon IR 23 [3], 24 [3]
  . 38 FA Bde (Col Emanuel Werz) = FKR 34 [5], Hon FKR 5 [4]
. Corps troops - Res Sqdn of HR 2; Heavy How Bn 12 [2]; 4, 5 & 6 Comps of SB 12 (but 4 Comp originally stayed back in Transylvania); 2 Comp/PB 2

III Corps
Commander = GdI Emil Colerus von Geldern
Chief of Staff = Col Richard Müller
Strength = 45 bns, 7 sqdns, 24 batties (140 guns), 3 technical companies
. 6th ID (FML Karl Gelb Edler von Siegesstern)
  . 11 Bde (GM Ludwig von Fabini) = IR 7 [4]; BH IR 2 [3]
  . 12 Bde (GM Felizian Kraesel) = IR 17 [4]; FJB 8, 9
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of DR 5
  . 6 FA Bde (Col Karl Kratky) = FKR 9 [5], I Bn of FHR 3 [2]
. 28th ID (FML Rudolf Kralicek)
  . 55 Bde (GM Alfred Edl von Hinke) = IR 87 [3], 97 [4];
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FJB 20
. 56 Bde (GM Johann Fernengel) = IR 27 [4], 47 [4]; FJB 4
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 3 Sqdns of DR 5
. 28 FA Bde (GM Wilhelm Elmar) = FKR 8 [5], II Bn/FHR 3 [2]
. 22nd LW ID (FML Heinrich Ritter von Krauss-Elislag)
. 43 LW Bde (GM Joseph Nemeczek) = LW IR 3 [3], 26 [3]
. 44 LW Bde (GM Ignaz Schmidt Edl von Fussina) = LW IR 4 [5 bns but just 3 MG Dets], 27 [4 bns with 2 MG Dets] (In the original, these regts are always referred to by their titles in 1917 - Mountain Schutzen Regts # 1 and 2)
. Div Cavalry = 2 & 4 Sqdns of DR 5
. 22 FA Bde (Col Michael Gärtner) = FKR 7 [4], FK Bn 22 [2], FH Bn 22 [2]
. Corps Troops - Res Sqdn of UR 5; Heavy How Bn 3 [2]; 4 & 5 Comps/SB 3, 5 Comp/PB 3

Directly under 2nd Army
. 11th ID (FML Alois Pokorny)
. 21 Bde (GM Milan Grubic) = IR 15 [4], 55 [4]
. 22 Bde (GM Alexander Ritt. Wasserthal von Zuccari) = IR 58 [3], 95 [4]; FJB 32
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 1
. 11 FA Bde (GM Rudolf Dieterich) = FKR 33 [5], I Bn/FHR 11 [2]
. 4th Comp of SB 11
. 43rd LW ID (FML Albert Schmidt von Georgenegg)
. 59 Bde (GM Ernst Horsetzky Edl. von Horntal) = IR 24 [3], 41 [4]
. 86 LW Bde (GM Moritz Jesser) = LW IR 20 [3], 22 [3], 36 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 1
. 43 FA Bde (FML Ferdinand Goglia) = FKR 31 [5], FK Bn 43 [2], FH Bn 43 [2]
. 6th Comp of SB 11
. 20th Hon ID (FML Friedrich von Csanady)
. 39 Hon Bde (GM Koloman Patzak) = Hon IR 3 [3], 4 [3]
. 81 Hon Bde (GM Eugen Perneckzy) = Hon IR 1 [3], 17 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of Hon HR 4
. 20 FA Bde (GM Stephan Schneeberger) = I Bn/FKR 20 [2], Hon FKR 8 [5]
. 1st Cav Div (GM Artur Freiherr Peteani von Steinberg)
. 6 Cav Bde (GM Samuel Freih. Apor de Al-Torja) = HR 7 [4], 14 [6]
. 7 Cav Bde (GM Johann Schilling) = HR 4 [6], 12 [4]
. Horse Arty Bn 7 [3]
. 5th Hon Cav Div (FML Ernst von Froreich)
. 19 Hon Cav Bde (GM Ferdinand Graf von Bissingen und
Nippenburg) = Hon HR 1 [6], 8 [6]
  . 23 Hon Cav Bde (Col Baron Colbert Zech) = HHR 6 [6], 7 [6]
  . Div troops = 1st Batty of Horse Arty Bn 6; Hon Bike Comp 1
  . 8th Cav Div (FM Georg Edler von Lehmann
  . 13 Cav Bde (GM Otto Berndt) = DR 7 [6], UR 8 [6]
  . 15 Cav Bde (GM Heinrich Freiherr von Gablenz-Eskeles) = DR 2 [6], UR 11 [6]
  . Horse Arty Bn 6 [2]
  . kk 35 Lst Bde (GM Arnold Münzel) = Lst IR 22 [3], 36 [3];
March Bns of IR 24 & 41; Res Sqdns of DR 9 & UR 8; Res Cannon Batty 31
  . kk 40 Lst Bde (Col Joseph Kroupa) = Lst IR 14 [3], 24 [4]; Res
Cannon Batty 35
  . ku 102 Lst Bde (GM Eduard Plank) = Lst IR 5 [3], 7 [3], 8 [2];
Res Sqdn of HR 4 (from 7 March Bde); Res Cannon Batty 11
  . ku 103 Lst Bde (GM Emil Hennel) = Lst IR 21 [3], 22 [3],
23 [3], 24 [3]; Res Sqdn of HR 16; Res Cannon Batty 36
  . kk 105 Lst Bde (Col Emil Stramlitsch) = Lst IR 3 [3], 4 [3];
Res Sqdn of DR 3; Res Cannon Batty 18
  . 12 March Bde (GM Kornelius Blaim) = Ma IR 23 [Bns of IR 50, 51, 62, 63], Ma IR 24 [Bns of IR 2, 31, 64, 82]; Res Sqdn of HR 5
  . March units of 20 Hon ID = Hon Ma IR 13 [Bns 1, 17, 45], Hon
Ma IR 15 [Bns 3, 4, 47]
  . March units of 38 Hon ID = Hon Ma IR 9 [Bns 21, 22, 41], Hon
Ma IR 10 [Bns 23, 24, 42]
  . Independent units - Mountain AR 14 [6]; 1 & 2 Comps/SB 8, 4
Comp/PB 3

Reinforcements from the Balkan forces
(For orders of battle, see above)
  . VII Corps (GdI Otto Meixner von Zweienstamm) - HQ arrived on
27 August
  . 17 ID - Arrival completed on 31 August
  . 34 ID - Arrival completed on 31 August
  . Corps units and trains - Arrival completed on 2 September
  . IV Corps (GdK Karl Tersztyanszky von Nadas) - HQ arrived on 2
September
  . 31 ID - Arrival completed on 8 September
  . 32 ID - Arrival completed on 8 September
  . Corps units and trains - Arrival completed on 9 September
  . 7 March Bde - Arrived on 2-5 September
3rd Army
Commander = GdK Rudolf Ritter von Brudermann
Chief of Staff = GM Rudolf Pfeffer

XI Corps
Commander = GdK Desiderius Kolossvary de Kolosvar
Chief of Staff = Col Franz Riml
Strength = 28 bns, 5 sqdns, 9 batties (50 guns), 2 technical companies
. 30th ID (FML Julius Kaiser)
  . 60 Bde (GM Oswald Kunesh) = IR 30 [3], 80 [3]; FJB 24, 30
  . 85 LW Bde (Col Georg Komma) = LW IR 19 [3], 35 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 1
  . 30 FA Bde (Col Franz Edler von Portenschlag-Ledermayr) = FKR 32 [4], II Bn of FHR 11 [2]
  . kk 93 Lst Bde (GM Artur Kaltneker) = Lst IR 19 [4], 35 [4]; Res Sqdn of UR 4, Res Cannon Batty 32 (Lst IR 19 temporarily on security service at Lemberg and at Mikolajow on the Dniester)
  . 11 March Bde (GM Alois Fürst Schönburg-Hartenstein) = Ma IR 21 [Bns of IR 15, 55, 58, 95], Ma IR 22 [Bns of IR 30 & 80; Comp of FJB 30]; Res Sqdn of UR 7
  . Corps troops = Res Sqdn of UR 13; Heavy How Bn 11 [2]; 5 Comp of SB 11, 5 Comp of PB 10

XIV Corps
Commander = GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
Chief of Staff = Col Joseph Ritter von Paic
Strength = 52 bns, 8 sqdns, 30 batties (160 guns), 3 technical companies
. 3rd ID (FML Joseph Roth)
  . 5 Bde (GM Joseph Schneider Edl. von Manns-Au) = IR 28 [3], 59 [4]
  . 15 Bde (GM Theodor Stipek) = IR 14 [4]; KJR 2 [4]
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 6
  . 3 FA Bde (GM Edmund Edler von Sellner) = FKR 42 [5], II Bn of FHR 14 [2 bns armed with mountain howitzers]
  . 8th ID (FML Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach)
  . 16 Bde (GM Emil Herzberg) = FJB 1, 13, 14, 16, 18
  . 96 Bde (GM Richard Mayer) = KJR 3 [3], 4 [3]
  . 121 Bde (GM Adolf Brunswik von Korompa) = KJR 1 [3]; FJB 27
  . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 6
  . 8 FA Bde (Col Karl Petersilka) = FKR 41 [5], I Bn of FHR 14 [2]
  . 44th LW ID (FML Heinrich Tschurtschenthaler von Helmheim)
    . 87 LW Bde (GM Franz Ritt. von Rziha) = LW IR 2 [3], 21
103

[3]
. 122 LW Bde (GM Ludwig Goiginger) = L-Sch Regt I [6 bns with 4 MG dets]
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 6
  . 44 FA Bde (Col Eugen Brunswik von Korompa) = FKR 40 [4], FK Bn 44 [2], FH Bn 44 [2]
. 88 Landes-Schutzen Bde (GM Karl Georgi) = L-Sch Regts II [5 bns with 3 MG dets], III [5 bns with 4 MG dets]; 1 & 3 Sqdns of Tyrol LW Uhlan Bn; Mountain How Bns of Mtn AR 8, 10 & 14 [totalling 6 batties]
. Corps troops = Heavy How Bn 14 [2]; 5 & 6 Comps/SB 14, 4 Comp/ PB 2

Units directly under 3rd Army...
. 41st Hon ID (FML Johann Nikic)
  . 40 Hon Bde (Col Adalbert Tanarky) = Hon IR 12 [3], 32 [3]
  . 82 Hon Bde (GM Rudolf Schamschula) = Hon IR 20 [3], 31 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of Hon HR 4
  . 41 FA Bde (Col Adolf Bauzher) = II Bn/FKR 12 [3], Hon FKR 7 [4]
. 23rd Hon ID (FML Heinrich Daempf) - Transferred from 2nd Army; the last elements arrived from the Balkan forces on 27 August
. 4th Cav Div (GM Edmund Ritter von Zaremba)
  . 18 Cav Bde (GM Eugen Chevalier Ruiz de Roxas) = DR 9 [6], UR 13 [6]
  . 21 Cav Bde (Col Alois Ritter Klepsch-Kloth von Roden) = DR 15 [6], UR 1 [6]
  . Horse Arty Bn 11 [3]
. 2nd Cav Div (FML Emil Ritter von Ziegler)
  . 3 Cav Bde (GM Albert Freih. Abele von und zu Lilienberg) = HR 6 [6], 16 [6]
  . 16 Cav Bde (GM Erich Freiherr von Diller) = HR 3 [6], UR 5 [5]
  . Horse Arty Bn 5 [3]
. 11th Hon Cav Div (GM Julius Freiherr Nagy von Töbör-Ethe)
  . 22 Hon Cav Bde (GM Karl Czito) = Hon HR 2 [6], 3 [6]
  . 24 Hon Cav Bde (Col Ladislaus Jony von Jamnik) = Hon HR 5 [6], 9 [6]
  . Div troops = Hon Horse Arty Bn 1 [3], Hon Bike Comp 2
. ku 97 Lst Bde (GM Alfred Weeber) = Lst IR 9 [3], 10 [3], 11 [3], 16 [3]; Res Cannon Batty 33
. kk 108 Lst Bde (Gm Gustav Szekely de Doba) = Lst IR 21 [3]; Tyrol Lst IR II [3]; 2 Sqdn/Tyrol LW Uhlan Bn; Res Cannon Batty 41 (Actually the word "Tyrol" wasn't used in the title of the Landsturm from that province; the Roman rather than Arabic numeral was used to distinguish Tyrol Landsturm from others)
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. 3 March Bde (GM Wilhelm Nickl Edler von Oppavar) = Ma IR 5 [Bns of IR 27, 47 & 87; Comps of FJB 7 & 20], Ma IR 6 [Bns of KJR 1, 3 & 4; Comps of FJB 1, 13, 14, 16, 18 & 27]; Res Sqdn of DR 2
. March units of 41 Hon ID = Hon Ma IR 14 [Bns 20, 31, 46], Hon Ma IR 16 [Bns 12, 32, 48]
. Independent units = 5th Cannon Batties of Mtn AR 6, 11 & 12 [i.e. 3 batties]; 1, 2 & 3 Comps of SB 12

Reinforcements
. 4 March Bde (GM Martin von Radicevic) - Joined on 28 August; hadn't gone to the Balkans with the rest of IV Corps. Had Ma IR 7 [Bns of IR 32, 44, 69 and of BH IR 3; Comp of FJB 24], Ma IR 8 [Bns of IR 6, 23, 70, 86]; Res Sqdn of HR 13
. March units of 23 Hon ID - Joined on 28 August from Balkans
. 2nd Comp of PB 9 (joined from Balkans; had been in 2nd Army)

4th Army
Commander = GdI Moritz Ritter von Auffenberg
Chief of Staff = Rudolf Krauss

II Corps
Commander = GdI Blasius Schemua
Chief of Staff = GM Leo Greiner
Strength = 39 bns, 7 sqdns, 24 batties (140 guns), 4 technical companies
. 4th ID (FML Rudolf Stöger-Steiner Edler von Steinstätten)
   . 7 Bde (GM Kletus Pichler) = IR 81 [3], 99 [3 - the Regt's Ist Bn stayed back in Vienna for guard duty at the Imperial palace, but the Bn's MG Det went with the Regt to the field]
   . 8 Bde (GM Adolf von Boog) = IR 8 [3], 49 [3]; IV Bn/IR 3
   . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 5
   . 4 FA Bde (Col Hugo Machaczek) = FKR 5 [5], I Bn/FHR 2 [2]
. 25th ID (FML Archduke Peter Ferdinand)
   . 49 Bde (GM Robert Edler von Langer) = IR 84 [3], BH IR 1 [3]; FJB 25
   . 50 Bde (GM Ferdinand Kosak) = IR 4 [3]; FJB 10, 17, 31; BH FJB 1
   . Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of LW UR 5
   . 25 FA Bde (GM Eduard Ritter Jemrich von der Bresche) = FKR 6 [5], II Bn/FHR 2 [2]
. 13th LW ID (FML Eduard Edler von Kreysa)
   . 25 LW Bde (GM Karl Englert) = LW IR 1 [3], 24 [3]
   . 26 LW Bde (GM Emil Lischka) = LW IR 14 [3], 25 [3]
   . Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 5
   . 13 FA Bde (Gm Eduard Tunk) = FKR 4 [4], FK Bn 13 [2], FH
Bn 13 [2]
. Corps troops = Res Sqdn of HR 1; Heavy How Bn 2 [2]; 4, 5 & 6 Comps/SB 2; 5 Comp/PB 2

VI Corps
Commander = GdI Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna
Chief of staff = Col Joseph Huber
Strength = 39 bns, 7 sqdns, 24 batties (140 guns), 3 technical companies
. 15th ID (FML Friedrich Freiherr Wodniansky von Wildenfeld)
. 29 Bde (Col Dr. Jur. Karl Bardolff) = IR 5 [3], 66 [3]
. 30 Bde (Col Joseph Mark) = IR 60 [3], 65 [4]
. Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of HR 15
. 15 FA Bde (Col Ernst Edler von Terboglaw) = FKR 17 [5], I Bn/FHR 6 [2]
. 27th ID (FML Friedrich Ritter Gerstenberger von Reichsegg und Gerstberg)
. 53 Bde (GM Adolf Urbarz) = IR 25 [3], 34 [3]; FJB 29
. 54 Bde (Col Adolf Sterz Edler von Ponteguerra) = IR 67 [4], 85 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 3 & 4 Sqdns of HR 15
. 27 FA Bde (Col Karl Niemilowicz) = FKR 16 [5], II Bn/FHR 6 [2]
. 39th Hon ID (FML Emmerich Hadfy)
. 77 Hon Bde (GM Desiderius Molnar von Peterfalva) = Hon IR 9 [3], 11 [3]
. 78 Hon Bde (GM Joseph Foglar) = Hon IR 10 [3], 16 [3]
. Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of HR 15
. 39 FA Bde (Col Joseph Reisinger) = FKR 18 [5], HFKR 3 [3]
. Corps troops = Res Sqdn of HR 12; Heavy How Bn 6 [2]; 5 & 6 Comps/SB 6, 3 Comp/PB 2

IX Corps  (Corps HQ arrived from the Balkans on 23 August, but the two divisions had moved directly from their mobilization stations to Galicia; 29th ID, also from the corps, stayed with the forces fighting Serbia)
Commander = GdI Lothar Edler von Hortstein
Chief of Staff = Col August Martinek
Strength = 30 bns, 5 sqdns, 17 batties (98 guns), 3 technical companies
. 10th ID (FML Theodor Hordt)
. 19 Bde (Col Artur Iwanski von Iwania) = IR 36 [4], 98 [3]; FJB 2
. 20 Bde (GM Hugo Reymann) = IR 18 [3], 21 [3]; FJB 12
. Div Cavalry = 5 & 6 Sqdns of LW UR 2
. 10 FA Bde (Col August Blaha) = FKR 25 [5], I Bn/FHR 9 [2]
. 4th Comp of SB 9
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. 26th LW ID (FML Johann von Friedel)
  . 51 LW Bde (Gm Viktor Seidler) = LW IR 11 [3], 12 [3], 30 [3]
  . 25 LW Bde (GM Otto Gössmann) = LW IR 9 [3], 10 [3]
  . Div Cavalry = 1 & 2 Sqdns of LW UR 2
  . 26 FA Bde (Col Oskar von Heimerich) = FKR 26 [4], FK Bn 26 [2], FH Bn 26 [2]
  . Corps troops = Res Sqdn of DR 1; Heavy How Bn 9 [2]; 5 Comp/SB 9, 5 Comp/PB 9

XVII Corps (formed on 20 August)
Commander = GdK Karl Graf Huyn
Chief of Staff = Col Theodor Edler von Lerch
Strength = 30 1/2 bns, 4 sqdns, 7 batties (42 guns), 3 technical companies

. 19th ID (FML Karl Lukas)
  . 37 Bde (GM Ernst Kletter) = IR 35 [3], 75 [4]; LW IR 29 [3]
  . 38 Bde (GM Heinrich Teisinger) = IR 88 [4]; FJB 6, 22
  . Div Cavalry = 4 & 6 Sqdns of DR 14
  . 19 FA Bde (Col Johann Regnier) = FKR 22 [5], II Bn/FHR 8 [2]
  . 5th Comp/SB 8

. 2 March Bde (GM Gregor Miscevic) = Ma IR 3 [Bns of IR 8, 49, 81; Comps of FJB 17 & 25 and of BH FJB 1], Ma IR 4 [Bns of IR 4, 84 and 99 and of BH IR 1 (latter had just 2 comps); Comps of FJB 10 & 31]; Res Sqdn of DR 15

. 2 March Bde (Col Friedrich Watterich von Watterichsburg) = Ma IR 17 [Bns of IR 18, 21, 36, 98; Comps of FJB 2 & 12], Ma IR 18 [Bns of IR 42, 74, 92, 94]; Res Sqdn of DR 8

. Corps troops = 6 Comp/SB 9 (which had come with IX Corps HQ from the Balkans), 1 Comp/PB 9 (initially had been with 2nd Army in the Balkans)

Directly under 4th Army

. 6th Cav Div (FML Oskar Wittmann)
  . 5 Cav Bde (GM Otto Schwer Edler von Schwertenegg) = DR 6 [6], 8 [6]
  . 14 Cav Bde (Col Anton Leiter) = DR 11 [6], HR 11 [6]
  . Horse Arty Bn 10 [3]

. 10th Cav Div (Viktor Mayr) — Had finished arriving from the Balkans on 25 August; order of battle shown above

. 6 March Bde (FML Hugo Kuczera) = Ma IR 11 [Bns of IR 25, 34, 67 & 85; Comp of FJB 29], Ma IR 12 [Bns of IR 5, 60, 65, 66]; Hon Ma IR 5 [Bns 9, 11, 37], Hon Ma IR 6 [Bns 10, 16, 38]; Res Sqdn of HR 6

. Independent units — Mountain AR 3 [6]; 1 & 2 Comps/SB 14; 1
Comp/PB 2; 1 Comp/PB 3

**Armeegruppe Kummer**

Commander = GdK Heinrich Ritter Kummer von Falkenfeld  
Chief of Staff = Col Karl Göttlicher  
Strength = 45 bns, 27 sqdns, 25 batties (106 guns), 7 technical companies

- 7th Cav Div (FML Ignaz Edler von Korda)  
  - 11 Cav Bde (Col Oskar von Mold Edler Mollheim) = DR 10 [6], UR 2 [6]  
  - 20 Cav Bde (GM Albert Ritter Le Gay von Lierfels) = DR 12 [6], UR 3 [6]  
  - Horse Arty Bn 1 [3]  
  - Combined Bicycle Bn (one comp each of FJB 11, 20, 24, 29)  

- kk 95 Lst ID (GM Artur von Richard-Rostoczil)  
  (Formed from the Lst Bde of the same number; each Lst IR received 2 MG dets drawn from the Cracow fortress)  
  - Lst Bde (Col Franz Pfeifer Edler von Lindenrode) = Lst IR 6 [4], 7 [3], 8 [4]  
  - Lst Bde (Col Karl Piasecki) = Lst IR 28 [4], 29 [4]  
  - Res Sqdn of DR 10  
  - Res Cannon Batty 22, 1 & 2 How Batties of Mtn AR 3; four 9 cm cannon batties (artillery later became FKR 95)  

- kk 106 Lst ID (GM Carl Czapp)  
  (Formed from the Lst Bde of the same number; each Lst IR received 2 MG dets drawn from the Cracow fortress)  
  - Lst Bde (GM Karl Wojtechowsky Edler von Broddenritt) = Lst IR 13 [4], 15 [3], 31 [3]  
  - Lst Bde (Col Augustin von Rochel) = Lst IR 25 [4], 38 [3]  
  - Res Sqdn of DR 12  
  - Res Cannon Batty 29; 1 & 2 How Batties of Mtn AR 4; four 9 cm cannon batties (artillery later became FKR 106)  

- ku 100 Lst Bde (GM Georg Mihalcsics von Stolacz) = Lst IR 13 [3], 14 [3], 15 [3] (plus 4 MG dets from the Cracow fortress); Res Sqdn of HR 15; Res Cannon Batty 13; four 9 cm cannon batties (the artillery later became FKR 100)  

- 1st Mountain Arty Bde HQ (Col Adolf Aust) = 15 cm Howitzer Batties # 25, 26, 27 (from the Cracow fortress, where mobilized as 10, 11 & 12 Comps of Fort Arty Regt 2)  
  - Technical troops = 1, 2 & 3 Comps of SB 2, 3 Comp of SB 1; reinforced by 1, 2 & 3 Comps of PB 5 from the Balkans

**German Landwehr Corps**

Commander = GdI Remus von Woyrsch  
Strength = 34 bns, 12 sqdns, 16 batties (96 guns) (Initially the 17 and 18 Ersatz Bdes also contained Ers cavalry, but the cavalry combined to create Ersatz Cav Regt during the campaign)
. 3rd LW ID (Götz Freih. von König)
  . 17 LW Bde (Benno von Grumbkow) = LW IR 6 [3], 7 [3]
  . 18 LW Bde (Eduard Neven du Mont) = LW IR 37 [3], 46 [3]
  . 17 Ersatz Bde (Hermann Riess von Scheurnschloss) = Bde Ers Bns 17, 18, 19, 20, 77; Ers FA Bns 20, 41, 54
  . LW Cav Regt 1 [4]; 1 & 2 Lst Batties/V Corps District

. 4th LW ID (Rudolf von Wegerer)
  . 22 LW Bde (Oskar Sachs) = LW IR 11 [3], 51 [3]
  . 23 LW Bde (Albert von Mutius) = LW IR 22 [3], 23 [3]
  . 21 Ersatz Bde (Friedrich von Busse) = Bde Ers Bns 21, 22, 23, 24, 78; Ers FA Bns 6, 42, 57
  . LW Cav Regt 2 [4]; later also the Ersatz Cav Regt [4]; 1 & 2 Lst Batties of VI Corps District

The fortifications
. Fortress Cracow (Commander = FML Karl Kuk)
  . 95 kk Lst Bde - Expanded as 95 Lst ID and in field with AG Kummer
  . 110 kk Lst Bde - In field with 1st Army
  . kk Lst IR 10 [4]
  . Arty - 31 x comps (including Reserve and March comps) from Fort Arty Regts 1 and 2 and from Fort Arty Bn 5; 25 x Lst Arty Dets (including 12 x 9 cm cannon batties in field with AG Kummer)
  . Sappers - 1 & 2 Comps/SB 1; 1 to 3 Comps/SB 4; two Lst Sapper Dets
  . Reinforced at start of Sept by Lst Huss Bn 3 [3]

. Fortress Przemysl (Commander = FML Hermann von Kusmanek)
  . 97 ku Lst Bde - In field with 3rd Army
  . Arty - 40 x comps (including Reserve and March comps) from Fort Arty Regts 3 and 6 and from Fort Arty Bns 3 and 5; 40 x Lst Arty Dets
  . Sappers - 1 to 3 Comps/SB 3, 1 & 2 Comps/SB 5, 1 & 2 Comps/SB 10

. Fortifications at Lemberg (GM Friedrich Gostischa) = kk Lst IR 19 [2 - from 93 kk Lst Bde]; 1 & 2 Comps of Fort Arty Bn 9; four Lst Arty Dets; 1 & 2 Comps/SB 11; one Lst Sapper Det

. Fortified bridgeheads...
  . Jaroslau - kk Lst IR 34 [2]; 11 x bridge defense comps; 11th Comp/Fort Arty Regt 3; four Lst arty dets; 3 Comp/SB 10
  . Sieniawa - kk Lst IR 34 [1]; 4 x bridge defense comps; 9 & 10 Comps/Fort Arty Regt 3; two Lst arty dets; 3 Comp/SB 5; one Lst sapper det
  . Mikolajow - kk Lst IR 19 [2 - from 93 kk Lst Bde]; 3 x
bridge defense comps; 12th Comp/Fort Arty Regt 3; 4th Comp/Fort Arty Bn 9; one Lst arty det; 4 Comp/SB 14
  . Halicz – kk Lst IR 20 [3]; 2 x bridge defense comps; 3rd Comp/Fort Arty Bn 9; four Lst arty dets; 3 Comp/SB 11; one Lst sapper det
  . Nizniow – kk Lst IR 20 [1]; 2 x bridge defense comps; one Lst arty det
  . Zaleszczyki – 4 x bridge defense comps, one Lst arty det
  . Also – One bridge defense comp apiece at Nisko, Radymno, Koniuszki-Siemanowskie, Zurawno, Zydaczow and Martinow

Summary of forces in the northern theater of war
  . Field Army = 798 1/2 bns, 6 bike comps, 377 sqdns, 379 batties (2076 guns), 69 technical comps, 5 fort arty comps, 1234 MG
  . In fortifications = 21 bns, 7 sqdns, 1 batty (6 guns), 18 technical comps, 83 fort arty comps
  . TOTAL = 819 1/2 bns, 6 bike comps, 384 sqdns, 380 batties (2082 guns), 87 technical comps, 88 fort arty comps, 1234 MG
  . Supported by German LW Corps (Woyrsch) with 34 bns, 12 sqdns, 16 batties (96 guns)

C. Units outside of the two theaters of operations
  . Defenses of Carinthia – Six detachments from (Mtn) LW IR 4 and 27; 1st Field & 1st Res Comps/Fort Arty Bn 4
  . Defenses of Tyrol – (Tyrol) kk Lst IR I [3]; 13 detachments from L-Sch Regts I, II and III. 34 comps (including Reserve and March comps) of Fort Arty Bns 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7; 1 Comp/SB 9, 3 Comp/SB 8, 3 Comp/SB 14
  . At the munitions factory at Steinfeld (Lower Austria) – III Bn of kk Lst IR 1
  . At Vienna – 1st Bn of IR 99
  . At Budapest – 5 & 6 March Comps of Fort Arty Regt 6
  . At Komorn – 3 & 4 March Comps of Fort Arty Regt 6

D. Attached to the German High Command
Serving on the Western front – 5 & 6 Comps of Fort Arty Regt 2 (also called 3rd & 4th 30.5 cm Mortar Batties); 1 & 2 Comps of Fort Arty Bn 8 (also called 7th & 8th 30.5 cm Mortar Batties)

E. Strength of the Land Forces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

1094 1/2 bns, 6 bike comps, 425 sqdns (including those of the ten Lst Huss Bns which were ready for the front in Sept and mostly sent to ku Lst Bdes), 483 field and mountain batties (2610 guns), 224 fort arty comps, 155 technical comps, 15 flying comps; 1582 machine guns
The following yearly contingents were mobilized to bring the units above to full strength...
. The contingent of 1893 (21 year old recruits and ersatz reservists, not yet trained),
. From the contingents of 1890 to 1892 (ages 22 to 24), which in 1914 were actively serving, the men who had been on leave or were in the ersatz reserve,
. The contingents of 1882 through 1889 (ages 25 to 32), consisting of reserves and ersatz reserves of the common army and of both Landwehr forces, and
. The contingents of 1872 to 1881 (ages 33 to 42) which made up the active Landsturm.
In addition to these contingents, there were about 66,000 workers who were liable to Landsturm service but who joined the army as volunteers. The grand total of men who left civilian life for active military service (including in the Landsturm) was around 2,900,000.

At this time the peacetime establishment of the Army was about 450,000; therefore its strength after adding the mobilized men was 3,350,000. This figure however includes men who stayed in the interior and, as noted above, the untrained contingent of 1893.

The totals in the units listed in the order of battle were...
. 1094 1/2 battalions (of 1000 men) .................. 1,094,500
. 6 bicycle companies (132 men) .......................... 732
. 425 squadrons (180 men) ............................. 76,500
. 483 batteries (average strength of 196) ............ 94,668
. 224 fortress comps (average strength 258) .......... 57,792
. 155 technical comps (average strength 260) ......... 40,300
. 15 air companies (106 men) ............................. 1,590
. In the machine gun formations .......................... 30,192
This accounts for ........................................ 1,396,334

In addition there were...
. 88 Landsturm arty detachments (202 men) ............. 17,776
. 8 Landsturm sapper detachments (205 men) .......... 1,640
. 28 bridge defense companies (250 men) ................ 5,500
So the grand total was .................................. 1,421,250

Although this total includes personnel who manned the guns, who transported machine guns, and who were in technical branches, it does not include the train, quartermaster, medical and munitions troop, nor the staff and liaison elements, or the military construction troops. When these men are added, the ration
strength of the Army in the field was about 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 men.

The combat potential of the Austro-Hungarian forces should not be exaggerated based on these large figures, however. It must be borne in mind that of the 1094 1/2 battalions, more than a third (401 battalions) were in the March and Landsturm Brigades. Similarly, 72 of the 425 squadrons and 32 of the 483 batteries were Reserve or Landsturm units.
F. The Operational Fleet
(as of 4 August 1914)
(This is an expanded version of the original; additional
information derived from Sokol, Seekrieg (op. cit.), Beilagen
pp. 8 ff)

Commander of the Naval Forces = Fleet Commandant Admiral Anton
Haus (on "Viribus Unitis")

1st Squadron (Vice Admiral Maximilian Njegovan)
. 1st Division (Njegovan's own) = Viribus Unitis,
   Tegetthoff, Prinz Eugen (each 20,300 T)
. 2nd Division (Kontre Admiral Anton Willenik) = Erzherzog
   Franz Ferdinand, Radetzky, Zrínyi (each 14,500 T)

2nd Squadron (Kontre Admiral Franz Löffler)
. 3rd Division (Löffler's own) = Erzherzog Karl, Erzherzog
   Friedrich, Erzherzog Ferdinand Max (each 10,600 T)
. 4th Division (Kontre Admiral Karl Seidensacher) =
   Habsburg, Arpad, Babenberg (each 8300 T)

Cruiser Flotilla (Vice Admiral Paul Fiedler)
. 1st Cruiser Division (Fiedler's own) = Sankt Georg
   (7300 T), Kaiser Karl VI (6300 T), Helgoland (3500 T),
   Aspern (2400 T); Szigetvar and Zenta (each 2300 T)
. 1st Torpedo Flotilla (Frigate Captain Heinrich Seitz) =
   Cruiser Saida (3500 T)
. 1st Torpedo Division = 1st Destroyer Group (Csepeł,
   Tatra, Balaton); 2nd Destroyer Group (Lika, Orjen,
   Triglav)
. 2nd Torpedo Division = 3rd Destroyer Group (Velebit,
   Dinara, Reka), 4th Destroyer Group (Csikos,
   Scharfschütze, Pandur)
. 3rd Torpedo Division = 1st Torpedo Boat Group (Boats
   # 74, 75, 76, 77), 2nd T.B. Group (Boats # 50, 51,
   73), 3rd T.B. Group (Boats # 53, 54, 56)
. 2nd Torpedo Flotilla (Frigate Captain Benno von
   Millenkovich) =
   Cruiser Admiral Spaun (3500 T)
. 4th Torpedo Division = 5th Destroyer Group (Tuzul,
   Wildfang, Huszar), 6th Destroyer Group (Streiter,
   Ulan, Uškoje)
. 5th Torpedo Division = 4th Torpedo Boat Group (Boats
   # 55, 68, 70), 5th T.B. Group (Boats # 61, 65, 66),
   6th T.B. Group (Boats # 64, 69, 72)
. 6th Torpedo Division = 7th Torpedo Boat Group (Boats
   # 52, 58, 59), 8th T.B. Group (Boats # 60, 62, 63),
   9th T.B. Group (Boats # 57, 67, 71)
Torpedo depot ships = Gää (for 1st Flotilla), "Dampfer IV" (for 2nd Flotilla)

Train of the main body of the fleet = Cyclop; plus 5 naval vessels (Lacroma, Vesta, Najade, Gigant, Meteor) and 10 hired civilian vessels (Dampfer I-III, V-IX, XI and XIII)

Coast defense forces
- 5th Division (Kontre Admiral Richard Ritter von Barry) = Monarch, Wien, Budapest (each 5600 T)
- 2nd Cruiser Division = Kaiser Franz Joseph I (400 T), Panther (1530 T)
- Not assigned = Mars

Pola Defense Command
- 7th Torpedo Division = 7th Destroyer Group (Planet, Trabant, Satellit); 11th Torpedo Boat Group (Boats # 1, 2, 7, 9), 13th T.B. Group (Boats #21, 24, 32, 39)
- U-Boat Station = U.1 to U.6; depot ship Pelikan
- Mine-Sweeper Detachment = Boats # 18, 27, 30, 33, 34, 37 and 40
- 1st Territorial District (at Pola itself) = Adria, Alpha, Herkules, Nixe, Nympe, Pluto; Torpedo Boat # 14
- 2nd District (at Fasana) = Leopard, Salamander, Whitebarkasse
- 3rd District (at Cape Compare-Peneda) = Gamma, Minerva, Basilisk, Hippos
- 4th District (Cape Compare-Promontore) = Spalato

Trieste Defense Command
- 15th Torpedo Boat Group = Boats # 20, 26
- 16th Torpedo Boat Group = Boats # 23, 45
- Sea Mine Command IV – Sebenico, Delta

Lussin Harbor – Had the 9th Torpedo Division, over 17th T.B. Group (Boats # 3 & 4) and 18th T.B. Group (Boats # 5 & 6) plus depot ship Beta
- Sebenico District Command
- 10th Torpedo Division = 19th T.B. Group (Boats # 8, 10, 11 and 12), 20th T.B. Group (Boats # 19, 22, 25, 31)
- Sea Mine Command III = Aurora, Frundsberg
- Mine-Sweeping Detachment = Boats # 29, 35
- Inner Harbor Command = Donau, Schwarzenberg, Vulkan

Gulf of Cattaro Defense Command
- Outer Basin
  - Sea Mine Command II = Kronprinz Rudolf, Dromedar
  - Mine-Sweeping Detachment = Boats # 36, 38
- Middle Basin
  - Ships = Zara, Kaiser Max
  - 11th Torpedo Division = Blitz; plus 21st T.B. Group (Boats # 13 & 15), 22nd Torpedo Boat Group (Boats # 16
and 17)

. Under the 6th Army = Dalmat
. In the Far East = Kaiserin Elizabeth
. (Old) ships not under higher HQ = Kronprinzessin Stephanie, Feuerspeier, Don Juan d'Austria, Custozza, Bellona, Miramar, Lussin, Taurus

The Danube Flotilla has been listed above (under the ground forces in the Balkans)

Total of naval personnel...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wartime strength...........</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>33,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Landsturm............</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total was...................</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>36,735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1250 staff and 27,888 men were on ships; 724 staff and 4,991 men served on land. There were thus 3,856 surplus men.
7. The Fortification Systems

In Galicia

The Galician fortifications consisted of the first class fortress cities of Cracow and Przemysl, some light construction around Lemberg, and the fortified bridgeheads at the crossings of the San and Dniester Rivers. There were also several stone blockhouses by major railroad bridges and tunnels.

The purpose of the Cracow Fortress was to protect the important lines of communication running through the Vistula Valley in the narrow passage between the Imperial border and the northern foothills of the Carpathians. The defenses were 57 kilometers in circumference, and included 16 principal works (10 of which were armored) and 14 smaller works (of which 7 were armored). There was also a second line of defense, 24 kilometers in circumference. The armament was 800 guns, and the garrison was two Landsturm Infantry Brigades (totalling 25 battalions).

The purpose of the Przemysl Fortress was to guard the major railroad line from Lemberg to Cracow and to make it difficult for an enemy to enter the Carpathian crossing points west of the Uzsok Pass. The drawback of the Przemysl position was that the rail lines leading into it from Jaroslau and Chyrow could be fired upon by an enemy advancing quickly from the east. Therefore the Army Command had often pushed for the construction of a rail line through the San Valley, which would enter the city from the west, but the line was never built. The defenses were 45 kilometers in circumference, and included 17 principal works (5 of which were armored) and 19 smaller works (of which 7 were armored). The second line of defense was 15 kilometers in circumference. The armament was 956 guns, backed up by another 180 in the mobile and heavy artillery reserve; the garrison was two Landsturm Infantry Brigades (totalling 22 battalions).

The Cracow and Przemysl fortifications had been built piecemeal during several periods; in each period there was a different defensive philosophy, based on the anticipated opposing artillery available at the time. The majority of the works stemmed from the 1880's. They were enclosed, elevated forts with brick walls; their guns were protected with earthworks. Many forts had subsequently been modernized and strengthened: their guns were protected by armored cupolas. The 15 cm howitzers and 15 cm mortars were linked to armored observation posts which spotted their long-range targets. For defense at
shorter ranges, the preferred weapons were 8 cm rapid-fire cannon. Meanwhile, in the older works many of the guns were still mounted on open walls.

The tactical doctrine was to make it impossible for the enemy to take the forts by storm, and thus to force them to bring up siege cannon and other material, a lengthy operation. When the main point of the hostile attack had been identified, a storm of fire from the defending artillery reserve would be directed against the advance. These reserve guns were 12 and 15 cm M.80 cannon, 15 cm M.99 howitzers, 12 and 15 cm cast-iron M.61 cannon, 15 cm M.80 mortars, and 9 cm M.75/96 field cannon. There were not enough of these pieces to arm large sectors of the defense perimeters. Most of the guns in the fixed positions were protected by armor; the pieces which stood on open walls were mostly 9 cm M.75/96 field cannon.

The fortifications of Lemberg were begun as earth works in 1887; during the crisis of 1912 they had been somewhat improved and enlarged. There was a circle of such earth works, a few more heavily reinforced, around the city; the circumference was about 48 kilometers. The armament was only 28 guns; in crises the field army would have to provide additional guns and men.

Some of the fortifications on the San and Dniester lines dated back to the mid-1880's, or even to 1854. When manned by parts of the field army, they would be used along with fortress Przemysl to hinder a Russian advance from the north and northeast over the rivers. Some of the bridgeheads were placed on the northeast banks of the rivers so that they could cover offensive crossings by our own forces. These works were at Sieniawa, Jaroslau, Mikolajow, Halicz and Nizniow; their strength is given above in the order of battle. The number of guns (including attached mobile batteries) were 70, 94, 58, 44 and 4 respectively, but most were rather old M.75/96 field cannon. The works at Niso, Radymno, Koniuszki-Siemanowski, Zydaczow, Zurawno, Martinow and Zaleszczyki were simpler bridgeheads on the western banks of the rivers, with garrisons ranging from 1 to 4 companies apiece.

Finally, there were 24 small blockhouses, each of which had a garrison of 25 men.

The Galician fortifications lacked a unified system of construction, since they had been built in haphazard fashion. Although parts of the defenses of Cracow and Przemysl were obsolete, in general they proved to be adequately armed and
prepared; both demonstrated considerable powers of resistance. The works at Lemberg and on the San and Dniester, on the other hand, were of very little use in the campaign.

On the Border with Serbia and Montenegro

The fortifications in the extreme south of the Monarchy were designed to guard Bosnia-Herzegovina against incursions by the Montenegrins (who would be ready to operate very quickly once war began) and against possible enemy amphibious operations against southern Dalmatia. They would also be needed to assist the peacetime garrison against possible uprisings by disaffected elements of the population, while protecting the slow assembly of the troops from other parts of the Monarchy during mobilization. This process would take almost three weeks because of the inadequate railroad network. Finally, once the field army began to deploy on the Drina River they would guard its southern flank against the Serbs.

Therefore, in southern Herzegovina a cordon of forts, fortified depots, block houses and caserns stretched down to the Bocche di Cattaro Military Harbor. The principal positions were Trebinje and Bileca (Bilek), each of which was surrounded by a ring of forts that were 25 and 23 kilometers, respectively, in circumference. The capitals, Sarajevo and Mostar, were each surrounded by an irregular system of works (20 and 22 kilometers in circumference). Construction of the fortifications had begun just after the occupation of Bosnia in 1878-79. Because the enemy on this front was not well equipped with artillery when construction was undertaken, the works were free standing stone structures designed to resist mountain guns. None of their armament was larger than 10 cm pieces.

Cattaro was the Monarchy's second largest Military Harbor (after Pola). In its winding fjords the warships could find excellent protection from the storms of sea and from the fire of a hostile fleet. The narrow entry to the harbor could be quickly blocked and was easily guarded by armored forts on the shore. However, there was a very unsatisfactory situation at the eastern end of the harbor because the international border ran along the slope of Mount Lovcen (1759 meter), which was mostly in Montenegro. The mountain gave the Montenegrins visibility over the entire eastern part of the harbor and an opportunity to fire on the ships in this area as well as the barracks and depots in and around the town of Cattaro. North of the town the high plateau of Krivosije was protected by fortresses which were secure against mountain artillery; this plateau was part of the Cattaro
fortified area. This area gave the Austrians room to maneuver against the Montenegrin approaches through the Grahovo Basin, and a linked up to the area of the Trebinje fortress.

After the first Balkan crisis of 1908 the south Slavic kingdoms strengthened their armies and acquired heavier artillery. This caused Army Inspector FZM Potiorek at the end of 1911 to initiate the enhancement and modernization of the fortifications in Herzegovina and Dalmatia. All of the Army and Navy installations in Cattaro town were to be moved to Teodo and Castelnuovo and several armored works would be built in Cattaro, Trebinje, Bileca and Gacko; the works would be armed with heavy guns. This would seal off the exits from the areas where the Montenegrin troops would assemble - Grahovo and Niksic - in the south (Cattaro), west (Trebinje and Bileca) and northwest (Gacko). It would also secure the route for bringing reinforcements from XV Corps (Sarajevo) through the important area around Kalinovik. Other small works, which either were too far from the border (such as Nevesinje) or no longer had any tactical significance because the enemy with their new equipment could advance only on the major roads, would be abandoned.

This nest of fortifications, which ran through Cattaro, Trebinje, Bileca, Gacko and Kalinovik, would also guard the major sources of water in this extremely dry territory. The fortifications were not extended along the eastern border of Bosnia, except at Visegrad where work had begun on a covered position armed with howitzers to block the road leading out of Uzice.

When the World War began the planned expansion and modernization described above had only been started. Nonetheless, the fortifications in Dalmatia and Herzegovina were completely successful in their mission of preventing incursions from Montenegro.

Out of all the fortresses in Croatia, Slavonia and south Hungary which had existed during the Turkish wars, only Peterwardein (Petrovaradin) still remained in service. It was to be restored as a modern circular fortress, the principal point of a bridgehead to be created when needed during mobilization. Only parts of the planned fortifications had been built (during the crises of 1912-13).

In Tyrol, Carinthia and the Coastal Lands

These fortifications are described in Volume II in connection
with the outbreak of war with Italy.

8. Technical Information about the Railroads

(see volume 1 leaflet 3)

Before the war, the 16 Austrian government railroads were controlled by the k.k. Railroad Ministry; the 12 Hungarian lines were controlled by the k.u. Trade Ministry. Of the private lines, only two (the Südbahn [South Line] and the Kaschau-Oderberg) had tracks in both segments of the Monarchy. The small gauge Bosnian railroads were under the control of the k.u.k. common Finance Ministry.

Geographical Obstacles

The Danube split the Monarchy's lands along a 1000 km line, and was crossed by railroad bridges at seven locations. Three mountain ranges forced the lines to converge at a few inconvenient crossing points:
. The Alps, 200 km wide (somewhat wider toward the east) and 500 km long, were crossed in their entirety by only four lines: these ran through the Brenner, Tauern, Semmering and Neumarkt passes.
. The Karst, a large area of water-poor rock running southeast from the Alps, was initially 70 km but later 240 km wide, and 600 km long. It limited the number of major lines running to the north Adriatic to three locations (Trieste, Pola and Fiume). The rest of the 500 km coast remained without direct connection to major lines.
. The Carpathians, 100 km wide and 1300 km long, encircled two-thirds of the northern and eastern borders of Hungary. Only seven lines crossed them into Galicia and four into Romania.

Destinations of the Major Lines

52 lines ran from Austria-Hungary into Germany, 2 into Switzerland. Over the other borders, four times longer and hostile, there were just 14 lines - 5 to Italy, 4 to Russia, 4 to Romania and 1 to Serbia. The 1300 km long border between Austria and Hungary was crossed by just 20 rail lines, even though they formed one economic unit. Geographical, economic and political factors caused dozens of line on either side of the common border to end without crossing it.

The railroad network of Hungary was centrally designed so that major lines all originated at Budapest and radial connections
were neglected. The heaviest traffic in a western and northwestern direction was along both banks of the Danube to Vienna, through the Waag Valley, and through the Jablunka Pass to the Prussian-Silesian coal mines. In the northern direction traffic went to the iron works at Salgo-Tarjan and through the Maros Valley to the coal mines of Petrozsény.

This centralized Hungarian network was enclosed on two sides by Austrian lines. The Nordbahn ("North Line") - Vienna-Prerau-Oderberg-Cracow - was one of the busiest railroads in central Europe. With its extension to Lemberg it was the most important line of communication for operations against Russia, but was very close to the left flank of the assembling armies. There was also heavy traffic on the Westbahn (Vienna-Salzburg), the Südbahn (Vienna-Trieste) and on the two lines leading to Budapest on either bank of the Danube. All other lines, as they moved south and east in the direction of Hungary were of little significance, and often only carried trains during the day.

Finally, the narrow gauge railroads of Bosnia-Herzegovina made up their own network.

Statistical Summary

**Full-Gauge Lines** (1.435 meter gauge)
There were 45,800 kilometers of track, of which 8482 were double-lines. Thus there was about one kilometer per 15 square kilometers of Habsburg territory or one for every 1122 Habsburg subjects. There were 11,967 locomotives, 32,642 passenger cars and 265,864 boxcars. In Austria there were 140,015 railroad employees (284,574 when common laborers are added) and in Hungary there were 78,951 (or 157,496 including laborers).

**Small-Gauge Lines** (100, 90, 80, 76 and 75 centimeter gauges)
There were 2516 kilometers of track, mostly unconnected and of only local significance. The only lines important for military operations made up the Bosnia-Herzegovina rail network, with 1395 kilometers of track and 8000 (mostly small) cars. The network reached the Adriatic at Metkovic, Gravosa and Zelenika in the Bocche di Cattaro; it was connected to the full-gauge lines only at Bosnisch-Brod.

**Military Railroad Organization**

In wartime, the railroads became the responsibility of the Chief of Field Transport Administration (located initially at Vienna, then with the AOK). Under this official were...
The Central Railroad and Steamship Administration at Vienna; it had offices to control the allotment of locomotives and boxcars and was run by several officials of the civilian railroad administration with 300 employees; and Field Transport Offices, which controlled affairs in the various military operational zones.

There were 313 stretches of track considered militarily significant. They totalled 31,200 km and were served by 3846 stations (thus the intervals between stations averaged 7.5 km).

Military regulations prescribed the maximum traffic for the lines based on their varying capacities. On single- or double-lines in level terrain the maximum permitted speed was 30 to 35 km per hour, but the average speed for long distances was only about 20 km. On poorly constructed lines and in the mountains the average speed dropped to 16 or even 12 km per hour.

Data Concerning Equipment

There were three types of military trains: 100, 70 and 50 axle trains - they had 49, 34 or 24 cars and could carry 500, 350 or 250 tons, respectively. A first-class car could carry 24 officers and their assistants. An ordinary car could carry 36 to 40 men, or 6 horses and 3 men, or 10 tons of goods. An open car could carry 2 field pieces or 2 vehicles of the train or 6-10 loaded carts or 10 tons of unloaded goods.

The Army maintained 3,000,000 tons of coal in reserve, which was enough for eight weeks of traffic.

When the war began there were 101 station commands, 101 boarding stations, and 122 hospital stations with 11,824 beds. There were 52 specially organized hospital trains with 1332 cars; they could provide shelter and care for 10,782 patients.

In areas near the borders there were guardhouses to protect the railroads against enemy incursions. In a few hours, about 10,000 active troops would be available to guard these 852 installations. Once the Landsturm was mobilized, the regulars would be relieved by about 83,000 men of the Landsturm Railroad Security Detachments, which would man the guardhouses and also patrol open stretches of track where necessary.

To quickly destroy strategic stretches of track in the event of a retreat, there were 309 mines in position containing 137,158 kilograms of explosives.
To repair damaged lines there was special equipment, including bridging material of various gauges. Landsturm Worker Detachments totalling about 11,000 men would be available to repair lines, along with 28 Construction Companies (7000 men) and the equipment provided by the Railroad Regiment.
II. The August Campaign against Serbia and Montenegro

A. Events Leading Up to the Austrian Offensive

1. The Austrian deployment in the Balkans

In the event of a war in the Balkans that did not simultaneously involve Russia and Italy, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff had prepared the following plan which, with certain modifications noted farther below (see volume 1 leaflets 2 and 7), was to be implemented in August 1914:

- 6th Army would have XV and XVI Corps (5 infantry divisions plus their attached March formations and 1 Landsturm infantry brigade). Its main strength would gather in two groups around Sarajevo and Mostar; 47 ID would stay in the Cattaro area.
- 5th Army would have VIII and XIII Corps (4 1/2 infantry divisions, 1 mountain brigade, 1 Landsturm brigade and 2 March brigades plus 2 Honved March regiments). It would be west of the Drina, from the river's confluence with the Sava down to Zvornik.
- 2nd Army would have as its main body the IV and IX Corps (6 1/2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions plus 1 Landsturm and 2 March brigades and 2 Honved March regiments). They would deploy in Syrmia, with one division apiece at Gross-Becskerek (Nagybecskerek) and Titel. The detached VII Corps (2 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, 2 Landsturm brigades and 1 March brigade) would deploy mostly between Pancsova and Bazias, with a weaker group by Orsova.
- The entire Danube Flotilla and part of the maritime fleet would be placed in service for the war with the two Serbian states.

The course of mobilization took a different course in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in other parts of Austria-Hungary. A type of martial law had been imposed immediately after the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Because there was unrest among the Serbs (almost half of the population) and counter-demonstrations by the pro-Habsburg Catholics (Croats) and Muslims, military
detachments were used to keep order. There were instances of harassment of the troops, acts of sabotage, and trouble on transportation arteries. Nonetheless the BHD Military Commander and Army Inspector, FZM Potiorek, who would become commander of 6th Army in wartime, took energetic counter-measures. He prevented the insurrection which the Serbs had been hoping to foment among their partisans, and ensured that the difficult mobilization and deployment of XV and XVI Corps took place with practically no unexpected delay.

In the event of war, it was hoped to use the Army as much as possible only in field operations rather than to keep order in BHD and to fight the violent bands of irregular partisans who would appear along the borders. These missions would be entrusted to the gendarmerie and to a "Veteran Corps"; the latter force consisted of 1600 discharged soldiers who had been enrolled in peacetime for mobilization in emergencies. Because the conscription in BHD was rather limited by law, there was also a large pool of pro-Habsburg manpower available in the population. From these elements a "Schutz Korps" was raised; by 1 August it already had 11,000 men, who were attached to the gendarmerie. Thus it was possible at the beginning of mobilization to strengthen the primary communication lines in BHD (single-track, mostly narrow gauge, rail lines), and the border defenses.

The regular border defense was provided by the Army's six Border Jaeger Companies and by gendarmerie and financial watch posts. They needed assistance on the lower Drina, where the river breaks into a number of confusing, easily-fordable channels and often changes its course. Here the 11 Mtn Bde was deployed to watch the border, and soon reinforced by 13 Inf Bde from XIII Corps. There were fewer crossing points on the middle Drina, where the river flowed rapidly through deep channels in a malaria-infested area. The river was guarded in the Visegrad-Gorazde sector by 7 Mtn Bde, and in the Foca sector by 8 Mtn Bde. Farther south, on 30 July FZM Potiorek deployed 3 Mtn Bde at Nevesinje and 14 Mtn Bde on the Bocche (di Cattaro) to support the border defenses and the fortified positions of Avtovac, Bileca, Trebinje and Cattaro. All the other troops assembled - partly by rail and partly by foot marches - on the line Kalinovik-Sarajevo-Vares. Here they were reinforced by men arriving from other parts of the Monarchy on the Brod-Sarajevo

58 In Austrian parlance, military units used to keep internal order were called "Militärassistenzen", the term used in this context in the original work.
Thus the 6th Army was deployed relatively early with most of its forces ready to support the great offensive which — under the contingency plan "B" (as long as Russia was neutral) — would be launched against Serbia. The main blows would be struck by GdI von Frank's 5th Army from the lower Drina south of the line Raca-Koceljeva-Lajkovac against Valjevo, and by GdK von Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army on its north, over the Sava.

### Potiorek's First Plan for the Campaign

FZM Potiorek's primary mission was to ensure the security of BHD, but was to support the decisive attack on Serbia with "the strongest available parts" of his own Army. Despite his expectation that Montenegro would soon enter the war, he decided to entrust the defense of the Bocche only to 14 Mtn Bde and of Herzegovina only to 3 Mtn Bde. This would leave XV and XVI Corps with eleven mountain bdes for an advance against Uzice. The 40 Hon ID, which was arriving in Sarajevo, would function as a reserve. The strong southern flank of XVI Corps would proceed in the direction of Plevlje.

On the afternoon of 31 July, when the order for general mobilization was published, Potiorek at first thought that his plan had become untenable, since the strength of the forces in the Balkans would no doubt be greatly diminished. Then he learned from the Railroad Bureau of the General Staff that the deployment to the Balkans would continue unaltered with the strong forces originally envisioned (see Section I-B-2 above). This led FZM Potiorek to conclude (reasonably — if incorrectly) that the overall strategy was still to first overrun Serbia before opening the decisive campaign against Russia. Therefore he did not modify his original dispositions. Long after these events, when the Feldzeugmeister learned that his deduction was mistaken, he regretted the secrecy of the AOK which had kept its true intentions hidden from him for almost a week.

### 2. The High Command and the Problem of a Two-Front War

When general mobilization was ordered against Russia, the Balkan theater sank to the level of a secondary front, at least from a purely military perspective. Nonetheless, GdI Conrad still favored a limited offensive for the "Balkan Minimal Group." A purely defensive stance was excluded because of the great length
of the border to be protected and the impossibility of quickly transferring troops between the defensive sectors. However, the offensive would be carried out only if the diplomats won other Balkan states as allies against Serbia and Montenegro, thus forcing the Serbs to detach units away from their borders with Hungary and BHD.

However, allies had not been won. There was controversy regarding whether Bulgaria should be advised to remain quiet, in hopes that Romania might yet rally to the Triple Alliance or at be least induced to remain neutral. On the other hand, the Ballhausplatz felt that Bulgaria seemed ready for an alliance and at the proper moment would quickly unfurl its standards, which had been but temporarily lowered after the Balkan Wars. This hope lessened on 27 July, when Greece declared that any intervention by Bulgaria would be treated as a casus foederis under its alliance treaty with Serbia.

Because of the unfavorable political situation, after the general mobilization began GdI Conrad prepared some extreme measures. In a note of 1 August he indicated that he planned to send against Russia not only the 2nd Army (IV, VII and IX Corps) but also the 5th Army HQ, VIII Corps, and the 40 Hon ID (from 6th Army). The last units which were being assembled for transport to Serbia (20 Hon ID plus its March Brigade and the 36 Lst Inf Bde), were also ordered to Russia even though they were part of the Balkan Minimal Group. The German military attache in Vienna reported this decision to Berlin on 3 August.

Meanwhile, however, Germany's entry into the war seemed to increase the prospects for favorable developments in the Balkans. Bulgaria, which on 28 July had just proclaimed its neutrality, on 2 August began to negotiate its adherence to the Triple Alliance. It was angling for the recovery of the Dobruja in case Romania failed to support the Alliance and Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia were not recognized. On 3 August the Romanian Minister-president, Jonel Bratianu, informed the k.u.k. Ambassador, Graf Ottokar Czernin, that his cabinet might permit Bulgarian intervention against Serbia, thus

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60 Deutsche Dokumente, op. cit. - Volume I, p. 214
61 Ibid., Vol. II p. 49
62 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 143; also Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 171
renouncing one of the guidelines of the Peace of Bucharest. Greece indicated that it would not support Serbia against Austria-Hungary as long as Bulgaria and Turkey remained neutral. Turkey had signed a military convention with Germany on 2 August and prepared for general mobilization. It was hoped that Turkey would keep Greece in check.

Although the general diplomatic situation of the Central Powers became more unfavorable almost every day thereafter, it still seemed that an initial Austrian success against Serbia would spur Bulgaria to action and overcome Sofia's reluctance to act because of fear of Romania. This was one of the reasons why diplomats hoped to seize Belgrade by a surprise coup immediately after the declaration of war, despite the lack of military preparation. Possession of the Serbian capital would be a useful pawn in negotiations with other powers. Now the Ballhausplatz grew impatient for a military success, ignoring the fact that the poor rail communications in southern Hungary and Bosnia made rapid deployment impossible.

There was another factor that entered into the political calculation. A major defeat at the hands of the small state of Serbia would doubtless have much greater consequences than at the hands of the overwhelmingly powerful Tsarist Empire. It would tarnish Austrian prestige in the eyes of the whole world, but particularly in the Balkans where success was so greatly needed to gain allies.

All of these factors influenced Conrad's decisions. Although in principle he had renounced any offensive against Serbia, he was concerned about a possible defeat that would shock Bulgaria and the other Balkan states. Therefore he decided to leave IV Corps on the Sava in place of the other units which were being redirected to the north.

The First Border Actions

Meanwhile the first shots had been fired on the border. In the night of 28-29 July, Serbian infantry in Belgrade had shot at a line of tow barges sailing up the Danube. When artillery from Semlin and the Danube Flotilla fired in reply, the Serbs

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64 Deutsche Dokumente, Vol. IV, p. 44; Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 172
65 Deutsche Dokumente, Vol. III, p. 167
66 Kiszling, Die praktische Undurchführbarkeit des Haltes in Belgrad (Die Kriegsschuldfrage, 1927, 3rd Heft)
immediately blew up the great railroad bridges. Beginning on 29 July the Danube Flotilla and land artillery fired on fortifications and other military targets in and around the Serbian capital. There were skirmishes along the rambling lower (northern) stretch of the Drina. Serbian partisans who crossed the river at Rogacica and Bajinabasta were driven back.

These were minor episodes. More important for the future course of operations were raids conducted by the Serbs on 3-4 August against the railroad stations at Uvac and Rudo, and against Vardiste. These raids reinforced the conviction of the staffs of 5th and 6th Armies that the enemy was massing considerable forces - estimated at 3 1/2 divisions - at Uzice and in the Sanjak for an incursion into southeast Bosnia. Therefore on 6 August FZM Potiorek, concerned for the safe deployment of his Army, hastily sent 9th Mtn Bde by rail and automobile transport to Visegrad, and 2nd Mtn Bde to Gorazde.

Decision in Favor of an Offensive

The news from Sarajevo also had an affect on the Army Command in Vienna, which hitherto had correctly analyzed the Serbian mobilization as indicating a defensive deployment; the misinformation was reinforced by false reports from various sources. Because at the same time (4 August) all reports of possible danger of a Serbian offensive into Hungary were relegated to the background, it seemed possible that the Austrian troops assembling on the lower Drina could intervene on the flank of a developing defensive battle in southeast Bosnia, thus increasing the chances of a major early success. The result of these developments was that instead of just leaving the protection of the Sava-Danube border to IV Corps, the 5th Army headquarters and VIII Corps would remain in the Balkans; also the 40 Hon ID would not be taken away. Thus the 5th and 6th Armies would be responsible for Balkan operations with 10 infantry divisions, 3 Landsturm brigades and 2 March brigades. Since the original plans for a Balkan Minimal Group envisioned 8 infantry divisions and 6 independent brigades, the force had been strengthened by about 1 1/2 divisions.

On the same day (4 August), FZM Potiorek's operational plan for his 6th Army arrived in Vienna. As the Feldzeugmeister had envisioned since 30 July, the greatest possible parts of the Army would take part in the defeat of Serbia, while the defense of Herzegovina was left to only a few units. The mass of 6th Army would cross the upper Drina in the direction of Uzice at the same time that the 5th Army crossed the lower Drina on the
Potiorek's plans were still based on the proposition that the AOK would divert large forces against Russia only after a decisive blow against Serbia; thus the 2nd Army as well as the 5th would participate in the fighting in the Balkans. This concept had been rendered obsolete days before by Russia's entry into the war. Nonetheless, the prospects of a successful advance along the line Sarajevo-Uzice made Potiorek's plan attractive to the AOK on political grounds; anyway, it was consistent with AOK's offensive philosophy and was therefore approved. By the end of 4 August a final decision was made and issued in the following order from GdI Archduke Frederick.

"The entry of the Monarchy and Germany into a war against Russia and France necessitates the transport of 2nd Army to the northeastern theater of operations. The following will remain permanently in the Balkans under 6th Army HQ - 6th Army with 40 Hon ID, and 5th Army (XIII and VIII Corps). Also under this HQ will be the forces in Syrmia (half of 7 ID, 1st and III Battalions of Fort Arty Regt # 6, the Peterwardein security garrison, the Danube Flotilla, and technical troops), and in the Banat (107 Lst Inf Bde). The minimum task of the Balkan forces will be to prevent incursions onto the territory of the Monarchy. The decision as to whether 5th Army will attack over the lower Drina when fully operational (i.e., on 12 August), or whether it will be used against the flank of an enemy offensive against Sarajevo, will be left to the discretion of 6th Army HQ. A successful blow against a Serbian offensive would be of great importance. The transport of 2nd Army against Russia will begin on 18 August. Until then any local operations involving 2nd Army should be approved by the AOK. There are no plans for 2nd Army to cross the Sava or Danube. It seems possible that Bulgaria will invade Serbia..."

3. The preparations of the two Serbian kingdoms

a. Serbia's military system

The Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian forces was Crown Prince Alexander; the Chief of the General Staff was Voivode Putnik. They had no reason to modify their war plans, which had been prepared in 1908, until there was further clarification of the political and military situation.
Serbia had six first-line (Ist Ban) infantry divisions; each had 16 battalions (and 16 MG), 3 squadrons (4 MG), 9 batteries (36 guns), 1 pioneer half-battalion, 1 bridging train, and 1 telegraph detachment; there was 1 cavalry division with 16 squadrons (16 MG) and 2 batteries (8 guns). Each of the 5 infantry divisions of the II Ban had 12 battalions (12 MG), 4 squadrons (4 MG), 6 batteries (24 guns) and the same technical units as a Ist Ban division. The reserve artillery under Army command consisted of five 12 cm cannon batteries, eight 12 cm howitzer batteries, and twelve mountain batteries; each had 4 guns. There was also one 15 cm mortar battery with 6 guns.

There were 2 extra infantry regiments and 18 cadre regiments (54 battalions) in New Serbia (the newly annexed areas), as well as 7 battalions being formed for 5 cadre regiments, and finally a march battalion for each infantry regiment and a number of recruiting depots. It is not possible to ascertain from the Serbian official history the exact number of units left for security against Bulgaria and as garrisons in New Serbia.

The Ist Ban troops had field gray uniforms, the II Ban had old blue uniforms. The III Ban men wore ordinary civilian clothes, but in accordance with the Geneva convention were supposed to wear arm bands or other insignia to differentiate them from the general civilian population. Failure to follow this prescription led to many of the "atrocities" which were later blamed on both Serbian and k.u.k. troops.

The equipment of the field forces was simple but effective; although the armament came from diverse sources and was somewhat obsolete, the artillery was outstanding. The Ist and II Bans were partly armed with Schneider-Creuzot quick-fire cannon, the III Ban with Debange guns; all types were well manned and fully supplied with ammunition. This was largely due to help from Russia and France, since the finances of the Serbian state were not adequate to keep pace with the expanding needs of the armed forces. The technical troops and the logistical train were not needed on a level normally considered sufficient to keep fighting in a land with inadequate roads, for a self-sufficient Serb soldier required little. Women and children often carried supplies, cared for the wounded and even fought in combat. However, the supply system was totally insufficient for a major offensive into enemy territory.

The Serbian Army was an extraordinarily good military instrument; it was nationally homogenous and energized by a decade of anti-Austrian propaganda and by its victories in both
Balkan Wars. The men were drawn from a naturally warlike population and had recent military experience. Minister President Pasic assured the Tsar that he would field half a million combatants, about 10% of the population.

The Army was supported by an excellent force of irregular fighters. The government, various political associations, and above all the officer corps had been motivated by pan-Slavic ideology to seek the "liberation of the oppressed brothers" in the neighboring lands of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There they had found support mainly from the Greek Orthodox clergy and intellectual circles. In Serbia itself some bold officers - assisted by the political associations – organized irregular bands, the so-called "Komitaji Detachments." Their mission would be to carry on guerilla warfare in conjunction with the regular Army by fomenting uprisings in enemy territory (for which purpose they carried ammunition for Austrian Mannlicher rifles) and by attacking outposts and lines of communication. If the enemy invaded Serbian territory, their mission would be to operate in the rear of the occupied lands, again concentrating on the supply lines and involving the local population in rebellious acts. A secret network of informers, called "channels", had been carefully organized; they would provide intelligence for the Serbian Army while supplying orders and arms to Serb sympathizers in enemy territory. Special terrorist cells would attempt to murder enemy commanders. Indeed, some of the Komitajis were controlled by the "Black Hand" organization which had played a major role in the murder of the Archduke-Successor at Sarajevo.

Because of these preparations the Serbian high command could face the future with confidence, and even more so because the terrain on which they would operate favored the defending forces. The threatened borders were covered by rivers, behind which troops of the III Ban took over security duties right at the beginning of mobilization. In the interior of the land there was a row of mighty massifs running in the direction southeast to northwest. Toward the north they were preceded by several parallel ridges, from which chains of hills ran to the Sava and Danube. Almost two thirds of the area of operations was forested, with thick undergrowth. Swampy ground with thick vegetation ran alongside the Sava and Danube Rivers. Since

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67 Charakteristik des serbischen Heeres 1914, in Schön's "Sabac" (Reichenberg 1928)
68 Wiesner, Die Schuld der serbischen Regierung am Mord von Sarajevo (Kriegsschuldfrage, Heft 4 of 1928, pp. 307 ff.)
there were also many groves of fruit trees, it could be said that the entire land was more or less thickly covered with trees. An exception was the broad and fruitful plain at the confluence of the Drina and Sava Rivers, called the Macva. There, however, the range of sight was greatly hindered by many thick hedges and by cornfields, which were extraordinarily tall and in the summer could even conceal a mounted rider.

The land was thinly settled. Correspondingly the roads were spaced widely apart, and most were constructed of pounded clay. The only useful ones were the principal routes in the valleys and a few important interconnecting roads—and even these became bottomless morasses after a long rain. There were no railroads in the area where the initial actions would take place. Another factor was a lack of water, especially in summer and in the stony upper reaches of the mountains.

Thus Serbia was an extraordinarily difficult theater of operations, that demanded special organizational and technical preparations by the attackers. Only troops who had been trained and equipped for mountain warfare were useful. Units which were accustomed to maneuvers in central Europe with mobile artillery and a large train of supplies would encounter insurmountable difficulties. On the other side, the terrain posed no particular problem to the defenders because of their familiarity with its peculiar features. Moreover the new maps which the Serbs possessed were considerably better than those of the attackers.

The Serbian High Command anticipated the principal Austrian attack to come on both sides of Belgrade and deployed most of its forces in a defensive position to counter this move, behind the line Palanka–Arangjelovac–Lazarevac. On the east was the 1st Army (4 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions), on the west the 2nd Army (4 infantry divisions); 2 infantry divisions [Dunav I and II] and the cavalry were in advance of the main body, directly behind the border along the Danube.

The defense of northwest Serbia was left to the 3rd Army of just 2 infantry divisions; that Army left 1 division as a reserve at

69 Translator's Note - It is not clear whether the prior two sentences are just a general statement or a way of explaining why the initial defeat was suffered by the 5th Army rather than by the 6th Army; the 6th, of course, consisted almost entirely of mountain troops. A further elaboration would have been useful in revealing the author's intention.
Valjevo and used the other plus troops of the III Ban to secure the Sava upstream from the mouth of the Vukodraz, and the Drina to a point above Ljubovija. Finally the "Uzice Group" was responsible for blocking a potential invasion from Bosnia into the upper Morava Valley; it deployed
  . the Uzice Brigade along the border from Rogacica to Mokragora
  . the Lim Detachment from there to the point where Austria, Serbia and Montenegro came together (near Metalka Pass), and
  . the strengthened Sumadija Div II, marching toward Uzice.

Although the mobilization had been ordered at 3:00 PM on 25 July, it was not ended until August 8-10. This was because so many cadres from Old Serbia had been stationed in newly-conquered Macedonia, an area where the standard Army organization had not been introduced, and because the country had just one major railroad line available. Moreover, several units were still not fully prepared when they reached their allotted stations and were still receiving supplies, equipment and even weapons as the opening battles began.

Organization of the Serbian Army

(The order of battle in the original was based on Bogdanovic's "Rückzug der serbischen Armee an die Küste" [Zagreb 1927], but has been supplemented here by further data)

The # in brackets [#/#/#] is the number of bns, sqdns and batties in a unit.
The units called "Komitaji detachments" were irregular bands, little better than bandits; they were responsible for most of the numerous atrocities committed during the campaign.

Supreme HQ = Commander was Prince Alexander, C/Staff was Putnik

1st ARMY (Bojovic)
  . ID - Timok I [16/3/9], Timok II [12/3/6], Morava II [16/3/6], Dunav II (or "Branicevo Detachment") [20/3/6]
  . Cavalry Div [0/16/4] with attached IR # 15 [4/0/0] from Timok I
  . Gornjacky Komitaji Detachment
  . Army artillery - 3 batties plus 6 additional 12 cm guns

2nd ARMY (Stepanovic)
  . ID - Morava I [16/3/6], Combined [16/1/5], Sumadija I [16/3/6], Dunav I [20/0/15]
. Rudnik Komitaji Detachment
. Army artillery - strength unknown

3rd ARMY (Jurisic-Sturm)
. ID - Drina I [16/3/9], Drina II (subdivided into Sabac Detachment [8/1/3] and Loznic Detachment [8/1/3])
. Detachments (Army) - Obrenovac [6/1/2], Ljubovija [2/0/1]
. Jadar Komitaji Detachment
. Army artillery - strength unknown

ARMY DETACHMENT Uzice
. ID and Bde - Sumadija II [16/2/3]; Uzice Bde [8/0/3]
. Detachments (Army) - Lim [6/0/1], Mokra Gora [4/0/3]
. Zlatibor Komitaji Detachment
. Army Detachment artillery - strength unknown

TOTAL of active forces (not counting Komitaji scum)
202 bns (200,000 rifles), 48 sqdns, 542 guns, 216 MG, 8 airplanes

Besides the active forces, in "New Serbia" and Montenegro there were 18 cadre inf regts (incomplete new units). In the interior and on the Bulgarian border there were 40 inf bns of the III Ban. At Nish, Krusevac and Kragujevac there were "Recruit Detachments." The inactive forces totalled 150,000 men.

Ration strength of the entire Army was 542,000 men, 75,000 horses and 76,000 oxen.

Notes on Regimental Organization

The Ist Ban Divisions were each organized with four IR under two bde HQ:
. IR # 1, 2, 3 and 16 made up Morava Div I
. IR # 4, 5, 6 and 17 made up Drina Div I
. IR # 7, 8, 9 and 18 made up Dunav Div I
. IR # 10, 11, 12 and 19 made up Sumadija Div I
. IR # 13, 14, 15 and 20 made up Timok Div I

In addition, each Div had a Cavalry Detachment and an Arty Regt with the same name as the Div (thus the Morava I Cav Det and Morava I Arty Regt, etc.)

The best troops of each Ist Ban Div made up a "Veteran IR", thus Veteran IR # 1-5 came from Divs Morava, Drina, Dunav, Sumadija and Timok, respectively. Four of the five Veteran IR made up the elite Combined Inf Div, which also had a cav sqdn and arty det of 5 batteries. (Probably at the outset these four regts
were Veteran IR # 1, 2, 3 and 4 while Veteran IR # 5 was with Timok Div I in place of its detached IR # 15, but this is not certain.)

The II Ban Divisions were each organized with just three IR and no bde HQ:
. IR # 1, 2 and 3 made up Morava Div II
. IR # 4, 5 and 6 made up Drina Div II
. IR # 7, 8 and 9 made up Dunav Div II
. IR # 10, 11 and 12 made up Sumadija Div II
. IR # 13, 14 and 15 made up Timok Div II

Each Div also had a Cavalry Detachment and an Arty Regt with the same name as the Div (as in the 1st Ban).

The III Ban consisted of independent IR # 1-15, which at the front were distributed as needed among the divisions or among the numerous special detachments.

The Cavalry Division consisted of 1st Bde (Regts # 1 and 3) and 2nd Bde (Regts # 2 and 4).

b. Montenegro

The aged King of Montenegro, Nicholas [Nikita], wanted to keep his country out of the new struggle because it was exhausted from the Balkan Wars, and because the King mistrusted Serbia for dynastic reasons. However, popular opinion – stirred up by agents from Belgrade – proved to be too strong for him, as Austria-Hungary had expected. To win time for mobilization, on 26 July he ordered "strengthened border defense" preparations, followed on 28 July by general mobilization. On 1 August the Montenegrin Skupstina (parliament) unanimously declared war on the Danube Monarchy.

The Montenegrin Army had considerable combat experience, but nonetheless by central European standards it was merely a militia. Under a new organization initiated after the Balkan Wars, it was to have 6 divisions; each division would have 3 brigades, and each brigade 4 battalions of 600 to 800 men; however, this organization had not been completed. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the war there were just about 40,000 men under arms, supported by 100 field and 100 mountain guns. There were only a few machine guns. The majority of the weaponry originated in Russia, some of the guns in Italy. Only the

70 Hubka, König Nikolaus von Montenegro (Deutsche Revue, Stuttgart 1921 – 46th Jahrgang, pp. 174 ff.)
instructional detachments were clothed in standard uniforms. Because the equipment was so insufficient, no major operations could be mounted by Montenegro. Nonetheless, the fighting spirit of the soldiers and the extremely difficult terrain was favorable to guerilla warfare of the type so characteristic of the Balkans; the entire area along Montenegro's borders with Herzegovina and Dalmatia was a stony wasteland. Montenegro itself was covered with mountains, some of considerable height. Most avenues of exit or entrance were narrow passes, practically ravines, except for a few more favorable routes in the newly annexed part of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. The principal lines of communication led through the long Duga Depression (near Kazanci) and a broad basin east of Trebinje.

The Serbian High Command demanded that two thirds of the entire Montenegrin Army should deploy near Plevlje and then launch an offensive against Sarajevo. The King, who also functioned as Commander-in-Chief, refused to follow this plan. He countered that the movement and provision of such a large concentration of troops was impossible with the insufficient equipment available. Instead he favored a mainly defensive stance along his country's borders, except for launching opportunistic attacks against the Bocche, whose harbors were the main targets of his greed. Therefore only about 6000 men assembled in the Sanjak, with another 15,000 on the western border opposite Herzegovina and 8000 against the Bocche. The group at the Bocche were also supposed to guard the most important strategic point in Montenegro, Mount Lovcen. Actually this position was not at all imperilled by Austria, since Italy had immediately declared it would not remain neutral if Lovcen were attacked. The rest of the Montenegrin forces were partly in the interior of the country, partly guarding the southern border opposite Albania.

Organization of the Montenegrin Army

(As the original work notes, official details are scanty.)

The Army commander was King Nicholas. There was no Chief of

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71 See the Serbian General Staff's "The Great War of Serbia for the Liberation and Unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (published in Belgrade 1924 in Serbian), Vol. I pp. 31 ff. Henceforward referred to as the "Serbian Official History" (Serb. Off Hist.)

72 See Austria-Hungary's "Red Book" - Diplomatische Aktenstücke, concerning the relations between Aus-Hung and Italy in the period 20 July 1914 to 23 May 1915 (Vienna, 1915), p. 35
Staff until 23 August, at which point the Serbian Military Attache, General Jankovic, took over this position.

- Sanjak Detachment (General Gojnic) - Had the "Plevlje" Div plus independent bns from "Old Montenegro"; total strength of the detachment was about 12 bns (6,000 rifles)
- Herzegovina Detachment (General Martinovic ?) - Had Divs Podgorica, Niksic and Kolasin; they totalled 30 bns (15,000 rifles)
- Lovcen Detachment (Prince Peter) - Had just the "Cetinje" Div of 16 bns (8,000 rifles)
- Old Serbia Detachment (General Nesovic ?) - Had just the "Ipek" Div with 12 bns (5,000 rifles)

Total strength was 70 bns at the front, with a rifle strength of about 40,000. At this time 20 more bns were forming in the interior; some of these new troops weren't yet armed. The new bns were larger than the old ones; they averaged about 1,000 men apiece (for a total of 20,000).

Notes on Unit Structure

At the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, the standing troops consisted of - Life Guard Infantry Comp, Life Guard Cavalry Platoon, and 3 x Line Infantry Bns: 1st at Cetinje, 2nd at Podgorica, and 3rd at Niksic.

Militia troops consisted of - 4 divisions, each of 3 bdes. The bdes were made up of independent bns. In the following unit list, the # in brackets [#] represents the number of bns in a bde. Each Div also had 1 or 2 field artillery batties, 1 mountain batty and 1 heavy batty. Each Div and Bde had both a name and a number; the name corresponded to the HQ town or district.

- 1st Cetinje Div - 1st Katunska Bde [6], 2nd Rijecka Bde [4], 3rd Primorska-Crumicka-Antivari Bde [7]
- 2nd Podgorica Div - 4th Zeta Bde [6], 5th Spuz Bde [3], 6th Brdska Bde [4]
- 3rd Niksic Div - 7th Niksic Bde [5], 8th Vukedoj Bde [4], 9th Durmitor Bde [5]
- 4th Kolasin Div - 10th Morac-Rovacka Bde [6], 11th Vasojevic Bde [6], 12th Berane Bde (ex Donjo Vasojevic Bde) [6]

As noted above, this organization was being changed in 1914 but the changes were incomplete; besides the four divisions shown above, in August 1914 the 5th Plevlje and 6th Ipek Divs were
being formed.

There were 62 bns in peacetime, and an additional 8 were created during the call-up of August 1914. Twenty more bns were raised during the first days of the war, but most of these served only in the interior. The maximum strength at the front was 82 bns (in Sept 1915).

4. The Orders for the Attacks by 5th and 6th Armies

Although the High Command had decided on 4 August to delegate to FZM Potiorek the overall command of the Balkan forces in addition to his original tasks as 6th Army commander and civil commander of BHD, another 24 hours passed before they telegraphed the orders to Sarajevo at 2:45 AM on 6 August (after the declaration of war on Russia). The Feldzeugmeister was eager for more responsibility and so greeted his "wide-reaching autonomy" in this new "difficult situation." By this point all of the circumstances which had driven his earlier decisions had changed. At this very hour reports arrived that the Serbian Lim Group had halted, so that also from the side of the enemy one of the conditions underlying his plans had disappeared. On the other hand, the order from AOK indicated that the defense of Imperial territory was only the "minimal task" of the Balkan forces, and in another place it stated that a "successful blow against any Serbian advance" would be of greater significance. Such words were not without an effect on the resolute Feldzeugmeister, who immediately indicated he would conduct operations in an "absolutely offensive" spirit.

The flank position in Bosnia still provided an opportunity to spoil a Serb incursion onto Austrian territory with a smaller force than the entire 6th Army. Potiorek had himself seen the potential of such a flank attack during a peacetime war game. Thus he could have concentrated most of his forces on the lower Drina rather than continuing the separate deployment of his two armies. It would still be possible to make this change if the date of 5th Army's offensive was suitably postponed. However, Potiorek decided against postponement because of the imminent departure of 2nd Army, whose presence in the Balkan order of battle played an especially important part in his plans.

Increased Activity in the South

On 7 August, a day after the arrival of the general directives
from the AOK, operations again became livelier in south Bosnia and in Herzegovina. Parts of the Serbian Uzice Group seized the dominating Panos Heights northeast of Visegrad. The Serbian Lim Detachment advanced against Megjegja, created a Komitaji unit on Bosnian soil from local Serbs, and initiated active guerilla operations at the mouth of the Lim. The Montenegrins dug in at the border pass southeast of Cajnice, took Celebic and in the evening advanced into the Dalmatian coastal area south of the Bocche, which had been evacuated by the Austrians.

On the 8th, units of the k.u.k. 2nd Mtn Bde took the weakly-held border defenses on the Kozara Ridge northwest of Cajnice. In Herzegovina the Montenegrins skirmished against Avtovac and Trebinje, and their artillery on Mt Lovcen opened fire on the Military Harbor of Cattaro. In the no-man's land east of Gorazde and Foca and along the Herzegovina border there developed a typically Balkan type of guerilla warfare, in which the Border Jaeger, Gendarmes, parts of the Schutz Korps and small detachments from the fortresses fought the Montenegrins. Meanwhile the local Muslims, including many from Montenegro itself, fled the area.

However, reports of these events were not likely to disturb the Balkan Command. The evening before it had issued orders for mutual support between 3rd Mtn Bde and the fortress garrisons at Bileca, Trebinje and Mostar, thus laying the groundwork for the successful defense of Herzegovina against the Montenegrins. Meanwhile the Foca-Visegrad line had been so greatly reinforced by newly-arrived troops that there was no longer any fear of an enemy advance in this area. In one sense FZM Potiorek actually welcomed tidings of increasing action in the south. They might be a sign that the Serbs were perhaps still preparing a major effort against southeast Bosnia and thus would give 6th Army an opportunity to win a significant victory over a relatively strong but still numerically weaker enemy force.

This interpretation, in conjunction with reports on the next day from the AOK regarding Bulgaria's preparations to become an ally, gave further impetus to the Feldzeugmeister to stick to the plans which he had prepared as commander of 6th Army, despite the changed conditions which had led to his becoming commander of all the Balkan forces. Thus there would be geographically separate attacks by the two armies, and 6th Army would not begin major operations until 5th Army had advanced for five days into enemy territory from the Drina toward Valjevo.

On the other hand, one of the factors which had prompted the
original planning, the participation of 2nd Army, would no longer be relevant, since that Army would begin to entrain for the north on the 18th. Nonetheless the Balkan Command believed that its presence would be effective for as long as 5th Army was making its isolated attack. The presence of 2nd Army on the right flank of the lower Drina line should make it impossible for the Serbs to advance their main line of defense beyond Valjevo into the northwest corner of their country, and therefore the k.u.k. 5th Army would be opposed only by the numerically inferior Drina security forces. The Serbian Army might soon be in a difficult position as the 6th Army began to threaten its rear.

The High Command in Vienna now began to have doubts about Potiorek's plan. On 8th August they sent a telegram which stated that the most important objective was to successfully fend off the "probable Serbian-Montenegrin advance on Sarajevo from Uzice, the Sanjak and Gacko." With some justification the Feld-zeugmeister considered this to be "concealed advice" to keep 5th Army closer to the 6th Army, which would be restricted to defensive operations east of Sarajevo. However, Potiorek felt that such a cautious deployment was at the moment neither necessary nor desirable. To pacify Conrad, he responded that on 13 August the 6th Army would be ready with a strong right flank behind the Drina sector Foca-Visegrad-Bajinabasta, and on the next day would advance against Plevlje and Uzice. This response was misleading, however, since it caused AOK to believe that the whole 6th Army would be ready for action as early as the 14th, whereas in reality only the XVI Corps in the Sanjak would be ready; the XV Corps could not complete its deployment at Visegrad until 18 August. Based on this misconception, the AOK agreed to the idea of an offensive by widely separated groups and the early attack of 5th Army on the lower Drina.

Nonetheless, it was still impossible to adhere to the original plan without further modifications. This became apparent in the difference of opinion that arose at the same time regarding the use of the Austrian forces north of the Sava-Danube line. It was obvious that if these forces were inactive or merely fired their artillery at the enemy they could not conceal for long their intended departure to fight the Russians. Thus the decisions of the leadership began to be hampered by the ill-defined role of the 2nd Army.

73 That such was indeed the intention of the AOK is clear from a letter from Conrad which arrived in Sarajevo on 11 Aug (Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV p. 344)
The Role of 2nd Army

FZM Potiorek expressed a wish that at least the parts of 7 ID which had deployed in Syrmia would cross the Sava at Sabac and Kupinovo. This was initially resisted by the commander of 2nd Army, GdK von Böhm-Ermolli, who didn't want to thus be drawn into action south of the river. He was immediately supported by the AOK, which wired on 7 August that "A crossing by 2nd Army and by 7 ID is completely ruled out." On the next day, AOK agreed to a demonstration by 2nd Army only if it could be accomplished without an actual river crossing.

Now, however, GdK Böhm-Ermolli himself became concerned by the possibility that the neighboring 5th Army could suffer a defeat right before the eyes of his inactive 2nd Army, and on the 9th he asked the High Command in clear language how far he should go in support of 5th Army. Therefore he was given permission to occupy Serbisch-Mitrovica and Sabac, but was not to undertake any action further east other than deceptive preparations for an offensive, without actually crossing the river. While announcing the imminent arrival of 14 Landsturm and March battalions in Syrmia, the AOK again pointedly warned "that 2nd Army should under no circumstances become entangled in events south of the Sava and Danube."

On the same day (9 August) the Balkan Command issued orders to 5th Army regarding the offensive on the lower Drina, which would commence on the 12th. The Feldzeugmeister figured that at the outset there would be little enemy resistance; therefore he expected GdI Frank's troops - even though they had just been mobilized and were not familiar with the terrain - to not only cross the river but to advance 100 kilometers through difficult terrain to Valjevo within 5 days. He even considered it permissible to divert FML von Sarkotic's 42 "Domobranen" Hon ID from 5th Army to the future battlefield of 6th Army.

The deployment of 5th Army was greatly delayed by three railroad collisions between 4 and 10 August; the transports were running 20 hours late and their schedule was thrown off. Because of these delays and specifically because "four military bridge trains and the 21 LW ID, particularly its artillery, could only reach the Drina on time by forced marches", on the night of 10 August and again on the morning of 11 August GdI Frank urgently requested a postponement of the river crossing until 14 August. However, he was not heeded, on the grounds that the enemy would not be strong and therefore the 21 ID could perform its mission.
without great difficulty.

Meanwhile, on 10 August the columns of 6th Army's XVI Corps were set in motion against the upper Drina: FML Trollmann's group (18 ID) with 4, 5 and 6 Mtn Bdes toward Foca, and GM Gabriel's group (1 and 13 Mtn Bdes) farther north moving toward Gorazde.

At this point the activity of the Serbian Uzice Group was again slackening. Air reconnaissance could provide no insight into the enemy's intentions. On the 11th the Lim Detachment approached Visegrad from the southeast and the 7 Mtn Bde, which had been dispersed over a wide area, had to concentrate on the defense of the narrow bridgehead at Megjegja. Meanwhile parts of 9 Mtn Bde were responsible for securing the Drina between Ustipraca and the important railroad bridge at Megjegja itself. In general it seemed that the Serbs and Montenegrins were satisfied with their gains to date near Gorazde and Foca.

An Offensive With Limited Goals

Early on 11 August there were disturbing rumors that the main Serbian forces were moving toward the lower Drina and the Sava-Danube line. These rumors proved false, but the incident clearly showed that without serious cooperation by 2nd Army the planned Austrian offensive would to a large extent be a leap into the dark. Already on the 9th the Feldzeugmeister had fully recognized this fact, and informed GdI Frank as part of the attack orders to 5th Army:

"Our goal is not permanent territorial gains. However we need a sudden, coordinated and decisive initial success over the Serbs..."

A letter from Conrad, dated on the 9th, arrived in Sarajevo on the 11th making the same point:

"Under no circumstances can we now suffer a check in the Balkans; a success however would be of great worth, because it very well could bring the hesitating states of Bulgaria and Romania over to our side." 74

FZM Potiorek did not need this reminder, since his decisions had already been made. He knew that when a report of the transfer of the principal Serbian forces to the river borders of the north and northwest of their country was finally confirmed it would indicate that the enemy had ceased to fear any

74 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV p. 358. This letter actually arrived in Sarajevo on the same date as the letter referred to above at Footnote 16.
intervention by 2nd Army. On the 11th the Feldzeugmeister had personally warned both corps commanders of 6th Army that even in the most favorable circumstances the enemy leadership would no longer take 2nd Army into account after the 20th or 22nd August at latest. This would mark the end of the first period of operations, and would require a redeployment and new planning. Hopefully in the meantime Bulgaria would have openly become Austria's partner.

In detail, the Feldzeugmeister ordered the following dispositions for 6th Army:

1. XV Corps - Until 17 August it was limited to holding the middle Drina on both sides of Visegrad, while 12 Mtn Bde would move through Srebrenica to Bajinabasta to provide a link to 5th Army.

2. XVI Corps - Would first expel the Montenegrins from Austrian territory by Cajnice and Celebic; then on the 17th it would reach the Lim between Priboj and Rudo, with its southern flank toward Plevlje. On the 18th its left flank would support XV Corps' attack toward Uzice. Influenced by Potiorek's warning not to stray too widely toward the south, the commander of XVI Corps reallocated 5 Mtn Bde from the southern to the northern column. 8 Mtn Bde would guard the right flank by advancing through Plevlje and Prijepolje toward Nova Varos. The Montenegrin incursions into Herzegovina would be halted by GM von Pongracz' 3 Mtn Bde, which advanced on 12 August from Nevesinje toward Avtovac, hitherto particularly threatened by the enemy.

On the same day (12 August) FZM Potiorek again justified his plans to the Chief of Staff, in full consciousness of his responsibility for operational matters. He said that the two Armies would advance separately through very difficult terrain because it was necessary to win over the Bulgars by a success and thus utilize the favorable period during which 2nd Army was still present, keeping the Serb main body facing the Sava-Danube line and thus "nothing to seriously fear."

At this point some especially hopeful news from Bulgaria had also placed the AOK in a confident frame of mind. When the High Command asked GdI Frank for his opinion, he indicated that he expected to confront three Serbian divisions by Valjevo, and soon thereafter would face superior enemy forces. The AOK responded that if the enemy concentrated against 5th Army they would only make the offensive of 6th Army more effective. The goal of 6th Army would be "to overthrow the enemy and by a blow at the heart of his country hinder any offensive into the
In this atmosphere the Feldzeugmeister found it necessary to warn against overly-optimistic hopes. He opined that he expected only to defeat the nearest enemy groups "by a limited offensive as far as Valjevo-Uzice." Lasting territorial gains could only be held if Bulgaria mobilized on the 15th, at the latest. Even if this happened the Balkan forces would have to regroup on the 20th or 22nd at latest.

The Chief of the General Staff took upon himself full responsibility for the opening offensive by written and telegraphed messages on 14 August, after the first blood had already been shed on the Drina.

5. Counter-Measures of the Enemy

When the Austrian offensive began, the Serbs were still in the positions where they had initially deployed. The "general operational plan" of Voivode Putnik, issued on 6 August, had indeed given his Army the mission of pinning down the largest possible enemy forces, thus keeping them far from the decisive Russian theater of operations, but nonetheless he placed most units on the defensive. Only the Uzice Group and two thirds of the Montenegrin Army were supposed to work together to capture Sarajevo. The rest of the Montenegrins would defend their country's borders against XVI Corps in Herzegovina. General Jankovic was sent to Cetinje to coordinate these movements, but as noted above he was not successful in winning over the Montenegrins.

As of the 8th, the Serbs reckoned that there were only weak forces facing Montenegro, while XVI Corps on the upper Drina and XV Corps on the lower Drina had a total of about 70,000 men. They estimated the forces north of the Sava at 90,000 and those in Banat at 50,000 combatants. Against these overwhelming numbers, the 1st and 2nd Armies would hold the line Adzbegovac-Lajkovac, while the 3rd would defend the Jautina Heights and Kamenica. The Uzice Group was ordered to defend the line Bajinabasta-Vardiste, since a combined operation with the Montenegrins was not possible. However, on 9 August the commander of 2nd Army was ordered to begin to reconnoitre "possible crossing points on the Sava west of the Kolubara", which indicates that the SOK had received its first - although

still unconfirmed — information about the upcoming departure of 2nd Army.

The Serbs' waiting period ended on the 12th when the k.u.k. 5th Army began to cross the Drina with 80,000 rifles. Immediately the Serbs' attention, hitherto fixed toward the north, was redirected to 5th Army. This was inevitable since several more days would pass before the columns of 6th Army were ready for action with about 60,000 rifles; although that Army's 40 Hon ID had arrived, ten and a half battalions would have to stay behind in the fortifications pending the arrival of all the Landsturm garrisons.
B. Actions through 20 August

(see volume 1 leaflet 8)

1. 5th Army crosses the Drina (12-15 August)

12 August

Opposite the 5th Army's deployment area, it was unnaturally quiet on the east bank of the Drina. Airplanes were sent to reconnoiter the thickly forested and concealed terrain, but returned with very sketchy information. The Austrians believed there were three divisions in the area between the river and Valjevo, and that the first serious resistance would occur on the heights of Ljesnica and Loznica, where field fortifications had been prepared. Anticipating these possibilities, GdI Frank felt obliged to hasten the arrival of the 21 LW ID, since his request for a short postponement of the river crossing had been denied. The difficulties of a rapid two day march was a depressing beginning to the campaign for the men of the Division, most of whom had only recently been called up from civilian life and who had just finished a four-day rail journey from Prague. As FZM Potiorek gained better information about the situation, he was correct when he advised GdI Frank to avoid using 21 ID on the first day of action. Its commitment was unnecessary because in fact the strength of the enemy which faced 5th Army on the heights east of the Drina was only 6 battalions and 16 guns.

5th Army ordered XIII Corps to seize the heights east of Loznica, which barred entry into the Jadar Valley, and to secure them by occupying the Boranja planina; meanwhile VIII Corps would cross the Drina east of Bijelnija and then advance to the south. A combined Brigade of Landsturm and March battalions was created and placed under GM Letovsky to maintain touch with 2nd Army in the direction of Sabac. Mitrovica, Sabac and the Zigeuner ("Gypsies'") Island near Belgrade would be occupied to mislead the enemy. In compliance with Potiorek's orders, 42 Hon ID would be used to keep in touch with 6th Army upstream on the Drina; however, GdI Frank also instructed the Division to hold itself ready to intervene if needed in the actions of 5th Army.

The original intention was to send all parts of 5th Army over the Drina simultaneously on 12 August on a broad front in six columns; this scheme was abandoned because much of the bridging equipment had been delayed on the rail lines and had not arrived
on time. Even the scaled down goals for the first day of
operations, however, could not be attained.

On 5th Army's extreme southern flank, the main body of 42 Hon ID
successfully crossed to the east bank of the Drina at Zvornik.
The other major component of XIII Corps, 36 ID, also crossed the
river relatively early and by mid-day had repelled two Serbian
counter-attacks and established a bridge over the Drina.
However, GdI Rhemen, the Corps commander, did not continue his
attack. His artillery could not find any field of fire in the
wood-covered plains along the river, and therefore had been left
west of the Drina, on heights that were rather too far from the
front. Therefore he would not advance without artillery support
which had been promised by VIII Corps. Another problem was that
XIII Corps' remaining infantry – 13 Inf Bde and 11 Mtn Bde – had
been unable to ford the Drina at Loznica because of the high
water level and therefore had to be re-directed to cross in the
rear of 36 ID. Meanwhile reconnaissance detachments sent
forward by 36 ID had been halted with some casualties; this
reinforced the commanders' caution. In the thickly covered
terrain the strength of the enemy was greatly exaggerated.

The assault preparations of VIII Corps took place under
considerable difficulties. The advance guard of 9 ID crossed
the main channel of the Drina but was then halted until mid-day
by the fierce resistance of Serbian border security troops and
Komitajis. This gave the enemy's Sabac Detachment time to send
two battalions and some guns to defend the eastern channel.
Therefore, although a bridge had already been built over the
main channel, the arrival of the bridging equipment on the
eastern channel was delayed into the night. The pioneers' work
was complicated by the fact that an approach route had to be cut
through 2 kilometers of heavy forest to the bridge. Meanwhile a
ford was discovered in late afternoon, and the Serbs were then
driven away from the east bank. The bridges were finished at
night, protected by 18 Inf Bde on the east bank. The rest of
9 ID and all of Letovsky's Bde spent the night on the island.
21 LW ID, exhausted by its approach march, was still west of the
Drina. Also on the west bank traffic jams caused an irreparable
muddle among the supply trains; the result was that for the next
48 hours it was scarcely possible to feed the troops.

The diversionary operation of 2nd Army had more success. Since
the 11th, fire from the Danube Flotilla and some land artillery
had caused the Serbs to concentrate on the lower Sava. Early on
the 12th, GM Blasius von Dani's 62 Bde, well-supported by the
artillery, crossed the Sava at Klenak and took Sabac after a
light engagement. The reserves of the enemy's Sabac Detachment, two battalions apiece stationed southeast and west of the town, did not attempt a counterattack; they retreated to the south. Six battalions of 29 ID crossed over at Mitrovica and Jarak without meeting any resistance.

At noon the SOK still hesitated to send troops toward the Sava because of possible danger from the northern sector by Belgrade. At nightfall it overcame its hesitation, and ordered General Jurisic-Sturm, commander of 3rd Army, to send an infantry regiment and 3 batteries of Drina Div I as reinforcements toward Sabac and Loznica; half of Drina I, however, would still remain at Valjevo. 2nd Army was reinforced by the Obrenovac Detachment, and would send Sumadija Div I through Koceljeva to counter-attack toward Sabac; two further infantry divisions, plus the Cavalry Division, would proceed to Ub. This group would be available to either fall on the east flank of an enemy advance from Sabac on Valjevo, or halt a possible enemy crossing of the Sava at Obrenovac. 1st Army, with three divisions, would shift west to the positions initially held by 2nd Army. Dunav Div I (south of Belgrade) was placed under 2nd Army. The Uzice Group would attack toward Visegrad as soon as possible to pin down the enemy forces on the upper Drina.

13 August

Again on 13 August the advance of the k.u.k. 5th Army was delayed by many difficulties. The bridges of VIII Corps were ready at dawn. However, the Corps feared it would meet a surprise attack because of the densely covered terrain; it expected major resistance directly beyond the river crossing point, on the heights east of Ljesnica (where a pilot had reported the existence of strong fortifications). The result was a premature regrouping for battle that wasted considerable time. The advance didn't begin until 2 PM, and then was further delayed by water courses and hedges, as well as by Komitajis who kept suddenly appearing out of fields of corn which were as tall as a man. Lack of water and oppressive heat enervated the men; evening arrived before the dead-tired, insufficiently supplied troops first reached the foot of the heights by Ljesnica. This was long after the time when the 5th Army command had ordered...

77 Details about the fighting at Sabac can be found in "Sabac" by FML Schön (Verlag Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg; Reichenbach 1929). For the Sabac actions of 12-15 August 1914 and subsequent action at Sianki in the Carpathians (4 Oct 1914) GM Dani received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Order.
VIII Corps to scale the heights "in order to support the opening of XIII Corps' attack with flanking artillery fire." Since XIII Corps was supposed to work together with VIII Corps, it therefore did nothing on the 13th even though it was ready for the offensive. Only 42 Hon ID advanced with its main body along the eastern bank of the Drina and reached the mouth of the Drinjaca.

29 ID of 2nd Army had left just two battalions south of the Sava in Mitrovica. Dani, who'd been reinforced by three March battalions, fortified the southern edge of Sabac and came under command of IX Corps, which had received orders from 2nd Army "to hold Sabac under all circumstances." In anticipation of the departure of 2nd Army, the 5th Army had decided to create a Landsturm group of 10 battalions under GM Letovsky as the Sabac garrison. Along with all troops who'd be left north of the Sava, and the Danube Flotilla, Letovsky's group would come under the orders of the commander of 7 ID, FML Freih. von Lütgendorf. On the 13th, Lütgendorf was ordered to immediately send an infantry regiment and three batteries of his 7 ID from Semlin to Sabac, where they would stiffen Letovsky's Landsturm and also be available to intervene in the actions of 5th Army.

The lack of Austrian activity on the entire front gave the Serbian reinforcements, approaching from Valjevo, time to unite with the groups near Sabac and Loznica. The former was ordered by General Jurisic-Sturm to recapture Sabac on the 14th. His proposal to move the main body of Drina Div I forward from Valjevo toward Loznica was approved by Voivode Putnik. By this time the weakness of the enemy garrison at Sabac, the failure of the Austrians to build a bridge there, and the meaningless cannonade along the river lines - along with the earlier received rumors about transfers of troops to fight Russia - had convinced Putnik that there was decreasing likelihood of an attack from the k.u.k. units in Syrmia. Therefore he believed that Sumadija Div I, which had reached Drasinje, would be a sufficient force to retake Sabac.

14 August

On the morning of the 14th, FML von Scheuchenstuel with 9 ID drove the Ljesnica Detachment from the heights northeast of Ljesnica. However, farther to the left the 21 LW ID moved only slowly up the Crna planina, delayed by the Komitajis and by the difficulty of the climb. Even at mid-day it was still not possible for VIII Corps to lend artillery support to XIII Corps. Nonetheless, at 11:00 AM the Army commander, who had come up to
the front for personal reconnaissance, ordered GdI Freih. von Rhemen to open XIII Corps' attack without delay. On the right flank 11 Mtn Bde was sent against the heights southeast of Loznica and its way was opened by artillery firing from the west bank of the Drina. 36 ID was not so well supported, although the 13 Inf Bde came up quickly to help out; it met fierce resistance from the Serbian north flank, which mounted strong counter-attacks. Finally the Serbs were subdued in the evening after costly hand-to-hand fighting. After losing several guns, they retreated toward Jarebice, where they linked up with the arriving main body of Drina Div I and immediately began to fortify the new position.

Meanwhile the Serbian Sabac Group attacked Sabac from the east and south during the morning, but were brought to a halt at the outskirts of the town. Although the first elements of Sumadija Div I arrived south of Sabac around noon, fortunately for the defenders only two battalions and three batteries of that Division entered the fighting. Thanks to the fortuitous arrival from the west of GM Letovsky's Brigade, and to useful cooperation by the monitors on the Sava, the enemy was then held in check.

The Sumadija Div I had failed to make its planned powerful attack on the Austrian left because of the exhaustion of the troops after their forced march and concern about the Division's own western flank. Before midnight the division commander ordered his men to temporarily stand fast on the heights next to Varna. The Serbs also pulled back the troops from 3rd Army which had been engaged in the attack, at the urgent demand of the Army commander.

The pressure on the defenders of Sabac alarmed the Austrian commanders north of the Sava. Reinforcements were placed in motion. 2nd Army finally ordered all parts of 29 ID to unite at Sabac, where the group from 7 ID arrived from Semlin in the course of the next day.

The Serbs Decide to Counterattack

On the morning of the 14th the Serbian High Command was being urged both by Russian Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch and by France to open an energetic offensive. The Crown Prince answered elusively that a forward deployment against the enemy by Sabac and Loznica was already under way, and that it probably

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would develop into a general offensive. In the same exchange of letters between the Russian and Serbian governments the latter made an offensive against Slavonia and Syrmia contingent upon arrival of some 1000 meter pontoon bridge equipment which the Russians had promised. Absent this equipment, the Serbs would stick to the offensive which they had been preparing to make in about a week through Visegrad into Bosnia. The Serbs were also impatiently awaiting the arrival of 120,000 Russian rifles.

The Serbian high command was perhaps influenced less by the pressure of its allies than by the events around Sabac, where the enemy was apparently building just one bridge. At 7:00 PM they ordered the commander of 2nd Army: "Immediately gather all your troops on the Dorava Brook, and take Sabac!"79 However, prospects changed later at night due to newly arrived reports about the actions at Loznica. Despite exaggerated reports about the strength of the Austrians in the Macva, Voivode Putnik arrived at the right conclusion that their main body would attempt to advance through the Jadar Valley on Valjevo; Sabac was merely a secondary operation, and the movements farther down the Sava were merely a diversion.

This correct analysis of the enemy's intentions led the Serbs to direct their principal effort against the Austrians who had crossed the Drina. Therefore at 3:00 AM on 15 August revised orders were sent to 2nd Serbian Army to commit only Sumadija Div I to an attack at Sabac, or at least to defense of the heights south of that strategic position to keep the Austrians bottled in. The Combined Div and Morava Div I would be sent by forced marches through Koceljeva to fall on the left flank of the enemy in the Jadar Valley. The Cavalry Div would serve as a link between the two forces, and would reconnoiter the Macva. General Jurisic-Sturm's 3rd Army would attack frontally in the Valley. Finally the commander of 1st Army, General Petar Bojovic, was given responsibility for the northern front; his reserve, Morava Div II, would take up a position at Ub. Timok Divs I and II, the reserves of the High Command, were ordered to Valjevo 80.

15 August

In accordance with the orders of 2nd Serbian Army, although against the intent of the SOK, early on 15 August the Sumadija Div I evacuated the heights south of Sabac and pulled back to the Dobrava, where it dug in.

79 Op. cit., p. 76
80 Op cit., p. 80
The Serbian withdrawal enabled the Austrians to complete the concentration of the reinforcements which had been hurrying by strenuous marches toward Sabac, and also to finish construction of the bridge, which had been halted on the day before because of artillery fire. GdI Hortstein now commanded the equivalent of two divisions: 29 ID, half of 7 ID, and the Landsturm and March battalions of GM Letovsky.

5th Army expected the decisive fighting to begin on the heights west of Valjevo, ahead of which the Serbs had prepared defenses on both sides of Kamenica. Therefore it was hoped that the Sabac-Krupanj road could be reached on 15 August without encountering substantial resistance. 11 Mtn Bde and 13 Inf Bde would move to Krupanj, 36 ID to Zavlaka, and 9 ID to Tekeris; the 21 LW ID would send its main column over the Cer planina to the Sabac-Krupanj road, and a left column to Desic.

However, XIII Corps had to reorder its units after the heavy fighting of the day before; moreover, it was short of ammunition and rations and further delayed because of confusion caused on the prior evening by Komitaji attacks on the supply trains. The advance thus didn't begin until afternoon. Then there was a heavy thunder storm which accelerated the arrival of darkness. 36 ID advanced only to the positions held by 3rd Serbian Army. The two independent Brigades were also hampered by the late arrival of their orders and didn't advance beyond the branch of the road leading to Krupanj. Meanwhile FML Sarkotic, who with his 42 Hon ID was advancing in the Drina Valley toward Ljubovija, learned that the front was quiet in front of XV Corps; in Krupanj, however, there was an enemy detachment - the Komitajis led by Major Tankosic, one of the conspirators behind the Sarajevo assassination. Sarkotic left the suppression of the Serbian border detachment at Ljubovija to a detachment under GM von Istvanovic (2 battalions and 2 batteries); he led the main body of 42 ID to the heights southwest of Krupanj, which he reached in the evening after some minor skirmishes.

The advance of 9 ID was delayed by low-intensity actions against the Ljesnica Detachment, by breakdowns on the bridges, and by the enervating heat. The main body had to halt late at night while still an hour from Tekeris. The 21 LW ID, which had already suffered greatly in the preceding days, was in even

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81 Armed civilians had ambushed the couriers bringing orders to the Brigades, while the thunder storm made use of the field telephones impossible.
worse shape. The main body of 3 regiments crossed the Cer planina, whose thickly wooded and waterless crest forced the column to break up into small, separated groups. They were constantly tormented by local Komitajis and toward evening were surprised by the thunderstorm; by twilight the advance guard was still 7 km from its goal for the day, the road to Sabac. FML Przyborski, who remembered that on the 14th the Corps commander had demanded justification for any failure to meet assigned goals, therefore ordered the march to continue in the dark. It was just before midnight that the column halted to rest for the night, still split up into small groups. Meanwhile the northern column (one regiment) left a battalion to guard the bulk of the division trains against raids by the Komitajis and local civilians, who were hiding unseen in the fields of tall corn. The other two battalions advanced while also guarding 7 of the Division's 8 batteries. The head of the column did reach its goal for the day, after skirmishes with Komitajis.

Although 5th Army had not advanced as far as had been hoped, there seemed no reason at the moment to believe it was in an unfavorable position. Since 3rd Serbian Army at Jarebice was being outflanked on both sides, it seemed that it would have to retreat to its main defensive position. Therefore the k.u.k. 5th Army was ordered for the 16th to reach the area along the Sabac-Osecina road.

However, GdI Frank recognized that if he advanced further the flanks of his Army, especially in the north, would be endangered. Therefore he requested FZM Potiorek as well as the AOK to order "wide-reaching participation by 2nd Army in the offensive to conquer Serbia", since the weak demonstrations of that Army were not fulfilling their intended role of pinning down the enemy. It is true that a lively bombardment of Belgrade and Obrenovac, carried out by 2nd Army at the request of FZM Potiorek on the 15th, did cause the Serbian High Command to again halt its reserves (Timok Divs I and II) at Lazarevac rather than sending them on to Valjevo. Nonetheless, the counterattack by 2nd Serbian Army would go on as planned.

GdI Frank's reports, which reached the BOK and AOK on the afternoon of the 15th, caused both commands to rethink their plans. FZM Potiorek decided to relieve 5th Army of anxiety about its southern flank. The Serbian Uzice Group had displayed little activity, and indeed had cautiously grouped three regiments behind the protecting heights east of Visegrad and left only the Lim Detachment in front, on both sides of the Lim upstream from Rudo. Therefore Potiorek directed FML Eisler of
48 ID, who was leading the Division's 12 Mtn Bde in operations to clear the Komitajis out of the area southeast of Srebrenica, to move with the Bde through Ljubovija on the 16th to join 5th Army. Potiorek also asked 2nd Army to immediately and energetically commit strong forces to the fighting by Sabac and Kupinovo.

The AOK in Vienna felt itself torn in two directions by GdI Frank's report. On the one hand they wanted to avoid the bad impression that defeat in Serbia would make throughout the world; on the other they saw the danger that the 2nd Army would be completely drawn into the actions and thus fail to reach Galicia in time. The result was a compromise. In the afternoon 2nd Army was ordered by telegraph to keep VII Corps, 23 Hon ID and 10 Cav Div out of the Balkan fighting under all circumstances. The unspoken message was that IV Corps and 29 ID could be used to relieve 5th Army. Toward evening, GdK Böhm-Ermolli was further advised that he could use his discretion in altering the departure dates of his units while supporting 5th Army. Nonetheless he was told in a postscript that he should still try to restrict his support to artillery fire from the north bank of the Sava.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided that under the circumstances the most he could do on the 16th would be to order an attack by 7 and 29 ID, while a detachment of 7 ID would occupy the Zigeuner Island. 62 Inf Bde wouldn't take part in the attack out of Sabac, since it was to march to Klenak by the evening of the 16th and there prepare for transport to the north. For this purpose the bulk of IV Corps had already moved back on the 14th to the area southeast of Ruma.

On 5th Army's southern flank, GdI Frank planned to unite the approaching 12 Mtn Bde with 11 Mtn Bde and 13 Inf Bde under the headquarters of FML Eisler's 48 ID, and then send them through Pecka to Valjevo. The enemy was indeed very sensitive to any danger in this sector. The advance of 42 Hon ID and a lack of available units had already forced the Serbs to send two and a half battalions and a mountain battery to strengthen the Komitajis near Krupanj, despite the impending major action at

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82 Translator's note: ÖULK here puts a different interpretation on Conrad's orders to 2nd Army than he does himself in his memoirs. Conrad gives the impression that he was still laying greater emphasis on an early departure of all of the Army to Galicia, and does not mention a "compromise." See Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 396-397
2. The Offensive against the Montenegrins (14 to 17 August)

On 13 August the XVI Corps had replaced 2 Mtn Bde (which was still under its peacetime organization) on Kozara Ridge by 1st Mtn Bde. 6 Mtn Bde handed over the northern portion of its positions east of Foca to 8 Mtn Bde. Because of exaggerated estimates of the fighting potential of the Montenegrins in conventional combat, and a consequent desire to await the arrival of the rear echelons of Gabriel's and Trollmann's columns — which were still far from the front — the 14th passed without any activity other than regrouping.

The Montenegrin General Vojnic had sent one Brigade apiece of his Plevlje Division to Cajnice and Celebic, while keeping his reserve around Boljanic in the Montenegrin part of the Sanjak. On the 15th, Gabriel's column advanced on a broad front against Cajnice: 13 Mtn Bde in the valley, 1 Mtn Bde on the right, and 2 Mtn Bde on the left (over the heights); they met little resistance from the Montenegrins. The enemy was content to open fire at long distance, and then withdraw as soon as the attackers threatened to come to close quarters. The advance of Trollmann's column was more difficult: in particular the 6 Mtn Bde on the left flank had to overcome extremely rugged terrain. It seemed that the Montenegrins would stand to fight in defense of Celebic. Their counterattacks were repulsed by 8 Mtn Bde, but only with difficulty. FZM Wurm ordered 8 Bde to postpone the attack on Celebic until 6 Mtn Bde could support it with a turning maneuver.

However, early on the 16th the Montenegrins put Celebic to the torch and disappeared. Meanwhile they tried to dispute the approach of Gabriel's column to Metalka Ridge. This fighting involved 1 and 13 Mtn Bdes, and finally also 4 Mtn Bde after it arrived on the south flank. Again the decision was delayed more by difficult terrain than enemy action, but was finally won in the afternoon. Thus another corner of Imperial territory was recovered from the foe, who had mainly restricted activity here to ambushing small Austrian patrols and raiding supply trains.

On the 17th the 1 and 4 Mtn Bdes of GM Gabriel turned against Bojanic, along with 6 Mtn Bde of FML Trollmann's group; 2 and 13 Mtn Bdes fought against parts of the Serbian Lim Detachment,
which had hurried to support their allies. After some minor fighting on the crest along the border, both enemy groups were forced to retreat: the Montenegrins toward Prijepolje, the Serbs to the Lim. However, they left Komitajis behind them to assault the Austrian pickets. A Serbian attack against the Drina bridge at Ustipraca was shattered.

During these actions, orders arrived from XVI Corps to move left toward the Lim. Only 8 Mtn Bde would continue to pursue the Montenegrins into the Sanjak. That Brigade was delayed by a Montenegrin rear guard at the crossing of a deep ravine, and did not advance far beyond Celebic. This allowed the Plevlje Division to carry out its retreat without hindrance from the Austrians.

The Montenegrins were also being driven from Herzegovina, although not completely. GM Pongracz' 3 Mtn Bde pushed back 7 and 9 Montenegrin Bdes east of Avtovac on the 14th and over the border on the 15th. On the 17th Pongracz attacked into Montenegrin territory and was successful even though the enemy had been reinforced; after this raid he returned to Gacko. The enemy bombarded the eastern defenses of the Bileca fortress on the 15th, but the garrison gained ground in a series of actions. GM Snjaric, who had brought k.k. Lst IR 9 to Trebinje on the 12th, was supported by parts of 14 Mtn Bde from the Bocche and was able to drive the enemy out of the border territories between Bileca and Trebinje by the 17th.

3. Opening Naval Operations in the Adriatic

On 7 August the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian fleet sailed south from Pola to help the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, which were being pursued by a much larger enemy force. However, the German ships turned east to sail to Constantinople, and Admiral Haus and his two squadrons returned to the principal military harbor at Pola on the 8th. The German Admiralty suggested that the entire Austrian fleet should follow Goeben into the Black Sea. However, Haus felt that the principal task of his fleet should be to protect the Monarchy's coast because of the dubious position of Italy; he did not agree to the German plan.

The entry of Montenegro into the war also gave the naval detachment stationed in the Bocche an opportunity for action. The cruisers Kaiser Karl VI, Szigetvar and Zenta bombarded Montenegrin fortifications and destroyed the radio station at
Antivari. To open the way for the Entente to transport weapons to Montenegro, the French Mediterranean Fleet appeared off Antivari on the 16th; it was reinforced by several English vessels. The enemy managed to cut off the escape of Zenta to the Bocche. The small cruiser was inadequately protected against high-angle fire; although it was hit a hundred times it fought on until it finally sank with all its flags still flying. Only 151 men saved themselves by swimming to the Montenegrin coast. On 21 August and 1 September the French fleet made unsuccessful attempts to penetrate into the Bocche.

4. The Battle of the Jadar River  (16-19 August)

16 August

The Serbian Combined Division had hastened to Tekeris on the 15th, despite great difficulties. According to the plan of General Stepanovic, the Army commander, it was to send at least one regiment to seize the ruins on Height # 706 on the Cer planina, "because success of the operation is dependent on possession of this spot." The advance guard reached Tekeris late at night. Noise and lights betrayed the positions of 21 LW ID on the Cer ridge. Despite their great exhaustion, two Serbian regiments gradually came up and fell upon the lead elements of the Bohemian division, which were camped along the road with insufficient defensive preparations. Although outnumbered two to one by the Serbs, the Landwehr fought bravely into the early morning hours; the Serbs were hampered by confusion arising from night fighting. However, at dawn on the 16th a third Serbian regiment and the enemy artillery entered the fighting, and the advance guard of the Landwehr was swept away. This was a bad beginning to the battle that opened along the entire front of 5th Army on 16 August.

The picture momentarily improved as the sun began to rise. The main body of 21 ID, with LW IR "Eger" # 6 in the lead, entered the fighting and was supported by artillery fire from 9 ID. Before noon IR # 102 of 9 ID attacked smartly toward Tekeris, and the Serbs' exhausted Combined ID withdrew from the field; it left one of its guns behind. Colonel Hinke (the commander of 21 FA Bde), who was leading the left column of 21 LW ID, attempted to also enter the action; however, he was suddenly attacked in flank and rear by two cavalry regiments. One battalion collapsed and two batteries were lost to the enemy. The rest of the northern column - one battalion and five batteries - held
off parts of the Serbian Cavalry Div and one regiment of Sumadija Div I until afternoon. Then they were in danger of being outflanked on both sides and had to retreat to the area of Lipolist.

The enemy followed up with just one cavalry regiment, because his main body had been diverted to face the attack by GdI Hortstein's Sabac group. The weakness of the Serbian outposts that had been left on the Misar Heights had at first been hidden from the Austrians in Sabac by concealing terrain. GdI Hortstein had decided to hold 7 ID along the southern edge of Sabac until the 29 ID was able to fall on the enemy flank from the west. Nine batteries on the north bank of the Sava would support the attacks.

At 8:00 AM the Sumadija Div I had received reports of a strong column moving toward its left flank, so it stopped its advance toward Sabac. The Division left just one regiment and two batteries north of Zablace and sent the main body back to the area south of Varna, where they would be able to confront the new adversary. Therefore the attack launched by IX Corps at noon was merely a blow into the air. 7 ID climbed the Misar Heights without seeing action; 58 Inf Bde, also without fighting, reached Jevremovac. However, the southern column of 29 ID (57 Bde), saw considerable action. It was moving through Dobric when it was suddenly fired upon from the flank by five Serbian companies; then it was attacked by most of the Cavalry Division. Full of offensive spirit, the men of 57 Bde threw themselves on the enemy. The ground cover and the many hedges in the area hindered officers' attempts to conduct an orderly engagement; on both sides some units shot against their own troops. Because of sudden heavy losses, the Austrians exaggerated the strength of the opposing enemy. The Division commander, FML Graf Zedtwitz, believed he had drawn a large force of all arms against him, and thus had achieved the goal of his demonstration. At 5:00 PM he therefore ordered 57 Inf Bde to retreat to Sabac; in part this was due to his belief that 29 ID would soon be leaving for Galicia. Although 58 Inf Bde had advanced to a line by Varna, at night it pulled back to link up with 7 ID by Jevremovac. 62 Inf Bde had remained as a garrison in Sabac.

Thus the sortie from Sabac did not have any wide-reaching affect on the progress of the great battle, except for saving the northern column of 21 LW ID from destruction.

9 ID was unable to exploit its success against the Combined ID,
which had suffered very heavy losses and retreated about 4 km. Nor were the Austrians able to fall upon the northern flank of 3rd Serbian Army at Jarebice, because 9 ID was immediately engaged in front and on the southern flank by Morava Div I, newly arrived on the battlefield. After a bitter struggle, particularly on the south flank, fighting came to an inconclusive end in the evening.

36 ID launched a frontal offensive against the positions held by Drina Divs I and II at Jarebice, but could not break through. However, the action farther south at Krupanj was more successful. Here FML Sarkotic's 42 Hon ID, supported by 13 Inf Bde, drove the Serbs back to Zavlaka, although the defenders fought bravely until defeated by a bayonet attack. 11 Mtn Bde crossed the Boranja Ridge and reached the Jagodnja planina west of Krupanj after a difficult but unopposed march. GM Istvánovic's detachment cleared the Serbian border guards out of the area around Ljubovija and guarded the approach of 12 Mtn Bde toward Pecka.

Although the situation on the southern flank of 5th Army thus seemed to promise success, the severe setback suffered by 21 LW ID on the strategic Cer planina appeared disastrous. After the retreat of the Serbian Combined Div, the Landwehr had also pulled back to the ruins on the heights because of the danger of being outflanked from the north. Here GM Panesch of 41 LW Inf Bde gathered 20 companies from various regiments, along with 400 severely wounded soldiers. FML Przyborski's nerves had been shattered by the developing actions; when his advance guard was smashed he fled first to 9 ID and then to VIII Corps headquarters. After Przyborski's gloomy description of the situation, in the afternoon GM Panesch also reported it would be impossible for him to stay longer on the Cer planina. He wanted to pull back closer to his field kitchens (left behind on the 13th) and to a water supply, and so reported that he would "march back today to Petkovica (4 km southwest of Lipolist) unless some exceptional circumstances interfere." Since there was no telephone link to Panesch, the VIII Corps command had to assume that he would soon carry out his retreat, and at 5:00 PM ordered all of 21 LW ID to concentrate at Lipolist. At nightfall, however, they learned that GM Panesch was still standing on the heights, and so sent him an order to stay put. At the same time measures were initiated by 9 ID to strengthen and supply him. The orderly officer with the message arrived at Cer planina too late. GM Panesch evacuated the position at 4:00 AM (on the 17th) in accordance with his first intention. The strategic heights were thus abandoned to the enemy.
5th Army command was operating under the assumption that the 3rd Serbian Army, which had so fiercely defended its positions by Jarebice, would continue to stay in place. Therefore it ordered VIII Corps and 36 ID to rest and regroup on the 17th, while FML Sarkotic's 42 Hon ID would move closer to the enemy's southern flank. Although there was a lack of information about the whereabouts of 11 Mtn Bde and 13 Inf Bde, they were given the same instructions as Sarkotic.

The threat from Sarkotic had meanwhile already significantly affected the Serbs. Their high command ordered a cadre regiment and three batteries to proceed from Kragujevac to Valjevo, although it would take this group at least three days of difficult marching through poorly-roaded country to complete the trip. Then the Serbs gained possession of a copy of the orders from 5th Army for the reformation of 48 ID and its advance against Pecka, and didn't know that these orders were already out of date. Their reaction, at 5:30 PM, was to immediately send Morava Div II forward from Ub to Valjevo. The Timok Div I took its place at Ub. Despite these measures, General Jurisic-Sturm still feared that his 3rd Army was threatened on both flanks, and in the south also in the rear, and decided to pull back from Jarebice. He retreated in the night: Drina Div II took up a strong defensive position on the heights on both sides of Zavlaka and Drina Div I dug in east of Belacrkva.

On the 16th the Uzice Group, after a day's preparation, opened its attack against Visegrad to bring direct support to the Montenegrins. This led to a defensive victory for XV Corps. An Austrian battalion which had crossed to the east bank of the Drina at Staribrod was thrown back with heavy losses by a Serb regiment. However, at that moment the 10 Mtn Bde came up and in turn drove the enemy back, establishing a firm foothold on the east bank. In the small bridgehead east of Visegrad the 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes vigorously defeated a concentric attack by two Serbian regiments. The Lim Detachment felt threatened on its western flank by the retreat of the Montenegrins and therefore restricted its activity to an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the railroad bridge at Megjegja by artillery fire from the heights southeast of the mouth of the Lim.

FZM Potiorek welcomed these developments as harbingers of the hoped-for Serbian offensive against Visegrad, "because in this

85 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 102
difficult terrain we cannot waste time trying to find the enemy." To him it seemed that the elusive early success was coming closer, at least for 6th Army. 40 Hon ID was set in motion toward Visegrad, since there was no need to strengthen the south flank in view of the favorable situation of XVI Corps. However, there was concern that the Serbs might insert themselves between 5th and 6th Armies. Therefore the BOK again recalled FML Eisler along with 12 Mtn Bde from the south flank of 5th Army and directed him to march up the Drina toward Rogacica.

The reports about the collapse of 21 LW ID and the fighting by Sabac were disturbing. In the evening Potiorek sent an urgent request to the AOK to direct 2nd Army to support the threatened north flank of 5th Army. This would have unfortunate results. Meanwhile GdK von Böhm-Ermolli had also received cries for help from 5th Army, and a request from GdI Hortstein to be strengthened by "at least one division." At midnight 2nd Army therefore alerted IV Corps, which was waiting to entrain near Simanovci, and set it in march toward Sabac. Only four battalions were left guarding the Sava. However, this didn't lead to the immediate commitment of IV Corps, because during the night new instructions arrived in Peterwardein from the AOK as a result of Potiorek's request for help. AOK once again directed Böhm-Ermolli to conduct only strong demonstrations to conceal the departure of his Army and confuse the enemy, "to the extent that this was possible while holding to the prescribed schedule for departure." Based on this latest reminder not to delay the rail movements, GdK von Böhm-Ermolli ordered GdI Hortstein at 4:00 AM on the 17th to hold onto Sabac no matter what happened and ordered GdK Tersztyanszky to assemble his IV Corps northeast of Klenak and there await further orders. In response to an inquiry from Böhm-Ermolli, 5th Army declared that it urgently needed him to advance through Varna toward Tekeris. Nonetheless, at 8:30 AM when 2nd Army issued further orders for the 17th and 18th it expressly omitted mention of any offensive mission for IV Corps.

**17 August**

The development of the situation around Sabac on 17 August would finally put an end to the hesitation of the 2nd Army command. In the afternoon, Sumadija Div I launched a sharp attack on IX Corps, which had pulled back to an inadequately entrenched position on the edge of the town. Artillery fired on the Sava bridges, and a disgraceful panic broke out among many of the supply trains during the bombardment. Since the fighting seemed
to take an unfavorable turn, at 2:00 PM GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered GdK Tersztyanszky to intervene with IV Corps at Sabac regardless of the time tables for departure. Meanwhile, however, the k.u.k. troops already in the town had inflicted a heavy defeat on Sumadija Div I, in which advance batteries committed by IV Corps played a part. In the evening the enemy pulled back to the heights south of the town.

On the north flank of 5th Army, parts of the Serbian Cavalry Division made a mounted attack on the camps of 21 LW ID. In some minor actions the enemy horsemen were driven away; however, the 21 LW ID remained inactive all day because it was in a state of disorganized confusion and great exhaustion.

From early morning the 9 ID was engaged on its south flank against the encroaching Morava Div I. The badly damaged Serb Combined Div didn't re-enter the fighting here until late in the afternoon; however, it had already in the morning sent a battalion to occupy the empty ruins by Height 706 on the Cer planina. Two companies of 9 ID had been sent to this area after it was learned that GM Panesch had abandoned the ruins, but they arrived too late. They had to be content with occupying the western heights and slope near the ruins to try to guard the left flank of 9 ID. This had become the Achilles heel of the whole Austrian position. As further elements of the Serbian Combined Div appeared on the Cer planina, 9 ID had to commit additional forces to guard the flank. Nonetheless it couldn't keep the Serbs from bringing its entire left wing and center under flanking fire from the heights. In the morning the mainly Czech IR # 102 had launched an attack with - in the words of the Serbian Official History - "great elan" against Morava Div I, but was brought to a standstill by the fire from Cer planina. On the other hand, in the afternoon the southern wing of 9 ID was able to drive Morava Div I back to the heights southeast of Tekeris. This operation was brilliantly assisted by a flank and rear attack by Col Raimund Budiner of Varasdiner IR # 16 (from the neighboring 36 ID), in which he led two of his battalions plus three batteries.

In XIII Corps, GdI Rhemen heeded the urging of the commander of 36 ID that his troops needed some rest, and therefore declined to attempt to drive into the Jadar Valley behind 3rd Serbian Army. 11 Mtn Bde reached the heights north of Krupanj. 42 Hon

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86 Serb Off. Hist., Vol. I, p. 144. See also Pavlović, "The Battle of the Jadar" (in Serbian), Belgrade 1924
ID drove back some Serbian pickets, but felt it necessary to spend time reordering its units and supply services; thus it stayed a healthy distance away from the positions of Drina Div I. Only 13 Inf Bde made an energetic attack, toward Stave to encircle the Serbs' southern flank. The Brigade's mainly Croatian troops broke into the trenches of their bitter Serbian enemies with great courage; however, they were thrown out again by hastily-arrived reinforcements. A second attack was also repulsed, because the quiet on the other segments of the front allowed 3rd Serbian Army to send all its reserves to the south flank to parry this dangerous threat.

On 5th Army's extreme right flank, FML Eisler led 12 Mtn Bde away from the area northeast of Ljubovija after receiving FZM Potiorek's direct order to return again to Rogacica. The weak group of GM Istvanovic was thus left by itself, and was not able to push the troops guarding the Serbian border out of their strong defensive positions southwest of Pecka. GdI Frank asked in vain that the withdrawal order to 12 Mtn Bde should be cancelled. Thus the situation on 5th Army's southern flank became considerably worse.

The Serbian High Command believed that it had dispelled the (purely imaginary) threat from 48 Aus-Hung ID for the time being by ordering up Morava Div II. They sent Timok Div I to Draganje so that it could either strengthen the northern part of 2nd Army - which was no doubt the decisive sector - or to guard its flank. The Timok Div II replaced Timok I at Ub.

On 17 August the k.u.k. AOK was on its way to its new headquarters at Przemysl in Galicia when it received GdK Böhm-Ermolli's report that he had sent IV Corps to support the Austrian troops defending Sabac. It was still possible for AOK to overrule this decision. However, tidings about the bombardment of Sabac by the Serbs induced the Chief of the General Staff to permit the commitment of IV Corps, though "with a heavy heart" 88.

Thus the wishes of FZM Potiorek had been at least partly fulfilled. His demand that 2nd Army should also cross over to Kupinovo with a strong contingent was denied by GdK Böhm-Ermolli due to a shortage of manpower. However, on 18 August GdK Terszyanszky would have a battle group of 35 battalions and 26 batteries at Sabac, ready for an attack to relieve 5th Army. An additional ten and a half Landsturm and March battalions under

88 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 413
GM Letovsky were available for the Sabac garrison. One drawback was that the supposedly "fresh" troops of IV Corps had to march for nearly 36 hours before they would enter the fight early on the 18th.

GdI Frank believed that the proposed relief offensive would enable his 5th Army to successfully attack along the Jadadr on the 18th. However, his orders stated that it "was yet unknown whether we can count on cooperation from Group Hortstein." Moreover, GdK Giesl reported that his VIII Corps would be incapable of resuming the offensive: 21 LW ID in general was still unreliable, and 9 ID - threatened from three directions - would be hard pressed just to hold its ground. Therefore 5th Army, though concerned about a lack of connection between its two corps, ordered only XIII Corps to attack. Although Frank was motivated by a natural concern to ease the pressure against 9 ID, perhaps it would have been wiser to also keep GdI Rhemen's XIII Corps on the defensive until it could act in unison with IV Corps.

The events in 5th Army's sector were all the more important because the Serbian Uzice Group had again suspended its attack against XV Corps on the 17th. In a counterattack, 10 Mtn Bde drove the enemy back from the heights on the border east of Staribrod; however, there were only cannonades at Visegrad during the day. The Lim Detachment dug in on the heights northeast of Rudo to counter the threat from XVI Corps. Only one Brigade of 40 Hon ID had reached the area west of Visegrad; the rest of the exhausted Division was by Rogatica. Therefore GdI Appel asked that the attack by XV Corps be postponed from the 18th to the 20th, so that the troops could be rested and properly deployed for a flanking maneuver toward the left. FZM Potiorek agreed to the delay, especially since XVI Corps would not be ready on the Lim before the 19th.

**18 August**

The three main scenes of fighting on 18 August were Zavlaka, Tekeris and Sabac.

In XIII Corps sector, GM Stracker's 13 Inf Bde made another attack on the Serbs' southern flank at dawn. However, he was himself outflanked and threatened in the rear by the advance of Morava Div II in the area northeast of Peca. In the afternoon 13 Bde was forced to retreat to the heights southeast of Krupanj. Because of this danger to its southern flank, 42 Hon ID was supposed to coordinate its already delayed and carefully
prepared assault with that of the north flank of XIII Corps. Here the 11 Mtn Bde and the south wing of 36 ID attacked with what the Serbian official history called "brisk energy, despite overwhelming artillery fire". The Serbs' artillery, superior because it was firing from positions closer to the front, brought the attack to a standstill near Zavlaka. North of this village the north wing of 36 ID defeated the north wing of Drina Div II in the evening. But then the XIII Corps command ordered 36 ID to halt and to prepare a strong reserve for a possible threat to its flank from the north, where there was a 10 km gap between it and VIII Corps.

Around noon, one and a half battalions from 9 ID climbed Height 706, while the two Serbian regiments from Combined Div which had been ordered to that position were still sitting, exhausted, about 3 km to the southeast. However, the Serbs held off Austrian attempts to advance from Height 706. In the afternoon the 9 ID was hit by concentrated artillery fire from the strengthened Combined Div and Morava Div I, and was threatened by a pincers movement. While 3 Serb regiments held the front, 3 regiments apiece attempted to outflank 9 ID from the north over the Cer ridges and from the south over Badanja. The Serbs' maneuver was hampered by the exhaustion of their northern group, the excessive caution of the southern group (which feared danger from the direction of Jarebice), and a heavy storm which developed toward evening. Thanks to these factors, 9 ID was able to stand its ground on the 18th. Nonetheless, before dawn on the 19th it would have to pull back its exposed and lengthy lines in the center. FML Scheuchenstuel, the Division commander, hoped that IV and XIII Corps would still be able to free him from this dangerous situation. Also there was still hope of relief on the north flank from a new advance by 21 LW ID; that Division had received sufficient rest on the 18th in the area of Prnjavor, because the Serbian Cavalry Division had left it alone due to the fighting around Sabac.

Naturally the commander of 5th Army was looking anxiously toward the Sava, whence GdK Tersztyanszky was to bring help. Tersztyanszky had planned to attack at 5:00 AM, but suffered an unwelcome delay because of the difficulty of crossing the Sava at night and damage to the bridge by enemy artillery in the early morning hours. The attack from Sabac thus didn't begin until 8:00 AM. Well-supported by artillery from north of the Sava, Archduke Joseph attacked with the first seven and a half battalions of his 31 ID, and broke the center of Sumadija Div I.

At 9:00 AM the Serbian commander ordered his division to retreat to the line Mt. Vranjska-Varna. The Serbian Cavalry Division took over defense of the western flank of this position. IV Corps, greatly exhausted, was unable to immediately exploit the Serbian withdrawal: the only infantry from 32 ID which had reached the field, one regiment, didn't finally occupy the Misar Heights until around noon. Nonetheless, GdK Tersztyanszky was impressed by this relatively easy success. He reported to 2nd Army the "full retreat of the enemy" and announced that his attack would continue against the presumed Serbian rear guards up to the Dorava Brook. Rejoicing over this good news, GdI Frank ordered that on the 19th his corps would advance in conjunction with Tersztyanszky, beginning on the left flank. Meanwhile, however, IV Corps had gained little more ground in the afternoon; it was dead tired after making two night marches in a row. 2nd Army, although not aware of this fact, wanted to ensure that the troops were kept in good condition since air reconnaissance had reported the presence of a fresh Serbian force - Timok Div I - at Dragnje. Due mainly to the exhaustion of his IV Corps, GdK Tersztyanszky was finally content with reaching the east-west line Misar (32 ID) - Mt. Vranjska (31 ID) - north of Varna (29 ID) - Dobric (Corps reserve). Thus the barrier which Sumadija Div I had placed in front of Tersztyanszky's group had not been breached at all.

The exaggerated report of the "full retreat of the enemy" in front of IV Corps seemed to open new possibilities for FZM Potiorek. His own 6th Army had not seen any major fighting on the 18th. XV Corps sent 79 Hon Inf Bde to the north flank of 10 Mtn Bde and the rest of 40 Hon ID to Visegrad. 12 Mtn Bde, the link to 5th Army, pushed back the north wing of the Uzice Brigade northwest of Rogacica. Six of the mountain brigades of XVI Corps reached the area southwest of Rudo. The other brigade, 8 Mtn Bde, approached Plevlje; it would enter that town on the 19th. It was welcomed enthusiastically by the people of Plevlje, where an Austrian garrison had been stationed until 1908.

19 August

The AOK at Przemysl was growing impatient as it watched 6th Army accomplishing little while 5th Army was endangered. Despite the urging of AOK, FZM Potiorek would not consent to commit 6th Army to an attack until it was fully assembled. At the start of the 19th, he issued directives "for the 20th and 21st" under which GdK Tersztyanszky would support 5th Army's offensive toward Valjevo by himself advancing toward Ub. 2nd Army was requested
to make convincing demonstrations by Semlin and Pancsova. In 6th Army, the XV Corps would cross the Drina at Visegrad on the 20th, while XVI Corps crossed the Lim northeast of Rudo. The Army would thus be in position to attack over the border toward Uzice on the 21st. FZM Potiorek believed that if the three divisions of 2nd Army south of Sabac could stay in Serbia for a few days beyond the 22nd, he would be able to make the necessary redeployment of his remaining units after the departure of 2nd Army and win a victory that would finally win over Bulgaria as an ally.

While the Feldzeugmeister was pinning his hopes on the units on his two flanks, the enemy high command still considered the center, where 9 k.u.k. ID was grimly holding onto Tekeris, to be the key to the battlefield. The Austrian failure to pursue Sumadija Div I allowed the Serb commanders to underestimate the strength of the enemy forces at Sabac; their main priority was to ensure that their 2nd Army had a decisive superiority of force. Thus the Timok Div I was assigned to that Army on the 18th. Although Putnik still was concerned by an imaginary threat from the k.u.k. 48 ID on his southern flank, he felt that the presence of Morava Div II northeast of Pecka would suffice to protect this area. The Uzice Group would be strong enough to fend off the Aus-Hung forces reported by Visegrad and Rudo.

The commander of 2nd Serbian Army brought Timok Div I by a night march to the road north of Rumska, where it would also be available in case danger increased from the direction of Sabac. Meanwhile, the Combined Div attacked the north wing of k.u.k. 9 ID before dawn on 19 August. After several changes of fortune, the ruins on the heights west of point # 706 were finally conceded to the Serbs shortly after 5:00 AM. Nonetheless, despite raking artillery fire from the Cерridges the 9 ID clung tenaciously to its remaining positions on the blood-soaked ground.

5th Army now had to give up its hope of timely intervention by IV Corps, when GdK Tersztyanszky's attack orders for the 19th made it clear that his group had not really achieved any of its objectives on the preceding day. Tersztyanszky's new plan entailed an advance directly in the direction of Tekeris.

In the morning of the 19th the IV Corps attacked the well-fortified Sumadija Div I. 31 ID at first stormed the lines with elan, but then apparently was wavering so badly that around 11:00 AM Archduke Joseph decided to retreat. A report of the Archduke's decision reached 32 ID, which was already under the
unfavorable influence of a minor setback; that Division was concerned that it could be torn apart in the thickly covered terrain, and fell back. In reality, the Archduke's 31 ID, without realizing it, had broken the main defenses of Sumadija Div I. General Hadzic, the Sumadija commander, had used up all his reserves; at this point he was also under threat of being outflanked from the west by k.u.k. 29 ID. Although he had received explicit orders to stand his ground "under all circumstances and despite all sacrifices" 90, around noon he ordered a retreat behind the Dobrava Brook. The Serbian Cavalry Division, threatened by 29 ID from the north and by advance elements of 21 LW ID from the west, also fell back. It moved to the heights north of Rumska, where it was strengthened by infantry from Timok Div I.

Meanwhile GdK Tersztyanszky had tried to help IV Corps forward by shifting 29 ID sharply to the east; the Division was unopposed when it crossed the road leading south from Varna at 2:00 PM. Thus however the 29th was in front of 31 ID, which had to cancel its briefly resumed advance because it did not want to come under fire from its own side. To sort out the resulting confusion among his units, the IV Corps commander postponed resumption of the attack until the next day.

In general the thick ground cover opposite IV Corps had favored the Serbs; however, an hour's march to the southwest the same factor favored the advance of the regrouped 21 LW ID. It caused the Serbian Cavalry Division to greatly exaggerate the strength of the northern group which FML Przyborski assembled in the afternoon at Desic, and therefore the Serbs were over cautious. Thus the guns of Przyborski's group were able to fire on the heights at Point 706, while GM Panesch advanced with four and a half battalions to the direct relief of 9 ID by approaching the Cer ridges. Half a battalion of LW IR "Eger" # 6, which had begun its advance the evening before, was able to halt the enemy at the heights before noon on the 19th. However, doom finally fell upon the southern wing of 9 ID, which after an exemplary resistance was forced back by Morava Div I. Now the entire Division had to retreat. The supply trains fortunately had already been sent to the rear. The heroic self-sacrifice of several batteries enabled the infantry to quickly disengage from the enemy. The equally exhausted northern wing of the Serbian Combined Div was held in check by Panesch's group until evening. The Serbs also felt threatened by FML Przyborski, who was unaware of 9 ID's retreat and planned to link up with IV Corps

on 20 August.

Serbian 2nd Army ordered its tired troops to "ruthlessly pursue" the Austrians, but they were unable to do so. Because much of the Combined Div could not leave the heights, the Division's southern wing was delayed in the Ljesnica Valley. Morava Div I felt its way only slowly forward on the heights to the south of the Valley. Timok Div I, sent to the southern flank of 2nd Army to participate in the fighting by Zavlaka, failed to engage because it was looking for the northern flank of 3rd Army. Fortunately for XIII Corps, the Serbs wound up resting east of Badanja, exhausted after marching 50 km in 24 hours.

Nonetheless, the retreat of VIII Corps was decisive for XIII Corps also. FML Czibulka of 36 ID had already had to employ nine batteries against Morava Div I to the north in an effort to support VIII Corps as ordered by Army headquarters. Naturally this diversion had weakened the Division's own offensive, which stalled at Zavlaka. It was not even possible to capture the eastern part of the village, and therefore the planned exploitation by 11 Mtn Bde, which had been temporarily pulled from the front, came to nothing. At mid-day the 5th Army command, encouraged by the approach of the leading elements of 21 LW ID to the Cer ridges, had informed XIII Corps that the position of 9 ID seemed to be improving. The 36 ID was then glad to redeploy the mass of its batteries again to support its own offensive, and left the task of securing the flank toward Badanja to just one battalion and two batteries. However, at 2:45 PM XIII Corps received a renewed request from 5th Army to support VIII Corps by attacking toward the north with all its strength. Preparations to carry this out had only begun when Army command reported that if VIII Corps remained without support it would retreat to the heights at Ljesnica; in this case XIII Corps would also have to withdraw, to the heights east of Loznica. Because the retreat of VIII Corps was still hypothetical, GdI Rheemen continued to prepare an offensive until 4:00 PM, when he received a definite order to pull back to the heights west of Jarebice-Krupanj. 36 ID and 11 Mtn Bde retreated in the evening. The disengagement was delayed until midnight only in one sector north of Zavlaka by a Serbian counterattack. Due to communication delays, FML Sarkotic, commanding his own 42 Hon ID and 13 Inf Bde, did not receive orders to retreat at the same time. However, his weak southern wing had been just slightly menaced by the Serbs; because of their continuing concern about the whereabouts of the ominous 48 ID, in this sector they cautiously advanced only some advance elements of Morava Div II. When his orders finally arrived,
Sarkotic began to withdraw at 3:30 AM on the 20th.

Meanwhile the Feldzeugmeister had initiated new measures to enable 5th Army to maintain itself on the eastern side of the Drina. 12 Mtn Bde would once again return to Ljubovija, 109 Lst Inf Bde would come up to the front at Vlasenica, and the offensive out of Sabac would be renewed, reinforced by 8 March Bde – which in the next few days would arrive at Peterwardein – and various troops who could be spared from other sectors. However, these reinforcements were not only insufficient; they would arrive too late to change the course of the battle on the lower Drina. GdK Giesl urgently remonstrated that it was not advisable to leave his burnt out and exhausted VIII Corps east of the Drina. Therefore at the end of the 19th GdI Frank ordered a retreat to the west of the river, regardless of how much the AOK and BOK might have wanted him to stay in place. Frank also requested GdK Tersztyanszky to evacuate Serbian soil. That very evening the VIII Corps hurried back toward the bridges at Ljesnica and Bijeljina.
C. The Austrian Offensive Ebbs

1. Command disputes regarding Sabac, and the retreat of 5th Army (20-21 August)

Confusion and Errors among the Commanders

On the evening of the 19th, when the AOK at Przemysl received by wire the first news about 5th Army's retreat behind the Drina, it had also ordered the evacuation of Sabac. At the same time, 6th Army was advised not to initiate any offensive against large bodies of the enemy, although it could make limited counter-attacks if the situation was opportune. Thus the forces in the Balkans would return to their original mission, "to prevent enemy incursions onto our territory".

Conrad ignored the desire in some quarters to attempt to conceal the defeat by maintaining units on Serbian soil, a desire based on political rather than military considerations.

This desire, understandably, was alive in the soul of Feldzeugmeister Potiorek. Several hours earlier Potiorek had already expressed a wish that 5th Army would stay east of the Drina. Accordingly the Balkan commander ordered IV Corps to continue its relief offensive out of Sabac on the next day. 6th Army would deliver a quick blow to the Serbian Uzice Group, but then pull back to the Romanja planina and redeploy for new activity in closer cooperation with 5th army.

However, shortly after midnight on the 20th a telephone report from GM von Csicsery, Chief of Staff to 5th Army, had destroyed the Feldzeugmeister's hope that the 5th remain east of the Drina; at the same time Csicsery reported the withdrawal to IV Corps. Potiorek thereupon did agree that GdK Tersztyanszky should evacuate his forward positions, which were untenable after 5th Army retreated, but with the qualification that Sabac itself should be retained to guard the flank of 5th Army and as a base for further sorties over the Sava.

The telephone conversation with GM Csicsery had revealed to FZM Potiorek for the first time that 5th Army was giving orders to GdK Tersztyanszky. To avoid a possible source of confusion, 5th Army command was forbidden to do this in the future. 2nd Army, which on the 20th was moving to the north, was also

91 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 432
notified that Tersztyanszky would be placed directly under the BOK. However, in communications with Tersztyanszky himself this information was inadvertently not mentioned, and so the anticipated clarification of the command structure was not achieved. Moreover it was further delayed because early on the 20th the 5th Army communicated directly with AOK—over the head of the Feldzeugmeister—to enquire how the command structure was to be organized after 2nd Army departed. The representative of AOK, who didn't know about Potiorek's wishes, notified 5th Army by telephone that naturally it would take over Tersztyanszky's group. A written order in the same sense was sent to Tersztyanszky, who thus prepared to follow instructions from 5th Army regarding the retreat over the Sava and the detachment of Letovsky's Brigade to join the Army's main body.

Meanwhile, the AOK had learned through some telephone conversations about the BOK's now obsolete orders for the continuation of GdK Tersztyanszky's offensive, and disapproved of these orders based on the reports received from 5th Army. Directives were sent by telephone and writing to FZM Potiorek as well as to 2nd and 5th Armies that Tersztyanszky's pointless attack should be halted. Instead he was to pull back over the Sava and place himself "fully and totally" under 5th Army. On receipt of an answering telegram from FZM Potiorek, who was still convinced that Sabac should be held, the Chief of the General Staff consented to the command organization as established by the BOK. In the afternoon of the 20th FZM Potiorek forbade further direct communication between 5th Army and AOK, since that had caused all the confusion.

The result of all this was that Tersztyanszky had been besieged by a long and rapid series of contradictory orders. In the night of the 19th-20th he had just received directions to evacuate Sabac and retreat when an order arrived from the BOK to continue his offensive. A second order to withdraw was cancelled at 4:00 AM on the 20th and he was told to begin attacking the enemy at 7:00 AM. The attack order in turn was cancelled by Potiorek at 6:30. Although the operation was stopped in time, inevitably some of the forward troops had already begun fighting. Shortly thereafter—at 7:45 AM—an order from 5th Army to pull back over the Sava, thus abandoning Sabac despite the directives of BOK. Searching for a final decision, GdK Tersztyanszky appealed to 2nd Army, only to be told that he was now directly subordinate to BOK. At this point the IV Corps commander told 31 and 32 ID to retreat to the

92 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 438
northern bank; 29 ID and Letovsky's Brigade would stay in a bridgehead to be established around Sabac. The Serbs were maneuvering in the area west of Belgrade to feign a possible attack over the Sava; therefore, GdB Böhm-Ermolli wanted IV Corps to hasten its retreat and then move to the area 25 km east of Sabac. At the same time he told IV Corps that he understood that the AOK had placed it directly under 5th Army; if so, Sabac would have to be evacuated after all to conform to 5th Army's plans. The final result was that GdK Tersztyanszky, in an attempt to conform to the wishes of all his superiors, sent IV Corps to the area of Subotiste (as GdI Frank had ordered). Letovsky's Bde was sent to 5th Army. 29 ID was left south of Sabac, despite the concerns of division commander FML Graf Zedtwitz who pointed out that the proposed defensive line to cover the bridgehead was too long, too scantily fortified, and dominated by terrain which concealed the enemy. The BOK had already been informed about the deficiencies of the bridgehead earlier in the morning; that headquarters would now have to decide if it still wanted to retain Sabac.

Because of concern that the Serbian counterattack against 5th Army might continue over the Drina into Bosnia, FZM Potiorek had repeatedly urged the AOK, beginning at 9:00 AM on the 19th, to free all parts of 2nd Army to join in a grand offensive which would also include 6th Army. On the 20th the AOK curtly denied this request. That this denial was inevitable should have been apparent because 23 Hon ID and 10 Cav Div had already entrained for Galicia two days previously.

The response of AOK destroyed the Feldzeugmeister's hope for a quick counterblow to the Serbs; now he would have to be content with bringing 6th and 5th Armies together finally for a combined battle. What was even more disturbing was AOK's communication that IV Corps and 29 ID would also just be staying temporarily in the South, due to the overriding importance of the upcoming decisive struggle in the north. This very unwelcome communication meant that Sabac must be given up. FZM Potiorek nonetheless still considered the possession of Sabac to be important because it would allow him to advance from the Sava onto the flank of the Serbs if they pursued 5th Army over the Drina or swung south of that Army to attack Sarajevo. Therefore he decided to hold IV Corps, ready for action, at Klenak (just north of Sabac on the other side of the Sava).

However, the ease with which 5th Army had broken contact with

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93 Conrad, Vol. IV; pp. 433 and 440
the Serbs, who didn't pursue closely, convinced GdK Tersztynszky that IV Corps would not again need to cross the Sava. Therefore he didn't cancel his original order for the Corps to move to Subotiste. This was consistent with the wishes of GdK Böhm-Ermolli, who before leaving for the north had several times advised that IV Corps should hold itself ready to follow him as soon as possible.

Operations during the Retreat

The Sumadija Div I, which had already suffered heavy losses, believed that the morning actions in its front on 20 August were caused by Austrian reconnaissance parties preparing a new offensive. It also believed that dust clouds raised in the afternoon by IV Corps as it moved away were caused by advancing enemy reinforcements. That night the Sumadija Div was itself reinforced by Timok Div II, which had completed a forced march of 60 km west from Ub (although with only half its soldiers; the rest were still being rearmed with new Russian rifles). The false interpretation of the afternoon dust clouds had also led Voivode Putnik to divert 2nd Army's Timok Div I, which had reached Jarebice, back to the road east of Tekeris.

On the 20th, one regiment of Timok I, along with the Cavalry Division (which now had also been placed under 2nd Army) moved against the north wing of 5th Army – FML Przyborski's Group, which didn't know about the order to retreat. Although the Group had just 3 battalions and 5 batteries and was attacked from 3 sides, it fought so bravely through noon that the enemy thought they were being stopped by a whole division 94. When FML Przyborski learned of the retreat of 5th Army he led his isolated group back, followed only at a respectable distance by the exhausted Serbian horsemen. Around midnight the group crossed the bridges at Bijeljina in good order to return to Bosnian soil.

The Serbs were unable to interfere with the retreat of the bulk of 5th Army on the 20th. 9 ID kept the Combined Div at a distance by a light rear guard action on the heights east of Ljesnica. Harassed only by artillery fire, the 9th reached the bank of the Drina west of Ljesnica at 6:00 PM. In XIII Corps, the northern wing stood on the heights east of Ljesnica from mid-day to cover the approach of the southern wing. 42 Hon ID was delayed by the movement of its supply train, but not by the enemy; it arrived east of Loznica late in the evening, while 13

Inf Bde was posted on Gucevo Ridge to guard the southern flank.

Despite the urging of the SOK, the Serbs followed XIII Corps very slowly. Morava Div I could have moved against the open northern flank of 36 ID; however, at the direction of 2nd Army headquarters (and to Putnik's displeasure), instead it climbed over the height of the crest south of Ljesnica Brook into the Jadar Valley and thus appeared before 36 ID's well prepared defensive positions. The tired Timok Div I could not begin its march from Jarebice until evening. The 3rd Army, also starting late, completely lost contact with the Austrians: Drina Divs I and II only reached the heights east of Jarebice, and Morava Div II the area around Krupanj.

After being relieved around midnight by 42 Hon ID, 36 ID and 11 Mtn Bde began their retreat early on the 21st. They were slowed down by serious delays when the troops, drained from numerous night marches, sank exhausted to the ground when they reached the river crossing points. The two units were not entirely on Bosnian territory until mid-day. Meanwhile, 42 Hon ID was in combat with Morava Div I from 9:00 AM. The artillery, which was already west of the Drina, couldn't offer much support to the brave Domobranen. Nevertheless, and although their path back to the bridges was open, they defended "every foot of ground with great steadfastness" because they had not learned the whereabouts of 13 Inf Bde. In a spirit of soldierly comradeship, they wanted to make sure that the Brigade could also reach the bridges in safety. When it was learned that the 13th had found a ford at Kozluk and was already on the west bank, FML Sarkotic also resumed his retreat. Covered by a barrage from XIII Corps' batteries, he completed the withdrawal around 7:00 PM, after which the bridges were destroyed.

On the 21st, Istvanovic's detachment of 42 Hon ID joined 12 Mtn Bde at Ljubovija. The BOK ordered these units to stay in place to cover the march of 6th Army toward Vlasenica.

After ten days of bitter and costly actions, the 5th Army had returned to the positions it held before the advance began.

2. Actions by Visegrad and Priboj (20-21 August)

Meanwhile the 6th Army was finally able to begin its long-anticipated attack against the Serbian Uzice Group. Its soldiers, drawn from almost all parts of the Monarchy, were
familiar with the local terrain and knew how to attack with great skill and elan.

By this time parts of 40 Hon ID (mainly 80 Hon Bde) were occupying Visegrad. GdI Appel deployed XV Corps north and northwest of that town. The bulk of the Corps consisted of 1 ID (with 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes)\textsuperscript{95}, 10 Mtn Bde and (on the northern flank) the 79 Hon Bde from 40 ID. These units would pivot on Visegrad and move toward the east and southeast, driving the enemy back over the border. On the 20th the attack met fierce resistance, which was aided by the mountainous, trackless terrain. In particular, the Panos Heights were defended by the Serbs with great determination against 1st ID, whose batteries were posted too far in the rear to give sufficient support. The Heights were finally taken around 4:30 PM in hand-to-hand combat, due in large part to the resolute action of Battalions III/49 and IV/84 from Lower Austria. At the same time, the Corps' northern wing captured the Vk. Stolac. By evening the 10 Mtn Bde and 79 Hon Bde were fighting in front of the heights on the border west of Zaovine. Although already ordered to break off the action and redeploy toward Vlasenica, GdI Appel asked and received permission to continue the attack on the 21st. However, during the night the enemy retreated to the hills west of Kremna, so that the Austrians occupied the heights on the border by noon, after driving away some weak rear guards.

Early on the 20th the XVI Corps was ready to cross the Lim at Rudo, but the enemy's Lim Detachment had already pulled back toward the east. Therefore on this day only 6 Mtn Bde was engaged; it pushed back enemy rear guards south of Uvac, but then was able to climb out of the deep river valley without encountering the expected resistance. 18 ID (4 and 6 Mtn Bdes) reached the heights by Priboj and Uvac; GM Gabriel's group (1, 2 and 13 Mtn Bdes) reached those northeast of Rudo. 5 Mtn Bde had been left by FZM Wurm in Rudo as the Corps reserve.

The enemy was reinforced to a strength of 12 battalions and had taken up a new position on the heights east of the Priboj-Bjelobrdo Road. On the 21st the Austrians assailed this position in an assault toward both flanks, during which 5 Mtn Bde on the north flank advanced through Bjelobrdo. Although the

\textsuperscript{95}Since 12 August, 1st ID had also included the former Scutari Detachment from Albania; it consisted of IV Bn of k.u.k. IR 87 to which the Imperial German "Marine Infantry Detachment" (company-sized) was attached. The latter was the only German unit to fight in the Balkans in 1914.
difficult terrain prevented a decisive action on the 21st, the Corps commander was informed that the enemy was beginning to retreat. At 6:00 AM on the next day (the 22nd), FZM Wurm received the order to pull back to the Romanja planina. He debated whether to immediately break off the attack before its mission was completed, or to postpone the redeployment until a decision was reached on the Lim. FZM Wurm decided on the second course of action. At this point the Serbian Lim Detachment, threatened on both flanks, pulled back to join Sumadija Div II on the Zlatibor planina. The Aus-Hung troops pursued them until mid-day.

Meanwhile, 8 Mtn Bde in the formerly Austrian Sanjak was advancing quickly from Plevlje toward Nova varos. The Bde was not hindered by Montenegrin General Varos, whose troops has mostly deserted, leaving him with just 2000 men. At the other end of the Sanjak, the Serbian commander at Novi Bazar had hastily armed 1000 men, supplied them with a Krupp battery which had been captured in the war with Turkey, and sent them west to Sjenica. Finally, the King of Montenegro responded to Serbian pressure by ordering two brigades to march to the Sanjak.

The enemy's concern for this area was unfounded, since on 23 August the k.u.k. 6th Army departed for the north. After three days of strenuous marching, XV Corps arrived at Vlasenica, XVI Corps at Sokolac. 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes were left behind to resume guarding the upper Drina at Visegrad, while 8 Mtn Bde watched the river by Gorazde and Foca.

3. The last actions around Sabac (21-24 August)

When units of 5th Army had destroyed the last bridges over the Drina behind them on the evening of the 21st, the story of confusion and errors around Sabac was still not finished.

Since the enemy had not closely pursued 5th Army, and since the combat strength of that Army had not been greatly impaired, the BOK hoped that it would be completely restored after a few days of rest while waiting for 6th Army to deploy around Vlasenica. The BOK was thus planning a new offensive in the near future, and for its accomplishment was counting on the continued presence of the three remaining divisions of 2nd Army. Their next attack over the Sava would be made easier by the possession of Sabac. Maintaining a bridgehead there would also be useful if the enemy followed 5th Army into Bosnia. Therefore GdK
Tersztyanszky was instructed to hold onto Sabac and keep IV Corps ready for action at Klenak.

21 August

The position which 29 ID held on the morning of the 21st was a bridgehead, still unfortified, about 15 km long; to ensure protection for the bridges the lines had to extend onto the heights south of Sabac. The conditions for defense seemed so unfavorable that FML Graf Zedtwitz had objected to GdK Tersztyanszky the day before that the town couldn't be held by just one division. Rebuffed by Tersztyanszky, at 7:00 AM on the 21st Zedtwitz communicated directly with FZM Potiorek. He stated that the bridgehead was a poorly fortified trap, dominated by enemy-held terrain; he felt that the afternoon would be the last point at which his Division could withdraw over the Sava without being drawn into a fight against superior forces. As soon as GdK Tersztyanszky, who had a quick temper, learned that Zedtwitz had tried to go over his head, he replaced him as commander of 29 ID by the division's Artillery Brigadier (GM Zanantoni) with the strict command: "Sabac must be held at any price!" 96

As predicted, the Serbs began to attack Sabac around noon. General Bojovic, commander of 1st Army, had Sumadija Div I attack on the east side of the Varna Road; the first half of Timok Div II to arrive was sent into action west of the Road. Bojovic appeared in person southwest of Sabac to encourage the attackers. During the afternoon the defenders were hard-pressed, so GM Zanantoni sent 3 battalions of his reserve to counterattack at 5:00 PM. This maneuver was aimed with splendid dash at the point where the flanks of Sumadija Div I and Timok Div II came together; the surprised Serbs had to pull back past Varna. Because of the thick ground cover, GM Zanantoni wasn't immediately aware of this victory; therefore at 7:00 PM he

96 See Schön, op. cit., "Sabac", pp. 288 ff; also Zanantoni, "Die deutsch-böhmische 29. Infanteriedivision im ersten Kriegsjahr 1914" (Reichenberg 1926) and finally several articles in the monthly Reichenberg publication "Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg." TRANSLATOR's NOTE - Zanantoni's book calls the 29th the "German-Bohemian" ID, a practice which is perpetuated in the original volumes of ÖULK. Although the Germans were a majority in the division, there were large numbers of Czech soldiers in the unit who were conveniently neglected after the war by German writers. In this translation the Division will be called "north Bohemian", not "German Bohemian."
reported to IV Corps headquarters: "The enemy has been bombarding Sabac since 2:00 PM. The bridges are still intact. We are fighting against at least one division. Further enemy forces are approaching. We still hold our foremost positions." This report sounded rather ominous to GdK Tersztyanszky, who therefore ordered Sabac evacuated to preserve the strength of 29 ID.

Meanwhile the western lines of the bridgehead, which were not supported by the batteries stationed east of Sabac, had to be pulled back to the edge of the town. Only one and a half battalions of the reserve were still available, which seemed an insufficient force to restore the situation. Therefore GM Zanantoni also pulled back his southern front to the edge of town. It was only at this point that he fully realized the success of the earlier counterattack, which had forced Timok Div II to withdraw a considerable distance. When he received the evacuation order at 11:00 PM, he replied that if the order was a reaction to his earlier report rather than to any higher strategic considerations, he would prefer to hold Sabac for the time being. He wanted to be given responsibility for deciding the best time for evacuation.

Zanantoni's latest report arrived at IV Corps headquarters at the same time as FZM Potiorek's reply to the much earlier request by FML Zedtwitz for permission to evacuate. Potiorek said that "Unless the enemy is present in overwhelming strength, commit all available men to the action south of Sabac." In an attempt to encourage his subordinates, the Feldzeugmeister included information about 6th Army's successes near Visegrad. Potiorek's order forced GdK Tersztyanszky to make a difficult decision. As far as could be determined from current reports, the enemy forces were by no means much greater than the total strength of IV Corps. However, the Corps was supposed to be leaving for Galicia as soon as possible. The report that 5th Army was completing its retreat over the Drina did not encourage an isolated incursion into Serbia. GdK Tersztyanszky decided to use a larger force to make a quick end to the Sabac incident. He gave GM Zanantoni the requested authority to decide the fate of the bridgehead, sent the artillery of 31 ID in a night march to the area south of Klenak, and ordered the infantry of that division to assemble northeast of the town early on the 22nd. 32 ID would stay in its present position guarding the Sava downstream from Sabac. The battalions of 7 ID stationed on the Zigeuner Island by Belgrade would be evacuated.
22 August

On the morning of the 22nd the 29 ID again occupied the entire perimeter of the bridgehead. The Serbs opposite Sabac were now led by General Aracic, who had taken over from Army commander Bojovic, wounded the day before. They maneuvered very cautiously to encircle Sabac entirely on the Serbian side of the Sava, while bringing heavy artillery into position. The first serious fighting occurred at noon along the Varna Road, while the Serbs suddenly fired shells into Sabac.

West of the road, Timok Div II - reinforced by three newly arrived battalions - again drove the Austrians back to the southwest edge of Sabac. However, a counterattack east of the road in turn pushed back the enemy; therefore, after the attached heavy batteries were in place the Timok Div II again withdrew to the heights northeast of Dobric. The day's actions had delayed both the encirclement of Sabac and the positioning of the heavy Serbian batteries, which didn't arrive in the zone of Sumadija Div I until after nightfall. On the other hand, a combined force of divisional cavalry had advanced northeast of Sabac until they nearly reached the Sava.

In general the position of the defenders was the same as when the day began, and the southern front, though menaced, was holding. The commander of 29 ID, now with full discretion, decided it was still not necessary to retreat. Indeed, when GM Zanantoni learned that 31 ID was ready to intervene, he told 29 ID at 7:00 PM that "It is a matter of honor for the division to hold onto Sabac."

At the same hour GdK Tersztyanszky, concerned by reports about new pressure on 29 ID, alerted IV Corps to prepare for yet another night march and to cross the Sava. The Budapest Corps should help the north Bohemians to either organize their bridgehead or to "extricate" them from their difficult position. The irony was that by the evening their position was no longer difficult, and the fighting had slackened off. An updated report had been sent to the IV Corps commander, but unfortunately he had moved from his old quarters to Klenak. Thus he didn't get the report until early on the 23rd, at which time his Corps was already moving to cross the Sava.

23 August

The plan of IV Corps for the 23rd was to roll up the Serbs' left flank from the area west of Sabac. 31 ID would attack first.
toward the south; 32 ID would follow it on the right and follow the enemy toward the southwest.

On the opposing side, the Serbs planned to use the 23rd to continue their encirclement maneuver and to send out strong reconnaissance patrols. They intended to storm the town at dawn on the 24th after a heavy bombardment; their main attack would be directed at the western front of the bridgehead and would seize the bridges, thus cutting off the defenders from escape.

IV Corps failed to deploy according to the wishes of its commander. Delays were caused by errors in transmitting orders, and by a two hour period during which the military bridges were drawn aside to allow the river monitors to pass by. Archduke Josef of 31 ID, deploying northwest of Sabac, was inadequately informed about the intended direction of his attack; until 9:00 AM the division faced southwest, and then until 11:00 AM faced northwest. By this time the 32 ID was arriving and got mixed up with the 31st. The commander of 57 Inf Bde, GM Schön, informed the Archduke that he was in the wrong position. Thereupon Josef, under the erroneous impression that communications had been lost with IV Corps HQ (back at Klenak), took over operational command of both 31 and 32 ID. He led them both to the southern edge of Sabac with the 32nd on the left rather than on the right of the 31st, and thus east of the Varna road. Although this change was unwelcome to GdK Tersztyanszky, the latter decided to accept it rather than to cause further delays by correcting the deployment. He detailed six battalions to serve as the Corps reserve outside the town on the western flank, and ordered 29 ID to cooperate in the action.

Thus when IV Corps finally attacked at 3:00 PM, six north Bohemian battalions took part on its east flank. These battalions were partly successful against Sumadija Div I, the only triumph of the day. For the two Hungarian divisions, massed together in a small area, launched a frontal assault along the Varna road and came under a devastating cross fire from Timok Div II, which now had all of its own troops plus half of Sumadija I. Losses piled up quickly. Around 5:00 PM, panic broke out in 31 ID, and soon spread to 32 ID. Both units fled back toward Sabac. IV Corps' reserve, exhausted like the other units by the two night marches, could not arrive in time to retrieve the situation. Therefore at 7:00 PM GdK Tersztyanszky, who had come to Sabac, gave the oral order to evacuate the hotly contested town. This evacuation could have been carried out on either of the two preceding nights under much more favorable circumstances. 29 ID and the monitors would cover the night-
time retreat of IV Corps.

24 August

The Serbs had also suffered heavily during the action of the 23rd, and had to cancel their planned storming action on the 24th. They were content to fire their artillery on the town and on the bridges. Fortunately for 29 ID, which couldn't begin its retreat until 5:00 AM, the enemy's batteries fired only shrapnel on the bridges, which were protected by a light morning fog. The shells hit the water so close to the bridge that large amounts of water splashed the troops as they crossed. However, the enemy did not hit the bridge until around 8:45 AM, when it was already being broken up after the evacuation was completed. Meanwhile the Serbs were wasting more ammunition by firing on the empty trenches around the edge of Sabac. The first Serbian patrols didn't enter the heavily damaged town until around 9:30 AM; they were followed by the enemy main body at noon. For the rest of the day the two sides traded artillery fire over the Sava.

4. Expulsion of the Montenegrins from Herzegovina (18 August–2 September)

While fighting was ending in most sectors, the brave defenders of Herzegovina were the last to gain a rest. On 18 August enemy pressure was increasing against the border fortress at Bileca; 14 Mtn Bde attempted to provide relief by crossing the Montenegrin border north of the Bocche but couldn't break through. Therefore on the 19th FZM Potiorek ordered GM Pongracz' 3 Mtn Bde, which had been watching the border at Avtovac, to assist the defenders of Bileca. Pongracz, however, first had to deal with Montenegrins who were attempting to advance around Duga Ridge. On the 23rd these Montenegrins were defeated in a 14-hour action at Kazanci and pursued on the 24th back to Krstac. Once the enemy at Duga had been intimidated, the Bde could march to Bileca. When GM Pongracz arrived there on the 30th, the bulk of the garrison left its position to join him in a counterattack. In a fierce action that lasted from 31 August to 2 September the erstwhile besiegers were driven from the field. Simultaneously sorties were launched eastward from Trebinje and northward from the Bocche to pin down the enemy; the result was that the Montenegrins were driven out of the area around Grahovo. For the immediate future the "Crnagoren" (Montenegrins) would have no stomach for further operations.
D. Results and Evaluations of the First Balkan Campaign

Establishment of an Autonomous Balkan Command

The successes of 6th Army, hitherto undefeated, hadn't prevented the misfortune on the Jadar and the unfavorable result of the fighting around Sabac. Therefore FZM Potiorek wanted to resume the offensive as soon as possible with all his force united in one sector. Meanwhile the AOK was striving to downgrade the southern theater of operations in favor of the main effort in the north. This led to opposition to GdI Conrad from the Foreign Ministry – for international political reasons – and also from the powerful Hungarian Minister President Graf Tisza, who was concerned about an unlikely threat to Hungarian territory from the Serbs.

These parties supported the efforts of Potiorek to secure for himself a greater degree of autonomy and a simpler command structure. He was soon given an opportunity to secure his goal.

The Chief of the Imperial-Royal Military Chancellery, GdI Freih. von Bolfras, was already concerned about receiving insufficient information from the AOK. Therefore on 14 August he had ordered that important communications from the BOK to the monarch would no longer be routed through the AOK, but directly by telegraph to Vienna. Four days later he asked that the daily reports of FZM Potiorek also be sent directly to the Military Chancellery. Shortly thereafter, on the 20th, direct communication between 5th Army headquarters and the AOK led to the misunderstandings described earlier. In his next daily report to the Emperor, FZM Potiorek complained about these difficulties and their evil consequences.

These events, and Potiorek's urging that the remaining parts of 2nd Army be left in the south, finally had an effect. On the 21st the Emperor announced to the AOK: "Because I consider it necessary to have a unified command for the forces fighting in the Balkans, I order that FZM Potiorek be given independent control of all units fighting Serbia and Montenegro; reducing these forces seems to me to be inappropriate."

GdI Conrad felt that this order was like a blow from a club; in particular he considered the final clause to be a major interference with the prerogatives of the AOK. The supreme commander, GdI Archduke Frederick, immediately raised objections.
to the Emperor, who on the 23rd replied that the AOK still enjoyed his fullest trust and that he had no intention of meddling with the dispositions of the army command. Thereupon, on the 24th, the AOK ordered the immediate preparation of IV Corps for departure to the north, even before news of the final outcome of the Sabac fighting had arrived. By this order the Chief of Staff wanted to take the wind out of the sails of his opponents in Vienna while relieving the aged monarch of the burden of a difficult decision 97.

However, the Emperor's warning regarding the size of the Balkan forces did have an effect. There was no question any more of sending 29 ID to Galicia, and discussions about also sending VIII Corps were ended. Thus to a certain extent the monarch's concern for the safety of the Danube-Sava line was addressed. This also gave some satisfaction to the Foreign Minister and to the Hungarian Minister President Graf Stephan Tisza, who in the preceding days had made a considerable clamor about this issue 98.

The final recall of IV Corps was a great disappointment to FZM Potiorek. However, he received compensation in the opening sentence of the recall order: "Operations to fulfill the tasks given to Your Excellency are left to your discretion." He had thus received the autonomy he had sought to enable him to renew the offensive. He would make up for the departure of IV Corps by economizing the forces detached on secondary missions.

An Analysis of the Failed Offensive

From the beginning, the first combat operation of the Aus-Hung Army in the World War suffered from military and political complications arising out of a two-front conflict. Basic strategic axioms came into conflict with the demands of the diplomats and difficulties in making adequate local defense preparations. These factors led to an offensive and in turn to a natural desire to use as many resources as possible to win. The greatest temptation to give in to this desire stemmed from the presence of 2nd Army; all levels of command from the AOK on down found it impossible to hold back a strong Army as a mere spectator while a decisive engagement was taking place within range of its cannon.

97 Conrad, op. cit., Vol IV - pp. 465 ff, 585 and 501
98 Ibid., Vol. IV; p. 475 and 498. Also see Tisza, "Briefe", Vol. I, pp. 56 ff
Another peculiar feature of the August campaign in Serbia stemmed from FZM Potiorek's decision to deploy 6th Army against the enemy at a considerable distance from 5th Army. This decision was made at a time when the Feldzeugmeister was still unaware that the main effort would be made against Russia; therefore he believed that 2nd Army as well as 5th Army would be available against the enemy's main force in northern Serbia. Reports of an isolated attack by Serbian detachments against southeast Bosnia had given hope to 6th Army, deploying east of Sarajevo, that it could win an impressive early victory. This would fulfill the wishes of both the high command and the Ballhausplatz. However, the decision to throw 6th Army into the fray in southeast Bosnia remained in place even after it was known that 2nd Army would soon be leaving for Galicia, and that there would be no major Serbian offensive into Bosnia and toward Sarajevo. Instead ofcountering an enemy attack, 6th Army would itself advance through southeast Bosnia to the line Visegrad-Uzice. The Feldzeugmeister persevered with this plan even though he saw its serious disadvantages and knew that 6th Army's advance would be limited and would have to end with a redeployment farther north. He made a "risky venture", as he himself called the proposed offensive, because he believed that active demonstrations by 2nd Army would confuse the Serb leadership long enough for him to win the opening victory so urgently desired by the politicians.

The difficulty in arranging cooperation between the Balkan armies, separated by difficult and trackless terrain, was compounded by the fact that 6th Army would not be fully assembled until six days after 5th Army. The BOK did recognize the danger that if 5th Army advanced too soon into the northwest corner of Serbia it would be confronted by the main Serbian forces, which had deployed between Valjevo and Kragujevac. Nonetheless, despite the opinions of Generals Frank and Böhm-Ermolli, the BOK continued to believe that the mere presence of 2nd Army would allay this danger. This hope soon proved to be incorrect.

Between 12 and 19 August, the Serbian command sent 90 battalions, 30 squadrons and over 50 batteries against the k.u.k. 5th Army, which had 65 battalions, 11 1/12 squadrons and 37 batteries. It is true that one fifth of the Serbian forces (Timok Div I) didn't actually fight. However, 5th Army's 21st LW ID was also mostly out of action after its fatal mishap on 16 August; only small parts of the 21st took part in the rest of the battle, and they were mainly engaged against Serbian horsemen. Thus in the decisive fighting of the next 3 days (17-
19 August), the equivalent of just four Aus-Hung divisions (9, 36 and 42 ID; 13 Inf and 11 Mtn Bdes) - with 52 battalions, 9 1/2 squadrons and 30 batteries - fought five Serbian divisions (Drina I and II, Morava I and II, and Combined) - with 74 battalions, 11 squadrons and 42 batteries. The Serbs thus enjoyed a 3:2 advantage when they won their victory over 5th Army. They owed their success to a relentless pursuit of their tactical objective of bringing pressure on the northern wing of 5th Army; because of the retreat of 21 LW ID and the lack of an Army reserve, 9 ID had to defend this sector alone. Nonetheless, it stood its ground for over two days, although it had just 13 battalions, 2 squadrons and 58 guns against two and a half Serb divisions (36 battalions, 4 squadrons and 48 guns); the enemy thus had a 3:1 superiority in infantry, and the slight Austrian advantage in artillery strength was nullified by the concentric fire of the Serbian batteries. It was fortunate that the Serbs, so heavily engaged against 9 ID, were unable to also take advantage of the gap that developed between VIII and XIII Corps during the Jadar Battle, since it was difficult for the latter Corps to guard its north flank.

The demonstration of parts of 2nd Army would no doubt have been more effective if it had taken place farther east - on the Danube, if possible, as requested by FZM Potiorek. A demonstration upstream on the Sava would direct the Serbs' attention toward the northwestern corner of their country and thus in the direction of the northern flank of 5th Army. However, because of the constraints of railroad transport, the AOK permitted only the sortie over the Sava at Sabac, and even there the units were committed gradually. At first the gallant 29 ID was sent alone; two days later, after the fate of 9 ID, fighting at Tekeris, was already as good as sealed, IV Corps was also released for the Sabac sector. Nonetheless, the Serbs' concern about 2nd Army did pin down the equivalent of three enemy divisions totalling 46 battalions (Dunav Divs I and II plus the Obrenovac Detachment), and prevented them from further increasing the odds against the 5th Austrian Army.

The attempt to hold Sabac after the retreat of 5th Army was one of the most painful episodes of the campaign. It again draws the attention of latter day critics to the unfortunate role of 2nd Army during mobilization, and how the misfortunes of that Army continued to have ramifications on the Balkan front even after most of its troops had already left for the north.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that if substantial parts of 6th Army had advanced in time from Sarajevo through Ljubovija
to the southern flank of 5th Army they would have had an enormous, perhaps a decisive, effect on the outcome of the battle. This is proven by the anxious attention which the Serbian high command paid to this sector during the fighting.

The 5th Army had already returned to Bosnia when 6th Army finally was ready to strike the Serbs on 20 August (two extra days later than originally planned because of difficulties encountered in its deployment). XVI Corps had previously given the Montenegrins a heavy blow, but this had no effect on the Serbian command. Nor did the Serbs feel it necessary to relieve pressure on 5th Army because of 6th Army's approach against the Uzice Group. Because of the extremely difficult terrain on both sides of the line Visegrad-Uzice, Voivode Putnik felt that the 31 battalions and 60 guns of the Uzice Group was a sufficient barrier to 6th k.u.k. Army 99.

6th Army, which had one third more infantry than the Uzice Group and twice as many guns, was able to break through the Serbs' lines but couldn't win a decisive victory because of the misfortune of 5th Army. XV and XVI Corps were already turning their backs on the battlefield on the upper Drina and Lim when the Serbian high command had decided to send the Timok Div I to Valjevo to assist the Uzice Group.

Conrad's Judgment on the Operation

In his memoirs, Conrad gave his judgment of the August offensive in the Balkans in the following words: "The whole offensive foundered because of:

. The separation of the forces in two widely separated groups of nearly equal strength;
. The mountainous terrain that delayed the approach of the southern group (6th Army); and especially
. The breakdown of 21 LW ID.

It is inadmissible to blame the defeat on the alleged late employment of IV Corps. Use of this Corps should not have been part of the plan of operations." 100

99 Per some sources the Serbian Uzice Group had 90 rather than just 60 guns.

100 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 441. (The last sentence is apparently a comment on Frank's declaration by telephone on 19 August regarding IV Corps, that "the offered help came two days too late." Cited by Conrad in Vol, IV, p. 432 – Translator's Note)
Two further comments must be made on Conrad's fundamentally sound analysis. One involves the role of 21 LW ID. Immediately after the fighting, proceedings were initiated to punish the Division, but they were quashed at the start of September at the express wish of the Emperor. This was proper because the initial reaction to the Division's performance had been overblown. It is certainly incorrect to attribute the unit's misfortune - as still occasionally happens - to nationalistic dissatisfaction among the Czechs. Such an analysis is decisively refuted by the fact that the battalions of 9 ID, which performed extraordinarily well during the same days that the Landwehr were defeated, were recruited in exactly the same territories. Moreover the 21 LW ID had in its ranks the LW IR "Eger" # 6, which came from the same town as the renowned k.u.k. IR # 73.  

The other comment on Conrad's analysis is that objectively it appears that his own headquarters must share responsibility with that of the Balkan forces. Except for some wavering in the very first days of August, the AOK had generally agreed to Potiorek's outlook on the offensive. On 14 August Conrad had indicated by telegraph and written messages that he assumed responsibility for the entire undertaking and its course. The only mitigating circumstance is that GdI Conrad was misled by Potiorek's report on 8 August that the entire 6th Army would be ready to attack on 14 August, whereas in reality just its southern wing was ready. On 5 September the Chief of the General Staff wrote to GdI Bolfras that in the next operations FZM Potiorek should be directed "to concentrate all his forces in one sector" and "not in two separate groups as in the first offensive." In fairness this sentence must be regarded as self-criticism on the part of Conrad, since in August he had approved the separated deployment of the two Balkan armies, mainly on political grounds, in full agreement with Potiorek.

Anyway the Feldzeugmeister had already himself drawn this lesson from the late events. On 19 August, even before 6th Army had left the upper Drina, he had decided that the next attack on Serbia would be undertaken out of northeastern Bosnia with

Translator's Note - The analysis of the incident in this paragraph is correct as far as it goes. It does not dwell on the real cause of the Division's collapse, which was the poor leadership of its senior officers. And it should be noted that the Czech units were less willing than others to sacrifice themselves to redeem their leaders' mistakes. This pattern was to be repeated throughout the war.
united forces, as indeed took place.

**Moral Factors and Effects**

The role of the middle and lower officers in the August campaign and the efforts they demanded of the troops have been sketched above, as much as the limits of space permitted. The fighting took place in extraordinarily difficult terrain against a usually unseen and ruthless enemy with recent military experience; it made great demands on the bodies and spirits of the Aus-Hung troops. It is common for an army to pay a bloody price to gain experience at the start of a war; this was especially the case in Serbia where the defenders were unsurpassed masters of partisan warfare. Nonetheless the overall efforts of the troops, as judged even by the enemy, were heroic though unsuccessful. This is demonstrated by the casualty figures. The engaged units lost about 600 officers and 22,000 to 23,000 men dead or wounded. On the other side the Serbs lost 16,000 men.

The Serbs were so exhausted after fending off the Austrian offensive that they could not reap the rewards of victory by a relentless pursuit. However, the expulsion of the troops of a Great Power from their territory was reason enough for them to celebrate, especially since the result was to dampen Bulgaria's interest in intervening. The Serbs' counter-stroke had also been sufficient answer to their allies' demands that they operate offensively. They would now enjoy a few days' well-earned rest, while their commanders had the satisfaction of knowing that the Austrian forces had been diminished by the departure of their entire 2nd Army.
III. The Campaign against Russia in Summer 1914

A. Deployment and Border Actions

(see volume 1 leaflets 1, 6, 9, and sketch 1)

1. Preliminary measures of the k.u.k. high command

From the moment that there was no longer any doubt about Russia's intervention in favor of Serbia, GdI Conrad was convinced that the decision must now be sought in the northeast. He himself said that even if he drew every available man from the Balkans - now reduced to a secondary theater - he would soon still be outnumbered by the tsarist army. Nonetheless, as a leading proponent of the offensive philosophy, he would seek salvation here also by attacking.

As detailed in Section II, the Chief of the General Staff was obliged to leave two armies against Serbia and Montenegro. They contained 80 more battalions and 200 more guns than he had originally planned. Another evil stemming from the outbreak of hostilities on the two fronts at different times and the earlier use of the railroads to the southeast was the painful delay in mobilization against Russia. The tsarist empire thus gained an initial advantage that would have bitter consequences for Austria. At the very least, it was feared that the Russian cavalry would break over the borders even before 6 August, when the first Aus-Hung mobilization transports would start rolling. To avoid provoking the Russians into such a move, GdI Conrad asked the Foreign Ministry to postpone the declaration of war on Russia until 6 August, despite the impatience of Germany and the wishes of the Austrian diplomats themselves.^[102]

Russia's mobilization advantage and the negative attitude of Romania made it necessary to deploy behind the Dniester and San rather than closer to the border. Troops stationed ahead of this line were instructed to keep detachments on the border to

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102 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 175; also Wegerer, Die Widerlegung der Versailler Kriegs Schuldthese (Berlin 1928), pp. 128 ff. Because of the situation in the Adriatic, Austria-Hungary declined to declare war on the Western powers. Therefore France and England themselves initiated hostilities against the Monarchy.
guard against incursions by Russian cavalry during the mobilization. The XI Corps, mobilizing in three groups by Czernowitz, Brzezany and Lemberg, was instructed to fall back without fighting to Ottynia, Martinow str. (on the Dniester) and Sambor if it was attacked by superior numbers.

Despite all these concerns, the mobilization in Galicia went ahead according to plan, undisturbed by the enemy. Even the dreaded incursion of mounted Russian hordes didn't occur. In some instances small groups of the enemy felt their way over the border, but were driven back without difficulty. These easy successes motivated the commander of XI Corps, GdK von Kolossvarv, to decide on 8 August to hold Lemberg not only until the completion of mobilization, but until he could be reinforced by the units arriving from other parts of the Monarchy. The AOK fully understood that the Corps commander didn't want to begin the war by abandoning the Galician capital and its field fortifications. Nonetheless, they let GdK Kolossvarv know that the orderly completion of the mobilization must be the primary consideration. He must keep enemy cavalry away from the stations where the troops were arriving and enemy infantry far away from the deployment areas. The AOK reserved to itself the decision whether XIV Corps, arriving at Sambor, would be committed to the defense of Lemberg against an early Russian invasion in force. However, the Galician capital should be held against any smaller body of the enemy.

A quick advance by Russian corps against Lemberg, although feasible, didn't take place. However, the early differences of opinion and planning between the AOK and XI Corps would have some effect on the first actions.

Arrangements with GO Moltke

Next to the completion of the mobilization of his own armies, the Chief of the General Staff was most concerned about working with the German ally to fulfill pre-war agreements. On 3 August, GO Moltke sent Conrad the first reports about the creation of the German eastern force, mainly the 8th Army commanded by GO von Prittwitz. This Army consisted of four and a half corps, one cavalry division and three mixed Landwehr brigades; it was mobilizing near and north of Thorn. The other German group was the Landwehr Corps of GdI von Woyorsch, consisting of two divisions in Silesia; it would advance through Kalisz and Czentsochau (Czestochowa). Five reserve divisions would arrive on the 12th and then deploy as the situation warranted. What Moltke wrote about the intended use of the
German eastern forces is significant:

The commander [of 8th Army] is ordered to pin down the greatest possible forces of the Russian Army in the north and west, thus keeping them away from the Austrian armies during the initial fights.

If the Russians begin an early offensive against East Prussia with forces greatly superior to the Germans, this will make victory easier for the Aus-Hung Army, especially if that Army advances quickly into Russia.

If the Russians do not attack East Prussia with superior force at the beginning, the German commander will lead the eastern army into Russia in a direction that will give the greatest possible support to the Austrian Army....

In any event, the German corps deployed opposite Kalisz-Czentschau will begin its advance on the 12th day of mobilization to Radom-Nowo Alexandria. The commander of this corps is ordered to advance into Russia without stopping until he reaches the left flank of the westernmost Austrian units. When he nears Russian forces the commander will take measures to unite his corps in tactical cooperation with the local Austrian commanders.

The Austrian Army can thus count on powerful support in its offensive against Russia by all the available German forces in the East. The joint success will be all the greater if the advance into Russia is early and relentless.

Conrad hastened to reply to Moltke on the same day with a similar report. He reckoned that 30 1/2 Austrian divisions would initially deploy on the San-Dniestern line; the left wing would be ready on August 20th, the right on the 23rd. After the arrival of 8 more divisions from the Balkans, there would be available by the end of August a total of 38 1/2 infantry divisions, 2 March brigades, 8 Landsturm brigades and (ahead of the main body) 10 cavalry division in central and east Galicia. They would have 670 battalions and 330 squadrons plus supporting batteries. If the 30 1/2 divisions could deploy without interference from the enemy, they would open an offensive to roll up the armies of the Russian Southwest Front toward the

103 Personal letter from Moltke in Berlin to Conrad on 2 August; quoted in Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 318 ff., along with Conrad's response from Vienna on 3 August. At the end of Conrad's reply, he wrote: "May our allied armies, united with German loyalty, emerge successfully from this gigantic struggle!"
east and southeast. If the enemy's main body approached from the east, the Austrian left wing would immediately (i.e. on 20 August) veer in that direction to join the right wing in a front running from the north to the south. On the other hand, if strong enemy forces threatened from the north the k.u.k. armies would advance in this direction with their right wing refused; the left would engage on the 22nd, the right would follow after it was fully ready for battle. In all cases, protection of the western flank was entrusted to Armee Gruppe Kummer, which consisted of a cavalry division, a bicycle battalion and 44 Landsturm battalions along with artillery. Kummer would advance on 17 August from Cracow into southwest Poland (which in the event was evacuated by the Russians) and eventually would cross the Vistula upriver from Ivangoord.

Controversy regarding the eastern German army

Kummer's group would cooperate with Woyrsch's corps after the latter advanced from Kalisz and Czentsochau through Radom to Nowo Alexandria. However, no concrete steps were taken to coordinate the main bodies of the German and Austrian Armies. The subject was not settled in the letter from Moltke cited above, although Conrad had expected a decision based on pre-war discussions 104. Since these discussions, Conrad was counting on a definite offensive by the eastern German army "in the direction of Siedlce", that is in the rear of Warsaw. For the Chief of the General Staff such an offensive was an essential part of the operations against Russia which had been planned before the war. If there was no German attack, one of the two pincers with which Conrad hoped to trap the Russian Army in Poland would be lacking. Only some action "by the enemy" would justify the abandonment of the attack envisioned in the pre-war agreements. In Conrad's judgment, no such enemy action was forthcoming.

Moltke's letter of 3 August had already betrayed that the Germans had little desire to pursue an offensive in the direction Conrad wanted. He stated that such an offensive would take place only if the enemy didn't enter East Prussia at the outset with superior forces; moreover, the offensive would take place in an unspecified direction "that will give the greatest

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104 See the discussion of pre-war plans in Section I above, and also Conrad, Vol. p. 404. Also see Kiszling, Das deutsche Ostheer im Sommerfeldzug 1914 (Mil. wiss. Mitt., Vienna 1924, pp. 385 ff.) and the German official history (Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg 1914-18; Berlin 1925): Vol. II, pp. 3 ff.
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possible support to the Austrian Army." GdI Conrad was not satisfied with such a vague promise. He pointedly demanded that the German 8th Army advance in the direction which had been agreed upon in peacetime. This demand was the center of a controversy that raged between the two general staffs in the next three weeks, especially after mid-August when the deployment of the enemy became clear: the concentration of strong Russian forces in the area Warsaw-Brest Litovsk-Lublin.

According to the Chief of the k.u.k. General Staff's analysis of the Russian situation on 15 August, the enemy had created three major groups:

1. The northern group under GdK Rennenkampf threatened East Prussia from the east; AOK estimated its strength as six or seven corps.
2. The middle group was assembling around Brest-Litovsk with detachments toward Cholm and Lublin; it had the five corps from the Moscow Military District and perhaps the two from Kazan. Apparently the group was covering its deployment with one corps on the Narew and two or three corps on the Galician border between the Vistula and Bug (XIV and XIX Corps and perhaps parts of XIII).
3. The southern group was appearing along the eastern border of Galicia from Dubno down to the Dniester or to the Pruth. It consisted of troops from the Kiev and Odessa Military Districts (totalling seven corps) and probably a corps from the Caucasus. Perhaps the two corps from Kazan would strengthen this group (rather than the center).

The Russian southern group was an ominous threat to the flank of the Aus-Hung armies deploying in east Galicia. The middle group could move either south toward Galicia or west into the heart of Germany. The menace from this group was so great that Conrad finally settled on the plan of attacking north between the Bug and Vistula to Cholm and Lublin. This would give him the operational freedom to also successfully fend off the danger from the east.

Under Conrad's final analysis of the situation, close cooperation with the German eastern army became even more important. On 3 August he had already asked Moltke to send the 8th German Army on an offensive "in the general direction of Siedlce." On 13 August he declared that "success will be possible only if these German forces also strike a blow together

On the 14th, Conrad sent a wire to the German army headquarters at Marienburg to urgently request their "arrival at Siedlce as soon as possible." Conrad does not state in his memoirs that these communications were actually an intensification of his original request on 3 August. Nonetheless it appears that this was how they were regarded by the DOHL and GO Prittwitz.

Both the German headquarters (DOHL and 8th Army) kept their actual decisions wrapped in silence until 15 August. On that day a telegram from k.u.k. Captain Fleischmann, serving as liaison to GO Prittwitz, brought clarification to Conrad, although the news was not very satisfying. A Russian army of three corps and four cavalry divisions under Rennenkampf was entering East Prussia "from Kovno, Olita and farther south." A second force, apparently from Brest-Litovsk, was assembling with two corps and two cavalry divisions on the Narew. The German 8th Army would first strike a blow against Rennenkampf "which should succeed in the next few days. Then it can undertake operations in the direction of Siedlce."

This was pretty much the opposite of what Conrad had expected. He believed that nothing good would come of such an eccentric diversion of 8th Army. On the same evening he sent a long letter to Marienburg to convince Prittwitz at the last minute of the necessity of his advance to the rear of Warsaw. Whether or not the enemy forces threatening Galicia from the east would allow the Austrian thrust to continue north past Lublin, the main body of the German eastern army must leave the defense against Rennenkampf to "the arriving reserve and Landwehr divisions" and hasten to the Polish battlefield. Although at one point the letter to GO Prittwitz referred to an advance "in the general direction of Siedlce", in two other places it forcefully demanded that the Germans advance "beyond" that much-discussed town. Conrad makes it clear in his memoirs that his keen plan was aimed at a combined operation on the battlefield

106 Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 208 ff. At this point Conrad still had not completely ruled out the possible cooperation of the Romanian Army with the Central Powers. The exchange of letters with Moltke shows that at this point the political situation was still not clear. Considerations of space dictated omission of the daily changing political situation from this work.
107 Ibid., p. 388
108 Ibid., p. 390
It is true that in peacetime he had always counted on a German eastern army of 12 to 14 divisions. Although the actual strength was somewhat less because the Italians would not be helping in the Vosges, Conrad still thought it was possible for GÖ Prittwitz to leave three divisions against Rennenkampf and attack to the southeast with the other six plus the cavalry division.

At this point, as Conrad was making these recommendations, he didn't know that the "Deployment Order" which the DOHL had given German 8th Army was even more contrary to his wishes than was Moltke's letter of 3 August. It is true that the commander of the German eastern army was told to "command according to his free judgment" and admonished to "strive for harmonious relations with the Austrian armies." However, the basic tone of the Deployment Order substantially emphasized "the difficult task of securing our [German] eastern provinces against a Russian invasion" as opposed to "also supporting the intended offensive by Austria." In a significant weakening of the position taken in Moltke's 3 August letter, the order declared that an advance into Russia would be permissible only in the improbable situation where the enemy remained solely on the defensive against Germany. The direction of such an offensive was not stated, but "would be determined by the situation." The only half-hearted reference to Conrad's heart's desire was a note that the Narew River, despite its fortifications, would "not be an impregnable barrier" if the German 8th Army attacked over it toward the southeast. Such bland orders, contradictory to the wide-ranging requests of the allied command, offered GO Prittwitz - who was not very confident anyway - enough justification to be satisfied with holding onto East Prussia, without deciding whether or not an attack over the Narew was feasible.

Thus Conrad's letter of the 15th, as well as another which he sent Prittwitz two days later, had no success. By this time the German 8th Army was already at Gumbinnen to take up the challenge from Rennenkampf.

The AOK moves north

At 2:00 AM on 16 August, Archduke Frederick and GdI Conrad left Vienna with their immediate staffs. Because the Commander-in-Chief was unpretentious and because the Chief of Staff also wished to avoid public notice, their departure took place
without any ceremony. After a journey of 36 hours the AOK arrived in the fortress of Przemysl on the San at 5:30 PM on the 17th and took up quarters in the barracks of Zasanie. Important news awaited them: in the southeast bitter fighting had already been raging for several days, and also on the Galician border the first shots had been fired and the blood of young men was sinking into the ground. There were also important questions regarding the political groupings on the Balkans and the no less doubtful position of Italy.

Fate was placing an almost unbearable burden on the shoulders of the men now entrusted with leading the Austro-Hungarian Army.

2. Assembly of the Austrian Northern Armies

a. Preparing the positions; reconnaissance operations

Successful mobilization

Despite initial concerns, it was several day after the beginning of the railroad movement, on 9 August, that the enemy's first squadron of horse felt its way into Galicia between the Bug and Bukovina. Austrian border patrols, cavalry and infantry, bravely supported by gendarmes, Landsturm and customs guards, were ordered by the high command to immediately expel the intruders. The area around the Zbrucz was already cleared on the 13th. The Russian 9 Cav Div spent two days at Zalosce; however GM Berndt's 13 Cav Bde (of 8 Cav Div) hurried from Tarnopol to force the Russians into a hasty retreat. At Brody, FML Ritter von Zaremba's 4 Cav Div, strengthened by 4 battalions, forced the 11 Russian Cav Div to speedily leave Galicia; LW IR 35 advanced over the Russian border to Radziwilow. At Sokal, the Russians' 7 Cav Div and parts of 17 ID entered Austrian territory; three days later and 10 km farther south they were confronted by FML Ritter von Ziegler with his 2 Cav Div and two infantry battalions; thereupon the enemy pulled back over the border without fighting. Thus by the middle of the month all Galician territory had been cleared.

Meanwhile the mobilization of the k.u.k. armies had made enormous strides since 6 August. Beginning on the 9th the rail lines to the northeast were operating at full capacity. Every day, 140 "100 axle" trains arrived in the deployment area with a total of 7000 cars. Counting empty trains on the return trip,
in mid-August there were over 800 trains with 40,000 cars in motion at once; if lined up one after the other they would have formed a line 400 km long. The almost perfect operation of this gigantic mass of equipment raised the self-confidence of the Army and its leadership, and strengthened the trust in public officials of all those who stood by the Emperor and his realm in this difficult hour.

On the right wing of the arriving forces, by Stanislau and Stryj, GdI von Kövess assembled the main body of his Armee Gruppe, initially two corps (III and XII). Also placed under his command were the units which had been pushed forward to the border: two and a half infantry divisions (11 ID, 43 LW ID and 35 Lst Inf Bde) and three cavalry divisions (1 CD, 5 Hon CD and 8 CD). GdK Rudolf Ritter von Brudermann's 3rd Army deployed in two groups. The larger group was at Sambor, and on 20 August consisted of XIV Corps, 41 Hon ID, 88 L-Sch Bde and 108 Lst Inf Bde; the smaller group was still covering Lemberg with just XI Corps (30 ID, 11 March Bde and 93 Lst Inf Bde). The Army had advanced 2 and 4 Cav Divs to the border, along with 24 Hon Cav Bde from 11 Hon CD (the rest of the 11th was expected to arrive on 24 August). On Brudermann's left, around Przemyśl and Jaroslau, GdI Ritter von Auffenberg deployed most of his 4th Army: II and VI Corps (each of 3 divisions) plus 19 ID; the 10 ID and 6 CD stood northeast of the main body to provide security. GdK Dankl's 1st Army was forming between Sieniawa and Lancut with Ist, V and X Corps plus several smaller formations, covered by 3 and 9 Cav Divs. Further divisions would arrive after the 20th, especially on the right flank where Kövess' Armee Gruppe would come under GdK von Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army when it arrived from the Balkans with IV and VII Corps.

GdK Ritter von Kummer's Armee Gruppe was drawn up around Cracow. Two of its three Landsturm Inf Bdes (95 and 106) had been increased to divisions and provided with mobile batteries and machine guns drawn from the fortress. FML Edler von Korda's 7 CD, also part of Kummer's Group, had already been on Russian territory since 6 August; it had been ordered to reach the Vistula between Annopol and Ivangoord by the 19th. Soon after beginning its advance, 7 CD had encountered a strong mixed detachment of the enemy (14 Cav Div, 2 Rifle Bde and some border troops), which however didn't offer any serious resistance until the area around Kielce. By this time (the 13th) the main body of Kummer's group had crossed the border. On the 16th it made contact at Nowe Brzesko and Miechow with GdI von Woyrsch's German Landwehr Corps, which had advanced from Czenstochau and Kalisz toward Przedboz and Piotrkow the day before. Kummer's
infantry was supposed to follow his cavalry toward the Vistula.

The Cavalry Operations

The AOK had ordered the forces east of the Vistula to also begin a long-range reconnaissance operation on 11 August, one week before the main body was ready to advance. Although 42 airplanes were included in the order of battle, only a small number were actually available to fly. Therefore the AOK sent its horsemen to the front, in accordance with old traditions. Although it was hoped that the great masses of cavalry could reconnoiter as far as the line Mogilev-Luck-Kovel-Lublin (see volume 1 sketch 1), its main mission was to at least identify the concentrations of Russian infantry. In particular, the divisions maneuvering on the right were charged with discovering the southern Russian flank on the Dniester.

The cavalry rode forth on 15 August. Patrols and messengers led the way with self-confident elan in the Sarmatian summer morning. The massed squadrons followed with splendid determination. Everywhere they were accompanied by a few infantry battalions, which were always prepared when necessary to lend fire support to their relatively weak sister weapon.

However, the results of the first 48 hours convinced the AOK that it would be impossible to reach the ambitious objectives. The divisions which GdI Kövess sent over the Zbrucz had just crossed the border when they came upon enemy forces determined on serious resistance. 1st CD, on the extreme southern flank, was able to advance into Kamenets-Podolsk on the 17th. However, on the same day 5 Hon CD, reinforced by one brigade of 8 CD, was halted at Gorodok; although it attacked both on foot and on horse, it was unable to break through the barbed wire and entrenchments held by 2 Combined Coss Div and a small force of attached infantry. When the dead-tired division was encamped that night at Satanow it was suddenly seized by a panic that led to the death of its commander, FML von Froreich. Farther north, the rest of FML Ritter von Lehmann's 8 CD was engaged with the Russian 10 CD and an attached infantry regiment; after skirmishing for several days the Austrians had to evacuate the

110 Pitreich, "Lemberg 1914" (Vienna 1929), pp. 20 ff.
111 It is said that FML Froreich committed suicide, but the actual cause of his death has never been determined. See also the Hungarian official history, A vilaghaboru 1914-18 (Budapest 1928), Vol. I p. 135 and an article by Dragoni in "Neuen Wienter Tagblatt" (12 May 1929)
In front of 3rd Army, FML Zaremba's 4 CD was already obliged on the 16th to turn back at Radziwilow; it was confronted in front by two Russian divisions (11 CD and 11 ID) and its line of retreat was threatened by 9 Russian CD which had crossed into Galicia at Zalosce. On the other hand, the 24 Hon Cav Bde farther west was able to make a relatively wide advance. On the 15th the Honved were engaged in close combat with the enemy detachment which had been shaken up by 2 CD the day before, and on the 17th they reached Szklin. Meanwhile the 2 CD to their west had come up against unbeatable resistance at Vladimir-Volynsky. At the same time the 2nd was threatened from the rear by the Russian Combined CD, entering Galicia at Rawa Russka, and therefore had to beat a hasty retreat.

Similarly, FML Wittmann's 6 CD, sent forward by 4 Army, could not break through even though it was reinforced by two battalions of the Deutschmeister IR # 4 and by FJB # 17. In a hotly-contested action at Narol on 15 August, Col Freih. von Holzhausen of IR 4 was killed in action while advancing in the skirmish line of his troops. 1st Army sent 9 and 3 CD forward. On the first days, 9 CD (FML Freih. von Hauser) was able to advance along the Bilgoraj-Frampol road without meeting resistance. However, 3 CD (FML Adolf Ritter von Brudermann) with the attached Hannak IR # 54 were engaged from 16 August at Krasnik against a greatly superior enemy (13 CD, "Warsaw" Guard Cav Bde and 18 ID of XIV Corps) in an action that was conducted with great bitterness for several days.

Although the AOK hadn't learned the full details about these actions, nonetheless they decided after arriving at Przemysl (on 17 August) to curtail the mission of the cavalry on the right wing and in the center. It would be enough if they could reconnoiter the area immediately along the border. The original objectives were retained only between the Bug and Vistula (the area where 4th and 1st Armies would attack), and especially in Armee Gruppe Kummer's sector beyond the Vistula. At the same time the high command warned against committing too much infantry or artillery into the border actions. Indeed, by this point the XI Corps had sent almost half its battalions forward to support the cavalry reconnaissance.

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112 Hoen, Waldstätten-Zipperer and Siefert, Die Deutschmeister (Vienna, 1928), pp. 55 ff.
113 TRANSLATOR's NOTE - The original text listed a non-existent Russian unit, 18 CD, instead of 13 CD.
Based on the new orders, GdI Kövess ordered 1 CD, which had meanwhile advanced beyond Kamenets Podolsk, to pull back behind the Zbrucz, where it next took up a position at Czortkow 114. Farther northwest the portions of the badly battered 5 Hon CD which were still battle worthy assembled on the Strypa, supported by three battalions of 11 ID. 8 CD came together again at Tarnopol.

In the area of 3rd Army the principal task now was to drive back the Russian cavalry units which had crossed the open border into Galicia; among them was the 10 Russian CD, with some supporting infantry, at Zalosce. This Div fought the k.u.k. 4 Cav Div on 21 August at Jaroslawice (north of Zborow) in one of the few real mounted actions of the World War. Although the hand-to-hand combat was indecisive, the day still ended in defeat for the Aus-Hung horsemen and the Landwehr who accompanied them, with heavy losses in men and guns. Parts of 11 ID and of 8 CD were sent forward to help out, but arrived too late to change the outcome of the fighting; nonetheless the Russians in this area advanced no further until reinforced by the main infantry forces 115.

More fortunate than the Jaroslawice engagement was an encircling operation against the Russian Combined CD. That unit's advance toward Lemberg was first barred by 30 ID at Zolkiew; then in an action with the baggage train of 24 Hon Cav Bde at Kamionka-Strumilowa one of its brigade commanders, General Vanovsky, was lost. Finally the Russians were threatened from the west by detachments of 10 ID and escaped only after heavy losses while breaking through the 2 k.u.k CD at Turynka 116.

On the left wing, 6 CD rode into Zamosc on 22 August, but had to evacuate the town next day because of the approach of superior

114 The bearer of the order to 1 CD, 1st Lt von Ambrozy of HR # 7, made a very gallant ride for which he received the Knight's Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresia.
Russian forces. 9 CD reached a point within 15 km of Turobin on the afternoon of the 18th; then it was forced to pull back to Frampol, on the northern edge of the Tanew Marsh, which was impassable except for a few roads. There it was supported by the upper Hungarian IR # 72 and stood its ground on the 20th and 21st against heavy attacks by Russian cavalry. 3 CD made fruitless attempts to break through at Krasnik, and then also withdrew to the north edge of the Tanew Marsh. Shortly before the general advance into the Vistula area the 3 CD was sent forward again on the 22nd, but at Goscieradow came upon enemy infantry supported by much artillery; the Austrians again had to give up ground after significant losses.

Meanwhile 7 CD was still operating west of the Vistula. On the 16th it moved from Kielce to Opatow, where on the 17th it was ordered by GdI Kummer to verify reports about the appearance of strong enemy forces on the main Ivangorod-Radom-Szydlowiec road. 7 CD rode northwest of Opatow and soon proved that these rumors were groundless. At the same time it reported that the Russian 14 CD, its former opponent at Kielce, had pulled back through Ostrowiec in the direction of Sandomierz. 7 k.u.k. CD now moved farther to its left and reached Ilza on the 22nd. On the same day, Kummer's Armee Gruppe reached the area around Staszow, Rakow and Kielce on a broad front; Woyrsch's Corps moved toward Radom, despite swarms of enemy horsemen on its northern flank. It had been hoped that the allied troops marching into the lands along the Vistula would rally patriotic Poles to fight against the Tsar, but this failed to happen.

b. The last decisions before the great battles

The results of the long-range reconnaissance by the cavalry were not worth the sacrifices because of the size of the opposing Russian units and because the splendid units had been trained mostly to fight on horse with their sabers. Many of the divisions would not be ready for combat again for several days because of fatigue, heavy casualties and injuries to the horses stemming from use of impractical, overly-heavy saddles.

This failure meant that the high command had to construct a picture of the enemy's dispositions from very inconsistent evidence. The picture was relatively clear west of the Vistula. Pilots who had flown up the river from the mouth of the San

117 Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 222 and 877
confirmed Kummer's reports that the Russians had evacuated this territory. Between the Vistula and Bug it had been definitely ascertained by the 22nd that there were 5 army corps in the area Turobin-Krasnostaw-Cholm-Lublin; their main body seemed to be preparing for a march to the southeast. The relatively trustworthy information about these troop concentrations strengthened GdI Conrad in his decision to open the campaign in any event with an offensive to the north by his left wing. The enemy group by Cholm-Lublin, behind which there were doubtless further forces arriving at Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk, was in a position to either cut the k.u.k. armies off from their principal lines of communication to the west by an outflanking maneuver to the right, or to advance over the middle Vistula toward Posen. These were precisely the circumstances that had led Conrad to plan an offensive between the Vistula and Bug before the war.

However, from the beginning the implementation of this plan was fraught with considerable difficulties because of the obscurity that still surrounded the enemy's intentions in the wide territory between the Bug and Dniester. By the 18th the Austrians estimated there were two army corps in the Rovno-Dubno-Luck triangle of small fortresses, a considerable force of undetermined size between Kreminiec and Proskurow, and two corps facing Bukovina and Romania. In vain Conrad sought in the next few days for news about events along the Bug between Krylow and Hrubieszow, a sector from which the enemy could hit his northern offensive in its left flank; also in vain was his attempt to glean information about the enemy along the open border between Sokal and Tarnopol. The secrecy surrounding the Russian deployment seemed to have been penetrated only east of the Zbrucz, but that at least was satisfying. With evident confidence, in which perhaps the wish was father to the thought, Conrad remarked early on the 20th to Colonel Metzger that there was no evidence of a Russian offensive against Lemberg from the east.\textsuperscript{118}

There continued to be many reports of enemy rail movements from Podolia to Volhynia. On the afternoon of the 21st the AOK received a report prepared by GdI Kövess on the 19th, giving his opinion that "substantial Russian forces will not be employed in the immediate future south of the Proskurow-Zmerinka rail line."\textsuperscript{119} (see volume 1 sketch 1 and 2) At the same time, Linien-Schiffs-Leutnant Banfield undertook a long flight in his

\textsuperscript{118} Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 433
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 447
plane into Podolia. He also could not spot any Russian units worthy of mention\textsuperscript{120}. In fact there were large masses of Russians in the area, but they were cleverly dispersed and marched mostly at night; during the day they were hidden from view in the forests and villages. However, the AOK regarded all the apparently consistent evidence as a confirmation of its own conviction. On the 21st they sent GdI Kövess the comforting information that apparently there were "no considerable enemy forces between the Dniester and the line Tarnopol-Proskurow."

One of the most accurate information services regarding Podolia was the small scouting office maintained by 1st Lt Fischer of the Gendarmerie at Czernowitz. Unfortunately it was not until the 24th that Fischer first received a report that the Russian 8th Army had assembled between Woloczysk and Nowosielica. By this point the Austrian offensive to the north had already begun.

While the situation in the east seemed to justify Conrad's plan of striking north with the strongest possible force, on the same day (the 21st) he received further support in news from the German eastern army. Indeed the earlier tidings that the Germans would turn against Rennenkampf had not caused Conrad to waver from his determination to attack; he felt that this made it all the more necessary for the Austrians Army to draw the mass of the Russians deploying east of the Vistula upon itself. Now, however (at 3:00 PM on the 21st), there arrived at headquarters in Przemysl a telegram from Cpt. Fleischmann in which he reported that the German 8th Army had to halt its battle at Gumbinnen - even though it had opened successfully - because the Russians had crossed the Narew. The Germans would pull back to the lower Vistula and from that point advance against the enemy's southern group - 2nd Army - which had so suddenly appeared on the scene. Although this news was not good, at least Conrad would now have the German eastern army where he had wanted it deployed at the outset. GO Prittwitz' intention of attacking the Russian southern group would be a step in the direction of the desired offensive toward Siedlec. For GdI Conrad this was a new reason to make his own attack as soon as possible.

\textsuperscript{120} TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - This puzzling reference to L-S-L Banfield is almost certainly an error. He was a naval rather than an Army pilot, and his own memoirs show that in August and September 1914 he was operating over the Adriatic shores against Montenegro (Banfield, Der Adler von Triest: Graz, 1984; pp. 51-53); I could find no reference to his ever having served on the Eastern front.
There were yet further considerations. It was not impossible that the enemy had begun his advance earlier and was using the opportunity to close the gaps between his forces, which had initially deployed in widely separated areas. This should be hindered as much as possible by quick Austrian action. There were also equally important factors of a tactical nature. The impassable Tanew Marsh—already mentioned above—was bordered on the north by higher ground along the line Narol-Frampol-Annopol. This ground should be seized before the enemy arrived or the whole offensive would be jeopardized.

Deployment for the Offensive

GdI Conrad had already issued orders at 1:00 PM on August 18 for the deployment of 4th and 1st Armies in a position preparatory to the attack; their front would run from Niemirow past Cieszanow on the heights north of Tarnogrod and from there along the south edge of the Tanew and the lower San. Thus 4th Army would hang back somewhat east of Tarnogrod, so that it could move either north, northeast or east. This new front line was reached on the 21st. At the same time, 3rd Army was ordered to move the Sambor group to Lemberg and to have it guard the flank and rear of the left flank armies against any enemy attack. Farther southeast, Kövess' Group should advance to the Dniester at Jezupol-Halicz and Zurawno-Zydaczow; in between the first troops from the Balkans would deploy—these were VII Corps and 20 Hon ID, which left their trains on the 22nd. The advanced divisions were advised to fall back to the main troop concentrations if strongly attacked by the Russians; thus 11 ID at Brzezany would fall back on 3rd Army, while 43 LW ID and 35 Lst Bde would fall back on the east flank of Kövess' Group.

This grouping of the army's right wing still took into account the possibility of a powerful Russian attack on east Galicia. However, in the next 48 hours the perception of the high command changed so much that at 8:00 PM on the 20th GdI Conrad could open his new orders with the sentence: "A general attack of all armies in a northerly direction is intended." Accordingly GdI Kövess was ordered to send his troops over the Dniester on the next morning and move them into the area between Lemberg and Przemyslany. Kövess himself would stay at Stanislau to await the arrival of GdK Böhm-Ermolli from the Balkans, scheduled for the 25th.

The AOK displayed the same confidence that it could send most of its divisions north without interference from the east in an
order which it released at 8:00 PM on the 21st. Meanwhile 4th and 1st Armies had prepared themselves for action on the line they had been ordered to reach on this day. Their long marches had been a trial for the recently called-up reservists who made up such a large portion of the units and who were not yet accustomed to such exertion; therefore the high command - encouraged by the enemy's hesitation to advance - told both Armies to make 22 August a day of rest. On the other hand, 3rd Army should move up on the 22nd to the line Kulikow-Zolkiew-Magierow, that is nearer to Auffenberg's east flank. This would leave the task of protecting Lemberg from the east mainly to Kövess' Group in the area southeast of the Galician capital.

Shortly after these orders were issued, reports arrived at Przemysl about an incursion by strong Russian infantry and cavalry columns at Husiatyn; similar news then also arrived from the areas of Tarnopol and Brody. There seemed to be only 4 or 5 divisions involved, but nonetheless the question of flank protection had gained significance, in contrast to the AOK's conviction a short time before that it was not important. Nonetheless the threat from the east, which had now become a fact, didn't for a moment defer GdI Conrad from his planned northern offensive. The orders he issued at 3:00 PM on August 22 still stated that a "general offensive by 1st, 4th, 3rd and parts of 2nd Armies is intended." The principal thrust would be by the two first-named armies to reach the already-mentioned Annopol-Frampol-Narol line; 1st Army was particularly charged with winning and holding the high ground between Annopol and Frampol. At the same time, Kummer's Group was ordered to advance as quickly as possible to the Vistula between Annopol and Jozefow and establish contact with 1st Army on Galician territory. "The primary concept was that Kummer's and Woyrsch's Groups and 1st and 4th Armies would attack the enemy between the Vistula and Bug while he was still assembling" 121.

However, the Russian advance in the east did substantially affect dispositions on the right wing. 3rd Army was still - as before - ordered to the line Magierow-Zolkiew-Kulikow; however, the III Corps, expected to take up a position east of Lemberg, was reassigned to it from Kövess' Group. Thus 3rd Army would be responsible for defense against the enemy forces advancing through Brody, Radziechow and Sokal, but also wholly or partially available to support 4th Army. Group Kövess, thus reduced to XII Corps, 11 ID and three weakened CD (5 Hon, 1 and 8), would turn its attention solely toward the east. It was

121 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 474
ordered to delay the advance "of the enemy which had invaded through Tarnopol and the area to its south" and "deliver a heavy blow against the enemy in the east when he has reached the line Dunajow-Krasne." It was "not in the intentions of the AOK" to allow the Russians past this line.

43 LW ID and the units arriving from the Balkans were ordered to assemble east and north of Stanislau on the Dniester to provide a flanking force facing north; they were to utilize the fortified bridgeheads on the Dniester. Observation of the border territory between the Dniester and Pruth was left solely to 35 Lst Inf Bde.

This was the order of battle on 23 August as Austria-Hungary's military machine entered its first great battle against the powerful foe. Several days previously, the enemy had also taken up the offensive, on the opposite flank. A gigantic campaign of maneuver was beginning.

c. The Russian Army - war preparations, plans and mobilization

Strength of the Army

(see volume 1 leaflet 9 and sketch 2)

Tsar Nicholas II, under pressure from his Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff, after a long delay had finally consented to general mobilization on 30 July. At this time his army in Europe and the Caucasus consisted of 30 corps with 59 active infantry divisions, 12 rifle brigades and 31 reserve divisions, plus 23 cavalry divisions and 4 independent cavalry brigades and about 12 Cossack Divisions of the II Ban. Total strength was thus 96 infantry and 37 cavalry divisions, or about 2,700,000 men; there were an additional 900,000 men in the opolchenyi (militia), fortress garrisons and ersatz units. A Russian infantry division had 16 battalions, 6 squadrons and 48 guns; there were also about 10 mostly heavy guns available per division from the corps and army reserve artillery. Thus a Russian division was not much stronger than an Austrian one. A Russian reserve division had the same strength as an active unit, but couldn't count on support from corps or army artillery. A rifle brigade was half the size of a division. A Russian cavalry division had about the same number of squadrons, machine guns and cannon as an Austrian division.
Moreover, this enormous force would eventually gain further strength when the distant Asiatic troops arrived; these consisted of 5 1/2 Siberian and 2 Turkestan corps. The total available army therefore consisted of 1830 battalions, 1250 squadrons and 6720 guns - together about 5,000,000 men.

Supported by its French allies, the Russian Army had recovered rather rapidly from the effects of its defeat by Japan and the ensuing revolution. Although the great armament program of 1913 wouldn't have been finished for 5 years, the Tsarist Army in the year 1914 was still a respectable military instrument in its inner quality as well as its size. Most of the leaders down to company commanders had had some combat experience in the Far East. In military training the troops had considerable advantages over their opponents, particularly in their utilization of terrain to counteract modern firepower. Although the Army contained soldiers of many nationalities, its tone was set by the Great Russian "Muzhiks." The numerous muzhiks were good soldiers, tough and durable. They showed considerable willingness for self-sacrifice, although this was due less to good morale than to Russian fatalism and to centuries of submission to outside authority. The downside of fatalism was a certain inertia, which reached even into the highest levels of command. To counteract this fatalism was a major goal of the man who was acting for the Tsar as Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch. His principal assistants were the Chief of Staff, General Yanushkevitch, and the First Quartermaster, General Danilov.

Pre-War Planning

Already on 6 August the Russian high command, called the "Stavka", had received definite information from its intelligence service that the German troops in Pomerania, Posen and Silesia (II, V and VI Corps) were being sent to the West; clearly Germany was making its main effort in that direction. Therefore, of the two pre-war plans - "G" (Germany) and "A"

122 Frantz, Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg (Berlin 1924), pp. 24 ff. According to Valentinov (Russia's Military Understandings with Foreign Powers before the War of 1914-18 (in Russian in Vozheno Istoristcheski Sbornik, Moscow 1919 - Heft 2, p. 112) the Russian Chief of General Staff of 1911, General Jilinski, had told his French colleague that the Russian Army organization would be finished by the end of 1916 rather than in 1918.
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(Austria) - the latter came into effect. In both situations it had been planned to divide the Army into two main groups: the Northwest Front under the former Chief of Staff, General Jilinski, with 1st and 2nd Armies, and the Southwest Front under General Ivanov with 3rd, 5th and 8th Armies. Under Plan "G" the strong 4th Army would have gone to the Northwest Front rather than the Southwest. The territory west of the Vistula was to be evacuated under either plan; if the German main forces had attacked in the East, the evacuation would have been extended eastward from Warsaw to Brest-Litovsk. In this eventuality the Russians, as in 1812, would have given up a considerable amount of land to their opponents. They would have stood on the defensive until the arrival of all the Asiatic troops enabled them to mount a counter-offensive.

For several years the French had been pressuring Russia to send its largest force against Germany rather than Austria even under the conditions of Plan "A." Although the Russian General Staff did not rate the power of resistance of the "disorderly, patchwork" Austro-Hungarian Army very highly, they still didn't want to risk leaving it alone without first crippling it by a heavy blow. Therefore in their convention with the French in 1912 they agreed to commit at least 800,000 men to the German front, but nonetheless were sending just 34 divisions against East Prussia and 46 1/2 against Galicia.

The Russian leadership intended its two Fronts to function as two fists which would break into the enemy bastions of East Prussia and east Galicia. Only after these bastions - or at least the Galician bastion - were taken would they proceed as the French desired and strike through Warsaw into the heart of Germany. Two flanking Armies would not fight initially - 6th Army was left to guard St Petersburg and Finland while 7th Army guarded the Black Sea coast. The Tsar's recent meeting with the King of Romania had given the Russians enough assurance of the latter's neutrality that they would immediately detach the VIII Corps at Odessa from 7th Army to proceed to the Galician front. The Grand Duke-Generalissimus wanted to reassure the disappointed French, and in any event fully intended to advance into Germany after seizing the outlying bastions; therefore between 7 and 10 August he began the formation of two more armies around Warsaw: the 9th and 10th. The 9th would consist of Guard and XVIII Corps, soon reinforced by the Finnish XXII Corps from 6th Army; the 10th would have II Caucasian, 1st Turkestan and III Siberian Corps. Of these six corps, four would proceed to the area Thorn-Posen, two to Posen-Breslau. If necessary the III Caucasian Corps, deployed by Ivango...
provide flank protection for this maneuver 123.

The two front commanders - Zhilinski in the north and Ivanov in the south - were given considerable independence in operational decisions. It proved very difficult for the Stavka to intervene in their affairs. Often the only means by which the high command could impose its will on the Fronts would be by releasing or withholding the units not assigned to either of them, and the newly arriving units.

**Russian operations during mobilization and deployment**

Because of their great numerical advantage against East Prussia, the Russian commanders initially had little concern about the strategic situation there. GdK Zhilinski sent 1st Army over the Niemen on 17 August and sent 2nd Army over the Narew two days later. The situation seemed more difficult in the south, where Ivanov's four armies lay in a wide arc around Galicia between the Vistula and Dniester. However, the mobilization against Austria-Hungary at the start of the war took place quickly thanks to improvements financed by French loans, the last of which had consisted of 2 1/2 million francs in 1913 124.

According to the estimates of the Austrian General Staff, the Russian railroads in the Ivangoord-Nowosielica border area could accommodate 260 trains per day as opposed to the 153 which Austria-Hungary could use for its own mobilization on the other side of the border. Nonetheless, because of the great distances within Russia this advantage would not bring decisive numerical superiority for some time. Also the Austrians' deployment back on the San and Dniester rather than on the border was an unpleasant surprise for the Russians, since they had hoped to attack three of the four enemy armies while they were still deploying farther forward on the long Nisko-Brody-Zalosce-Kopyczynce front.

Although Ivanov had large masses of cavalry available, he didn't

123 Zichovitch, Strategic Study of the World War 1914-1918 (in Russian, Moscow 1922), Vol. I, pp. 42 ff and 50 ff; as part of this arrangement the 4th Army would transfer one corps to 1st Army.

124 Eisenbahnbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes, Mitteilungen über Eisenbahnen in Russland, April 1914. Sukhomlinow, Errinerungen (Berlin 1924), pp. 240 ff. Ratzenhofer, Russlands Aufmarschkraft gegen Österreich-Ungarn und Russlands Aufmarsch-kraft, ein Prüfstein des Willens zum Angriffskrieg (Kriegsschuld-frage, Heft 5, 1928)
have any confidence in their ability to carry out a long-range reconnaissance mission; therefore the Russian horse opposite Galicia were used to screen their own side's movements rather than to detect those of the enemy. Ivanov's most important source of information was a well-prepared espionage network. Thanks largely to Russophile sentiment among parts of the Ruthene (Ukrainian) population, Russian spies ranged over all of east and central Galicia as far as the Beskid Mountains and thereby caused considerable inconvenience to the Aus.-Hung. armies in the beginning. Nonetheless, the Russian leadership was just as uncertain about the enemy's situation as were the Austrians. This uncertainty reacted upon the intelligent but methodical and hesitant Commander of the Southwest Front, much to the displeasure of the Grand Duke-Generalissimus. The Grand Duke felt himself obliged to urge the Front command several times to begin its advance as soon as possible. It was not until 18 August that Ivanov, at a conference in Rovno, consented to reinforce his right wing at the expense of the left by diverting the approaching III Caucasian Corps on the rail lines to 4th Army.

The Russian General Staff planned to catch the enemy forces deploying in east Galicia in an encircling movement and to destroy them by preventing their retreat to the west in the direction of Cracow or to the south over the Dniester. The 4th Army of General Baron Salza deployed around Lublin with 9 1/2 infantry and 4 1/2 cavalry divisions initially, although it would be gradually reinforced; Ivanov directed Salza to advance over the San to the area Debica-Rzeszow, thus cutting the enemy armies' escape route toward Cracow. The main goal of General Plehve's 5th Army (13 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions) was to seize the area Cieszanow-Rawa Russka-Magierow, northwest of Lemberg; from there it would be able to intervene in the fighting at Lemberg or Przemysl by either of the neighboring armies, or continue its movement between the two cities. Russky's 3rd Army (13 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions) would advance from the "fortified triangle" (Rovno-Dubno-Luck) to take Lemberg. Brussilov's newly-created 8th Army (11 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions) advanced in the area between Lemberg and the Dniester, with a refused southern wing to guard the flank. It was intended to cover the stretch between the Dniester and Pruth with a special detachment from 7th Army, but finally the task was given to a brigade from Brussilov's 12 ID; this was the

125 Auffenberg, Höhe und Niedergang, p. 281. Metzger, Der Krieg 1914 gegen Russland (Schwarte, Vol. V, p. 31)
forerunner of the "Dniester Detachment".  

Mainly due to urging from the Grand Duke-Generalissimus, Ivanov decided to let 8th Army advance on the 18th and the 3rd Army on its right on the 19th, without waiting for the arrival of III Caucasian or XXIV Corps. Thus on 22 August the 8th Army had already crossed the Zbrucz with VII, XII and VIII Corps between Woloczysk and Husiatyn, while XXIV Corps, which was to guard the southern flank, was still far behind at Kamienets-Podolsk. On the same day the 3rd Army came up to the border between Zbaraz and the upper Bug. 5th Army was still only partially assembled; its forward elements were on the line Krasnostaw to Vladimir-Volynsky; 4th Army, also incomplete, was on the line Jozefow-Bychawa. Both 4th and 5th Armies were nonetheless directed to begin their advance to the southwest on the 23rd. The Russian army command believed that this advance on the right would be aided by the earlier offensive on the left, which should be drawing the enemy's attention to the east. Conrad's firm decision to gain ground mainly in the north, and the fact that - at least at the start - he held back his flank guard, Kövess' Armee Gruppe, meant that the Russians' hopes would remained unfulfilled. Since the two sides on the western wing were already close to each other, this sector between the Bug and Vistula was the scene of the first great collision.

127 This Army's three reserve divisions, and the Ural Cossack Division, had not even begun to arrive as of 23 August (La grande guerre - Relation de l'etat-major russe, Paris 1926, p. 22)
The Russian order of battle
(This section is expanded considerably from the original text, where a short summary order of battle appears in Skizze 2. The additional information is drawn from the Hungarian official history and various Russian regimental lists.)

a) SUMMARY INITIAL DEPLOYMENT

Northwest Front (Zhilinsky), against Germany
. 1st Army (Rennenkampf) - Corps III [Vilna], IV [Minsk], XX [Riga]; 1 & 2 Gd CD; 1, 2, 3 CD; 1st Indep Cav Bde. 13 1/2 infantry, 5 1/2 cavalry divisions
. 2nd Army (Samsonov) - Corps II [Grodno], VI [Bialystok], XIII [Smolensk], XV [Warsaw], XXIII [Warsaw]; 4, 6 and 15 CD. 14 1/2 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions
. 9th Army (Leschitsky; still forming) - Guard, Ist and XVIII Corps [all from St Petersburg]; 5 and Caucasian CD. 6 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions

Southwest Front (Ivanov), against Austria
. 4th Army (Salza) - Corps Grenadier [Moscow], XIV [Lublin], XVI [Kazan]; 8, 13, 14 CD; 3 Don CD; Warsaw Guard Cav Bde. 9 1/2 infantry, 4 1/2 cavalry divisions
. 5th Army (Plehve) - Corps V [Voronezh], XVII [Moscow], XIX [Warsaw], XXV [Moscow]; 7 CD, Combined CD, 1st Don CD. 13 infantry, 3 cavalry divisions
. 3rd Army (Russky) - Corps IX [Kiev], X [Kharkov], XI [Rovno], XXI [Kiev]; III Caucasian [Vladikavkaz; diverted to the western flank]; 9, 10, 11 CD. 13 infantry, 3 cavalry divisions
. 8th Army (Brussilov) - Corps VII [Simferopol], VIII [Odessa], XII [Vinnitsa], XXIV [Samara]; 12 CD, 2 Comb Cossack CD. 11 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions

Still in the interior of the Empire
. 6th Army (by St Petersburg) - XXII Corps [Helsinki]. 4 infantry and 1 1/2 cavalry divisions
. 7th Army (by Odessa, opposite Romania) - 4 Reserve infantry divisions, 1 1/2 cavalry divisions.
. Opposite Turkey - Ist and II Caucasian Corps [both Tiflis], plus cavalry.
. In Asia - Ist and II Turkestan, Ist to V Siberian Corps, plus cavalry

b) Organization of Southwest Front as of 10 September (i.e., at the end of the fighting)

Commander = Ivanov
Strength = 51 x ID, 21 x CD; 823 1/2 bns, 690 sqdns, 417 batties (with 3060 guns)

**3rd Army** (Ruzsky)

IX Corps (Shcherbatchev) (2 Black Sea Coss Regt; 9 Mortar Bn)
- 5 ID - IR Archangel 17, Vologda 18, Kostrom 19, Galicia 20; 5 Arty Bde
- 42 ID - IR Luck 165, Rovno 166, Ostorisk 167, Mirgorod 168; 42 Arty Bde

X Corps (Sievers) (3 Poltava Coss Regt; 32 Don Coss Sotnya; 10 Mortar Bn)
- 9 ID - IR Yelets 33, Sievsk 34, Bryansk 35, Orel 36; 9 Arty Bde
- 31 ID - IR Pensa 121, Tambov 122, Kozlov 123, Voronezh 124; 31 Arty Bde

XI Corps (Sakharov) (2 Ekaterinburg Coss Regt, 12 Don Coss Sotnya; 11 Mortar Bn)
- 11 ID - IR Selenguin 41, Yakutsk 42, Okhotsk 43, Kamchatka 44; 11 Arty Bde
- 32 ID - IR Kursk 125, Rylsk 126, Putivl 127, Stary Oskol 128; 32 Arty Bde

XXI Corps (Shkinsky) (43 Don Coss Regt, 13 Don Coss Sotnya; 21 Mortar Bn)
- 33 ID - IR Bessarabia 129, Cherson 130, Tiraspol 131, Bender 132; 33 Arty Bde
- 44 ID - IR Kamenets 173, Romensk 174, Baturusk 175, Perevolochnensk 176; 44 Arty Bde

III Caucasian Corps (had transferred to 4th Army)

Independent (Reserve) Infantry Divisions
- 58 ID - IR Skvir 229, Novo Volynsk 230, Drogitschin 231, Radomyshl 232; 58 Arty Bde
- 69 ID - IR Bogoduchev 273, Izyum 274, Lebedin 275, Kupiyan 276; 69 Arty Bde
- 78 ID - IR Ovrutschk 309, Szatsk 310, Kremieniec 311, Valikov 312; 78 Arty Bde

Cavalry Divisions
- 9 CD - DR Kazan 9, UR Bug 9, HR Kiev 9; Ural Coss Regt 1; Horse Arty Bn 9
- 10 CD - DR Novgorod 10, UR Odessa 10, HR Ingria 10; Orenburg Coss Regt 1; Don Coss Horse Arty Bn 3
- 11 CD - DR Riga 11, UR Chuguiev 11, HR Izyum 11; Don Coss Regt 12; Horse Arty Bn 11

3 Caucasian Coss Div - Ekaterinodar Coss Regt 1, Ossetia Horse Regt, Kizilyar-Greben Coss Regt 1, Dagestan Horse Regt 1; Cauc Coss Horse Arty Bn 3

Army artillery - 4 Heavy Arty Battalion (3 batteries, 12 guns)

Miscellaneous - The Army had absorbed some border guard units,
but the details are unknown

**4th Army** (Evert, who’d replaced Salza on 4 Sept)
Guard Corps (from 9 Army) (Bezobrazov) (Astrakhan Coss Regt; Gd Mortar Bn)
1 Gd ID - Gd Regts Preobrazhensk, Semenov, Ismailov, Jaeger;
   1 Gd Arty Bde
2 Gd ID - Gd Regts Moscow, Grenadier, Pavlov, Finland
   2 Gd Arty Bde
Grenadier Corps (Mrozovsky) (6 Don Coss Sotnya; Gren Mortar Bn)
1 Gren Div - Gren Regts Ekaterinoslav 1, Rostov 2, Pernau 3,
   Nesvizh 4; 1 Gren Arty Bde
2 Gren Div - Gren Regts Kiev 5, Tauride 6, Samogitia 7,
   Moscow 8; 2 Gren Arty Bde
XVI Corps (Geismann) (16 Mortar Bn)
41 ID - IR Alexandropol 161, Akhaltsykh 162, Lenkov- Nassheburg 163; 41 Arty Bde
47 ID - IR Bash Kadiklaya 185, Avlanduz 186, Avars 187, Kars 188; 47 Arty Bde
III Caucasian Corps (from 3 Army) (Irman) (3 Cauc Mortar Bn)
21 ID - IR Apsheron 81, Dagestan 82, Samur 83, Shirwan 84;
   21 Arty Bde
52 ID - IR Chemakhin 205, Salyan 206, Novohaya Zetsk 207, Loris 208; 52 Arty Bde
XIV Corps - Had transferred to 9 Army on 3 Sept
Independent Infantry
2 Rifle Bde - Had transferred to 9 Army on 3 Sept
80 ID - Had transferred to 9 Army
82 ID - IR Tsarev Gurev 325, Bieigerazh 326, Korvan 327, Novo Uzen 328; 82 Arty Bde
83 ID - IR Buzuluk 329, Zlatoust 330, Ora 331, Oboyan 332; 83 Arty Bde
Cavalry
8 CD (arrived on 1 Sept, moved to 9 Army on 3 Sept)
13 CD (to 9 Army on 3 Sept)
14 CD (to 9 Army on 3 Sept)
"Warsaw" Gd Cav Bde - Tsar's Gd UR, Grodno Gd HR; Gd Horse Arty Battery 3
Cossacks
3 Don Div - Don Regts 18, 20, 30, 32
Ural Div (completed 21 Sept) - Ural Regts 4, 5, 6, 7
Army Artillery - 3 Heavy Arty Bn
Border troops (absorbed into regular units) - 14 x inf comps and 14 x cav sqdns
**5th Army** (Plehve)

V Corps (Litvinov) (5 Mortar Bn)
- 7 ID - IR Smolensk 25, Mogilev 26, Vitebsk 27, Polotsk 28; 7 Arty Bde
- 10 ID - IR Ekaterinburg 37, Tobolsk 38, Tomsk 39, Kolivan 40; 10 Arty Bde

XVII Corps (Yakovlev) (17 Mortar Bn)
- 3 ID - IR Old Ingria 9, New Ingria 10, Pskov 11, Veliki Luki 12; 3 Arty Bde
- 35 ID - IR Nezhin 137, Bolkhov 138, Morshansk 139, Sarai 140; 35 Arty Bde

XIX Corps (Gorbatovsky) (19 Mortar Bn)
- 17 ID - IR Moscow 65, Butyrsk 66, Borodino 67, Tarutine 68; 17 Arty Bde
- 38 ID - IR Black Sea 149, Taman 150, Pyatigorsk 151, Vladikavkaz 152; 38 Arty Bde

XXV Corps (Zuyev) (25 Mortar Bn)
- 3 Gren Div - Gren Regts Siberia 9, Malorossia 10, Fanagoria 11, Astrakhan 12; 3 Gren Arty Bde
- 46 ID - IR Ostrolenka 181, Grokhov 182, Pultusk 183, Varchan 184; 46 Arty Bde

Independent ID
- 55 ID - Had been in Brest garrison, then transferred to Northwest Front
- 61 ID - IR Siedlec 241, Lukov 242, Cholm 243, Krasnostaw 244; 61 Arty Bde
- 70 ID - IR Pereiaslav 277, Krom 278, Lochvitsk 279, Sursk 280; 70 Arty Bde
- 81 ID - Assigned to 5 Army, but was in Brest garrison rather than at the front

Cavalry
- 7 CD - DR Kinburn 7, UR Olviopol 7, HR Belarus 7, Don Coss Regt 11; Horse Arty Bn 7
- Combined CD - 2 Indep Bde [HR Chernigov 17 & Nezhin 18], 3 Indep Bde [UR New Archangel 17, Novomirgorod 18]

Cossacks
- 1 Don Coss Div - Don Regts 9, 10, 13, 15 and Horse Arty Bn 1
- 4 Don Coss Div - Don Regts 19, 24, 25, 26; arty ??
- 5 Don Coss Div - Don Regts 27, 28, 29, 33; arty ??

Army Artillery - 5 Heavy Arty Bn

Border troops (absorbed into regular units) - 17 x inf comps and 17 x cav sqdns

**8th Army** (Brussilov)

VII Corps (Eck) (32 Don Coss Sotnya; 7 Mortar Bn)
- 13 ID - IR Brest 49, Bialystok 50, Lithuania 51, Vilna 52;
13 Arty Bde
34 ID - IR Simferopol 133, Feodosia 134, Kertch-Enikol 135, Taganrog 136; 34 Arty Bde

VIII Corps (Dimitriev) (8 Mortar Bn)
14 ID - IR Volhynia 53, Minsk 54, Podolia 55, Zhitomir 56; 14 Arty Bde
15 ID - IR Modlin 57, Praga 58, Lublin 59, Zamosc 60; 15 Arty Bde

XII Corps (Letch) (2 Uzup Coss & 3 Kuban Coss Regts; 12 Don Coss Sotnya; 12 Mortar Bn)
12 ID - IR Azov 45, Dnieper 46, Ukraine 47, Odessa 48; 12 Arty Bde
19 ID - IR Crimea 73, Stavropol 74, Sevastopol 75, Kuban 76;
19 Arty Bde

XXIV Corps (Kvritsov) (18 Orenburg Coss Regt, 35 Don Coss Sotnya; 24 Mortar Bn)
48 ID - IR Ismail 189, Ochakov 190, Largo-Kagul 191, Rymnik 192; 48 Arty Bde
49 ID - IR Sviash 193, Troitsk-Sergiev 194, Orovais 195, Insarsk 196; 49 Arty Bde

Independent Infantry (Rifle Regts had 2 bns each instead of 4)
3 Rifle Bde - Rifle Regts 9, 10, 11, 12; 3 Rifle Arty Bn
4 Rifle Bde (usually attached to VIII Corps) - Rifle Regts 13, 14, 15, 16; 4 Rifle Arty Bn
60 ID - IR Grazhvoron 237, Vetluzh 238, Konstantinograd 239;
Vavr 240; 60 Arty Bde
65 ID - IR Braclav 257, Kishinev 258, Olgopol 259, Eupatoria 260; 65 Arty Bde
71 ID - IR New Moscow 281, Alexandria 282, Pavlograd 283, Vengrov 284; 71 Arty Bde

12th Cavalry Div - DR Starodub 12, UR Belgorod 12, HR Akhtyrk 12;
Orenburg Coss Regt 3; Don Horse Arty Bn 2

Cossacks
2 Combined Div - Don Regts 16, 17; Line (Kuban) Regt 1; Volga (Terek) Regt 1; Orenburg Coss Horse Arty Bn
1 Kuban Div (not ready until 21 Sept) - Kuban Regts Uman 2, Poltava 2, Taman 2 (i.e. just three regts)
2 Kuban Div (not ready until 21 Sept) - Regts Zaporozhe (Kuban) 2, Kuban 2, Orenburg 10
Terek Div (not ready until 21 Sept) - Regts Gors-Mozdok 2, Sunzha-Vladikavkaz 2, Volga 2, Kizlyar-Greben 2
(Army had no artillery battalion assigned yet; no border troops absorbed)
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**9th Army** (Lechitsky)
Had joined SW from NW Front...

XIV Corps (from 4 Army) (Murdos-Zhilinsky) (14 Mortar Bn)
18 ID - IR Ryazan 69, Ryask 70, Belev 71, Tula 72; 18 Arty Bde
45 ID - IR Izbov 177, Venden 178, Ust-Dvinsk 179, Vindau 180; 45 Arty Bde

XVIII Corps (Krusenstern) (18 Mortar Bn)
23 ID - IR Belomorsk 89, Onezhsk 90, Dvina 91, Pechersk 92; 23 Arty Bde
37 ID - IR Novocherkask 145, Tsaritsyn 146, Samara 147, Caspian 148; 37 Arty Bde

Independent
Gd Rifle Bde - Gd Rifle Regts 1, 2, 3, 4; Gd Rifle Arty Bn
2 Rifle Bde (from 4 Army) - Rifle Regts 5, 6, 7, 8; 2 Rifle Arty Bn
75 ID (at Ivanгород fortress) - IR Kovel 297, Mstislav 298, Dubrin 299, Zaslovsk 300; 75 Arty Bde
80 ID (from 4 Army) - IR Drissa 317, Chernoyar 318, Bugumil 319, Chembarsk 320; 80 Arty Bde

Cavalry Divisions
5 CD - DR Kargopol 5, UR Lithuania 5, HR Alexandria 5; Don Coss Regt 5; Horse Arty Bn 5
8 CD (from 4 Army) - DR Astrakhan 8, UR Voznesensk 8, HR Lubny 8; Don Coss Regt 8; Horse Arty Bn 8
13 CD (from 4 Army) - DR Military Order 13, UR Vladimir 13, HR Narva 13; Orenburg Coss Regt 2 (unknown arty)
14 CD (from 4 Army) - DR Malorossia 14, UR Yamburg 14, HR Mitau 14; Don Coss Regt 14; Horse Arty Bn 14
Turkestan Coss Div - Regts Orenburg 4, 5, 6; Ural 2, Semerchin 1 (i.e. five regts); Orenburg Coss Horse Battery 2; Turkestan Horse Mountain Battery
B. The Northern Attack of the Austro-Hungarians

1. The Victory at Krasnik (23–25 August)

(see volume 1 sketch 3 and leaflet 9)

While the Russians' left flank gained ground in east Galicia on the 23rd, the right also began its advance. On this day General Plehve's 5th Army reached the line Izbica–Hrubieszow–Vladimir–Volynsky, where it planned to await the arrival of more transports on the 24th. On the other side, Auffenberg's 4th Army was able to complete its approach march through the forests, sands and swamps of the upper Tanew without holdups, and on the evening of the 23rd camped as planned behind the line Narol–Tereszpol. Still in the rear were XVII Corps (which had just been formed around Radymno and Jaroslau from 19 ID and 2 and 9 March Bdes) and 26 LW ID, most of which was arriving by rail in the deployment area. The 23 Hon ID, coming from Syrmia, had been supposed to join 4th Army; however, when it detrained at Sadowa–Wisznia it was sent on to 3rd Army.

On 23 August General Salza, commander of the 4th Russian Army, ordered his Corps – XIV, XVI and the Grenadiers – to advance on a broad front to the line Zaklikow–Janow–Frampol. The Army's flanks and rear were guarded by 13 CD (reinforced by the Warsaw Guard Cav Bde) along the eastern bank of the Vistula and by 3 Don Coss Div on the left of the Grenadiers. 14 Cav Div, still west of the Vistula, was sent ahead toward Sandomierz and Baranow.

On the same day the k.u.k. 1st Army wanted to seize the terrain north of the Tanew for use as a base for "a powerful advance of the western Army wing to the north followed by a successful pivot by the Army toward the east." Therefore it was inevitable that the western flank armies of the two Empires would collide in the lands south of Krasnik.

In the last few days, Dankl's cavalry had already identified 18 ID of the Russian XIV Corps in addition to 13 Cav Div and the Guard Cav Bde. Crossing the 15 to 30 km wide Tanew Marsh required special preparations, which had been accomplished on 22 August, a day devoted to "closing ranks." To cover the Army's deployment after marching through the narrow paths in the Marsh, mixed detachments of 12 ID were sent ahead to the high ground.
The advance guards of the various Corps were ordered to reach and secure the line Goraj-Polichna-Goscieradow-Annopol. 9 Cav Div was in front of the Army's right, 3 Cav Div in front of the left. 100 Lst Inf Bde, which had advanced on boats down the Vistula from Cracow, deployed just west of the river; it was ordered to advance to Lasocin to cover the construction of a military bridge at Zawichost for the use of Kummer's Group. Two other Landsturm Inf Bdes, 1 and 36, were coming up by rail and would be available on the 26th at Baranow and Nisko (near the San-Vistula confluence).

23 August

The columns of 1st Army started off early on 23 August to be certain of meeting their wide-ranging goals for the day. Dankl's troops made their way forward under the scorching glare of the summer sun along sandy roads that often led through bogs. Around 9:00 AM the first detachments of GdK Karl Freih. von Kirchbach's 1st Corps (5 and 46 ID) came into conflict north of Zaklikow with 18 Russian ID, advancing from Krasnik. The marching columns which followed them set to work to secure the paths leading out of the Tanew Marsh and deployed for the attack. In a severe combat which lasted until evening, Kirchbach's west Galician, Silesian and Moravian regiments drove the enemy through Goscieradow and back to the north. The Russian 13 CD, stationed with some attached regiments of 2 Rifle Bde west of Goscieradow, was also drawn into the fight. In the morning the Russians had won an action with the k.u.k 3 CD; however, in the afternoon they were attacked from Annopol by FML Kestranek with his own 12 ID and the 1st March Bde and, like 18 ID, forced to retreat 128.

FZM von Puhallo's V Corps was in the center of 1st Army; in this sector IR # 76 and two batteries (led by GM von Scharicz of 27 Inf Bde) had already taken the heights south of Polichna at dawn. Around noon they were attacked in vain by superior enemy forces (from 45 ID of Russian XIV Corps). Soon thereafter IR # 76 opened a counterattack and in a heroic but costly effort took the town of Polichna, even though the enemy had been substantially reinforced. Farther to the left a detachment under GM von Willerding (from 28 Inf Bde) arrived at 1:00 PM and also threw the Russians back; FJB # 11 was particularly

128 Near Goscieradow, Major Oskar Hofmann of FKR # 1 on his own initiative led part of a battery against the flank and rear of the enemy force; for this he was awarded the Maria Theresia Cross.
distinguished in this action. Other parts of FML Martiny's 14 ID helped put the finishing touches to the victory. The main body of Ist Corps, 33 ID and 37 Hon ID, reached their day's objectives without fighting.

The k.u.k. X Corps (GdI Hugo von Meixner) also was not engaged. After difficult marches (involving up to 30 km for many of the troops), but without encountering the enemy, it camped for the night on the heights northwest and east of Frampol. On the Army's flank, 9 CD reported encounters with small detachments of enemy foot and horse south of the Por Brook; the Austrian cavalry, exhausted by ten days of difficult reconnaissance missions, took up quarters at Frampol when the day ended.

The impetuous attack of the left wing of 1st Army had been a very promising opening to the fighting between the Vistula and the Bug. GdK Dankl, planning to drive the enemy toward the east, ordered Ist Corps to continue the attack on Krasnik from the west on the 24th, while the left flank and center of V Corps approached the city from the south. The rest of V Corps and all of X Corps would hold itself in readiness to advance against the Por Brook when ordered by the Army commander.

The plan to roll up the enemy line from the left was consistent with the wishes of the AOK. Kummer's Group, which on the 23rd had reached Opatow after an easy march, was ordered by Conrad to quickly cross the Vistula at Sandomierz and An mopol with the largest possible force and thus strengthen Dankl's drive. Moreover, AOK had learned from flyers that two Russian corps (XVI and the Grenadiers) were advancing toward the Por Brook; therefore they ordered parts of II Corps, on the left flank of 4th Army, to intervene in the action of 1st Army. This decision was possible because at the same time it was learned that 5th Russian Army was still holding back from the fighting; however, the favorable outcome of the Krasnik Battle eventually made the commitment of II Corps unnecessary.

On the Russian side, the beaten XIV Corps pulled back on the evening of the 23rd to the heights west of Krasnik. The main bodies of the XVI and Grenadier Corps had not yet crossed the Por Brook; only detachments stood south of the stream. 3 Don Coss Div was patrolling northeast of Tereszpol. Under the first

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129 The two brigade commanders (GM Scharczer and Willerding) as well as Colonel Boeriu of IR # 76 were decorated with the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Order for the capture of Polichna.
impression of the setback and on receiving reports of the advance of three enemy columns through Bilgoraj to the north (apparently this referred to X k.u.k. Corps and perhaps also to II Corps), Salza was inclined to stay on the defensive with his whole Army south of the Wyznica and the Por Brook; for this purpose he sent one brigade of XVI Corps to reinforce the badly hurt XIV. Yet Salza finally failed to rescind the order which he had given the day before to XVI Corps and the Grenadiers to reach Janow and Frampol. This seems to have been due to a directive of the 23rd from Ivanov - who was still ignorant of the new situation - which widened 4th Army's mission to explicitly include the occupation of the line of the San River from its mouth down to Jaroslau.

24 August

Early on 24 August, the second day of the Battle of Krasnik, the XVI Corps and the Grenadiers collided with our V and X Corps. Under X Corps, which was farther south than the rest of 1st Army, 24 ID staved off heavy attacks by the Grenadiers on both sides of the low ground along the Lada around Goraj; on its left the 2 ID (FML Liposcak) held 41 ID of XVI Corps at bay with spirited counterattacks. In the afternoon the Russians threatened to push into the gap between the two divisions, so the dismounted 9 CD hurried to the scene to hurl back the enemy. The decision was won by FML Ljubicic's 45 LW ID on the right wing of X Corps; it advanced against the flank of the 2nd Grenadier Div east of the Lada and received considerable artillery support from 4 ID of 4th Army (stationed by Tereszpol). The Russians could no longer hold their ground; as they pulled back they left numerous prisoners and 19 guns in the hands of the attackers.

Under V Corps, 37 Hon ID (on the left of 2 ID) fought a successful defensive action against parts of XVI Russian Corps. The Corps' left wing - 33 and 14 ID - wheeled around toward Krasnik and thus struck the inner flanks of the enemy's XVI and XIV Corps. In a severe struggle which raged back and forth, FML Edler von Rebracha's 33 ID in particular was able to gain ground; the Russians lost the heights on the southwestern and southern edges of Krasnik.

Ist Corps used the morning to carefully prepare its position; it had regained control of Kestranek's group (12 ID and 1 March

130 Zichovitch, op. cit., p. 141. La grande guerre, pp. 139 ff.
Bde) which on the previous day had been directly under 1st Army. Then FML Nastopil's 46 LW ID advanced west and southwest of Krasnik, taking advantage of the successes of V Corps. FML Scotti's 5 ID drove the enemy XIV Corps over the Wyznica and stayed on the heels of the Russians as they retreated northwest; its advanced guard reached the area around Urzedow in the evening.

Kestranek's group stayed in echelon on the left of the other two divisions of Ist Corps. Farther west, in the Vistula valley, 3 CD felt its way forward around Jozefow. News about Austrian activity in this area reached the Russian army commander around noon. This made such an impression on General Salza, already depressed by the events of the 23rd, that he wanted to retreat with his Army to the line Wilkolaz-Bychawa-Krzczonow 131. However, in the evening the Russians were still standing farther to the south. 1st Army's right wing was too exhausted by the fighting to begin the pursuit over the Por Brook in the gathering darkness. The left wing had mostly been halted several hours earlier by Dankl; because of an exaggerated report of strong enemy reinforcements approaching from Opole and wishing to avoid unpleasant surprises, he directed the troops to stay south of the Wyznica - except for 5 "Olmütz" ID, which had reached Urzedow north of the river. Because of these developments there was no immediate threat against the badly battered XIV Russian Corps; it was able to stay on the heights east of Krasnik, with its right flank bent sharply back toward Wilkolaz. XVI Corps spent the night at Batorz, and the Grenadier Corps was north of the Por at Turobin.

The news from the battlefield at Krasnik now began to cause great uneasiness among the higher echelons of the Russian command. The Russians had suffered misfortune in the very sector where the Tsar's army had planned to cross the San and deliver a death-blow to its enemy. And now it seemed they would be lucky just to hold their ground. General Ivanov at Southwest Front HQ ordered the 80 ID transported as quickly as possible to Lublin 132 while the Stavka also wrestled with some difficult decisions. They surmised that the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian army would advance north on the Tomaszow-Zamosc Road; therefore they ordered 5th Army, which had reached the line Izbica-Hrubieszow, to veer toward the southwest to take the enemy in the flank and rear. 5th Army's right flank corps - the XXV - should immediately take up a position on the Wieprz facing

131 La grande guerre, pp. 140 ff.
132 Zichovitch, p. 144
due west while marching one brigade at Salza's request directly to Lublin. Until 5th Army could intervene, General Salza should stay without budging on the heights by Goraj. Salza hoped to fulfill this mission by having XIV Corps give up a little more ground to its especially strong opponent but hold the line Belzyce-Wilkolaz while the left wing launched a new offensive south over the Por Brook. The pivot of this difficult maneuver, which would greatly try the flexibility of both leadership and troops, was Wilkolaz, held by 45 ID. The reinforced 3 CD was responsible for guarding the northern flank.

25 August

For 25 August, GdK Dankl ordered his left wing to continue its effort to roll up the enemy line, while the right wing stood in place. Ist Corps was to advance at 8:00 AM from Urzedow toward Wilkolaz, but the movement was postponed due to continuing concern about possible enemy intervention from the direction of Opole. Because of this concern, Kestranek's group was to be held back to protect the left flank and to cover the crossing of the Vistula at Jozefow by 110 Lst Inf Bde, which had advanced to the mouth of the Kamienna.

Since the troops were still tired, Ist Corps didn't attack until 10:00 AM. FML Kestranek, who'd been reinforced by the Hungarian 101 Lst Inf Bde, didn't receive the Army commander's order to halt and therefore hastened with his regiments to cross the Wyznica to the left of his original position. The advance of Dankl's left wing caught the enemy while they were redeploying according to Salza's orders. The Russians, already in motion, evacuated the battlefield; as their right flank fell back east of Krasnik it became impossible for their left to carry out the planned attack on Goraj. By the first hours of the afternoon there could be no more doubt for the k.u.k. 1st Army: the enemy was in full retreat toward Lublin. At the same time advancing patrols of X Corps on the Por Brook found large numbers of Russian rifles and equipment abandoned on the battlefield of the day before. The action on the 24th had shattered the elite troops of the Grenadier Corps.

In the three-day Battle of Krasnik, the Austrians had 144 battalions, 71 squadrons and 354 guns against the Russian's 104 battalions, 100 squadrons and 350 guns. Both sides had very heavy casualties killed and wounded, a first taste of the sacrifices which the war would demand. Moreover the Russians

133 La grande guerre, pp. 142 ff. Danilow, pp. 234 ff.
lost 6000 prisoners and 28 guns. The Austro-Hungarians had opened the campaign with a promising victory, for which the victorious Army commander GdK Dankl was awarded one of the first Commander's Crosses of the Theresian Order to be won in the World War.

Results of the Battle

The strategic significance of the success by Krasnik was that Conrad had seized the initiative in the Vistula-Bug sector, an area that was menacing to both Austria and Germany. He was now dictating the course of events, which had already become clear when the Stavka started altering its dispositions on the second day of the battle. The Russians were now obliged to move their 5th Army toward the west, which would shortly give the k.u.k. 4th Army an opportunity to strike it on the flank and win another impressive battlefield success. Even more important was the fact that Krasnik led to the break-up of the large mass of troops which the Grand Duke-Generalissimo was assembling around Warsaw for an advance into Germany. In response to the pleas of the French, he was still firmly committed as late as the 23rd to sending 9th Army into Germany as soon as possible, without waiting for the completion of 10th Army. III Caucasian Corps, moving by rail toward Ivangoord, would follow 9th Army through Kielce. However, only 48 hours later the Grand Duke found himself forced to divert the leading corps of 9th Army - the XVIII - against Dankl's right flank to aid the hard-pressed 4th Army. Thus the plan for an immediate advance into Germany was more or less put on the shelf. Krasnik had almost given similar relief to the k.u.k. forces engaged in east Galicia: the Russians considered transferring XXIV Corps from their extreme left to their extreme right flank, and the westernmost corps of 3rd Army (XXI) to 5th Army. Unfortunately, however, these measures weren't taken.

At the end of 25 August, General Evert replaced Salza in command of 4th Army. Salza was accused of responsibility for the defeat because of his inadequate reconnaissance of the large tracts of forest along the Tanew, faulty coordination of the units of his Army, and failure to prepare for the enemy threat along the Vistula. However, his misfortune was primarily caused by the fact that 4th Army, on the western edge of the Russian mobilization, was inevitably the latest to reach full strength. Nonetheless, it had been driven to attack prematurely in an

attempt to encircle the Austrian armies as quickly as possible, regardless of whether it was prepared to do so. The victory at Krasnik had made such an encirclement maneuver impossible for the immediate future, while greatly strengthening the self-confidence of all the Austro-Hungarian troops in the area.

Measures of the Opposing High Commands after Krasnik

(see volume 1 leaflet 9)

While the news from the Krasnik battlefield raised spirits at headquarters in Przemysl, a heavy storm was approaching in eastern Galicia. The Russian 3rd and 8th Armies were resolutely moving toward Lemberg, while the Austrian covering forces were pulling back step by step. At this point, of course, the AOK still did not realize the heavy numerical superiority of the Russians. In his memoirs, GdI Conrad stated that until the afternoon of 24 August the staff in Przemysl estimated enemy strength northeast and east of Lemberg at 10 divisions; a review of the actual reports shows that this estimate is only a total of the identified Russian infantry and cavalry divisions. Nonetheless, the approach of a force of even this relatively small size pulled the problem of flank protection more and more into the foreground, especially since every step that the attacking armies took toward the north increased the distance between them and the flanking army at Lemberg.

As noted above, in the orders of 22 August Conrad entrusted the defense of east Galicia to the slowly arriving units of 2nd Army and to Kövess' Group, which at this point consisted only of XII Corps, 11 ID and 1, 5, and 8 CD. To Conrad's great anger, the events around Sabac would detain parts of 2nd Army longer than expected in Serbia; therefore in the next 48 hours the AOK would have to find some other means to ensure the immediate security of the Galician capital. The extraordinarily difficult task of guarding the flank and rear of the attacking armies against the threatening danger east of Lemberg was now placed in the hands of GdK Brudermann's 3rd Army. It would consist of XI and III Corps and, from the evening of the 23rd, also "temporarily" the

135 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 505. The use of actual reports to arrive at the figure of 10 divisions was the work of Pfeffer, "The Tenth Anniversary of the Battles of Zloczow and Przemyslany, 26–30 August 1914" (Vienna, 1924, p. 24). According to Pfeffer, the AOK neglected to pass on the information about the enemy situation, as it was clarified, to 3rd Army (p. 209).
XII Corps, 11 ID and 8 CD (i.e. most of Group Kövess). In addition, the 2nd Army command - expected to arrive at Stanislau on the 25th - was instructed "to drive back the enemy advancing here from the Zbrucz" with the units at hand and thus "protect the flank and rear of the whole Army." Toward the close of this order to the armies in the evening of the 24th, Conrad noted that after the successful completion of the northern offensive it might be necessary "to turn 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies to an attack in an easterly direction." However, for the foreseeable future all decisions taken regarding the eastern sector would be subordinate to the needs of the northern offensive. This was more important than ever because Conrad had just received a report from Capt. Fleischmann that the new commander of the German eastern Army, GO Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg, was sending his men into battle with the 2nd Russian Army, therefore "in the direction of Siedlec." In this sense, the AOK advised its two armies on the eastern flank at 5:30 PM on the 24th to be prepared for a possible later attack toward the north. 3rd Army was ordered to immediately release its left wing - Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's group of 3, 8 and 41 Hon ID - to support the attacking armies.

On the attacking wing, 1st Army was directed at 9:00 PM on the 24th to continue its advance toward Lublin: the right wing would move through Biskupice while the left would - as hitherto - seek to roll up the enemy while looking out for a sortie from the fortress at Ivangorod. The right wing of 4th Army, while providing "strong security against the east" would advance in the direction of the Huczwa. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would "move in echelon on the right [of 4th Army] toward Hrubieszow and secure the area eastward toward the Bug." Kummer's Group, which was nearing the Sandomierz-Konsk rail line near Ostrowiec, was ordered to cross the Vistula at Zawichost and there come under command of 1st Army. The German Landwehr Corps south of Radom would take over responsibility for flank protection in the direction of Ivangorod.

Thus the directives of the AOK made 1st Army the key player in the operation, and within that Army emphasized the importance of the left wing on the Vistula. This was consistent with the guiding idea of the campaign, to push the Russians back against the Pripyat Marshes. The Archduke's task of securing the right flank of the advancing 4th Army against the east again indicated how the events east of Lemberg were working against the Austrian plan. In a few days, however, the k.u.k. armies would be

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136 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 509
somewhat reluctantly obliged to shift plans because of the enemy's reactions to his defeat at the Battle of Krasnik. These reactions were the right wheel of 5th Army, which would thus offer its flank to Auffenberg, and the extension of the front of 4th Russian Army by the addition of XVIII Corps, whose approach would soon be felt by Dankl's brave troops. The result of these developments would be a new major trial of arms, the victory at Komarow.

GdK Dankl's opponent, Evert, was a resolute soldier. In full knowledge of the danger that threatened his right wing, the new commander of 4th Russian Army sent all available forces to the area around Wawolnica: these were a brigade of 46 ID, the first arriving troops from 80 ID, and the leading brigade of the approaching XVIII Corps (from 37 ID). The main body of Evert's army would face southwest on the line Belzyce-Borzechow-Bychawa-Turobin and draw the Austrians' attention, while the new group assembling around Wawolnica, in addition to 13 CD, would deliver a decisive relief attack southward into the enemy's open flank. However the opening of this flank attack would have to be delayed because of the inadequate railroads leading from Warsaw to Ivangorod; this would keep XVIII Corps from arriving on the battlefield until the evening of the 27th.

In the meantime it was therefore important for 4th Army to receive some help from its neighbor on the east, General Plehve's 5th Army. Ivanov had already ordered this Army on the 23rd to hold off the enemy forces reported around Tomaszw and Zamosc while falling on the flank and rear of the Austrian 1st Army. Thus moving slightly to the southwest, the Army would reach the line Zamosc-Tyszowce-Sokal on the 25th. On the 24th, the commander of the Southwest Front again instructed Plehve to "gather his corps for an attack against the flank and rear of the enemy forces pushing against 4th Army." However, Plehve should not neglect security measures in the direction of Rawa Russka and the importance of maintaining a link with Russky's north flank through Kamionka-Strumilowa.

Although Plehve was one of the most respected Russian commanders, he had only inadequate and partially incorrect information about his opponent. Therefore he wasn't counting on a collision with strong Austrian forces from the south for the foreseeable future (see volume 1 sketch 4). Indeed his corps did reach their objectives for the 25th without any fighting. XXV Corps was facing to the west on the heights on both sides of

137 Zichovitch, p. 46
the Wieprz by Zamosc; although tired, it was thus available to come to the aid of 4th Army, which was right on its flank. To support the fighting which was expected in the Zamosc area on the 26th, the center corps of 5th Army – XIX and V – were drawn together in the area Tomaszow–Laszczow to launch an attack to the south. XVII Corps, maneuvering to their left around Sokal, was to be ready to intervene either west or east of the Bug as needed. 1st Don Coss Div covered the gap between XXV Corps and the Army's center while 7 CD was on the eastern flank of XVII Corps. The Combined CD, which had been heavily damaged in the fighting at Turynka, was pulled behind the line to recuperate 138.

2. Opening of the Battle of Komarow (26 August)

(see volume 1 sketch 4)

GdI Auffenberg was meanwhile striving to bring his Army together; including Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, it now was spread out over an area 100 km wide and 60 km deep. On 25 August he was content to push his first line (VI, IX and II Corps) forward to Chodywance, Tomaszow and the upper Wieprz, while the Archduke's Group reached Zolkiew and Magierow. During this maneuver, Auffenberg received erroneous information that the enemy's main body had already reached the line Zamosc–Komarow–Tyszowce on the evening of the 24th, whereas in reality this didn't happen until a day later. Headquarters of 4th k.u.k. Army therefore reckoned on a major battle developing on the 25th, or at latest on the 26th. However, Auffenberg's corps settled down for the night on the 25th without being disturbed by the Russians, while the Army command also began to revise its picture of the enemy. It now seemed that only three Russian divisions had advanced to the area Tarnawatka–Rzeczyca, while the main body of the enemy 5th Army was still in echelon by Krasnostaw, Hrubieszow and Cholm.

This conviction led the commander of 4th k.u.k. Army to rapidly seize his opportunity, which anyway was consistent with the AOK's desire that he work together with the victoriously advancing 1st Army. So Auffenberg abandoned his original plan of using the 26th to bring his units closer together. Instead he would take advantage of the fact that his enemy was also widely scattered, and attack with the Austrian front line before

138 Zichovitch, p. 151. La grande guerre, pp. 149 & 153
the mass of Plehve's Army could coalesce. II Corps would advance to Zamosc, IX Corps to Jatutow and VI Corps to Tyszowce. II Corps was ordered to work together with the neighboring X Corps of 1st Army; VI Corps was to advance while deployed in depth to be able to either react to enemy attacks from the direction of Krylow or to itself make a swing to the right for an enveloping attack. The Army's two Cavalry Divisions were the 6 and 10 (the latter had arrived from the southern theater); they were placed under command of the senior Division leader, FML Wittmann of 6 CD, and directed to scout toward the Bug between Sokal and Hrubieszow. The left flank of the Archduke's Group had already been directed in the afternoon to advance from Magierow toward Uhnow; it was now told to aim even farther north, toward Tyszowce. 19 ID of XVII Corps was to reach Lubaczow, while the Corps' two March Brigades (2 and 9) were still a day's march farther south.

According to his post-war memoirs, GdI Auffenberg had already decided in the afternoon of the 25th to conduct the wide double encirclement of the enemy north of Tomaszow that he actually did carry out and which nearly resulted in an annihilation battle like Cannae. In a second work he included a facsimile of a post card on which this plan was sketched in considerable detail. "I gave this card," he stated, "to the Chief of the Army's General Staff with the direction that he use it as a guideline for further deployments." However, his Chief of Staff (later GdI) Rudolf Krauss and the Chief of the Operational Detachment, (later GdI) Carl Soos von Badok, did not remember these details when they submitted their own evidence to the archives after the war. Their recollection was that the plan for Komarow wasn't suddenly created, but evolved between the 25th and 28th as the situation kept changing.

The orders by the commanders on both sides led inevitably to a meeting engagement on the 26th between the Huczwa and the Wieprz. East of the Zamosc-Tomaszow Road, the main body of the forward-marching XIX Russian Corps collided on a slight elevation near Tarnawatka with 39 Hon ID, on the left flank of the k.u.k. VI Corps which was moving into battle in tight formation. The Honveds eagerly threw themselves onto the enemy and scored several successes, but finally had to pull back to the heights just north of Tomaszow where they were supported by the Corps reserve. On their right, 27 ID pushed back a weaker

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139 Auffenberg, Aus Österreich-Ungarns Teilnahme am Weltkriege (Berlin, 1923), p. 148
140 Auffenberg, Aus Österreichs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 293
enemy force by the source of the Huczwa, while 15 ID was able to reach the area south of Laszczow with almost no fighting.

West of the Zamosc-Tomaszow Road, a closed-up group of four divisions - 10 ID of IX Corps and 25, 13 LW and 4 ID of II Corps - advanced into the area around Zamosc; at the request of 4 ID, they were joined by the unit on the right flank of 4th Army, the 45 LW ID. While these units were carrying out a very difficult march toward the north they came upon 3 Gren Div of XXV Russian Corps at Zamosc; meanwhile the 70 ID to the north of Por Brook and half of 46 ID south of the Brook were hastening to the aid of 4th Russian Army's east flank by Turobin (the other half of 46 ID had been sent to strengthen 4th Army's position by Lublin). The Grenadiers collided in the woods southwest of Zamosc with the Lower Austrian and south Moravian regiments of 13 LW and 25 ID; since they were also threatened on the eastern flank by parts of 10 ID, the Russians had to pull back to the walls of Zamosc after some bitter fighting. The same fate befell the half of the Russian 46 ID south of the Por Brook; beset by 4 ID and 45 LW ID it had to seek protection behind the Labunka.

On the right flank of k.u.k. 4th Army, the horsemen of FML Wittmann came upon two Russian infantry regiments, accompanied by several Cossack sotnyas, who were guarding the southern flank of V Corps as it moved west from Warez toward Laszczow. The cavalry corps sent half its squadrons into the fight dismounted, and thus forced the enemy to deploy for battle. Neither side won an advantage. In the evening the two Austrian cavalry divisions, suffering from a lack of ammunition, pulled back to Uhnow.

Soon after beginning their march, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group received news about an alleged advance by Russian XVII Corps and about a movement by the right flank division of the 3rd Russian Army at Radziechow. It appeared that the goal of these marching Russian columns was Mosty Wielkie. Therefore the Archduke drew his divisions closer to this town. However, there was no action on the 26th because it was a rest day for the enemy XVII Corps and because the north flank of 3rd Russian Army was actually moving toward Kamionka-Strumilowa, not Mosty Wielkie.

3. Opening of the battle in front of Lublin (26–28 August)

(see volume 1 sketch 5)

26 August

To the left of the k.u.k. 4th Army, the troops of Dankl's 1st Army needed a rest day after the actions of the last 72 hours. Nonetheless, many of them spent the 26th in moving ahead toward the enemy front, which had been pulled back considerably north of Krasnik. On the eastern wing, X Corps advanced cautiously by Por Brook, where in the evening parts of 2 ID (and of 37 Hon ID of V Corps) drove back Russian rear guards who were still south of the stream. On the other side the Russian Grenadiers, whose artillery was still extraordinarily active, received considerable support as 70 ID (which was attached to XXV Corps) arrived at Turobin. On the left flank of k.u.k V Corps, 14 ID advanced on the east bank of the Bystrzyca, where it was engaged in the evening in an action at Rudnik; although the right brigade of 46 LW ID (Ist Corps) was drawn in to support the 14th, neither side gained the decision. Darkness intervened to end the action at Rudnik. The Army command had given the Ist Corps a rest day, and it camped on both sides of the Krasnik Highway south of Wilkolaz; however, its rest was disturbed by actions on both its right (by part of 46 LW ID, as noted above) and on its left. On the Corps' left (western) wing, Kestranek's Group (mainly 12 ID) advanced in minor fighting through Chodel toward the right wing of XIV Russian Corps, which was entrenching northwest of Borzechow. As the 26th drew to a close, Kestranek postponed an attack on the main enemy body until the next day because it was growing late and because the neighboring 5 ID declared it wasn't ready to participate because the troops were too tired. The over worked 3 CD managed to reach the heights north of Chodel.

The Army command was waiting in vain for 110 Lst Inf Bde to cross the Vistula at Jozefow; they didn't know that on the day before this Brigade had come under artillery fire from the Russian 14 CD deployed on the north bank of the Kamienna and had retreated in disorder to Lasocin. More fortunately, Kummer's Group was now close enough to prevent this panic from causing any lasting difficulty. Kummer's Landsturm troops had exerted all their strength to reach the area Sobotka-Opatow-Ostrowiec on the evening of the 25th. 7 CD was west of Ilza on the 23rd when it was pushed back behind the Kamienna by the Russian 14 CD —
strengthened by infantry – but it had itself been reinforced by a brigade from 106 Lst ID and had returned to the Ilza area.

Kummer's Group had wanted to rest on the 26th, but was spurred to action by the misfortunes of 110 Lst Inf Bde. 100 Lst Inf Bde was Kummer's advance guard; it had been supposed to be the first to cross the Vistula at Zawichost on the 26th, but instead it hurried north of Lasocin on its own responsibility. 95 Lst ID and parts of 106 Lst ID were ordered by Kummer to the same area in a night march. However, by this point the Russian 14 CD felt itself so much menaced from Ilza by its old opponent, k.u.k. 7 CD, that it withdrew from the mouth of the Kamienna. Therefore GdI Kummer could finally give his battalions their intended day of rest on the 27th.

In its orders on the 26th, the Austrian AOK had instructed Kummer's Group and the 1st and 4th Armies to continue to follow the earlier orders of 24 August. At this time GdK Dankl was convinced that the Russians were in full retreat toward Lublin. Accordingly for the 27th he told his units to be ready to renew the fight. Kestranek's Group was north of Borzechow and Ist and V Corps on both sides of the Bystrzyca; Ist Corps was to hold its already advanced position while V Corps advanced to Bychawa. Then Kestranek with 3 CD on his left would pivot in echelon toward the east, while Ist and V Corps attacked from the south. Kummer's Armee Gruppe would join the battle north of Kestranek's Group as soon as possible. The first task of X Corps would be to secure the higher ground north of the Por Brook; at the express instructions of the AOK it was also to be ready to intervene on the flank of 4th k.u.k. Army (the latter mission was given to 45 LW ID on the Corps' left).

27 August

Early on the 27th a renewed battle blazed on the entire front of 1st Army. The immediate objective of X Corps was to take the town of Zolkiewka, after which it would turn toward either Lublin or Krasnostaw depending on the situation. However, the advance guard of 24 ID got into trouble in the morning, when it was assailed near Nowa-Wies by the Russians' fresh 70 ID from the northeast. Overly-complicated orders from 24 ID at first made it impossible to provide support for its battalions fighting on the north bank of Por Brook. To make matters worse, to the east of 24 ID the advancing left column of 45 LW ID, the 90 LW Bde, was defeated by other parts of 70 ID and thrown back over the Brook. Therefore GdI Meixner had ordered 9 CD and 10 March Bde from their camps at Goraj to the battlefield, when
suddenly at 2:30 PM the enemy broke off the action and withdrew hurriedly to the northeast. This was a result of the final defeat of Russian XXV Corps at Zamosc, which will be described later. Now it became possible for 2 ID to cross the Brook without difficulties; in front of the Division the Russians withdrew from the woods northeast of Turobin without fighting. At this point 2 ID was halted, so that it wouldn't become separated from 24 ID. The 89 LW Bde of 45 LW ID east of the Wieprz had advanced as far as Labunka, but withdrew when it heard exaggerated reports of the earlier setbacks northeast of Por Brook; the Bde fell back to Deszkowice, where the whole 45 LW ID was reunited at the disposition of X Corps headquarters.

In the center of the Army, the advance was supposed to be merely a preparation for a later attack, but it soon turned into a heated battle because the Russians were still standing firm south of Bychawa. In V Corps the two flank divisions (37 Hon and 14 ID) launched a spirited attack which drove the enemy to the north; they were supported by the center division (33 ID, held somewhat in reserve) and by the right brigade of 46 LW ID (from 1st Corps). In 1st Corps, the mass of 46 LW ID stormed the town of Sobieszczany without waiting for artillery support; 5 ID took Klodnica, but then came up against a strongly held position at Borzechow.

At 2:00 PM the powerful attack by V Corps and 46 LW ID finally forced XVI Russian Corps, after bravely standing its ground for hours, into a retreat that in some places turned into a rout. This exposed the flanks of its neighbors (XIV Corps and the Grenadiers), and together with the defeat of XXV Corps forced the Grenadiers and 70 ID to retreat from Por Brook. Meanwhile however the XIV Russian Corps, despite its heavy losses at Krasnik, displayed astounding powers of resistance at Borzechow and south of Belzyce. Thus even though Kestranek's Group (12 ID and 1 March Bde) was reinforced by 101 Lst Inf Bde, coming up on the left through Chodel, it was halted with heavy losses and fell back to its original line. The Group would have to stay there on the 28th so that it could take time to bring its badly intermingled units back to order and to prevent a possible Russian counterattack.

It was now important to finally determine whether there was danger threatening from Ivangorod. Because of the exhaustion of the men and horses of 3 CD, particularly among its artillery, that Division could not be used to answer the question. The Army command had the impression that there was nothing to fear from Ivangorod, and that the Russian troops identified at
Wawolnica — who in reality were the first elements of the group deploying there to counterattack — were only parts of enemy units which had been recently defeated and were regrouping. Since Evert's eastern wing was anyway retreating, and his center had once again been defeated, GdK Dankl made expulsion of the enemy's western wing from its heavy fortified position at Duza and Belzyce the next priority. Dankl had moved his headquarters on the 27th to Krasnik, where it occupied the peacetime officers' mess of the 9th Don Coss Regt. He planned to break Russian resistance not by a frontal attack, but instead by having V Corps move against Duza from the east while Kummer's Group launched an outflanking attack from the west through Opole. Meanwhile X Corps had itself proposed that its next goal should be Krasnostaw. The double mission of supporting 4th Army on the right as well as V Corps on the left was becoming a heavy burden for X Corps' commander.

On the Russian side, Evert's first reaction when he learned in the afternoon of the 27th about the heavy defeat of his XVI Corps was to order the corps to regain its lost position. However, as he obtained more details about the magnitude of the misfortune he rescinded the order. Instead the three corps of 4th Army at the front (XIV, XVI and Grenadiers) would stay on the defensive south of the line Belzyce-Duza-Chmiel and await the intervention of the fresh troops gathering behind the right wing.

28 August

Early on the morning of the 28th, the 46 LW ID found the battlefield between the Bystrzyca and the great road to Lublin empty. GdK Kirchbach called upon the Division to take the heights directly south of Duza, and then to pivot to the northwest to assist 5 ID in its difficult attack on the heights north of Klodnica. The 46th stormed forward, but its efforts and those of 5 ID couldn't budge the Russian XIV Corps.

In Puhallo's V Corps, 14 ID followed 46 LW ID to guard its flank; the other two divisions of the Corps took the area north and east of Bychawa, with 33 ID advancing farther than 37 Hon ID. The enemy retreated to Jablonna. X Corps advanced to the line Staw-Zolkiewka, unhindered by Russian XXV Corps which was pulling back toward Krasnostaw. The X Corps command received incorrect news about heavy actions by 45 LW ID and the left

142 Pastor, Viktor Dankl (Freiburg, 1916), p. 15
143 La grande guerre, p. 161
flank of 4th Army on the Labunka, and felt obliged to temporarily send 9 CD and 10 March Bde against Deszkowice. The cavalry, at the request of 4 ID of II Corps, patrolled toward the Labunka, but 10 March Bde returned to X Corps after a long and tiring detour. Thus Hugo von Meixner's units were again assembled together.

The actions of 1st Army in the last 6 days had been glorious, but they had considerably exhausted the troops. Many regiments, especially in 1st and V Corps, had already suffered such heavy losses that it was necessary to rebuild them with their first March battalions. On the bad roads, supplies could be brought forward only on light horse-drawn carts; although the large amount of supplies consumed in modern combat can normally be supplied only by rail, there were no rail lines in the vicinity. A field rail line was being constructed from Rozwadow, but of course it could not keep pace with the rapidly advancing front.

Thus it was high time for the Army to take a short pause. On the evening of the 28th GdK Dankl ordered most units to halt and began to take the measures necessary to ensure that the attack could resume as planned and as quickly as possible. He anticipated using Kummer's Group, of which the 95 1st ID was the first to cross the Vistula (on the 28th at Jozefow); the rest of the Group followed on the 29th and early on the 30th. Also, two more Landsturm Inf Bdes (1st and 36) were coming up from the mouth of the San to the rear of Ist Corps. For the time being, only X Corps would continue to advance, at the urging of 4th Army and also of the Corps commander himself; its main body would push on toward Krasnostaw, while 2 ID held back to maintain a link with V Corps toward Krzczonow.

Although the pause in fighting by 1st Army was no doubt necessary, it would have unfortunate results for the rest of Dankl's advance, because the enemy had recognized the decisive significance of this battlefield and was bringing up reinforcements. This in turn would greatly influence the entire campaign in Russian Poland and Galicia.

4. Continuation of the Battle of Komarow (27-28 August: the fighting by Zamosc and Tomaszow)

(see volume 1 sketch 6)

Meanwhile the advance of k.u.k. 4th Army was gaining promising
momentum. As of the evening of the 26th, GdI Auffenberg had the impression that his VI Corps was confronting a strong enemy force which was receiving further reinforcements from Hrubieszow and Cholm (the latter is the Ukrainian name of the town; it is Chelm in Polish). On the other hand, he didn't anticipate much further resistance from the shattered XXV Russian Corps. Therefore the Army commander felt that his II Corps, strengthened on its left by 45 LW ID of 1st Army and on its right by parts of 10 ID, had the strength to dispose of the enemy at Zamosc. Auffenberg planned to then encircle the Russian XIX Corps at Tarnawatka before the oncoming reinforcements could assist them. 39 Hon ID would pin down the front of the enemy Corps while it was surrounded from the west by 26 LW ID plus the parts of 10 ID not needed at Zamosc, and from the east by the remaining divisions of VI Corps (27 and 15).

The question of guarding the Army's right flank had again become rather difficult. This had been the responsibility of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group. However, events east of Lemberg forced the AOK on the afternoon of the 26th to again place the Archduke under 3rd Army and to order him to the area Zolkiew-Lemberg. Therefore GdI Auffenberg reassigned the protection of his eastern flank to VI Corps and to Wittmann's Cavalry Corps; the latter would be reinforced by 6 March Bde, which was advancing as quickly as possible through Rawa Russka. The tasks given to FML Wittmann were rather extensive:

. Guarding toward the east,
. Raiding around the mass of the Russian infantry position at Posadow and through Tyszowce into the rear of the enemy force that was to be encircled, and
. Reconnoitering toward Grabowiec.

To support the flank guards on the east wing, the Army commander ordered 19 ID of XVII Corps to the area around Belzec.

Plehve, the enemy Army commander, took strong measures to thwart Auffenberg's encirclement plans by his own orders for the 27th. XXV Corps - which by the express orders of the Grand Duke-Generalissimo was to serve as the link between 4th and 5th Armies in the area Mosciska (22 km southwest of Krasnostaw)-Zamosc - was ordered to renew its attack despite the heavy blow it had suffered the day before and the fact that its left wing had been thrown back. In essence it was being left to its fate. The main effort of 5th Russian Army would be to smash the Austro-Hungarian forces around Tomaszow; for this purpose XIX Corps would attack from the north and V Corps from the northeast. Behind the left flank of V Corps, the XVII Corps was
to reach the Sokal-Krylow area by forced marches. Thus three corps would be closely concentrated between Tomaszow and Uhnow, while XXV Corps to the northwest would be more than a day's march distant and left to fight on its own.\footnote{La grande guerre, p. 159. Zichovitch, p. 153}

27 August

The second day of the Battle of Komarow, 27 August, began with an unfortunate event for the k.u.k. 4th Army. 10 CD had camped for the night north of Uhnow; its units were packed closely together without adequate security. At daybreak the Division was surprised by a Cossack detachment armed with machine guns; its Hussar Regiments - which later displayed splendid courage at Limanowa and other actions - on this occasion were overcome by panic and fled all the way to Rawa Russka. The 6 CD, alerted by the sounds of battle, immediately threw itself on the enemy, but in turn had to give ground in the direction of Zurawce.

In VI Corps, the 15 ID on the east wing advanced over the upper Huczwa in the area northwest of Laszczow, in the belief that its flank was guarded by Wittmann's Cavalry Corps. However, it was hit in the flank by detachments of V Russian Corps, coming up from the southeast. The Division wheeled around against the enemy and drove them back through Laszczow; it finished the day at Puzarzow, where the exhausted troops established an inadequately protected camp, with the swampy banks of the Huczwa in their rear.

Farther west, 27 ID took Rachanie on the flank of Russian XIX Corps. However, on the other parts of the battlefield the maneuvers which Auffenberg had planned against that Corps were unsuccessful. 39 Hon ID, very tired from the fighting on the preceding day, won only a little ground. 26 LW ID, after an insufficient night's rest, was late in breaking camp and only got part of its men into the action. The half of 10 ID that was supposed to fall upon the rear of XIX Corps was heavily damaged by artillery fire on its own open flank as it attempted to march south, and had to quickly withdraw.

On the other hand, the attack of the left wing of 4th Army won significant success. The strengthened II Corps took Zamosc and the heights to its west from XXV Russian Corps; the enemy 70 ID, as noted in the preceding section, was ordered to break off its own promising action at Turbin to save the situation at Zamosc, but didn't arrive in time. XXV Corps asked XIX Corps for help
in the form of a flank attack against the Austrians at Zamosc, but this failed to materialize because the messenger carrying the request by bicycle was taken prisoner. Plehve ordered the hard-pressed XXV Corps to pull back behind the Wojslawka, where it could still protect the roads from Krasnostaw to Lublin and Cholm if necessary.

Around noon the 4th Army command received news about the approach of significant Russian forces from Hrubieszow to Tyszowce; it was also surmised that a strong column was marching from Sokal toward Belz. At the same time the first tidings arrived about the rout of 10 CD, which greatly increased the danger to the Army's eastern wing. Fortunately at the same hour the AOK had again changed its orders to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group; because of somewhat better reports from the area east of Lemberg the Group was reassigned to 4th Army. The Archduke had already begun his march to the south toward Lemberg, however, and the change in his orders cost time. The pause at least allowed the troops, very tired from marching back and forth in the sands and swamps along the Bug, to gain a little rest on the morning of the 27th. In the afternoon they proceeded to positions south of the Solokija which they would use early on the morning of the 28th as their jump-off points for the offensive to the north; however, a whole day had been lost.

Although the Archduke's Group would thus provide considerable security for the eastern wing, GdI Auffenberg decided to take a further measure when he learned that afternoon the full account of the catastrophe to 10 CD, and precipitated the movement of 19 ID to Belzec. In the event, this Division was able to send two Jaeger Bns (FJB # 6 and 22) and some artillery to support 6 CD in the evening. Also parts of the approaching 6 March Bde could be used to oppose the enemy between Rawa Russka and Belzec.

In this manner the danger of a Russian breakthrough toward Belzec-Narol seemed to be nullified. To be sure, however, it was not possible to pierce the thick screen of Russian cavalry to gain information about the Russian advance beyond the line Korczmin-Laszczow. Despite the lack of clear information, GdI Auffenberg had already made decisions at mid-day for the continuation of the attack. 15 and 27 ID of VI Corps would pull back somewhat to halt the drive of the Russian XVII and V Corps on the line Rzeczyca-Rachanie. As soon as they had halted the enemy, the Archduke's Group would hit the Russians in their open flank by advancing from the south on both sides of Belz. The left flank of VI Corps (39 Hon ID) and IX and II Corps were
instructed to capture the town of Komarow and the line of the Labunka.

On the Russian side, General Plehve was still determined to support his hard-pressed neighbor on the west, although he complained with a heavy heart that he was fully in the dark about the movements of 4th Austrian Army. Therefore XXV Corps, untroubled by its weakened condition, should attack again; its target would be the right flank of k.u.k. 1st Army, which was pressing hard against the Grenadier Corps. Of course the road from Zamosc to Krasnostaw should continue to be barred to the Austrians. General Yakovlev of XVII Corps was given the responsibility of using some of his troops to provide necessary cover in the gap between XXV and XIX Corps, growing dangerously wide. The majority of his Corps, however, would work with V and XIX Corps to drive the enemy to the southwest; Yakovlev also had overall control of this operation.

28 August

The third day of the battle, 28 August, also began quite inauspiciously for Auffenberg's Army. 15 ID had been stationed north of the upper Huczwa when it was ordered to pull back to the new positions by Rzeczyca; despite the great exhaustion of the troops, it began to move soon after midnight. The march had taken the Division to the road running on the dike through the Huczwa Swamp when it was ambushed by V Russian Corps, which had been lying in wait through the night. The troops were fully surprised; although some behaved like heroes others milled around in great confusion. The Russians claimed to have taken 4000 prisoners and 20 guns. Presumably almost as many officers and men were killed or wounded. The Division's commander, FML Freih. von Wodniansky, killed himself out of desperation. The remnants of 15 ID pulled back to the west and alarmed 27 ID, which soon entered the fight toward the east and southeast on both sides of Rachanie; they halted the enemy in some heavy fighting. GdI Boroevic of VI Corps quickly decided to call back 39 Hon ID, which was moving at the direction of the Army commander toward Komarow; the Division was placed on the north flank of 27 ID, ready for any eventuality. The Corps commander collected 15 ID at Tomaszow and placed it temporarily under the command of FML Edler von Schenck, formerly in charge of the Army's rear areas. With Schenck's help, Boroevic made the wasted Division again capable of attacking.

145 Zichovitch, p. 155
Meanwhile the luck of k.u.k. 4th Army was also bad to the left of VI Corps. Partly because of the sickness of GdI Hortstein, his IX Corps was not committed as a unit. Panic broke out in the night in the brigade of 26 LW ID which made up the Division's right column, considerably delaying its movement. The left column attacked in the afternoon toward Komarow from the west, but after a few successes suffered a setback. Parts of 10 ID were more successful; because of its bad experience of the day before, the Division was reluctant to repeat the dangerous flank attack toward Komarow; however, it was able to occupy the heights east of Zamosc without fighting. This was because the XXV Russian Corps had felt itself too weak for further fighting and had pulled back to the area south of Izbica; the Russians prepared a new position on both sides of the Zamosc Road, between the Wieprz and the Wolica.

By noon the Army commander had learned enough about the events at VI Corps to appreciate the difficult position of that unit. GdI Boroevic was obliged by overwhelming enemy pressure to pull 27 ID back to the heights just northeast of Tomaszow. There soon followed some reports about 3rd Army: after heavy combat which had undermined the nerves of the troops, it was in retreat from the Zlota Lipa to the Gnila Lipa. In connection with this movement, 3rd Army would have to pull its north flank back three days' marches behind Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, toward Lemberg. Naturally the dangerous gap would increase with every step which the Archduke, following the orders of 4th Army, took toward the north. Moreover, it seemed that a rather large force of Russian cavalry was threatening to move into the gap. In his concern for Lemberg and for the rear of 4th Army, GdI Conrad wanted to once more turn the Archduke's Group around and place it under 3rd Army for a relief offensive against the enemy forces pushing toward Lemberg. However, GdI Auffenberg protested decisively against this plan. The departure of the Group would rob him of a victory which, despite the momentarily difficult situation, he still believed was possible — and the Group could not arrive in time anyway to help 3rd Army.

Although the AOK had stated at 10:00 PM on the 26th that victory in the entire campaign depended on the success of 3rd Army on the right, it allowed itself to be persuaded by Auffenberg. Conrad ordered the Archduke to stay with 4th Army. To cover the gap between the Armies, Conrad patched together a cavalry corps at Zolkiew out of 10 CD from 4th Army, 4 CD and 11 Hon CD from 3rd Army, and three battalions of 6 March Bde; he also prepared a strong infantry group at Zolkiew out of his last reserves (23 Hon ID and 97 Lst Inf Bde).
Meanwhile the 4th Army command had promised to send the two March Brigades hitherto assigned to XVII Corps (2nd and 9th) to prop up the flank of the hard-pressed VI Corps. Since these Brigades couldn't arrive at Belzec until late in the evening, Boroevic himself had meanwhile created a force of 10 battalions from the divisional reserve of 39 Hon ID, 6 March Bde (minus the 3 bns sent to Zolkiew), and the two Jaeger Battalions from 19 ID; this force was placed on the right flank of 27 ID to prepare to counterattack the enemy. However, the Russians were coming forward only hesitantly, because the advance of k.u.k. XVII Corps and the Archduke's Group was beginning to be noticeable on the southern flank of Russian XVII Corps.

The opening move in this sector was delivered by 19 ID of XVII Corps. Its commander, FML Lukas, was by Zurawce when he heard the thunder of cannon in the direction of VI Corps and at his own discretion led the Division toward the fighting. At Jarczow he was engaged in a sharp action until the evening hours in which he drove back the left flank of the enemy V Corps and the leading division (3 ID) of XVII Corps.

Meanwhile to the right of 19 ID, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, which included troops from the Alpine provinces, had begun to force a decisive turn in fortune. Clearly recognizing the urgency of the situation, the Archduke had begun sending his troops over the Solokija at 3:00 AM; the crossing was not disturbed by the enemy. After a necessary rest break for the tired soldiers, the Group went over to the offensive. The left wing was led by FML Johann von Kirchbach, and consisted of two brigades of his own 8 ID (which had mobilized with three brigades) plus 41 Hon ID. It advanced from Uhnow toward the north and northwest into the flank of the Russian XVII Corps, which was not in position for defense and was completely surprised (at this point XVII Corps had the attached reserve 61 ID as well as its own 3 and 35 ID). The Honveds entered the fighting with almost too much spirit; they didn't wait for

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Translator's Note - The original says "The Archduke's Group with its Alpine 'Kerntruppen'", which translates roughly as 'picked troops.' Besides inserting a value judgment in favor of the Alpine units (which may or may not be defensible), the sentence gives the misleading impression that most of the units involved were Alpine. Analysis of the actual infantry OB shows 18 battalions from the Alpine lands and 20 from elsewhere in the Monarchy. This fact must be borne in mind for the rest of the narrative, which is mostly a hymn of praise to German-speaking units.
artillery support and consequently were halted. Then 121 Inf Bde (of 8 ID) entered the fray. Its Tyrolean Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 1, in its first action of the war, drove the Russians out of the woods south of Tarnoczyn and took 16 unlimbered guns from the enemy 35 ID. As evening fell, the Volhynian forest resounded with the voices of thousands of Tyroleans singing the Imperial anthem 147. Farther right, the 96 Bde (KJR # 3 and 4) was equally gallant but not as fortunate. The Bde come up against a better-prepared enemy backed by powerful artillery fire; it was only able to secure the north bank of the Solokija.

The decisive blow was struck by FML Roth's 3 ID (reinforced by 16 Inf Bde from the large 8 ID), which had crossed the Solokija at Belz. FML Roth found his immediate front free of the enemy, and therefore swung half to the left toward Wasylow. His splendid troops (including the Upper Austrians of IR 14, the Salzburg and Innviertel soldiers of IR 59, and Kaiser Jaeger Regt 2), suddenly stormed upon the last of Yakovlev's divisions (61 ID) as it was making its way west and broke it into fragments. They took numerous prisoners and 40 guns. The badly beaten Russian XVII Corps fled toward the north. General Plehve had to abandon all his hopes of a massive offensive by Yakovlev's group.

Further Prospects for the Battle

Despite the evil tidings which GdI Auffenberg had received in the afternoon, he didn't wait for the victory of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand while he made further preparations for the double encirclement of the enemy, the plan to which he held fast throughout the battle. At 8:00 PM on the 28th he issued his next series of orders. Only 4 ID and the smallest possible part of 13 LW ID would continue the pursuit toward Krasnostaw on the heels of the XXV Russian Corps; 1st Army was requested to let X Corps help with the operations in this area. The bulk of II Corps would move east from Zamosc and advance toward Cesniki. Farther south, IX Corps would simultaneously attack east through Komarow toward Tyszowce. VI and XVII Corps would continue to fight in their current areas, and the Archduke's Group would continue the encirclement on the right.

4th Army was preparing to wrest an impressive victory from the enemy. The burning question of the moment was only the extent

to which the fighting which was taking place at the same time east of Lemberg would permit the fruits of victory to be actually plucked by the northern armies.
5. The Battle of Zloczow

(see volume 1 leaflets 9 and 10)

Continuing Danger on the Eastern Flank

Soon after penetrating into east Galicia, the Russians realized that their opponent in this sector was weaker than they had anticipated in peacetime planning. This was one of the factors that influenced the Grand Duke-Generalissimo; the others were the uncertainty about the deployment area of his enemy's main forces and the unremitting pressure from France for a quick offensive toward Berlin, which by Russian reckoning could not take place until substantial damage was done to the Austro-Hungarian Army. Therefore on the 22nd, 23rd and again on the 24th the Grand Duke ordered the advance of 3rd and 8th Armies to take place "with increasing rapidity." The news from the battlefield of Krasnik made fulfillment of this wish seem more desirable. Nonetheless, General Russky, commander of the 3rd Army, felt obliged on the 24th to give his very tired troops a day of rest along the line Radziechow-Sassow-Zborow. Since Brussilov's 8th Army didn't follow this example, on the same day it reached a line from Wybudow to the Koropiec Brook and came abreast with 3rd Army.

Meanwhile, the defeat of Russian 4th Army at Krasnik had been completed and the 5th Army was hurrying to aid its western neighbor through Zamosc and Tomaszow. If 3rd Army continued its current course toward Lemberg, the gap of 50 to 60 km between the eastern and western wings would continue to increase despite their concentric advance; that gap was covered only by 69 ID plus some cavalry. Therefore on the 25th Ruszky was ready to swing his main body north of Lemberg to the area Mosty Wielkie-Kurowice. At the same time, Brussilov would leave a flank guard along the Dniester between Nizniow and Mikolajow while making his main effort farther north between Lemberg and the Dniester. However, this concept was upset in the next few days by the enemy.

In accordance with the directives of the k.u.k. AOK, until the 23rd GdK Brudermann was focusing his attention on preparation for an immediate march to the north; however, as noted previously he was given responsibility for guarding against the

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149 Zichovitch, op. cit., pp. 54 ff.
east on that day. At this point the identified enemy units advancing into the area were two infantry divisions with a strong mounted force by Brody and one infantry and one cavalry division by Tarnopol. Since this was a relatively weak opponent, Brudermann still believed he should let XI Corps complete its concentration north of Lemberg and then march north on the right of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. III Corps and Kövess' Group would be a sufficient force to watch the east. The former unit was moved ahead to Przemyslany-Gliniany, ready to deliver a strong blow to the right over the heights between the Pletew and the line Bobrka-Przemyslany-Pluhow. In Kövess' Group, the 16 and 35 ID of XII Corps had reached Firlejow and Strzeliska Nowe; the troops were exhausted after marching 90 km in three days, and so they were given a rest day. 11 ID, the advance guard, pulled back from Zborow toward Dunajow. 38 Hon ID of XII Corps, the last elements of which were still detraining at Jezupol, was ordered by GdI Kövess to march on the 24th to Monasterzyska and Podhajce; in this area it could assist 1 CD and 5 Hon CD, which were hard pressed by the Russian 2 Combined Coss Div.

A larger action was in progress by Czernowitz early on the morning of the 23rd; the Russian Dniester Detachment (parts of XII Corps) was attacking GM Münzel's 35 Lst Inf Bde. FML von Schmidt's 43 LW ID hastened to the scene from Zaleszczyki and launched a flank counterattack at Toporoutz. In the evening of the 23rd the AOK did not know full details of this operation, but the reports justified hopes for success, which in the event were not disappointed. The enemy was again forced to evacuate Bukovina.

Preparing the Attack Toward Zloczow

By the evening of the 23rd, information about the enemy had swelled to such an extent that it was possible for 3rd Army command to identify the following groups: a Russian cavalry division reinforced by infantry at Radiechow, Russian XI Corps at Brody, a large force of horsemen (apparently 9 and 10 CD) south and west of Zalosce, an infantry division plus 12 CD east of Tarnopol, and finally numerous cavalry squadrons supported by infantry between Tarnopol and Czortkow. These enemy forces could reach the upper course of the Bug and the Zlota Lipa by the 25th. Thus they were already endangering the flank and rear of the operations of 4th and 1st k.u.k. Armies.

150 This is based on a written statement which GdK Brudermann prepared on 16 December 1915 as self-justification.
Since 3rd Army was fully deployed on this day, the AOK ordered GdK Brudermann on the evening of the 23rd "to deliver a decisive blow against the enemy approaching through Brody and Tarnopol (if they continue their march); for this purpose the XII Corps was temporarily placed under command of 3rd Army, along with the units attached to XII Corps (11 ID and 8 CD)." At this point the AOK still envisioned the defensive operations toward the east as only a passing episode, as indicated in a postscript to Brudermann that the subsequent mission of 3rd Army would be "an offensive in a northerly direction toward the line Kamionka-Strumilowa-Rawa Russka." Also, it was once more determined - as GdI Kövess had been informed the day before - that any move toward the east should not go further than Dunajow-Krasne.

The high command did not underestimate the difficulties of the task assigned to GdK Brudermann. They were especially concerned about the flanks of 3rd Army. Defense of the southern flank would be entrusted to 2nd Army, whose headquarters was expected to arrive at Stanislau on the night of the 25th. On the day after his arrival, GdK von Böhm-Ermolli would control two cavalry divisions (1 and 5), two Honved infantry divisions (20 and 38), the 40 Lst Inf Bde, and parts of 12 March Bde. They would also be joined by 43 LW ID, which was instructed to finally shake off the enemy Dniester Detachment, then to leave the security of the sector south of the Dniester in the hands of 35 Lst Inf Bde; this would free 43 LW ID to fall on the left flank of the Russians through Zaleszczyki and Buczacz, toward Brzezany.

Perhaps these troops of Böhm-Ermolli would also be reinforced on the 26th by parts of VII Corps, arriving by rail in the area Zurawno, Zydaczow and Chodorow. As before, the Chief of the General Staff was sick at heart because IV Corps was still entangled in fighting the Serbs at Sabac. In a voluminous correspondence he strove as much as possible to counteract the influential persons in Vienna and Budapest who were opposed to further weakening of the Balkan front.

On 3rd Army's northern flank, the AOK had transferred Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group to 4th Army. However, GdK Brudermann was informed on the 25th that in place of that Group he would have available the 44 LW ID along with 88 L-Sch Bde, deployed north of Lemberg at Kulikow.

151 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 518 and 549
GdI Conrad told Brudermann to fulfill his mission with the following tactics: "As soon as the enemy attacks as expected from Brody and Tarnopol and passes the line Krasne-Dunajow, deliver a quick counterblow with 6 or 7 divisions assembled on the high ground south of Unterwalden and west of the Gnila Lipa."\textsuperscript{152} In this context, the AOK on the afternoon of the 25th ordered XII Corps, III Corps and "the available parts of XI Corps" to march to the heights west of the line Firlejow-Przemyslany-Gliniany. From this point their closely concentrated forces could launch a blow as soon as possible to rip through the net which the enemy was apparently trying to cast over east Galicia.

GdK Brudermann himself had already at 2:00 PM on the 24th ordered XII and III Corps to prepare for action west of the line Dunajow-Krasne; these corps were ready in their prescribed stations on the evening of the 25th. Based on current reports about the Russians, at this point Brudermann still felt he was superior to the enemy. However, there was no doubt that the Russians who had already advanced past the east Galician border over such a wide area would be reinforced by greater forces than those identified to date. Therefore GdK Brudermann fervently wished to defeat the enemy before they would have superior numbers on their side. By his calculations this would have to be accomplished by the 26th at latest \textsuperscript{153}. After this point, he feared he would have to reckon with a greatly stronger foe, who would threaten to dangerously outflank the closely concentrated 3rd Army.

These concerns made GdK Brudermann wonder whether it might be advisable to strike the enemy immediately rather than waiting for their approach as prescribed by the AOK. On the 25th his Chief of Staff, GM Pfeffer, phoned GdI Conrad for permission to advance past the Krasne-Dunajow line to Zloczow if it seemed possible that the two or three Russian divisions reported to be in this area could be defeated in detail \textsuperscript{154}. After briefly hesitating, Conrad gave his permission.

Actually, differences of opinion between Conrad and GM Pfeffer regarding the tactics to be followed by GdK Brudermann in fulfilling his responsibility had already surfaced in telephone conversations the day before. In opposition to Conrad, who

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 516
\textsuperscript{153} Based on GdK Brudermann's self-justification of December 1915
\textsuperscript{154} Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 517; Pfeffer, p. 41
envisioned a concentrated frontal breakthrough, the 3rd Army command wanted to avoid danger on its wings by itself undertaking a more widespread flanking maneuver. Thus III Corps would launch an attack by its strong right wing from the high ground at Gologory to Zloczow. XII Corps with 11 ID, guarded from the south by 8 CD, would move through Remizowce on a wide sweep. Meanwhile XI Corps (consisting of 30 ID, 11 March Bde and 93 Lst Inf Bde) would first attack from the area northeast of Lemberg to drive back the enemy north of the Krasne-Brody rail line, then intervene on the flank of III Corps' action. This was contrary to Conrad's intention of using most of XI Corps south of Krasne; it also placed too much responsibility on a corps consisting of Landsturm and March units not yet toughened by exercise, and of an active unit (30 ID) already exhausted from the border fighting. Nonetheless, Brudermann believed that the danger from the northeast forced him to use XI Corps to gain elbow room north of the low ground along the Peltew. The Chief of the General Staff didn't wish to contest these considerations, and agreed to the deployment of the XI Corps in the sectors desired by 3rd Army command. However, it appears from subsequent writings by Conrad and Pfeffer that there was no agreement on the question of whether III and XII Corps should operate together or separately; this led to a lengthy post-war controversy between the two parties.

Deployment for the Battle

Meanwhile, by the evening of the 25th, after some rather difficult marches, XII Corps had reached the area east of Janczyn and Przemyślany, III Corps the vicinity of Gologory and Bortkow, and XI Corps was at Dziedzilow (north of the Jaryczowski Canal). Until this hour, the AOK and 3rd Army were still in agreement that the enemy had sent 5 or 6 infantry and about 4 cavalry divisions over the border between Sokal and Tarnopol, and that the bulk of these forces had moved through Tarnopol and Zloczow. Further large forces were marching west in several columns between Trembowla and the Dniester, and seemed to be nearing the Zlota Lipa below Brzezany. Several

155 See Brudermann's paper in his own defense, and also Pfeffer, op. cit., p. 25 ff. Conrad doesn't mention the phone discussion regarding XI Corps in his memoirs; probably the conversation wasn't recorded in Przemysl.

156 The accounts of the phone conversations on the issue in Conrad (Vol. IV, p. 516 ff.) and Pfeffer (p. 36 ff.) differ substantially. There is no official transcript that could resolve the issue.
reports indicated that the enemy columns were deployed in echelon and in depth.

This picture of the Russian situation - which was completely incorrect regarding their front-line strength - gave impetus to 3rd Army's quest to fall upon the nearest enemy columns, those by Zloczow, before the approach of the other columns gave the Russians an overwhelming advantage. GdK Brudermann felt that this supposed opportunity outweighed the disadvantage of fighting with his own forces still not fully assembled and, in some instances, already exhausted from long marches or irritating border actions. Therefore he ordered his corps to attack on the 26th over the line Dunajow-Gliniany. XII Corps would seize the territory south of Remizowce, III Corps the heights southwest of Zloczow, and XI Corps the banks of the Bug River between Krasne and Busk. Protection of the south flank around Brzezany would be the responsibility of 11 ID, which had fallen back to this area from the frontier, along with 8 CD; they would soon be reinforced by 4 CD, moving south from Przemyslany. On the north flank of 3rd Army, 11 Hon CD and IR 80 from 30 ID were stationed at Kamionka-Strumilowa, where since the day before they had been guarding against Russian attempts to cross the Bug. In the area immediately around Lemberg, the Landwehr units from the Innsbruck Corps area (44 LW ID and 88 L-Sch Bde) were standing guard; they were still under the immediate command of the AOK.

Meanwhile, GdK von Böhm-Ermolli had arrived at Stanislau from Syrmia at 9:00 AM on 25 August, and had taken over control from GdI Kövess of all k.u.k. forces operating against the Russians on the southern wing. For the time being he was virtually an Army commander without an Army, since of his original units the III and XII Corps had joined 3rd Army, while VII Corps was just arriving by rail and IV Corps was still in action at Sabac on the other front.

38 Hon ID, one of the few units immediately available in the sector when Böhm-Ermolli arrived, was still operating on the 25th under the last instructions from Kövess' Armee Gruppe command. It collided with parts of XXIV Russian Corps at Monasterzyska and was thrown back, along with k.u.k. 1st CD. The 1 CD retreated to Mariampol and the Honveds to the bridgehead over the Dniester at Nizniwow, where they were joined by 40 Lst Inf Bde, coming up from Tlumacz. The decimated 5 Hon CD fought another action at Podhajce and then fell back to Halicz. At the same time the 43 LW ID, after successfully completing its mission farther south, had left Czernowitz for
Zaleszczyki; as ordered by the AOK, 35 Lst Inf Bde thus became solely responsible for the defense of Bukovina, which had been cleared of Russian forces.

The actions at Monasterzyska and Podhajce strengthened the determination of GdK Böhm-Ermolli to avoid further splintering his force and to initiate operations only after he had a sufficiently large force at hand. In this matter, Böhm-Ermolli was in harmony with the Chief of the General Staff, who was also dissatisfied by the disjointed series of actions which had taken place north of Nizniow \(^{157}\). Therefore there were no major actions in the area of the still thinly-spread 2nd Army on 26 August. However, this day was very eventful for the k.u.k. 3rd Army, fighting to its north.

26 August

A warm summer day was beginning on the 26th, while the Russians were abandoning the battlefield at Krasnik to the 1st k.u.k. Army and while Auffenberg's troops at Zamosc and Tomaszow were crossing swords with the enemy for the first time in a serious action. Also east of Lemberg the opposing armies were let loose upon each other to reap a bloody harvest. At least at the beginning, however, III Corps had the impression that there would not be contact on this day with a major enemy force. The impatient Inner Austrian regiments of 28 and 6 ID crossed the low ground by Bortkow and Gologory at 7:00 AM, an hour earlier than ordered. 28 ID (FML Kralicek) advanced over the flat, rolling and swampy terrain north of the Lemberg-Zloczow Road; in the first attack they drove back the advanced posts of XI Russian Corps and reached the railroad by Lackie Wk., where a markedly stronger enemy force blocked the way to Zloczow. The 6 ID from Graz (FML von Gelb) was engaged south of the Road in rough terrain containing hills and woods that were difficult to cross; they could hardly use their artillery, but nonetheless were initially successful in advancing as far as Kralicek's regiments. Then 6 ID, like the 28th, was stopped cold by superior Russian forces.

Unfortunately for the entire III Corps, its third division (FML Ritter von Krauss-Elislago's 22 LW ID) was lagging far behind. The Division had camped for the night farther west of the others; the orders to advance were delayed and there was hesitation in the deployment, so that by noon the men hadn't reached the west branch of the Zlota Lipa. The enemy took

\(^{157}\) Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 529
advantage of this opportunity to attack the open south flank of Gelb's 6 ID; although the troops fought coolly and bravely, they suffered heavy casualties and finally had to withdraw to Gologory. Meanwhile, 22 LW ID had finally crossed the Zlota Lipa early in the afternoon and threw itself on the enemy. The attack was undertaken with insufficient artillery support and wasn't coordinated, so it failed to reach its objective despite the splendid conduct of the troops. Krauss-Elislag o succumbed to depression in the face of his first action and made the unfortunate decision to lead his Division back over the Zlota Lipa. To top everything, his retreat took place in the evening darkness when both his staff and many of his men fell into confusion. In this most dangerous moment the Division was virtually leaderless and most of its personnel fell back all the way to Przemyslany. Only a few units on the northern wing held fast southwest of Gologory and rejoined the main body as it assembled around Przemyslany early on the 27th. Neither III Corps HQ nor 6 ID received timely warning of this wide pullback to the rear.

Meanwhile GdI von Colerus, the Corps commander, had already given his consent to the retreat of the isolated 6 ID to Gologory (at 4:15 PM on the 26th). 28 ID, however, was ordered to pull back only its right flank in conformity with 6 ID. Not knowing the true situation of 22 LW ID, Colerus ordered it to deliver a relief attack in support of 6 ID; if this didn't succeed, 22 ID was to hold its ground south of Gologory. Meanwhile, during the retreat of 6 ID some enemy troops had inserted themselves between it and 28 ID; therefore most of the latter Division pulled back over the Olsznica, leaving only a portion on the eastern bank.

The regiments from the Alpine lands had thrown themselves on the enemy with proud self-confidence in the morning. In the evening they pulled back to the positions they had left at daybreak in search of victory; they came back unbroken, but with enormous holes in their ranks, having been robbed of some of their best men. They had truly deserved a better fate!

Meanwhile the XII Corps had fought with scarcely more luck than the IIIrd. GdI Kövess had again assumed command of the Corps after the arrival of Böhm-Ermolli. He had been informed that he was facing only negligible enemy forces, and therefore sent only 16 ID into the attack against Remizowce. 11 ID, which had just joined the main Austrian body after 10 days of border actions, was to guard the southern flank at Narajow, along with 8 CD, while 35 ID stayed behind as a reserve to support either group.
FML Paukert's 16 ID collided with the foremost of the three divisions of X Russian Corps on the Orne Heights. Pushed somewhat back, the Division still managed to hold firmly to a position east of the Zlota Lipa.

Soon after the action started, GdI Kövess received a report about the unfortunate fighting which had taken place the day before at Monasterzyska and Podhajce. Concerned for his southern flank, Kövess sent 35 ID toward Narajow; however, 3rd Army - not aware of Kövess' plans - then called the Division up to the battlefield of 16 ID at Dunajow. 35 ID was thus exhausted by pointless marching back and forth; its advance guard had reached the woods east of Dunajow considerably after noon when panic broke out among the main body of the Division and affected the division commander FML Njegovian. The troops had to be pulled back to the western edge of the forest. Meanwhile 11 ID (FML Pokorny) had sent 22 Inf Bde into action against a strong force of Russian horse (probably 12 CD) which had advanced from Brzezany, and drove them back. On the southern flank of the Corps, 8 CD fell back from Brussilov's cavalry toward Rohatyn, but was not seriously engaged with the enemy.

In the first hours of the morning, the commander of XI Corps (GdK Kolossvary) learned that 11 Hon CD had been forced by the Russians to retreat from Kamionka-Strumilowa and that enemy troops were feeling their way forward between that town and Derewlany. 44 LW ID was asked for help, but it was able to send just one regiment to Zoltance to support 11 Hon CD as it fell back from the Bug; the main body of 44 Division had been earmarked by the AOK for service east of Lemberg. Therefore Kolossvary decided to send all of his 30 ID to protect the seriously threatened northern flank of the Army in the direction of Busk; the Division's advance was not seriously disturbed by the enemy. Meanwhile the 11 March and 93 Lst Inf Bdes, combined into a temporary Division under GM the Prince of Schönburg-Hartenstein (of 11 Bde), advanced without fighting to the banks of the Peltew west of Krasne.

The first tidings of the setbacks to 3rd Army had already forced the AOK to send its reserves (44 LW ID and 88 L-Sch Bde) through Lemberg east to Winniki, and also to place Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and his three divisions back at the disposal of GdK Brudermann. When GdI Conrad learned the extent of the misfortunes of 3rd Army late in the evening, he wrote that they were due to two factors: GdK Brudermann had placed too many troops north of the Lemberg-Zloczow Road, and there had been
insufficient coordination of the troops in the hilly terrain south of the Road. Nonetheless, the advance should be resumed on the 27th because - as the AOK told 3rd Army HQ on the evening of the 26th - "the decision on the entire Eastern Front depends on success of the attack toward Zloczow." GdK Brudermann had already issued his orders for the renewal of the battle two hours earlier (at 8:00 PM). In the center, III Corps should bring up the greatest possible force from 28 ID (i.e. away from the level terrain on the Road) and wrest the heights by Gologory from the enemy. Meanwhile XI Corps would launch a flanking attack from the north through Bialy Kamien while XII Corps (reinforced by 88 L-Sch Bde) attacked in the south. Security for Brudermann's own right flank would be provided at Dunajow and Narajow by 11 ID (now reinforced by the just-arrived 4 CD), at Strzeliska Nowe by 105 Lst Inf Bde, and at Borynicze by 108 Lst Inf Bde; there was no over-all commander appointed for these units. GdK Brudermann wanted to send part of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Armee Gruppe to III and part to XII Corps. However, the AOK ordered instead that the Archduke should first deal with the enemy force which he had reported at Mosty Wielkie, and then should advance through Kamionka-Strumilowa; this would be the best way for him to guard the north flank of 3rd Army as well as the gap between 3rd and 4th Armies.

Results of the First Day's Fighting

In the night, 3rd Army command received a more pessimistic picture of the condition of III Corps. Tidings arrived about the collapse of entire regiments, such as IR 97 (from Trieste), which in fact couldn't be brought back to order until it had fled all the way back to Lemberg. These and other alarming news make it understandable that the Army command asked the AOK at 8:00 AM on the 27th to permit the whole force to retreat. Conrad then ordered the corps to fall back to the line Mikolajow-Lemberg-Zolkiew and intended to bring Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group to Zolkiew to fall in line next to them, facing the northeast. At the same time GdK Böhm-Ermolli was advised to have his Army ready south of the Dniester in the area Żydaczow-Zurawno-Stryj so that it could "either fend off an enemy advance south of the Dniester or cross the river itself." The last reserves of the AOK, 23 Hon ID (which was almost finished detraining after its trip from the Banat) and 97 Lst Inf Bde, were placed at the disposal of 3rd Army in the area north of Lemberg.

The extent to which these critical events weighed upon the Chief of the General Staff is shown by the fact that for the first
time he considered halting 4th Army in its successful progress toward the north in order to deliver a blow toward the south or southeast to assist 3rd Army. However, the time had not come for such a far-reaching change. For it soon became apparent that III Corps was not being pressed by the enemy, and that the Russians anyway weren't attacking XI Corps. Therefore at midday the AOK revoked the orders to retreat which they had given GdK Brudermann, and once again placed Archduke Joseph Ferdinand (as described in an earlier section) under 4th Army.

Fortunately the troops of 3rd Army had not been troubled by these numerous changes in plan, since the orders to implement them hadn't been issued. Therefore the orders to attack issued on the evening of the 26th were still in effect. To strengthen III Corps, 44 LW ID with parts of 88 L-Sch Bde had come to Kurowice. Also 108 Lst Inf Bde (originally intended for the south flank) and the 3 March Bde (still coming up by rail) were to come under III Corps, but they didn't arrive in time to fight in the battle.

Actually the furious assault by III Corps had had an effect upon the Russians. Their IX Corps and the southern wing of XI Corps had been painfully taken aback by the assault, and therefore on the next morning (the 27th) they advanced very cautiously in fear of unpleasant surprises. The two wings of Ruszky's Army advanced with more determination. Brussilov, moreover, who was still not confronted by any large enemy force, was able to answer his northern neighbor's request for assistance by sending his right-wing (VII Corps with 12 CD) toward Dunajow to fall on the flank of 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army. Brussilov's two middle corps (XII and VIII) continued to move farther west; on his south flank the XXIV Corps swung toward Nizniow and Halicz.

27 August

Because of the hesitation of Ruszky's center, it is understandable that on 27 August the fighting started on the north front of the battle field. Since most of 30 ID was tied down guarding the flank toward the north, implementation of the XI Corps' enveloping attack was entrusted mainly to Schönburg's Combined ID. With only 3 batteries, it lacked adequate artillery preparation as it advanced against the enemy standing on the level terrain east of Krasne. The Russians allowed the Landsturm troops of 93 Bde to maneuver awkwardly close to their lines, then unleashed a sudden, destructive hail of fire. The

158 Conrad, Vol, IV, p. 542
Brigade fled with heavy losses, taking with it the 11 March Bde which had very little staying power; 8 guns were left behind. Meanwhile a pincers attack from the north and east had also forced 30 ID to give way. At 1:30 PM GdK Kolossvary pulled his badly shaken corps back to the small rise of ground between the Jaryczowski Canal and the Peltew, and here established a new front facing to the north. The greatly superior enemy, five divisions of the Russian XI and XXI Corps, did not pursue. Nonetheless, a false alarm around midnight caused great confusion again within the Combined ID.

The events at Krasne had once again proved that Landsturm and March Brigades, with their inadequate training, totally insufficient artillery, and lack of machine guns, were not suitable for a campaign of maneuver. Even when led by a commander of great soldierly quality like Schönburg-Hartenstein, the use of such Brigades merely offered the enemy an opportunity for an easy triumph.

III Corps, fighting south of the XIth, apparently suffered on the 27th from the disappointment and heavy losses which it had suffered the day before. 28 ID had been ordered by the Corps commander to move up to the Olszanica. However, it was delayed; this enabled the enemy to launch their flanking attack on the south wing of XI Corps. When that Corps evacuated the field, 28 ID also had to pull back to a position west of Gliniany. The main body of III Corps followed this example before an offensive maneuver by 22 LW ID - initiated by 3rd Army command itself - could have any effect. Without engaging in serious fighting, the Corps had by evening given ground past Gliniany and Lahodow and toward Przemyslany. Thus the bitter impressions of the preceding day had had severe effects on both the leaders and troops of these regiments.

The XII Corps was in no position to bring relief to its hard pressed neighbor to the north. GdI Kövess had sent a brigade from 35 ID to 16 ID, which was fighting toward the east in the area north of Dunajow; he also moved the Landes-Schützen directly to the battlefield from their railroad trains to assist 16 ID in a frontal attack against the Orne Heights. The 11 ID, with the second Bde of the 35th, attacked alongside the south wing of 16 ID. The attack toward Pomorzany seemed to be gaining ground, when the south wing of X Russian Corps and the VII Corps of Brussilov's army intervened, fell upon 11 ID, and drove it back. The Corps commander thereupon ordered his troops back behind the Zlota Lipa; actually his northern wing had already anticipated this order with a retreat to Wypski because it was
no longer covered by III Corps.

Thus the 3rd k.u.k. Army was not able on 26 and 27 August to free the capital of Galicia and the communications of the left wing of the Austrian front from the extremely threatening Russian advance. The disjointed, uncoordinated attack of III Corps on the first day of the battle, which moreover was directed right at the center of the enemy 3rd Army, had managed to delay the advance of the Russians through Zloczow for a little while, but at the cost of heavy casualties to some of the best Austrian troops in this sector. On the second day of the battle, III Corps did almost nothing. While GdK Brudermann had switched the main weight of his attack to the two wings of his Army, the Russians crossed up his plans by using their numerical superiority to outflank the Austrian wings. When reinforced by Brussilov's VII Corps, Ruszky's Army had 292 battalions, 162 squadrons and 720 guns against Brudermann's 115 battalions, 91 squadrons and 376 guns. Thus the Russians had a twofold numerical superiority, a figure which puts the difficulty of the task given to k.u.k. 3rd Army and its commanders in full perspective.

Retreat Behind the Gnila Lipa

Because of the strength of the enemy, which the 3rd Army command now estimated (correctly) at ten and a half infantry and several cavalry divisions, GdK Brudermann felt obliged to pull his left wing, seriously threatened with encirclement, as well as the center of the Army behind the Gnila Lipa. Thus in the course of 28 August the 3rd Army took up an arc-shaped line which began north of Rohatyn, ran through Firlejow, Przemyslany and Gaje to Zydatycze, and there was anchored on the field works guarding Lemberg (see volume 1 sketch 9). The right wing consisted of XII Corps (including 11 ID and 88 L-Sch Bde), covered on its right by 105 Lst Inf Bde and 4 and 8 CD south of Firlejow; III Corps held the center from Przemyslany to Gaje, while XI Corps was the northern wing of the Army.

During the withdrawal to the new line, parts of III Corps had to fend off the Russians with a counterattack. Reich German officers who had arrived from Przemysl and observed the Corps that day praised the bearing of the Inner Austrian regiments 159. South of III Corps, Russian cavalry attacked the trains of 11

ID. Otherwise the march took place without friction and almost without interference from the enemy.

On the morning of the 28th, GdK Brudermann inserted 44 LW ID – which had come up to Winniki – between III and XI Corps, facing toward the north; this increased the security of Lemberg. 108 Lst Inf Bde followed the Landwehr to Gaje. 23 Hon ID, along with 97 Lst Inf Bde which was placed under its command, assembled as an Army reserve around Jasniska, north of Lemberg. 11 Hon CD, after heavy actions in the last few days, was on the southwest edge of the capital city to gain a short rest.

In this order of battle, GdK Brudermann hoped that as much as possible he could carry out the latest orders of the AOK, which were "to resist to the uttermost limit."

The Impact on 2nd Army

The course of the fighting by 3rd Army naturally had an effect on the fate of 2nd Army, which was still deploying. On August 26 Conrad had agreed that Böhm-Ermolli should enter the fray only after he had assembled relatively large forces; however, on the next day Conrad had been obliged to suggest that 2nd Army make every effort "to halt or drive back the enemy advancing south of Brzezany, and above all to hinder him from attacking the south flank of 3rd Army." Although such an action would have been very useful to XII Corps, on the 27th it was simply impossible. Anyway Böhm-Ermolli was hurrying preparations to bring assistance to 3rd Army in at least 48 hours so that it wouldn't once again be outflanked. For this purpose he decided to assemble all available troops by noon of the 28th in a position stretching from the heights northeast of Halicz to Rohatyn, with its left flank held in strength. On this line he would be able to carry out the wishes of the AOK.

Reports indicated that many enemy columns of foot and horse were moving over the Zlota Lipa toward the west. For a long time it was impossible to gain a reliable picture of their strength. Reconnaissance efforts by the units out beyond the Dniester, such as the 8 CD at Rohatyn (which was now under 2nd Army) were not successful. Finally in the afternoon of the 28th pilots were able to report that the leading divisions of some enemy corps (actually XII and VIII Russian Corps) were moving from Brzezany through Podwysokie and Podhajce in a generally westerly direction. Now GdK Böhm-Ermolli deployed his forces in two groups. One group was under GdI Otto von Meixner (commander of VII Corps) and was on the western slope of the Gnila Lipa Valley.
at Rohatyn, ready to attack toward the east. It contained the equivalent of about 3 1/2 divisions: 20 Hon ID, 12 March Bde and the first elements of VII Corps, which detrained at Rohatyn early on the 29th. The second group was under FML Freih. von Karg (commander of 38 Hon ID); it was to deploy behind the earth walls of the Halicz bridgehead over the Dniester. Karg's own 38 Hon ID, approaching from Nizniow, had only come a little way past Mariampol on the 28th because of exhaustion; it was grouped with 43 LW ID (which had arrived by railroad) and with parts of the Halicz bridgehead garrison. The group's mission was to enter the action by Rohatyn in a flanking maneuver.

6. Further Decisions of the Opposing High Commands

(see volume 1 sketch 7)

The Austrians

The fate of 3rd Army weighed heavily on the spirits of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. In the first sentence of a letter to the Kaiser's General Adjutant (Bolfras) on the 27th he said that he was writing "in the most difficult moments" of his life. Toward the close of the letter he stated that "for my part, I have locked my feelings into my heart." The events in 3rd Army sector did had a negative impact in the next few days on the northern flank, which hitherto had been moving hopefully forwards; they threatened in the eleventh hour to threaten the success which seemed to beckon within reach. How much this change of fortune already was feared early on the 27th, when the situation of 3rd Army seemed especially critical, has been demonstrated by Conrad's first reaction - to halt 4th Army and redeploy it in the area Zamosc-Laszczow-Tomaszow. There it could "support 3rd Army by a thrust to either the east or southeast." The temporary diversion of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group from its goal of giving meaningful assistance to Auffenberg also demonstrates how near the AOK came in these gloomy hours to abandoning the mission of 4th Army because of Brudermann's dilemma.

When the situation of 3rd Army again seemed somewhat rosier later in the same morning, the Chief of Staff once more returned to his original plan of campaign. At 2:00 PM he instructed his army commanders by wire to continue to fight in the next few

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days using all their forces without considering "local setbacks." Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was given back to 4th Army, where his intervention would decisively influence the outcome. Even the renewed defeat which 3rd Army suffered on the second day of its battle didn't sway Conrad from his decision to let the situation on the north wing take its course. According to the AOK's estimates, 1st Army was opposed by 6 1/2 Russian divisions (Evert's Army with XIV, XVI and Grenadier Corps), while 4th Austrian Army faced 7 divisions (XIX and XXV Corps, a third unidentified corps, and 70 ID). Thus no excessive optimism was necessary in order to hope for success between the Bug and Vistula.

Accordingly, the priority of the AOK remained the operations of the armies of the left wing; however, it should be noted that Conrad no longer hoped, as he had several days before, to roll up the enemy on the northern front by an envelopment maneuver from the left. In the new calculations of the Chief of the General Staff, the tense situation in east Galicia made it impossible to carry out such a wide-ranging plan. On the 28th the AOK had given Brudermann a new group of units on the heights south of Zolkiew; it consisted of 23 Hon ID, 97 Lst Inf Bde, and most of 44 LW ID (actually 3rd Army command had already sent most of the latter to the front). The group by Zolkiew could protect Brudermann's flank while two cavalry divisions filled the gap farther north. However, despite these measures Conrad was convinced that it would soon be necessary to recall forces from the northern group to the battlefields by Lemberg. Therefore he was prepared to limit his gains in the north and - shunning the possibilities that seemed to exist earlier - to be content with winning the line Cholm-Lublin. This seemed a reasonable expectation based on the situation of Generals Auffenberg and Dankl at that moment.

The conviction that the offensive to the north could now be only an episode surely made it easier for the k.u.k. Chief of Staff to put up with the temporary disadvantages which Auffenberg's continued advance posed for the northern flank of 3rd Army, and which could only be made good if Auffenberg won a rather substantial victory. For now the concentration of force continued in the direction of 4th Army, which on its right had full authority over Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and on its left had X Corps of 1st Army to guard the flank. It is true that Dankl was receiving some compensation for his loss of a corps in that he now had Kummer's Group and would later also have Woyrsch's German Landwehr. Nonetheless it is undeniable that the main effort on the northern front had shifted from 1st to
4th Army, against the original operational plan which had been based on maintaining a stronger left flank.

At the same time, the highly ambitious plan of sending 3rd Army and the greatest possible part of 2nd Army to the north to join in the decisive fighting between the Vistula and Bug had inevitably been abandoned. This development, so contrary to the original operational plan, was made easier for GdI Conrad to bear because of the actions of the German 8th Army (although these actions caused him other difficulties). Even on the 28th he had sent a message to GO Moltke that "It is urgently desired by us that German forces reach the vicinity of Siedlce as soon as possible." On the 29th and 30th he repeated the request, in part because of reports about the imminent advance by strong Russian forces from Warsaw toward the west. In the message of the 30th he referred to the reports of German victories in East Prussia, Belgium and north France: "Anyway I presume that on the German side the war against Russia will now be conducted in grand style." However, on the day before Captain Fleischmann had indicated in his report about the Battle of Tannenberg that Hindenburg would now turn to the northeast to deal with the advance of Rennenkampf's 1st Russian Army. The assurance that the Germans would finally undertake "an offensive over the Narew toward Ostrow-Siedlec" after settling accounts with Rennenkampf was not very convincing. GdI Conrad was becoming more convinced that the main mission of the German eastern army was the defense of East Prussia and that it had no intention of linking up with its ally behind Warsaw in the foreseeable future.

The Russians

While the changes in plan on the Austrian side were driven by the events on the eastern wing, the further plans of the Russian commanders were influenced above all by concerns for the western wing. Here the most powerful influence was exerted by Dankl's advance. The new commander of the 4th Russian Army was preparing to counterattack Dankl by gathering a group behind his right flank, built around XVIII Corps as it arrived at Ivangorod. Despite this measure, General Evert felt on the 28th that the situation of his Army was so critical that he asked Ivanov what he should do if it became necessary to retreat behind the Wieprz. Ivanov answered that in that scenario the main forces of 4th Army should protect the line of the Bug between Drogiczyn (35 km northeast of Siedlec) and Brest-Litovsk, while XVIII Corps guarded the roads leading to Warsaw.

161 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 578
Concerns over the fate of 4th Army were heightened by reports that Kummer's Group had crossed the Vistula and that the German Landwehr were advancing against Ivangoord. Since at the same time the offensive of 2nd Army over the Narew into East Prussia had taken a disastrous turn, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo decided to postpone the plan for a direct advance from Warsaw toward the west, and to divert the remaining two corps of the 9th Army from Warsaw to the most endangered part of the front, i.e. to 4th Army. The Guard Corps, which was just arriving at Warsaw, was sent on to Ivangoord; XXII Corps, whose trains from Petersburg had reached Lukow, would move on to Lublin. The transportation of III Caucasian Corps and of the 80, 82 and 83 ID - already on their way to 4th Army - was expedited. Command of the Guard and XVIII Corps and of the detachments serving west of Ivangoord was entrusted on 30 August to the commander of 9th Army, General Letschitzky; his immediate task was to hold the line in this most sensitive sector.

The situation of the 5th Army seems to have caused the Stavka less concern than that of the 4th. This was in part due to General Plehve, who reported on several occasions from his headquarters at Cholm that his Army didn't face any crisis. On the afternoon of the 28th Plehve seemed so confident that he also caused Ivanov in Rovno to anticipate a victory. It was hoped that the massed employment of three corps the next day to Tomaszow would end successfully, and that these corps could then be usefully employed elsewhere. In particular, Ivanov wanted 5th Army to ensure that the roads to Brest-Litovsk were barred to the enemy, and that pressure from its left flank should be as great as possible to keep the Austrians from diverting troops toward Lemberg and into Ruszky's northern flank.

However, this picture changed in the next few hours. Plehve received word about the defeat which Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had inflicted on XVII Corps, and about new setbacks to 4th Russian Army. These tidings didn't cause the Russian general to flinch. Even if his earlier hopes of victory had come to nothing, he still believed that 5th Army could hold its front. To ensure this, Plehve ordered his right wing, XXV Corps, to once again attack toward Zamosc without regard for its weakened condition; this would concentrate the attention of the Austrians upon their left flank. It was not possible at this time to count on any support from Evert's 4th Army. However, Plehve
hoped that 3rd Russian Army could help by a determined attack or at least by cavalry operations to relieve his left wing. A suggestion concerning this was made to General Ivanov and fell on fruitful ground.

After a cautious march, 3rd Army had reached the line Kaminonka-Strumilowa-Gliniany-Przemyslany-Brzuchowice on the 28th. The advance guards of the two corps on the left (IX and X) were still in action with the Austrians that afternoon in the hilly country south of the Lemberg-Zloczow highway. The marching columns were closed up tightly together, but the fighting of the last days had caused heavy casualties among the troops and used up their ammunition. Therefore General Ruszky asked for two or three rest days. Without yet knowing of the heavy setbacks suffered by Plehve's corps, the Southwest Front commander decided to let Ruszky rest, but instructed him to advance again early on the 31st, at the latest. Because of reports of enemy troop movements north of Lemberg, Ruszky would move not directly west but, as had been envisioned earlier, more toward the northwest. 8th Army, which had VII and XII Corps on the Narajowka, VIII opposite Halicz, and XXIV watching the Dniester back to the Austro-Russian border, would advance in accordance with this change of direction.

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch, however, perhaps because of Plehve's reports about the catastrophe to XVII Corps, refused to approved Ivanov's dispositions. Thus Lemberg became for the Russian eastern wing the primary target of operations, just as Lublin was the target of the Austro-Hungarian western wing. The Grand Duke ordered 3rd Army not to waste its time with redeployments, but rather to stay "on the enemy's throat" and to launch a concentric attack on the Galician capital, while 8th Army advanced to the west as it had earlier with its center through Rohatyn. The commander-in-chief was convinced that these orders, which were implemented by Ivanov against his own judgment, were the best way to bring help to the Front's right wing and especially to Plehve's desperately fighting Army. The Grand Duke would not be disappointed in his expectation.

The second act of the bloody drama in the Galician-Polish theater of operations would take place based on these decisions by the opposing commanders. It would feature the blunting of Dankl's attack against a superior Russian force that was growing by the hour, the completion of the Austrian victory at Komarow,

\[163\] Zichovitch, op. cit., pp. 156 ff.
\[164\] Ibid., by 165. Also see La grande guerre, pp. 170 ff.
and a new heavy setback near Lemberg.
C. The Austrian Offensive at High Tide

1. The encirclement of the Russians at Komarow (29-30 August)

(see volume 1 sketch 8)

The orders for the attack which GdI Auffenberg issued on the evening of 28 August, called for bold maneuvers by the two flanks of his 4th k.u.k Army in an effort to encircle the enemy forces being pressed together between Komarow and Laszczow. The right wing pincers, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, was to move around the flank of the 5th Russian Army. Meanwhile the Group was itself threatened in the rear by Ruszky's north flank, although it should take two or three days before this threat materialized. Even more difficult was the task allotted to the left wing pincers, GdI Blasius Schemua's II Corps. Schemua had to his front an enemy force that had been repeatedly defeated but still was astonishingly tough; nonetheless he was expected to turn his men, hitherto facing to the north and northeast, around to the east and southeast. This would be possible only if there was sufficient protection against an enemy thrust from the original direction of operations (the north). The situation in this direction was unclear, and complicated by the fact that the XXV Russian Corps had done an excellent job of concealing its retreat to the edge of the woods north of Str. Zamosc; the Austrians didn't know its current location. Pilots did report there was a large gap in the Russian line between the Labunka and the Wieprz; this made it easier for Auffenberg to decide to swing the bulk of II k.u.k. Corps to the east; only 4 ID plus a detachment of 13 LW ID (LW IR 25 plus two batteries) would continue their northward advance, attacking toward Krasnostaw. Auffenberg believed that this would be sufficient protection on the right flank, especially since he hoped that X Corps of the victoriouslly advancing 1st Army would also take part in the offensive toward Krasnostaw.

29 August

The 4th Army command waited with great impatience for the battle to flare up again early on the 29th. On the one hand, news of the victory of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand caused concern that the enemy would avoid encirclement by a prompt retreat. On the other hand, some pilots reported in the morning that a Russian corps was approaching from Krylow; it was hoped that the task on
the battlefield could be completed quickly before the enemy could receive reinforcements. In reality, the aerial reports apparently were based only on observation of the XVII Russian Corps, which had been smashed by the Archduke the day before and whose components were now marching back and forth in an attempt to reassemble for a counterattack.\footnote{At this point the Army command was insufficiently informed about the enemy situation on the eastern flank. It thought that the Russian V Corps was in front of Arch duke Joseph Ferdinand, and that XIII Corps (actually in East Prussia!) was in front of Boroevic, while XVII Corps was still in the rear.}

The Archduke had sent his troops forward in the morning in a new assault. The enemy's resistance was noticeably weaker. FML Roth and his three brigades (3 ID plus 16 Inf Bde) took Hujcze from 61 Russian ID, while capturing 24 cannon. FML Kirchbach, with 8 ID and 41 Hon ID, reached the area between Posadow and the Huczwa after a lively fight with 35 Russian ID. After careful artillery bombardment, 19 k.u.k. ID (FML Lukas) drove the enemy back to the upper reaches of the Huczwa. The right flank of XVII Russian Corps attempted to gain a breathing space by launching counterattacks, but they were broken up by the flanking fire of the Honveds and of 19 ID.

Under VI Corps, the group on the right flank which had been hastily assembled behind the front the day before was hard pressed by a surprise Russian attack early in the morning. However, at 10:00 AM the 27 ID and 39 Hon ID advanced north from the Tomaszow-Tarnawatka area in a well-prepared attack. They first threw back the center of V Russian Corps, then fended off a relief offensive attempted by the northern wing of that Corps. During the day the divisions were reinforced by 2 and 9 March Bdes. Although by evening the Corps hadn't reached its final objective (the heights southeast of Komarow), it was on the line Rachanie-Dzieraznia; this was truly a noteworthy accomplishment for troops who'd already been engaged for three days. The 15 ID, which still needed to recuperate, spent the 29th resting near Tomaszow.

The IX Corps was not as fortunate. This unit was ordered to attack toward Komarow with 26 LW ID from the southwest and 10 ID from the northwest, while II Corps came up on its left. Because of the risk that the Russians would retreat, the Army commander urged IX Corps to advance boldly; thus the somewhat delayed II Corps was two hours behind them when the battle was joined. IX Corps came up against a stubborn defense by Russian XIX Corps,
which had had several days to prepare its position, and also was heavily hit by the Russian artillery. By evening the 26 LW ID had lost all the ground it had temporarily gained east of the Tomaszow-Zamosc highway. 10 ID also lost some territory, but this was soon recovered thanks to the arrival of 25 ID of II Corps.

Gdi Schemua had delegated command over the greater portion of his II Corps (25 ID and most of 13 LW ID) to FML Archduke Peter Ferdinand (commander of 25 ID) for the movement toward Komarow. Schemua himself stayed at Zamosc so that he could also oversee 4 ID (attacking toward Izbica) and LW IR # 25 (deployed north of Zamosc).

Because the order to march was delayed, the Archduke didn't begin his advance toward Czesniki-Tyszowce until 10:00 AM. His southern column, composed of the main body of 25 ID, supported the wavering portions of 10ID and in the afternoon stormed the town of Czesniki; the Deutschmeister IR # 4 played a prominent role in this action. FML Kreysa's 13 LW ID was engaged on the left; he had LW IR 14 secure his north flank and sent 25 LW Bde, along with IR 84 from 25 ID, to attack through Miaczyn. However, Kreysa's troops were bunched too closely together; his reserve force (three battalions under Colonel Stöhr) was supposed to move parallel to the main body and pursue the enemy toward the Huczwa, but instead had to pivot right toward Dub. Heavy defensive fire from the Russians, who recognized their deadly peril, and the arrival of darkness made it necessary for most of Archduke Peter's Group to halt for the night on both sides of Czesniki, while Colonel Stöhr's battalions were near Miaczyn; the troops camped while still in contact with the enemy. The two Landwehr regiments watching toward the north (# 14 and 25) had spent the day repelling Russian cavalry.

Clarification of the enemy situation north of Zamosc and on the Wieprz was of great importance for the continuation of Archduke Peter Ferdinand's outflanking maneuver. This task was entrusted in 4th Army's sector to FML von Stöger-Steiner's 4 ID; however, Gdi Auffenberg could also rightly count on assistance from the neighboring 1st Army. Although Dankl had given most of his divisions a day of rest, he had ordered X Corps on his right flank to attack toward Krasnostaw and had also placed 9 CD at Auffenberg's disposal. If X Corps could reach the Lublin-Cholm rail line it would cut the route by which the Russian commanders could most easily bring up reinforcements opposite the eastern wing of 1st Army.
Throughout the 29th, the 4 ID had restricted its operations because the enemy situation was still unclear. A report from 9 CD that a Russian force of unknown strength was entrenched in the woods north of Str. Zamosc didn't shed adequate light on enemy dispositions. FML Stöger-Steiner advanced his troops with great caution through the swampy course of the Labunka Brook to the higher ground on its northern bank, a movement which lasted until the evening. The example of 4 ID affected 45 LW ID of X Corps. Although the Landwehr were ready, as requested, to assist their neighbor to the right, they advanced only 5 km on the 29th, to Tarnogora. 24 ID camped for the night a half day's march farther northwest, after throwing back enemy rear guards at Chlaniow (see volume 1 sketch 5). On the western wing of X Corps, 2 ID saw no action while it maintained the connection with V Corps. Under V Corps, the right wing of 37 Hon ID, assisted by 33 ID, repelled a sharp counterattack by the Grenadier Corps at Bychawa 166.

4th Army headquarters had moved from Oleszyce to Narol. Although the events of 29 August had not gained the Army everything it had hoped for, enough had been achieved to lay a foundation for further success. The two pincers arms had the Russians half encircled in the area Komarow-Telatyn. It appeared that only a little more pressure would be needed to crush the enemy. GdI Auffenberg ordered that on the 30th the two wings would continue as planned with the outflanking maneuver. Meanwhile the center of the Army (VI and the southern wing of IX Corps), which had been heavily engaged the day before, would just fight a stationary action.

30 August

The first action of the day opened when XXV Russian Corps, facing the left flank of 4th Army east of the Wieprz, carried out a counterattack with its last strength. This attack hit 4 ID at Str. Zamosc at the moment when GdI Schuemau had just decided to send the Division to reinforce the widely separated units of Archduke Peter's Group. 4 ID fought a hard action and had heavy losses before it pulled back behind the Labunka; it was not pursued by the enemy. The withdrawal succeeded largely because of a gallant and self-sacrificing offensive by IR "Freih. von Hess" # 49 on the left wing; the momentum of its attack brought the 49th by the end of the day to Tarzymiechy (6

166 For this action the commander of 73 Hon Inf Bde, GM Paul Nagy, received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
km southwest of Tarnogora), far in advance of the rest of the Division. It pulled back to the main line during the night.

In the morning of the 30th Archduke Peter had received word from GdI Schemua that 4 ID would wheel east toward Grabowiec, and that 9 CD had also been ordered to ride to the area north of that town. The Archduke's Group would stay in its positions to await the redeployment of these divisions. Meanwhile, however, both 25 ID and 13 LW ID had resumed their offensive of the day before, in the course of which Stöhr's group on the extreme eastern flank came up against the fresh 5th Don Cossack Div, supported by two infantry regiments from V Russian Corps. Although the k.u.k. troops gained a little ground, they couldn't break through the enemy's desperate resistance. Moreover, the Archduke believed that his rear was threatened by the approach of Russian detachments. On top of this, he was bitterly disappointed when he learned at 2:00 PM that 4 ID was not coming, but was itself under heavy attack at Str. Zamosc. 9 CD had arrived to take the place of 14 LW IR in fighting west of Miaczyn (the 14th returned to 13 LW ID); however, the relatively weak firepower of the cavalry made it an insufficient reinforcement.

Nor could Archduke Peter's Group expect meaningful support from the south. IX Corps, operating in this direction, was laboring under the incorrect but alarming idea that the Russians were planning to break through its lines toward the west. The strong defense which the Russians opposed to an attack by 10 ID in the early hours of the afternoon strengthened the misconception of the IX Corps command. Therefore the Archduke's demand for cooperation in an offensive was in vain. Finally he resolved to seek a decision using his own resources, and ordered his much-reduced lines forward for a final offensive. However, only Stöhr's group was successful; it took the heights northeast of Dub. From this point Stöhr could only harass the Russian columns retreating toward the east with rifle fire, because the battery which he had been promised failed to arrive. The sight of the wavering enemy forces at Dub, and reports that the Russians in this area were starting to retreat, indicated that Archduke Peter's troops had again done their best on this day.

Under VI Corps, the north wing of 27 ID attempted on its own initiative to take the heights north of Rachanie; however, the attackers were driven back to their positions by destructive artillery fire. The enemy V Corps, on the other hand, was no more fortunate, even though a brigade of the reserve 81 ID had arrived to replace the two regiments which had been sent north.
toward Dub. V Corps exhausted itself in fruitless attacks which were supposed to take some of the pressure off of its comrades fighting so desperately at Komarow. Now firmly convinced that the enemy was tiring, GdI Boroevic brought up 15 ID and six March battalions to his northern wing to prepare for a decisive drive to Komarow on the 31st.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group again was making encouraging progress in the late morning of the 30th. 19 ID drove the enemy over the upper course of the Huczwa. The Russians' weak resistance in this sector seemed to justify the decision to pull large portions of the Division, including its artillery, out of the line and to send them toward the Army's eastern flank. FML Kirchbach's columns took Telatyn and the bend of the Huczwa south of Laszczow after some difficult fighting. FML Roth's columns didn't move unit 10:00 AM because of the exhaustion of the troops and concern about the possible approach of enemy reinforcements on the eastern flank. They soon came upon the Russians and drove them back past Poturzyn. 2 and 6 CD, which were responsible for guarding the wing and reconnoitering toward the Bug, entered the action toward evening; they set upon the fleeing Russians of XVII Corps with flanking fire and cold steel. When darkness came, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's troops lay down exhausted upon the Volhynian soil, with considerably reduced striking power. Although the Russians had already lost many guns, their artillery fire remained extraordinarily dangerous and inflicted heavy casualties; the Austrian batteries were not nearly as effective.

Thus concerns were already mounting that the momentum of the Archduke's excellent regiments was faltering when a more alarming event occurred in the afternoon. Airplane pilots believed they had spotted an enemy infantry division on the march through Mosty Wielkie toward the west, thus into the rear of the Archduke's Group. 4th Army command believed that the forces already responsible for the security of this sector (10 and 11 CD) would be sufficiently reinforced by the addition of 6 CD and two March battalions, which were ordered to proceed there immediately. However, the Archduke still felt immediately threatened. He began to prepare a new front to guard the Solokija toward the south between Uhnow and Krystynopol; besides 6 CD, he used 2 CD, one regiment of 3 ID (KJR # 2), and the portions of 19 ID which had been pulled from the line. Thus he deprived himself of the last reserves which he could have used to complete the destruction of the enemy along the Huczwa.

The Russians Decide to Retreat
The enemy felt seriously threatened by the latest Austrian successes. At Plehve's headquarters the optimism which had prevailed 48 hours earlier had been replaced by a more sober assessment of the situation. By the afternoon of the 30th there could be no doubt that the southern group of 5th Army was badly wavering. Nonetheless, Plehve declared he wanted to stand his ground as long as 4th Army did also; he expected 3rd Army to help by sending its right wing division and - above all - a strong cavalry force toward the north. At this point he learned that X Austrian Corps had taken Krasnostaw. These tidings rightly caused the Russian 5th Army commander to fear that his opponents could break through the gap between him and Evert; as a result, he quickly removed his headquarters from Cholm to Dorohusk on the Bug. Once again he appealed to the much-tried XXV Corps: it should retake Krasnostaw regardless of casualties.

Then reports arrived from the southern group that it was in danger of encirclement. Now the 5th Army could not longer rely on half-measures. Plehve decided to break off the battle. His left flank would pull back to the area of Vladimir Volynsky: XVII Corps would retreat toward Krylow, V Corps toward Hrubieszow, and XIX Corps to Grabowiec. The right flank, consisting only of XXV Corps, should hold Krasnostaw if its counterattack succeeded, or Cholm if the attack failed. The troops were to be in their new positions by 2 September.

2. The culmination of Dankl's attack toward Lublin, and the capture of Krasnostaw (30 August–1 September)

(see volume 1 leaflet 11 and sketches 5 and 8)

On 30 August, GdK Dankl planned to advance against the enemy on both flanks in a maneuver similar to that of 4th Army. On the right, X Corps would resume the attack toward Lublin while cooperating with 4th Army. On the left, Kummer's Armeegruppe would throw back the Russian west wing at Belzyce and Wawolnica and advance toward Ivangorod; its own left flank would be protected by 3 and 7 CD, combined into a Cavalry Corps under Adolf von Brudermann (of 3 CD).  

Kummer's crossing of the Vistula had been hampered by many delays. Therefore the troops began to attack on the 30th before they were fully assembled. Following the orders of the Army command, the weaker column (100 Lst Inf Bde) advanced through the town of Chodel; the stronger column (95 Lst ID) moved on the left through Opole. North of Opole the lead regiment of 95 ID, Lst IR # 8 from Prague, collided with advance elements of the Russian XVIII Corps. Although the Russians had arrived too late to interfere with Kummer's crossing of the Vistula at Jozefow, they were able to unleash a hail storm of artillery and machine gun fire upon the Austrian Landsturm. 95 Lst ID was overcome by panic and fled quickly back to the heights south of Opole. Here the enemy was halted with some difficulty by the division's artillery, several horse batteries from Brudermann's Cavalry Corps, and the leading brigade of 106 Lst ID as it arrived west of Opole. Kummer's attacking column on the right - 100 Lst Inf Bde - fought a series of actions in which it was finally able to secure a position on the heights north of the town of Chodel; this was largely due to the fact that its right was anchored on the well-entrenched positions of Kestranek's Group.

Fighting also flared up again west of the Vistula. 14 Russian CD was extremely active; it was led by one of the best cavalry commanders of the war, General Novikov. To keep the enemy as far from Ivangorod as possible, Novikov pushed hard against 100 Lst Inf Bde, which Kummer had again brought forward to the mouth of the Kamienna. The second brigade of 106 Lst ID had to interrupt its crossing of the Vistula and hurried forward with artillery to once more drive back the pesky Russian horsemen.

The events of the 30th left no doubt in the minds of the staff of 1st Army that Kummer's elderly and tired Landsturm troops were not capable of any major offensive operations. They were inadequately equipped and physically unprepared; none of their officers were active soldiers except for the regimental and battalion commanders and a few adjutants. Dankl ordered GdK Kummer to hold his ground south of Chodel Brook and to spend his time improving the condition and organization of his men while awaiting the arrival of Woyrsch's Prussian Landwehr Corps.\footnote{At this point Woyrsch had been placed under the command of 1st Army, in accordance with an agreement reached by the Austrian and German General Staffs on 20 December 1913. Preserved in the German archives, this agreement indicates that whenever allied forces were within tactical striking}
The Germans were instructed to advance through Solec to Jozefow, where the leading unit (4 LW ID) would arrive on 2 September at the earliest. Their crossing point would continue to be guarded on the western Vistula bank by 110 Lst Inf Bde, assisted by 20 Cav Bde (from 7 CD) and two batteries of horse artillery.

Because of the misfortunes of the Army's left wing, the success of X Corps, advancing on the same day on the right wing, gained in importance. Although 45 LW ID failed to take the town of Tarnogora, which was well protected by artillery, 24 ID advanced to within cannon range of Krasnostaw in a lively action; then it forced the enemy to evacuate the city. Elements of the Division would occupy the western part of Krasnostaw on the next day. The Lublin-Cholm railroad, one of the principal communication arteries of the Russian western wing, was dangerously imperilled.

Evert was concerned for the future of his Army. To avoid losing touch with Plehve's troops, he sent half of 82 ID (which had just arrived) and parts of 3 Don Coss Div to help XXV Corps. Moreover, Evert felt that his own lines were in equal need of reinforcement. Therefore on the 29th he had halted III Caucasian Corps, originally ordered to deploy south of Ivangoorod against the Prussian Landwehr, and ordered it to detrain where it could directly support the left wing of 4th Army in the area of Lublin and Trawniki. Meanwhile XIV Corps received 80 ID and XVI Corps received 83 ID and (temporarily) 1st Gd ID. Thanks to this enormous infusion of new Russian forces, the balance of strength between the Wieprz and Vistula shifted very much against the 1st k.u.k Army during the next few days. At the outset Dankl had 152 battalions, 51 squadrons and 414 guns against the Russians' 128 battalions, 56 squadrons/sotnyas and 450 guns (these figures include 70 Russian ID of XXV Corps). By 5 September the 1st Army with 225 battalions, 70 squadrons and 600 guns was facing 264 battalions, 104 sotnyas/squadrons and 918 guns under the armies of Letschitzky and Evert.\textsuperscript{169}

31 August

\textsuperscript{169} The figures for 1st Army no longer include the March battalions, since by 5 September most of them had been incorporated into their parent regiments; nor do they include the squadrons of 9 CD, which had been placed under 4th Army. The figures for the Russians no longer include 70 ID.
Although GdK Dankl was compelled to let his western wing rest for the next few days, he was still determined that his eastern wing should operate in defense of Auffenberg's right flank, as requested by 4 ID, II Corps, and 4th Army command itself. Dankl ordered X Corps to make its principal attack toward Krasnostaw, while parts cooperated directly with Auffenberg's troops around Zamosc. X Corps headquarters entrusted the latter task to 45 LW ID; it was to secure the crossing points over the Wieprz at Tarnogora so that it could hurry to the eastern bank if necessary to help 4 ID. Anyway the operations of the 45th along the Wieprz should enable X Corps to move on toward Lublin after securing Krasnostaw, in accordance with the long-range plans of the Corps commander.

On the morning of 31 August, 45 LW ID drove the remaining enemy from the west bank of the Wieprz at Tarnogora; however, the Russians were given enough time to set the bridges on fire. This forced FML Ljubicic to cancel his planned pursuit of the enemy. At this time, fortunately, 45 LW ID ascertained that XXV Russian Corps was retreating to the northeast, which meant that X k.u.k. Corps didn't have to worry about further aiding 4 ID. 24 ID advanced northeast from Krasnostaw to Lopiennik Russki; 10 March Bde and 2 ID advanced to Izbedno, which they reached in the evening after very little fighting. 45 LW ID spent the night around Tarnogora.

1 September

On 1 September, GdI Hugo Meixner continued X Corps' offensive toward Lublin. In the morning hours his men defeated 82 Russian ID and some other units, captured 1400 prisoners, and reached the line Fajslawice-Czestoborowice. 37 Hon ID, on the right flank of V Corps, joined the operation; it swung the direction of its front around from the northeast to the north and after a day of heavy fighting advanced to a position south of Chmiel. Suddenly an enemy force arrived by train at Trawniki, on the right flank of X Corps. A brigade of 24 ID hurried to meet this threat and by the evening had driven the Russians behind the railroad. That night the blazing flames of the railroad station illuminated the field of k.u.k X Corps' victory.

45 LW ID, now in the Corps' rear, was ordered to march to Krasnostaw. The Division used up its time on security measures,

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170 The account of X Corps operations was based on an unpublished manuscript of FML von Kralowetz, who at that time was the Corps' Chief of Staff.
and didn't advance much past Tarnogora on the 1st. This made it possible for XXV Russian Corps to attack the weak Austrian elements in Krasnostaw and to push them back to the heights west of the city.\footnote{Translator's Note - The identity of these "weak elements" is uncertain. The text say they were troops which 45 LW ID had left in Krasnostaw, but that Division hadn't reached the city! Probably the text should refer to troops which 24 ID had left at Krasnostaw.}

GdK Dankl planned to build upon the success of X Corps by ordering V Corps (now reinforced by 36 Lst Inf Bde) to join the attack on the next day. At the same time, 3 CD would ride over from the left to the right flank, and the Prussian 4 LW ID would begin to cross the Vistula at Solec. However, General Ivanov was also active. He planned to open a great counterattack with fresh forces; the first objective would be to drive the Austrians from the Cholm-Lublin railroad.

### 3. The victory at Komarow (31 August–2 September)

(see volume 1 leaflet 11 and sketch 8)

Meanwhile actions on the battlefields of Komarow and on the Huczwa had reached their climax. Here Plehve had begun to retreat. The great question was whether he would be able to lead his troops out of the wheel of fire into which they had fallen. On the other side, Auffenberg was doing his utmost to destroy the 5th Russian Army. For August 31, he ordered VI and IX Corps along with Archduke Peter's Group to deliver a death blow to the Russian masses bunched together near Komarow by a combined attack from the south, west and north. At the same time the right wing, under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, would block the Russians' way toward the east; his cavalry would destroy the bridges over the Bug at Krylow and Hrubieszow. Thus the fleeing enemy would be annihilated.

#### 31 August

The threat from Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group impelled Russian XVII Corps to the most active and ruthless possible resistance. Already after darkness had settled on the 30th the enemy had attacked FML Kirchbach's troops, who fended them off until midnight. Three hours later the Russians fell upon the
left wing of 3 ID and drove it back about 4 km. Fortunately the 2nd Kaiser Jaeger, who had begun to march toward the Solokija, were still in the area; they brought the action to a standstill. FML Roth, who had been asked for assistance during the initial setback to FML Kirchbach, now also intervened. Nonetheless, XVII Russian Corps (reinforced by the 2nd Brigade of 81 ID), still put up such a strong resistance on the 31st that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group didn't gain any noteworthy ground other than the capture of Laszczow by 41 Hon ID. It was gratifying to the Group that the reports of a dangerous threat from the direction of Mosty Wielkie turned out to be erroneous. A few Russian sotnyas supported by guns appeared south of the Solokija, but were easily driven away by the parts of 2 and 6 CD which had also moved to the area. The Archduke was therefore able to recall the battalions and batteries of 19 ID (about half of the division) which had been sent toward Belz, and placed them behind 8 ID. Protection toward the south was entrusted to 2 and 6 CD (under FML Wittmann) and to the parts of 6 March Bde assembled at Uhnow. On the next day they would be joined by two Honved March Regiments (# 13 and 14), coming up by rail. 38 Inf Bde of 19 ID was still on the Huczwa; because the terrain in its front was a swampy valley, the Bde shifted to the left and was placed under VI Corps.

While the fight east of the Huczwa was thus still undecided, the bloody action around Komarow had become the key to the battle and rose to a dramatic height. On the Russian side, V Corps was ordered to remain on the battlefield until the hard-pressed XIX Corps, using up its last strength, could free itself from the deadly threat in the north and northwest and break through to safety.

GdI Boroevic, attacking from the south, did all that was possible to frustrate this plan. His left wing, which was made up of 15 ID strengthened by six march battalions, advanced in a series of hot actions through forested terrain to the heights south of Komarow, which they took in the afternoon; they were inspired by the personal example of several high-ranking officers 172. The Russians either gave themselves up piecemeal or saved themselves by wild flight to the north and east.

172 One of these officers, General Staff Col Dr. Bardolff, was commander of 29 Inf Bde; he led his troops into the attack while riding high on horseback. For his contribution to the success of VI Corps he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Order.
In IX Corps, the two divisional commanders had been depressed by their experiences of the last few days. They had declared that they would attack only after thorough artillery preparation and only in conjunction with the neighboring corps. It was almost noon before the Corps advanced. Only two hours later, the 10 ID, fighting on the northern wing, heard reports that Archduke Peter was pulling back and therefore itself retreated back to its initial position. The reports about the Archduke turned out to be true.

Archduke Peter had already become unsure of himself in the afternoon of the 30th because of the withdrawal of 4 ID behind the Labunka and the action which 9 CD was carrying out at Miaczyn against enemy forces to its north. On the morning of the 31st, the 13 LW and 25 ID had summoned up their remaining strength and once more opened an offensive; however, they were hit by frightful artillery fire that soon pinned them to the ground. The enemy fire was followed by heavy counterattacks, as the Russians staked everything on a last effort. However, despite the uncertain position on his flank and rear and the inactivity of IX Corps, the Archduke still hoped that he could hold onto the line his men had won after so many casualties until VI Corps won the expected decision. At 10:00 AM some shocking news from 9 CD's sector seemed to banish this hope. The Archduke had roused the Cavalry Division from its camp at 1:00 AM and ordered it to patrol through Miaczyn toward Werbkowice; it was given several difficult assignments. The Division's regiments, exhausted after several hours of riding through the night, had not advanced much past Miaczyn when enemy cavalry - apparently Don Cossacks - began to cause trouble. The Austrians dismounted for a fire fight which was carried out during several changes of front. Soon thereafter there were reports about the approach of several Russian infantry battalions from the direction of Grabowiec, apparently directed against the left flank of the dismounted cavalry. Fearing for the safety of his line of communication, the commander of 9 CD, FML Hauer, ordered a retreat to the heights west of Czesniki; he hoped that from this position he could effectively carry out his primary mission, the protection of Archduke Peter's troops toward the north.

The Archduke was oppressed by the report that Hauer had pulled back, as well as by continuing uncertainty about the Russian XXV Corps; unlike 45 LW ID, the 4 ID wasn't sure that the Corps was retreating toward the north until the evening. Therefore Peter believed he could no longer be responsible for leaving his Group in what appeared to be an exposed position so far to the east.
He felt obliged to pull 13 LW and 25 ID back to the line Labunki-Zamosc to avoid a perceived danger of encirclement.

Based on the first reports it received, 4th Army command at Narol was under the positive and generally correct impression that the enemy around Komarow had already begun to retreat toward the north and northeast. Full of confidence, they ordered at 11:00 AM that the corps in the Komarow area (VI, IX and II) should "carry out a general offensive in the direction of Tyszowce."

In VI Corps the right wing had still not been able to gain any significant ground from the fiercely resisting V Russian Corps. The picture changed when 15 ID worked its way to the southern outskirts of Komarow as the evening sun began to set. At this point the troops of IX Corps finally broke out of their positions. In some lively actions they took the heights west of Komarow from Russian troops who were already wavering. At dawn on 1 September elements of IX Corps made contact with 15 ID, which had already entered Komarow.

Reactions of the Higher Headquarters

Meanwhile, during the afternoon of the 31st, 4th Army HQ had received word from the AOK about another heavy setback to 3rd Army. On 1 September that Army would have to retreat to the line Mikolajow-Lemberg and thereafter would be pulled back at least as far as the Wereszyca River. Because of this situation, 4th Army would have to win a decision within 24 - or at most 48 - hours.

At this point, Army HQ believed that the eastern flank was still making good progress east of the Huczwa and knew nothing about the serious change of fortune in Archduke Peter Ferdinand's Group. Their reports to Przemysl were all confident. This was especially the case with the head of the Army's Operations Detachment, the temperamental Colonel von Soos. He stated that according to his current interpretation of the situation there was hope that the 5th Russian Army "was completely dissolving", while the Austrian troops were in excellent condition and not concerned about any threat to their rear. It was possible that the victorious 4th Army could free up four divisions in the next few days to support 3rd Army 173.

173 Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 593 ff. GdI von Soos reported after the war to the Military Archives that he felt obliged to make this telephone report to the AOK in order to raise their
These hopes significantly declined around 3:00 PM when the headquarters at Narol received the first tidings about the pull-back of Archduke Peter Ferdinand's Group. Because at the same time it became evident that the Archduke had allowed false or at least greatly exaggerated information to lead him into his unfortunate decision, the Army commander became understandably angry; the great success that seemed so near now threatened to be diminished. Auffenberg indignantly ordered 13 LW and 25 ID to immediately regain the positions at Dub. 9 CD should drive away the infantry battalions which had been reported south of Grabowiec; the Archduke's concern about the Russian XXV Corps should be dispelled by an attack to the north by 4 ID and (if possible) by 45 LW ID (the latter, of course, was not under 4th Army's jurisdiction). However, these directives could not be carried out, at least on the 31st. Archduke Peter Ferdinand's troops, who had arrived dead tired at their new positions, were simply incapable of carrying out the Army commander's orders. On the other hand, the enemy force that supposedly opposed 9 CD turned out to be a phantom. 4 ID also finally reported that the Russians of XXV Corps had pulled back to the north at their own decision quite a while before.

Thus the taste of victory which the leader of 4th Army experienced in the last days of August was mixed with some bitterness. However, GdI Auffenberg showed that he was not resigned to remaining content with a diminished success. Even if the encirclement at Komarow was no longer possible, Plehve's Army should at least be driven back as far as possible to the east; thus the position of the Russians facing Dankl could be made untenable. The AOK gave 4th Army permission to use one more day (1 September) to carry out this task. Therefore, Auffenberg ordered his Army to open a general attack toward the east, while Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would stay in place as the pivot for the maneuver. II Corps was also to bring its 4 ID along for the march to the east in the direction of Dub.

1 September

The enemy army commander Plehve had to admit that with the loss of Komarow the outcome of the battle was settled. However,
since the enormous Russian supply trains had not yet evacuated the field, XVII Corps would have to still retain its positions on 1 September to cover the continuing retreat. Meanwhile, V Corps pulled back to Tyszowce and occupied a bridgehead over the Huczwa within cannon range of that town. XIX Corps, which had been given free passage by Archduke Peter Ferdinand's Group, held a temporary position on the heights north of Dub while retreating toward Grabowiec.

East of the Huczwa, the Russians were so successful at concealing their retreat that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's troops stayed in place; some units made attempts on their own initiative to clarify the enemy situation by probing attacks, but this had no significance. The slackening of Russian resistance finally became so evident in the afternoon that it seemed to invite a general attack. However, at this time the AOK heard from pilots that strong enemy detachments were marching toward the Archduke's rear and therefore recommended that his Group should ensure its security toward the south by committing not only 2 and 6 CD, but also "significant forces from XIV Corps." 6 CD was soon able to ascertain that this report was considerably exaggerated; therefore the Archduke didn't send the entire 19 ID south to the Solokija, as originally planned, but just one brigade. Nonetheless, the attack of his Group toward the north had to be postponed to the next morning because the day was almost over and the troops were exhausted.

West of the Huczwa, the k.u.k. divisions remained hard on the heels of the retreating enemy on the 1st. The northern wing of VI Corps (15 and 39 ID), although tired, took the area around Czartowczyk in light actions. In the afternoon the 27 ID and the parts of 19 ID still at the front followed up to the heights northwest of Laszczów. IX Corps advanced astride the Komarow-Tyszowce road, captured Zubowice from the enemy, and in the afternoon fought a lively pursuit action east of that town. Parts of 10 ID turned toward the north against the Russian rear guards holding Dub. GdI Schemua's II Corps, with its left flank covered by 9 CD, pushed east with three divisional columns only as far as the swell of ground by Czesniki and Dub, and (with a flank guard) to Miaczyn; it didn't interrupt the movement of the enemy's XIX Corps.

The Russians proved themselves masterly in retreat, as they did in many other critical situations during the war. Plehve's last rear guards disengaged from the Austrians in the early hours of 2 September. In a strenuous night march his XIX Corps reached
Grabowiec, V Corps reached Hrubieszow, and XVII Corps the area directly south of Vladimir-Volynsky. When Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's regiments finally wanted to fall upon the enemy at dawn on the 2nd, they found the Russian positions abandoned. The other corps of 4th Army, closely massed together west of the Huczwa, had the same experience.

Analysis of the Battle of Komarow

This was the end of the seven-day Battle of Komarow. The 4th k.u.k. Army with 194 battalions, 102 squadrons and 610 guns had had numerical superiority, though not a decisive edge, over Plehve's 152 battalions, 150 squadrons and 600 guns. From the beginning, Auffenberg's ambitious goal was to encircle the enemy by advancing both his wings. Filled with an iron determination to achieve this success, he took in stride two accompanying disadvantages: the development of large gaps in his line and the eventual massing of his forces in a few locations. If he succeeded in dealing a mortal blow to his enemy, the disadvantages would prove meaningless.

The main burden of carrying out this maneuver fell in the center upon the Upper Hungarian and Slovak regiments of VI Corps, which were given the difficult task of holding down the enemy; they were led by the ruthless and resourceful general who would later be victorious on the Isonzo. The flanking attacks were carried out by the Alpine XIV Corps and the Lower Austrian-Moravian II Corps, both of which included numerous German regiments. Thus the great venture was in capable hands.

174 During the Battle, the 10 Aus-Hung CD had left 4th Army but was replaced by 9 CD; the strength of just one division has therefore been included for these two formations. Honved March Regts # 13 and 14, which arrived at the very end and weren't engaged, are excluded from the total. 70 ID of Russian 5th Army was engaged against k.u.k. X Corps rather than against Auffenberg, and therefore is also excluded.

175 This refers to Gdi Svetozar Boroevic, commander of VI Corps. At a meeting of the Order Chapter of the Maria Theresia Order on 3 October 1931 he was recognized for his role in the Battle of Komarow by an award of its Knight's Cross.

176 The original text refers to the "picked German troops" of the II and XIV Corps and gives – as often – the misleading impression that they were some kind of special elite force and that they were wholly German in composition. In reality, as noted above, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group consisted of
Although the encirclement attempt was not fully successful, this was certainly not the fault of the brave troops who for over a week had marched and fought despite all kinds of difficulties and privations; thousands of them were laid to their final rest in the Volhynian earth.

On the decisive day of the battle, 31 August, the eastern wing was unable to complete the desired outflanking maneuver. This was mainly because its troops had already exerted all the strength that was humanly possible, and could do no more. The real or perceived threat to the rear of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, however, did play a part. It weakened the resolve of the decision-makers at all levels, who were just becoming acquainted with vicissitudes of warfare, and led to the detachment of units, especially cavalry, whose absence was bitterly lamented on the battlefield. When Russian XVII Corps found the bridges over the Bug intact to aid its hasty retreat, this was due in large measure to the fact that 2 Aus-Hung CD was patrolling to the south on the Solokija instead of carrying out its original mission of destroying the bridges in the north.

More decisive than the events on the eastern wing of the battle front was the withdrawal of Archduke Peter Ferdinand's Group, also on 31 August. Although the right wing's failure to advance made impossible the great annihilation battle ("Cannae") of which Auffenberg had dreamed, it would still have been possible to win a smaller "Cannae" around Komarow. Archduke Peter's Group merely had to stay in place until the offensive of 15 ID and of IX Corps trapped the enemy at Komarow, which would have been a catastrophe for XIX Russian Corps. However, the commanders on the spot, influenced by false alarming reports, at the last minute removed the barrier which they themselves had built to block the retreat of XIX Corps. Thus it was also possible for this part of the enemy Army, although shaken and bleeding from a thousand wounds, to march unmolested from the battlefield where both sides had fought with such death-defying bravery to win the palm of victory.

Fate had thus not rewarded the k.u.k. 4th Army as much as had been hoped. The bold attempt to encircle 5th Russian Army had failed. However, the Army commander and his staff were convinced that the withdrawing enemy forces had been decisively more than just XIV Corps, and that Corps included a strong minority of non-Germans. Similarly, II Corps had a German majority but a significant number of Czech units as well. (Translator's Note)
beaten; this conviction was also adopted by the AOK. Early on 2 September, while Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group advanced to the area east of Tyszowce, IX and II Corps to the banks of the Huczwa north of this town, and XVII and VI Corps to their assembly points at Laszczow, Auffenberg's HQ received orders from Przemysl which summoned the victorious 4th Army to new deeds.
4. The Battle of the Gnila Lipa (29-30 August)

(see volume 1 sketch 9)

While GdK Dankl was holding his ground one day's march from Lublin and Auffenberg was winning a significant victory after several changes of fortune, the eastern wing of the k.u.k. forces fighting Russia was suffering a new and bitter setback on the Gnila Lipa.

29 August

On 29 August, the first day of the new battle, the 3rd Russian Army had been ordered by the Grand Duke-Generallissimo not to rest, but to immediately launch a concentric attack against Lemberg. However, this order was accomplished gradually, so that in the event only the Army's southern flank was strongly active. As a consequence, the Aus-Hung northern wing was granted a certain freedom of movement throughout the day; because so many units were exhausted and still not accustomed to marching, it was anyway not able to take full advantage of this opportunity. On the extreme left the cavalry corps concentrated its forces around Zolkiew (10 and 11 CD plus four March battalions from 6 March Bde). Farther south, FML Daempf's Group (his own 23 Hon ID plus 97 Lst Inf Bde) advanced only to a point just west of Kulikow. Thus the hope of the AOK that pressure from this direction would develop on the 29th against the enemy's northern wing remained unfulfilled. On the other hand, the Russians' inactivity permitted XI Corps to carry out its planned retreat to the field fortifications of Lemberg; it took up a position at Zydatycze facing to the east and northeast.

The defensive strength of III and XII Corps had been increased by distributing the battalions of the Landes-Schützen Bde throughout their front. Moreover, 3 March Bde was dissolved and its regiments broken up to reinforce III Corps. The enemy began his activity against both corps by opening a powerful, admirably directed artillery fire. This was all the more effective against the Aus-Hung troops because they were insufficiently entrenched. Moreover, some of their own batteries were already suffering a lack of ammunition as the battle began, partly because of the losses suffered by the munitions columns in the preceding day and partly (at least in XII Corps) because of inadequate organization of the supply services. For a time the enemy supplemented this unequal artillery contest with local attacks to gain information; the defenders often mistook these
forays for major offensives.

Thus, 22 LW ID of III Corps was disturbed by one of these local attacks at Przemyslany rather early in the day, and urgently requested reinforcements. A similar situation developed in the sector of its southern neighbor, 16 ID of XII Corps. Although the latter division soon recovered its poise and was able to place two Landes-Schützen battalions at the disposal of the 22nd, the 3rd Army HQ became concerned by the calls for help from III Corps. It immediately sent 108 Lst Inf Bde - which had been supposed to go to the Army's southern flank - to support 22 LW ID, and diverted the first echelons of 14 March Bde - which was supposed to join FML Daempf's Group - to Gaje. HQ also considered sending a brigade of 44 LW ID to III Corps. Fortunately, 22 LW ID finally decided that its own resources were sufficient to cope with the enemy and GdI Colerus, the Corps commander, declined the offer of the brigade from 44 ID. Thus the 44th was able to make an attack on its own initiative in the afternoon, which relieved some of the pressure on III Corps from the north.

On the south wing of XII Corps, in the first hours of the morning the 11 ID was able to force back several Russian batteries, and then the enemy 10 CD. Soon afterward, however, air reconnaissance reported the approach of long columns of Russians from Brzezany toward Janczyn. This was the VII Corps of Brussilov who, unlike Russky, was driving his troops forward without pause. Despite the vigilance of 105 Lst Inf Bde, which was attached to XII Corps, it was unable to keep the northernmost group of 8th Russian Army from setting foot west of the Gnila Lipa at Firlejow. The example of their southern neighbors now caused the adjacent elements of Ruszky's Army to also leave their entrenchments. Toward evening a superior enemy force pushed back the inner flanks of the 11 and 35 ID. Although the cohesion of the units engaged against this Russian onset had undoubtedly suffered under the blows of the preceding days, they could still be effective at the front when inspired by the personal leadership of their commanders. Unfortunately, several of these officers were also suffering from the belief that they were involved in an inevitable catastrophe. Thus the commander of 88 L-Sch Bde, after sending most of his staff into combat and getting them shot up, fell back with the miscellaneous elements of various units which had assembled around him to the area south of Swirz. There was a similar performance by the artillery brigadier of 11 ID; concerned for the safety of several of his batteries, he led them back to Bobrka, thus greatly weakening the defensive strength of his
Division for the actions on 30 August. When morning dawned on the 30th there were hundreds of stragglers milling around Strzeliska Nowe.

The 3rd Army command was greatly alarmed by reports about the advance of VII Russian Corps. 105 Lst Inf Bde, engaged in its first action, could scarcely be considered an adequate force to counter this new opponent. There were no other reserves available in the sector. Relief could only come from the quickest possible intervention of the VII k.u.k. Corps of Böhm-Ermolli's Army, which was assembling at Rohatyn. Around noon the 3rd Army sent urgent demands for its help both to the AOK and to HQ of 2nd Army.

Böhm-Ermolli's order to VII Corps to hold itself ready south of Rohatyn, with its face toward the east, had been received at Corps HQ early on the 29th. On the evening before, VII Corps had decided based on reports of the enemy situation that there was a greater danger from the direction of Bursztyn than from Brzezany; therefore the troops already at hand were deployed between Rohatyn and Podmichalowce facing to the southeast, and the other troops were to be unloaded from the trains farther to the rear. On the morning of the 29th, the direction of the front was changed from southeast to east as the Army command desired. Then, at noon Böhm-Ermolli responded to the call for help from 3rd Army by ordering 34 ID, 20 Hon ID and 12 March Bde to immediately prepare to move north. Thus they could hinder the advance by the Russians north of Rohatyn around the flank of 3rd Army.

Only one of the units of this group (which was placed under FML von Csanady of 20 Hon ID), FML Ritter von Krautwald's 34 ID, was able to win the ground to which it was sent. Before the other two units began their pivot to the north, around 1:30 PM they were attacked from the east by XII Russian Corps and driven back. To the south of Csanady's group, parts of 17 ID attacked the lead regiments of VIII Russian Corps; after several changes of fortune, the Russians were also left in possession of this battlefield.

The Group of FML Freih. von Karg fought with better fortune. Around noon the Army command, believing that VII Corps was already engaged, ordered him to attack north of Bołszowce with his own 38 Hon ID on the right and the nine available battalions of 43 LW ID on the left. FML Karg drove back division-sized detachments of Russian VIII Corps at Zelibory. Further to the southeast, XXIV Russian Corps was content to observe the
Austrian bridgeheads on the Dniester. Because of unfounded rumors about Russian attacks, there was briefly some uneasiness at the Halicz bridgehead. GdK Böhm-Ermolli allowed the Dniester bridges at Mariampol to be destroyed, and brought 103 Lst Inf Bde up from Stanislau to Halicz.

Preparations for the Second Day of Battle

Despite local successes, the events of 29 August had not been very satisfactory for the Russians, especially because at the same time their 5th Army was so hard-pressed at Komarow. On the 30th the two eastern armies, which Ivanov had for practical purposes both placed under Ruszky's orders, should finish their work. Moreover, the commander of the Southwest Front, considering Plehve's situation, had returned to a plan that had been discussed earlier, the extension of the north wing of 3rd Army toward Mosty Wielkie. XXI Corps should shift to the area northwest of Kamionka-Strumilowa while XI Corps took over the former sector of the XXIst. A mounted group consisting of 9 and 11 CD would move to the west of Mosty Wielkie. Because of this redeployment by 3rd Army, the task of breaking enemy resistance on the Gnila Lipa naturally had fallen primarily to 8th Russian Army. Brussilov, who correctly estimated Austrian strength around Rohatyn at three to four divisions, ordered his VIII Corps to pin down Karg's Group, while XII and VII Corps completed the breakthrough of the enemy positions which had been initiated on the 29th. The Russians believed with justice that the security of their extreme left (Dniester) flank could be entrusted to the Dniester Detachment east of Czernowitz; this Detachment was reinforced by 71 ID and instructed to capture the capital of Bukovina 177.

On the 29th, the AOK had still cherished fading hopes that a flanking operation - though with rather weak forces - could be launched on both wings against the enemy approaching the Gnila Lipa. By the 30th it was clear that not much could be expected of the units north and northeast of Lemberg, because of their own lack of capacity to maneuver and because of the strengthening and extension of the Russian north wing. Therefore the intervention of 2nd Army to the south of 3rd Army was all the more important; neither the AOK nor Brudermann's HQ left Böhm-Ermolli in any doubt about their expectations.

30 August - Operations of 2nd Army

177 La grande guerre, p. 178. Zichovitch, p. 168
The ability of 2nd Army HQ to control operations was hampered by poor communications with its immediate subordinates. GdK Böhm-Ermolli, who apparently did not have a clear picture of the situation, repeated the orders of the 29th on the 30th. GdI Meixner of VII Corps was informed about events in the sector of 34 ID, but knew no more about the condition of the other parts of his command than did Böhm-Ermolli. Therefore he decided to personally direct Csanady's Group in the morning. At the same hour, 34 ID should attack toward the north. Because of the danger threatening east of Rohatyn, it was originally intended to use just seven battalions for this attack. Finally, however, the entire Division advanced early on the 30th; they defeated Russian cavalry and an infantry brigade of XII Russian Corps which had just arrived south of Firlejow and pushed them back through Ruda.

Meanwhile the Corps commander had reviewed the situation of his southern group. He found 20 Hon ID and 12 March Bde in great disorder, so that it seemed fruitless to order them to a new attack toward the east. This task therefore fell to 17 ID (FML Ritter von Henriquez); supported on the right by 8 CD and on the left by 4 CD, it won some initial successes. Then, however, it was hit by a counterattack by greatly superior enemy forces and had to pull back to the heights east of Knihynicze. To add to the calamity, in the afternoon one of the brigadiers of 20 Hon ID suffered a nervous breakdown and panic broke out in his brigade. The unit fled to the west, where it was finally brought under control with difficulty; it could not be led back into action that day. Deeply concerned, the Corps commander left the task of aiding 3rd Army solely to 34 ID; he pulled his southern group back behind the Swirz Brook. Only 17 ID, which was not harried by the enemy, remained in bivouac east of the Brook.

VII Corps was not alone in its misfortune. Group Karg, although strengthened by parts of 103 Lst Inf Bde, shared the same fate. Karg's right wing flank guard, which consisted of four Hungarian Landsturm battalions and just two guns, was attacked at Hnilcze and driven back to Halicz. 43 LW ID, which made up the left column, was outflanked from the west by VIII Russian Corps, which had not been preoccupied as expected by the operations around Rohatyn. Therefore FML Karg had to pull his whole Group back to Halicz. Parts of 43 LW ID even had to cross over to the south bank of the Dniester. According to enemy sources, 31 guns were left in the Russians' possession.\footnote{Zichovitch, p. 169}
Meanwhile GdK Böhm-Ermolli became very impatient and hastened up to Knihynicze. When he arrived in the late afternoon, it was too late to prevent the collapse of his plan of attack, which he had been forced by events to initiate so prematurely. Nevertheless, from the battlefield he ordered Meixner's and Karg's Groups to renew the offensive if the enemy seemed ready to swing around Brudermann's southern flank. The events which befell 3rd Army around this time made it unnecessary for Böhm-Ermolli's troops to carry out this order, which would have been very difficult in any event.

30 August - Operations of 3rd Army

Events in 3rd Army's sector were influenced by Ruszky's shift to the side north of the Lemberg-Zloczow road. In the extreme north, half way between Kamionka-Strumilowa and Zolkiew, detachments of the 10 k.u.k. CD crossed swords with 11 Russian CD. South of the 10th, 11 Hon CD assembled at Kulikow. The two Aus-Hung mounted divisions were not able to relieve Auffenberg's Army of the serious concern about approaching enemy forces in this area. In the afternoon, FML Daempf's Group collided with the flanking columns of Russian XXI Corps as it marched north, and fought them in a stationary action. The k.u.k. XI Corps advanced between the railroad and the Lemberg-Zoltance road; its 60 Inf Bde in the woods south of Jaryczow-Nowy came upon 11 Russian ID, which was deploying there to cover the sideways movement of Russky's other units. Supported by other parts of 30 ID, 60 Bde drove the Russians back toward the east and took 4 guns.

Similarly, on the northern wing of III Corps the 44 LW ID, on its own initiative, launched an afternoon attack on XI Russian Corps, which was moving to its right; the attack was supported by artillery from neighboring units to the south. The fighting troops of III Corps, who had recovered their cohesion, wanted to follow the example of 44 ID when they recognized that the enemy was moving to the side; however, the Corps commander was still strongly influenced by the disastrous events of the preceding days, and would not give permission. Thus on 30 August the 22 LW ID was the only other part of III Corps engaged in a major action. This occurred early in the morning, right after the Division had sent back the two Landes-Schützen battalions which had been attached on the 29th; the battalions rejoined 16 ID, the next unit on the right, which was seriously threatened by a concentration of enemy troops. Apparently the Russians attacked 22 LW ID with the goal of distracting attention from the
regrouping on their northern wing. There was furious street fighting in Przemyslany, after which the town remained in the hands of the enemy. A similar diversionary attack by the Russians against 6 ID was stopped cold.

Meanwhile a heavy storm had overtaken XII Corps, deployed to the south of the IIIrd. The batteries of VII and X Russian Corps hammered away at the positions at Meryschcow with greater intensity beginning early in the morning. Behind this wall of fire, the enemy prepared massed attacking forces, which broke loose at 10:00 AM. The storm columns of VII Russian Corps south of Brzuchowice smashed the already thin front of 35 ID as well as 11 ID, which was fighting with almost no artillery. Counterattacks by the scanty reserves won no lasting success.

When the Austrian line fell back, the southern wing of 16 ID, already under attack by X Russian Corps, was also affected. The commander of XII k.u.k. Corps, GdI Kövess, attempted to rally his faltering troops around Height 437 (southeast of Swirz) and thus to halt the enemy breakthrough while anchoring a new line on the two outermost flanks of his Corps, which were still standing their ground. However, the badly demoralized and intermingled units were overtaken in their movement to the new position by 10 Russian CD. Fire from enemy horse artillery batteries, operating right at the front, caused panic to break out. Even Kövess' staff, who were in the front firing line, were swept away. Troops and supply echelons ran quickly and without order between the columns of fleeing civilians, who here as everywhere in east Galicia were filling the roads. Some of the soldiers went toward Bobrka, others went through Romanow toward Lemberg.

South of the breakthrough, 105 Lst Inf Bde, with the parts of 11 ID who were still at the front, pulled back to the heights east of Strzeliska Nowe. 34 ID from VII Corps, which had been moving up from Ruda in a vain attempt to join XII Corps, retreated to Podkamien after two of its regiments were seized with mass panic. Farther to the right, 4 CD had already taken up a position near Podkamien.

The catastrophe of XII Corps now forced III Corps to withdraw. GdI Colerus wished to hold onto Kurowice as a pivot for the rest of his line as it swung back, but then received orders from Army HQ for a much farther reaching retreat.

And so the second battle in east Galicia also ended in misfortune for the Austrian army. By the end of the contest, 2nd and 3rd Army pitted 282 battalions, 133 squadrons and 718
guns against the 336 battalions, 264 squadrons and 1214 guns of the two Russian armies. The Russian superiority in infantry was not overwhelming (although it must be remembered that Brudermann and Böhmer's total includes 107 weak Landsturm and March battalions). However their edge in artillery – about 500 guns – proved decisive.

5. The Loss of Lemberg

(see volume 1 leaflet 11 and sketch 10)

Tidings about the catastrophe of XII Corps arrived in Lemberg around 5:00 PM on 30 August. Soon thereafter the failure of VII Corps' flank attack was also confirmed. Around 6:00 PM the 3rd Army HQ (which now had a new Chief of Staff, GM von Boog), ordered XII Corps and 105 Lst Inf Bde to pull back to the Bialy potok below Bobrka. III Corps would, for the time being, just pull its southern wing back toward Bobrka. However, an hour later the orders were amended so that if the left wing was pressed by the enemy it should also give up its current positions and retreat to the area around Lemberg (except for Daimpf's Group, which would continue its attack).

Although GdI Conrad didn't cherish any unjustified optimism about the situation in the east, he was still deeply shaken by the news about 3rd Army. The plan he had been considering for several days – to move parts of 4th Army against the flank of the troublesome enemy – seemed more feasible after the latest unfortunate turn of events. However, 4th Army must first complete its work at Komarow, for which they would need at least 31 August and probably also 1 September. To avoid any new blow directed at 3rd Army in the meantime, the Chief of Staff agreed with GdK Brudermann that his Army's front should pull back to the shorter and less endangered line Mikolajow-Lemberg. However, in his mind Conrad was already considering an even further retreat to and behind the Wereszyca. He was holding off a decision about this until the 31st, but he was already concerned about occupying intermediate delaying positions,

179 The figures for the k.u.k. troops do not include 1 or 5 CD, 35 Lst Inf Bde, or the garrison troops at Lemberg and Mikolajow. The Russian figures exclude the Dniester Detachment, one reserve Inf Div that apparently hadn't yet reached the front, and three Cossack divisions.

180 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 586
especially the most important crossing over the swampy low ground. Therefore Meixner's Group, whose first assignment was to retreat behind the Chodorow ponds, was earmarked to secure Komarno; 40 Lst Inf Bde would hold onto Halicz; all other parts of 2nd Army would fall back to the area east of Stryj, giving up Nizniow and Czernowitz.

3rd Army HQ completed the eventful 30th of August by issuing the necessary orders for retreat to the Mikolajow-Lemberg line. In the first two days of September the XII and III Corps would assemble between Dornfeld and the south side of Lemberg, 44 LW ID behind the city's eastern fortifications, and XI Corps behind the northeast fortifications. Daempf's Group would guard the northern flank at Kulkiow and Zolkiew. Preparatory orders were also issued for the continuation of the retreat to the Wereszyca, if necessary.

31 August

August 31st brought a little bright light into the gloomy picture of the situation. According to the testimony of eyewitnesses, including General Staff officers sent to the front by the AOK, the condition of the eastern armies, particularly of 3rd Army, was considerably better than had appeared at first glance.

The cautious, probing advance of the enemy allowed the Austrian divisions to make an orderly retreat; only Daempf's Group fought a more serious action with the Russians a short day's march east of Zolkiew. XI Corps was able to occupy its fortifications in satisfactory order. 44 LW ID and two divisions of III Corps (#6 and 28) were firmly under control of their commanders; their rear guards were still in their old positions, fending off some probes by the Russians, who were somewhat livelier in this sector. Only III Corps' 22 LW ID was still suffering somewhat from the woeful events of the preceding days. XII Corps, however, was considerably disorganized. Small groups from the Corps had wound up in the sector of 2nd Army; larger parts assembled in Lemberg, where they were re-equipped and sent by rail to the area west of Lubien Wk., where it was planned to assemble the whole Corps. A strong group made up of detachments of all the regiments, among whom was the Corps commander, marched back to Bobrka as ordered. Here they took up a rear guard position to cover the retreat of the enormous supply trains, and fended off weak local attacks by the enemy. In 2nd Army, the divisions of VII Corps pulled back behind the Chodorow ponds, while the other units reached the southern bank of the
Meanwhile, the AOK was awaiting developments in 4th Army's sector with understandable impatience. The speed with which Auffenberg could release and turn around significant forces was crucial to determine whether 3rd Army would really have to retreat to the Wereszyca and therefore whether or not Lemberg could be held. At 2:00 PM there finally arrived a confident report from Colonel Soos (mentioned in the preceding section), which indicated it was possible that the Russian forces facing Auffenberg might be in total dissolution. Based on this analysis, it was still possible to avoid the loss of Lemberg, which would have unfavorable political as well as military consequences. The most crucial need was to hinder the enemy's advance into the area north of the capital city. 3rd Army command had the impression that the Russians here were moving markedly toward the north, that is toward Auffenberg's rear, rather than northwest closer to Lemberg. Nonetheless, FML Daempf, whose command now also included 10 and 11 CD, was emphatically ordered to hinder any advance to the northwest or west by the Russians in his sector. The direct defense of Lemberg was left to XI Corps and 44 LW ID. South of the city, the III Corps - reinforced by all of 88 L-Sch Bde, was ready to counterattack against any enemy force pushing toward the capital. Thus it seemed that necessary precautions had been taken against this eventuality.

GdI Conrad sent a very earnest report by telegraph to the DOHL, asking them to send at least two corps to the area of Przemysl. Actually a force of this strength, plus a cavalry division, was in transit from France to the East. Although the commander of the German eastern army said he didn't need this reinforcement, the two corps rolled on to East Prussia; they arrived there after the Battle of Tannenberg.

1 September

On 1 September, as on 31 August, the enemy in east Galicia displayed surprising caution (see volume 1 leaflet 11). The fighting by Daempf's Group continued without reaching a decision, but also without any unfavorable turn. 3rd Army HQ, which on the day before had moved to Grodek, returned to Lemberg to take direct control of its defense. The Austrians urgently

hoped that the Russians would give XI and III Corps, particularly the latter's 22 LW ID, more time to recover. Farther south, GdI Kövess brought 4500 men of his XII Corps back to Dornfeld. Since this corps could not be expected to be ready in the next few days to assist in the fighting to hold Lemberg, it was ordered to continue marching to the rear until it reached quarters by Lubien Wk. and Komarno for rehabilitation. 4 CD and 105 Lst Inf Bde, which both were in better condition, would cover the Corps' withdrawal. In 2nd Army, VII Corps along with 20 Hon ID and 8 CD reached the area on both sides of the Dniester by Mikolajow. The Army's other units took up a line between Stryj and Stanislau. 35 Lst Inf Bde had moved west from Czernowitz and as ordered had handed over the defense of the Bukovina to the gendarmerie and militia of Lt Col Fischer. IV Corps had begun to detrain at Sambor and Chyrow, while two more Brigades (102 Lst Inf Bde and 7 March Bde) were rolling through Munkacs toward Stryj.

VII Corps was held in readiness in case the enemy attacked Lemberg; it would either move to support 3rd Army by a flanking movement or, if the Russians allowed enough time, would fill in the gap left by the pullback of XII Corps.

Now the AOK spent anxious hours awaiting word from 4th Army that would decide the question of whether Lemberg should be held. They were still awaiting the great success which had been anticipated the day before. If Auffenberg was not victorious, Conrad saw no other solution than to immediately lead all his armies back behind the San. Finally at 9:30 PM good news arrived from Narol: the enemy was in full retreat.

The Chief of Staff thereupon decided to implement an idea that was one of the most finely-balanced and boldest of the World War. Auffenberg's victorious Army should leave just the

182 Because a dangerous gap had opened between 4th and 1st Armies during the Battle of Komarow, the AOK had briefly considered diverting IV Corps to this sector when it arrived from the Balkans. However, this movement would have strained the capacity of the railroads behind the battlefields beyond their capacity, so the idea was abandoned. (Note based on a report of GM Kless and Col Brantner, who at that time were captains in the Operational Bureau of the AOK)


184 Translator's Note - This characterization of Conrad's decision has been shared by many subsequent writers. However, there is another school of thought, perhaps best summarized in
minimal forces necessary opposite its defeated enemy, two infantry divisions east of the Huczwa and one infantry and one cavalry division west of that river. The bulk of 4th Army however would make a 180 degree turn and by 3 September would be held in readiness on the line Uhnow-Belzec. Thus it would be ready "to either attack in the direction of Lemberg in relief of 3rd Army, or could march to the Jaroslau-Lezajsk area [on the San], in case 3rd Army was obliged to retreat." With this order, which was supplemented in the next few days with directives on its implementation, the nimble and tireless spirit of the Chief of the General Staff directed the course of events into a new channel. Of the two alternatives for which 4th Army was preparing, it was self-evident given the stubbornness with which Conrad sought for success that he preferred the first (sending the Army into the fighting north of Lemberg) to the second (a retreat). Another factor was his peacetime promise to his ally that he would ensure the German western armies a period of six to seven weeks in which they would not have to worry about the east. This promise would be fulfilled much better by staying in the area of Lemberg than by immediate retreat to the San.

The Evacuation of Lemberg

However, the fate of Lemberg was sealed before 4th Army could arrive to throw its strength into the balance. This was due to an accidental occurrence north of the city on the night of 1-2 September. Here Daempf's Group had successfully held its ground against an apparently larger enemy force until the evening. However, in the darkness panic seized the north Hungarian 97 Lst Inf Bde, and soon spread to the neighboring 23 Hon ID. Under the usual circumstances (troops firing on their own side, breakdown of discipline, etc.), both units retreated through the night to Lemberg. On the next morning, they were brought under control and assembled with difficulty at the outskirts of the city, where they were joined by the first arriving battalions of 4th March Bde. Also, 11 Hon CD south of Zolkiew had been taken by surprise by the Russians during the night and fell back in one bound to Janow. On top of these developments, there were reports that a strong Russian column had broken into the forested area northwest of Lemberg. 3rd Army's defensive plan for the northern sector had collapsed.

The situation was no better farther south. VII Corps reported

the opinion that the plan was "almost lunatic." See N. Stone (Eastern Front), p. 89.
that it wouldn't be able to fill the gap in the line left by the XIITH until 3 September, and then only if it wasn't pressed by the enemy. Moreover, GdK Brudermann was convinced that 4th Army would not be able to render effective help for six days. It seemed to the Army commander that to hold the Galician capital with its weak earthen fortifications during this relatively long time would be a trial for his troops, who badly needed rest. The situation could easily become catastrophic for his already hard-pressed force. Therefore on the morning of the 2nd GdK Brudermann asked the AOK if he could lead his Army "behind the Wereszyca, with strong forces on the northern wing; there it could harden anew its power of resistance so that when the decisive moment came it would again be reckoned a significant factor." After brief reflection, and then "with a heavy heart", the AOK agreed an hour later to give up Lemberg and to let 3rd Army retreat behind the Wereszyca.

Knowledge about the situation and intentions of the enemy's eastern armies still left much to be desired. Above all, reports made possible only a fluctuating judgment about the main question: would the 3rd Russian Army meet Auffenberg's corps as they were called to the south with an attack or only with a defensive position on the heights at Zolkiew? In Conrad's opinion, it was more likely that the enemy would seek to go around the line of ponds along the Wereszyca rather than to assault it frontally. As far as 3rd Austrian Army was concerned, Brudermann's report that the Army would have to be pulled back further after two or three days of further action could not have been very encouraging to the AOK. Thus it was all the more important in such a case to bring Auffenberg into play, as well as Böhm-Ermolli with 2nd Army from the south 185.

Accordingly, on 3 September Conrad told 4th Army to prepare to drive from Belzec-Uhnow in a generally southerly direction, therefore toward Niemirow and Magierow. If 3rd Army pulled back any further, a more southwesterly direction would be necessary.

The AOK did not want 2nd Army to remain so widely spread out in the east. It was directed to pull its forces together farther to the west, in the area Drohobycz-Komarno. Here it could defend the approaches to the Carpathians from the east while it would be available to make a flanking attack in support of 3rd Army. If 3rd Army could not stand on the Wereszyca, then the 2nd Army would also pull back, with its main body in the direction of Sambor. From that point, reinforced by IV Corps

185 Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 630 and 635
which would have completed its deployment, the Army could counterattack toward Rudki, west of the large swampy zone called the "Wielkie Bloto."

In the afternoon of 2 September the last k.u.k. troops evacuated Lemberg. This marked the end of the first phase of the opening campaign in the northeast; the second, and decisive, phase had begun.

The Russian Situation

Until this hour the regrouping of the Aus-Hung forces for the new battles had taken place almost without disturbance from the enemy. This was largely due to the length of time which it took for the Russians to recognize the magnitude of their own victory on the Gnila Lipa. When the armies of Brussilov and Ruszky had awoken early on 31 August in the positions they had taken the day before, they were certain that there would be new and heavy actions against Austrian reinforcements of unknown strength. Indeed, on the 31st the Russian commanders reported hard fighting by Brussilov's VII and XII Corps. From the Austrian side, it is clear that the Russians had encountered resistance only from some brave rear guards. By that evening the two Russian corps had not advanced over the Swirz Brook, while Brussilov's VIII Corps was still southeast of Rohatyn and XXIV Corps was way behind by Halicz. On 1 September the leading elements of VII and VIII Corps reached the line of ponds leading south from Bobrka.

In 3rd Russian Army, on 31 August the X and IX Corps probed cautiously toward Lemberg south of the highway, while XI Corps did the same farther north. There were actions against III k.u.k. Corps, as described above. On 1 September the Russians reached the area around Jaryczow-Nowy and Gaje. Northeast of Lemberg, two divisions of XXI Russian Corps were sent toward Mosty Wielkie and Turynka. The third division of this Corps was the enemy force which Daempf's Aus-Hung Group had held off on the heights east of Zolkiew until the panic that broke out on the night of 1-2 September brought its resistance to an end.

Meanwhile the Russians were finally realizing how great had been their victory east of Lemberg in the last days of August. Besides thousands of prisoners their two eastern armies had taken 114 Austrian guns. This was a sure sign of the heavy blow which they had inflicted on the enemy.

186 La grande, guerre, p. 183
The Plans and Expectations of the Russian High Command

At this time the Stavka was badly in need of the good tidings which were finally arriving from east Galicia, for it had received nothing but bad reports in the last few days (see volume 1 sketch 10). These included the destruction of the 2nd Army at Tannenberg, the capture of Krasnostaw by the k.u.k. X Corps (which seemed to indicate that Lublin was seriously in danger), and the flight of Plehve, whose reports left no doubt that 5th Army was also in great peril. Moreover, they continued to receive cries for help from their allies in the west. Despite the instincts of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch, who hated the Germans, he would have to postpone doing anything to respond to French expectations of assistance. Dankl's continuing offensive toward Lublin had already necessitated the diversion of 9th Army from the projected western offensive and its deployment by Ivangorod several days before. Now the defeat at Tannenberg led to the diversion of XXII Corps of the St Petersburg District, which had been supposed to join Evert, to the lower Narew. It was followed to the Narew by the entire 10th Army (III Siberian, Ist Turkestan and II Caucasian Corps), which was diverted while on its way to Warsaw to take part in the western offensive.

Now that all of his forces were fully committed on both his Fronts, the Generalissimo felt that the only way he could fulfill his promises to France in the foreseeable future would be to first win a complete victory over Austria-Hungary. In this sense, on 31 August he had ordered Ivanov (who'd moved his HQ from Rovno to Lukow) to immediately open a general offensive by Southwest Front "regardless of what it costs." Ivanov was given an understanding of the great importance of the success of his general offensive for the entire course of the war in a further explanation of this order. The Grand Duke informed him that "if it turns out to be completely impossible to win a decisive success against the Austrians in the next few days, the armies in the southwest would have to begin a far-reaching retreat." Because of Tannenberg, the Russians were contemplating the evacuation of all of Poland as far as Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk.

The Grand Duke still reckoned seriously with the possibility of a general retreat even after he issued his new orders for Ivanov to attack. This became very clear during meetings which he

187 La grande guerre, pp. 184 ff. Zichovitch, p. 56
conducted on 2 September with General Zhilinsky, commander of the Northwest Front, regarding measures to be taken because of Tannenberg. The Russians reckoned that the armies of the Northwest Front would be fortunate if they could hold the Niemen-Bobr-Narew line long enough to enable 4th and 9th Army to withdraw to the area Siedlec-Lukow-Wlodawa in conjunction with 5th Army, which was already falling back. Thereafter, however, the departure of the German eastern army to fight Rennenkampf allowed the Stavka to breathe a little easier; then they learned that Lemberg and Halicz had been taken. Now the general attack against Austria-Hungary could be unleashed while new armies were built up opposite East Prussia and around Warsaw to resume the offensive in those sectors 188.

The best way to carry out the Grand Duke's wishes would seem to have been for Ivanov to send his armies from their current positions into a concentric attack on the Austrians. This is evident from the Grand Duke's orders after the Battle of Zloczow. He considered such a concentric offensive to be most promising because it could cut the defenders' lines of communication to the west. However, the commander of Southwest Front believed on the contrary, as he had already indicated on 28 August, that a general attack couldn't take place unless his hard-pressed right wing received immediate assistance from the forces in east Galicia. The stretching of 3rd Army's lines toward the north had already begun to implement this mission. Later reports about the events at Tomaszow and Krasnostaw had strengthened General Ivanov's conviction that his plan was correct. As of 1 September (see volume I leaflet I I) the XXI Corps was in the area northeast of Zolkiew; it would be followed by XI Corps, and then by XII Corps. The latter unit was reassigned from 8th Army and placed in reserve at Rohatyn to move north of Lemberg, where it was scheduled to arrive on 5 September. Three corps (IX, X and VII) would approach Lemberg and attack the city on 4 September. This would leave 8th Army with just VIII and XXIV Corps; they would provide flank protection in the direction of Mikolajow and the Dniester.

During the course of 2 September, news of Plehve's defeat became public, and caused Ivanov to go further. He was ready to temporarily postpone seizing Lemberg in order to free more forces to save his right wing. He asserted to his officers that "The fate of the first period of the campaign depends not on our operations against Lemberg and the Dniester, but rather on the outcome of the battles by Lublin, Cholm and Hrubieszow.

188 La grande guerre, pp. 197 ff. Zichovitch, pp. 58 ff.
Every corps that we can free from other tasks and bring to this sector will increase our chances of success. Even the capture of Lemberg would not outweigh a defeat farther north. This places us in a difficult position, and forces us to renounce claim to Lemberg."

By holding back from the Galician capital, Ivanov believed he could move the entire 3rd Army to the area east of Rawa Russka, while 8th Army would become responsible both for securing the line Rawa Russka-Zolkiiew and for guarding against the Austrians at Lemberg and on the Dniester. Once this redeployment was accomplished, the enemy forces attacking Lublin, Krasnostaw and Cholm could be shaken off by a concentric attack by 9th, 4th, 5th and 3rd Armies. Shortly after orders to this effect were issued, however, word arrived that 42 ID of IX Corps had found Lemberg evacuated by the enemy at dawn. When Grand Duke Nicholas in turn learned of this event a few hours later, he wanted Ivanov to release several crops for the East Prussian front. However, the commander of Southwest Front held to his opinion that first the left wing of the Austro-Hungarian forces must be disposed of. For this purpose the four armies mentioned above (# 9, 4, 5 and 3) would launch a general attack to the line Jozefow-Bilgoraj-Jaroslau. The advance to Bilgoraj-Jaroslau was entrusted to 3rd Army north of Lemberg; it would also provide security in the direction of Przemysl. The other three armies would press the enemy over the Vistula toward the west, both above and below the mouth of the San. 8th Army would cover the entire operation from the south; for this purpose it would hold a line on the Dniester (where the enemy had evacuated his bridgehead at Halicz), on the approaches to the Carpathians southeast of Drohobycz, and in the area around Lemberg.

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189 Zichovitch, p. 181
D. The Austrians Shift their Attention to the Lemberg Area (first week of September)

1. The Russians start to counterattack at Lublin

(see volume 1 sketch 10 and 11)

2 September

Early on the morning of 2 September, the right wing of k.u.k. 1st Army was preparing to continue its advance on Lublin from its position northwest of Krasnostaw. X Corps attacked from the line Fajslawice-Krzczonow on both sides of the main highway to Lublin. 37 Hon ID of V Corps, strengthened by detachments of 33 ID, joined the attack in the direction of the heights by Chmiel. On the other side, however, the Russians weren't waiting for Ivanov's order to launch a general offensive. Because their situation had become so critical, Evert had already ordered the commander of the Grenadiers, General Mrozowsky, to begin to counterattack from the area south of Biskupice. Mrozowsky had a striking force of about 60 battalions, some of them already in place, others arriving by train – a brigade of III Caucasian Corps, his own 2nd Gren Div, most of 1st Guard ID and probably also of 82 ID.

The powerful Russian blow first fell upon the right wing of 24 ID, advancing toward Trawniki; the Austrians soon found their rear threatened by additional enemy detachments which had crossed to the western bank of the Wieprz at Lopiennik Russki. The 2 ID was also hard pressed by the Russians. Commitment of the Division's reserves and assistance from 37 Hon ID made it possible to keep on attacking until a Russian counterstroke against the western flank of 2 ID finally forced the unit to give up the little ground that it had gained. 45 LW ID had been ordered up from Tarnogora, but was not yet in position; therefore GdI Hugo von Meixner led his X Corps – very tired from 11 days of action – back to Lopiennik Russki and Izdebno. He still hoped that in the next few days he could return to the offensive with the help of the Landwehr.

1st Army HQ approved this withdrawal. Nonetheless, from various reports it estimated the enemy force south of Biskupice as just one reserve division, and therefore believed that the Russian position here was the weakest on the entire Army front. Therefore it expected that a decision could still be won by X
and V Corps in this area. 3 CD, which was moving by forced marches from the left to the right wing of the Army, was placed under X Corps to guard its flank toward the east.

3 September

Understandably, the commander of V Corps went along with these plans of the Army commander. In the existing position of 14 ID he left just 27 Inf Bde, in the position of 33 ID he left just three battalions; the other components of these Divisions were sent to the right wing by 37 Hon ID. Thus FZM Puhallo assembled 32 battalions and 18 batteries for the attack toward Piaski. However, the night march exhausted the troops, while heavy rains soaked the terrain selected for the attack. Then the west Hungarian regiments found themselves engaged against the inner flanks of the Russian XVI and Grenadier Corps, and could not break into their strongly held positions.

The Russian Group Mrozowsky continued its advance against X Corps on 3 September. When the first waves of enemy soldiers in green-brown uniforms broke into the forest west of Lopiennik Russki, they were expelled by 24 ID and 10 March Bde. Emboldened by this encouraging start, and expecting forward movement by his neighbor on the left (V Corps), GdI Meixner ordered the entire X Corps to attack toward Piaski at 9:45 AM. By noon the 10 March Bde had already been stopped by a Russian flank attack and then fell back. 24 ID was again forced back on the defensive by the arrival of fresh enemy troops. 2 ID on the left was concerned about Russian skirmishers who were pushing into the gap between V and X Corps, inadequately filled by 3 CD; therefore it did not even attempt to advance. Only the 45 LW ID, which had come up to Lopiennik Russki the evening before, gained significant ground (in the area between the Wieprz and the Lublin highway). To give new impetus to the faltering offensive, X Corps HQ wanted to bring up the detachment of 45 LW ID which had been left behind to guard the rear at Krasnostaw (LW IR # 18 and two batteries), even though contact had not yet been made in this sector with Col Herzmansky's Detachment of 4 ID (IR # 99 and one battery), which had been left by II Corps and directed to move up from Zamosc to Krasnostaw. However, around noon the X Corps HQ received significant information from the Landwehr back at Krasnostaw: although the Russians had again evacuated the town on the day before, an enemy division was now approaching from the north. Soon afterwards, new Russian attacks pushed 45 LW ID and 24 ID back to Lopiennik Russki. 2 ID, on the other hand, was still holding on to its positions. 10 March Bde was pulled back behind the center of the Corps to
serve as a reserve.

At this point GdI von Meixner received new orders from Army HQ; because of the serious danger to his flanks and rear he was to withdraw his Corps to the line Gorzkow-Izdebno on 4 September. Dankl's HQ now recognized that the Russians were attacking southeast from Lublin with superior strength. For the time being there was no prospect of stopping them by a counterattack with the over-tired and weakened Austrian regiments on the scene. Instead, V and X Corps should devote all their efforts to halting the enemy "regardless of casualties." Meanwhile 3 CD, instead of guarding the Army's eastern flank, would have to stay in the gap between the two corps until it could be relieved by 36 Lst Inf Bde (which was assigned to V Corps). Thus there were no men immediately available to guard the flank, especially since Col Herzmansky's Detachment failed to arrive at Krasnostaw as expected. He had been diverted by II Corps to the area east of Zamosc. Although at the urging of 1st Army Herzmansky was turned around once more, he would not be able to reach the Wieprz south of Tarnogora until the morning of 4 September, after an exhausting night march.

Operations by Kummer's Group

Meanwhile the Russians had also launched an attack on 2 September against the western wing of Dankl's army in order to pin the Austrians down in this sector. The advanced bridgehead over the Chodel Brook held by Kummer's Group near Wronow was an inviting target. However, the Russians received a bloody repulse at the hands of 100 Lst Inf Bde \(^{190}\). Encouraged by the defensive success, GdI Kummer proposed to launch a general offensive. GdK Dankl, however, didn't want to risk a setback that could endanger the crossing of the Vistula by Woyrsch's Landwehr Corps. In the event, continuing Russian attacks forced the two Hungarian Landsturm Inf Bdes (100 and 101) to evacuate the position north of the Chodel Brook that night. By this time the Imperial German Landwehr were beginning to cross the Vistula - not at Solec as originally intended, but farther south at Jozefow. Covered by the Austrian units of FML Tertain's Group (110 Lst Inf Bde and 20 Cav Bde) the Prussian-Silesian 4 LW ID crossed to the eastern bank on 3 September; 3 LW ID followed on 4 September.

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\(^{190}\) For this action the commander of II Bn of k.u. Lst IR # 13, Major Lehar of k.u.k. IR # 83, won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
2. The center and east wing of the Austrian front on 3 September

The withdrawal of the right wing of 1st Army was also made necessary by the situation which was developing east of the Wieprz on 3 September. Here Auffenberg had turned the mass of his Army around 180 degrees in the last 24 hours. On the evening of the 3rd his IX, VI and XVII Corps faced to the south and were assembled on the line Tomaszow-Korzmin. They were prepared to carry out the orders of the AOK to advance in the direction Niemirow-Magierow or perhaps somewhat more to the southwest to fall upon the flank of the enemy confronting 3rd Army. FML Kuczera had deployed nine March battalions on the Solokija to conceal this movement from the Russians. In the rear of 4th Army had been left Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, now consisting of four infantry and two cavalry divisions (XIV Corps with 3 and 8 ID, II Corps with 4 ID and 13 LW ID, plus 2 and 9 CD). On the afternoon of 2 September the Group was instructed to pursue the defeated 5th Russian Army and throw it over the Bug. Thus the rear of 4th Army as well as the eastern flank of the 1st would be protected. 2 CD, sent ahead to reconnoiter toward Krylow, reported that the enemy in this sector had already pulled back over the Bug. Thus the Archduke was able to leave his corps in their camps on both sides of the Huczwa for 24 hours to gain a much needed rest. Then reports arrived that an enemy division was marching south from Hrubieszow and another from Grabowiec. The Archduke planned to drive back these divisions in detail: first the eastern unit, then the western.

For Auffenberg's further operations, it was essential to determine where and in what condition the 3rd Army would finally halt its retreat. Reports which reached the high command at Przemysl on 3 September were more encouraging than those received on earlier days. Even XII Corps, which had been the most shaken, was "capable of offering resistance in spite of everything." All units of 3rd Army were able to cross the Wereszyca to the west without any harassment from the enemy. In similar fashion, 2nd Army was able to reach the Sambor-Drohobycz area. If 3rd Army didn't retreat further to the west, 2nd Army would counterattack from this area: partly over the lowermost reaches of the Wereszyca, partly along the Mikolajow-Lemberg road. Only in the Dniester sector were the Austrians still in

191 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 631
close contact with the enemy, while there was almost no contact in the Lemberg area.

It was impossible to gain a clear picture of the strength of the Russian forces approaching the Carpathians. On 3 September and even until the morning of 4 September Conrad believed that the Russians might break through due west along the Lemberg-Jaworow road. Therefore he ordered 3rd Army to deploy on 4 September along a front facing northeast between Grodek and Jaworow and prescribed that the left flank should be held as strongly as possible. At the same time he emphasized the importance of deploying the VII Corps of 2nd Army as quickly as possible on the southern flank of XII Corps, thus ensuring that the Wereszyca could be held against any enemy advance in this sector. At least XII and VII Corps would be ready at any time to open an offensive over the Wereszyca.

Because of the withdrawal toward the west, the Carpathians were laid almost bare to the enemy. Protection of this sector was entrusted to the former Military Command of the Lemberg (XI) District, which had moved back to Munkacs. That HQ guarded the mountain passes with some k.u.k March battalions plus two Hungarian Landsturm Etappen Bdes. 35 Lst Inf Bde, which had retreated from Czernowitz, reached Delatyn on 4 September. There it was held in readiness to attack the Russian forces which had been reported to be on the way to Stanislau. Col Fischer and his brave Gendarmerie were organizing the defenses of central and southern Bukovina.

The Situation of the Railroads

While the Aus-Hung command was building a new order of battle, the mobilization of the k.u.k. armed forces was finally being completed. Ordinary civilian rail traffic behind the fronts was partly restored on 18 August, and fully restored on 31 August. Nonetheless, there was still considerable movement of troop trains. Extra trains were available because 29 ID was staying on the Sava River and because the movement of IV Corps from that sector was so long delayed; they were used to transport additional March and Landsturm troops to the front, as well as munitions columns, corps supply magazines and field hospitals. These were elements of the so-called "C-Staffel." At the end of August the magazines back home had only 12 trains available to transport ammunition, so it was necessary to divert more

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192 Pitreich, p. 91
193 Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 632 and 637
resources for this purpose. Beginning on 1 September, 200 more March battalions became available for transport to the front (these were the II March Bns of the k.u.k. and Honvéd regiments and the Ist March Bns of the k.k. Landwehr regiments). They would be entrained as quickly as possible.

The evacuation of east Galicia, which in some areas was carried out with too much haste, caused friction on the railroad network that reached back far into the interior. This was due to the loss of about 100 locomotives with 15,000 boxcars, the flood of refugees, the accumulation of goods at the stations, the necessity of moving the de-railing points farther back, and the displacement of the east Galician military railroad offices. Another problem was the number of trains needed to transport the wounded, the number of whom was much greater than anyone had foreseen; in the first third of September up to 22,000 wounded men were brought back from the front each day. The strain on the railroads immediately behind the Army affected the transport of IV Corps from the southeast, which was so impatiently awaited by the high command. The Corps was delayed at Mezőlaborczi for 30 hours and more on 4 and 5 September. Dealing with congestion was one of the most serious problems which confronted the civil and military railroad offices of the Danube Monarchy throughout the war. It proved impossible to avoid at least temporary delays in the movement of supplies.

Measures of the Russians on 3 September

As the k.u.k. AOK was taking the measures described above in the afternoon and evening of 3 September to form a new order of battle west and northwest of Lemberg, they didn't know that in the same hours the commander of the Russian Southwest Front, General Ivanov was also ordering significant troop movements based on the discussions of the last few days. He had decided to literally leave the 2nd and 3rd Aus-Hung Armies alone while concentrating all his strength to defeat Conrad's western wing. On 4 September General Letschitzky, the commander of 9th Army, would take over XVIII and XIV Corps, the Guard Rifle Bde, and the units west of the Vistula. He was ordered to push the enemy between the Vistula and Bystrzyca back in a southwesterly direction toward Józefowo. General Evert of 4th Army - which now consisted of the XVI, Guard, Grenadier and III Caucasian Corps - would build on the successes of the past few days by advancing between the Bychawa and the upper Por Brook toward Krasnik. 5th Army was ordered to halt its retreat on the line Krasnostaw-Hrubieszow; there it would turn around and reach the line Turobin-Krasnobrod on the left of 4th Army. The attack of these
three armies would commence on 4 September. On 3 September the left wing of 3rd Army (IX, X and XII Corps) was holding Lemberg while the right wing (XXI and XI Corps) was shifting northwest toward Mosty Wielkie. The Army was ordered to fall upon and defeat the Austrian troops in front of Plehve from the southeast. By further concentrating toward the right flank, 3rd Army was to reach the line Warez-Belz-Dobrosin-Janow on the 5th, Uhnow and Rawa Russka on the 6th, and Tomaszow and Niemirow on the 7th. The Russians left just their 8th Army of three corps to confront the k.u.k. 3rd and 2nd: VIII Corps was to capture Mikolajow, VII would secure the Wereszyca, and XXIV Corps would advance from Halicz toward Mikolajow. 71 ID and parts of 12 ID were placed under General Aryutinov to watch the flank in the direction of the Carpathian foothills. Two Cossack divisions under General Pavlov were deployed on the south bank of the Dniester at Halicz to take Stryj and reconnoiter toward the passes.

3. Dankl's defensive actions south of Lublin (4-6 September)

(see volume 1 sketch 11 and 12)

In accordance with the Russian plan of attack, the fighting broke out first on the western wing of the battle lines running in a wide arc from the Vistula to the Carpathians, and then spread gradually toward the southeast. When the Russians unleashed the new storm against the k.u.k. 1st Army, they committed two and a half armies with 22 infantry and 6 1/2 cavalry divisions (the two corps on Plehve's right were supporting the troops of Letschitzky and Evert). Dankl had 13 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions plus 5 independent Landsturm brigades.

4 September

On the west bank of the Vistula, Novikov's Cavalry Corps (8 and 14 CD, half of 75 ID and parts of 18 ID) felt its way toward the lower Kamienna, where Group Tertain (110 Lst Inf Bde and 20 Cav Bde) was stationed, reinforced by the Germans' 18 LW Inf Bde. On the Chodel Brook the Russian XVIII Corps drove the last Austrian posts back to the south bank. Farther east, heavy but unsuccessful attacks by XIV Russian Corps against the k.u.k. Ist

194 La grande guerre, p. 250. Zichovitch, pp. 186 and 191
Corps forced the Austrians to bring 1st k.k. lst Inf Bde up closer to the front. East of the Bystrzycy, Puhallo's V Corps endured an overwhelming attack by Russian XVI Corps plus parts of the Guard and Grenadier Corps; Puhallo was successful because the enemy attacks were uncoordinated while the Austrian units cooperated closely. 36 Lst Inf Bde was deployed on V Corps' right flank; it replaced 3 CD, which had moved to X Corps.

On the right wing of Dankl's Army, the Russians were soon aware of the withdrawal of X Corps to the line Gorzkow-Izdebno rather early on the 4th. Advanced detachments attacked the Austrians and caused disorder among some of the supply trains of 45 LW ID, which were lagging behind. This added to the difficulties of the 45th as it pulled back to its new position; apparently parts of XXV Corps of 5th Russian Army, which was advancing over the Wieprz south of Krasnostaw, took part in this operation. On the other hand, 24 and 2 ID were able to regroup without interference by the enemy.

At this point (about 1:00 PM) General Evert sent forward Mrozowsky's Group for a decisive blow against the still unready lines of the k.u.k. X Corps. On Mrozowsky's left, Plehve's XXV Corps continued its advance, while XIX Corps moved toward Zamosc. 2 ID, with 10 March Bde guarding its still insecure left flank, and 24 ID were both able to hold their ground.

However, 45 LW ID began to waver under the destructive fire of the Russian artillery; the arrival from Wirkowice of Col Herzmansky's Group (IR # 99 and one battery) was not sufficient to change the situation. Also the X Corps HQ had been aware since the morning hours that the approach of XXV Russian Corps was becoming more dangerous. Therefore at 5:00 PM GdI Meixner felt compelled to disengage his entire Corps, protected toward the east by Herzmansky's detachment and 3 CD.

The setback to X Corps ruined the plans of 1st Army HQ. They had still not abandoned the hope that after the arrival of the German Landwehr Corps and some heavy artillery they could launch

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195 Major von Klempa of k.u.k. IR # 26 on his own responsibility led a reserve battalion from another command in a counterattack which considerably strengthened the position of V Corps; for this deed he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.

196 1st Lt Freudenseher of LW IR # 34 with his Machine Gun Detachment fought effectively in these actions, and stayed at the front even after he was seriously wounded. He was recognized by winning the Theresia Cross.
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a decisive attack toward Lublin. Therefore they had intended to have the Landwehr Corps relieve 12 ID and 101 Lst Inf Bde, and send these units to reinforce X Corps. Now, however, the news from X Corps forced Dankl to order that unit back behind the Por to avoid further shocks. In conformance, Puhallo's eastern wing would have to bend sharply back toward the south, while the rest of the Army's front would stay in place. Dankl had little doubt that the west wing of his Army would also soon be pulling back. However, since he felt that his main task was to draw as many enemy units as possible toward himself to prevent their advancing toward Tomaszow, he wanted to give ground only gradually. To ease his situation, Dankl asked that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group be brought toward Zamosc. Even if this was implemented and the enemy didn't interfere, on 5 September the Archduke could only reach the area Tyszowce-Miaczyn (see volume 1 sketch 12), still 50 km away from 1st Army. The German Landwehr Corps would take up a position behind the Strozka Brook west of Krasnik; if necessary, this would become the next line of the Army's west wing. The supply units were moved to the area south of the line Annopol-Goraj, and the Vistula bridges at Jozefow were broken up.

5 September

Early on 5 September the X Corps had to pause in a position on both sides of the Zolkiewka, in order to give the supply trains time to withdraw. Then the retreat resumed, along with numerous skirmishes with Russian advanced guards on the water-logged roads. X Corps reached the south bank of Por Brook as darkness was falling. On the east flank, Col. Herzmansky's Group was engaged into the night driving enemy troops from the area where the Gorajer Brook flows into the Por. The main body of Russian XXV Corps was following up only slowly; it reached the line Bzowiec-Zolkiewka in the evening. Nonetheless the situation for 1st Army remained critical, since at the same hour Plehve's XIX Corps, unopposed, entered Zamosc. Thus it had severed the route leading from 1st Army to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group.

The right wing of V Corps received the order to withdraw at dawn; initially the movement was hindered by the enemy (several hours earlier the 33 ID had repulsed a Russian night attack with a powerful counterstroke). Finally, however, the enemy Guard and Grenadier regiments were halted at Gielczew and Puhallo's right wing could take up its new position in orderly fashion. Unfortunately the V Corps' 27 Inf Bde, which had stayed in place on the morning of the 5th at the pivotal point of the line west of Bychawa, had to abandon its position to a strong Russian
attack. In order to delay the withdrawal of the west wing, GdK Dankl ordered a counterattack to regain this lost position. On the 5th and 6th this task was successfully accomplished in heavy fighting by 28 Inf Bde (the V Corps reserve), parts of 33 ID, and by the 1st Lst Inf Bde from Upper and Lower Austria.

Under Ist Corps, 12 ID was attacked in the night of 4-5 September. However, the Russian attack was anticipated and defeated by counter-movements led by the commander of 12 FA Bde, GM von Jordan-Rozwadowski; 1600 enemy soldiers were taken prisoner 197.

Alarming news arrived during the 5th from the west bank of the Vistula, where Novikov's Cavalry Corps had driven back FML Tertain's Group; the Austrians and Germans retreated in one bound back to Sandomierz. GdK Dankl hastily assembled a group of Aus-Hung and German battalions along the Vistula at Jozefow. However, after it was realized that Novikov had only a small force, these battalions were returned to their parent divisions.

6 September

According to prisoners, the night-time victory of the k.u.k. 12 ID had caused so much disorder among Letschitzky's two corps (XVIII and XIV) that the Army commander ordered them to forego any new offensive on 6 September. On the other hand, the fighting in the positions by Bychawa spread to the entire front of V Corps. On the Corps' right flank, held by 36 Lst Inf Bde, this led to a temporary crisis, which was overcome only by the determined intervention of the neighboring 2 ID (of X Corps). Most of X Corps, whose regiments were exhausted and in some cases reduced to one third of their original strength, was fortunately not pressed by the Russian XXV Corps; this enabled the Austrians to consolidate their position on the south bank of the Por. The Russian XIX Corps also remained stationary at Zamosc. However a Cavalry Corps under General Dragomirov (4 and Combined CD, half of 1 Don Coss Div) advanced to Bilgoraj where it ambushed Aus-Hung supply trains. Dragomirov also noted the presence of the German Landwehr behind Dankl's front; his report about this was a principal reason for the hesitant advance of the two corps from 5th Russian Army.

The hesitancy of the Russians on 6 September allowed the Aug-

197 For this feat, GM Thaddäus Ritter von Jordan-Rozwadowski received the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.
Hung leadership to breathe again. The indefatigable GdK Dankl still wanted to change his luck by an attack on the eastern wing. For this purpose Woyrsch should shift his corps farther to the right. Dankl also considered a general attack by the whole Army. However, the distance of the Landwehr Corps from the front, the exhaustion of X Corps and an agonizing shortage of artillery ammunition finally convinced him to await the approach of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's two corps. In more sober moments, the Army commander felt his present position was untenable; this was demonstrated when he ordered the heavy batteries, which had finally come up, to return to the San. He also dismantled the northern portion of the field railroad serving his front. The dangers which were mounting up, especially on Dankl's right flank, were reason enough to justify these preventive measures.
E. The Battle of Rawa Russka–Lemberg (6–11 September)

1. The intervention of Auffenberg's Army (3–7 September)

(see volume 1 leaflet 12 and sketches 12 and 13)

a. 4th Army marches south

Because the 3rd Russian Army didn't reach the line Warez-Dobrosin-Janow until 5 September, the k.u.k. 4th Army was able to march south until the evening of that day to the area around Rawa Russka and north of Niemirow without seeing action. The Army's right wing, IX Corps, was strongly deployed and in the advance, because the AOK still feared that the enemy would break through north of the Jaworow-Lemberg road. For the same reason, 3rd Army HQ had assembled 4, 10 and 11 CD north of Jaworow. GdI Auffenberg, however, was less concerned about his right flank than about his open left flank. Because of this concern, and in order to make his Army's intervention more effective, he would have preferred a concentration toward the left.

The Uncertain Position of the Archduke's Group

Perhaps Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group would be available to serve on the Army's left. On the night of the 4th, the HQ of 4th Army intercepted a Russian radio message that revealed one and a half Russian divisions moving from Vladimir-Volynsky to Brest-Litovsk. This news strengthened the staff in their conviction that Plehve's Army, which faced the Archduke, would not soon be able to resume an advance. On the basis of this supposition the Archduke — who had wanted to move against the Russian division reported at Hrubieszow — was ordered by Auffenberg at 6:00 AM on the 4th to immediately send 2 CD to Belz; it then came under command of XVII Corps. At least one division from XIV Corps was to follow the cavalry to this area. Four hours later the Army HQ sent a second command: if the situation around Hrubieszow permitted, the entire XIV Corps

198 Auffenberg, Höhe und Niedergang, p. 389
199 This movement was probably due to the Grand Duke-Generalissimo's conference at Bialystok, described above.
200 Apparently Auffenberg himself was less sanguine about the capabilities of Plehve than was his staff (Auffenberg, "Teilnahme am Weltkrieg", p. 289)
should join the main body of 4th Army. Since there were no new reports about enemy activity at Hrubieszow, the Archduke left the task of guarding in this direction to II Corps (reinforced by 9 CD), so that both 3 and 8 ID of XIV Corps could turn to the south at noon along with 2 CD.

In reality, on 4 September the Russian corps opposite the Archduke's Group (Vth at Busno and XVIIth north of Hrubieszow) were not yet ready to begin their planned advance because they were still recovering from the losses suffered at Komarow. On the other hand, as we have already noted in the account of events in 1st k.u.k. Army's sector, the two corps on Plehve's right wing (XXV and XIX) were advancing in the area south and southeast of Krasnostaw. XIX Corps was moving through Skierbieszow toward Zamosc, where in the next few days it could cooperate with the left wing to hurl back the Archduke's Group, the location of which was apparently known to the enemy. The offensive of Plehve's two right wing corps was a major reason why the situation of 1st k.u.k. Army would become critical in the immediate future. As already mentioned, this serious menace had compelled 4th Army HQ on the evening of 4 September to cancel the morning orders to the Archduke. Now he was to hurry to the aid of Dankl not just with II Corps (as the AOK had prescribed) but also with one division of XIV Corps plus 9 CD. Nonetheless, he was still not to neglect defending the rear of 4th Army. This order was repeated several times with the emphatic note that support in the Zamosc area was a matter of life or death for 1st Army.

In compliance with these emphatic orders, on 5 September the Archduke didn't hesitate to shift II Corps to the vicinity of

201 Zichovitch, p. 187
202 There was no consensus within the staff of 4th Army regarding the use or even the optimum composition of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Armee Gruppe. The Army commander and his Chief of Staff always wanted to bring the whole XIV Corps into the decisive battle. The Chief of the General Staff Detachment, Col Soos, gave greater emphasis to staving off the danger to the rear of 4th Army; Soos was in constant telephone communication with the AOK and thus was oriented toward the prevailing thinking at Przemysl. He lacked confidence in the ability of the II Corps commander to carry out the rear guard mission; in agreement with the AOK, Soos therefore wanted the Archduke in charge of this sector, and felt he should retain part of his own (XIV) Corps along with the IInd for this purpose.
Miaczyn and 8 ID of XIV Corps to Tyszowce. 9 CD would scout toward Grabowiec. 3 ID and 2 CD, following their earlier instructions, continued on their way south to the Sookijia. Joseph Ferdinand adhered to this decision even though the presence of Russian cavalry (from 1st Don Coss Div) was detected in the early morning at Zamosc and although considerable enemy movement was reported north of the line Hrubieszow-Grabowiec.

The sideways march of the Archduke's main body was carried out without disturbance by the enemy. However, 9 CD's scouting mission was soon halted at Grabowiec by 5 Don Coss Div, so that it could report on the situation only in a very restricted area. Plehve's two corps on the left had begun to advance on this day and reached the line Uchanie-Werbkowice; at the same time the XIX Russian Corps entered Zamosc. Thus the Archduke's group was already half encircled by the enemy 203. Meanwhile the 3 ID, protected on the left by 2 CD, was supposed to move behind the east flank of 4th Army to Domaszow (10 km east of Uhnow). However, north of Belz it collided with the advance guard of Russky's northern wing, which had reached the line Warez-Belz. Therefore the Austrians pulled back to Korczmin, whence they planned to seek a junction with XVII Corps on the next day by moving through Uhnow rather than Domaszow.

The Situation of 4th, 3rd and 2nd Armies

Although GdI Auffenberg was already directing his gaze more than hitherto toward the east, during the course of 5 September the AOK had still not fully given up its hope that 4th Army, with "a strong western wing in the van as much as possible" would advance in the direction Wierzbiany-Starzyska against an "enemy force attacking the left wing of 3rd Army, and fall on its flank and rear." However, reports from the front indicated that although Russian columns were advancing from Zolkiew and Lemberg toward Janow, the main body of the enemy was holding back. The AOK, in agreement with 4th Army HQ, came to recognize the necessity of "moving the objectives of 4th Army somewhat farther to the east." 204 This would also avoid entangling the right wing of the 4th with the left of the 3rd Army. Nonetheless, the Austrian commanders were still far from recognizing the full danger that threatened them from the forests and swamps west of the Zolkiew-Sokal road.

203 La grande guerre, p. 246. Zichovitch, p. 198
On 5 September the 3rd Army received a new commander, the strong and energetic GdI Boroevic. He was instructed to be ready to join Auffenberg's advance, beginning with his left wing.

2nd Army, which had now taken over XII Corps, was ordered to advance over the Wereszyca line on 7 September. South of the Dniester, the group of FML Karg (38 Hon ID, 40 and 103 Lst Inf Bdes, 1 CD and 5 Hon CD) was to hinder the advance of Russian forces beyond Stryj. Karg was also supposed to be ready to attack with any available units in conjunction with the left wing of 2nd Army through Mikolajow in the direction of Lemberg. 35 Lst Inf Bde, which had evacuated the Bukovina, was to join Karg's Group along with the garrison of Zaleszczyki.

Thus the orders of the AOK still followed the lines laid down at the start of September: an attack by both wings against enemy forces pushing west from Lemberg. However, the effort to outflank the enemy was already being modified by the necessary shift of Auffenberg toward his left; the full consequences of the changing situation were not yet apparent. There would be further surprises in the immediate future.

Further Consultations with the Germans

In the last few days GdI Conrad had once again made a forceful attempt to gain greater German support for the upcoming actions, which would decide the campaign. Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg and the retreat of the remnants of 2nd Russian Army to the Narew led Conrad to return to his wish that the eastern German army would advance to Siedlec. Moreover, the reports of glorious victories on the Western front, and the journey of two German corps from Belgium to East Prussia, led him to hope for direct support by his allies. Based on these two considerations, Archduke Frederick sent the following message to the German Emperor on 2 September:

"To achieve our great common purpose, the overthrow of Russia, I believe that an energetic German offensive to Siedlce by powerful forces is necessary, and would be decisive. Moreover, it seems to me that after the glorious and conclusive successes in France the moment has come in which the Aus-Hung operations can receive the direct support from German troops which was promised in this situation." 205

205 Quoted in Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 625. The day before Conrad had asked Moltke for "fresh German forces, if possible at least two corps, to be sent to Przemysl to decisively change
The indignant Kaiser Wilhelm told FML Stürgkh: "Our small army in East Prussia has drawn twelve enemy corps upon itself; some of them have been destroyed, the rest defeated. Thus we have considerably assisted the Austrian offensive and acted fully in the spirit of our existing agreements. One cannot demand more than what we have accomplished." Moltke officially responded to the request of the k.u.k. Commander-in-Chief on 4 September. Regarding the West, he said that although some significant successes had been won, no significant portion of the enemy armies had been destroyed. "We cannot contemplate any weakening of our Western armies for the immediate future." In the East, the first priority would be the defeat of Rennenkampf. "This will be carried out as soon as possible. Then, after leaving necessary units to guard the border of East Prussia, a German army of 4 to 5 corps plus 2 cavalry divisions will begin the advance on Siedlec."  

On 7 September, a day after getting this message, Conrad complained in a letter to Cpt Fleischmann that "if strong forces had by now been deployed at Siedice, the campaign in Poland would be settled in favor of Germany and us." Also, the k.u.k. Chief of Staff did not hold back his disappointment at the cancellation of the Siedlec offensive from GLt Freytag-Loringhoven. Left to their own fate, but still full of strong resolve to win victory, the Habsburg regiments marched ahead into new and difficult fighting.

b. The deployment of 4th Army at Rawa Russka (6 September)

Although GdI Auffenberg's Army had been forced to move slightly toward its left, he had not given up his hope that he could still fall on the flank of the enemy units maneuvering north and northwest of Lemberg. To avoid wearing out his men before the fighting, they were only supposed to reach the line Wierzbiany-Lipnik-Hujcze by 10:00 AM on 6 September. Thereafter, if the enemy situation didn't require a change, the right wing would move from Wierzbiany to Starzyska, while the left moved down the main road to Zolkiew. In the morning the AOK indicated to 4th
Army HQ that it would be desirable to concentrate strong forces in the direction of the high terrain west of Zolkiew, since a powerful Russian attack was anticipated in this area. In Auffenberg's calculations, however, concern about the enemy's right wing was still a greater factor. He agreed that his own right should move energetically to draw the Russians' attention. But his primary interest was to build up XVII Corps on his left wing, where the Army's heavy artillery was also concentrated, for a blow to the enemy's flank. It would be important for 3rd Army to join the fighting and roll up the Russian line at the right moment, which would come when 4th Army was attacking the Russian entrenchments at Zolkiew. It was even more important that 6 CD and the approaching 2 CD would scout the enemy forces around the Rata and Solokija Rivers to determine their strength. In any event, XVII Corps could strike south with its whole force only if there was no menace from the east.

As it began to grow light on 6 September, the k.u.k. 4th Army resumed its march, starting on the right wing. FZM Friedel's IX Corps had three divisions (the original 26 LW and 10 ID, plus 25 ID from II Corps) in the forested area south of Niemirow. VI Corps was now commanded by FML von Arz. He advanced through the rolling hills around Szczerzec with 39 Hon, 27 and half of 15 ID in the first line; the other Brigade of 15 ID was in the second line. XVII Corps, under its new commander FML Kritek, was held in readiness by Rawa Russka. Since it soon became evident that at least the right wing of 4th Army would reach its objectives of 10:00 AM without encountering the Russians, the AOK ordered 3rd Army to also advance in echelon beginning with its left flank. In accordance with Boroevic's orders, III Corps secured the gap between two ponds at Grodek, while the Army's center (XI Corps) and right wing (23 Hon ID and 88 L-Sch Bde) reached the line Moloszkowice-Starzyska without encountering the enemy. Boroevic reassigned the three Cavalry Divisions assembled on his left (4, 10 and 11) to 4th Army; they would move to Auffenberg's northern wing.

Although 3rd Army was not engaged, heavy fighting developed in 4th Army's sector as the day went on. Shortly after GdI Auffenberg issued the orders for further advance, 41 Hon ID of XVII Corps, which was supposed to follow VI Corps in echelon on its left, collided with the Russian IX Corps just east of Rawa Russka. FML Kritek deployed 19 ID north of the 41st, and shortly after noon drove the enemy's advanced guards back behind the Moszczana. 41 Hon ID captured part of the heights which extend north of Magierow. However, the hope that the enemy could be driven over the Biala on both sides of the road to
Zolkiew remained unfulfilled. A major reason why the attack of XVII Corps lacked impetus was that while it was being carried out the XI Russian Corps threatened to fall upon the Austrians' flank in the area southeast of Hujcze. A group under FML Wittmann (6 CD, 2 March Bde, and several Honved battalions) staved off this danger only with difficulty by holding a sand dune west of the village of Hujcze.

Meanwhile, VI k.u.k. Corps reached the area southwest of Magierow around 3:00 PM. Here they were halted by the artillery of X Russian Corps before they could reach their objective, the line Wiszenka–Magierow. IX Corps was even farther in the rear; its exhausted troops were staggering through sandy terrain and could only reach Kurniki.

Despite the outbreak of heavy fighting in some sectors, theAus-Hung leadership still lacked a clear picture of the enemy situation on 6 September. 3rd Army reported the presence of Russian cavalry on the Wereszyca; their mission was apparently to screen troop movements in the area northwest of Lemberg. 4th Army had the impression that the Russians had only weak forces in front of IX Corps, while deployed in strength opposite the VIth and XVIIth. The enemy force advancing northwest of Hujcze was believed to be an infantry division, while there were several reports of a cavalry division at Belz. 3 ID, which had crossed the Solokija to the south in a strenuous force march in the morning, fought some horsemen—presumably from the force at Belz—around Domaszow. After disposing of the cavalry, the Division was to continue its advance through Hujcze toward the battlefield of Rawa Russka, where its arrival had already been anxiously anticipated on the 6th. The Austrians still believed that 5th Russian Army lacked the capacity to intervene forcefully, although this assumption was being contradicted by reports of the advance of that Army's XXV and XIX Corps against Dankl.

The impressions of the high command were the basis for the orders issued for 7 September. The north wing of 3rd Army would resume its advance after the lagging south wing of 4th Army came up. Auffenberg ordered his three corps to continue the attack on Magierow and the heights to its north at dawn; he emphasized the importance of their close mutual cooperation. FML Wittmann's Group, which was slightly refused on the left flank, would attack together with 3 ID to throw the enemy back from Hujcze; then it would join in the advance toward the southeast in echelon left of 19 ID. At this point Wittmann's 6 CD would seek to cut off the anticipated Russian retreat in the direction
of Turynka. 2 CD would stay around Domaszow with instructions to secure the Solokija against any attack toward the rear of XVII Corps from the north. The cavalry transferred from 3rd Army (4, 10 and 11 CD) would proceed to Rawa Russka with GM Berndt in the van, leading his own 4 CD plus the artillery of the other two divisions.

A special concern to both the AOK and 4th Army HQ was the fact that the Zamosc-Rawa Russka road was blocked by just a group of three and a half March battalions and four guns at Labunje (southeast of Zamosc). Since the Austrians considered Russian 5th Army to have relatively little fighting value, they believed that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group could hurry through Zamosc to assist the sorely beset 1st Army; the Archduke would then be placed under Dankl's command.

It would soon be apparent that the picture of the enemy situation which was the basis for these orders by the AOK differed considerably from reality.

At the same time the Russian command was not to be spared surprises. Just as on 3 September when they had ordered the offensive from Zolkiew through Rawa Russka, they still expected that the attackers would fall on the flank and rear of Auffenberg's divisions, which they believed to be operating farther to the north. Russky, at least, was gradually coming to the realization that the encirclement attempt by his IX and X Corps - guarded from the south by XII Corps and the cavalry - was turning into a frontal assault because of Auffenberg's daring march to the south. Russky was thus for the time being engaged with forces of roughly equal strength. However, the commander of 3rd Russian Army was fortunate, because his northern wing (XI and XXI Corps) was unexpectedly in a position to advance around Auffenberg's left.

The first signs of the danger from Russky's northern forces had become apparent to the left wing of XVII k.u.k. Corps on 6 September. Even more imperilled was the XIV Corps. Because of the unfavorable situation its two divisions were widely separated: 3 ID was seeking to link up with 4th Army while 8 ID at Tyszowce patrolled the wide gap between the Army and II Corps, which had been ordered to Zamosc.

c. The Archduke’s Group guards the rear

Although the commanders of 4th Army and of XVII Corps had hoped that 3 ID would soon be available at Hujcze, the Division was
still engaged on the evening of the 6th against parts of XXI Russian Corps at Domaszow; thus it fulfilled its other mission of guarding the flank in the direction of Belz. After sunset the fighting subsided and 3 ID turned south into the swampy woods. Its artillery was pulled back behind 2 CD to travel down the road from Uhnnow to Rawa Russka. The 2nd Regiment of the Tyrol Kaiser Jaeger, serving as the Division's advance guard, surprised in the dark of night the 11 ID of XI Russian Corps, which had camped in the woods north of Hujcze, and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. When dawn broke, and the Kaiser Jaeger emerged from the woods, they were themselves attacked from all sides, fully surrounded, and practically annihilated after a bitter struggle. The regimental commander, Col. von Brosch, met a hero's death along with hundreds of brave men from Tyrol; two whole battalions disappeared for a time from the order of battle.\(^{209}\)

FML Roth, commanding 3 ID, could not find out what was happening in the forests, still enshrouded by darkness; unaware of the fate of the Kaiser Jaeger, he pulled the rest of the Division out of the woods north of Hujcze and back to Uhnnow. From there he continued the effort to link up with XVII Corps. His artillery, marching ahead and separately, was able to reach the Corps on 7 September in time to help fend off a heavy Russian flank attack.

Two days' march north of the Hujcze battlefield, the 8 ID had been located early on the morning of 6 September at Tyszowce when it learned that a strong Russian column - the north wing of XXI Corps - had come from Sokal to Warez the day before. The Archduke, who at this time was with the Division, didn't hesitate to order it against this new enemy at 8:00 AM (see volume 1 sketch 12). In the afternoon, 8 ID engaged Russian detachments, some of which were just roused from their camps, at Telatyn. The Austrians made noteworthy progress, but were still glad when the Archduke sent 9 Cav Bde of 9 CD to support them. For they were apparently confronted by two Russian infantry divisions and some cavalry. These strong forces seemed poised to move southwest into the rear of k.u.k. 4th Army. Soon after the fighting started, the Archduke therefore decided to set aside all other assignments to concentrate on driving this enemy group back by 8 September at the latest; he was also prepared to

call back II Corps for this purpose.

That Corps had not moved any further to the west early on the 6th, but rather was attempting to stem the advance of the enemy infantry that was feeling its way south from Grabowiec with increasing force. The hope that this could be accomplished solely by 4 ID, while 13 LW ID and 9 CD could be used elsewhere, proved illusory. At the very beginning of the action the cavalry plus one of the Landwehr Brigades were needed to extend the line on the right of 4 ID. However the position still couldn't be held for long, because II Corps was confronted not only by most of V Russian Corps, but also by the XVIIth, which was coming up from Hrubieszow in an encirclement maneuver. Already advised that he should assist 8 ID, and concerned for both of his flanks, GdI Schemua broke off his attack to pull back to the swampy low ground south of Miaczyn. Thanks to the slow movement of the enemy, this movement succeeded with only a few casualties. By evening one of the Landwehr Brigades had reached Tyszowce. However, most of II Corps was still on the heights at Dub to cover the retreating supply trains, which could only move slowly through the swamps and water courses behind the front.

Despite these difficulties, preparations were still going ahead for a coordinated attack on the most menacing enemy unit at the moment - XXI Russian Corps - when at midnight the Archduke received the explicit command from the AOK to send his Group in another direction on 7 September. He was to leave only a small force to guard 4th Army's rear while himself leading most of his men to join 1st Army and come under its command. All his earlier orders were cancelled. Now the Archduke planned to leave one brigade of 8 ID at Posadow while marching the rest of his Group to the west. However, this plan was soon aborted due to enemy action.

Already on 6 September the Russian movements had aimed at nothing less than the total encirclement of the Archduke. Under 5th Army, V Corps from Grabowiec and XVII Corps from the Huczwa were to pin down the Archduke's Group; XIX Corps from Zamosc would close in from the west. XXI Corps, the northernmost unit of 3rd Army, would advance its right wing from the area Laszczow-Uhnow to Dolgobyczew and Telaytn to cut off the line of retreat toward the south. This maneuver was continued on 7 September as a concentric attack by V, XVII and the north wing of XXI Corps against the divisions of Joseph Ferdinand.

At dawn the detachments of XXI Corps attacked 8 ID next to
Posadow. The Austrians escaped from their danger only by an extremely costly retreat, in which three batteries lingered too long and were captured. Similarly, II Corps (4 ID, 13 LW ID and 9 CD) made a vain attempt to halt the enemy on the heights west of Tyszowce, then pulled back toward Rachanie. Fortunately Plehve's XIX Corps at Zamosc was not very active. It was content to remain 45 km away from the main action, while sending a brigade to drive away the weak detachment of k.u.k. March battalions at Labunie. In response, 4th Army HQ sent 2 CD, which on the 6th had moved from the Solokija to Rzyczky (6 km north of Rawa Russka), back north on the road through Tomaszow.

Meanwhile, at 4:00 PM on the 7th the Archduke received what in the current situation was a really surprising order - to have 8 ID follow 3 ID to the south and then with the thus reassembled XIV Corps to intervene in the Battle of Rawa Russka with a flank attack. Only II Corps, reinforced by 9 CD, would support 1st Army. The order made no mention of protecting the rear of 4th Army. However, the Archduke decided on his own that this important task should still be entrusted to II Corps, especially since the presence of enemy forces at Zamosc now made it simply impossible to support 1st Army. Therefore Joseph Ferdinand left GdI Schemua to hold the heights south of Grodek to guard the rear of 4th Army, while he himself moved with 8 ID to Wierszczyca during the night.

d. The flank attack becomes a frontal attack

The decision to bring all of XIV Corps to the north wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army stemmed from the tense situation which had arisen on Auffenberg's left during 7 September and which caused a basic alteration of the plan of campaign.

General Russky, commander of 3rd Russian Army, ordered his corps to attack again, just as his opponent had. IX and X Corps, along with 3 Cauc Coss Div and 11 CD, would resume a frontal offensive against Rawa Russka and through Magierow. To their north, XI Corps would make an enveloping movement toward Rawa Russka. This would set up a decisive blow to be delivered between Laszczow and Uhnow by XXI Corps (reinforced by 9 CD), as has already been mentioned above in connection with the activities of the Archduke's Group. As before, XII Corps would guard the area by Janow; it was returned from Russky's army to
Brussilov's. 210

The noticeable passivity of XII Russian Corps enabled the k.u.k. 3rd Army to take over the line Grodek–Janow by the evening of the 7th without noteworthy interference by the enemy.

On the other hand, the k.u.k. 4th Army was engaged in a heated battle throughout the day. In IX Corps, on the right wing, 25 and 10 ID advanced while fighting skirmishes through the large clump of forests north of the Janow road, and reached the lower Wereszyca. On their left the north Bohemian 26 LW ID also advanced, but soon suffered a setback which caused it to pull back in confusion to its last camp at Kurniki. A brigade of 10 ID attempted to provide relief by attacking to the north, but was beset by larger Russian forces and was in turn also forced back to Kurniki. 39 Hon ID, on the southern flank of VI Corps, also suffered because of the setback to 26 LW ID, and was forced to relinquish the admittedly small amount of ground which it had taken north of Wiszenka. The other divisions of VI Corps (15 and 27 ID) sought in vain to break the resistance of the Russians at Magierow and the heights to its south; the enemy continued to mount powerful counterattacks. 211 In the afternoon the situation of 27 ID, which was engaged in the heaviest fighting around Magierow, became critical when the Russians attacked the entire front of the Corps. The lines that had been won with such bloodshed could only be held by committing the last reserves. FML Arz bitterly regretted the battalions which he had sent to help the heavily engaged XVII Corps in the early morning.

XVII Corps had been ordered to mount a general attack early on the 7th regardless of the threat to its left flank. The Russians also didn't hesitate to attack; at daybreak they assaulted the heights of Magierow, where 41 Hon ID was awaiting the deployment of 19 ID, hanging back somewhat on the left. Not only some battalions of VI Corps, as mentioned above, but also parts of 19 ID had to hurry to the aid of the Honveds and saved the situation. At the same time the eastern wing of XVII Corps was seriously threatened. Here FML Wittmann's Group had been ordered to advance to Butyny. Initially the 2 CD, which had arrived the evening before at Rawa Russka the evening before, was supposed to cooperate, but the Division had hastily been sent off toward Tomaszow. Just to retain Hujcze, FML Wittmann

210 La grande guerre, p. 255
211 Arz, Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges 1914–18 (Vienna, 1924), p. 26
needed the support of not only the artillery which 3 ID had sent ahead, and the cavalry and batteries of GM Berndt; the 19 ID also had to hurry to his aid, so that it was no longer able to mount its own attack. XVII Corps had been stopped cold; on the evening of 7 September it was still holding lines in a half circle to the south and east of Rawa Russka.

On the same day at noon, the Russian XXI Corps was advancing 10 kilometers into the rear of the Austrian XVIIth when it again came upon 3 ID, trying to move from Uhnow to Rawa Russka. Supported by the divisional artillery, which was hastily recalled, FML Roth and his much depleted regiments were able to hold off superior enemy forces in an action that lasted until evening. After the fighting ebbed, 3 ID took up a position in the night hours linked finally to the left wing of FML Wittmann's Group.

After the actions at Magierow and Rawa Russka on 7 September, neither the AOK nor Gdi Auffenberg could any longer doubt that 4th Army's planned flank attack had been turned into a frontal attack by the counter-movements of the enemy. It was not only that "the enemy [was advancing] with strong forces...out of the area around Lemberg in a northwesterly direction" and had forced Auffenberg to deploy toward the east. Reports on the 7th also indicated that the Russian 8th Army, like the 3rd, was making a noticeable shift toward the northwest. In this sector on the day before, the 81 Hon Inf Bde had failed to follow its orders to defend the Nikolajow to the end; it abandoned the position, and a large number of mostly obsolete cannon, to Russian VIII Corps. Now the Austrians recognized that parts of the Russian forces were still moving west through Szczerczec toward the Wereszyca, but other parts were shifting northwest toward Lemberg. The enemy wasn't trying to cross to the south bank of the Dniester in force. Between the Dniester and the Carpathians the only Russians in range were the two Cossack divisions of General Pavlov, to whom FML Karg's Group relinquished Stryj on 8 September; Karg planned to offer resistance farther back in the rough field fortifications on the Niezachowka. The nearest large enemy infantry units, 71 ID and half of 12 ID, were marching toward the northwest and hadn't moved much past Czernowitz; thus they were still 100 km from the battlefields. The Russians had obviously made the area northwest of Lemberg their principal objective in Galicia.

On the other side, our own southern wing (2nd Army) had received a new Corps, the IVth; because of great delays on the clogged railroads, the Corps would not be fully assembled on the
Weressyca until the 9th. Since the Russians were not active south of the Dniester, 2nd Army HQ planned to commit not only IV Corps but also the corps-sized Group Karg to the north bank. Because of the loss of Mikolajow, Karg would have to cross the Dniester east of the Wk. Bloto, which would be a less encompassing flank attack on the Russian front on the Weressyca.

These insights and further deliberation led Conrad to change his plans again. When the campaign started he had sought a decision on the extreme left, Dankl's sector. A few days later he had sought the palm of victory mainly at Komarow, then shifted his attention to the area around Rawa Russka. Now he was still determined to seize victory from the Russian forces, although they were visibly gaining greatly superior force, in the hilly land west and southwest of Lemberg. GdI Conrad planned "to slow the enemy with 4th Army, to have 3rd Army operate against his flank and either halt him or throw him back; 2nd Army, on the right of the 3rd, would drive against the forces reported south of Lemberg and then fall on the Russian flank from the southwest and south." In this fashion the Aus-Hung Chief of Staff reckoned he could still save the campaign in the eleventh hour!

However, the operation would have a strict time limit. General Russky, no less astounded than his opponent to have collided with a large force at Rawa Russka, considered the situation of his 3rd Army to be critical and had asked for support from Plehve's divisions. Ivanov hastened to order XVII and V Corps plus Dragomirov's Cavalry Corps to the area Tomaszow-Labunie; XIX Corps would occupy the crossings of the Wieprz below Szczebrzczyn. At the same time the eastern wing of 4th Army would break through at Turobin to cancel the perceived threat to XXV Corps caused by the arrival of the German Landwehr behind k.u.k. 1st Army. The armies of Letschitzky and Brussilov, on the two extreme flanks, would intensify their pressure on the enemy.

The result of Ivanov's measures would be to insert 50,000 Russian soldiers into the wide open gap between the k.u.k. 1st and 4th Armies and into the rear of the 4th. At this point neither the AOK, which had in effect placed Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group unconditionally at the disposal of 4th Army on the evening of the 7th, nor Auffenberg's HQ recognized the magnitude of the danger. However, the presence of two Russian corps (XIX and XXV) in the area around and northwest of Zamosc was reason enough for the AOK to cancel the transfer of the Archduke's Group to 1st Army once and for all. It took no

212 La grande guerre, p. 256. Zichovitch, p. 194
little steadiness and courage for the Aus-Hung military leaders to seek a decision by attacking west and southwest of Lemberg despite the growing dangers to the inner flanks of the two northern armies. It would probably be only a matter of hours rather than of days until the Russians took advantage of 1st Army's complete separation from its comrades, and fell upon 4th Army's rear.

2. Fighting on the entire front

a. 2nd and 3rd Armies attack over the Wereszyca (8–9 September)

(see volume 1 sketch 13 and 14)

The Russian movements on their side of the Wereszyca were carefully observed from the Austrian side. After taking Mikolajow, Brussilov had first moved his VII and VIII Corps closer to Lemberg while directing the XXIV in place of the VIII to the area around and northwest of Mikolajow. On the next day Brussilov was force to take further measures by the events at Rawa Russka and especially the fighting which involved XII Corps – which had now been returned to 8 Army – south of Janow. While XXIV and half of VIII Corps pinned down the Aus-Hung forces on the lower Wereszyca, the main body of the Army – XII, VII and the rest of VIII – would advance on the western bank of the Wereszyca between Janow and Grodek and roll up the enemy line toward the north. The Dniester Detachment was instructed to advance through Nizniow to Stanislau and observe the Carpathian passes 213.

2nd Army HQ had planned to open its offensive on 9 September, after IV Corps was ready. Because of the critical general situation, however, the AOK ordered the advance to begin a day earlier. Advance elements secured the river crossings during the 7th. During the course of the 8th, the whole Army would advance. Group Karg (38 Hon ID, half of 20 Hon ID, and 40 Lst Inf Bde) would cross the Dniester and take Ryczcyhow, VII Corps would advance toward Dornfeld-Mostki and in the north XII Corps would join in by attacking Stawczany.

IV Corps would move up behind the VIIth. 1 CD and 5 Hon CD were

213 Zichovitch, pp. 193 ff.
both placed under GM von Peteani (of 1 CD) and ordered to scout through Mikolajow toward Lemberg. Security of the position on the Niezachowka was entrusted to 103 Lst Inf Bde and five March battalions.

8 September

FML Karg's Group crossed the Dniester at Terszakow. Delays in building the bridges and a setback to the 81 Hon Inf Bde, which had crossed the river in the van without artillery support, slowed the advance. When evening fell on the 8th, the Group was barely past cannon range of its crossing point. Farther right, 1 CD remained stuck on the south bank of the Dniester, even though it was supported by parts of 103 Lst Inf Bde. 5 Hon CD, which was exhausted and had suffered heavy losses in the last three weeks, at this time was simply unable to participate in the attack by 1 CD.

At 10:00 AM the k.u.k. VII Corps, with 34 ID at Rumno and 17 ID east of Komarno, came upon parts of Russian XXIV Corps. At this point the Corps reserve, half of 20 Hon ID, had to be diverted to guard the right flank because of Group Karg's failure to advance. Unfortunately the Aus-Hung infantry had still not discarded the habit of over-hasty attack which had been instilled in peacetime training. They stormed restlessly ahead without waiting for artillery support or for cooperation from neighboring units and thus were often defeated by the counter-measures of a tough, persistent and more experienced enemy. This happened to VII Corps. After gaining some significant ground, first the Honveds, then 34 ID, and finally the entire Corps was forced to retreat in the afternoon hours. Now GdK Tersztzyanszky, the commander of IV Corps, hurried to the battlefield; as the senior general, he assumed command of VII Corps also. He decided to send into the fighting that evening the parts of his Corps which had arrived (18 battalions and 15 batteries) and 43 LW ID, which had been brought up from the south Dniester bank and attached to his command. However, the arrival of Tersztzyanszky's first battalions was sufficient to stem the retreat of VII Corps. The Russians did not pursue them.

Although XII Corps had been ordered to await the movement of VII Corps, it advanced at 8:00 AM when its northern neighbor, III Corps, became engaged. 16 ID, with 105 Lst Inf Bde, was deployed on both sides of the highway leading to Lemberg, with 35 ID south of the road; 11 ID, following behind, was initially in reserve. 16 ID, now led by GM Goldbach, soon had to turn its
front toward the north because of a setback on the southern wing of III Corps. GdI Kövess sent 12 March Bde to support 16 ID, and deployed a brigade of 11 ID on the left flank of 35 ID. After III Corps' situation was restored, GM Goldbach again turned to the east and took Height # 315. To his south, FML Pokorný with 11 and 35 ID advanced to the same level. However, in the afternoon the retreat of VII Corps had a pernicious effect on the southern wing of XII Corps, and then on the whole command. The troops were still easily demoralized because of their experiences in the August fighting. Panics broke out, and several detachments were only brought back under control after they had fled west of the Werezyca. By early evening the Corps had lost almost all of the ground gained earlier in the day.

However, the attack of XII Corps had also significantly upset the Russians. It had struck the southern flank of the group which Brussilov had ordered to attack between Janow and Lubien Wk. Prisoners taken in the battle represented detachments of regiments from all the corps of 8th Russian Army, which had been brought to this sector in response. The Russians, like the Austrians, suffered from heavy losses among the officers and mass panics among the rank and file.

For 8 September, the k.u.k. 3rd Army had been ordered by AOK to "support the fighting of 4th Army with as strong a force as possible on its flank while guarding against a thrust from Lemberg; if necessary it would shift toward the north." GdI Boroevic deployed III Corps between the highway and railroad leading from Grodek to Lemberg; XI Corps was farther north, and 23 Hon ID was along the Janow-Lemberg road. The Army reserves were 22 LW ID (behind the right wing), 11 March Bde (in the center), 97 Lst Inf Bde, 14 March Bde, and at Lelechowka (5 km northwest of Najow) the 88 L-Sch Bde.

3rd Army's attack collided with the main forces of Brussilov's own offensive. GdI Celerus committed 6 ID on both sides of the main highway, supported by several batteries which had been taken away from the Cracow fortress; 28 ID with 4 March Bde attacked north of the road. After some temporary setbacks on the southern wing, which were overcome thanks to help from 16 ID of XII Corps (as noted above), most of the day's fighting occurred in the woods south of Mszana. The north wing of VIII Russian Corps was finally driven from the position after one regiment of 14 March Bde and parts of 22 LW ID were brought up from corps reserve. The Styrian IR # 27 and 47 were distinguished in this fighting, in which two Russian batteries
were captured. However, an attempt to attack toward Kaltwasser (Zimna voda) faltered in the face of powerful enemy artillery fire, which cut enormous gaps in the ranks of the brave Inner Austrian warriors. Finally, as evening approached the southern flank of 6 ID had to pull back to maintain contact with the retreating XII Corps. 22 LW ID and 108 Lst Inf Bde, which had been returned to Colerus by 3rd Army HQ, took up their stations behind the southern wing.

The XI Corps (44 LW ID - with attached 93 Lst Inf Bde - and 30 ID) and independent 23 Hon ID fought through the day to take the ground east of Janow, which was full of ponds and clumps of forest. The Aus-Hung troops struck before the Russian VII and XII Corps, which had also been ordered to attack. They drove XII Corps back through the burning town of Janow, but were not able to also seize the ground between the ponds. 88 L-Sch Bde, which had been shifted to the north wing of 3rd Army at the urgent request of 4th Army HQ, fought in close coordination with IX Corps to the north, and took the village of Lelechowka.

Thus on the first day of their new operation Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic had successfully thwarted the offensive of 8th Russian Army. The enemy commander Brussilov and his subordinates were very dissatisfied with developments; the strong Aus-Hung pressure on the lower Wereszyca might force the withdrawal of the Russian left flank. The situation of the north wing of 8th Army seemed even more menacing. The enemy threatened to break the connection with 3rd Army in the vicinity of Lelechowka, which might allow him to roll up the inner flanks of both armies. To prevent such a breakthrough at the last minute, the 10 and 11 CD and 3 Cauc Coss Div were hastily thrown into the threatened area to oppose the Tyrolean Landes-Schützen.

9 September

Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic continued their attack on 9 September. The former placed GdK Tersztyanszky in charge of Karg's Group and IV and VII Corps and told him to take the strong enemy position on the Szczerek from the right. Then 2nd Army would advance to the line Brodki-Dornfeld-Stawczany. To cancel any danger from Mikolajow, such as had been feared the day before, the 103 Lst Inf Bde on the south bank of the Dniester would try to take the town in a coup de main.

214 Byelkovitch, "The Troops of VIII Russian Corps in the Fighting at Grodek, September 1914" (Moscow, Vozheno istoritschesky sbornik, IV Part, 1920), pp. 46 ff.
Inspired by a sharp appeal from their commanders, the regiments of 2nd Army stormed forward against the outnumbered Russian XXIV and VIII Corps, which defended themselves with the courage of despair. Once again the combat strength of the 27 battalions of FML Karg's Honved Group gave out quickly, and they failed to take their first objective, Ryczychow. The IV Corps, however, won a significant success in its first action on the Russian front. In the afternoon FML Archduke Joseph's Group (43 LW ID and 31 ID) took Horozanna from the Russians after a difficult and bloody fight; in the evening FML Fail-Griessler's Group (half of 32 ID, half of 20 Hon ID and one regiment of 34 ID) took the burning town of Rumno.

The performance of VII Corps, which included the other half of 32 ID on its right wing, suffered from the after-effects of the previous day's events. The Corps was concerned about its southern flank and didn't begin to advance until afternoon, although it continued to attack into the evening. While 17 ID was able to storm the town of Einsiedel on its cone-shaped hill, the 34 ID was thrown back to its starting point with heavy casualties.

On the 9th, the XII Corps was not affected by the hesitation of its southern neighbor, but began operations early in the morning. The ground which had been given up the evening before was quickly regained, because the Russians - their ranks in considerable disarray - had not occupied it in strength. The Corps, which left 70 Inf Bde back at Lubien Wk. as a reserve, advanced as far as the eastern edges of the clumps of wood between Lubien Wk. and Stawczany. South of Height # 315, which had been taken by III Corps, the XII Corps established a firm link with 3rd Army.

Although 2nd Army hadn't reached all its objectives on the 9th, the IV Corps had taken 4000 prisoners and 17 Russian guns. This considerable tactical success forced Brussilov to pull his hard-pressed XXIV Corps back behind the Szczerek. On the other hand, the commando-style operation of 103 Lst Inf Bde against Mikolajow was a failure, as was a similar attempt by several March battalions against Stryj.

On 9 September, III Corps likewise launched new attacks. It was given 122 Inf Bde from 44 LW ID and 93 Lst Inf Bde to assault the town of Mszana. However, only 22 LW ID on the south wing made significant gains; it took Height # 315 at 10:00 AM. On other parts of the battlefield neither friend nor foe gained a
lasting advantage. The self-sacrificing courage of the Inner Austrian regiments could not prevail against the defensive fire of massed Russian artillery.

Under XI Corps, the portions of 44 LW ID which were fighting just to the north of III Corps gained some ground at a bend in the Wereszyca River. On the opposite flank, the 88 L-Sch Bde (now commanded by GM Schönburg-Hartenstein) defeated the newly arrived Russian cavalry by noon and hurled them back behind the edge of the forest south of Walddorf; this action was a considerable relief to 4th Army, which had asked Gd I Boroevic for help in this sector. However, the main body of XI Corps in the center—the 27 battalions of 30 ID, 23 Hon ID and 11 March Bde—again failed to break through the land between the ponds around Janow. There was not enough artillery to properly prepare for the infantry attacks. In particular, a large number of howitzers would have been needed to defeat the well-protected Russian artillery massed at Stradcza. In the afternoon the Russian XII Corps launched a counterattack and again recaptured the hotly-contested town of Janow from the 23 and 30 ID, whose battalions had become intermingled.

The active operations of Brussilov were of great help to his northern neighbor Russky, even though 8th Russian Army had been unable to roll up its opponent's front from the south at Janow. During the day Auffenberg had several times asked Boroevic to send further forces to follow the Landes-Schützen, who reported that the enemy was pulling back in their sector. The commander of 3rd Army denied the requests on the grounds that he was facing ten Russian divisions. In reality, as of 8 September only five divisions had been identified from prisoners, who belonged to XII and VII Corps and to 65 ID. There were no other Russian units on the battlefield of the k.u.k. 3rd Army. Unfortunately these five divisions were sufficient to pin down the whole Army.

b. 4th Army on the defensive at Rawa Russka

(see volume 1 sketch 14)

GdI Auffenberg had been ordered to confront the Russian attack head on; if his own troops were unable to move forward, they should at least offer the stiffest possible resistance. He should give special attention to strengthening his Army's left wing. Nonetheless, 4th Army HQ had not given up hopes of making
a successful outflanking maneuver; this would at least ease the situation if it didn't completely turn the tide. On the southern wing the IX Corps would make an attack of limited scope; on the northern wing XIV Corps would move in the direction of Turynka.

8 September

In IX Corps, the right wing (25 ID and half of 10 ID), which had reached Wereszyca village the day before, was ordered on 8 September to first gain further ground toward the east, then shift to the north; there it would work with the other parts of IX Corps and if possible with 39 Hon ID of VI Corps to take Wiszenka from the Russians. The beginning of the maneuver was carried out as planned. While 88 L-Sch Bde of 3rd Army stormed Lelechowka (as noted above), the right wing of IX Corps pushed the enemy over the Wereszyca by noon. Meanwhile the other half of 10 ID and GM Gössmann's Combined Bde (which contained the remnants of the shattered 26 LW ID) began to advance toward Wiszenka. However, a sharp counterattack by Russian 31 ID (of X Corps) drove Gössmann's battalions back before neighboring troops could intervene. At this point, moreover, the northward march of the Corps' right wing was greatly delayed by the thick forest. Thus the parts of 10 ID which had advanced to Turniki were not supported on either flank; they had difficulty in just holding the edge of the woods south of Wiszenka. 39 Hon ID, on the left of Gössmann's Brigade, was waiting in vain for that formation to move forward again. Thus when the sun set the IX Corps had not been able to launch a concentrated attack against the enemy forces which it had encircled on three sides.

Farther north, Arz' VI Corps and Kritek's XVIIth attacked toward the southeast at the same time that Russky was sending the closely massed X and IX Russian Corps in their direction. The fighting around Magierow led to breath-taking tension, as VI Corps hurried to assist its northern neighbor as it had the day before. 41 Hon ID twice stormed the heights north of Magierow, but couldn't hold them against a hailstorm of Russian shells. On the other hand, the enemy was also prevented from making significant progress.

On the left of XVII Corps, FML Wittmann's Group was opposite Rzyczki, and had been ordered by Auffenberg to make a determined stand against the attacking XI Russian Corps. In carrying out this mission, dismounted horsemen of 4 CD held onto their hastily dug trenches near Hujcze.
Farther to the left, the k.u.k. XIV Corps was to advance from Uhnow in the direction of Turynka along with FML Baron Nagy's Cavalry Corps (10 CD and 11 Hon CD). The rear of the attacking force would be guarded against "the enemy who had already been beaten at the Battle of Komarow" by II Corps (4 ID, 13 LW ID and 9 CD). 4th Army HQ instructed II Corps to hold the heights at Wierszczyca (between Uhnow and Tomaszow) at all costs. On the Army's extreme left, advanced in the direction of Tarnawatka, was 2 CD; it was reinforced by the small force of 3 1/2 March battalions and 1 battery which had retreated to this area from Labunie.

The dispositions of 4th Army's northern wing were still based on Army HQ's conviction that Plehve's divisions had little combat value. When Archduke Joseph Ferdinand received his orders early on 8 September he did not hesitate to voice his objections, based on his better knowledge of the situation. He said it was urgently necessary for II Corps along with 9 CD and also 8 ID to guard the flank and rear toward the north; only 3 ID and Nagy's cavalry squadrons should advance at Rawa Russka. Auffenberg approved this change of plans.

In the event, not even 3 ID and Nagy's Cavalry Corps were able to make the flanking maneuver on the left wing of XVII Corps. FML Kritek learned from an intercepted Russian radio message that the enemy XXI Corps was being sent from Uhnow toward the Belzec-Rawa Russka road. This news made it necessary for 3 ID to take up a line west of Rzyczky and facing to the north; the Cavalry Corps deployed to secure its left flank.

The Archduke's Group was involved in relatively little fighting on 8 September, although the situation was nonetheless worsening. While Plehve's two western corps (XXV and XIX) were now fully engaged in support of 4th Russian Army, his two eastern corps (V and XVII) were advancing through Komarow. Dragomirov's cavalry squadrons reached Krasnobrod, with orders to proceed toward Tomaszow and then Rawa Russka. The Austrians were also menaced by 3rd Russian Army's XXI Corps and its attached 9 CD.

As a response to the enemy movements, the k.u.k. II Corps fell back to Tomaszow, against the will of 4th Army HQ and of the Archduke. This movement denuded the line Laszczow-Lubycza Krolewska, so Joseph Ferdinand hastily sent 8 ID to fill the gap by establishing a defensive position east of Zurawce. 2 CD kept in line on the left of II Corps on the Zamosc Road, while 9 CD deployed behind the Corps as the Archduke's reserve force.
After these events, GdI Auffenberg finally abandoned the plan of rolling up the line of 3rd Russian Army from the north. The Archduke's sole mission was now to guard 4th k.u.k. Army's flank and rear by holding the Solokija sector along the line Hrebenne-Tomaszow. By this time no more could be expected from his exhausted Group. Intercepted radio messages to the two corps on Plehve's left (V and XVII) made it clear that in the next few days the Archduke would have to deal with them as well as with the enemy XXI Corps.

9 September

These gloomy forecasts became reality on 9 September. While 8 ID was pushed back by Russian XXI Corps to Lubycza Krolewska, II Corps had to give ground south of Belzec to avoid encirclement by XVII, V, and Dragomirov's Cavalry Corps. 2 CD fought on the left of the Vienna Corps, 9 CD was in reserve behind its center. Nagy's Cavalry Corps stayed in line next to the Archduke's Group south and southeast of Lubycza Krolewska. That evening Joseph Ferdinand made an impressive appeal to his brave but sorely tried soldiers to hold out until victory could be won between Rawa Russka and the Dniester.

The advance of XXI Russian Corps toward the Austrian rear at Rawa Russka enabled Russky to shift the other corps of his army somewhat toward the south and thus solidify his connection with 8th Army. XI Corps was directed to attack toward Rawa Russka, IX toward Magierow, and X through Wiszenka. IX Corps in the center entered the fray before its neighbors, but was so vigorously repelled by FML Arz' divisions that even the Russian artillery fell silent for a time. In the afternoon Russky's other corps joined the attack. The action along the half circle around Rawa Russka intensified to a feverish pitch until darkness. The Russians received another bloody setback at the hands of 41 Hon ID (reinforced by six k.u.k. battalions) and of Wittmann's Group. In the evening parts of 15 ID emerged suddenly from their trenches and seized several enemy positions on the heights south of Magierow. In proud consciousness of their superiority, the troops noted that the Russians' power of resistance was slackening, and believed that they could yet be defeated.

At the start of the day the Landes-Schützen Bde, now under command of 4th Army, also seemed to be in an advantageous position after their drive into the gap in the enemy line at Walddorf, which had been insufficiently plugged by Russian
cavalry. 25 and 10 ID now readily joined the attack on Wiszenka. The rupture of the enemy position at this decisive point seemed likely, but the two divisions and Schönburg's brigade were not supported. FZM Friedel, commander of IX Corps, no longer trusted the offensive capacity of Gössmann's Brigade. 39 Hon ID, in line north of Gössmann, was unwilling to advance without any protection to its right flank. As noted above, GdI Boroevic declared at this time that he had no reinforcements available to send to the Landes-Schützen. And so the attacks of 25 and 10 ID petered out without noteworthy success.

On the evening of 9 September, General Russky recognized the developing crisis on his southern wing when he stated, "At noon a gap developed between X and XII Corps, into which the enemy advanced from Polwerek Bulawa (2 km south of Walddorf). Two cavalry divisions held off the attackers until evening. In the night several reserve units were brought to the threatened area with considerable difficulty. The situation in general is unfavorable, but can be retrieved by taking Rawa Russka with the assistance of XXI Corps and the left wing corps of 5th Army." Since the k.u.k. IV Corps was also gaining success against Brussilov's southern wing, it is evident that a continuation of the attack by the inner wings of Boroevic's and Auffenberg's armies might still have won the campaign.

That same evening, however, Ivanov's Chief of Staff General Alexiev raised the spirits of Generals Russky and Brussilov with a telephone report about an important and perhaps decisive turn of fortune on the bloody battlefield south of Lublin. Alexiev told Brussilov, "Your Army will cover itself with glory if it can just hang onto the positions it has won. The fruits of their heroism will be to the advantage of the entire Front." This hopeful tone was based on the good news from the three western armies of Letschitzky, Evert and Plehve after several days of uncertainty. The Russians now hoped that the enemy's resistance would be broken by the events on the northwestern end of the front.

c. 1st Army pulls back south of Lublin, 7-9 September

(see volume 1 sketch 15)

7 September

On the morning of 7 September, the left wing of the k.u.k. 1st Army was still holding its line between Bîchawa and the Vistula. On the right wing, V Corps had pulled back southeast of Bîchawa to the source of the Por Brook, and X Corps deployed south of the Brook. 4th Russian Army was advancing against the arc now formed by V Corps' line. The Corps was able to hold off the Russians west and south of Bîchawa. However, there was a considerable crisis in the sector of 36 Lst Inf Bde, whose Czech personnel had to be driven back to the front with draconian measures. Finally the Reich German 4 LW ID was inserted to relieve this Brigade and the southern wing of 37 Hon ID. The fresh and brave Silesians counterattacked the Russian Grenadiers and 82 ID in the afternoon, and took 1000 prisoners.

While inserting 4 Ger LW ID between V and X Corps, GdK Dankl was also preparing for an attack to the northeast and east which would be delivered by Woyrsch's Corps and the right wing of 1st Army on 9 September. This attack would hopefully hinder the deployment of Russian units into the gap between 1st and 4th Armies and make it easier for Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to march west and join hands with Dankl's men around Zamosc. However, late on the evening of the 7th it became known at Krasnik that the Archduke's movement had been cancelled. For 1st Army HQ this not only meant that any further offensive plans were cancelled, but also raised the question of how long the Army could even hold its lines with the difficult terrain of the Tanew region in its rear while facing an enemy whose already superior strength was obviously growing.

At noon on 8 September GdK Dankl received the following dispatch from the supreme command:

"The AOK is convinced that the brave 1st Army will do everything possible to prevent an enemy advance from the Lublin area...as long as its line of retreat to the San is not endangered."

1st Army HQ inquired of Ist and V Corps if they favored an immediate retreat, but they replied in the negative. In fact,

216 German official history (Reichsarchiv), Vol. II, p. 133. The Germans considered this the opening of the "Battle of Tarnawka", which lasted until 9 September.
217 On the Russian side the last reinforcements were arriving in Lublin - the rest of 2nd Gd ID on 5 September, the Guard Rifle Brigade on the night of the 5th-6th, and III Caucasian Corps on the evening of 8 September.
they felt that if they could receive heavy artillery and support from the German Landwehr they might be able to resume the offensive. After receiving these replies, GdK Dankl gladly decided to hold his ground. Even if he could only do so for two more days, he would have done much to guard the flank and rear of the armies engaged at Lemberg by tying down the enemy. Resistance could perhaps be prolonged longer by the intervention of Woyrsch's Landwehr and other units.

8 September

Meanwhile, there were further unfavorable reports from the battlefields. On the evening of the 7th, Russian regiments had thrown back k.u. 100 Lst Inf Bde, fighting on the right flank of GdI Kummer's Armee Gruppe. On the morning of the 8th, the enemy struck k.k. 106 Lst ID on Kummer's other flank. After many heroic but vain attempts to regain the lost positions, GdI Kummer felt obliged to withdraw his Landsturm units from Opole to the high ground between Godow and Jozefow. 100 Lst Inf Bde's position was stiffened by a brigade from 12 ID and by a German detachment under GLt Riess; the latter consisted of 3 battalions and 3 batteries which had come over from the western bank of the Vistula. Although at first glance this was a completely gloomy situation, Kummer pronounced a more favorable judgement when the Russians - as so often - failed to follow up their advantage. The Group commander even believed that he could recover his old positions by a night-time counterattack. This, however, was not permitted by GdK Dankl, especially since a new local setback to the k.u. 100 Lst Inf Bde forced the 1st Corps on its right to evacuate the lines it had honorably defended since 27 August. Supported by its reserves, 1st Corps pulled back to a new position.

In contrast to the situation farther west, V Corps' sector on 8 September was disturbed only by a heavy artillery bombardment which lasted throughout the day; the Austrian guns fired back only sporadically because of a lack of ammunition. To the Corps' right, there was a major action at Tarnawka. Evert's Guards and Grenadiers hurled themselves against 4 LW ID; they penetrated as far as the German artillery, but fortunately were kept from hauling away the captured guns by the approach of darkness 218.

218 German official history, Vol. II, p. 334

Meanwhile the situation had become especially difficult on the Army's right wing. On the night of 7-8 September the Russians
had already established themselves on the western bank of the Por at the point where it is joined by the Gorajec Brook. In the morning of the 8th it was reported that at least one Russian division was advancing from Zamosc toward Gorajec village. (The report referred to XIX Corps, which actually was diverted at Szczebrzczyn to move toward the southwest.) Following the orders of Army HQ, GdI Hugo Meixner began to pull 2 and 24 ID back from the Por at 5:00 PM, leaving a few battalions as a rear guard. The divisions were to proceed against the new enemy force in the Gorajec area and cooperate with 3 CD to guard the Army's important line of retreat through Frampol and Bilgoraj. However, when Army HQ at Krasnik learned late in the evening about the misfortune of the Silesian Landwehr, GdK Dankl called 2 ID back to its former position and placed 24 ID at Grodki as the Corps reserve behind 45 LW ID. 3 CD, which was dead tired, was brought back to Frampol to gain a little rest during the night.

The Russian commanders at first were inclined to underestimate the extent of their successes at Opole and Tarnawka. Evert in particular reported to Ivanov in the evening that further frontal attacks had little chance of success and suggested that he should wait until the west wing of 5th Army reached the line Janow-Bilgoraj. Ivanov was wiling to grant this request and to let 9th Army as well as the 4th go over to the defensive. Meanwhile Evert should strengthen the right of 5th Army by transferring III Caucasian Corps and 82 ID; if necessary Plehve would also be given 81 ID from the Brest-Litovsk garrison. At this point, however, Evert's confidence seems to have risen again. On the morning of the 9th he informed the commander of Southwest Front that he and Letschitzky could resume their concentric attack. Ivanov concurred, while lightly reprimanding Evert for his over-hasty mood changes. Thus k.u.k. 1st Army, after 18 days of unbroken combat, would again be attacked by two and a half Russian armies.

9 September

When Letschitzky sent his men in thickly massed brown formations against the Aus-Hung lines early on 9 September, they were stopped cold in front of Kirchbach's Ist Corps, just as on all previous days. However, a Russian breakthrough against 95 Lst ID caused all of Kummer's Group to pull back behind the Wyznica.

219 The authors found little reference to the action at Tarnawka in the available Russian literature about the war.
220 La grande guerre, p. 258. Zichovitch, pp. 198 ff.
This forced 12 ID to bend back its left wing to stay in contact with Kummer. Toward evening the Russians launched a new attack against 106 Lst ID, but were counterattacked and pushed back by the k.k. Lst IR # 31 (from Teschen).

The operations east of the Bystrzyca had much more serious consequences. Woyrsch's Corps brought 3 LW ID (GLt von Wegerer) into the action, and at first was able to recover its old positions. The cannon that had been abandoned the day before were also recovered, although most of them had been rendered unusable. Soon thereafter, however, an overwhelming attack by the entire 4th Russian Army drove back the right wing of 33 ID and all of 37 Hon ID. The lack of artillery ammunition had broken the back of the defenders, and made recapture of the lost positions impossible. To add to this misfortune, around 10:00 AM the 37 Hon ID abandoned its new lines The Division felt itself menaced after some important high ground on its right wing was lost, and when it received some preliminary orders from V Corps for the supply trains to pull back, it misinterpreted them as instructions for a general retreat. This ruined the plan to have V Corps withdraw gradually, beginning with the left wing. FZM Puhallo was now obliged to also pull back 33 and 14 ID as quickly as possible. 14 ID left one Jaeger Battalion on the battlefield to protect the flank of 46 LW ID of Ist Corps.

Now the Russians fell upon the unprotected northern flank of the German Landwehr; they won a significant success and captured 26 guns. The Germans' supply trains quickly fell back, accompanied by detachments which had fled the fighting; they became mixed with Puhallo's retreating men, who by evening had reached Studzianki. 33 ID had been reduced to between 4000 and 5000 men, who were reorganized as 8 1/2 battalions. The other divisions of V Corps and the German Landwehr were not in much better shape.

In the first hours of the morning, detachments of XXV and perhaps of XIX Russian Corps had reached the western side of the valley by Gorajec, where they threatened 45 LW ID. The commander of this Division, FML Ljubicic, was also given control of 24 ID by GdI Meixner. Around 11:00 AM he sent 24 ID forward to counterattack in two columns. Soon afterwards there was a report that the enemy was threatening the Frampol-Bilgoraj road, so X Corps HQ sent the southern column down to help 3 CD, engaged at Bilgoraj. The combined force was able to parry the enemy threat. At the same time the other parts of 24 ID were able to give some relief of 45 LW ID. However, after 2:00 PM Ljubicic's front began to crumble. Three hours later GdI
Meixner had to pull his entire Corps, including 2 ID which had deployed west of Turobin, behind the Lada Brook. 3 CD was operating separately to secure the southern flank.

The reports arriving from the front led GdK Dankl at 4:00 PM to order his entire Army to retreat to a line running from Frampol through the heights south of Krasnik to Swieciechow on the Vistula. The movement would start at 3:00 AM the next day. The Army's last reserve, 18 German LW Bde, was coming up from Sandomierz; it was assigned to X Corps. Because of the enemy's superior numbers and the serious threat to the eastern flank there were naturally no plans for prolonged resistance in the position directly north of the Tanew region. On the evening of the 9th the AOK asked whether this was feasible, but GdK Dankl frankly declared that his divisions, suffering from the effects of 3 weeks of combat and a crippling shortage of artillery ammunition, should retreat behind the San. Despite all precautions, there would probably be additional casualties as the Army pulled back through the low ground along the Tanew.

221 The most serious munitions shortages in these weeks would eventually made good by the additional munitions columns which arrived behind the front in late August and early September as part of the "C-Staffel." However, there was an ongoing shortage caused not by deficiencies in the supply services, but by failure to provide the Army with sufficient funds before the war.
F. The Campaign is Decided (10–11 September)

1. Planning by the commanders

(see volume 1 sketch 14, 15, and 16)

The Austrians

(see volume 1 leaflet 13 and sketches 14, 15, and 16)

Because of the events of the last few days and earlier telephone messages from Dankl, the AOK was not surprised by his report which arrived early on the 10th. Conrad had already spoken of the necessity of pulling 1st Army back behind the San to GO Moltke on the evening of the 9th; as on other occasions he did not neglect to link this painful outcome to the failure of the Germans to attack toward Siedlec. Nonetheless, the decision to approve Dankl's withdrawal greatly depressed the k.u.k. Chief of Staff. Although the actions by 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies on 9 September had not been decisive, the partial successes of Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic and the halting of the Russians at Rawa Russka made the situation on the front toward Lemberg still seem hopeful. On the other hand, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's forced retreat to the north flank of 4th Army due to superior enemy strength was a bitter blow. There was now a gap of almost 3 days' marches between the Archduke and 1st Army; the gap was covered only by some weak cavalry forces who were confronted by strong Russian units (one or two corps). Now that 1st Army would have to abandon the high ground north of the Tanew swamps, the main Austrian body fighting near Lemberg would lose the protection to their lines of communication toward the west in one or two days. Nonetheless, the AOK could not counter the valid grounds which lay behind Dankl's request to retreat; on the morning of the 10th they sent him this order:

"1st Army should just delay the advance of the enemy north of the Tanew region, while avoiding any decisive action. Carry out the withdrawal of the supply trains; when necessary lead the Army back behind the San and hold that river from its mouth to Trzebosnica. Secure the Bilgoraj-Sieniawa road with cavalry and other detachments."

222 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 689
On the evening of the 9th, developments in 1st Army's sector and the continuing threat to the rear of 4th Army intensified the importance of the question of whether the high command should break off the Battle of Rawa Russka-Lemberg. There were urgent reasons for taking this course, but Conrad's iron will triumphed over all his doubts. "Many battles have been conceded to the other side because they were prematurely broken off...Premature concession is rightly considered a grievous error." Therefore the Chief of Staff and Archduke Friedrich, who shared in all the responsibility, played their last card. Because time was running out they could no longer wait for the attempted flanking movement by Böhm-Ermolli's and Boroevic's armies to take effect. Although parts of the eastern wing had already been pushed back north of Rawa Russka, the entire wing would now launch a combined attack that perhaps would change their luck at the twelfth hour. Therefore in the evening of 9 September the AOK ordered a "concentric attack by 2nd, 3rd and most of 4th Armies against the enemy around Lemberg. The left wing of 4th Army along with Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group will guard the flank and rear of the attacking forces."

The Russians

At the same hour when the k.u.k. AOK was preparing this last attempt to win victory for the Aus-Hung banners, General Ivanov and his Army commanders were modifying their plans in light of reports about Dankl's withdrawal south of Lublin. One factor was that Ivanov's attention was continually being drawn toward the northern flank and rear of the k.u.k. 4th Army at Russky's insistence. Another was that in the fighting of the last few days the hope that the main Aus-Hung forces seeking to recapture Lemberg could be mastered solely by Brussilov and Russky had faded. Based on reports of these two army commanders, there was concern that the enemy was gaining the upper hand. The Austrians' offensive potential and resistance could only be broken from the northwest, and naturally Plehve's 5th Army, advancing into the gap around Tomaszow, would play the decisive role. Ivanov's main concern now was to make Plehve's blow to the enemy rear as effective as possible. He did not want the two corps on Plehve's right (XXV and XIX) to become too deeply embroiled in the fighting south of Lublin, because they would soon be needed in the advance to the south and southeast. As of 9 September he was certain that the fight against Dankl could be carried out by Letschitsky and Evert, who would still have greatly superior strength without Plehve's two corps.

223 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 693
In the next 36 hours, Ivanov issued a series of orders which clearly indicate his plans for further operations. Only 9th and 4th Armies were to continue the pursuit of Dankl — the former would advance to the lower San or beyond it to the Leg River; the latter would at least take the heights south of the Tanew and hopefully reach the San between Rozwadow and Krzeszow. The cavalry west of the Vistula would cross to the east bank near Sandomierz to create disorder in the enemy's rear. While GdK Dankl was still making a stand north of the Tanew, the two western corps of 5th Army would continue to support Evert's Army by a powerful attack toward the line Janow-Bilgoraj. Then they would shift toward the southeast through Tereszpol toward Cieszanow-Narol; Dragomirov's Cavalry Corps was also instructed to move rapidly toward this sector. Plehve's two eastern corps would first operate in close cooperation with XXI Corps of 3rd Army toward the rear of the enemy lines at Rawa Russka. Thereafter Ivanov planned to move them also toward Cieszanow-Narol to join the western corps. While General Plehve was thus given a decisive role, the two eastern armies were instructed only to hold their ground and pin down as many enemy units as possible.

If this maneuver was successful, the methodical commander of the Russian Southwest Front would then give his armies a rest of several days along the line Leg-Tanew-Obsza-Niemirow-Janow-Mikolajow. His headquarters at Lukow had no plans for a more wide-ranging exploitation of any advantages which might be won by Plehve's offensive.

2. The Austrian general offensive toward Lemberg

10 September - operations of 2nd and 3rd Armies

The successes of 2nd Army west of the Szczerek Brook on 9 September, and the resulting rearward movement of XXIV Russian Corps had given GdK Böhm-Ermolli hope that the advance of his wing could continue on 10 September to the line Wolkow-Nawarya,

224 La grande guerre, pp. 262 ff. Zichovitch, pp. 201 ff. The names of the actual towns do not appear in the various orders, but they do represent the geographical objectives outlined in the documents.

225 See also the judgment on Ivanov's plans by k.u.k. Col Graf Szeptyckl in Auffenberg, "Höhe und Niedergang", p. 378
which lay a whole day's march to the northeast. GdK Terszytanszky would carry out this attack with his own IV Corps plus VII Corps. On his left, XII Corps was instructed to support III Corps of 3rd Army in its attack down the Grodek-Lemberg Road. To the right of IV Corps, FML Karg's Group (also placed under GdK Terszytanszky) would make a surprise attack on the bridgehead of Mikolajow, which 2nd Army HQ believed had been evacuated by the Russians. 35 Lst Inf Bde, which had come to Delatyn from the Bukovina, planned an attack on Stanislau; later it should also join the Austrian units near Mikolajow.

GdK Terszytanszky, unlike 2nd Army HQ, believed it was unlikely that the Russians had evacuated Mikolajow, and felt that Karg's Group lacked any capacity for major operations. He would be satisfied if Karg, after attaching 81 Hon Inf Bde to IV Corps, just guarded the flank toward the east (using 38 Hon ID plus 40 and 103 Lst Bdes). With his main forces, Terszytanszky planned to first win the line Dornfeld-Mostki. However, because of the increasingly narrow area of the battlefield, he decided it was desirable to shift 32 ID and the half of 20 Hon ID which had been attached to VII Corps away from that Corps into reserve behind IV Corps. This maneuver used up time. Thus the advance didn't begin until 3:00 PM, when IV Corps began to cross the Szczerek Brook and also drew VII and XII Corps into the offensive.

Action began in 3rd Army's sector considerably sooner than in that of 2nd Army. Brussilov had heard that the Austrians were concentrating many troops in the woodlands around Mszana and decided on a preemptive counterattack. This lead to heavy fighting for parts of 44 LW ID under GM Ludwig Goiginger (of 122 Bde); VII Russian Corps also attacked at several other points. In late morning, when GdI Archduke Friedrich arrived on the battlefield east of Grodek along with the Archduke-Successor and Conrad, this fighting was still raging at Mszana. It ended when the Russians were finally driven back to their starting positions. However, the episode had delayed preparations for GdI Boroevic's own planned offensive, while the effectiveness of the Russian batteries stationed at Stradcz considerably diminished the hopes of Boroevic and the high command for the success of the operation 226. Thus Conrad, conscious that time was running out, became even more impatient for 2nd Army - and particularly XII Corps - to advance. Before returning to Przemysl in the afternoon, he appealed to 2nd Army for "an energetic, impetuous and ruthless advance." GdK Böhm-Ermolli,

however, thought it was inappropriate to pass this appeal on to his troops. By his reckoning, there had already been too many instances of hasty infantry attacks without artillery preparation, which was anyway very difficult against the more numerous Russian guns. Although such attacks had occasionally been successful, they had more often been defeated with heavy losses which could have been avoided by more methodical operations. He now wanted to spare his men - specifically XII Corps - such a fate, and would not tell them to hurry.

Thus the advance of 2nd Army was considerably shorter than had been expected in the morning. IV Corps reported that after several very sharp engagements on Szczerek Brook, stoutly defended by XXIV Russian Corps, they had occupied the line Dornfeld-Szczerzec by evening. VII Corps had gained some ground north of Szczerezec. Under XII Corps, 35 ID stormed a plateau by Mostki, and in the evening 16 ID took Stawczany from its stubborn defenders.

On 2nd Army's right wing, the attempts of Group Karg to cross the lower Szczerek were frustrated by long range Russian artillery fire from the bridgehead of Mikolajow, which they still occupied. South of the Dniester there was increased activity by the Russians at Stryj. This compelled 2nd Army HQ, which had been holding back 102 Lst Inf Bde after it detrained at Sambor, to send the Bde to Drohobycz. The Bde commander, GM Plank, was now also given command of 1 CD and 5 Hon CD (which together made up a group under GM Peteani). 35 Lst Inf Bde, after an unpromising attack north of Nadworna, pulled back through that town to a position blocking the pass leading to Delatyn.

Another example of how the troops were in need of a pause after such prolonged and difficult fighting was provided on 10 September in III Corps' sector. GM Goiginger's Group attacked in the afternoon and evening on the Grodek-Lemberg Road, but despite all their efforts were unable to win any significant advantage over the Russians' VII Corps and parts of the XIIth on

227 Based on a report by FM Freiherr von Böhm-Ermolli to the military archives (Troppau, October 1928). Translator's note: As usual, the original text tries to avoid taking sides in this difference of opinion, although the next sentence seems to endorse Conrad's view. If, however, Böhm-Ermolli was correct about the tactical impossibility of a hastily improvised offensive, Conrad's entire strategy for the last days of the campaign was senseless.
the blood-soaked fields around Mszana. Although many Landsturm
and March battalions had been attached to the active troops,
they provided little support; in fact their presence only led to
confusion and increased the casualty list, which was
extraordinarily high. Goiginger's six battalions of Landes-
Schützen were reduced to half their strength; companies of IR
# 47 (in 28 ID) contained only 50 to 60 men apiece instead of
250.

30 ID and 23 Hon ID were no more successful than III Corps when
they attempted to drive the enemy out of the narrow ground
between the ponds at Janow. Every time they advanced into the
burning town of Janow they were again driven out by overwhelming
Russian artillery fire.

10 September - 4th Army and the Archduke's Group

Under 4th Army, the battle had flared out several times already
during the preceding night. Late in the evening of the 9th,
Russky had sent his badly depleted battalions forward to attack
on both sides of Magierow. In front of 41 Hon ID the Russians
attempted to advance under cover of falsely-raised white flags.
This illegal ruse didn't help them, and they were thrown back.
The same fate befell Russian XXI Corps when it attacked FML
Wittmann's Group on the Uhnow-Rawa Russka Road at 3:00 AM on the
10th. IR # 59 (from Salzburg and Upper Austria) provided
stalwart support to Wittmann's defenders.

Nonetheless, these sporadic Russian attacks deprived the
Austrians of rest during the night and made it impossible for
Auffenberg to launch a coordinated surprise attack by IX, VI and
the southern wing of XVII Corps at 3:30 AM as planned. Only 15
ID attacked on time; although its Russian opponents pulled back
slightly, they soon dug in and could not be dislodged from their
new position. Similarly the exhausted regiments of 27 ID and 41
Hon ID could not make a dent in the Russian line at Magierow. A
concentric attack which IX Corps launched against a Russian
salient at Wiszenka was also shattered. The 88 L-Sch Bde, 25 ID
and 10 ID advanced toward the south, but only the latter
division won some ground in the early morning and again in the
afternoon 228. Gössmann's Bde (the combined remnants of 26 LW
ID) attacked from the west, but the unit had displayed little
fighting value in the last few days. Gössmann was concerned

228 During these actions, 1st Lt Rössel of II Bn/FHR # 2 in 25
ID distinguished himself; he was rewarded with the Maria
Theresia Cross.
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that it would not be capable of fighting in woods at night, so he led it back to its starting positions when darkness fell \(^{229}\). 39 Hon ID of VI Corps was supposed to support IX Corps, but only its artillery was engaged. Unfortunately these guns erroneously shelled 10 ID in its newly-won positions.

Auffenberg had once more entrusted the covering position toward the north and northeast to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group (see volume 1 sketch 16). Besides XIV and II Corps and the cavalry divisions in the vicinity, the Archduke now also commanded the left wing of XVII Corps. The magnitude of the task he faced was revealed on the morning of the 10th by interception of a Russian radio message which told the two corps on Plehve's left wing not to press too closely toward Rawa Russka (where anyway the XXI Corps was engaged), but rather to deploy more toward the west. At the time this order was issued, V Russian Corps was a day's march west of Belzec (in the area of Narol) and XVII Corps had not moved much past Tomaszow. However, implementation of the directive endangered the Archduke's left wing - II Corps south of Belzec - with an overwhelming attack. 8 ID, stationed to the right of II Corps, had been reduced in strength to the equivalent of a regiment and was hard pressed by numerically superior units of XI Russian Corps. Although the left wing of 8 ID was supported by parts of 13 LW ID and of 10 CD, and by the artillery of 9 CD, it finally had to give ground. Now GdI Schemua had no choice but to also pull back in the area northwest of Rawa Russka, thus giving up the important road leading to Narol and Cieszanow. Early in the morning the 9 CD had already defeated a regiment of V Russian Corps on the road. At noon, Dragomirov's Cavalry Corps advanced through Narol to the south; 2 CD, although reinforced by parts of 9 CD, was unable to hinder this movement. A few hours later one of the infantry divisions of the enemy's V Corps marched through Narol toward the southwest. 2, 9 and 10 k.u.k. CD

\(^{229}\) Between 6 and 11 September the rifle strength of this Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs, had shrunk from 8920 to 2200; it had suffered only a few casualties in dead and wounded. When asked for an explanation, GM Gössmann stated that the rank and file had fought bravely, and that the constantly recurring instances of refusal to fight were due to heavy losses among the officers and non-commissioned officers. Auffenberg also spoke words of praise about 26 LW ID (in "Höhe und Niedergang," p. 375). Nonetheless, it appears that anti-military and pacifist propaganda was already noticeable in the unit; several of its regiments had been influenced by these tendencies in peacetime.
camped for the night at Prusie.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's right wing (3 ID and FML Wittmann's Group) stood their ground against all attacks.

The promising fact that the Russian V Corps had already reached the rear of 4th Austrian Army still had not silenced Russky's warnings of the great dangers facing the two eastern armies. His own 3rd Army had not advanced one step nearer to Rawa Russka on the 10th. He felt that the enemy wanted to break into the area between him and Brussilov, supported by units that had pulled back from Plehve's sector. Brussilov had insufficient reserves to counteract the heavy pressure which the Austrians were exerting against his southern flank. These were some of the reasons why Ivanov urged Plehve to move his two left-wing corps as well as Dragomirov's cavalry more quickly to the area Lubaczow-Niemirow, thus cutting the escape routes of the k.u.k. 4th Army.

Operations on 11 September

The danger that was thus increasing for Auffenberg's army didn't prevent the Aus-Hung high command from continuing the bloody strife west and southwest of Lemberg on 11 September. Their hopes were now based mainly on 2nd Army, whose commander GdK Böhm-Ermolli believed that on this day he could drive the Russians back to the outskirts of Lemberg and thus open the road to the Galician capital for 3rd Army.

However, the reports of the day before that IV Corps had already advanced through Dornfeld soon proved to be exaggerated. The Corps was standing just east of the Szczerek Brook; the reserve group that was supposed to continue the advance (32 ID and half of 20 Hon ID) had not yet deployed on its right flank. Once again on the 11th preparations for the offensive were not completed until afternoon. Meanwhile however the Russians also became active, and the 32, 43 and 31 ID became heavily engaged just to protect the gains they had already won. Group Karg was deployed in echelon on the right flank to guard the advance of IV Corps toward Lemberg; however, its 38 Hon ID and the finally reunited 20 Hon ID (of IV Corps) were attacked by Russian infantry, supported by some cavalry, and fell back from the eastern to the western bank of the Szczerek. Only VII Corps was able to gain ground; in the evening hours it took Pustomyty and a height northwest of Dornfeld. Nonetheless, GdK Tersztyanszky

230 Zichovitch, pp. 203 ff and p. 208
believed that a night attack by IV Corps and the southern wing of VII could still force the Russians to retreat to Lemberg.

XII Corps of 2nd Army fought once again in close cooperation with 3rd Army. When Boroevic's 22 LW ID had to give up some ground to the Russians, 16 ID of XII Corps intervened toward the north, and the Corps' heavy artillery also helped to halt the enemy in front of III Corps. In the afternoon GdI Boroevic recognized that further frontal attacks would not lead to success but rather would increase the already enormous casualty list. Therefore he suspended his offensive until he could see some progress by 2nd Army. At the same time GdI Kövess also put XII Corps on the defensive. Thus the offensive gradually died out like an untended fire.

The course of events was similar on the southern wing of 4th Army, whose commander once again ordered the removal of the "thorn" (the Russian salient) at Wiszenka early on the 11th. 10 and 25 ID, along with Schönburg's L-Sch Bde, vainly attempted to fulfill their commander's assignment with one attack at dawn and two more in the afternoon. 3rd Army had sent three Honved battalions to reinforce the Landes-Schützen and throughout the day had the bulk of 23 Hon ID deployed at the northern end of the Janow Pond. Boroevic believed he could do no more to help 4th Army without endangering the stability of his own front. In the afternoon reports of the retreat of the left wing of 4th Army further dampened the spirits of the attackers. The "thorn" at Wiszenka remained embedded in the flesh of the k.u.k. IX Corps.

The report of the withdrawal of 4th Army's left was correct (see volume 1 sketch 16). At 3:00 AM the 4th Army HQ had learned that II Corps had retreated to the area northwest of Rawa Russka and that enemy forces (the Russian V Corps was correctly identified) had advanced toward Cieszanow. They had already been informed a little earlier that 1st Army was pulling back to the San. To avoid the threatened encirclement, GdI Auffenberg decided to pull back his own left wing. The movement would begin while still protected by semi-darkness at dawn. The units would take up a line on the heights south of Rawa Russka and along the railroad west of this town. Thereafter they would move back further to the line Szczerzec-Horyniec-Cieszanow.

Translator's Note - There is an apparent error in the original text, which states that the movement back to the railroad would take place in the morning of the 11th and the further retreat to the Cieszanow line by the end of the day.
Without interference from the enemy, GdI Schemua led his troops back at daybreak to the Rata, which they crossed at 10:00 AM. At 5:00 PM his three infantry divisions were deployed on the rail line. The cavalry guarded their western flank.

The disengagement of XVII Corps was more difficult because the Russians renewed their attacks on both sides of Magierow at dawn. As previously, 41 Hon ID along with VI Corps' 27 ID offered heroic resistance to the enemy. Nonetheless, the retreat of Kritek's corps had to be postponed until evening. Fortunately the XXI Russian Corps neglected to attack the left flank of k.u.k. XVII Corps, which lay exposed all day because of the withdrawal of Schemua's Group.

3. The battle is broken off

Meanwhile the high command had made a major decision. An intercepted Russian broadcast had revealed that Plehve's two left wing corps were heading for Cieszanow and Brusno on the 11th. Based on this information, GdI Conrad had the Operations Office prepare an order for the entire northern Aus-Hung army to retreat; however, publication of the order was still postponed. Perhaps 2nd Army could yet achieve a last minute change of fortune. Until then the best that could be done would be to delay the very threatening advance of Plehve's two corps. For this purpose, shortly before noon the 4th Army was told to gain breathing room in the rear by an attack by the Archduke's Group and any other available units. The AOK order admonished: "In this crisis the general situation cannot be improved by endless passive resistance and withdrawals."

Nonetheless, preparations were begun to destroy the bridges on the rail line Rawa Russka-Lubaczow-Jaroslau. 1st Army, which was leaving its positions north of the Tanew swamps, was directed to hold not only the stretch of the San from its mouth to Lezajask – as in the original order – but to extend its front to Jaroslau. This was necessary because it could no longer be hoped that when the 4th Army was pushed back to the river from the north it would reach the Jaroslau area in time with

However, the description in the next paragraph and the situation map for the end of September 11 show clearly that during the 11th the men pulled back only to the rail line and the further retreat took place on the 12th.
sufficient forces to secure this important sector. Fortunately, 4th Army HQ had already issued orders on the 10th for its supply trains to pull back; they were able to reach the west bank of the San at Barycz and Jaroslau early on the 11th.

The order to have the Archduke's Group attack gave further witness to the unshakable determination of the high command to keep the flag flying as long as possible. Nonetheless, this undertaking was aborted. Auffenberg wrote later, "The Archduke's Group at that moment contained at maximum 10,000 riflemen and 120 guns, and had been engaged in unbroken combat for 18 days. An attack by this exhausted force against three enemy corps would have ended in its destruction. On this basis, the implicit censure at the end of the order had to be accepted with quiet resignation."\(^{232}\) However, the Archduke would be able to completely avoid action against Plehve's two flank corps in the next few days.

Conrad hesitated to issue the order for general retreat until late in the afternoon. Then the last possibilities had vanished, and the dreaded moment had arrived.

"The advance of 2nd and 3rd Army had not brought any effective decision by penetrating the enemy lines. On the other hand, the left wing of 4th Army was in serious danger. A blow to its back by two Russian corps would place that Army in a catastrophic position; this would also affect 3rd and 2nd Armies and force the main body of the k.u.k. forces back into west Galicia.

This could not be allowed to happen. The war promised to be a long one, and could be won by cooperation with our German allies under a common plan; the k.u.k. armies must remain intact to carry this out.

We could not count on sustained resistance by II Corps and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group, and there were no more reserves. In this situation there was only one decision left: to break off the battle and pull the armies back behind the San."\(^{233}\)


\(^{233}\) Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 701 ff
The order to retreat was signed at 5:30 PM on the 11th. In his memoirs, Conrad said "It wasn't easy for me to give this document to his Imperial Highness Archduke Frederick for his approval. It affected him deeply, but I heard no word of reproach; the Archduke's calm and noble demeanor helped me to get through this difficult moment."

The following tasks were assigned by this significant order:

. "1st Army to deploy from the Vistula to Trzeboznica, secure Lezajsk and reinforce the bridgeheads at Sieniawa and Jaroslau.
. 4th Army's left wing to intervene against the enemy's advance on Jaroslau; the main body to hold the stretch of the San from Jaroslau to just north of Przemysl; a strong force to be deployed quickly and held in readiness in the area by Przeworsk.
. 3rd Army to move to Przemysl and the area south of the city up to and including Nizankowice.
. 2nd Army to deploy farther south in the area Nowe Miasto-Dobromil-Chyrow-Bilicz.

The combat troops of 4th, 3rd and 2nd Armies will disengage from the enemy in the night of 11-12 September...Until the sectors mentioned above are reached, combat should be avoided as much as possible."

The AOK said it would be desirable if on the 12th the rear guards of 4th Army were on the line Lubaczow-Hruszow-Jaworow, those of the 3rd on a line from Jaworow to west of Grodek, and those of the 2nd on the Wereszyca. (see volume 1 leaflet 13) At this point Conrad didn't believe that the retreat would end on the San. He thought that for prolonged resistance "the river line was too long and the strength of our armies too little, even aside from the disadvantages posed by passive frontal resistance."

The Question of German Aid

Along with the decision to retreat, the high command was wrestling with the question of how they should seek eventual support by their allies. In the evening of the 11th, Conrad complained in a letter to his friend Bolfras: "Because of the German operations in East Prussia, which totally ignored the overall military situation, our 40 1/2 divisions with 526 battalions are confronted by 47 1/2 divisions with 752

battalions. This is a difference against us of 226 battalions, or more than 200,000 men, which explains everything. Germany must finally decide whether it will immediately set to work with us, or let us bleed away."

According to the pre-war agreements this was the moment - the end of the seventh week of the war - when Germany was to have defeated France and begun the transfer of strong forces from the West to the East. As late as the beginning of September it still seemed that this would actually happen. However, Moltke's letter of the 4th (see above) had struck a less hopeful note. Since then the unprecedented series of German victories in the West had come to an end. On 9 September their right wing had pulled back on the Marne. On the 11th, in the same hours in which Conrad had decided to break off the Battle of Lemberg, Moltke made a journey to the headquarters of his center armies and also pulled them back. Just as in the East, the first campaign of the Central Powers in the West had ended with the battlefield conceded to the enemy. The only force whose luck had held out was the small German Eastern army under Hindenburg and Ludendorff. After the destructive blow to the 2nd Russian Army at Tannenberg in the last days of August, they were now dealing with Rennenkampf's 1st Army around the Masurian Lakes. Between 12 and 14 September the Russians barely escaped the fate of their comrades at Tannenberg by a hasty flight.

When Conrad decided to retreat on the afternoon of the 11th, he imagined that "the fighting for a decision in France was still going on."

At a later date his primary assistant, Colonel Metzger, recalled that "Another piece of bad news which the AOK received strengthened us in our decision to disengage our forces from the enemy and to lead them back in preparation for a further effort. This was news that - although it didn't fully expose the change of fortune in France - still let us infer that the quick and annihilating blow in the West, to be followed by the transfer of powerful German forces to Russia, had not succeeded." Both Conrad and Metzger conceded that in that moment they didn't fully appreciate "the importance of the Battle of the Marne." However, it was already clear to the high command that there was no immediate prospect of significant parts of the Germany Western armies being transferred. To the

235 See the start of the next section for a closer examination of the opposing forces.
236 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 704
extent that their ally could provide support, it would have to come from the Germans already in the Eastern army.

In his letter of 4 September, GO Moltke had expected that after the victory over Rennenkampf an army of four to five corps would advance toward Siedlec. Now, on the evening of 11 September, it seemed that the moment for this operation was approaching. However, Conrad was no longer in favor of the Siedlec campaign which he had formerly advocated so fervently. The retreat of his own armies, which would not be halted until they reached west Galicia, and their somewhat dubious condition made more direct help seem desirable. Accordingly on the last evening of the Battle of Lemberg he confided in FML Stürgkh as follows: "German aid is coming too late to affect the first phase of the campaign. In the present situation it is urgent that they send the strongest possible forces to us by rail through Cracow— at least three corps from 8th Army. Any other cooperation would arrive much too late." 238

The General Diplomatic Situation

As fate would have it, in the critical hours of 11 September there was a second, if only temporary, ray of hope besides the prospect of receiving German help. The Aus-Hung ambassador to Bucharest, Graf Ottokar Czernin, reported "that if Romania was given the area around Suczawa" it was prepared to actively intervene at the side of the Central Powers. In an urgent telegram on the afternoon of the 11th, Commander-in-Chief Archduke Frederick asked the Emperor "to determine if it might not be in the Monarchy's interest to make this heavy sacrifice to win over Romania." 239 It appeared that a major victory by Austrian arms over Russia might have brought Romania in as an ally. However, the events in Galicia destroyed such hopes, whether or not they were substantial. Similarly the setback on the Marne led to renewed activity by the anti-Austrian party in Italy, after a temporary period of restraint 240. On 12 September Italy and Romania outlined a common policy in a special treaty 241. At the end of September and beginning of October, Bucharest exchanged notes with Russia in which the Tsar

238 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 704
241 Glaise-Horstenau, "Katastrophe", p. 45
promised to assist the Romanians in the event of an Aus-Hung attack and recognized their title to the territories they wished to annex from Austria-Hungary \(^{242}\). This was Romania's first official step on the road that eventually made it Austria's enemy. Meanwhile Bulgaria, shocked by the failure of the Aus-Hung offensive against Serbia, remained on the sidelines. Thus the events at Lemberg and especially those on the Marne caused the political situation to tilt substantially against the Central Powers.

This was the situation at noon on 12 September when the high command left Przemysl to establish its new quarters in the town of Neu Sandez in the hills of west Galicia.

4. The retreat to the San

(see volume 1 leaflet 13 and sketches 15 and 16)

The following is the outline order of battle as of the evening of 11 September \(^{243}\):

- AOK HQ at Przemysl
- 1st Army (HQ at Nisko) - Kummer's Group [95 & 106 Lst ID; 7 CD; 100 & 110 Lst Inf Bdes]; Ist Corps [5, 12, 46 ID; 1 & 101 Lst Inf Bdes; Riess' German Detachment (of 3 bns)], V Corps [14, 33, 37 ID; 36 Lst Inf Bde], Woysrch's German LW Corps [3 & 4 LW ID], X Corps [2, 24, 45 ID; 3 CD; German 18 LW Inf Bde]
- 4th Army (HQ at Niemirow) -
  - Group Archduke Joseph Ferdinand - II Corps [4, 8, 13 ID; 2 & 9 CD], XVII Corps [3, 19, 41 ID; Group Wittmann (with 4 & 6 CD, 2 & 9 March Bdes); 10 & 11 CD
  - Other - VI Corps [15, 27, 39 ID], IX Corps [10 & 25 ID; Bde Gössmann (remnants of 26 ID); 88 L-Sch Bde]
- 3rd Army (HQ at Mosciska) - XI Corps [23, 30, 44 ID; 93 & 97 Lst Inf Bdes; 11 March Bde], III Corps [6, 22, 28 ID; 108 Lst Inf Bde; 4 & 14 March Bdes]
- 2nd Army (HQ at Komarno) - XII Corps [11, 16, 35 ID; 105 Lst Inf Bde, 12 March Bde], VII Corps [17, 34 ID], IV Corps [20, 31, 32, 43 ID; Col. Schramm's Group (parts of 8 CD that were still...

\(^{242}\) Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege (Berlin 1927), pp. 184 ff.

\(^{243}\) In the original text, this information is in Beilage 13.

The Russian order of battle at the same date, based on the Hungarian official history, has already been given above.
Units guarding the Carpathians - 35 Lst Inf Bde at Nadworna; Fischer's Group (about 3 bns) on the Sereth; Military Command Munkacs (about 20 bns) on the Hungarian border.

At this point the strength of the k.u.k. combat forces on the northeast front - including the German Landwehr Corps but excluding the fortress garrisons, Carpathian security forces, lines of communication troops, and the IInd March Battalions - consisted of 770 battalions, 356 squadrons and 377 batteries (2098 guns). The Russian Southwest Front - again excluding fortress garrisons and troops on the lines of communications - had 824 battalions (in active and reserve divisions), 694 squadrons and 2888 guns. The Russians' superiority in artillery (around 800 guns) is immediately evident, and in fact had proved to be decisive. Less important was their advantage in infantry (54 battalions) and their 2:1 superiority in cavalry (338 squadrons). However, it should be remembered that of the 770 Austrian battalions, 257 were second line units (Landsturm, March, and German Landwehr battalions); thus the actual combat superiority of the Russian infantry was greater than indicated by a simple numerical comparison.

Operations of 2nd and 3rd Armies

On 11 September, between Rawa Russka and the Dniester the Austrian forces - excluding the Archduke's Group - contained 454 battalions, 124 squadrons and 213 batteries (1232 guns); they faced 352 battalions, 267 squadrons and 1262 guns in Russky's and Brussilov's armies. The superiority of the k.u.k. armies in infantry - around 100 battalions - was not especially useful because 108 of their 454 battalions belonged to the second line. Moreover, the psychological effects of the August battles had impaired the effectiveness of Böhm-Ermolli's and Boroevic's armies. Even their best regiments had not overcome the impressions they had received: too many of their actions had been uncoordinated and full of unpleasant surprises, fought against an enemy with significantly more men and artillery. The well-trained Russians were led by methodical but clear-sighted commanders.

Despite everything, however, the Austrians still felt they were superior to the Russians. This was proven on the evening of 11 September, when the officers and men heard the order to retreat and could not believe their ears. GdI Boroevic had to
categorically insist that his divisions obey the order, because they could not understand why they were unnecessarily bidden to abandon the battlefield which they held amidst such great sacrifices at a time when the Russians were growing weaker. The 2nd Army was even more surprised, because in the last few days the Russians on its front had shown more signs that their resistance was slackening. It was not easy to make the straightforward troops at the front understand GdI Conrad's summary: "This halt to the battle was not tactically necessary, for the immediate situation wasn't bad; however, the strategic situation was no longer tenable."  

The disengagement from the enemy took place without any hitch for either 3rd or 2nd Armies. The retreat, however, was made difficult by sudden downpours of rain; they turned the roads, already choked by supply trains and columns of refugees, into morasses. Moreover, it was necessary to coordinate the march of each division for each day and night of the withdrawal. The situation was complicated for 3rd Army because its northern neighbor, 4th Army, was being pushed to the south by the enemy; thus some of Auffenberg's troops, trains and groups of stragglers kept getting mixed up with Boroevic's columns. Commanders and staffs were busy day and night in maintaining order and keeping the movement going.

North of the Dniester, GdK Böhm-Ermolli led his three corps back to the area south of Przemysl, which he planned to reach on the 15th. FML Karg's Group crossed over to the south bank of the Dniester during its retreat. Still further south, GM Plank protected the Army's movement against any flank attacks. 35 Lst Inf Bde entrained in Mikuliczyn and from there was to move through Mezőlaborcz to join 2nd Army. The exhaustion of the troops and difficulties of the march compelled Army HQ to give IV and VII Corps a day of rest at Sambor on the 15th. Thus the bulk of 2nd Army reached its allotted goal - the area between Nizankowice and Stary Sambor - a day later.

Despite heavy traffic, 3rd Army reached the area around Przemysl on 15 September. 11 ID returned to its pre-war command, XI Corps, and 88 L-Sch Bde rejoined 3rd Army. 4 and 14 March Bdes were sent to their parent corps (IV and XIV) to be broken up as replacements.

Operations of 1st Army

244 Quoted in Auffenberg, Höhe und Niedergang, p. 358
The retreat of 1st Army had been carefully prepared because of the difficulties anticipated in crossing the Tanew area. On the morning of the 10th, when GdK Dankl was sure that the AOK substantially agreed with his plans, he didn't hesitate to begin his retreat. He was concerned by the unmistakable increase in the enemy's strength and in particular by the threat to the bridgehead at Sandomierz. Occupied by the weakened and demoralized 110 Lst Inf Bde, this bridgehead guarded the Army's rear against a possible Russian thrust over the Vistula; since 8 September it had been confronted by the advance of substantial Russian forces. The main concern of the Army commander, however, was his wish to march through the forested zone without having to fight any actions. This would protect his Army from further surprises and enable the regiments to replenish their manpower once they reached the San by incorporating the reinforcements who were now arriving. It would be especially difficult to quickly move the numerous wagons along the poor and scanty roads.

For the retreat, HQ divided 1st Army into four groups (see volume 1 sketch 15), each of which was responsible for coordinating the movement of its own troops and supply trains. The groups were (from west to east): Kummer's Armee-Gruppe, 1st Corps, Group Puhallo (V Corps plus Woyrsch's Corps), and X Corps plus 18 German LW Bde. X Corps was also responsible for guarding against any Russian flanking movement from the east. For this purpose Bilgoraj had to be held for as long as possible, since 3 CD had identified a large enemy force (apparently XIX Corps) at Rudka. Woyrsch's German Landwehr, placed under FZM Puhallo's Group, were ordered to hold their original positions until 9:00 AM on the 11th, and then to stay at Janow until the 12th.

On 10 September, 95 Lst ID of Kummer's Armee-Gruppe was driven back to Gosieradow. Otherwise the day passed without any fighting, which permitted Kummer to finish preparations for the difficult retreat. His troops began their march to the Tanew Swamps that evening; the other parts of 1st Army started the next morning. The enemy failed to pursue, so the numerous

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245 These reinforcements consisted of the II March Battalions of the k.u.k. and Honved regiments, and of the 1st March Battalions of the k.k. Landwehr. Replacements were most urgently needed by the LW divisions; thus for example on 10 September the regiments of 45 LW ID had been reduced as follows: LW IR # 17 to 760 rifles, # 18 to 1553 and # 33 to 340 (the strength of # 34 at this date is unknown).
traffic jams were cleared up without any serious consequences. Because Ist Corps also had to tear up the military rail line, it was obliged to halt its divisions until the evening of the 11th in an intermediate position north of Zaklikow. Fortunately the weather was sunny and dry; bright moonlight made it possible to continue moving troops and wagons during the night.

(see volume 1 leaflet 13)

On the evening of 12 September, all of Kummer's Group and half of Ist Corps had reached the San. The German Landwehr, who had fought rear guard actions during the day with Russian cavalry at Janow, had to be diverted into the area of X Corps because the roads in their own sector were clogged. On the 13th the entire 1st Army was behind the protective barrier of the river. The precautionary measures taken by Army HQ had prevented the losses in equipment which it had feared would occur during the retreat.

Originally it was planned to defend the river line by offensive sorties. However, as noted above the AOK had ordered 1st Army on the 11th to counter Plehve's outflanking maneuver by occupying Lezajsk, Sieniawa and Jaroslau in addition to the original line. Therefore GdK Dankl decided to organize his front solely for the defensive. Lezajsk was occupied by a mixed detachment of X Corps, the Sieniawa bridgehead by 3 CD. One Landwehr regiment and several March battalions from Ist Corps were sent to Jaroslau. The Sandomierz bridgehead west of the Vistula, essential to guard the left flank, was retained; 100 Lst Inf Bde joined 110 Bde in its defenses. 7 CD was responsible for guarding the Vistula between Sandomierz and Tarnobrzeg.

Operations of 4th Army

The retreat of the k.u.k. 4th Army was the most difficult because in the moment at which the battle was broken off there were strong enemy forces (see volume 1 sketch 16) - two corps and a massive cavalry group - in the Army's rear. The Army was supposed to reach the line Szklo-Hruszow-Lubaczow on the 12th, which represented a march of 30 km. The north wing left its positions in the night of the 11th, beginning on the left. Joseph Ferdinand's Group, strengthened by parts of XVII Corps and six cavalry divisions, was to provide flank protection toward the northeast; it was instructed to pull back south of the Rawa Russka-Lubaczow railroad while denying this area to the enemy. However, the Archduke felt that his troops, who had suffered heavy losses and needed rest, were no longer capable of
fighting a numerically superior enemy. To avoid combat, he diverted his march farther to the south. 2 and 9 CD scouted on the north flank and 10 CD on the west flank; 11, 4 and 6 CD guarded the Group's rear. The shift of the Archduke's Group to the left obliged the other corps of 4th Army to move more to the east and south. The units of the Army would thus become closely crowded together, especially when they reached the area between Krakowiec and the railroad north of Mosciska.

When the commander of the Russian Southwest Front, General Ivanov, learned early on the 12th that Rawa Russka had been evacuated, his confidence soared. In the first flush of victory, he issued orders for 4th, 5th and 3rd Russian Armies to launch a concentric attack against Auffenberg; the objective was nothing less than the total encirclement of the k.u.k. forces retreating west and northwest of Lemberg. However, the results of the day's operation were not enough to justify any hope that this plan would be accomplished.

The Archduke's Group reached the Zawadowka sector above Hruszow without great trouble, although the troops were not in good condition. Only 4 ID on the extreme left was forced by Plehve's V Corps to turn aside farther to the south. To keep the massed supply trains moving in the area of Niemirow, FML Kritek had to use 19 ID to hold off Russky's advance guard. The artillery of the gallant 41 Hon ID laid down a barrier of fire in front of the enemy at Szczerzec (west of Magierow). The bulk of VI and IX Corps were able to reach the area around Jazow Str. and Szklo after insignificant skirmishes.

Because the reports from the middle and lower Wereszyca also promised no great successes for the Russians, Ivanov quickly abandoned the plans for encirclement he had issued early on the 12th. He returned to his earlier intention, which was to first advance his armies to a strong position and then give them the rest they so urgently wanted. On the 13th, the 9th Army was ordered to the area Tarnobrzeg-Nisko, the 4th to the northern banks of the San and Zlota as far as the Bilgoraj-Sieniawa Road, the 5th Army to the area from that road east to Lubaczow, the 3rd to the line Lubaczow-Kamienobrod and the 8th with its advance guards to Sadowa Wiznia 246. However, General Plehve wasn't satisfied with these strictly limited goals. The situation in front of his left flank was so inviting that he didn't halt V and XVII Corps, or Dragomirov's cavalry, but let them go farther to pursue the enemy. This would increase the

246 Zichovitch, pp. 212 ff. La grande guerre, p. 266
difficulties of 4th Army, and especially of the Archduke's Group.

On 13 September, Auffenberg's five corps pressed together in an area only 20 km wide between Wk. Ocy and the railroad north of Mosciska; the Archduke's Group - which again consisted of II and XIV Corps plus the cavalry divisions - was as usual guarding the north flank. In the event, the troops of 4 ID and 13 LW ID, entrusted with the defense of the crossings of the Szklo north and northwest of Krakowiec, became involved in an action of increasing intensity. The artillery of all four of Joseph Ferdinand's infantry divisions came up to support the wavering regiments, and infantry of XIV Corps also made ready to intervene. The concentrated artillery fire made it possible to hold onto the dominant heights on the river banks north of Krakowiec. However, wide-range fire by some Russian batteries caused great confusion among the enormous supply trains that were moving around Krakowiec and on the roads toward Radymno. Army HQ, which at the time was at Krakowiec, sent a detachment of VI Corps by truck to guard the crossings of the Szklo at Laszki, but ordered the troops not to get drawn into costly actions. GdI Auffenberg and his staff, who had wanted to ride on to Radymno, were forced to turn aside to Medyka; there they caught a train early on the 14th that took them to Przemysl and then to Lancut.

On the 14th, Auffenberg's corps were considerably less troubled by enemy interference. The bulk of the Army crossed the San between Medyka and Radymno; they were protected by strong rear guards and by Wittmann's Cavalry Corps (4, 6 and 11 CD), which held off Russian horsemen at the crossings of the Wisnia. However, the difficulties of the march intensified rather than diminished. "The supply trains pushed forward only with great toil. In the villages and on the bridges there were very dangerous traffic jams, that backed up the columns along the roads. Parts of the trains were constantly stopping on the highways because of the exhaustion of the horses or to procure necessary fodder; other parts still sought to move on and finally the trains were generally proceeding in three to four parallel rows. The roads were greatly torn up by the rainy weather and especially by the vehicles containing ammunition or pulling guns; this made the march longer and more toilsome." Many trains and thousands of stragglers took the roads toward Przemysl, pushing into the sector already allotted to 3rd Army. "An inextricable tangle of wagons developed in Przemysl on the

247 Pitreich, op. cit., p. 117
evening of the 14th. In the broad streets and squares they piled up in six to eight rows, often disrupted by automobile traffic. Many wagons crossed each others' path and could not be brought into order. On the main highway back toward Mosciska the columns were pushed thickly together and couldn't be brought in safety over the San. This dangerous traffic backlog lasted for two days before the knot could finally be disentangled.  

The condition of the armies on the San

The picture thus presented by the k.u.k. army of the north as it reached the San was not designed to lift the spirits of the leadership. The troops had just finished four weeks of unbroken marching and fighting against an enemy whose numerical superiority had increased from hour to hour. Of the 900,000 combatants who had embarked full of confidence on the great adventure in August, less than two thirds had returned to the San. The Russians did not greatly exaggerate when they claimed in their bulletins that 250,000 Aus-Hung soldiers were killed or wounded and another 100,000 taken prisoner. Among the casualties there was a large proportion of the professional soldiers, whose numbers were rather small to begin with. It would not be easy to replace these men, who were distinguished by superior training, experience and morale. There was a disturbingly high percentage of losses among the professional officers; these losses wouldn't be made good during the course of the whole war. The consumption and loss of material also caused the high command anxious hours. The shortage of artillery ammunition became especially noticeable in the last days of combat, and was reported by all portions of the army. It is understandable that the physical suffering and privations, the difficult psychological circumstances, the consciousness of heavy sacrifices, and the disappointment caused by the final misfortune all had a negative impact on morale. Dead tired, bleeding from a thousand wounds and with diminished ranks, the

248 Ibid.

249 The total losses are given as 322,000 men and 216 guns by Algya-Pap, "The Maintenance of Our Army in the World War 1914" (in Hungarian, Budapest, 1929), p. 21

250 The enormous casualties among the officers stemmed in great part from the proud indifference with which they led their men into enemy fire, just as in earlier wars. Despite the heaviest firing, officers and even senior commanders rode back and forth on horseback among the marching ranks of their soldiers. This is one of the most familiar pictures of the first battles.
k.u.k. regiments on the San and in the mountains south of Przemysl prepared to face further challenges.

However, the army had also many proud deeds to its credit at Krasnik, Komarow and Lemberg and even during the retreat; this was proven by the faint-hearted way in which it was followed by the enemy, who gained little joy from their victory. The Aus-Hung Military Attaché at Constantinople, GM Pomiankowski, reported: "My Russian naval colleague, a very communicative man who had been my friend for years, told me on the day that the Russians took Lemberg that theirs was a Pyrrhic victory. Russian casualties were enormous; all of western Russia had become one large hospital. No one in Russia had expected to encounter such stubborn resistance and military ability from the Aus-Hung armies. 251" When their opponent evacuated the battlefield ten days later, the Russian leaders realized that they had not won a decisive advantage. In his memoirs, General Danilov wrote, "The frightful exhaustion and heavy loses which they Russian armies had endured unfortunately limited the pursuit of the enemy. 252" The verdict of the official Russian historians was similar: "Victory was dearly bought...The victors were no different from the vanquished; they lacked the capacity to exploit their success by a vigorous pursuit. 253" Ivanov's armies had sent about 1,000,000 men into the campaign; at the conclusion they had lost 250,000 killed, wounded or captured. Although the generals of the Russian Southwest Front had some glimpses of the confusion that beset their withdrawing enemy, their orders in the next few days only occasionally displayed any strong intention of capping their victory on the battlefield with a ruthless drive into the marching columns of Austrians. More prominent was the attempt to ensure that the troops received some badly needed rest; there was also concern that the enemy would somehow recover enough to make some surprising counter-move. Thus Captain Stegemann was correct when he applied the words of Clausewitz to this great and tragic episode: "The retreat of a great commander and a war-hardened army is always like the withdrawal of a wounded lion. 254"

251 Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches (Vienna, 1927), p. 61
253 Korolkov, "The Operations at Warsaw-Ivangorod in 1914" (in Russian, Moscow 1923), p. 5
G. An Analysis of Austria-Hungary's First Campaign Against Russia

1. The Austrian mobilization

Critics of the first Aus-Hung campaigns of the World War always focus primarily on the mobilization, which despite the menace from the larger Russian armies deployed two fifths of the k.u.k. forces against the small state of Serbia and its collaborator Montenegro. If the intervention of Russia could have been definitely expected on the evening of 25 July 1914, when Emperor Franz Joseph signed the order for partial mobilization, then the Austrian General Staff surely would not have sent more troops to the Balkans than had been envisioned for the small "Balkan Minimal Group." However, the attitude of Russia at that hour made it possible to still hope that it would be possible to deliver a quick but decisive blow against the Serbian Army before the Tsarist Empire became an enemy, rather than staying on the defensive in the south, which would be difficult for both military and political reasons. Already in the next few days the responsibility for continuing the major deployment to the Balkans weighed heavily on the soul of the Chief of Staff. This was first evident when the 2nd Army - although it would be needed in the north in the event of war with Russia - was travelling on the railroads between Eger and south Hungary along with the "B" Staffel 255. Then when it became necessary to also mobilize against Russia, a situation arose which had never been

255 The fact that this time of uncertainty and tension lasted for five days (25 to 30 July) was largely due to the praiseworthy attempt of Germany to maintain peace between the Great Powers. The Reich German military historian Theobald von Schäfer stated in his collection of essays "Der casus foederis zwischen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn" (German Officers' League, Berlin, 1928, p. 1050): "In its interpretation of the casus foederis, Germany adhered to the greatest extent possible to the idea that war should be averted. This reticence availed us nothing and no one has thanked us for it; undoubtedly it disadvantaged us militarily. The Central Powers' chances of successes stood on a razor's edge. Who can say whether or not an earlier clear statement of Germany's position would not have spared the Habsburg armies their misfortune at Lemberg, from which they never fully recovered?" The same thoughts appear in Conrad, op. cit. (Vol. IV, p. 713).
envisioned in the peacetime planning (despite the numerous alternative versions) and which placed a heavy burden on the railroad network.

When Russia's intentions finally became clear on 31 July, the duty of the military and civil railroad officials was to begin the deployment toward the northeast at a time when the full-scale deployment in the Balkans was already in full swing. The railroad office of the General Staff, in conjunction with the Hungarian state railroads - which were the most affected - set the first day of mobilization against Russia as 4 August; the major rail transports to Galicia would begin on the 6th. This would give the necessary time to prepare personnel and equipment for the diversion of resources. However, the chief of the military railroads, concerned about the problems that already threatened the deployment to Galicia, emphatically rejected the idea of diverting 2nd Army to the North, as desired by Conrad and his principal assistant Colonel Metzger. Although it would have been possible to stop the trains carrying 2nd Army at the points they had reached, or to return them to their home stations, it was decided for operational, inner political, and psychological reasons to let them roll on to the south. Another argument for this decision was that because of the heavy traffic on the rail network Böhm-Ermolli's Army would in any event arrive in Galicia after the other three. If they re-boarded their trains in Syrmia and the Banat at the appropriate time, they would arrive just as quickly as if they had been redirected immediately.

Thus the fact that almost half of the army of Austria-Hungary was still moving toward the southeast despite the military intervention of the Russians was due not to a lack of basic military sense, but rather to political considerations that had affected the order for general mobilization. However, the disadvantages for the course of the first campaigns cannot be denied. The extent to which the problem affected operations on the Sava and Drina has already been discussed in the section on

256 As previously, to avoid further confusing the reader about this already complex problem, the phrase "2nd Army" is used as an abbreviation for the more correct "parts of the 2nd Army which were entrained as part of the B-Staffel." In fact 2nd Army was not identical to the B-Staffel, and different orders of battle for the Army were envisioned in alternative pre-war plans. It must also be remembered that some parts of 2nd Army which were still at their home stations at the start of the general mobilization were sent directly to Galicia.
the Serbian battles. One major factor which affected operations against Russia was the delay in moving IV Corps because it became engaged in the fighting around Sabac. Yet more serious was the fact that 80 battalions which would have been sent directly to the north if they hadn't been initially mobilized with the Balkan group wound up spending the rest of 1914 in the south.

The technical railroad problems stemming from the dual mobilization also significantly affected the plan of operations that was finally implemented against Russia. For a whole generation, one of the most important underlying assumptions of all of Austria's offensive plans for war with Russia was that the Danube Monarchy must mobilize and deploy its forces more quickly than its enemy. If the Russians could be attacked while their troops were still assembling, they would lose the advantage of their numerical superiority. Although it has frequently been asserted that Russia had already placed several corps - including the Siberians - on a war footing at some point prior to 30 July 1914, such was not the case. These rumors were fed by a number of trial mobilizations in Russia, and by some planned redeployments of personnel in spring 1914 which were delayed into the summer. However, even without adopting such measures, thanks to careful preparations Russia was able to mobilize on 30 July and gain a week's advantage over the Habsburg armies.

The inauspicious opening situation was further worsened by

257 For the problems stemming from mobilization on two fronts, see Conrad, Vol. III (pp. 534 and 775) and IV (pp. 156, 164 167, 267, 270 ff., 276, 303, 313, 321, 323 and 713). The clearest exposition appears in Vol, IV, pp. 112 ff. In these passages different opinions are given as to the final day on which it would still have been possible to easily divert 2nd Army from the Balkans to Russia. At the end of July, Conrad initially thought that 5 August would be the last day, then decided on 1 August. Because the transports to the Balkans were moving much quicker than had originally been planned, the railroad office felt that the diversion of 2nd Army - which Conrad would gladly have implemented - was already impossible on 31 July. See Ratzenhofer, "Die Öst-Ung. Aufmärsche gegen Balkan und Russland: Einfluss der Aufmarschtechnik", in Öst. Wehrzeitung # 39, 40 and 41 for 1927; also, by the same author, "Das Kriegseisenbahn-wesen", in Mil.-wiss. Mitt. for 1927, pp. 433 ff. and 692 ff. and for 1928, pp. 56 ff. and 149 ff.
Romania's failure to cooperate with Austria. Finally, Italy's neutrality led to the weakening of the German forces in the East. There is no doubt that the prospects for Conrad's offensive were considerably more unfavorable than had been anticipated in peacetime.

2. Conrad's plan of attack

The offensive with which Austria-Hungary opened its war against Russia has been characterized by many critics as an error. One of the most severe critics was GdI Alfred Krauss. In his opinion, the Aus-Hung. armies should have awaited the enemy's attack along the San-Dniester line; once the Russians' deployment was clear, the Austrians should then have attacked one of their flanks while leaving the other enemy flank the thankless task of assaulting a well-prepared position. Leaving aside the difficulty of such a maneuver, it should be remarked that it would have left the initiative to the enemy from the first moment. Moreover, at the beginning of the war it was by no means certain that Russia intended to fall upon Austria-Hungary with its main forces, and therefore Germany laid great stress on the importance of an Aus-Hung. offensive against the Tsarist army to protect its own rear.

Another reason why tarrying in a defensive position on the San and Dniester was unthinkable was a geographical disadvantage of the area where the Austrians had to deploy. This was the fact that the principal line of communication to the west ran just behind the army's left wing; the problem would not have been overcome even if there had been a strong reserve deployed in depth on the left and prepared for a counterattack. FML

258 Krauss, "Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage" (3rd printing at Munich, 1923), pp 134 ff. Also see Auffenberg, "Höhe und Niedergang" (p. 289) and "Teilnahme am Weltkrieg" (p. 114). Kabisch, "Streitfragen des Weltkrieges 1914" (Stuttgart, 1924 - pp. 42 ff.) and "Ergänzugen zu Streitfragen des Weltkrieges" (Stuttgart, 1927). Moser, "Ernsthaftes Plaudereien über den Weltkrieg" (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 69 ff. etc.

259 See also Freytag-Loringhoven, "Menschen und Dinge", p. 221; among other points, he stated that "Conrad later let me understand that he had given the order to advance only with a heavy heart (to fulfill Germany's wishes)."

260 The idea of deploying strong reserves on the left appears in Groener, "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen" (Berlin,
Metzger has summarized all the grounds for the offensive in general and for an attack to the north with a strong left flank in particular: "We always had to reckon with the possibility that the numerically superior enemy would force us to retreat. In such an eventuality, we had to avoid having our northern armies pushed over the Carpathians into eastern Hungary. This would have opened the road into the heart of the Central Powers to the Russians, separated the Aus-Hung. troops from all available assistance in the homeland, and sealed the fate of the Monarchy. An advance over the east borders of Galicia (through Brody or farther south) while staying on the defensive against enemy forces coming from Lublin and Cholm was out of the question. Because of the unfavorable balance of forces, such a movement would have greatly intensified the dangers described above..." 261.

It can hardly be maintained that the actual course of events proved that Conrad's plan of attack was incorrect. The offensive on the left wing won significant successes at the outset. Dankl's victory at Krasnik forced Ivanov to send 5th Russian Army, which was still not ready, against Dankl's flank. This exposed its own southern wing to Auffenberg. Moreover, the Grand Duke had to divert some of the corps which he had been deploying around Warsaw as an advance guard for the march to Berlin. Dankl's threat against Lublin still continued to concern the Russian leaders even after the offensive potential of 1st Army began to slacken after the long and difficult fighting. The Russians still toyed with the idea of pulling the corps at Lublin back toward Brest-Litovsk. Thus the Aus-Hung. high command narrowly missed reaching all of the goals for which it was aiming with its powerful offensive to the north. The reason for the unfortunate final outcome was not the offensive planning as such, but rather the fact that the General Staff felt obliged by events in east Galicia to depart from the original concept in some important particulars.

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3. The problem of guarding the flank toward the east

The deployment of strong Russian forces on the eastern borders of Galicia could not have been a surprise for the Aus-Hung. high command. Already in peacetime the General Staff had estimated that Russia would have 17 infantry divisions on the line Rovno-Proskurov-Kamenets Podolsk by the 20th day of mobilization, and 28 divisions by the 30th. The actual total was 22 1/2 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions. The reports which the k.u.k. AOK received in the first weeks of the war generally confirmed the pre-war estimates. An especially important source of information was a telegram sent by k.u.k. General Consul Götz from Jassy (Romania) on 14 August; it made it possible to ascertain the composition of the Russians' two eastern armies except for one corps. On the 21st, however, the high command suddenly gave greater credence to some unsubstantiated reports that there were no strong enemy forces facing east Galicia - despite the pre-war and other estimates. This signified that the desire to send the greatest possible portion of the army into the fray between the Bug and Vistula had induced HQ to ignore all other considerations, including warnings from its own officers.

In the event, the way in which the Austrians handled the problem of flank protection toward the east in the initial campaign against Russia is the least defensible against criticism. This is true even considering the extraordinary difficulties which had to be overcome in this sector, which were already inherent in the configuration of the deployment area. In the last years of peace, there was a school of thought within the General Staff that flank protection could be provided by a defensive operation based on the numerous tributaries of the Dniester, which ran parallel to each other and cut deep, swampy lines in the terrain. In the hour of battle, however, the "spirit behind the education and training of officers and men" proved decisive and the solution was sought in an offensive. As in all other sectors, the August operation assumed the character of continuous attacks by both sides.

There was a difference of opinion regarding the details of the

262 The telegram arrived in Vienna at 4:00 AM on the 15th (Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 394)
263 The most important warning was received from Col. Graf Szeptycki of the Operational Detachment of the AOK; he had observed the Russo-Japanese War as a military attaché.
264 FML Metzger in Schwarte, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 31
operation. Conrad had in mind an attack by 3rd Army with tightly concentrated forces against the north flank of the Russians who were overrunning east Galicia. However, the Army commander GdK Brudermann sought on the first day of battle to hit the Russians while they were still in dispersed marching order; he accepted the risks inherent in a less concentrated offensive, and thus suffered a setback. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether a more concentrated attack would have turned out any better against the considerably larger Russian forces. A better appreciation of the power of the defensive, which was lacking on both sides when the war started, would surely have led to adoption of a holding strategy by 3rd Army. Then the 2nd Army, mostly assembled south of the Dniester by 30 August, could have been given the task of striking the south flank of the Russians (whose deepest penetration at that point would have been the line Mikolajow–Lemberg) from the Dniester bridgeheads. This in fact had been the purpose for constructing the bridgeheads, although they were never used correctly. Another advantage of this solution would have been that the numerous Landsturm formations could have found useful employment in the ranks of 3rd Army, since they were capable only of defensive operations. In the other sectors where the Landsturm were actually used (especially in Kummer's Group on Dankl's left wing) they could have been replaced by active units with greater capacity for maneuver warfare.

In actuality, the 3rd Army launched courageous but doomed attacks on 26 and 27 August, then fell back heavily damaged to the Gnila Lipa. Here divisions of 2nd Army came up on their southern flank, but also were unable to prevail against the dangerous outflanking maneuvers which the enemy initiated against Brudermann. Poor performance by individual lower-level commanders and troops, panics that even affected the better regiments, and other accidents contributed to the outcome. The results were defeat in the Battle of the Gnila Lipa, the evacuation of Lemberg, and the retreat to the Wereszyca.

4. Placing a limit on the northern offensive

Before the fighting started, the Chief of the General Staff had been aware that stronger pressure from the east might under certain circumstances force him to set strict limits to his northern offensive. After the Battle of Zloczow this possibility came to the fore. Another important factor was the failure of the Germans to advance toward Siedlec, as Conrad had expected when the war began. Although the German eastern army had been transferred to the southern border of East Prussia
after prematurely halting its offensive at Gumbinnen, the
Austrians could expect no relief unless the Germans continued
their advance over the lower Narew, and this would not happen
any time soon. Therefore the AOK made the rail line Cholm-
Lublin the final goal of the northern offensive; once that line
was reached, units would be switched to the battlefield at
Lemberg as quickly as possible. Meanwhile Auffenberg's
encirclement maneuver was approved, although it diverged
significantly from the original strategy for the northern
offensive.

While Conrad was fully satisfied with the operations of 1st
Army, in his memoirs he commented as follows on Auffenberg's
Army in connection with events on 30 August: "I would have
preferred that 4th Army attacked by advancing on a broader
front." 265 Conrad was concerned about the development of a wide
gap in the line by the diversion of Archduke Peter Ferdinand's
Group to the east, a gap which could prove very dangerous also
for 1st Army. However, the advance of X Corps toward Krasnostaw
pinned down the Russian XXV Corps and thus provided effective
security for Archduke Peter's rear. Meanwhile the right flank
of 4th Army continued to move away from 3rd Army. Thus there
was a broad unoccupied zone north of Lemberg; its relatively
good road net offered the enemy a chance to advance against the
flank and rear of both Armies.

In the last days of August the offensive strength of the Aus-
Hung. left wing was thus separated into at least three or
perhaps four sectors: east of the Huczwa (Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand), Komarow (the bulk of 4th Army), and Krasnostaw (the
right wing of 1st Army); in the fourth sector - Opole - Kummer's
Group was only very briefly on the offensive. As these battles
took shape, they demonstrated the will to victory of the two
Army commanders, as well as their ability to see the larger
picture. Thus Dankl was wiling, despite his own heavy tasks, to
provide flank protection to Auffenberg. Nonetheless, it seems
that the conduct of the fighting would have been better
coordinated if the attention of the AOK had not so often been
diverted by the events east of Lemberg, or if the entire left
wing had been placed under control of an Army Group commander
266.

265 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 588. See also Leppa, "Der
Entschluss zur Schlacht bei Grodek-Lemberg" in "Wissen und
Wehr" (Berlin, 1929, p. 24)
266 Conrad, op. cit., Vol. IV - p. 711
Perhaps all of the problems listed above, which affected both the north and east wings of the army, could have been avoided if the entire force initially deployed on the San-Dniester line had been led into the attack with a front tilted more toward the northeast. In this case the adverse circumstances stemming from the gap between 4th and 3rd Armies would have been avoided by both Armies. The main goal would still have been maintenance of a strong left wing which would be assured of a successful advance through Lublin.

If Auffenberg had won the complete victory which he envisioned on 29 or 30 August, all of the disadvantages would have been rendered irrelevant. When Archduke Peter's Group pulled back, however, the hoped-for "Cannae" became just "an ordinary victory." And when the Austrians began to pursue the withdrawing enemy, another drawback of the change of the "Schwerpunkt" from 1st to 4th Army became apparent. Because Dankl was farther from 3rd Army, he would have had several days in which to carry out a relentless pursuit. Auffenberg, however, was compelled by the misfortune of the immediately neighboring 3rd Army and the ensuing danger to his own rear to quickly disengage from the defeated Russians. Thus the fruits of the victory he had won in fierce struggle on the battlefield were considerably diminished.

5. For and against the Battle of Rawa Russka-Lemberg

The fact that the 5th Russian Army hadn't been damaged as badly as anticipated is one of the chief arguments advanced by critics against the maneuver which Conrad now initiated, and which led to the Battle of Rawa Russka-Lemberg. Among the causes which later caused Auffenberg's removal was the accusation that the Army commander had exaggerated the greatness of his success. Auffenberg defended himself in his memoirs against this accusation, and in fact it is not supported by any oral or written evidence. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the quickness with which Plehve resumed his advance was a painful surprise for the Aus-Hung generals. His advance, and the retreat of the 1st k.u.k. Army, forced the AOK to break off the Lemberg battle. Therefore most critics of the campaign have taken the opportunity to insist that Conrad should never have

267 "4th Army should have had at least 3 days to carry out the pursuit." (Auffenberg, "Teilnahme am Weltkrieg", p. 258)
268 Auffenberg, "Höhe und Niedergang", p. 403
made the attempt to recover Lemberg.

Even GO Arz, who normally refused to pass judgment, stated on page 31 of his war memoirs: "The decision to resume the battle on the Wereszyca was based on two suppositions:
. That 1st Army - in conjunction with Kummer's Group and supported by Woyrsch's Landwehr Corps - would maintain itself successfully against the enemy's 4th Army, and
. That Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group was strong enough to hold the damaged 5th Army in check until our 4th Army could strike south to intervene in the fighting by 3rd Army.

These premises, however, were not correct. Thus the question arises whether the army, now that Lemberg had been given up, should not have pulled back to the San where it would have been aided by the fortifications of Przemysl and the bridgeheads in conducting a successful defense..."

Auffenberg believed that there was no possibility of success for the Battle of Rawa Russka-Lemberg after 7 September; from that moment "the chances...were nearly zero." On the other hand, Freytag-Loringhoven said "The decision of the Aus-Hung. command after the fall of Lemberg to concentrate all available forces for its recovery was very audacious. It seems they were justified... in seeking a decisive victory, for in war no chance to do so should be ignored." In another context the same author, while recognizing the argument in favor of an immediate retreat behind the San, commented: "The bravery of the decision to commit all available forces to the recapture of Lemberg, and to hold fast to this decision despite adverse reports from the left wing of the army, is undoubtedly worthy of recognition."

However, it can be questioned whether "all available forces" were in fact sent into the decisive battle at Rawa Russka-Lemberg. It would have been bolder to have left just a small screen of cavalry to observe Plehve's beaten army and to have sent the II and XIV Corps - the entire infantry strength of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Group - to the south. The enemy at Rawa Russka would hardly have been able to resist an attack that was so heavily reinforced. Then a decision could have been won at Lemberg before the new advance of 5th Russian Army, which at this point was six days' march north of Lemberg, could have become a factor.

269 Freytag-Loringhoven, "Heerführung im Weltkriege" (Berlin, 1921), Vol. II, p. 18
It seems that the critics have allowed themselves to be overly influenced by that cruel judge of every military commander: success on the battlefield, which decided against the Aus-Hung. leadership. Thus they have ignored several quite significant chances of success which emerged during the battle; these chances were never utilized, not due to the weaknesses of the overall plan, but due to other circumstances.

The underlying concept behind Conrad's change in plans did not succeed in reality. The threat to his western flank by Dankl and Auffenberg had forced the Russian commander Ivanov - against the plans of the Stavka - to use his 3rd Army not for an attack west through Lemberg, but rather in the area north of the Galician capital to relieve Plehve. Thus he unintentionally turned Conrad's intended flanking maneuver against Russky's flank into a frontal attack. The AOK however didn't hesitate to draw the necessary conclusions from this development and to make the southern flank the decisive sector. The attempted flanking maneuver in the south was delayed because the fortified bridgehead of Mikolajow had been lost two days previously when the garrison panicked. This was one of several unlucky accidents which, along with the worsening overall situation in the north, denied the high command the victory they had pursued so doggedly. Nonetheless, the enemy facing Böhm-Ermolli had more than once contemplated withdrawing to the inadequate protection of the walls of Lemberg.

According to the Russian post-war literature, a greater chance of success may have existed at the point where Brussilov's and Russky's flanks came together and where the Landes-Schützen almost ripped open the enemy lines in a brilliant attack. Perhaps the outcome would have been different if 3rd k.u.k. Army, instead of expending its strength in difficult frontal attacks east of Grodek and at Janow, had concentrated on this vulnerable enemy position near Lelechowka! Russky warned his superiors almost every hour that the situation at this vital point was "extraordinarily serious." 271

271 Translator's Note - Although the opinion of General Russky might on the surface seem to be an excellent testimony to the prospects of Austrian success in the battle, it must be borne in mind that throughout the war he was prone to exaggerate his difficulties as a means of avoiding action or of obtaining reinforcements. "Russky's HQ, as Ivanov and later commanders discovered, had a habit of making everything sound like a dirge." (Stone, "Eastern Front", p. 88)
One other question must be considered: whether it was realistic to send the exhausted regiments, inadequately supported by artillery which was short of ammunition, into a general attack on 10 and 11 September. At that point the 1st Army was already in retreat, and the enemy had advanced so far between that Army and the Archduke's Group that he was already in Auffenberg's rear. The balance of forces west of Lemberg hardly favored a decisive success in this extremely tense situation. A more vigorous enemy than the Russians could probably have placed the Aus-Hung. northern armies in great danger by cutting off large segments from retreat or by pushing the main body over the Carpathians. Against this argument it can be maintained that the difficult fighting had also weakened the Russians' capabilities and that a correct assessment of an enemy's weaknesses is one of the factors that distinguishes a good commander. Anyway, the Austrian leadership showed great courage in using up every single chance of battlefield success. It is interesting to compare how stubbornly Conrad strived for victory in the East while in the same days and hours the German high command quickly gave up its chance of victory on the Marne in a moment of weakness.

6. The attack toward Siedlec

Among the major controversies involving the first campaign against Russia, it is now time to raise again the much-discussed question of the "attack toward Siedlec." When Groener writes that Conrad and Moltke the Younger in their verbal and written agreements before the war had "beaten around the bush and avoided the central issue", he is close to the truth. Undoubtedly Moltke had promised the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff to advance over the Narew, although the details cannot be precisely determined. Much ink was later spilled on the question of

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272 Groener, p. 114. Other writers on the World War have taken a variety of positions regarding the "attack toward Siedlec." Besides passages in Kabisch, Moser, Freytag-Loringhoven and other authors already cited, certain magazine articles are also of interest: Kiszling, Das deutsche Ostheer im Sommerfeldzug 1914 (Mil. wiss. Mitt. for 1924, pp. 385 ff); Horsetzky, Österreichische Randglossen zum Buche eines preussischen Generals (Öst. Wehrzeitung for 1925, issues 11 and 12). Also an opposite opinion by Steinitz-Schäfer in Deutscher Offizierbund for 1927 (# 7, 9 and 13)
whether he promised to move "in the direction of Siedlec" or "through Siedlec."^273^  

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the calculations of the German General Staff about the conduct of the war in the East, after most of the Army had gone to the West, were dominated by defensive planning. The need to first stave off the Russians advancing toward East Prussia was far more important than other objectives. While understandable, such planning was inconsistent with fulfilling promises made to their Austrian allies. The next significant question was which of the Russian armies on the East Prussian border should first be confronted, the one on the Niemen or the one on the Narew. If the Germans moved first against the Narew, leaving the Russian Niemen Army in their rear, the latter would significantly restrict freedom of operation toward the south. If on the other hand they dealt first with the Niemen Army, they could later move against the Narew Army with greater security while at least partly fulfilling the Austrians' wishes. Ultimately it was not of great significance whether the attack was to have gone beyond Siedlec, as Conrad at times believed to be possible, or whether pressure was only to be exerted against the Russians up to the Narew or slightly beyond that river. The Germans unanimously believed that their small eastern army was simply too weak for wide-ranging operations behind Warsaw^274^, and Conrad in the event would have been done better to speak less of "Siedlec" and more about the "lower Narew." The point is that a mere threat to the Narew line would have greatly influenced the Russian leadership, as is proven by the behavior of the Stavka at the end of August and beginning of September 1914.

Schlieffen had been inclined to deal first with the Niemen Army, but Moltke the Younger advocated the opposite course of action. Because the strength of the German eastern army had been diminished because of Italy's neutrality, Conrad should have recognized that the Germans could have launched an immediate attack to the south only if they had left significant forces behind to guard toward the northeast. GO Prittwitz' decision to first move his army toward Gumbinnen was Conrad's initial

^273^ Significantly, GM Graf Waldersee, who was the Chief of staff to 8th Army at the start of the World War, had assured GdI Conrad in Vienna on 24 January 1913 that the German eastern army would assemble on and east of the lower Vistula to attack toward Warsaw with its right wing (Conrad, Vol. III, pp. 87 ff.)

^274^ Groener, p. 174
disappointment, although it didn't defer him from opening his own offensive. In the event, the German attack against the Russian Niemen army, if it hadn't been prematurely curtailed by Prittwitz, would have served the overall cause of the allies substantially better than the actual outcome, in which the Germans transferred their attention to the Russian Narew Army without first eliminating the threat from Rennenkampf. Again we cite the important testimony of Groener:

"In peacetime, GO von Moltke had promised to support the Aug-Hung offensive from Galicia between the Vistula and Bug by a German offensive from East Prussia toward the Narew. This pledge could have been carried out only if the Russian Niemen Army had first been destroyed before we also smashed the Narew Army. Then the way over the Narew would have stood open to the Germans and the quick capture of the fortresses on that river would inevitably have followed. The Germans could have crossed the Narew in pursuit of the enemy. Although fresh Russian forces would still be approaching from the line Bialystok-Brest Litovsk and from Warsaw, this disadvantage would have to be accepted to fulfill the promises given to General Conrad von Hötzendorff. However, events turned out differently due to the course of operation in East Prussia."

No one can deny that the German eastern army succeeded in tying down an astonishingly large Russian force in comparison to its own size, and that this of course was of direct assistance to the Aus-Hung armies on the eastern front. However, the question is still open as to whether they should have continued their pursuit of the Russians after Tannenberg as far as the Narew. This would have taken place in the very same days that the Aus-Hung. northern offensive was at high tide, and could have substantially increased the Austrians' prospects for success. Once again we quote Groener:

"On the German side, there were strong grounds for continuing the pursuit immediately after the Battle of Tannenberg at least to the Narew, with the goal of annihilating the remnants of Samsonov's Army plus any enemy reinforcements arriving in that sector. The question of whether we should have advanced over the Narew, and if so how far, must remain open. In this scenario, the defense of East Prussia and of the rear of 8th Army against the Niemen Army could have been entrusted to the units arriving from the West - the XI and Guard Reserve Corps - plus 8 Cav Div. In the event it is unlikely that the Niemen Army,

275 Groener, ibid., p. 173
after the shocking example of Tannenberg, would have sought to advance further into East Prussia without substantial reinforcements.\textsuperscript{276}

Groener's conviction that the German eastern army, victorious at Tannenberg, faced no immediate menace from Rennenkampf is confirmed by Russian sources. It is clear that at this point the Russians were hoping only to hold onto the Niemen-Bobr-Narew line. An attack toward the Narew by the German eastern army might possibly have forced the Stavka to cancel the order it had just issued for a general attack on the Austro-Hungarians and to withdraw the right wing of the Southwest Front to Siedlec. Thus Conrad would have gained all he had hoped for by the "attack toward Siedlec" which he had consistently advocated. Even if the result had been less favorable, a few days' pressure by the German 8th Army against the lower Narew would perhaps at least have drawn to this sector substantial parts of the Russian reserves which Nicholas Nikolaievitch instead was able to commit to the Lublin front. The diversion of the Germans against Rennenkampf made this an academic question that will never be answered.

7. The results of the campaign

To make a final judgment regarding an operation, it is necessary to clearly determine the extent to which it reached its goal. It is indicative of the difficulties which a multi-front war imposed upon the Central Powers that even the principal goal of the Aus-Hung. campaign against Russia is a subject of controversy. It is a historical fact that Austria-Hungary diverted Russian forces away from Germany, and that when operations began the Germans emphasized the importance of their ally carrying out this thankless task. After the Russian plans became known in the post-war literature, however, and it was learned that before the war the enemy had no intention of attacking the heart of Germany before first overthrowing Austria-Hungary, less importance was attributed to the initial spoiling attacks of the k.u.k. Army\textsuperscript{277}.

It must be borne in mind, however, that at the time the allied General Staffs were ignorant of the actual Russian plans and had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{276} Groener, ibid., pp. 173 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{277} In this connection see Auffenberg, Höhe und Niedergang, pp. 289 ff and Kabisch, "Streitfragen", pp. 83 ff.
\end{itemize}
to reckon with the possibility of an immediate Russian attack on Germany. Moreover, in reality the situation for the Russians themselves was not as simple as envisioned in their pre-war planning. They indeed wanted to first deal a decisive blow against Austria-Hungary. However, full realization of this plan contradicted promises the Russians had made to France that they would move the strongest possible forces as early as possible toward Berlin. This promise weighed heavily on Nikolai Nikolaievitch, who anyway hated the Germans. The more the French felt threatened by Germany as the first weeks of the war unfolded, the more pressure they exerted on the Grand Duke through all available channels to fulfill his commitments as an ally. As a testimony to his good will, he had already begun to build two "advance guard armies" around Warsaw for the march to the West. If the Aus-Hung. leadership had been content to remain on the defensive on the San and the Dniester, leaving the initiative to the Grand Duke, would he have been strong enough to long resist the French demands, as in reality he was forced to do by the Austrian offensive? Would he not at the least have unleashed such strong forces against East Prussia that even the genius of Hindenburg would not have prevailed against them? Of course the German eastern army under Hindenburg's glorious leadership played a major role in keeping the Russians east of the Vistula for a much longer period of time than the Entente had hoped. But when a Reich German author states that the sole "saviors of Berlin" were the men at the head of 8th German Army, not the Aus-Hung. chief of staff 278, he unfairly underestimates the extent to which his allies planned and actually implemented a major contribution to the common war effort.

Thus the first Aus-Hung. campaign against Russia had done all that was possible to fulfill its major strategic goal. The same cannot be said for the operational goal which Conrad pursued until 11 September, which was to drive the Russians from the battlefield despite their increasing superiority in manpower and above all in artillery. Perhaps the Chief of Staff demanded too much of himself and his Army. On the other side, however, it must be said that the enemy also failed to achieve his objective of destroying the Aus-Hung. northern army. FM Conrad touched upon the heart of the question when he wrote in his memoirs:

"The k.u.k. armies had not been defeated. They merely had been pulled back to avoid a situation which would have led to defeat if the fighting had continued. The Army had to be preserved. The first blow (Krasnik) and the second

278 Kabisch, "Streitfragen", p. 83
(Komarow) had succeeded, but the third blow (Lemberg-Przemyslany) and fourth (Lemberg-Rawa Russka) had failed. Perhaps the fifth, sixth or even a later blow would win a decisive success! Therefore I wished to ensure freedom of movement and to rehabilitate my forces as soon as possible. Salvation was possible only if freedom of movement was maintained. I had no doubt that the enemy had suffered greatly in the weeks of combat. Now it gradually became apparent that he had suffered to such an extent that he was unable to exploit the situation and couldn't interfere with the withdrawal of the k.u.k. Army."

Certainly, however, it was not easy to make the Austrian Army understand this concept as it withdrew. The importance of gaining an initial battlefield success is a basic axiom of military science. Nonetheless, the World War proved that it is not always correct. Victory and defeat alternated for four long years, and it cannot be shown that the initial battles had a decisive impact on the final result. On the other hand, it remains true that one's first impressions of battle have great significance. This is true for individual units as well as for entire armies.

For the common soldier, the nature of his first encounter with the enemy was often of long-lasting importance. This is the reason why in the preceding account all of the most significant cases of mass panic were related, despite the danger of tiring the reader. Such setbacks afflicted many troops in a moment of weakness during their first action. The lower and middle-ranking officers could have spared their men such moments by more careful procedures. Many units were traumatized by their first setbacks for a long time; here and there in the ranks the cry "The Cossacks are coming" could still have an effect as late as the year 1917.

It is noteworthy how many units - from the highest to the lowest levels - lost their vigor as soon as they began to doubt the wisdom of their commanders' too-frequent reliance on impetuous, often overly hasty, attacks. Naturally this doubt was most evident in cases where the attacks had failed. Thus Auffenberg's 4th Army - under the recent impression of its victory at Komarow - was able to hold its ground at Rawa Russka under the most difficult conditions against superior Russian forces, while at the same time the 3rd and 2nd Armies farther south - still full of bitterness over the result of the battles

279 Conrad, Vol. IV., p. 710 (quoted here in extracts)
east of Lemberg — were unable to break through an enemy that was certainly inferior in strength. Now, after 11 September, the campaign had come to a painful conclusion for the Austro-Hungarian Army as a whole. Despite unparalleled exertion and sacrifice the attack which had begun with such great elan had ended with the surrender of a battlefield sanctified by the blood of the best soldiers, and with a retreat that lasted for hundreds of kilometers. The successes that had been won were forgotten, and the more bitter experiences alone were remembered. The losses in blood and equipment undoubtedly caused a loss in morale; this loss was not complete, but it could be overcome only slowly. Therefore the strategic triumph which Austria-Hungary's armed forces had contributed to the total conduct of the allied war effort had not been cheaply bought. It was astounding to those who had first seen this Army during its retreat when only 14 days later it persistently resumed its advance. The Army's extraordinary strength would enable it to overcome the heavy disappointments of its first actions.
IV. The Campaign Against Russia in Fall 1914

A. Campaign Plans of Both Sides

1. Preparations for the first combined operation of the Allies

(see volume 1 leaflet 14 and sketches 17 and 18)

a. The Austrian retreat continues to west Galicia and into the Carpathians

The hesitant behavior of the Russians ensured that the bulk of the Aus-Hung. northern armies would gain a few days' much-needed rest after reaching the San. Because of Ivanov's orders of 13 September, the only somewhat intense action with the enemy between the 14th and 16th occurred in the forested area south of the mouth of the San. Until the evening of the 15th, Dankl's troops, under pressure from 9th Russian Army, gradually pulled back to a line running from Wola-Krolewska (west of Lezajsk) to Tarnobrzeg. On this day the 4th Russian Army reached Krzeszow, where they sent a Guard battalion over the San, and the area around Tarnogrod. The 5th Army reached a point half-way between Lubaczow and Jaroslau, the 3rd came to Jaworow, and the 8th to Sadowa Wisznia. 3rd and 5th Armies had become considerably entangled during their pursuit of Auffenberg. Moreover, the dispositions of 9th and 5th Armies were not wholly consistent with the intentions of the Front commander, who had wanted their march directed mainly toward the west rather than to the south.

(see volume 1 leaflet 14 and sketch 19)

The attention of Ivanov and of his Chief of Staff Alexeiev was turning primarily toward Przemysl, which stood directly in the path of their intended advance and would have to be blockaded as soon as possible. Once this was accomplished and the supply lines were secured, a further advance toward Cracow could be contemplated. This plan was the basis of the orders which Ivanov issued on the 18th. 3rd and 8th Armies would move forward against the Aus-Hung. Radymno-Pzemysl-Chyrow front; protection in the direction of the nearest Carpathian passes would be provided by 8th Army, while the farther passes were the
responsibility of the Dniester Detachment. Farther north the 5th Army would attack through Jaroslau and Przeworsk toward the road from Przemysl west to Dynow, while 4th and 9th Armies would capture the Rzeszow-Kolbuszowa area and the lower Wisloka River. Novikov's Cavalry Corps, which after the 16th would have five and a half divisions, would provide security north of the Vistula and scout ahead as far as the line Czestochowa-Cracow. The new offensive would begin on 22 September.

Apparently Ivanov's directives were prepared without any real knowledge of the troop movements which his enemy was meanwhile initiating.

During the Battle of Lemberg, GdI Conrad had come to the decision that in the event of a retreat the evacuation of Galicia would not end on the San. Also, the order for the defense of the San, which the high command issued early on the 12th before it left Przemysl, stated that the objective was to secure for the Armies a chance for a few days' urgently needed pause in central Galicia. The factors that influenced Conrad's decision not to tarry on the San were the condition of the troops, which no doubt made a longer separation from the enemy desirable, and his concern about getting help from the Germans. The farther he withdrew toward the west the more he would force his allies to hasten and make it possible for them to quickly appear at his side.

In this difficult moment the Germans were certainly inclined to provide support to the Aus-Hung. Army. Assistance from the western armies would not be available because of their own problems, as the k.u.k. AOK had suspected during the last days of the Lemberg battle. However, the German eastern army, which after Tannenberg had now won another complete victory in Masuria, would be able to help.

Initially Moltke had wanted to move two corps of his 8th Army to Prussian Silesia. On the other hand, Hindenburg's headquarters at Insterburg believed that the moment had come for the offensive toward Siedlec which Conrad had so often demanded earlier; the k.u.k. northern armies would have to stay on the San to await the results of this move. On the evening of the 11th Conrad had already informed the Germans that under the altered situation any help other than the direct infusion of

280 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 726
German reinforcements through Cracow would "come too late" for him. He repeated this declaration in a telegram to Moltke on the afternoon of the 13th; twelve hours later Archduke Frederick made the same point in a letter to the German Emperor. Based on orders it had already issued to Hindenburg, the DOHL replied that German forces would arrive by train in conformance with the wishes of their allies.

As soon as the HQ of the German eastern army bowed to the necessity of providing immediate support to their allies, Ludendorff proposed to the DOHL to commit not just two corps, but if possible the entire 8th Army, which could "initiate a whole new operation independent of the Aus-Hung. armies." Meanwhile GLt von Falkenhayn had taken over operations at General Headquarters in place of the very sickly GO Moltke after the Marne battle was broken off on 12 September. Falkenhayn went along with the substance of Ludendorff's suggestion, and on the evening of the 15th directed that four corps and a cavalry division from 8th Army would be sent to the Polish-Silesian border; they would constitute the 9th Army under the command of GdA von Schubert, with Ludendorff as his Chief of Staff. If the situation permitted, two further corps would join the new Army later.

Two days later (on the 17th), the German Emperor reported to Archduke Frederick that GO Hindenburg would take over command of the 9th Army, which would consist of five corps (XI, XVII, XX, Guard Reserve, and Woyrsch's), Bredow's Division ("Haupt Reserve Posen"), and 8 Cav Div. The defense of East Prussia would remain the responsibility of the reduced 8th Army (where Schubert would succeed Hindenburg in command).

Meanwhile the Aus-Hung. high command had begun to continue the retreat to the west and southwest, because of the reasons already mentioned and because of the threat that 1st Army would be outflanked by the Russians. The orders were issued on the 16th. The units would abandon their positions and on the San; while avoiding any "large scale, decisive fighting"; 2nd Army would pull back behind the Dukla Pass and in the area around Sztropko, while the other armies retreated behind the Biala and Dunajec. Kummer's Armee Gruppe was dissolved. Parts of it were

282 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 731
284 Ludendorff, "Meine Kriegserinnerungen" (Berlin 1920), p. 55
285 German official history, Vol. V, p. 408
absorbed by the k.k. 106 Lst ID, which now was entrusted with securing the upper reaches of the Vistula; other parts joined the fortress garrison at Cracow or the line of communication troops.

1st Army disengaged itself from the enemy amidst some fighting with Letschitzky, who was driving toward the lower Wisloka, accompanied in the south by a large number of cavalry squadrons. However, the disengagement of the other armies took place without any noteworthy difficulty; Przemysl fortress and the fortified bridgeheads at Jaroslaw and Sieniawa rendered useful service in this operation. The Russians had begun to shell Sieniawa with light guns on 16 September, and thereafter the works were mostly destroyed by mortar fire. However, their XXV Corps, supported by parts of III Caucasian and XIX Corps, didn't seize Sieniawa until the 18th. The garrison (three Landsturm and five March battalions), which was under the able leadership of Engineer Major Papp, had meanwhile wrecked all the guns that couldn't be brought away, blown up the bridges, and made a timely withdrawal to Przeworsk.

The course of events at Jaroslaw was similar. General Plehve, commander of 5th Russian Army, sent no fewer than three corps (V, XIX and XXV) against the Jaroslaw bridgehead after the capture of Sieniawa. The Russians began their artillery bombardment on the 20th. The defending commander, FML von Benigni, had LW IR # 15, k.k. Lst IR # 34, five March battalions and half of a Lst-Etappen Bn; his troops carried out a lively defense until the night of 20-21 September, then evacuated the bridgehead. Parts of the garrisons of Sieniawa and Jaroslaw pulled back to Przemysl; the rest (LW IR # 15 and the ten March battalions) marched through Dynow and Pilzno to join 1st Army.

On the day that Jaroslaw fell, the k.u.k. armies, thanks to their rapid retreat, were already a substantial distance from their enemies. The 1st Army was west of the Wisloka, the 4th was in the hills west and southwest of Rzeszow, the 3rd was marching along the Przemysl-Domaradz road, and the 2nd had crossed the basins at Lisko and Sanok in a southwesterly direction. Autumn rains and muddy roads made the march extraordinarily difficult. Day and night, the infantry proceeded with bowed heads, although undiscouraged, behind the enormous supply trains. The artillery worked its way forward,

287 At Sieniawa and Jaroslaw the Russians captured 46 totally obsolete guns, per Korolkov's "Strategic Overview of the World War 1914-1918" (in Russian; Moscow, 1923), Vol. II, p. 17
although their axles were sinking into the mud. The shrunken
cavalry regiments, looking like the horsemen of the Apocalypse,
were also on the move; their presence was often announced from a
considerable distance by the penetrating smell from the
festering gall wounds of hundreds of horses who were being led
by hand. Day and night the commanders and their staffs were at
work - organizing routes of march, keeping the columns in
motion, untangling traffic jams of troops and trains, collecting
stragglers, and ensuring that necessary provisions were at hand.
These were difficult weeks, in which hardly a ray of sun seemed
to penetrate the darkness.

b. A position is prepared for new fighting

However, the high command didn't waste a second in its efforts
to master this difficult situation. When GM Ludendorff appeared
at the headquarters in Neusandez on 18 September for a
conference to prepare the next operations, he was surprised at
the confidence which he found there 288. He and Conrad
immediately agreed that it was necessary to deprive the enemy of
the initiative as soon as possible. They could not confidently
predict what the Russians planned to do. The only large Russian
units identified were those which had broken over the lower San.
Austrian intelligence, which still didn't know that these units
had been placed under 9th Army after Krasnik, reckoned that they
were part of 4th Army; they believed that the 9th Army, of
unknown composition, was southeast of Ivangoord. Otherwise no
large Russian units had crossed the San, where at this point
Jaroslau and Sieniawa still barred the crossing points. Conrad
believed that the Russians would continue their advance deep
into west Galicia, and eventually also over the Carpathians;
Ludendorff believed that they would concentrate stronger forces
across the central Vistula. Above all, Hindenburg's Chief of
Staff wanted to avoid having his Army outflanked by the
Russians; if possible he wished to outflank them. Therefore he
had no intention of sending the mass of the German corps to
Cracow; rather he wanted to deploy on the broad front Beuthen-
Pleschen (southeast of Posen). He was more confident that he
could fall on the Russians' northern flank from this position.
Since Conrad still laid great emphasis on the closest possible

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IV, pp. 796 ff. Anyway persons present at headquarters at
this time noted that on the same day the reports from the
Armies were more encouraging than previously.
cooperation, however, Ludendorff agreed that the German 9th Army would base its operations in the area from Cracow northwest to Kreuzburg, closer to the Austrians. The last corps to arrive would detrain at Cracow itself. From this sector the offensive into the Vistula valley would begin as quickly as possible.

It seems that the role which the Aus-Hung. Army would play was at this point still not certain. If the Russians continued their advance into west Galicia, three armies would defend the Biala and the Dunajec or, if necessary, the area south of Cracow. Meanwhile the German 9th Army from the Vistula and the k.u.k. 2nd Army from the Carpathians would make flanking attacks. If, however, the enemy held back in Galicia the Austrians would themselves advance to seize the initiative. If the Russians turned toward Hungary, the k.u.k. 2nd Army would hold them off while the other three Aus-Hung. armies together with Hindenburg fell on their rear from the west and northwest.

In conferences at Breslau on 19 and 20 September, in which the k.u.k. AOK was represented by Colonel Oskar Slameczka, the Germans decided that 9th Army would assemble on the line Cracow-Wolbrom-Lelow-Wielun and begin its offensive on the 30th at the latest. The troops covering the deployment would include some k.u.k. horsemen, initially the 7th CD. The German Landwehr Corps would deploy on the north wing of Austrian 1st Army so that it could transfer to the control of the German eastern army.

Meanwhile reports about the enemy were arriving from various sources and with apparent clarity. They convinced Hindenburg that he must send his army yet farther toward the north. While the Russians in Galicia were only cautiously feeling their way forward north and south of Przemysl and were standing fast on the lower Wisloka, it seemed that large bodies of troops - perhaps substantial parts of the still mysterious 9th Russian Army - were being sent from Ivangoord to the hilly country around Kielce. The rumors about Kielce were later proved to be false, and apparently had been planted by the enemy. Nonetheless, on 22 September Hindenburg felt obliged to suggest to the Aus-Hung. high command that they send an army to the northern bank of the Vistula, thus enabling the German corps to shift more toward the north.

289 See also Metzger's comments in Schwarte, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 39
290 On 18 September Ludendorff had already mentioned to the Austrians that they might bring the 2nd Army from the
At this point GdI Conrad felt that it was still possible for the enemy, with 51 or 52 divisions, to send the bulk of his forces against our 37 1/2 divisions south of the Vistula. He declared that he would not be able to decide the extent to which he could fulfill Hindenburg's wishes until at least the 28th. However, in the next 24 hours there was a change in opinion at the AOK. One reason was continuing reports about the appearance of Russian divisions on the left bank of the Vistula; they seemed to justify Hindenburg's desire to deploy farther to the north, although Conrad still felt that the Germans wanted to do "too much" in that direction. The other reason was that it became more doubtful by the hour that the Russian main body intended to advance any further into west Galicia.

On 23 September GO Hindenburg reported through Captain Fleischmann that he was thinking of opening the attack prior to the 30th, and that any Aus-Hung. forces that came to the north bank of the Vistula after the 28th would be too late. Conrad informed the German commander that he would let five Aus-Hung. divisions deploy on the lower Nida by the 30th. Moreover, in his message to Hindenburg he stated that "in conjunction with the advance north of the Vistula the Aus-Hung. armies would also be moving on the south bank". Conrad had thus decided not to wait any longer for the Russians, but to move against them himself. As a result, on the same day he ordered that the three armies which were marching back to the Dunajec and the Biala should halt on the heights east of these rivers; 2nd Army would not retreat to Bartfeld (Bartfa) as originally planned, but would halt a day's march farther east.

The allotted positions were reached by 1st and 4th Armies on the 25th, by 3rd and 2nd Armies on the 26th. The 9th German Army was deploying north of Cracow (XI Corps), west of Jedrzejow (Guard Reserve Corps), and east and northeast of Czenstochau (XX and XVII). The units which the k.u.k. 1st Army had already sent over the Vistula - 35 Lst Inf Bde (which had been brought from east Galicia) and 7 CD - provided a link with the Germans. In the next few days GdK Dankl sent further troops to the north bank: 3 CD, 37 Hon ID, 100 Lst Inf Bde; then Ist Corps (5 and 12 ID, 46 LW ID) and 106 Lst ID.

Carpathians to the area north of Cracow (German official history, Vol. V, p. 413)
c. The Russian incursion into upper Hungary

In this period there was an episode that caused great anxiety on the home front, especially in Hungary. Here the Kaschau [VI] and Lemberg [XI] Military Commands (the latter redeployed to Munkacs) improvised a defensive force in the mountains, consisting of March, Ersatz and Landsturm troops plus Honved reserve batteries. Some of the soldiers wore the old blue peacetime uniforms, others wore their civilian clothing with only black-yellow or (Hungarian) red-white-green arm bands to show their military status. Most had old Werndl single-shot rifles.

Although the Russians didn't intend to risk sending strong forces into the unfamiliar mountains, Ivanov still carried out some diversionary operations to distract his opponents' attention and to influence Romania to the east. On 24 September, Brussilov's 2nd Combined Coss Div advanced from Turka and drove the weak garrison of two Hungarian Landsturm battalions from the Uzsok Pass. Although the Kaschau Military Command sent up 17 Lst Terr Bde to help, it was too weak. Therefore GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered FML Karg to recover the mountain crossing, which was of great importance to the flank of 2nd Army, with 38 Hon ID and 102 Lst Inf Bde. Between 26 and 30 September, Karg drove the enemy back to the southwest entrance of the Uzsok Pass in a series of fluctuating mountain actions.

In the same period the Russian Dniester Detachment, which now had 71 ID and three Cossack divisions, sent mounted detachments into the sector called the "Forest Carpathians." The Lemberg Military Command at Munkacs had 30 battalions, 4 squadrons and 3 batteries (as described above) to cover the whole area. In the last weeks of September the Cossacks reached Szolyva and Toronya and temporarily even Ökörmező; farther east they occupied Maramaros-Sziget on 2 October. Their raid was a sore affliction to the population, even though many of the local people were Ukrainians closely related to the intruders. However, Ivanov's Carpathian operations didn't meet their goal of disturbing the enemy leadership; Conrad recognized that they were only demonstrations.

d. Conrad's intentions on 28 September

Meanwhile on the 25th a Russian radio broadcast revealed that the enemy already had some knowledge of the presence of Germans
north of Cracow. This made more credible to the allies the reports of the deployment of Russian forces between Ivango\rood and Kielce (reckoned, as previously, as part of 9th Army). However the enemy situation in Galicia was still shrouded in complete darkness. Strong Russian cavalry forces were scouting toward 1st Army from the lower Wisloka. Farther south, an impenetrable screen of cavalry guarded the approaches to the upper Wisloka; a smaller infantry force was approaching Sanok from Chyrow. The mass of the Russian Army however seemed to have stayed in the same area it had occupied for the past week.

This behavior by the enemy filled Conrad with increasing anxiety. What were the Russians preparing behind their screen of cavalry? Were they planning an offensive into Hungary or – as the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff believed more likely at this moment – an offensive over the middle Vistula toward Germany? If Conrad himself attacked the Russians, would he find them in strength on this side of the San? It was high time to clarify the situation and disturb the enemy's plans by rapid movement. However the troops' need for rest necessitated a delay of a few more days.

In the night of 28 September another intercepted Russian radio broadcast shed a significant amount of light into the darkness: the HQ of the Russian Southwest Front ordered three corps of 9th Army back to the area bounded by Jozefow, the mouth of the San, and Rozwadow! Thus it was firmly established that a movement to the rear was taking place and that the troops on the upper Wisloka had belonged to 9th Army rather than to the 4th; the location of 4th Army was problematic. These noteworthy troop movements were soon confirmed by reports from the lower Wisloka and on the 30th by a second Russian radio broadcast. They made it possible to deduce with reasonable certainty "that the next great action of the Russians would be to turn against Germany by an attack from Warsaw, while they held the San and the stretch of the Vistula north of its confluence with the San."293

As Conrad's plan for the next operations took on sharper detail, there were still two unsolved questions which played a great role:

- Would Hindenburg reach the Vistula without

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292 Conrad personally drew the conclusion that the forces which were allegedly crossing the Vistula at Ivango\rood belonged to the 4th Army rather than to the 9th. See Conrad, op. cit., Vol IV, p. 872
293 Conrad, Vol. IV, p. 871
encountering overwhelming numbers of the enemy?

- And would the Aus-Hung. armies, advancing in Galicia, still be able to pin down substantial Russian forces west of the San?

If the answer to both questions was "yes", the original plan (a double envelopment against a Russian offensive over the San from the upper Vistula and the Carpathians) would at least become reality on a smaller scale. In this eventuality, the German eastern command promised to help by sending two corps in a southward direction over the Vistula west of the mouth of the San. If the Russians, however, had already pulled back over the San, then it would remain to be seen what situation existed behind the great river barriers— would Hindenburg be able to attack to the east bank of the Vistula, or would the main assault have to be directed more toward the Aus-Hung. wing? Ludendorff's later remarks about the campaign which 9th German army was about to open also held true for his Aus-Hung. allies in the next days and weeks:

"New and difficult situations faced the high command every day. Subordinate commanders had to act on their own initiative. The campaign was a combination of bold risks, energetic fighting, and prudent retreats. The Army's weak forces were separated by wide distances...This was one of the most fluid campaigns ever fought, and was one of the foremost in the annals of military history."  

The fact that the allies were fighting on the same battlefield brought the question of a combined command apparatus to the fore. Already on 16 September GdI Archduke Frederick had asked the German Emperor to place GdA von Schubert, who was to be given command of the new 9th Army, under the command of the k.u.k. AOK. The Germans weren't disposed to agree to this suggestion. GO Hindenburg was named instead of Schubert as commander of 9th Army. Thus the German Emperor "made an Aus-Hung. overall command impossible, because the General Oberst outranked the highest commander of the allied army." The order to GO Hindenburg stated "I entrust you with leadership of all operations in the East. 8th Army, which General von Schubert will take over, remains also under your authority. Direction regarding cooperation with the Austrian Army and operations in Prussia I reserve for myself."  

294 Ludendorff, "Meine Kriegserinnerungen" (Berlin 1920), p. 64
This was the first episode in the long and painful process by which the two high commands tried to resolve the constantly recurring question of how they should coordinate their combined efforts.

2. The creation of the "Russian Steamroller"

Even more than the allies, the Russians were making their further decisions in the dark. The orders which Ivanov issued on the 18th for preparing the blockade of Przemysl were based on an operational plan of Alexeiev, his Chief of Staff. 3rd and 5th Armies would surround the fortress, which thus was beginning to play a strategic role of great importance; 8th Army would provide protection against any relief attack attempted from the Carpathians. Pursuit of the withdrawing enemy was entrusted to 9th and 4th Armies. These two armies were to proceed only as far as the Wisloka, where they would halt and await the investment of Przemysl. Ivanov planned to later relieve 3rd Army with a new besieging army composed of reserve divisions; the 3rd would join the 8th to cover the siege. 5th Army would join 9th and 4th to open the advance against Cracow around the middle of October.

The plan already took for granted that parts of the armies attacking Cracow would operate on the north bank of the Vistula. This aspect is made clear in a memorandum which Alexeiev submitted to the Stavka on the 20th. By this point the Russians knew about the renewed retreat of the Aus-Hung. armies and of the approach of German reinforcements toward Silesia. In response, Alexeiev proposed that a massive force of 12 to 16 corps should assemble on the Nida and then advance to the line Piotrkow-Miechow in western Poland. From this point they could

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296 Korolkov, "The Operations of Warsaw-Ivangorod" (in Russian; Moscow 1923), pp. 9 ff. Schäfer, "Die russischen Angriffsoperationen unter dem Gross Fürsten Nikolaus Nikolajewitsch" (in Wissen und Wehr, 1925, pp. 481 ff.)

297 Danilov writes (p. 297) "Meanwhile the staff of Southwest Front was already receiving in mid-September some unconfirmed reports that German troops were transferring to the Austrian front. Based on the overall situation, SW Front found it scarcely probable that German troops would appear at Jaroslau and Przemysl. However, they considered it possible that the enemy would open coordinated operations...on both sides of the Vistula directed toward the mouth of the San."
advance either through Cracow in the direction of Vienna or through Kalisz-Lissa (NW of Breslau) in the direction of Berlin. Such an operation would be the most effective means of relieving the Northwest Front; it would only require a group from that Front at Warsaw to provide flanking cover for Ivanov's attacking armies.

General Danilov, the highest-ranking assistant to the Stavka Chief of Staff Yanushkevitch, didn't agree with Alexeiev's reasoning. He believed that the Aus-Hung. Army had little offensive capability, but gazed with all the more concern toward East Prussia. In that quarter there were rumors that the Germans planned to attack toward the rear of Warsaw. For this reason the new commander of the Northwest Front, General Russky, had feared that the connection between his left wing and Warsaw might be endangered, and therefore felt obliged to pull the wing back toward Bialystok and the area to its southwest. In opposition to Alexeiev's plans, Danilov suggested that "operations against the Austrians be restricted to the minimum necessary" and that four corps and three cavalry divisions of the Southwest Front be transferred through Chelm and Lublin to Russky's apparently threatened left wing.

Ivanov's Dispute with the Stavka

Ivanov was irritated by Russky's retreat as well as by Danilov's suggestions. At his request the Grand Duke-Generalissimo and the Commander of the Northwest Front came to meet him at Chelm on the 22nd. The Grand Duke was under renewed pressure from the French to finally attack Germany. Therefore he seemed not as much opposed to Ivanov's plans as was Danilov; he only felt that the deployment area which Alexeiev had suggested was dangerously too far toward the west. The result of the conference was a compromise that attempted to reconcile Ivanov's and Danilov's opinions. Russky's left wing would discontinue its retreat and strengthen the Warsaw District with two corps. Ivanov, however, would send an army of three corps to the Vistula around Ivangoiord to maintain a link with the northern flank and for its direct support. For this purpose Ivanov selected 4th Army, whose main forces were still east of the San because of the high waters. While the Ural Cossack Div covered its movement on the

298 Danilov, op. cit., pp. 297 ff. "La grande guerre", pp. 321 ff. Translator's Note - Also see Stone, "Eastern Front", pp. 95 and 96, which indicates that Russky actually wanted to abandon Warsaw in his concern about a possible German offensive.
west bank of the Vistula, the Army's three corps (Grenadiers, III Caucasian and XVI) would move through Lublin to its assigned area.

Russky had hardly returned to his own quarters when he surprised the Stavka with new reports and suggestions. Now he wanted his left wing (the 2nd Army) to pull back to the area southwest of Białystok, without worrying about a link with Warsaw and Novo Georgievsk; then he would attack East Prussia with the new 10th Army - deploying on the Bobr - and the reassembled 1st Army on the Niemen. The attack could begin on 3 October; until that time Ivanov's Southwest Front, parts of which would guard the rear of the Northwest Front, should remain in place. Russky's ideas totally harmonized with those of Danilov, who also succeeded in gaining the agreement of the Commander-in-Chief.

Danilov, however, had not reckoned with Ivanov. The latter had meanwhile (by the 24th), gained more exact, although exaggerated, intelligence about the appearance of substantial German forces on the line Sieradz-Noworadosm-Miechow. By his calculation the Germans could reach the middle Vistula by 29 September, while the Austrians could advance from the line Tarnow-Jaslo by 1 October at the latest 299. Because of these facts and their concern about the high water in the rivers running behind their front, Ivanov and Alexeiev considered it impossible to remain inactive until Russky began his offensive. Moreover, both generals feared that their own rear areas would be threatened by the withdrawal of the left wing of the Northwest Front. On 25 September they told the Stavka that there was only one solution: to bring all units of their Southwest Front back behind the line Ivangorod-Jozefow-Krasnik-Tomaszow-Javorov (except for a corps to cover Lemberg) and then from this central position strike against one of the two approaching enemy forces 300.

The Stavka was rather indignant about this proposal, which was also a demonstration against the preference being given to the Northwest Front. Surrendering the area along the San with Jaroslau and Przemysl was inadmissible for political and strategic reasons. The Stavka responded to Ivanov, "In any event you are requested not to make a decision on the lines of

your last communication...The Commander-in-Chief wishes to visit you and to personally discuss the question with you as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{301}"

The second conference at Cholm took place on 26 September. It led to measures designed to ensure the retention of as much of central Galicia as possible and to counterattack the German offensive toward the Vistula from the area between Ivangorod and the mouth of the San. For this purpose, 4th Army - which was already marching to Ivangorod - would be reinforced further south behind the Vistula by the 9th, which pulled back from the Wisloka. 5th and 3rd Armies would dig in to firmly hold the lower San, but would still be ready to launch a sudden attack toward Cracow. 3rd Army was also responsible for blockading Przemysl; because of that fortress' rather inadequate armament it was believed possible to take it by storm. As previously, 8th Army was responsible for guarding the outlets from the mountains on both sides of Chyrow. Reserve divisions coming up for the siege of Przemysl would initially be placed under 3rd Army.

The final orders to prepare a "steamroller"

\textit{(see volume 1 leaflet 14 and 15)}

The conference didn't touch on the possibility of accompanying the attack over the central Vistula with a blow from Warsaw, which had been raised repeatedly by Ivanov and Alexeiev; this was because Russky still denied that there had been any substantial weakening of the enemy forces in East Prussia. Then on the 27th the Russians gained greater clarity regarding the overall situation. On the one hand, by evening it was reported that the Germans had reached the line Piotrkow-Pinczow and that a strong Aus-Hung. force (Dankl's divisions) had appeared north of the Vistula. On the other hand, reliable agents reported that three German corps had left East Prussia through Thorn in the direction of Breslau \textsuperscript{302}. Impressed by these developments, the Stavka finally made a major decision. On the 28th it ordered both Fronts to prepare a great offensive with the bulk of their forces. It would be directed from the central Vistula to the upper Oder and thus into the heart of Germany. Southwest Front would send at least ten corps over the Vistula. Forces from the Northwest Front would strike from Warsaw to the area Slupca (40 km SE of Gnesen) and Kalisz; in the meantime Warsaw

\textsuperscript{301} "La grande guerre", pp. 82 ff. Danilov, p. 299
\textsuperscript{302} "La grande guerre", p. 283
would be defended to the utmost.

Russky still sought to avoid weakening his positions opposite East Prussia, and referred to a diversionary attack which 8th German Army was opening toward the area Suwalki-Augustov-Ossoviets. However, on 30 September some documents found on the body of a fallen German officer confirmed the transport of four corps out of East Prussia. Russky finally had to agree that in the next few days the 2nd Army would deploy in the area around Warsaw, and that effective on 2 October it would come under Ivanov's command.

Ivanov learned of this new command situation, which greatly enhanced his authority even against the Stavka, by a telephone call on 29 September. Now he also pulled 5th Army out of central Galicia to the area north of the Tanew, so it would be on hand for the planned offensive over the Vistula. To secure the river crossings the 4th Army entrained III Caucasian Corps to travel to Radom, and 9th Army sent the Guard Rifle Bde to Opatow. Cavalry stationed west of the Vistula would also shield the shifting of troops to the north. The armies that would stay in Galicia were the 3rd (now led by a former Bulgarian General, Radko Dimitriev) and the 8th; they were still part of Southwest Front but were both led by Brussilov.

On 1 October Ivanov established the final ground rules for the upcoming operation. The units of the Southwest Front made up three great groups:

. The main force had 2, 4, 9 and 5 Armies plus Novikov's Cavalry
. The Galician group under Brussilov had 3 and 8 Armies, and would soon be reinforced by the Przemysl siege army
. The new "Narew Group" had XXVII Corps plus cavalry.

The Armies of the main force would advance as follows:

. 2nd Army - from a line between the south outskirts of Warsaw to the mouth of the Pilica toward Lodz and Opoczno
. 4th Army - from between the Pilica and the Ilzanka toward Opoczno and Skarzysko Koscielne
. 9th Army - from south of the Ilzanka to the line Skarzysko-Sandomierz.

5th Army would move as quickly as possible behind the 9th and assemble in the area Lublin-Krasnik. Novikov's Cavalry were ordered to pull back through Ivangoord to the east bank of the Vistula as the enemy advanced; later they would attack out of

303 "La grande guerre", pp. 283 ff. and 347 ff.
Warsaw.

The Galician group would blockade Przemysl and accompany the main group south of the Vistula in the direction of Cracow, while securing the Carpathians along the line Dynow-Sanok-Lisko-Nowe Miasto-Drohobycz. The Narew Group, supported by the fortified area around Warsaw, would protect the great offensive against any threat from the direction of Mlawa.

With these orders the Russians created a great block of armies which would go down in history as the "Russian steamroller." It was both the latest manifestation of the Oriental Asiatic drive for expansion and a tool of the Western democracies. In October and November 1914 it would batter in vain against the doors of the Occident.

Order of Battle of the Southwest Front, 1 October 1914

(Strengths shown are based on the average strength of a division; thus an ID = 16 battalions, 7 batteries and 58 guns. A CD = 24 squadrons, 2 batteries and 12 guns)

Commander = GdA Ivanov; Chief of Staff = Gen Lt Alexeiev
Totals (minus 2 Army & the Narew Group) - 52 x ID, 23 x CD; 832 bns, 552 sqdns, 410 batties (with 3292 guns)
The 2nd Army & Narew Group had 17 1/2 x ID, 2 3/4 x CD; 280 bns, 66 sqdns, 128 batties (with 1048 guns)

2nd Army - GdK Scheidemann
This Army was under SW Front only for 1-12 Oct; the order of battle shown was that which the Stavka planned at the end of September, but completed during the course of October. At the end of October the Army also gained 50 ID (from 6 Army) and 13 Siberian ID (from Asia) as parts of V and VI Siberian Corps.
. Corps - I [22 & 24 ID], II [26 & 43 ID; joined from 1 Army; on 19 Oct moved to 5 Army], IV [30 & 40 ID; also from 1 Army, and on 19 Oct to 5 Army], XXIII [3 Gd ID, half of 2 ID], I Sib [1 & 2 Sib Div; arrived by rail from Asia, and on 19 Oct to 5 Army], II Sib [4 & 5 Sib Div], VI [4 & 16 ID]
. Other - 4 Cav Div, 1 Rifle Bde

Warsaw Detachment (on 2 Oct became "Narew Group")
. XXVII Corps [63 & 77 ID, half of 2 ID]; 79 ID, Caucasian CD, Gd Coss Bde; Astrakhan Coss Regt # 1

4th Army (GdI Evert) = 128 bns, 36 sqdns, 59 batties (482 guns)
. Corps - Gren [1 & 2 Gren Div], III Cauc [21 & 52 ID], XVI [41
& 47 ID]
. Other - 81 ID, half of 75 ID; Ural Coss Div; 1 Transbaikal
Coss Bde

9th Army (GdI Letschitzky) = 160 bns, 180 sqdns, 85 batties (670
guns)
. Corps - Novikov Cav [5, 8 & 14 CD; Turkestan Coss Bde, which
went to 5 Army on 8 Oct; 4 Don Coss Div, which went to Narew
Group on 14 Oct; 5 Don Coss Div, which went to 5 Army on 8 Oct;
half of 75 ID was also assigned here, but attached to 4 Army,
above], Group Delsalle [Gd & 2 Rifle Bdes; Gd Cav Bde], Guard [1
& 2 Gd ID], XVIII [23 & 37 ID], XIV [18 & 45 ID]
. Other - 13 CD, 80 & 83 ID; perhaps also 70 ID (listed twice?);
an independent Cav Bde (which?)

5th Army (GdK Plehve; placed under General Russky of NW Front on
13 Oct) = 160 bns, 72 sqdns, 76 batties (616 guns)
. Corps - XVII [3 & 35 ID; to 4 Army on 19 Oct], XXV [3 Gren
& 46 Inf Divs; on 2 Oct to 9 Army], XIX [17 & 38 ID], V [7 & 10
ID]
. Other - 61 ID, maybe 70 ID (listed twice?); 1 Don Coss [to 9
Army on 8 Oct], 2 Don Coss [to 3 Army in early Oct], 3 Don Coss
[also to 3 Army in early Oct]

11th Army (GdI Selivanov) - Formed on 8 Oct at siege of Przemysl
with 120 bns, 48 sqdns, 56 1/2 batties (459 guns)
. Corps - XXIX (78 & 82 ID; formed on 7 Oct]; XXVIII [58 & 60
ID; formed on 7 Oct]; XII [12 & 19 ID; to 8 Army on 9 Oct]
. Other - 69 ID, 3 Rifle Bde, 9 CD, 11 CD [latter to 3 Army in
early Oct]

3rd Army (GdI Dimitriev) = 160 bns, 72 sqdns, 76 batties (616
guns)
. Corps - XXI [33 & 44 ID], XI [11 & 32 ID], IX [5 & 42 ID], VII
[13 & 34 ID], X [9 & 31 ID]
. Other - 7 CD, Combined CD, 3 Cauc Coss Div

8th Army (GdK Brussilov) = 104 bns, 144 sqdns, 57 1/2 batties
(449 guns)
. Corps - VIII [14 & 15 ID], XXIV [48 & 49 ID]
. Other - 4 Rifle Bde, 10 & 12 CD; reinforced on 29 Oct by the
12 Sib Rifle Div from Asia

Miscellaneous
. Dniester Group - 71 ID; 2 Comb Coss Div; 1 & 2 Kuban Coss
Divs, 1 Terek Coss Div; supported in the rear by opolcheniye
. Lemberg garrison - 65 ID (on 2 Oct joined Przemysl siege)
B. The Allied advance to the San and Vistula

(see volume 1 leaflets 14 and 15)

1. The situation at the end of September and start of October

Early on the 27th, after a pause of barely 14 days since the last action, the first units of the k.u.k. Army opened the new advance; they were 7 CD plus 35 Lst Inf Bde, which had been placed under its command. They pushed Novikov's cavalry back behind the lower Nida. On the 30th, 7 CD stood north of Stopnica; 3 CD, which meanwhile had come to the front, stood south of this town. Dankl's northern group had completed their crossing of the Vistula and had reached the lower Nida. 9th German Army had begun its advance on the 28th; on the 30th it had reached the area around Chmielnik-Kielce and to their northwest. XI, Guard Reserve and XX Corps were in the first line; in the second line, behind the XIth, was Woyrsch's Landwehr Corps. To protect the northern flank, XVII Corps was deployed in echelon farther back (west of Konsk) and "Frommel's Corps" was at Piotrkow and to its west. Frommel's command was made up of Bredow's Division ("Haupt Reserve Posen"), 35 Res ID, 21 LW Inf Bde, and 8 CD. The area between these units and the border defenses of the Thorn Fortress was covered by Landsturm troops deployed between Sieradz and the Vistula.

Although Hindenburg was impetuously pushing forward, the Aus-Hung. high command felt it necessary to give most of their troops, still exhausted from the great initial campaign, a few more days of rest. The tremendous casualties were being made good by incorporating the remaining "First" March battalions and then the "Second" battalions. Thus the field battalions again contained 800 to 1000 men. The squadrons, however, only had 80 to 100 horsemen because for the moment there were not enough horses available. Except for 6 cannon and 8 howitzer batteries, the field artillery units had all been replenished; light batteries again had 5 or 6 guns while medium and heavy batteries

304 Originally it had been planned to send 35 Lst Inf Bde to join 2nd Army, but this was cancelled because the railroad lines through Mezőlaborcz and Uzsok were overloaded. The Bde was sent through Budapest, Sillein and Cracow; it was at first a mobile reserve for the Cracow fortress, then placed under Ist Corps for the start of the offensive.

305 German Official History, Vol. V, p. 420
had 4. The tremendous amounts of ammunition which had been expended were partially replaced. The Aus-Hung. motorized 30.5 cm mortars, which had drawn the attention of the entire world by their destruction of the Belgian and French fortresses, would now have a chance to also prove their usefulness in the battles in the East. At the end of September the northern armies had 585 1/2 battalions (including 60 Landsturm battalions) and 352 squadrons, or 477,000 riflemen and 26,800 horsemen. The artillery consisted of 261 1/2 field cannon, 60 field howitzer, 8 heavy cannon, 36 heavy howitzer and 21 mountain batteries (1,578 guns).

Although it had been possible for the most part to replace the material losses of the first campaign in a few days, it was not so easy to repair the physical and moral damage. The hardships of four weeks of unending actions and the very unfavorable weather during the retreat had greatly lessened the strength and health of the combatants. There were many cases of illness, and cholera appeared as an unwelcome guest in some of the camps. Thus in the second half of September over 2,000 men of IV Corps in 2nd Army were stricken by cholera; two thirds of them died. 43 LW ID, after transferring from Böhm-Ermolli's right flank to west Galicia, had to be quarantined for several days. The Aus-Hung. military physicians were able to master the disease fairly quickly, which was a major accomplishment.

However, the events of the last few weeks had also undoubtedly lessened the troops' eagerness for battle. The warlike fervor of August had been replaced by the feeling that a difficult task lay ahead which must be met with gritted teeth. This crisis in morale was heightened by the fact that so many of the professional officers were gone – some in graves in east Galicia and south Poland, others lying wounded in hospitals. A similar fate had befallen many of the "old" long-serving enlisted men, who were also sorely missed. The replacements were not equal in physical or moral toughness to the men who'd fought in the first battles; this was because the majority were insufficiently trained and in many cases were either older or younger than the age of greatest effectiveness. Also, anti-dynastic political influences from home were beginning to become more evident. It is a testimony to the will and determination of the leadership that it was able to call for an offensive after the shortest possible rest period. The Army organization was still very strong, and the troops obeyed the call to battle with unflagging

306 The Division was given special quarters and placed under medical observation.
persistence and willingness to make sacrifices.

After the northern half of the k.u.k. 1st Army had already begun to move on 30 September, the Aus-Hung. AOK ordered a general advance on 1 October "to attack the enemy who has advanced into the area west, southwest and south of Przemysl." The key concepts of the AOK's plan were expressed in this order: "The north half of 1st Army should hold itself ready to intervene over the Vistula in the actions of the main body. The right wing of 2nd Army must first gain the Uzsok Pass so that it can undertake an outflanking movement through Turka, Stary Sambor and (partly) through Lutowiska." The advance of the main body would take place beginning with the left wing. 1st Army's left (the forces north of the Vistula) would cross the Nida on 1 October between the Vistula and the line Pinczow-Opatown; its right would not march until 3 October. 4th and 3rd Armies would advance on 4 October in the general direction of Rzeszow and Krosno; 2nd Army would move on 5 October toward the area south of Przemysl.

The allied order of battle on 1 October

(OB shows troops from Thorn to the south, i.e. it excludes East Prussia)

9 German Army (GO von Hindenburg)
. Thorn border defense troops
. A group of 4 1/2 bns and 2 battalies of Landsturm (from II and V Wehrkreise; later expanded as Lst Bdes Rintelen, Hoffmann and Westernhagen)
. Field forces - Corps Frommel (8 CD, 21 LW Bde, 35 Res ID, Div Bredow), XVII Corps (35, 36 ID), XX Corps (37, 41 ID), Gd Res Corps (3 Gd ID, 1 Gd Res ID), XI Corps (22, 38 ID), Woyrsch LW Corps (3 & 4 LW ID)
. TOTAL = 154 bns, 68 sqdns, 145 batties; or 133,000 foot, 8000 horse, 806 guns

1 Army (GdK Dankl)
. Cavalry Screen - 3 & 7 CD
. Main Body - I Corps (5, 12, 46 ID), indep 37 ID, V Corps (14, 33 ID; 1 Lst Bde), X Corps (2, 24, 45 ID; 9 CD)
. Reserves - 43 & 106 ID; 35, 100, 101, 110 Lst Bdes
. TOTAL = 182 bns, 107 sqdns, 118 batties, or 163,000 foot, 10,000 horse, 430 guns
. Changes - On 11 Oct, 3 & 7 CD joined 9 German Army; later, 1 Army gained 2 CD (10 Oct) & 11 CD (22 Oct)
4 Army (GdI Archduke Josef Ferdinand)
  . II Corps (4, 13, 25 ID), XVII Corps (19, 41 ID), XIV Corps (3, 8 ID), VI Corps (15, 27, 39 ID); Cav - 2, 6, 10, 11 CD
  . TOTAL = 136 bns, 115 sqdns, 111 batties, or 113,000 foot, 9000 horse, 408 guns
  . Changes - During Oct the 2 & 11 CD joined 1 Army

3 Army (GdI Boroevic)
  . IX Corps (10, 26 ID), XI Corps (11, 30 ID), III Corps (6, 22, 28 ID; 88 L-Sch Bde)
  . Reserves - 44 ID, 4 CD
  . TOTAL = 126.5 bns, 41 sqdns, 82 batties, or 74,000 foot, 3000 horse, 392 guns

2 Army (GdK von Böhm-Ermolli)
  . XII Corps (16, 35 ID; 105 Lst Bde), VII Corps (17, 20, 34 ID), indep 32 ID & 103 Lst Bde, IV Corps (31, 38 ID; 40 & 102 Lst Bdes; 17 Lst Terr Bde), Cav - 1, 5, 8 CD
  . TOTAL = 141 bns, 89 sqdns, 75.5 batties, or 125,000 foot, 4000 horse, 411 guns
  . Changes - In late Oct the Army received 1 & 2 Lst Terr Bdes

Carpathian Security Forces (Military Command Munkacs, led by GM Hoffmann)
  . At Uzsok - 4 bns under Lt Col Traxler
  . At Verecke & Beskid - 8 bns and 1 batty under Lt Col Sparber
  . At Toranya - 2 bns and 1 batty under FML Graf Attens
  . At Königsfeld, Körömesző & Lebdina (under GM Bothmer) - 12 bns (incl. parts of 6 Lst Eta Bde), 2.5 batties
  . At Kirlibaba-Jakobbeny (under GM Schuller) - 4 bns (incl. parts of 7 Lst Eta Bde), half of a batty
  . In Bukovina - 4 bns under Lt Col Fischer
  . TOTAL = 34 bns (14 March, 14 Landsturm, plus police and volunteers), 5 batties (30 guns)
  . Changes - In early Oct, GdK von Pflanzer-Baltin took over the Carpathian forces; by 20 Oct, the OB was as follows:
    . 55 ID, Polish Legion; 52, 54, 56 ID; Group Fischer
    . Reinforced in late Oct by 12 Lst Terr Bde

Besieged garrison of Przemysl (GdI von Kusmanek)
  . 23 ID; 93, 97, 108, 111 Lst Bdes; Group GM Nickel
  . TOTAL = 62 bns (of which 40.5 were Lst), 7 batties (42 guns)
  and 43 fort arty comps (ca 1,000 guns)

GRAND TOTALS
  . German = 154 bns, 68 sqdns, 145 batties (806 guns)
  . Austrian = 693.5 bns, 352 sqdns, 391.5 batties (1650 guns)
(of the Austrian total, 156 bns were Landsturm).
The Germans accounted for 18.17% of the foot, 16.1% of the horse, but 27.02% of the batties and 32.81% of the guns (not counting the Przemysl garrison artillery)

**Movements of the Russians through 2 October**

While the allies were advancing to their new offensive, the Russian armies were also milling around from East Prussia to the Carpathians like a swarm of bees. The southern wing was blockading Przemysl and in the Carpathians was organizing a shield for the besiegers. As of 2 October, the 8th Army had sent just one Corps (XXIV) forward to the line Dobromil-Chyrow-Stary Sambor. Its other Corps (XII, VII and VIII) were still lined up on the Grodek-Mosciska road. General Keller with 12 CD was around Sanok, while the rest of the cavalry divisions were at the Uzsok Pass and farther east, probing into Hungary. The besieging army, which was forming from reserve divisions, lay in a three-quarter circle to the south, east and north of Przemysl. The 3rd Army was concentrated at Jaroslau and the area to its northwest, except for two infantry divisions scouting in the area around Dynow. Its cavalry was forward at Debica and Jaslo.

On the lower San, 5th Army's first mission was to take over the defense of the river at Rozwadow-Sieniawa; thus it would guard the rear of 9th Army, which it would later follow to the north. From right to left, 5th Army deployed XXV, XIX, V and XVII Corps.

General Letschitzky had wanted to take his 9th Army to the north bank of the Vistula over the military bridges that had already been prepared above Sandomierz. However, Ivanov more cautiously ordered that Letschitzky's march to the north should take place on the south and east banks of the Vistula. On 2 October, the Guard and XVIII Corps were northeast and southeast of Jozefow, while the XIVth was still at Sandomierz-Rozwadow. In the next few days the two northern corps would relieve XVI Corps of 4th Army, which was responsible for guarding the river around Jozefow. 4th Army had two other Corps - the Grenadiers were at Nowo Alexandria-Kazimierz, and III Caucasian Corps was entrained and moving from Lublin toward Ivangoord.

General Scheidemann's 2nd Army was to consist of seven corps; the advance elements of the first three corps were arriving in the area Warsaw-Garwolin 307.

307 La grande guerre, pp. 336 ff. Korolkow, "Warsaw-
The Russians' movements, like those of their opponents, were made difficult by bad weather, high water in the rivers (which destroyed many bridges), and the indescribable condition of the roads. "Because the railroad net was deficient, many corps had to complete their entire movement on foot; the corps which were to deploy at Ivangoorde and farther north couldn't use the rails until they reached Lublin and had to march on foot for 5 or 6 days to reach that city...Many roads ran through forests and swamps, where they had to be cleared of fallen limbs and undergrowth...The highway from Jaroslau north to Lublin was in such terrible condition that some of the parallel paths through the fields were preferable routes. The men waded up to their knees in mud. Guns and supply wagons were constantly getting stuck. Frequently it was necessary to use teams of up to twelve horses to pull them along, which greatly worsened the condition of the horses. 308" Although these difficulties were of a temporary nature, another concern was raising its head which in the future would never be mastered by the Russians: the new replacement troops lacked weapons, and especially ammunition. 309

It was especially important for the Russian commanders to fulfill two overlapping missions: to protect the creation of their "steamroller" while the troops moved to the left bank of the Vistula and simultaneously to prepare as many easy crossing places as possible to bring these enormous masses over the river. The measures which were taken were often influenced by a justified caution; the leadership didn't want to expose the advanced unit to any unnecessary setback.

Around Warsaw, the Russians had moved their covering troops forward toward the Bzura and Rawka Rivers and toward Grojec. The advance guard at Radom, whose strength was greatly overestimated by the allies, consisted of parts of 75 ID (from 4 Army) plus Novikov's 4 and 5 Don Coss Divs and some other cavalry. Southwest of Ivangoorde, there were only some equally weak elements of 4th Army west of the Vistula. Parts of XVIII Corps were supposed to cross the river at Annopol, but this was being delayed by the high water. Lettschitzky was establishing a covering force in the area Opatow-Klimontow, partly due to orders from his superiors and partly on his own initiative; the units were led by General Delsalle. On 2 October the Guard

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308 Danilov, p. 308
309 Per an order of the Stavka on 29 September 1914 (quoted in "La grande guerre", p. 339)
Rifle Bde was on the heights west of Opatow, and 2 Rifle Bde was approaching that town from the southeast. The "Warsaw" Guard Cav Bde had established a position at Klimontow. As a further reinforcement for Delsalle, 80 ID was assembling at Sandomierz. Three other cavalry divisions of Novikov's command (5, 8 and 14) were deployed west of Opatow ahead of Letschitzky's covering force; they would be the first units engaged in the new actions.

2. The advance of the allied north wing

(see volume 1 leaflet 14)

Dankl's advance was opened on 1 October by the north wing of his 1st k.u.k. Army on the lower Nida. FML Wieber's Group was on the right with 37 Hon ID, 100 Lst Inf Bde, and 106 Lst ID. Ist Corps (GdK Karl Freiherr von Kirchbach) was on the left with 12 ID, 5 ID, 46 LW ID and 35 Lst Inf Bde. 3 and 7 CD were moving rapidly in the van.

Almost without fighting, by the evening of the 2nd Dankl's cavalry reached the area around Bogorya, while FML Wieber's Group and Ist Corps reached the Wschodnia. Novikov's numerous cavalry divisions, who had maintained a strong covering force on the Nida and Pilica, pulled back to the east. Meanwhile, V Corps had advanced its 66 Inf Bde in the Bren River sector south of the Vistula. Here the Russian 9th Army had withdrawn to the upper San since 25 September, as had been known from a Russian radio broadcast intercepted five days previously.

Thus the roads leading to the north flank of the enemy forces presumed to be west of Przemysl (5th and parts of 3rd Army) seemed to have been left open in front of Dankl by the Russians themselves. Meanwhile further intercepted Russian broadcasts afforded some glimpses through the clouds which surrounded the enemy's counter movements.

A Russian infantry brigade - obviously a unit sent by 4th Russian Army to guard its flank during its march to the north - had already crossed to the north Vistula bank below the mouth of the Wisloka on 25 September. From other information received through the afternoon of 2 October, it was learned that additional forces (the Guard and 2 Rifle Bdes) were moving through Sandomierz toward Opatow. It therefore seemed that 9th German Army might fulfill their hope that they could fall upon the Russians before reaching the Vistula crossings. 1st Army HQ, on the other hand, inclined more to the opinion that only minor Russian forces would be encountered on the Vistula's left
bank, while the main body of 9th Russian Army would initially stay on the defensive behind the Vistula between Zawichost and Jozefow.

Based on this analysis of the situation, Dankl issued the following order to his Army at noon on 2 October: "Ist Corps, FML Wieber's Group and 1 and 7 CD should be always ready to either intervene with their whole force in actions which could develop on the line Sandomierz-Opatow, or to shift toward the south over the Vistula. The southern group (V and X Corps and 9 CD) will open their offensive on 3 October and be prepared to either break the enemy resistance in their front or if necessary move toward the south to support heavier actions by 4th Army."

To carry out these orders, Dankl's units south of the Vistula also began to move on 3 October. Here the detachment of 66 Inf Bde which V Corps had sent to the Bren sector drove some Cossack rear guards back over the Wisloka. North of the Vistula, 3 and 7 CD scouted toward Klimontow. The right wing of 9th German Army came near to Opatow.

While the combined advance of the allies in south Poland was approaching the bend in the Vistula, fortress Przemysl reported that Russian columns were marching north on 2 October. Newly intercepted Russian radio messages confirmed these movements. It was correctly surmised that the 5th Russian Army was concentrating in the area targeted by the k.u.k. 1st Army, while 9th Army was grouping its divisions farther north. Thus Hindenburg's contention that the Russians intended to attack the Aus-Hung. and German forces advancing north of the Vistula between Sandomierz and Ivangorod appeared ever more correct. Therefore Conrad advised 1st Army HQ "to be always ready to move at least parts of the southern portion of the Army over the Vistula to intervene in the actions of the northern group."

However, at least in his own mind the Chief of Staff had no intention of making the main effort of the Aus-Hung. Army in the area north of the Vistula. He believed it more likely that Hindenburg would not be able to break through the Russians as they advanced to the left bank of the Vistula; thus the best solution was to bring the main body of the k.u.k. Armies to both sides of Przemysl and then deliver a blow in the direction of Lublin against the Russian southern flank.

310 In these pursuit actions on 3 October, 1st Lt Ungar of IR # 83 stormed and secured the Wisloka bridges at Ujscie on his own initiative. For this feat of arms he received the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.
Now that the march of the Russians toward the north was confirmed, Dankl felt that his tasks for the next few days would be the following:

. The Army's left wing, together with Hindenburg, would defeat any Russians found west of Sandomierz, and
. The right wing would prevent the enemy forces south of the Vistula in the area Baranow-Sandomierz from crossing to the north bank. Letschitzky had actually planned to send these forces north, but this was prohibited by Ivanov (as noted previously).

Meanwhile, on 3 October the 3 and 7 CD had come to blows at Klimontow with the Russian Guard Cav Bde, which was already being reinforced by infantry from 80 ID. The Aus-Hung. cavalry couldn't break through, and toward evening they fell back toward the approaching advance guard of Ist Corps.

The withdrawal of the two cavalry divisions, and the wide area that still lay between the south wing of 1st Army (on the Wisloka) and the San, made it impossible for Dankl's HQ to identify which Russian forces were actually in front of them on the evening of the 3rd. On the next day the 9 CD, which was deployed in front of X and V Corps south of the Vistula, would scout toward the San south of Rozwadow. North of the Vistula, Ist Corps would advance toward Klimontow-Sandomierz, with 37 Hon ID following in echelon on its right.

Hindenburg reckoned that on 4 October he might collide with two or three Russian corps, which he wanted to destroy with the south wing of 9th Army while guarding against any intervention from Jozefow-Ivangorod. However, he was also pondering whether or not it would probably be necessary to shift further to the north.

4 and 5 October - The actions at Opatow and Klimontow

Meanwhile, on the night of 3-4 October Novikov's horsemen had evacuated the front at Opatow in front of 46 LW ID and moved north. General Delsalle's plea that Novikov should at least protect his northern flank was not heeded. Therefore Delsalle moved his own Guard Cav Bde from Klimontow to his right wing. Ivanov now also became alarmed about the situation of this group, which was too far forward; however, until Delsalle received an order to retreat on 4 October he still believed he could hold his ground. This belief led to his doom.
Hindenburg estimated that the Russians were present in the
Opatow area in much greater strength. Therefore he sent XI
Corps along with parts of the Landwehr and Guard Reserve Corps
against General Delsalle's three brigades and by noon forced
them to retreat after losing 7,000 men. At the same time the
k.u.k. Ist Corps attacked a regiment of Russian 80 ID which had
stayed at Klimontow and drove it back toward Sandomierz. By
this advance the Corps also seriously endangered the retreat of
the Russians who had been defeated at Opatow. The remnants of
General Delsalle's Group were barely able to save themselves in
the night of 4–5 October; parts retreated to Zawichost, other
parts to the Sandomierz bridgehead.

On the south bank of the Vistula, the bulk of V and X Corps
reached the Wisloka on both sides of Mielec during the course of
4 October. GdK Dankl did not yet know the outcome of the action
at Klimontow, but based on other reports he decided to let Ist
Corps continue its advance in the direction of Annopol. FML
Wieber's group would move against the Sandomierz bridgehead.
The two southern corps (V and X) would move quickly to the lower
San, in order if possible to cross the river simultaneously with
the enemy. V Corps was also to be ready to come to the support
of Wieber's Group in action around Sandomierz by 6 October at
the latest. X Corps, on the other hand, might under certain
circumstances have to move quickly toward the south, because
according to available reports there were still fairly
substantial parts of 5th Russian Army east of Kolbuszowa.

On 5 October the two inner flanks of the Aus-Hung. 1st and
German 9th Armies took up the pursuit of the enemy toward the
Vistula sector around Zawichost; however, the enemy had
disappeared. While the advance of XI German Corps toward the
Jozefow-Zawichost area greatly compressed the front of the
k.u.k. Ist Corps, FML Wieber's Group attempted to take the
Sandomierz bridgehead from 80 Russian ID. However, they failed,
and so did the 12 ID of Ist Corps when it arrived in the
evening. Sandomierz finally fell on the morning of the 6th
after 106 Lst ID was also employed. The Russians were able to
evacuate their troops and equipment.

On the south bank of the Vistula, 66 Inf Bde followed its
advanced detachment forward. On the afternoon of the 5th it

311 German official history, Vol. V, pp. 426 f. Korolkow,
"Warsaw-Ivangorod", p. 66. La grande guerre, pp. 353 ff.
came upon entrenched infantry of Russian XIV Corps in front of Tarnobrzeg. When the first units of the main body of V Corps came up, the Russians (covering forces from 18 ID) fell back to their principal positions. They offered resistance on these lines until early on the 6th, after 80 ID had completed its crossing of the Vistula.

At first the exact details about the course of events on the 5th remained unknown at 1st Army HQ. However, in the afternoon 37 Hon ID had reported that the Russians were in "unbroken retreat" over the bridges at Sandomierz. Ist Corps, which like the first parts of German XI Corps had reached the Vistula, was also not engaged in any more serious combat during the day. Novikov's Cavalry Corps and the Russian XVIII Corps (which finally seemed to have sent its advance guard to the left Vistula bank over a bridge at Annopol) had made a prompt withdrawal over the river. However, an intercepted Russian radio message revealed that their XIV Corps was stuck between the San and Vistula because some of the San bridges at Radomysl had collapsed. GdK Dankl made a quick decision and at 10:00 PM ordered FML Wieber to immediately send 37 Hon ID, 106 Lst ID and 3 CD over the Vistula at Sandomierz to attack the enemy forces stalled in the corner between the rivers. Meanwhile Ist Corps, plus 7 CD and 35 and 100 Lst Inf Bdes, would stand fast on the heights along the left bank of the Vistula and maintain the link with 9th German Army. At the same time, GdK Dankl ordered FZM Puhallo "to advance energetically to the San with V Corps, reinforced by 45 LW ID, and to seize the San crossings below Radomysl." X Corps (2 and 24 ID) would continue to advance on Majdan and protect the Army's right flank. GdK Dankl attached an extra admonition to his order for the pursuit: "Should V Corps see an opportunity to win success by advancing toward the east along the south bank of the San, it should do so."

GdK Dankl was thus complying, to the extent permitted by the situation, with the AOK's original intention that after 1st Army arrived west of the mouth of the San it should shift south to seize upon the right flank of the Russians who were still on the west side of the river.

6-8 October: Actions at the San-Vistula confluence

(see volume 1 leaflet 14 and sketch 20)

After the fight at Opatow-Klimontow, the planned outflanking maneuver of the Aus-Hung. and German troops through south Poland
to the Vistula had turned out to be a blow into thin air. Hindenburg now had to decide whether and in what direction his operations would proceed \(^313\). It would hardly be possible to continue the offensive over the Vistula, whose waters were swollen from the rain. Moreover, in the last few days there were indications that strong enemy forces were moving northward behind the Vistula between Sandomierz and Annopol. According to reports compiled through early 6 October, the Russian 9th Army consisted of at least three corps (XIV, XVIII and the Guard). It was also known that 4th Army was deployed north of the 9th. Therefore the sector held by the 4th must extend as far as Ivangorod. Because of this altered situation, the 9th German Army was forced to make its main effort farther to the north, just as the Russians were doing, in order to outflank the enemy if possible. Accordingly, the right wing of 9th German Army would guard the Vistula below the mouth of the San against a possible Russian attack, the center would take the bridgehead at Ivangorod, and the left wing would guard the Army's open flank in the direction of Warsaw \(^314\).

While Hindenburg issued these orders for the continuation of his offensive, for Conrad the question was still open as to whether he would succeed in finding substantial Russian forces west of the San. Based on reports received through 5 October, it was estimated that besides the 5th Russian Army the 3rd and perhaps also the 8th were pulling back from the Przemysl area toward the north and northwest. They were covered by rear guard detachments on the line Barycz-Rzeszow-Sokolow. These developments inclined Conrad to be cautious. Dankl's Army was about one or two days' marches ahead of the others and its right wing was already hanging in the air; there was concern that the Russian 5th Army might attack this open right flank of 1st Army. Conrad assigned 43 LW ID to guard Dankl's flank. Because of the cholera outbreak, the Division had been held for quarantine at Cracow; now it was sent to Rzochow (north of Debica) and from there immediately marched to join 1st Army's right wing. Moreover, since the situation on the afternoon of the 6th was still unclear, Conrad replied to an inquiry from 1st Army HQ that a decision about the next operations was dependent upon the actions of 5th Russian Army. He said that General Dankl's goal

\(^313\) Translator's Note - The original always refers to "Hindenburg" in connection with decisions by the German high command in the East. Of course the real decisions were never made by Hindenburg, but rather by Ludendorff aided by the able chief of operations, Max Hoffmann.

would be "to strike the enemy pressed together at the San-Vistula confluence" with the bulk of 1st Army. Ist Corps, around Zawichost on the left bank of the Vistula, would guard against any Russian attempt to to cross the river, in cooperation with 9th German Army. The Corps would itself cross the Vistula if the enemy withdrew his forces from this sector.

Thus there was complete agreement between the k.u.k. AOK and GdK Dankl, who on the evening of the 5th had already decided on his own to order an energetic pursuit of the enemy units who were reported to be in the area where the San flows into the Vistula. Now, however, when everything depended on a quick maneuver, difficulties arose which no one could master. The Russians had been able to destroy the Vistula bridges at Sandomierz in time; therefore on the morning of the 6th FML Wieber wasn't able to cross the river barrier quickly enough. When the arrival of bridging equipment finally made it possible to ship 73 Hon Inf Bde and 3 CD across around noon, it was already too late to attack XIV Russian Corps while it was crossing the San. The strength of the troops had been drained by their hasty advance, so 73 Hon Inf Bde lay exhausted on the south bank of the Vistula. Only 3 CD was able to push on, driving its dead-tired horses. In the night of 6-7 October the cavalry linked up on the Leg River with the first elements of V Corps, which had advanced by forced marches. On the Leg, however, the pursuers came up against new resistance that brought their movement to a halt. After General Delsalle's Group and 80 ID had retreated, 18 ID set up a new blocking position behind the Leg to enable XIV Corps to safely cross the San.

Meanwhile, on 6 October a Russian radio broadcast clarified the enemy situation at the San-Vistula confluence; it was determined that the Russians on the lowest reaches of the river had already brought all substantial parts of their force to the north bank. On the other hand, there was still maddening uncertainty regarding the position of 5th Russian Army. If there were still strong forces west of Lezaijsk, which several sources suggested, Dankl could score a useful success by attacking toward the south. If, however, the 5th Army was already east of the San, there was no other alternative than to send 1st Army over the river toward Lublin as Conrad had already envisioned; this would outflank the Russian armies marching along the middle Vistula from the south. Hindenburg could assist this maneuver by operations downstream from Ivangoord, which was especially desired by the k.u.k. Chief of Staff. However, reports about the arrival of strong Russian units at Grojec, south of Warsaw, made it seem unlikely that the allies' north wing would have
With his orders for 7 October, GdK Dankl strove to make the right choice in this still rather unclear situation: "GdK Kirchbach, with his Ist Corps plus 7 CD and 35 Lst Inf Bde, will stay on the left Vistula bank. This group will [later] cross the Vistula in connection with XI German Corps. All necessary preparations are to be initiated. 106 Lst ID will stay at Sandomierz at the disposition of Army HQ. FZM Puhallo with his V Corps (including 37 Hon ID) plus 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes and 3 and 9 CD, will deploy on the lower reaches of the San, if possible with strong elements north of the river, for an eventual advance either to the north or southeast. GdI Meixner, to whom 45 LW ID is being returned, will group his X Corps west of Rozwadow; he will guard the Army's flank and be prepared to quickly move southeast."

The continuation of the pursuit on the right Vistula bank led to further heavy actions on 7 October. 18 Russian ID, which had already started to cross the San at Radomysl, turned around in the morning to keep the advancing Austrians at bay. Thus the 14 ID of V Corps was unable to advance very far over the Leg River. In the evening, 45 LW ID from X Corps, which had been sent to Grebow, entered the action. However, the gathering darkness forced the postponement of the continuing attack until the 8th.

Meanwhile the foremost elements of 33 ID, 37 Hon ID and 3 CD had crossed the northernmost reaches of the Leg and nearly reached the mouth of the San. The slow pace of the advance of 14 ID however led the Army HQ to recognize that the crossing point at Radomysl was still held by considerable Russian forces. FZM Puhallo was directed "to drive the Russians out of the area south of the San down to Rozwadow." However, 18 Russian ID had crossed the river in the night of 7-8 October; only some weak rear guards now stood west of the crossing points. After they were driven away, 14 ID reached Radomysl on the San in the morning of the 8th. Now the whole V Corps was sent toward Rozwadow from the northwest plus 45 LW ID from the west, and the town was taken by evening. The majority of X Corps (2 and 24 ID) reached the central Leg at the same hour without fighting and pitched their camps. 9 CD found Nisko and the surrounding area free of the enemy.
On the night of 6-7 October the AOK at Neusandez had received new reports proving that 5th Russian Army had retreated and was shifting further toward the north. So a second attack by k.u.k. 1st Army toward Lublin, as Conrad had planned, seemed in order. First however the troops would have to cross the lower San and also the Vistula at Zawichost; on the evening of the 8th the high command ordered 1st Army to begin the necessary preparations for the crossing.

Meanwhile, 1st Army command had ordered on the afternoon of the 7th that V Corps and 45 LW ID of X Corps should make ready to cross the San, and Ist Corps the Vistula. It was still unknown when this operation would begin. 37 Hon ID, which had been sent to the mouth of the San, sought in vain during the 8th to send its pursuing detachments over the River. Since the Russians had destroyed all the bridges behind them, and were guarding all the crossing points from the other side, there was nothing else to do but await the arrival of the bridging equipment. It was also necessary to give the troops a pause to rest, because they were exhausted after their eight days' advance, which had included some combat.

Because crossing the rivers would be difficult, the 1st Army command pondered late on 8 October whether it would not be preferable to carry on operations west of the San in the rear of the Russians who apparently were making a stand at Rzeszow against the k.u.k. 4th Army. Such an operation would delay the "Drive to Lublin", but would at least fulfill one expectation of the AOK by defeating parts of the Russian Army while they were still west of Przemysl.

4-8 October: operations of 4th and 3rd Armies

(see volume 1 leaflet 14)

The units of 4th Army had been commanded since 1 October by GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand in place of the recalled GdI Auffenberg. The Army began its advance in the direction of Rzeszow on 4 October. XVII, II and XIV Corps made up the first line; behind the left wing followed VI Corps and the cavalry divisions (2, 6, 10 and 11 CD). The horsemen of the Archduke's Army became operationally effective again during the course of

316 For information about this change in command, see Auffenberg "Höhe und Niedergang" (pp. 388 ff.) and Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 881 ff.
the first weeks of October; in the meantime they could only provide scouting detachments for the corps in the first line.

The Russian outposts pulled back to the east. Since however there were no indications that the enemy was lifting the blockade of Przemysl, 4th Army HQ expected to meet resistance somewhere in the vicinity of Rzeszow.

Through the evening of 5 October, the right wing and center of the Army advanced over the Wisloka without seeing any action. On the next day (the 6th), XVII Corps marched along the bottomless roads south of the Rzeszow highway and its advance elements reached the area west of Czudec. II Corps (commanded since 25 September by FML Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach) pushed forward to Sedziszow; the advance guard of 13 LW ID collided at noon with Cossack detachments on the heights west of Ropczyce, but after a brief skirmish the enemy retreated toward Rzeszow. XIV Corps was supposed to reach the Kolbuszowa area on the 6th to keep pace with the right wing of 1st Army, but its march was attended with great difficulties. The foremost units of the Corps only reached Niwiska on the 6th, while most of the men were still hanging back west of the Wisloka. Here the VI Corps (in the second line) also halted for the night.

Meanwhile, Army HQ received on the afternoon of the 6th an order from the AOK which stated that 4th Army "in its further advance toward the San should select a direction in which it could provide the most effective protection to the right wing of 1st Army; then it can either attack the 5th Russian Army (which might be in the San-Rzeszow-Wilcz Wola area, although this isn't confirmed) or intervene directly with parts of its left wing in the actions of the k.u.k. 1st Army."

Because the situation was unclear, the commander of 4th Army decided to advance from Rzeszow with three divisions north of the Wislok (XVII Corps – 19, 41 Hon and 13 LW ID) and four divisions south of that river (II Corps with 4 and 25 ID, and XIV Corps with 3 and 8 ID). In the second line the majority of VI Corps (15 ID and 39 Hon ID) were behind the Army's left wing while 27 ID was behind the center; the Corps could later be sent forward as circumstances dictated. If there was no combat with 5th Russian Army between Rzeszow and Wilcz Wola, 4th Army HQ was ready to proceed without delay along both sides of the Wislok toward the San in the same deployment; in this case it would reach the Lancut area on 8 October and the line Pruchnik–Przeworsk–Lezajsk on the San on the 9th. The detachments of the cavalry divisions at the front of the Army were sent ahead to
reconnoiter the area up to the San.

South of 4th Army, the 3rd Army at this time consisted of III, XI and IX Corps, FML Tschurtschentaler's Group (44 LW ID, 88 L-Sch Bde) and 4 CD. Parts of the Army had already begun to advance on 3 October. GdI Boroevic led his men in grueling marches straight through the northern foothills of the Beskids toward Przemysl, in order to attack the enemy units reported west and southwest of the fortress. On 4 October his Army had already reached the upper Wisloka, and on the 5th the upper Wislok. Late on the evening of the 6th, the forward elements of Group Tschurt-schenthaler, and then those of III and XI Corps, reached the area around Brzozow and Domaradz, while IX Corps was at Strzyzow and 4 CD on the Jasiolka. Russian rear guards were encountered on the upper Wislok, but they pulled back to the east without offering serious resistance. However the advance of the tightly massed 3rd Army was made very difficult by the unfavorable weather and poor roads. Artillery and supply wagons often sank up to their axles in the mud of the torn-up roads, and in many cases were left far behind the infantry columns. GdI Boroevic therefore felt obliged to let his units close ranks. Only IX Corps, advancing on the Army's left wing, should continue its march on 7 October from Strzyzow through Domaradz to the vicinity of Barycz. The AOK, however, ordered that "3rd Army should reach the San above Dynow on the 7th, at least with its advance guards" to prevent the left wing of 2nd Army from becoming isolated. This order was necessitated by a shift to the right which 2nd Army, advancing farther south in the Sanok-Lisko area, would carry out in the next few days.

Therefore on the 7th GdI Boroevic detached two groups (each of three battalions and one battery) from 44 LW ID and 6 ID respectively, and sent them ahead to the San. Both detachments found the area west of the river free of the enemy. IX Corps became engaged at Barycz in the first hours of the afternoon. Here the Russian 11 CD, reinforced by several battalions of X Corps, had occupied a blocking position. 26 LW ID was sent on a wide outflanking maneuver, but before the attack began the Russians evacuated the heights east of Barycz and retreated toward Bachorz.

On the same day (7 October), 4th Army moved through the area on both sides of Rzeszow. XVII Corps crossed the difficult hilly terrain south of the Rzeszow Highway; its leading elements reached the Wislok without seeing action. II Corps marched

317 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 33
along and north of the great Highway straight toward Rzeszow and Glogow. At Swilcza and a little to the north, the advance guards of 13 LW ID and 25 ID were opposed by Russian cavalry units (3 Don and 3 Caucasian Coss Divs plus 7 CD). After a short action the enemy horsemen were driven back. II Corps then resumed its advance and reached Rzeszow and Glogow as planned. Because the equipment of the military bridging train was lagging behind, XIV Corps wasn't able to cross the rain-swollen Wisloka until the night of 6-7 October; after forced marches on the 7th, they reached the area around Kolbuszowa that evening. Behind XIV Corps, the VI Corps and 6 and 2 CD crossed the Wisloka near Niwiska; behind II Corps the 10 CD reached the area west of Rzeszow. The weak resistance by the enemy cavalry and the uninterrupted advance of the two neighboring armies (the left wing of 3rd Army was expected to reach Dubiecko on 8 October while the right wing of 1st Army reached the San) convinced 4th Army HQ that there would not be any major battle on the heights east of Rzeszow. They decided not to pause, but would continue to advance on both sides of the Wislok up to the San between Radymo and Lezajsk.

3. 2nd Army crosses the Carpathians (2-7 October)

(see volume 1 leaflet 14)

The primary goal of the advance of 2nd Army was to create a threat against the flank of the enemy forces in central Galicia. In his general orders of 1 October, Conrad reckoned that Böhm-Ermolli would collide on the line Stary Sambor-Lisko-Sanok with the Russian 8th Army, covering the siege of Przemyśl toward the south. Perhaps the Russians would mount a counterattack themselves in order to maintain the isolation of the fortress on the San. For these reasons, the AOK emphasized that 2nd Army should break through the Carpathian crest on a broad front: the right wing (IV Corps) would cross through the Uzsok Pass (at this time still occupied by the Russians), the middle through Lupkow Pass, and the right wing through Dukla Pass. 5 October was designated as the date for the attack over the crest.

Although on 2 October the AOK decided that Brussilov's Army was not harboring any plans for an offensive, an impending assault  

on Przemysl indicated that the Russians might still offer heavy resistance. On the next day 2nd Army command received this report: "Fortress Przemysl reports that enemy forces are leaving toward the north and northwest; apparently only cavalry with a few infantry are located west and southwest of the fortress; there are 3 to 4 divisions in the south and southeast." This was a new confirmation of the week-long reports that the Russians were shifting to the north, and stimulus enough for the AOK to let 2nd Army advance already on 4 October.

The Recapture of the Uzsok Pass

On the right wing of 2nd Army, IV Corps had already moved toward the Uzsok Pass on the evening before the general advance. GdK Tersztyanszky had been ordered on 30 September by 2nd Army to win a decision at the Pass on 3 October or, at the latest, at the start of the 4th.

In great haste, on 2 October Tersztyanszky sent 31 ID from the Cziroka Valley to the railroad at Nagyberezna. There the troops would quickly entrain to roll up the Ung Valley; they would leave their cars right behind the battlefield where FML Karg's Group was engaged. Although Karg's men had meanwhile worked their way forward through Fenyesvölgy to the heights north of Uzsok town (as noted above), on 2 and 3 October they were hard pressed by Russian counterattacks. Because of this situation, GdK Tersztyanszky placed the first regiment of 31 ID, which arrived at the front on the morning of the 3rd, under Karg's group. While the fight was raging on the western slopes of the hills by Uzsok, the majority of 31 ID prepared to carry out a decisive action against the pass. GdK Tersztyanszky intended to send the Division through Beniowa against the right flank and then the rear of the defensive position which was being so stubbornly defended by 2 Combined Coss Div. Archduke Joseph and his 31 ID began the difficult climb to the mountain crest at noon on 3 October; he would make a night march toward the left to attack Beniowa, thus opening the way into the enemy's rear.

However, at the same time when the flanking maneuver of 31 ID started, the situation of Karg's group, engaged in the frontal battle, was worsening. A new Russian attack shattered the right wing of 38 Hon ID and threatened IV Corps' main line of advance in the Ung Valley. Therefore in the evening Tersztyanszky felt obliged to immediately deploy the last battalions of 31 ID at Fenyesvölgy. Also, on 4 October 40 Lst Inf Bde was directed to join Karg's group, while 1 CD moved to the area of Revhely.
As daylight arrived on 4 October, thick clouds enshrouded the mountains and made it impossible for artillery observers to study the Russian positions. In the trackless hills, 31 ID gained ground only slowly. Archduke Joseph didn't reach Beniowa until the afternoon; from there he and his troops turned toward the enemy's right flank. When GdK Tersztyanszky learned this, he ordered FML Karg to launch a frontal attack at the same time. However, the exhaustion of the troops and the approach of night brought the action to a standstill. Tersztyanszky planned to continue the concentric assault on the next morning, but also agreed to FML Karg's suggestion of a night-time surprise attack on the heights around the pass. When this mission was carried out that night by some battalions of 31 ID, they found the Russian emplacement empty. General Pavlov, the commander of 2nd Combined Coss Div, had ably defended his position; however it had been made untenable as 31 ID's flanking maneuver progressed. In the evening of the 4th his men carried out a timely evacuation of their entrenchments. Thus the hotly-contested Uzsok Pass was in Tersztyanszky's hands before daybreak on 5 October.

On the 5th, a detachment of 102 Lst Inf Bde followed the retreating enemy on the road toward Turka; GdK Tersztyanszky wanted to take the Ostry Heights, half way to Turka, by the end of the day. However, Cossack rear guards were already encountered on the hills immediately north of the Uzsok Pass; they forced 102 Lst Inf Bde and parts of 38 Hon ID into a time-consuming deployment to drive them away. Despite the fire of Russian mountain artillery, the hills were climbed in the evening and the positions taken by parts of Karg's group. 31 ID spent the night in some wretched mountain towns at the source of the San. 40 Lst Inf Bde was at Uzsok, 1 CD around Fenyesvölgy, and 8 CD at Nagyberezna. 17 Lst Inf Bde had pulled back to Ungvar to guard the road leading up to Uzsok Pass from the south. The detachment of 102 Lst Inf Bde which had been sent ahead

319 This success was mainly due to the advance of 31 ID's forward troops from Beniowa into the flank and rear of the Russians; the group was led by GM Dani of 62 Inf Bde. The action was one of two that led to Dani's entering the Maria Theresia Order (the other, noted earlier, had occurred at Sabac).

320 During August and September, extra Landsturm troops in the Vienna (II), Prague (VIII), Leitmeritz (IX) and Innsbruck (XIV) Military Districts created five Landsturm March Brigades and twelve Landsturm Territorial Brigades to guard the Italian
in pursuit was meanwhile blocked at and east of the Ostry Heights by a strong new Russian defensive position. GdK Terszyanszky decided on the evening of the 5th to attack. FML Karg's group (38 Hon ID, 102 Lst Inf Bde) would assault the heights frontally from the east and along the road to Turka, while Archduke Joseph led 31 ID up from Beniowa on the left; thus he would fall on the right flank of the Ostry Heights and thence onto the enemy rear.

The plans was carried out in the actions on 6 October. On this day, General Pavlov received as reinforcements a brigade of XXIV Corps from Turka. When Archduke Joseph's enveloping wing was moving around noon from the San valley north of Beniowa toward the east against Ostry, these Russian reinforcements made a surprise attack on the left flank of 31 ID. However, Archduke Joseph had sent a covering group toward Jablonka wz., and they were fortunately able to interfere with this dangerous Russian maneuver. By evening, Aus-Hung. units were on three sides of the enemy's defensive positions; however, the decisive attack had to be postponed until the next morning because the troops were completely exhausted. General Pavlov's right flank was already almost surrounded; he didn't wait for the Austrians to launch a bayonet attack, but gave up his trenches shortly after darkness fell. The Russians hurried back on the road toward Turka.

When this retreat was discovered on the morning of 7 October, Archduke Joseph at first wanted only to harass the withdrawing enemy with artillery fire. Because of his difficult supply situation and the exhaustion of the troops he thought he should stay for one day in the positions already gained. GdK Terszyanszky, however, felt that a rapid continuation of the operation was necessary to keep the enemy from once more setting up a defensive position at Turka. Therefore he ordered his two battle groups to seize the heights north of Borynia on the 7th. To conform with this order, Karg's group took the town of Borynia in the evening, but was unable to seize the high forested ridges to its north, where Cossack rear guards were border. Some of the new formations, however, were actually employed in the fortified bridgeheads of Vienna, Pressburg, Komorn and Pressburg, and in the Cracow fortress. Landsturm Territorial Bdes # 1 and 2 from Vienna and # 12 from Linz were sent to the Carpathians. Landsturm Territorial Bdes # 15, 16 and 17 were created from Galician Landsturm battalions evacuated to upper Hungary; they were employed by IV Corps and by Pflanzer-Baltin's Group.
entrenched. Advance elements of 31 ID advanced as far as the heights northwest of Jablonka wz., whence they could observe the Russians' camp fires around Turka.

2nd Army shifts toward its right

On 4 October, while GdK Tersztyanszky's group was already engaged north of the Uzsok Pass, the bulk of 2nd Army began to cross the Carpathians from the valleys near the sources of the Cziroka, Laborcza and Ondawa Rivers. On the right, GM Ludwig Goiginger's group (32 ID and 103 Lst Inf Bde) moved through Cisna and Baligrod toward Lisko. In the center, VII Corps (17, 34 ID and 20 Hon ID; now commanded by FML von Fail-Griessler) advanced from Mezőlaborcz through the Lupkow Pass toward Zagorz (southeast of Sanok). On the left, GdI Kövess' XII Corps (16 and 35 ID plus 105 Lst Inf Bde) came through the Dukla Pass and Rymanow to reach the basin around Sanok. The march wasn't disturbed by the enemy units, which were almost all cavalry, as much as by the unfavorable weather and road conditions. After numerous delays, GM Goiginger's group and 34 ID crossed the San during 6 October and occupied the heights north of the river. 20 Hon ID was behind 34 ID; 17 ID, which was behind Goiginger's group during the advance so that it could support either Goiginger or IV Corps if necessary, had nearly reached Baligrod. Farther west, 16 ID of XII Corps came up to the San on both sides of Sanok. In this sector also there was little trace of resistance from the enemy. Only some cavalry rear guards were spotted. VII Russian Corps, whose presence had been reported in the last few days, had apparently pulled back toward Chyrow.

After the information received in the last 48 hours, this result was no surprise to the high command. Because of the Russians' movements, the flank attack by 2nd Army had become a blow into thin air. There was nothing else to do but to shift most of 2nd Army toward the east; thus if they couldn't strike the enemy's flank they would at least encounter the wing of the forces which had blockaded Przemysl and on the 6th had made the first serious assault on the fortress. This turn of events enhanced the importance of the operations of Tersztyanszky's group; since they were already the farthest toward the east, they alone could still achieve an outflanking maneuver.

The first directives for the shift toward the right had already been prepared by the AOK on 5 October. It was hoped at that time that 2nd Army could begin changing its front on the next day, but this proved impossible because of bad weather. Some further disadvantages of the position of 2nd Army became
apparent on the 7th. The attempt to move the Army's left wing along a supposedly passable route through Trzcianiec to Dobromil, while the right used the Chyrow road, proved impractical. Neither guns nor supply wagons could move forward on the northern route through Trzcianiec. The divisions of XII Corps also had to be diverted to the Chyrow road, which was thus clogged by seven divisions and their long supply trains in an endless column. The Trzcianiec route could be used only by a small flank group (k.u.k. IR # 2 from 16 ID), without any artillery. The 2nd Army staff was oppressed by the question of how they could deploy their long marching columns against a well entrenched foe at the point where there was only a narrow opening out of the hills at Chyrow.
C. The first siege of Przemysl, and the relief of the fortress

(see volume 1 leaflets 14 and 16, and sketch 21)

1. The Russians blockade and attack the fortress

When the Aus-Hung. Army retreated from east Galicia, the bulwark on the San suddenly became the focus of military attention, and it was only a matter of days until it would be invested. On 16 September the AOK notified Przemysl that the field armies would be marching on to the Biala-Dunajec line, and ordered GdI von Kusmanek, the commander, "to hold the fortress to the last extremity."

Przemysl was now given the important assignment of drawing as many enemy forces as possible in its direction and thus hindering the Russians from pursuing our armies as they pulled back. Several circumstances would determine whether the fortress could perform this function. Its capacity for resistance wasn't rated particularly high because its fortifications were relatively weak and because it had ammunition and food available for three months' time at most. In peacetime the city had been surrounded with a long belt of permanent forts and a second (inner) line of supporting works. However, the second line was 20 to 30 years old and armed with obsolete guns. The scanty material available for

321 Stuckheil, "Die strategische Rolle Przemysls auf dem östlichen Kriegsschauplatz (in Mil. wiss. Mitt. for 1923, pp. 60 ff. and 131 ff.). By the same author, "Die Festung Przemysl in der Ausrüstungsziet" (same publication for 1924, pp. 201 ff.)

322 According to GM Hans Schwalb ("Der Verteidigung von Przemysl", in Mitt. des Art.- u. Geniewesens for 1918, pp. 1373 ff.), before war broke out with Russia there were 38 forts, while the second line consisted of 21 supporting works and batteries

323 Before the siege, the fortress had about 1000 guns, but this included old pieces such as iron cannon dating from 1861. More than half of the guns were only effective at short ranges. The fortress had only 4 of the most modern guns (30.5 cm mortars). The other long-range pieces were: 12, 15 and 18 cm siege cannon from 1880, 10 and 15 cm armored howitzers from 1899, 15 cm mobile howitzers from 1899, and 24 cm mortars from 1898.
permanent fortifications had mostly been used in Tyrol and on the coasts. When war started with Russia, the high command sent a small army of 25,000 men to put the fortress on the San into adequate defensive condition; it was anticipated that six weeks would be required to complete this task. The work proceeded with great energy and all available manpower, but had to be halted in the third week of September, as the field armies marched out of the area and left the fortress to fend for itself.

The garrison consisted of 23 Hon ID and four Landsturm Inf Bdes (93 k.k., 97 k.u., 108 k.k. and 111 k.k.); except for the 111 Bde, these were units which had already fought and bled near Lemberg. On 18 September the total strength of troops in the fortress also included parts of the bridgehead garrisons at Jaroslau and Radymno, four Honved March Regiments that had not yet been used as replacements (# 3, 4, 6 and 16), the Ist March Battalion of LW IR 35, five Lst Ersatz comp, and GM von Nickl's Group (about 4 battalions of Lst railroad security troops and Lst Gendarmerie plus a Lst Ersatz Comp). Thus there were about 65 battalions (of which 40 1/2 were Lst). A great part of the personnel were either Ruthenian or Hungarian; there was also a smaller German contingent. Of the other arms, there were 7 squadrons, 4 field cannon batteries, 43 fortress artillery companies, 48 Lst artillery detachments, 8 sapper companies, and various special formations and offices.

Already on 16 September, the first day that Przemysl was on its own, infantry and artillery from 3rd Russian Army appeared along the eastern perimeter. Enemy detachments crossed the San at Walawa, downstream from the fortress, on the 20th. Because this move threatened contact with the bridgeheads at Jaroslau and

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324 8 sapper companies, 70 military worker detachments and a great number of civilian workers who were fulfilling their Landsturm obligations.

325 In the surrounding area, 21 villages and about 1,000 hectares of forest were levelled. 7 new intermediate works and 24 strong points were added to the main fortified belt. 50 km of protected trenches were built to connect the works, and included 200 battery positions. 1,000,000 meters of barbed wire were strung in front of the main belt, and numerous mine fields were laid down. Nonetheless the defensive potential of the fortress was still considered inadequate. For example, only 12 of the works in the main belt were rated "secure against heavy ordnance", while all the others were at best rated "secure against shell fire."
Radymno, the fortress HQ sent Hon IR # 7 with a battery toward Sosnica. This detachment picked up a battalion of Hon IR # 2 which had pulled back from Radymno on the evening of the 20th, and then was joined by the garrison of Jaroslau. After this brief sortie, the detachment returned to Przemysl on the evening of the 21st. After the San bridgeheads were evacuated, the Russian 5th Army crossed the San north of the fortress and advanced to the area of Sokolow, Lancut and Jawornik Polski. At the same time (22 and 23 September), 3rd Russian Army deployed its two wings on the north and south sides of Przemysl. On the 23rd, fortress HQ sent a detachment up the San toward Bachorz to protect a transport of ammunition from Dynow; however, it found the route already blocked by the enemy. On the evening of 26 September Przemysl was totally shut off from the outside world.

Although General Ivanov laid great emphasis on taking the place as soon as possible, during the last week of September the Russians restricted their activity to ineffectual artillery fire on the fortress works. Just after the Battle of Lemberg was decided, Ivanov had ordered the advance halted on the San because he believed he could not risk operations against Cracow as long as the Przemysl fortress and its garrison, which might have potential for a strong offensive, was left in his rear.

GdI Kusmanek, the energetic fortress commander, sought with his artillery and some minor sorties to make it difficult for the enemy to build siege lines. In the first days of October, the fortress HQ was surprised to determine that enemy forces were leaving the area. These were the divisions of 3rd Russian Army which were being relieved by a new besieging Army (later called the 11th), and were marching to take the place of 5th Army in the area west of Jaroslau. At the same time, there were unmistakable signs that the Russians were preparing to attack the fortress.

General Brussilov, the commander of the Russians who were staying in Galicia, had meanwhile decided to immediately assault Przemysl. He had received information that a portion of the garrison was allegedly unreliable; also the strength of the fortifications didn't seem impressive to him. Moreover, a new Aus-Hung. offensive seemed likely. All these factors impelled him to act quickly and ruthlessly to bring about the fall of the San fortress prior to the arrival of a relieving army. On 2 October, Brussilov commanded General Shcherbatchev, who commanded the troops blockading the right bank of the San, to prepare a powerful attack. In feverish haste, Brussilov strengthened the besieging army with XII Corps (12 and 19 ID), 3 Rifle Bde and 65 ID of 8th Army as well as with three heavy
cannon and three mortar battalions; he placed all these units under General Shcherbatchev and told him to open the attack on 5 October 326.

This undertaking was a gamble, since the lengthy preparations necessary for a major assault could hardly have been completed in so short a time. There was also concern that the advance elements of 3rd Russian Army which had been sent out toward Lancut and Jawornik Polski would only be able to hold out for a few days against the overwhelming Austrian forces which were approaching. Nonetheless, General Ivanov gave the commander of his Galician armies a free hand, because based on the reports he received an attack on the fortress still seemed to have some prospect of success.

5-7 October - The Russian assault fails

The blockade of Przemysl in the north, east and south had been carried out by infantry. The infantry positions began south of Rokietnica, extended through Walawa, Medyka and the heights north of Mizyniec, and ended on the heights northwest of Nizankowice. The area between Fredropol and Krasiczn, to the west of the fortress, was held by 9 Cav Div.

On 4 October the Russians demanded that the fortress commandant surrender the city 327. GdI Kusmanek curtly refused the demand. On the 5th, General Shcherbatchev opened the attack. At this time he had seven and a half infantry divisions (12 and 19 ID of XII Corps, 3 Rifle Bde, and the second-line 58, 60, 69, 78 and 82 ID). 65 ID was also available as a reserve. The Russian forces committed to the attack totalled 117 battalions and 483 guns, of which just one twelfth were field howitzers or heavy artillery; the rest were light field cannon. These forces were concentrated most thickly against the southeastern part of the defensive belt.

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327 The demand, which was handed over under flag of truce, was signed by General Dimitriev, because at that hour he was still the direct commander of the besieging corps. However, the assault on Przemysl was led by the temporary commander of the assembling siege army (later 11th), General Shcherbatchev. The permanent Army commander, General Selivanov, arrived during the fighting and actually took over after the assault had been repulsed (see Korolkov, "Strategic Overview", p. 83).
Under the protection of the artillery, the Russian infantry worked their way forward from positions about 4 to 5 km from the outer defenses. By observing the heaviest fire, GdI Kusmanek soon recognized that the enemy had chosen as his first target the group of forts at Siedliska, extending in a salient toward the southeast. Early on the 6th, parts of 19 Russian ID attacked these forts, but were pinned down by the fire of the defenders. During the day, the Russians advanced with alarming speed to positions about 500 meters from the Siedliska Group, and 1 km from the northern line of forts. In the evening, the fortress HQ sent part of its reserves and the divisional artillery of 23 Hon ID to Siedliska, which was still the most threatened sector of the defenses.

The main assault followed before dawn on 7 October. As the defenders had anticipated, it was directed against the Siedliska Group. Here Shcherbatchev deployed three divisions (19, 58 and 69 ID) for the decisive assault. Shortly after 3:00 AM the defenders' searchlight was knocked out by a direct hit, and the enemy assault followed directly thereafter. The Russian "Crimea" IR 73 of 19 ID had reached Fort I/1 and the adjacent infantry position without being detected. Although the Work's garrison was on the alert and had prepared a bloody reception for the attackers, their barbed wire defenses had been destroyed; the Russians were able to break into the Fort. 1st Lt Sverljuga heroically led the defenders in a bloody hand-to-hand action in the interior of the work and then in the embrasures of the casemate until 9:00 AM. Meanwhile the reserves in the Siedliska area, several companies of Hon IR # 7, hurried to the rescue. Amid wild cries of "Rajta! Rajta!", the Honveds climbed the bastion and overpowered the Russians who had entered the fort. The enemy soldiers left alive laid down their arms.

328 See Rieser, "Przemysl - Der Kampf um das Werk I/1 der Gruppe Siedliska am 7. Oktober 1914" (in Öst. Wehrzeitung for 1925, Issue 29). The garrison of Fort I/1 of the Siedliska Group consisted of 37 men from Fortress Arty Regt # 1 (Vienna) and one company of k.u. Lst IR # 10, under Lt Altmann. Also the Artillery Commander of the Siedliska Group, 1st Lt Sverljuga, had his HQ in this work.

329 Translator's note - At this point, Sverljuga is referred to as the commander of the Fort, but in the preceding (original) footnote he is called the "artillery commander of the Siedliska Group", which was apparently his correct title. This is also confirmed by Franz Forstner in "Przemysl" (Vienna, 1987), p. 174.
The other Russian attacks were collapsing at the same time. 58 ID was sent against the forts on the eastern front at Hurko, but came under such heavy artillery fire that it was unable to advance over the glacis. A similar fate befell the attacks of 69 and 60 ID, which stormed the southeast front of the fortress on the left of 19 ID. An assault party of 69 ID was trapped in front of the obstructions at the fort by Popowice until it was driven away by a sortie of the fort's garrison. Another Russian regiment, thrown back by fire from the forts on Mogilki Ridge, stumbled into a minefield at Rozubowice, where it was decimated. The attack of 3 Russian Rifle Bde, which advanced on the south front at Grochowce to within 300 paces of the fortified belt, fared no better; the Bde's strength melted under the defenders' fire and it had to pull back in disorder. As the morning advanced, the brown tide receded.

In the night of 7-8 October the Russians made a surprise attack against the north front with assault parties. However, this attempt also miscarried under the fire of the vigilant defenders. The same fate befell a second and final desperate attack on the Siedliska Group at 2:00 PM on the 8th. Then the Russians gave up further attempts; they pulled back from their advance positions to the original lines of the blockade. Although the situation was still unclear to the fortress command on the evening of the 7th, at that point the enemy had already begun to feel the first effects of the approach of the relieving forces.

2. Deployment for the relief of Przemysl, 7-8 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 16)

On 7 October the Aus-Hung. leadership reviewed recent events and

330 According to Cherkasov ("The Storm of Przemysl", pp. 128 ff.), Constantine Ivanov Velischko in his work "The Fortresses in the World War" estimated the Russians lost 20,000 men in the three-day assault on Przemysl. However, Cherkasov himself believed this figure was too high; based on available figures for three of the attacking divisions, he reckoned that the besieging corps lost 10,000 men at most, of whom not more than 3 to 4,000 were killed. 19 ID, in the thick of the fight against the Siedliska Group, lost 44 officers and 3,000 men, about 25% of its authorized strength.
drew the conclusion that the hope of trapping the Russian forces in central Galicia by means of a double envelopment had vanished. The only remaining opportunity for such a maneuver was in the area immediately around Przemysl, and even here the chance would have to be exploited immediately. Conrad wished the fortress to be relieved by 12 October at the latest. After this happened, the Chief of Staff felt that the time would be ripe for an operation to roll up the Russian front on the Vistula from the south. If it appeared in the next few days that the enemy had even less strength left in Galicia than anticipated, 1st Army could immediately cross over the Vistula at Zawichost, and over the lower San. Otherwise the 4th Army would first reach the line Krzeszow-Bilgoraj before Dankl began to cross the San. To provide protection toward the east, Conrad told Col Metzger at this time that "a preliminary action in the direction of Lemberg would be necessary." The German 9th Army would "keep the enemy from attacking over the Vistula."

This train of thought led to an order issued on 8 October; it still expressed the hope that as much damage as possible could be done to the enemy near Przemysl, but also stated that the further course of the offensive would be conducted as follows:

"On 10 October there will be a general attack on the enemy in the Przemysl area.

3rd Army will send strong forces north of the fortress toward the Radymno area, and smaller parts to Przemysl itself and to the vicinity of Nizankowice.

2nd Army will send VII and XII Corps to at least the area Dobromil-Chyrow on 10 October; GdK Tersztyanszky's group will continue to advance toward Stary Sambor.

4th Army will advance on 9 October toward the stretch of the San between Krzeszow and Jaroslau and quickly strike the enemy forces in the area; on 10 October it will be able to send strong forces from the Jaroslau area to assist in the actions of 3rd Army.

1st Army will tighten its hold on the San downstream from Krzeszow and make all necessary preparations for an assault crossing of the lower San and the Vistula by Zawichost."

The Russians retreat from the western side of the fortress

The background of the operations of the enemy's Galician group in this period cannot be precisely ascertained from published

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331 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 61
Russian sources. When the desperate attempt to take the forts of the Siedliska Group had been shattered early on 7 October, Brussilov as commander of the operations in Galicia had at first intended to try again on the next morning. Soon, however, he thought better of this idea. In the night of 7-8 October he pulled back the troops who'd been blockading the northwest side of Przemysl, leaving the area open. It appears that the opinions of his superiors played a part in this decision. General Yanushkevitch sent him the following radio message from Cholm: "If we can take Przemysl easily it will be worth our while; this will free the besieging army for field service. However, the Stavka does not wish to take Przemysl regardless of cost, and we do not wish to lose the equivalent of an army corps for this purpose." 333

The general situation of the Galician group was causing the Grand Duke-Generalissimo considerable concern because of the position on the right, where the 3rd and 5th Armies were marching to the north. This threatened to leave a gap on the San and might leave the units in the Carpathians isolated. If there was a setback in this sector, wouldn't it lead to the forced evacuation of Galician soil "purchased with so much blood", even though Ivanov had been forbidden on 25 September to evacuate? The forces which had already arrived on the central Vistula were scheduled to advance west of Ivangoord and south of Warsaw on 10 October to prepare the necessary glaci for the building of the rest of the "steamroller." 334

What would happen if the Galician group left the southern flank open before this maneuver came to fruition? At this point General Dimitriev's 3rd Army seemed to be deployed too far forward toward Rzeszow, and it was also threatened from the north because of the loss of Sandomierz.

Ivanov's Chief of Staff, General Alexeiev, responded that it was true that Dimitriev (commander of 3rd Army) had forwarded some alarming reports. However, neither the recapture of Sandomierz nor a relief offensive by Letschitzky's 9th Army over the lower San was feasible. Dimitriev would have to perform a gradual withdrawal, while ensuring the timely evacuation of the supply wagons and provisions which had been assembled in his rear.

333 La grande guerre, pp. 372 ff.
334 Further details are beyond the scope of this work, which concentrates on the Aus-Hung. fronts. See the German official history, Vol. V, pp. 458 ff.; La grande guerre, pp. 372 ff. Korolkov, "Warsaw-Ivangorod", pp. 89 ff. and (by the same author) "Overview...", pp. 48 ff.
areas. As for the other problems, Alexeiev felt that a temporary setback in a secondary theater was acceptable at the start of a decisive offensive like the one now unfolding.

This conviction doesn't seem to have eliminated the concerns of the Stavka, which is apparently why Ivanov was forced on the 8th to order Brussilov to resume the offensive against the advancing Aus-Hung. army. However, for the moment Brussilov was not in a position to carry out this order. On the contrary, he was doing all he could to save the units that were still far to the west from encirclement; he achieved this objective with the usual Russian proficiency in withdrawal. On the 7th and 8th the 78 and 82 ID, which now made up the XXIX Corps, quickly pulled back to the area southwest of Radymno and took over the task of guarding the flank of 3rd Army. 58, 60 and 69 ID created the XXVIII Corps, which took up a position on both sides of Medyka and north of Mizyniec. The two new corps made up the blockading army, which temporarily also commanded XII Corps (with 3 Rifle Bde) at Mizyniec. The other corps of 8th Army (VIII and XXIV) were deployed in strength on the line Mizyniec-Felsztyn-Stary Sambor. 3rd Army gave up its plans for an offensive and pulled back to the east; it was covered by a strong force of cavalry on the line Jezowe-Lancut-Dubiecko. XXI Corps (reinforced by 13 ID of the VIIth) and XI Corps were ordered to cross the San immediately and then to take over defense of the river between Rudnik and the mouth of the Wislok. IX and X Corps (the latter reinforced by 34 ID of the VIIth) would deploy at Przeworsk and the area farther southeast; together with XXIX Corps of the blockading army they would protect the withdrawal of the supply trains from the area around Jaroslau and then follow them over the San. 335 Defense of the San below Rudnik was the responsibility of XIV Corps of 9th Army and of parts of XXV Corps, which had been assigned to that Army.

3. 4th Army's advance to Jaroslau (8-11 October)

8 October

As Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army continued its march on 8 October on both sides of Rzeszow, the gusts of rain which had been recurring for weeks finally ceased. GdI Kritek's XVII

335 Since both divisions of VII Corps (13 and 34 ID) had been detached, the Corps temporarily disappeared from the Russian order of battle.
Corps moved through the hills south of the Wislok while FML Kreysa's 13 LW ID marched along the Rzeszow Highway toward Lancut. North of the Wislok, FML Johann Freih. von Kirchbach's II Corps headed in the general direction of Zolynia and still farther north the XIV Corps (FML Roth 336) was moving toward Jezowe. The bulk of FML Arz' VI Corps (15 ID and 39 Hon ID) were in the second line behind II and XIV Corps, while his 27 ID marched behind 13 LW ID. On the Army's left wing, 2 and 6 CD were scouting northeast toward the San; 10 CD guarded the northern flank of 13 LW ID in the Wislok Valley east of Rzeszow.

In the first hours of the morning, leading units of XVII and II Corps encountered resistance from the rear guards of Russian 3rd Army, who had dug in on the heights north of Jawornik Polski, at Lancut, and in the woods south of Sokolow. The Russians fought resolutely against the advancing Austrians to win time and space for Dimitriev's Army as it crossed the San. GdI Kritek's group (XVII Corps plus 13 LW ID) and II Corps deployed against this enemy. The infantry attack faltered in the face of strong Russian defensive fire. Kritek's divisions didn't work their way up to the Russian positions until evening, and no decision had been won by nightfall. Meanwhile, II and XIV Corps had reached the area south and northwest of Sokolow without seeing noteworthy combat.

When 4th Army HQ learned about the course of the fighting at Lancut, they believed that XVII and II Corps were meeting strong resistance from five to six Russian divisions. An apparently weaker enemy force in front of XIV Corps was pulling back toward the San. Based on this analysis of the situation, Army HQ shaped its decisions for 9 October. GdI Kritek was ordered to continue the attack of his three infantry divisions against the enemy positions south of the Wislok. Meanwhile the decision would be sought north of the Wislok by encircling the enemy's right wing. For this mission the II and XIV Corps as well as 10, 6 and 2 CD would form a strong attacking group under the command of FML Johann Kirchbach. II Corps would advance in the general direction of Jaroslau, while XIV Corps attacked in the northeast to Lezajsk, where it would cut off the enemy's retreat over the San. To make the planned attack as powerful as possible, 4th Army HQ requested of GdI Boroevic that he "advance with parts of 3rd Army from the south toward Jaroslau, because a great success is anticipated in this area."

336 After Archduke Joseph Ferdinand became commander of 4th Army, FML Roth received XIV Corps and GM Ernst von Horsetzky got 3 ID.
9 October

However, the hopes of 4th Army HQ that the enemy forces west of the San could still be defeated by a double envelopment on both flanks were not fulfilled. The rear guards of Dimitriev's Army didn't wait for the morning, but evacuated their positions at Lancut during the night of 8-9 October. When the columns of 4th Army resumed their advance on the morning of the 9th and found no resistance, Army HQ was certain that the enemy was in full retreat on the entire front of 4th Army and was heading over the San. The staff saw that it was necessary to continue the pursuit of the withdrawing enemy with full strength and to attack him relentlessly in order to interfere with his withdrawal over the river; in the morning they set new goals for the marching troops. GdI Kritek's Group and II Corps should reach the Jaroslau-Sieniawa sector on 10 October; XIV Corps should cross the San at Lezajsk to pin as many enemy units as possible on the right bank of the San from the rear.

The soldiers of 4th Army moved forward with energy, but the operations developed too slowly. In the evening of the 9th the advance guards of XVII and II Corps collided on the Mleczka Brook and the lower Wislok with strong forces which General Dimitriev had left behind to protect his retreat through Sieniawa, Jaroslau and Radymno.

While these Russian rear guards had thus impeded the progress of XVII and II Corps, the XIV Corps from Innsbruck, on the Army's left wing, made a forced march through Sokolow toward Lezajsk. 3 ID (GM Ernst Horsetzky) managed to overtake 13 Russian ID in the evening of the 9th while the enemy was crossing the San. During the night of 9-10 October they fought their way to Stare Miasto and Lezajsk and took 1300 Russians as prisoners.

10 October

In the morning of 10 October, GdI Kritek attacked the enemy positions behind Mleczka Brook with his reinforced XVII Corps. However, his right wing (19 ID and 41 Hon ID) couldn't break through. 13 LW ID, advancing immediately south of the Wislok, was more successful. The gallant LW IR 24 waded through the swollen waters of Mleczka Brook and forced their way into Przeworsk in the evening. North of Kritek's Group, FML Johann Kirchbach with the bulk of his Vienna Corps (4 and 25 ID) reached the area around Grodiszko. 6 and 10 CD were sent ahead and reached the Wislok where it flowed north into the San, but
could not reach the east bank of the Wislok in the evening. XIV Corps was engaged in heavy actions at Lezajsk, while its 8 ID reached the San south of the town. To gain some space, the 13 Russian ID cancelled its river crossing and turned about at Stare Miasto to counterattack on the western bank. The k.u.k. 3 ID soon mastered the situation, however, and finally drove the Russians back over the San. The left wing of XIV Corps was covered by 2 CD, which advanced to Rudnik.

11 October

Thus on 10 October the 4th Army had its XIV Corps on the San already, while II and XVII Corps were still stuck on the lower Wislok and on Mleczka Brook. Army HQ did all it could to bring its lagging right wing forward quickly. For the 11th, it ordered Kritek's Group to continue the attack on Jaroslau and II Corps to drive to the San bridges at Sieniawa. Meanwhile, however, Dimitriev's principal forces had crossed the San. In the night of 10-11 October the strong Russian rear guards, threatened from their south flank by the simultaneous advance of the left wing of k.u.k. 3rd Army on Radymno, abandoned their positions behind the Mleczka Brook and at the confluence of the San and Wislok Rivers. The troops of XVII Corps resumed their pursuit early on the morning of 11 October. GdI Kritek sent 19 ID from the south, 41 Hon ID from the west and 13 LW ID from the northwest in a concentric attack toward Jaroslau. The enemy resisted only briefly; 19 ID and parts of 10 ID (from IX Corps) had already entered Jaroslau in the afternoon.

II Corps' pursuit progressed more slowly. The Russians had destroyed all the bridges over the lower Wislok and it took time to ford the swollen river. Finally 10 CD was able to get over the Wislok. In the evening advance elements of 13 LW ID and 4 ID came up to the San between Jaroslau and the mouth of the Wislok. Most of II Corps camped for the night at Grodzisko. On the left wing of 4th Army, XIV Corps spent the day in a heavy fire fight at Lezajsk and guarded the west bank from Russian counterattacks. 2 CD reached the San between Krzeszow and Rudnik to protect the gap between 4th and 1st Armies. VI Corps came up behind the Army's center to the area around Zolynia, 11 Hon CD came to Rzeszow.

By the evening of 11 October the resistance of the last Russian rear guards had been broken along the entire front of 4th Army, which stood on the San between Jaroslau and Rudnik alongside 1st Army. The Army had taken 5000 prisoners, 6 guns and numerous supply wagons from the enemy in the last few days. The barrier
of the San River, the exhaustion of the troops, and the fact that the bridging equipment, all the heavy baggage, and even some of the artillery were still in the rear made it necessary to pause before resuming the offensive.

4. 3rd Army relieves Przemysl, 8-12 October

The center of Boroevic's Army was to move directly on Przemysl. Because it was anticipated that the Russians would guard all the routes to the fortress, Boroevic wanted to advance from Dynow downstream on both banks of the San in equal strength. This plan soon had to be abandoned because the destroyed railroad bridge over the Jasiolka couldn't be restored before 10 October, while the barren countryside east of the San between Dynow and Mrzyglod was inadequate to provide sufficient provisions for a large force. In view of these circumstances, Boroevic directed that during the next phase of the advance only Tschurtschenthaler's Group (44 LW ID and 88 L-Sch Bde) and 6 ID of III Corps would operate south of the San, while the rest of III Corps (22 LW ID and 28 ID) moved down the road through the San Valley to Przemysl and IX Corps moved north of the river through Dubiecko to Pruchnik. XI Corps would follow the IXth toward Pruchnik in the second echelon. The objectives for 8 October were: the San south of Dynow (Tschurtschenthaler's Group and 6 ID, with their advance elements on the east bank of the San), Dynow (III Corps), Dubiecko (IX Corps) and Barycz (XI Corps).

On 8 October the advance guards of Tschurtschenthaler's Group and of 6 ID crossed the San, swollen by high water; they were surprised to find no enemy forces on the high banks to the east of the river. The nearest Russian forces, 10 CD, were reported in the area of Bircza. This was not the experience of IX Corps, which advanced on a broad front along the road from Barycz toward Dubiecko. The 11 Russian CD, reinforced by a few battalions of 31 ID (from X Corps), had prepared a delaying position between Jawornik Polski, Bachorz and Dynow. 10 ID of k.u.k. IX Corps, which was sent by FZM Friedel to attack over the heights west of Jawornik Polski, couldn't break through. 26 LW ID, attacking the heights north of Bachorz on the right of 10 ID, had more success. After a short action the weak Russian forces evacuated their positions north of Bachorz.

While these events unfolded, 3rd Army HQ on 8 October received the AOK's order for a general attack against the enemy in the
Przemysl area. Still troubled by the unclear situation, 3rd Army HQ ordered that on 9 October Tschurtschenthaler's Group and 6 ID should cross the San and advance to Bircza. The Army's left wing north of the San would clear the roads leading to Przemysl and Radymno. While IX Corps attacked northeast from Dubiecko toward Pruchnik, and the XIth marched to Dubiecko behind the IXth, III Corps would advance from Dynow down the San Valley.

To carry out these orders, FML Tschurtschenthaler's Group finished crossing the San north of Mrzyglod on 9 October. Their advance guards reached the Bircza area without any fighting.

On the Army's north wing, IX Corps once again came upon Russian resistance. 26 LW ID had to drive smaller Russian forces out of Dubiecko, and 10 ID engaged Russian rear guards east of Jawornik Polski. Because of this interference from the enemy and the heavily soaked terrain, only one regiment from IX Corps was able to reach the objective for the day, the Pruchnik area.

During the course of the day, 3rd k.u.k. Army HQ learned that the Russians had already abandoned the blockade of Przemysl and conceded the entire area west and southwest of the fortress. Around noon a cavalry patrol from XII Corps (2nd Army) had already ridden into the fortress without incident. However, stronger enemy forces were believed to be north of 3rd Army, at Jaroslaw. In the morning 4th Army had reported that on the evening of 8 October it had been stopped before Lancut by the stubborn resistance of 5 to 6 Russian divisions. Around noon the 4th Army HQ had urgently requested Boroevic to cooperate in an attack toward Jaroslaw (as noted in the previous section). GdI Boroevic decided that on 10 October his Army's left wing (III and IX Corps) would advance between the San and Mleczka Brook in a northeastern direction on Radymno and Jaroslaw, where he believed the entire VII Russian Corps was deployed. As reserves behind the left wing, XI Corps would move to Pruchnik and 4 CD to the area north of Barycz. On the Army's right wing, Tschurtschen-thaler's Group would advance to Nizankowice and 6 ID to Bircza. Since Boroevic wished by a quick advance of his left to fall on the flank of the enemy units believed to be confronting 4th Army, he emphasized to III and IX Corps that they must reach Rokietnica and the area south of Jaroslaw on the afternoon of the 10th.

After a brief night's rest, the soldiers of III and IX Corps resumed their advance on the morning of 10 October through hilly country still shrouded by fog. The columns moved forward only
slowly on the bottomless roads and byways. At Rokietnica and on the heights north of Pruchnik the foremost elements of both corps came under fire from enemy rear guards, who were here protecting the X and XXIX Russian Corps as they crossed the San. In the late hours of the afternoon, after III and IX Corps had deployed for an attack, the enemy gave up his resistance. The advance against the south flank of the Russian forces believed to be in the area west of Jaroslau thus seemed to have succeeded. However, a report from 4th Army HQ now revealed that the Russians had already begun their retreat behind the San in the night of 9-10 October along the whole front of 4th Army. It was now of the greatest importance that the left wing of 3rd Army come forward without stopping. Eager to pin down the quickly retreating enemy and if possible to cut off his retreat over the San, 3rd Army HQ ordered on the evening of the 10th that IX Corps should take the San bridges at Jaroslau by a quick advance and hold them until the arrival of 4th Army. Meanwhile III Corps should continue to advance toward Radymno, while Tschurtschenthaler's Group would drive south of Przemysl to Nizankowice; 6 ID would march to the western edge of Przemysl.

On 11 October, IX Corps advanced with 26 LW ID toward Tuczepy and with 10 ID toward Jaroslau. At 4:00 PM parts of 10 ID, along with 19 ID of XVII Corps, entered the city after a short action. 26 LW ID reached its goal on the San without any major fighting. The rear guards of X and XXIX Russian Corps offered stronger resistance on the 11th in front of Radymno and Sosnica. These enemy forces were attacked by 23 Hon ID (from the Przemysl garrison) and from the west by III Corps (28 ID and 22 LW ID), supported by half of 26 LW ID. On 12 October the Russian rear guards had been driven from the left bank of the San along the entire course of the river downstream from Przemysl to Jaroslau.

South of the liberated San fortress, Tschurtschenthaler's Group reached Nizankowice on the morning of the 11th without fighting.

Thus was completed the relief of Przemysl, whose brave garrison had repulsed a heavy attack in a bloody action before the arrival of 3rd Army. The fortress had achieved more than had been expected. After the retreat of the Aus-Hung. army from the San it had tied down three Russian armies (3rd, 8th and 5th) and

HQ of 3rd Army entered Przemysl at 6:00 PM. Because the telephone communications had been damaged, the HQ didn't learn about the course of the pursuit actions until the morning of 12 October.
thus won for the exhausted field forces an urgently necessary pause from battle while they regrouped on the Dunajec and in the Carpathians.

5. 2nd Army advances through Chyrow toward Stary Sambor (8-10 October)

(see volume 1 leaflets 14 and 16)

2nd Army's goal was to reach the area of Chyrow and Stary Sambor by 10 October; its march was delayed more by difficult terrain than by enemy resistance. Despite the urging of the AOK, on 8 October Böhm-Ermolli felt obliged to let the lead division of VII Corps remain west of Ustrzyki Dl. in order to first allow XII Corps, which originally was supposed to move through Trzciniecz to Dobromil, to shift from Tyrawa Wołoska to Lisko and to let its troops close ranks.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli placed VII and XII Corps in motion again on the 9th from Sanok and Lisko; the advance was very difficult because the Russians had destroyed all the bridges in Strwiaz Valley. GM Ludwig Goiginger's Group (32 ID and 103 Lst Inf Bde), marching ahead of VII Corps, reached Kroscienko. The other units of VII Corps (20 Hon ID and 34 ID) and all of XII Corps (16, 17 and 35 ID plus 105 Lst Inf Bde) camped for the night widely dispersed in the vicinity of Ustrzyki Dl., Lisko, Sanok and Zarszyn. The Army's left side column, IR # 2, reached Trzciniecz. 10 and 12 CD of 8th Russian Army had already abandoned their blocking positions at Birčza and Ustrzyki Dl. on the 8th and pulled back to Nizankowice and Chyrow.

On 10 October, Goiginger's Group was to send 32 ID through Chyrow to Stara Sol and 103 Lst Inf Bde to the Bilicz area, while the bulk of VII Corps (20 Hon ID and 34 ID) reached Chyrow and the area to its west. One Bde of 34 ID at Dobromil would provide a link with the side column moving through Trzciniecz. XII Corps would follow VII Corps; its lead unit, 16 ID, would reach Kroscienko. Finally, Col Barza was given a detachment of three battalions from 17 ID and sent to march through Czarna and Mszaniec to establish a link with Tersztynszky's Group.

When Goiginger's Group, as scheduled, started to march to Chyrow on the morning of 10 October, the Russians had already abandoned the outlets from the mountains. Nonetheless the advance was once again time consuming. 32 ID entered Chyrow in the
afternoon without seeing action. Because of the great exhaustion of the troops, however, it could not longer reach Stara Sol, its objective. It spent the night in the area east of Chyrow. Because of the miserable condition of the road to Bilicz, Goiginger diverted 103 Lst Inf Bde to follow 32 ID toward Chyrow. His Group reported that there were Russian forces ahead of them on the heights at Stara Sol. Also the heights east of Dobromil, which the side column (IR # 2) reached in the evening, were apparently still occupied by the Russians. It was not known whether these were rear guards of 8th Army or the Russian main body.

The Russians are driven from Turka

Relatively good news was received in these days from GdK Tersztyanszky's Group. On the evening of the 7th Tersztyanszky had been ordered with some emphasis to advance as far as possible toward Stary Sambor by 10 October. His opponent was still General Pavlov, whose group had been reinforced by infantry and was preparing new resistance in front of Turka. He held the heights which formed a semi-circle around the town. GdK Tersztyanszky decided to repeat his earlier outflanking maneuver. While 31 ID and 40 Lst Inf Bde (which meanwhile had come through Uzsok Pass) moved from Jablonka wz. to attack from the left, FML Karg's group would maintain pressure in the front along the road and the heights to its east.

On 8 October the Aus-Hung. skirmish lines from Borynia and the heights north of Jablonka wz. moved against the Russian blocking positions in exhausting climbs up and down the hills. The misty weather limited the effectiveness of the artillery almost completely. An icy snowstorm blew over the desolate highlands and sent drifts onto all the paths. Nonetheless, 38 Hon ID worked its way almost to the key point of the enemy defenses, a hill crest 814 meters high just south of Turka. Here however the frontal attack of 38 Hon ID came to a standstill in face of strong enemy resistance, because the expected flanking attack on the right by 102 Lst Inf Bde from Stryj Valley wasn't carried out. Also the pressure by 31 ID on the left against the other enemy flank was not yet significant, because the troops who were to carry out Archduke Joseph's envelopment were lying exhausted in front of the main Russian positions west of Turka. Although GdK Tersztyanszky had very much wanted to reach Turka that day, these circumstances forced him to order his battle groups to halt the attack until the next morning. 1 CD, which had now come up to the front, was directed to attack on the 9th toward the left against Rozlucz and the enemy line of retreat to Stary
General Kornilov, the commander of the latest reinforcements, had meanwhile taken over all Russian forces in the area. In the night of 8–9 October he evacuated the trenches covering Turka. On the next morning the troops of IV Corps resumed their advance. At 11:00 AM the lead elements of 40 Lt Inf Bde entered the liberated town of Turka. In the afternoon, Archduke Joseph's pursuing group reached the heights to its north.

After sharp actions and despite the worst possible terrain and weather conditions, Tersztyanszky's Group had thus taken possession of the last major barrier in the valley leading to Stary Sambor. Despite the impatience of the high command, the Corps commander now gave his tired troops a day of rest on 10 October; the pause was also useful for improving the supply situation. Only 1 and 8 CD (the latter of which had just come through Uzsoke Pass) were ordered to scout toward Drohobycz, Sambor and Stary Sambor and to establish contact with the main body of 2nd Army.

6. Recovery of the forest Carpathians (1–10 October)

While Tersztyanszy's Group was advancing from Uzsoke Pass to the hills on the upper Dniester, farther east the Austrians were driving most of the Russians who had invaded the forest Carpathians back out of Hungary.

Although the high command had not attached any great importance to this Russian incursion, they had permitted some reinforcements to be sent at the end of September to the "Military Command of Lemberg" (stationed at Munkacs under GM Hofmann). At the same time, further measures were taken because of the increasing greediness of the Romanians (caused by the presence of the enemy on the upper Tisza) and because of secret plans for a bold flank operation against the Russians. An Army Group was created under the command of GdK Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin; it consisted of March and Landsturm units which had been in Transylvania: 24 1/2 battalions, 2 1/2 squadrons and 6 batteries, organized as 52, 54 and 56 ID.

On 1 October the first detachment of eight March battalions and three batteries assembled by the AOK arrived at Munkacs under

338 Conrad, Vol. IV p. 886 and Vol V p. 69
Col Fleischmann. At the same time the Polish Legion was sent by rail from Cracow to Nagy-Banya. GM Hofmann now felt he had the strength to retake the lost mountain passes. He ordered Col Fleischmann with six battalions to attack the enemy forces who'd come through the Verecke and Beskid Passes to Szolyva and to send the other two battalions forward by rail to Huszt to join GM Bothmer's Group.

On 5 October Col Fleischmann entered Also-Verecke and Volovec; he took Verecke Pass on 6 October and Beskid Pass on the 7th. 2 Kuban Coss Div fell back from the two Carpathian passes to Koziowa and Tuchla. On 8 and 9 October Col Fleischmann continued to pursue the enemy. He advanced with his right column in the Opor Valley to Slawsko and with his left column in the Orawa Valley to Tucholka.

The Munkacs Military Command entrusted the attack on Maramaros-Sziget to FML Attems, who for this purpose was also given control over GM Bothmer's Group. FML Attems opened the action on 5 October. He led eight battalions and three batteries up the Tisza from Tecso, while at the same time the lead echelon of the Polish Legion (which had arrived at Nagy-Banya on the 4th) was sent forward by the Munkacs Military Command toward Maramaros-Sziget. After two days of fighting, Maramaros-Sziget was retaken on the night of 7 October. Cossack rear guards offered short resistance at Nagy-Bocsko, then were pushed back to the Jablonica Pass on 7 and 8 October. To destroy the Cossack detachments who had advanced from Maramaros-Sziget into the Visso and Iza Valleys, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin had meanwhile prepared an encirclement operation in cooperation with GM Hofmann. Six battalions and a battery of FML Attems' Group advanced from Maramaros-Sziget up the Visso Valley, seven battalions and a battery (7 Lst Eta Bde) under GM Schuler from Kirlibaba toward Borsa, and six battalions and a battery (Col Racz' Bde) from the south toward Romuli. Assaulted from all sides, the enemy (about one Cossack regiment and a battery) was overtaken in the forested mountains at Romuli and wiped out.

339 At the start of October GM Hofmann had about 42 battalions, 5 squadrons and 5 batteries at his disposal. They made up Groups led by Col Fleischmann, Col Berger, FML Attems and GM Schuler, plus the Polish Legion (under FML Durski) and Lt Col Fischer's Streifkorps.

340 Before the forces in the Carpathians were placed under GdK Pflanzer-Baltin their command structure was never formalized, and changed almost daily.
Thus the Counties of Maramaros–Sziget and Munkacs were freed from the raids of Cossack bands, which had caused panic and mass evacuations by the population. Now it was time to coordinate the further operations in the Carpathians with those of the main forces, which had meanwhile continued their advance. On 8 October, the same day on which the orders were issued for a general advance on Przemysl, the AOK issued further directives to Pflanzer's Group without considering the concerns of the Hungarian Minister-President or of the Emperor's Military Chancellery. In order "to carry out a combined action against the enemy forces who were in the Carpathians east of Uzsok Pass and by the passes in Upper Hungary and Transylvania", GdK Pflanzer-Baltin would also control the troops of the Munkacs Military Command; he would initiate preparations for an offensive over the Carpathians to the Dniester. Thus the forest Carpathians down to the border with Romania were becoming a major theater of operations.

7. The 1st Army between 7 and 10 October

When GdK Dankl was directed on 8 October to cross the San, he planned to do so on the 10th. According to an agreement between Generals Puhallo and Karl Kirchbach, V Corps would cross the lower San while initially 1st Corps, on the Vistula, would only help with artillery fire. After the San operation was successfully completed, 1st Corps would begin the significantly more difficult crossing of the Vistula. However, preparations for the undertaking proceeded very slowly. Supply columns bringing up rations and ammunition were stuck in the morass of the overtaxed roads; guns could be brought into position only after enormous toil.

On 9 October the heavy bridging equipment had begun to arrive for 37 Hon ID (although still incomplete); the other divisions of V Corps received their equipment in the next two days. These circumstances made 1st Army HQ uncomfortable about making an overly hasty attempt to cross the river. Also, Dankl's staff learned on the morning of the 9th that 4th Army had apparently encountered 5 or 6 Russian divisions at Lancut (as noted previously). In this situation, wouldn't it be preferable to have the bulk of 1st Army intervene on the flank of the action of 4th Army, rather than to send them in a separate direction from the rest of the Aus-Hung. forces, over the lower San toward

the north? On the afternoon of the 9th, Army HQ raised these questions in a telephone conversation with the AOK at Neusandez; the response was that there was no longer any need for 1st Army to shift toward the south because the enemy all along the front of 4th Army was already retreating behind the San. Thus 1st Army would still be required to cross the San, but this wouldn't be necessary on either the 10th or 11th, since 4th Army would not begin its crossing until the 11th at the earliest.

The AOK had indicated that they were less interested in having the San and Vistula crossed at the earliest possible moment than in making sure that the operation was successful. Therefore GdK Dankl decided on the evening of the 9th to postpone the start of the operation until the morning hours of 11 October.

Meanwhile, 24 ID of X Corps had come up to the San on the right of 45 LW ID just downstream from Nisko. 2 ID had reached the Leg River in the area north of Stany, while 9 and 2 CD of 4th Army were watching the San around Rudnik. Technical preparations for the crossing were still incomplete on the 10th, so 1st Army HQ had to postpone it again, until the morning of the 12th. Now V and X Corps were to simultaneously cross the San between Nisko and the river's mouth. The main attack would take place in V Corps' sector under the leadership of FZM Puhallo. Ist Corps and XI German Corps (which would come under 1st k.u.k. Army on 11 October) would cross the Vistula after V Corps was firmly established east of the San. After everyone was across the rivers, the units would attack toward the north.
D. The Battle of Przemysl-Chyrow, First Phase (10–23 October)

1. Actions from 10 to 12 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 17 and sketches 18 and 22)

When the Russians disappeared from the area west of Przemysl, so did the last of the chances of success with which Conrad reckoned at Neusandez. By a timely retreat, the enemy had avoided the punishment which the Aus-Hung. high command had wanted to inflict. The flank attack which was supposed to be carried out by 2nd Army could now be continued only in the form of Terszytansky's operation against Stary Sambor. Also the expectation that either Dankl or Hindenburg would outflank the enemy in the north had not been fulfilled. Dankl had strongly defended river positions in his front. The concerns which Ludendorff had expressed in Neusandez regarding the prospects of 9th German Army had been proven correct. While planning to attack Ivangorod, on 9 October Hindenburg had already had to divert substantial forces from his left wing over the lower Pilica toward Warsaw as a countermeasure to the threat of being outflanked by the Russians.

On the other hand, there had been one considerable gain among all these disappointments: the Russians had retreated from western Galicia and raised the siege of the fortress on the San. At least on Austrian soil the initiative had been wrested from the Russians by their opponents. GdI Conrad, as he indicated to Col Metzger on 7 October, had already counted on this development for several days. Now that 3rd Army had marched into Przemysl, he felt that the moment had come to take advantage of his opportunity.

The four Austrian armies in central Galicia and north of the mouth of the San, plus the attached XI German Corps at Zawichost, had 42 1/2 divisions against about 47 Russian divisions. Although Conrad felt that the continuation of our offensive required that the enemy front on the Vistula should be rolled up, he also considered it possible that substantial Russian forces might retreat toward Lemberg. Thus the question of flank protection in this enormous theater again became paramount. Conrad wrote:

"After the armies started to the east, they would have to
shift to the north through the area between Bilgoraj and the Bug. But before this was feasible, we would need to gain breathing room toward the east to guard the flank and rear of the offensive to the north. A strong and far-reaching attack in the direction of Lemberg would provide this security. How far the attack should proceed would depend upon events."

These concepts lay behind the details of the orders which the high command issued on 10 October. The commands were introduced by immediate instructions for the next day:

"On 11 October, 4th and 3rd Armies should follow directly after the withdrawing enemy to take the San crossings and to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy. 3rd and 2nd Armies should also prevent the former besiegers [of Przemysl] from removing their siege artillery and other special equipment."

Then it was stated that the high command still didn't have a completely clear picture of the enemy dispositions as of 10 October, but that the necessity of immediately preparing the offensive demanded energetic operations. While Hindenburg simultaneously attacked Ivangorod and Warsaw, these would be the missions of the Austrian forces:

1. 1st Army, as already directed on 8 October, would cross the San and Vistula together with XI German Corps; then it would swing to the north with a strong right wing.
2. 4th Army would attack from the line Jaroslau-Krzeszow north of the railroad toward Rawa Russka to win the line Rawa Russka-Tomaszow-Bilgoraj; thence it could move to either Lemberg or the area south of Lublin. Its task was similar to that which it had been assigned in the first campaign in August.
3. Farther south, the 3rd Army's objective was the area northwest of Lemberg; its prescribed line of march was Nizankowice-Mosciska-Jaworow-Janow.
4. On Boroевич's right, 2nd Army would strengthen Tersztynszky's Group as much as possible to seize a flanking position at Mikolajow.
5. GdK Pflanzer, with his forces drawn from diverse sources, would descend from the forested Carpathian mountains to the Dniester valley.

Thus the Aus-Hung. high command wanted to carry on the war as it had already planned in August 1914 and would again - within the limitations of the theater - once more in summer 1915, and

342 Conrad, Vol. V., p. 86
finally with success.

The extent to which the Army commanders were given only general guidelines is quite striking to the retrospective observer. GdI Conrad justified this practice because in peacetime maneuver he had already developed the "habit of orienting the commanders early regarding my overall intentions and leaving it to them to prepare or initiate all necessary measures for their implementation." His orders of 10 October had this to say about the possibility of a collision with the enemy: "To ensure that their heavy artillery is evacuated, [the Russians will have to make a stand] not far east of Przemyśl covering the Lemberg highway." The 3rd and 2nd Armies could maneuver the Russians out of this position by flank attacks. The behavior of the enemy to this point had thus given great confidence to the Aust-Hung. high command. Although such confidence is one of the preconditions of a successful general, in this instance it was not to prove justified. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that on 25 September Ivanov had actually suggested a wide-ranging retreat such as Conrad now anticipated, and that only the intervention of the Stavka kept him from carrying it out.

2nd Army's advance by Chyrow and Turka

On the evening of 10 October, 2nd Army was moving forward through the narrow Strwiaz Valley. In front was GM Goiginger's 32 ID, which had reached the area directly east of Chyrow. The commander of VII Corps, FML Fail-Griessler, was still unsure of the enemy's situation. For 11 October, he ordered Goiginger's group to reach Stara Sol (which had also been its goal on the 10th). A flanking detachment should advance to Strzelbice (northwest of Stary Sambor) to fall upon the rear of the enemy forces reported to be retreating from Turka. The foremost troops of 20 Hon ID should reach Felsztyyn, those of 34 ID Dobromil.

However, the army orders for the morning of 11 October set much wider goals for VII Corps. In conjunction with the AOK's directives of the day before, GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered "the pursuit of the enemy retreating from Przemyśl to Lemberg." He wanted Goiginger's group to advance to Stary Sambor to cut off the retreat of the Russians falling back from Tersztyn's Group toward the north. The main body of VII Corps (20 Hon ID and 34 ID) should shift north from the narrow lowlands around Chyrow to the line Rakowa-Nowe Miasto; XII Corps would follow the VIIth with its lead division (16 ID) in the area east of Krosienko. Tersztyn's Group, in cooperation with
Goiginger's, would advance through Drohobycz and Sambor toward Mikolajow. GdK Böhm-Ermolli believed that his orders would place Tersztyanszky's Group and VII Corps as quickly as possible in a position on the southern flank of the enemy units believed to be retreating to Lemberg.

On 10 October, GdK Tersztyanszky had stayed at Turka with IV Corps to give the troops a short rest break; only the horsemen (1 and 8 CD) had continued to scout ahead. His opponent was General Kornilov, whose group had increased to about one and a half or two infantry divisions. Kornilov pulled back on the 10th to Stary Sambor and in the direction of Drohobycz, where it apparently received further reinforcements. On the morning of the 11th, when 2nd Army HQ ordered Tersztyanszky to pursue the enemy toward Drohobycz as planned by the AOK, the group commander decided to shift his main body in a more northeastern direction instead of their original line of march to Stary Sambor. The routes to Drohobycz and Sambor seemed to have been left open by the Russians themselves; Tersztyanszky hoped that he could deploy his columns on the edge of the Carpathian foothills on the line Borysław–Horodyszcze by 14 October. Then they could descend on a broad front into the plains along the Dniester and through Mikolajow and advance to the area south of Lemberg.

However, events would turn out differently.

OPERATIONS ON 11 OCTOBER

The two cavalry divisions which GdK Tersztyanszky had sent ahead to follow the retreating enemy came up against new resistance on the afternoon of the 11th. 8 CD was halted west of Borysław by detachments of the 2 Combined Coss Div; 1 CD encountered a Russian blocking position south of Stary Sambor and couldn't break through. To open the road to Stary Sambor, GdK Tersztyanszky decided to divert 40 Lst Inf Bde (originally on the way to Drohobycz) to reinforce 1 CD.

Meanwhile, Böhm-Ermolli's VII Corps had also begun to collide with Russian XXIV Corps as well as parts of VIII Corps. GM Ludwig Goiginger's group encountered strong enemy forces in front of Stara Sol. Goiginger wanted to attack immediately, and asked that 20 Hon ID also intervene in the fighting. FML von Csanady, the commander of 20 Hon ID, was sending his unit north of the Strwiaz through Felsztyn; thus it would outflank the northern wing of what was presumed to be a Russian rear guard detachment at Stara Sol. Shortly thereafter, at 10:00 AM, enemy...
units of all arms were reported to be approaching from the east between the Strwiaz and Blozewka rivers. FML Csanady, who prior to the arrival of VII Corps HQ was directing the battle, deployed the bulk of 34 ID (which had just arrived at Chyrow) on the left of 20 Hon ID to attack Wolcza Dl. At the same time, Csanady asked that 16 ID, marching at the head of XII Corps, should immediately advance in the direction of Rakowa, if possible south of the Blozewka.

In the first hours of the afternoon, most of VII Corps had entered the fighting outside of Chyrow. Goiginger's Group (32 ID, 103 Lst Inf Bde and parts of 34 ID) attacked the Russians' blocking positions on both sides of the road to Stara Sol, south of the Strwiaz. North of the Strwiaz, 20 Hon ID attacked Felsztyn and the Wegrzeliska Heights (north of Felsztyn); most of 34 ID, with IR # 2 from 16 ID (which had come up through Trzcianiec) attacked Blozew Grn. (southeast of Nowe Miasto). As evening fell, Goiginger's Group had taken the foremost Russian positions at Stara Sol. FML Csanady had entered Felsztyn with 20 Hon ID. FML Krautwald, with the bulk of 34 ID plus IR # 2, had reached Wolcza Dl. and Blozew Grn. 16 ID of XII Corps (minus IR # 2) was in the area south of Chyrow; the rest of XII Corps was still stuck in the narrow mountain passes farther west.

OPERATIONS ON 12 OCTOBER

For 12 October, GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered VII and XII Corps to make a combined attack on the enemy on both sides of Chyrow; he delegated conduct of operations on the battlefield to GdI Kövess, commander of XII Corps.

FML FAIL-GRIESSLER didn't wait for the deployment of XII Corps, but advanced with his VII Corps early on the 12th. Goiginger's Group energetically attacked the enemy lines on both sides of Stara Sol in the morning hours, but couldn't open the way toward Stary Sabmor. Also the intervention of parts of 16 ID on Goiginger's south wing, which was intended as an outflanking maneuver, brought no decision. No matter how far the arriving units moved toward the south, they still came upon a strongly held enemy front.

The actions between the Strwiaz and Blozewka were also unsuccessful. 20 Hon ID's attack on the Wegrzeliska Heights came to a halt in front of well-constructed Russian trenches on the western slope. FML Krautwald wanted to drive toward Koniow with the main body of 34 ID and encircle the Wegrzeliska Heights.
from the north. However, he couldn't carry out his attack because the Russians were deployed in strength on the heights at Czyszki, threatening his own left flank; their fire made it impossible to advance south of the Blozewka valley. Therefore FML Krautwald decided to reinforce IR # 2 of 16 ID, which had been sent against the Czyszki Heights, with the bulk of 34 ID; the position on these Heights must be taken before it would be possible to attack toward Koniow.

In Tersztyanszky's sector, on 12 October the 40 Lst Inf Bde and IR # 33 (the latter sent from 17 ID through Lawrow) intervened in the action of 1 CD south of Stary Sambor. They drove the enemy out of his foremost trenches and occupied the heights around Zawadka and around Jankow. The operation was led by GM Peteani, commander of 1 CD. However, Peteani's group was then halted in front of a strongly fortified Russian line which formed a half circle south of Stary Sambor.

Thus the supposed Russian "rear guards" still hadn't been driven from their positions on 12 October. 2nd Army HQ was convinced by the slow pace of the advance that this was no action against rear guards, but rather a major battle with the entire 8th Russian Army.

The prospects facing the bulk of 2nd Army as it entered action with a strong enemy force were not favorable. GdK Böhm-Ermolli could only deploy his divisions one after the other and in piecemeal fashion as they emerged from the narrow passes around Chyrow. This was already causing units to be fragmented and mixed up. The enemy, posted on high ground, dominated all of 2nd Army's lines of approach with fire from the front and flanks. This fire was all the more effective because it was difficult for our own artillery, hampered by the rain-soaked ground once they left the roads, to follow the infantry. They only gradually came up into firing positions, and therefore could not silence the Russian batteries which had been skillfully placed on the level ground atop the Wegrzeliska Heights.

On the morning of 12 October, GdK Tersztyanszky had already received an urgent order from 2nd Army HQ to advance toward Stary Sambor with the largest possible force. Based on this order, he decided to further modify the earlier plan of sending most of his strength toward Drohobycz, and to divert more men toward Stary Sambor. He ordered 38 Hon ID, which meanwhile had marched to Turze, to immediately turn north; it would advance through Zwor and Wola-koblanska to outflank the Russian south
wing, which was believed to end east of Stary Sambor. Tersztyanszky now also set in motion the 31 ID, which at the insistence of Archduke Joseph had been given another rest day at Turka. It would take the road to Stary Sambor behind 38 Hon ID; first it would reach the area around Strzylki. 8 CD, which had been checked by the 2 Comb Coss Div at Smolna, would move toward Sambor through the Bystrzyca valley. The other units of IV Corps, 102 Lst Inf Bde and 5 Hon CD, would advance through Isaje and Turze toward Boryslaw to guard the Corps' right flank.

While GdK Tersztyanszky was issuing these orders, scouts from 1 and 8 CD had already determined that the lines of advance through Zwor and Wola-koblanska toward Sambor had been blocked by the enemy. Spies reported that the Russian 4 Rifle Bde had taken up a position around Blazow. Since the enemy's left flank apparently extended to Blazow, 38 Hon ID's projected line of march would not be an outflanking maneuver. Therefore the Division's commander, FML Karg, decided not to advance through Zwor as IV Corps HQ had ordered, but rather through Turze and Smolna to Zalokiec. Then he would attack together with 8 CD down the Bystrzyca valley through Podbuz and Sambor into the rear of the Russian units engaged at Stara Sol and Stary Sambor. GdK Tersztyanszky approved this wide encircling maneuver toward the east; he ordered 31 ID to take the place of 38 Hon ID and to quickly advance to Luzek Grn. in a night march. 31 ID would block the routes leading from Blazow toward the rear of Peteani's Group (1 CD and 40 Lst Inf Bde).

Subsequent reactions by the Russians prove that as a result of these developments Karg's Group had been sent in the most strategically sound direction. However, there was a negative side. Tersztyanszky was splitting up the already weak southern wing of 2nd Army into smaller and smaller groups; thus he was reducing its offensive strength. Moreover, his units would have to march for long distances through difficult and little-known mountain terrain; they would not be in position for the anticipated outflanking of the Russian position until at least 14 October.

A halt south of Przemysl and on the San

Detachments of 3rd and 4th Armies had reached the San during 11 and 12 October, but found all the bridges destroyed; because of heavy fire from the Russians, who held all the crossing points, they were unable to come over the river. These detachments, like other parts of the armies, urgently needed a rest after eight days of constant marching and fighting. Also the
condition of the supply columns, disrupted by the autumn rains as they trudged along the atrocious roads, forced the advance to pause. In 4th Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was compelled to postpone the crossing of the San from 13 October to the 14th. 3rd Army was so short of supplies that it had to use up some of the rations of the Przemysl fortress; GdI Boroevic refused to set a firm date for crossing the San. Only his Army's right wing south of Przemysl, Tschurtschenthaler's Group (44 LW ID and 88 L-Sch Bde), launched an attack on the 11th. They were unable to break through the strong defenses of XII Russian Corps on both sides of Myziniec (in German called the "Baumhöhe", or Tree Heights, of Tyszkowice and Magiera).

At this time the situation on the lower San, where 1st Army was supposed to cross, was even more unfavorable. The stubborn forces of nature proved much stronger than the wills of human commanders. Unceasing autumn rains caused new masses of water to flow out of the mountains; they spilled over the lowlands and soon turned the area between the San and Vistula into one great swamp. On the bottomless roads into the area the wagons carrying the heavy bridging equipment could barely budge. Before the pontoons could enter the water, they had to be dragged for great distances under enemy fire. And so the situation of V Corps became ever more hopeless; despite great exertions, the time-consuming preparations for the crossing were still not ended on 11 October. HQ of 37 Hon ID gave its opinion that "in the next few days any crossing attempt will be a vain effort; even if the crossing is successful, the conditions are such that days or weeks of preparation would then be needed prior to a further advance." Reports from all the other HQ sounded equally hopeless. Therefore 1st Army HQ once again postponed the river crossing, this time until 13 October. Because the high waters now made it impossible for V Corps to cross the San, the decision would be sought only by X Corps.

However, the situation in X Corps was not much better. The Corps commander, GdI Hugo Meixner, planned to have 45 LW ID attack over the river in the vicinity of Plawo. An attack farther upstream, in the sector of 24 ID, didn't seem advisable because there the Russian positions were higher than the west bank. A couple companies of 24 ID had defied death and crossed the San on the 11th, but were forced by strong enemy fire to return to the west bank that night. X Corps doubted that 45 LW ID would have any more success at Plawo, where a strong enemy force was in place.

Then in the late afternoon of 12 October a new order from
Neusandez brought word of a surprising change in opinion at the AOK: "Because of the high water in the San, 1st Army should wait on further directives before crossing the river; the order for X Corps to cross the San is cancelled."

2. Decisions of the k.u.k. high command on 12 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 17 and sketch 23)

For the high command at Neusandez, the events of 11 and 12 October significantly clarified the situation, although more on the German than on the Aus-Hung. front. South of the mouth of the San the 36 1/2 Aus-Hung. divisions were confronted by about 26 Russian divisions, which however had more men and significantly more guns than their opponents. Of these 26 Russian divisions, at least those on the south wing opposite Böhm-Ermolli were offering determined resistance. Nonetheless, on the evening of the 11th the AOK still advised that the enemy "at Dobomril and Stary Sambor is probably fighting for time" and therefore ordered 2nd Army not to pause "to deploy strong columns for a frontal assault" but rather to seek to outflank the enemy. On the 12th the Army should "energetically advance toward Mosciska and...toward Rudki." The high command's firm desire for an offensive, however, was not lessened either by this report nor by the difficult situation on the lower San, where 1st Army was emphatically ordered early on the 12th to accomplish the river crossing on the 13th.

The further operations of 1st Army would be decisively influenced by events which occurred in the next few hours on the central Vistula.

Here, after the actions at Opatow and Klimontow, Hindenburg had pressed on against Ivangorod; at the same time, however, his plans also included a coup de main against Warsaw, where the forts were obsolete and largely abandoned. Although the city had seemed at first to be only lightly defended, later reports indicated that two Siberian corps had arrived in the Warsaw District. On the night of 8-9 October, Hindenburg decided to

send the majority of 9th German Army against the Polish capital, while smaller forces blockaded the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Vistula at Ivangorod until some Aus-Hung. heavy mortars came up to make possible an attack.\textsuperscript{344}

The left wing of 9th Army, commanded by GdK von Mackensen, advanced rapidly to the north from 9 October until the evening of the 11th, when it was 10 km from the outer forts around Warsaw. At the same time, the Guard Reserve Corps and the Silesian Landwehr drove the lead units of Russian 4th Army back over the Vistula at Ivangorod. However, the Russians maintained a presence on the west bank of the river in the Ivangorod bridgehead and farther downstream.

Meanwhile, on 10 October German soldiers on the battlefield south of Warsaw found on the body of an enemy officer some orders that revealed the Russians' plans in complete detail. Through this stroke of good luck, the Germans learned that four Russian Armies (2, 4, 9 and 5) were deploying between the mouth of the San and Nowo Georgiewsk for an attack over the Vistula.

The commander of the German eastern armies didn't hesitate to draw the necessary conclusions from this picture of the enemy situation. Above all it was clear that for the foreseeable future there was no possibility for the 9th Army to carry out offensive operations against such overwhelming numbers of Russians. This conclusion had been reached earlier for the Ivangorod area, and was now true also for Warsaw. Early on the 11th, Mackensen was advised "that the objective is no longer the capture of the city, but only to throw the enemy back into the city and keep him bottled up."\textsuperscript{345} Since the Germans would have to be content with whatever ground they had already won, the main burden of the offensive would have to be borne by the Aus-Hung. Armies, as had become increasingly evident in the last few days.

However, it was also clear that 9th Army would not even be able to stand its ground unless it received reinforcements. This was especially true for the left wing, standing at the gates of Warsaw.

\textsuperscript{344} German official history, Vol. V, pp. 435 ff. and 459 f.
Also see Schäfer, "Die militärische Zusammenwirken der Mittelmächte im Herbst 1914" (in Wissen und Wehr for 1926, pp. 213 ff.), and Ludendorff, "Kriegserinnerugnen", pp. 64 ff.
\textsuperscript{345} German official history, Vol. V, pp. 450 f.
In the French-Belgian theater, Falkenhayn was preparing for the Battle of Ypres. Therefore no reinforcements could be expected from that quarter. New Reserve Corps had been raised in the interior of Germany; although not complete, they were all being sent to the Western armies except for one sent to East Prussia. To ensure direct cooperation with 8th Army, which had stayed in East Prussia, on 17 September Hindenburg had been given "command of all operations in the East." However, by the end of September there was no prospect of using 8th Army in the Polish campaign, since its small strength was needed to defend against the 1st and 10th Russian Armies, attacking over the Niemen and at Augustow. As the situation on the central Vistula became ever more critical after 10 October, new consideration was given to the possible transfer of one division from East Prussia. However, GdI von Francois, the new commander of 8th Army, didn't want to give up units for Poland until the freshly raised XXV Reserve Corps had arrived and he had won a decision in the Suwalki area. Therefore the Germans turned for help to their Austrian allies, who had been relieved of pressure in their own sector by the Russian buildup on the central Vistula.

When the Aus-Hung. high command learned on the 11th of the contents of the Russian orders which had been discovered south of Warsaw, their reactions coincided completely with those of Hindenburg. The AOK's order of 10 October (above) had already anticipated that the Galician front would become the main area of the allied offensive. Now Conrad believed that since "large parts of 5th Russian Army [were reported] in the area around and south of Krasnik", the left wing of 4th Army should move up closer to the 1st Army. The 4th should attack not toward Bilgoraj, but due east toward Janow.

Although concerned about Hindenburg's situation, Conrad didn't feel it was desirable to shift the mass of the k.u.k. Armies to the left bank of the Vistula because time was short and because of the strength the Russians still had in Galicia. "However, we can partially strengthen the allied forces which have gone to the left Vistula bank."

Thus Hindenburg found some willing help at Neusandez when he asked that two cavalry and then two infantry divisions be sent to the Warsaw area. The Aus-Hung. high command immediately placed 3 and 7 CD at his disposal; their presence in the area of the Polish capital was anyway desirable for political reasons. However, Conrad wasn't willing to send infantry divisions so far.

346 German official history, Vol. V, pp. 414, 417 & 448
from his own theater of operations. Nonetheless, he did let 22 ID of XI German Corps (which was relieved on the Vistula by k.k. 35 Lst Inf Bde) and 5 ID of the k.u.k. 1st Corps proceed down river to the area around Solec.

In the next 24 hours, unfavorable reports arrived from the battlefield at Ivangorod, particularly from the sector of the Landwehr Corps. Because the situation here seemed to directly threaten the north wing of the Aus-Hung. front, and because the prospects for a successful cross-river attack by 1st Army seemed doubtful, Col. Metzger suggested to his chief early on the 12th that k.u.k. V Corps of 1st Army should be shifted to the north bank of the Vistula. This idea was consistent with the Germans' wishes.

The necessary orders were issued immediately. GdK Dankl was told to move 5 ID as quickly as possible to the area southeast of Zwolen and to make three other divisions from his Army available to march to Ozarow. The units which remained on the lower San shouldn't cross that river until 4th Army had occupied the opposite bank. 3rd and 2nd Armies were ordered "to throw back the enemy forces south of the Jaroslau-Jaworow road as soon as possible." Once this had happened, 3rd Army would aim for the area Oleszyce-Mosciska, and from here would be available to intervene in 4th Army's action with a flank attack. Conrad hoped that these measures "would bring the enemy's attack over the Vistula to a halt."

Dispositions of the Russians

The Russians' attempts to win freedom of movement beginning on 10 October to protect their "steamroller" as it crossed the Vistula had been tripped up by the German 9th Army. The Russian 4th Army had suffered a setback around Ivangorod which it interpreted as a major defeat. The parts of 2nd Army which had arrived at Warsaw had pulled back temporarily to the line of the outermost fortifications (although not actually compelled to do so by their German opponents, who had halted). Some units (rather more than a corps in strength) had crossed the Vistula at Gora Kalwarja, but then were pulled back over the river by Ivanov because he feared they would be left in an isolated

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347 Because of the very insecure conditions at Ivangorod, the Aus-Hung. mortar batteries which had been moving to 9th German Army were pulled back.
position 349. Very downcast, Ivanov ordered the postponement of further attacks at Warsaw and farther up the Vistula until the deployment of troops in the fortifications and along the river was complete. In the Vistula theater only 4th Army at Ivango rod would continue to exert pressure, in order to keep the enemy from moving any further toward the north.

On 13 October, at the request of Ivanov, the Grand Duke-Generalissimo appeared at HQ of Southwest Front in Cholm. At the instigation of the Grand Duke, it was decided that command of the northern wing of the great offensive force which was still assembling would be transferred to General Russky. Thus he would control the Narew Group, 2nd Army, and 5th Army (the latter had been ordered to the area immediately southeast of Warsaw). Ivanov would command 4th and 9th Armies plus the three Armies still in Galicia. The advance would finally begin after the concentration behind the Vistula and at Warsaw, after so many delays, was completed.

On the 11th and again on the 13th, Ivanov ordered the Galician armies to immediately attack the enemy forces opposing them, and thus to pin down the Austrians in that theater. Brusilov didn't deny the necessity of this operation, but for the time being it was difficult to translate his good intentions into action. Because of the effects of the maneuvers during the first campaign, the Russians in Galicia were still not ready to bear the burdens of a new offensive. None of the corps had recovered yet from marching back and forth through miserable weather on equally miserable roads. Conditions for movement were still very unfavorable, which would delay preparations for an advance. Moreover, since 11 October the 8th Army had been under heavy attack from Böhm-Ermolli's divisions. Although 3rd Army was feeling less pressure from the enemy, it had been weakened because on the 13th the commander of the Southwest Front took its XXV and XIV Corps (with the exception of one division apiece) away from the lower San to reinforce the Vistula front of 9th Army. This necessitated further redeployments among Dimitriev's corps. The new "besieging" Army wasn't capable yet of undertaking an offensive. Several more days would pass before 3rd and 8th Armies would be able to heed Ivanov's appeal for an offensive. In the meantime they would remain on the defensive.

The right wing of the defensive position was well guarded by the San River, still swollen with high water; moreover, the heights on the Russian side (the east bank) were higher than those on the other side. Around the middle of October the following units were deployed (from right to left):

- General Chelnitzky's Group consisted of the two infantry divisions left behind by 9th Army (80 and 46 ID) plus 3 Cauc Coss Div
- XXI Corps, reinforced by 13 ID
- XI, IX and X Corps (the latter including 34 ID), and 7 Cav Div.

To the south, the "besieging" Army, thickly massed together, held the line as far as Mizyniec. Farther left, between Mizyniec and Stary Sambor, were XII, VIII and XXIV Corps. Brussilov had deployed 4 Rifle Bde as a flank guard in the area south of Sambor; 12 CD and 2 Comb Coss Div would provide backup support to the Rifle Bde. The roads leading out of the Forest Carpathians were blocked, as previously, by the Dniester Group (71 ID, 1 and 2 Kuban Coss Divs, and 1 Terek Coss Div). Between the mouth of the San and Stary Sambor, the Russians had 25 1/2 infantry and 7 cavalry divisions (408 battalions and 168 squadrons). Their Austrian opponents had 36 1/2 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions (including Landsturm and fortress troops, these totalled 513 1/12 battalions and 216 squadrons).

Thus the area around the mouth of the San divided the theater of operations into two great battlefields, on which friends and foes fought in quite different roles. On the central Vistula the weak 9th German Army, plus the divisions which Dankl was sending as reinforcements, had to hold off a tremendous Russian force deploying in a relatively small area. South of the mouth of the San, the main body of the Aus-Hung. army was attacking in an attempt to overturn the Russian plans. Although the Austrians hadn't fully recovered their strength from their first difficult trial by fire, they advanced with their accustomed spirit of self-sacrifice into intrepid attacks. Their opponents in Brussilov's regiments were deployed in admirable defensive positions, and had been ordered themselves to later mount a counterattack.

3. Continuation of the attack south of Przemysl (through the intervention of III Corps)

(see volume 1 leaflet 17 and sketches 23 and 23)
On 13 October, the day on which 4th Army made ready to cross the San, the 2nd Army with reinforced strength attacked the Russian positions between the Blozewka and Stary Sambor. FML Krautwald with most of 34 ID targeted the heights east of Nowe Miasto to give VII Corps freedom to maneuver between the Strwiaz and Blozewka. The attack was shattered by the flanking fire of Russian artillery from the Magiera Heights and adjoining hills south of Myziniec. For the same reason the planned attack by 20 Hon ID on Koniow and the Wegrzeliska Hill couldn't be carried out. VII Corps had to be content with the lines it had already established south of Czyszki, at Blozew Grn., and on the western slope of the Wegrzeliska.

South of the Strwiaz, GM Schariczer had ordered Goiginger's Group (32 ID and 103 Lst Inf Bde plus IR # 43 of 34 ID), which had been reinforced by most of 16 ID, to renew their attack on the night of 12-13 October. Parts of 32 ID established themselves in the main Russian positions at Stara Sol, but an enemy counterattack in the morning again flung the Hungarians out of the captured trenches. The 16 ID worked its way forward between Stara Sol and Strzelbice. It was forced to the ground by the heavy fire of Russian guns even before it reached the main enemy positions. 35 ID arrived in front of Strzelbice in the afternoon, after a forced march from Chyrow. The division commander, FML Fox, immediately sent the tired troops to attack Stary Sambor. On this day, however, they couldn't storm the Russian positions on the heights because their artillery had been unable to follow the infantry through the trackless mountain terrain, and also because the anticipated intervention of Tersztyanszky's Group from the south had failed to materialize.

GdK Tersztyanszky had done all he could to support the advance of 35 ID. On the morning of 13 October he ordered Archduke Joseph with 31 ID to attack immediately to the north, over the heights east of Terszow; this would lead to the capture of the key position in the Russian front, Stary Sambor. In the afternoon, 31 ID was marching quickly as ordered out of the Dniester valley when GM Peteani's Group (40 Lst Inf Bde, 1 CD, and IR # 33 from 17 ID) was struck by a heavy Russian counterattack. The Russians recaptured all the ground which Peteani had won and forced him back from the heights south of Stary Sambor through Terszow. To prevent the enemy from advancing farther up the Dniester valley, Archduke Joseph was forced to immediately hurry to the aid of Peteani's hard-pressed group. Meanwhile the time-consuming outflanking maneuver on the far right wing was faltering, although FML Karg made every
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effort to bring 38 Hon ID forward quickly. 8 CD was fighting in an advance position at Zalokiec, where it encountered stubborn resistance by the Russian 12 CD. The enemy was guarding the outlet into the Bystrzycya Valley in order to protect his right wing from being enveloped.

Thus the 2nd Army had been unable to make any decisive progress on 13 October. That evening GdK Böhm-Ermolli demanded that VII and XII Corps should continue their attacks, and he sent Tersztyanszky another urgent call to seek a decision by sending all available forces in the direction of Stary Sambor. 17 ID, which meanwhile had arrived at Chyrow, would deploy on the north wing against the heights at Czyszki; it would help VII Corps move forward between the Blozewka and the Strwiaz.

Early on the morning of 14 October, FML Fox and his 35 ID, on the south wing of XII Corps, attacked the Russian positions between Strzelbice and Stary Sambor. The Division took the Jankow Heights and linked up with Tersztyanszky's Group, but then the attack came to a halt. Simultaneously, Schariczer's Group had renewed the battle for control of the Russian lines north of Strzelbice and on both sides of Stara Sol, but had not made any further progress. As long as our artillery was not in position on the south wing of XII Corps, and the eagerly awaited intervention of Tersztyanszky's Group from the south had still not affected the enemy, GdI Kövess had to be content with these small but dearly bought gains.

South of FML Fox's troops, 31 ID of IV Corps intervened on 14 October in the actions of Peteani's Group. The Division managed to recapture Terszow and to maintain the offensive until our lines again approached the main Russian positions directly south of Stary Sambor. However, the decisive advance over the heights east of Terszow which had been ordered by GdK Tersztyanszky still couldn't be carried out on the 14th because of the diversion of 31 ID to help Peteani.

On Tersztyanszky's extreme right flank the 8 CD, supported by 38 Hon ID, drove 12 Russian CD out of its trenches at Zalokiec. Karg's Group had thus opened the way into the Bystrzca Valley and immediately advanced toward Podbuz.

While GdI Kövess with XII Corps had resumed the attack south of the Strwiaz on 14 October, FML Fail-Griessler was content to hold onto the position already won by VII Corps between Strwiaz and Blozewka, because he wanted to wait for the intervention of 17 ID on his north wing. Early in the morning, GdK Böhm-Ermolli
left his headquarters at Sanok and went through Przemysl and Dobromil to visit the battlefield at Chyrow. He found that the divisions of VII Corps were locked in indecisive combat, and that the Russians were already mounting counterattacks. From the reports of the Corps commander, he deduced that the enemy would not be easily overcome in this sector. Therefore he ordered VII Corps to hold the line it had already reached between Stara Sol and Blozewka, while Fox' Group and (especially) IV Corps continued their attacks.

On the south wing of 3rd Army, FML Tschurtschenthaler's Group (44 LW ID and 88 L-Sch Bde) were engaged on 12 October with parts of XII Russian Corps and one division of XXVIII Corps east of Nizankowice; no substantial ground was gained on this or the following days. North of Przemysl on the 12th, III Corps had driven away the last Russian rear guards and reached the San, while IX Corps - along with XVII Corps of 4th Army - entered Jaroslau that afternoon. From the beginning, Gdi Boroevic was skeptical that he could cross the San in this area; the difficult supply situation of his Army (since the railroads to Przemysl were still broken up) contributed to his doubts. Already on the 13th the Army commander considered transferring the bulk of his Army to the south of the fortress; there he could deploy III Corps and also XI Corps - which meanwhile had halted at Pruchnik - for a decisive attack in the direction Nizankowice-Husakow. However, it was finally decided on the 13th to only send III Corps through the fortress to the area behind Tschurtschenthaler's Group; in the next few days it would join the Group in seeking a decision in the direction of Mosciska. XI Corps took the place of the IIIrd on the San; it arrived as ordered on the evening of the 14th. 4 CD stayed in the second line. The river crossing was further postponed, because the situation had not improved at all. Meanwhile spies were sent to gain some insight into conditions in the rear of the San defenses.

4. The counterattack of 8th Russian Army

(see volume 1 sketch 22, 24, 25, and 26)

Meanwhile the commander of 8th Russian Army had also been active while events unfolded, and was tensely awaiting the moment when

350 According to a report of GM Anton Pitreich, at that time Chief of the General Staff Detachment of 3rd Army
he could again go over to the offensive. Naturally a preliminary condition was that his left wing would have to stand firm against Tersztanszky and against Pflanzer-Baltin's western group under GM Hofmann, which was already becoming a factor. For this purpose Brussilov deployed 4 Rifle Bde south of Stryj against Tersztanszky and 71 ID with its main body around Stryj against Hofmann. Also he sent the two divisions of his Army reserve from Mosciska by railroad through Lemberg to the Mikolajow area: first the 34 ID, then 31 ID. These measures to protect his flank would be substantially in place by the 16th, when the general attack south of Przemysl would begin. However, the strong pressure from the Austrians obliged many of Brussilov's units to mount counterattacks of their own prior to this date.

14 October

On the afternoon of 14 October, while GdK Böhm-Ermolli was returning from his conference with the commanders of the left flank to his headquarters at Sanok, Russian artillery fire rumbled with increasing intensity over the battlefield of Chyrow. In the preceding night, the Russians had made a significant counterattack from the heights of Czyszki against the left wing of k.u.k. 34 ID. They now seemed to be preparing a more powerful attack in the Strwiaz Valley, directed toward the outlet from the mountains at Chyrow. FML Fail-Griessler was concerned, and readied his reserves of 20 Hon ID for this eventuality.

Around noon the Russian XXIV Corps opened its counterattack south of the Strwiaz. The half of 16 ID deployed at Strzelbice felt itself greatly menaced and sent urgent appeals for reinforcement. On the north wing of Schariczer's Group, 103 Lst Inf Bde began to waver. Under pressure of these events, GdI Kövess ordered one regiment of 17 ID, which was supposed to participate in the attack on Czyszki and therefore had marched to the north wing of VII Corps, to return to Chyrow. Meanwhile, however, the quick intervention by Goiginger's reserves had succeeded in halting the retreat of 103 Lst Inf Bde.

Soon thereafter the VIII Russian Corps, between the Strwiaz and Blozeka, also joined the offensive and by evening had caused k.u.k. VII Corps to stagger. The right wing of 20 Hon ID was driven back in the Strwiaz Valley, but was able to move forward again thanks to commitment of the reserves; however, the left

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351 Korolkow, "Overview", pp. 87 f. and 93
wing was still hard pressed. The full fury of the Russian attack fell upon the Honveds' northern neighbor, 34 ID; after a tough fight, that Division had to evacuate its positions in front of Koniow and pull its right wing back to Bloziew Grn. To stiffen the resistance of VII Corps, GdI Kövess placed the bulk of 17 ID at the disposal of FML Csanady and of 34 ID. 105 Lst Inf Bde, which had arrived as the last element of 2nd Army at Chyrow, was to reinforce GM Schariczer's Group. Meanwhile FML Fail-Griessler, who considered the situation of 20 Hon ID to be critical, asked for help in the night of 14-15 October from III Corps, whose HQ had arrived at Nizankowice.

15 October

Early in the morning of 15 October, the Russian VIII Corps renewed its offensive between Strwiaz and Blozewka. 34 ID was able to hold its positions at and north of Blozew Grn. However, 20 Hon ID had to give ground to the enemy in the direction of Chyrow. News of this setback caused earnest concern to the commanders. FML Fail-Griessler demanded that GdI Colerus intervene in the fighting at Chyrow with the entire III Corps. He received the comforting response that 12 Inf Bde of 6 ID had already been sent in motion at 4:00 AM toward Nowe Miasto to provide help. However, it was questionable whether this reinforcement, which couldn't reach the battlefield until the afternoon, would arrive in time. In the critical morning hours of the 15th, FML Csanady reported that 20 Hon ID had already lost much of its combat strength and could not continue to hold on. Informed that the Honveds were retreating, Böhmb-Ermolli ordered his troops to stand their ground under all circumstances, since a retreat in the narrow Strwiaz Valley could have disastrous consequences for the entire Army. To again master the situation, GdI Kövess sent his last reserve, IR # 51, into action. He also ordered FKR # 35, which had been held back at Chyrow, to immediately deploy on the heights at Berezow; thence it could open fire on the left flank of the Russians and keep them from advancing further up the Strwiaz Valley.

Meanwhile the tension around Chyrow was lessening. At noon 34 ID was still standing firm in the marshes of the Blozewka Valley. Supported by parts of 17 ID, the 34th had successfully fended off two attacks during the morning. Also the retreat of 20 Hon ID, which had caused the greatest concern to the commanders' staffs, had been brought to a stop thanks to the intervention of reinforcements. FKR # 35 on the heights by Berezow was now pouring fire into the ranks of the enemy and
preventing them from renewing their advance toward Chyrow. Around 3:00 PM the arrival of 12 Inf Bde from Nizankowice began to have an effect. The Bde was inserted into the middle of VII Corps' shaken front and stiffened the resistance of 34 ID. On the Corps' southern wing the reinforced 20 Hon ID was able to advance again a bit toward the east in the woods north of the Strwiaz. By evening the reinforcements which had rushed in from all sides had staved off the greatest danger and brought the battle between Blozewka and Strwiaz to a standstill. Nonetheless, the situation was still considered far from promising, because FML Csanady declared emphatically that with his badly weakened troops he wouldn't be able to stand firm if the Russians renewed their advance.

While these menacing events unfolded in VII Corps' sector, the two battle groups of XII Corps (led by GM Scharicz and FML Fox) continued their attacks in areas where they were not held fast by Russian counterattacks; however, they didn't gain any new successes.

On the left wing of IV Corps, 31 ID finally began to attack toward Sozan on the morning of the 15th. It received an order from GdK Tersztyanszky "to venture everything, in order to secure a decision today." As the Division advanced on the heights east of Terszow, its right flank was suddenly hit by a counterattack by parts of XXIV Russian Corps; the Hungarians' attack soon came to a halt. On the other hand, the heights southwest of Zwor were taken and held by flanking detachments which Archduke Joseph had sent from the east. On the eastern wing of Tersztyanszky's Group, 38 Hon ID advanced in the Bystrzyca Valley through Podbuz and drove the enemy forces in its way (probably just Cossack detachments) back to Uroz. Thus Karg's flanking group was advancing well and had already gained significant ground.

However, at this point the developments on the right flank of 38 Hon ID became very unclear. 5 Hon CD and 102 Lst Inf Bde, moving toward Borysław, had advanced on 14 October as far as the area south of Zalokiec without meeting resistance. Spies reported that fresh Russian forces were arriving at Drohobycz and Borysław, and advised caution. To protect his rear against enemy attacks, FML Karg therefore weakened his offensive group; he had 8 CD, strengthened by a regiment taken from 38 Hon ID, take up a position at Zalokiec facing east. When 5 Hon CD reached Borysław on 15 October, it found the town and the area to its east free of the Russians. On the other hand, 102 Lst Inf Bde and 8 CD, which advanced that day into the area
northwest of Boryslaw, suddenly found enemy units to their front. When 8 CD saw the Russians, it pulled back again toward Zalokiec. 102 Lst Inf Bde panicked, fled in all directions, and had to be reassembled in the rear. GdK Terszyanszky interpreted these developments as a serious indication that the Russians were attempting an outflanking maneuver, and ordered FML Karg to halt the enemy columns advancing through Boryslaw at Zalokiec.

While the 2nd Army's VII Corps underwent a crisis on 15 October, and XII Corps was mounting fruitless frontal attacks on Stara Sol and Stary Sambor, IV Corps was thus fighting split up among the mountains and was unable to carry out the envelopment of the Russians' left flank. However, there was no reason to despair of ultimate success. An intercepted Russian radio broadcast revealed that General Brussilov had urgently directed the commander of Stryj to immediately pull back the units which he had sent toward Drohobycz back to Stryj; this was because the exhausted 2 Kuban Coss Div could not continue to block the Stryj and Swica Valleys where the rivers flowed out of the mountains. There seemed little likelihood of a Russian counter envelopment from the east, especially since the units which supposedly threatened the flank of IV Corps (probably cavalry detachments and parts of 71 ID) were themselves menaced by GM Hofmann's Group at Skole. Therefore GdK Böhm-Ermolli urged that this Group advance on Stryj as quickly as possible.

The situation also seemed to be improving on 2nd Army's northern wing. In the evening of 15 October, Böhm-Ermolli's headquarters received the glad tidings that the entire III Corps would come through Nowe Miasto to intervene in the action of VII Corps on the next morning.

When GdI Colerus had reported to his own Army commander that the 12 Inf Bde had been diverted to the northern wing of 2nd Army, Boroevic at first forbade him to send any further troops, since this might prejudice the prospects of 3rd Army's own offensive. At Boroevic's HQ it didn't seem that the situation on Böhm-Ermolli's northern wing was so dangerous as to interfere with their own plans. However, in these same hours the alarming reports from 20 Hon ID obliged GdI Kövess to request the AOK through 2nd Army to commit the entire III Corps as reinforcements. The high command concurred, and directed Boroevic that if the Honveds retreated any further he should "direct the attack scheduled for 16 October by III Corps and 44 LW ID in such a direction as to relieve 2nd Army." In the afternoon new and very disquieting reports arrived at 3rd Army.
HQ in Przemysl regarding the situation south of the Blozewka, and forced Boroevic to also cease his resistance to committing III Corps. Toward evening he ordered the Corps to attack through Nowe Miasto toward the southeast and thus to intervene on the flank of 2nd Army's action.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli used the anticipated intervention of III Corps as an opportunity to rally his VII Corps and the southern wing of his Army to resume the offensive. He hoped that the distinguished regiments of the Graz Corps would be strong enough to relieve the pressure that had been building up on 2nd Army in the last few days.

**16-17 October**

The early morning of 16 October was the time at which the enemy Army commander, Brussilov, decided to send his troops into a general offensive. Already at daybreak, before III Corps could attack on 2nd Army's north wing, the pressure from the Russians began to increase. All of the enemy's attempts to attack between Strwiaz and Stary Sambor were shattered; however, Fox' and Schariczer's Groups were tied down and prevented from launching their own offensive. Despite all the anxieties, 20 Hon ID was able to hold its ground with the aid of some reinforcements. On the other hand, 34 ID was forced back and its left wing was rolled up. Once again the front of VII Corps threatened to crumble. Then at the decisive moment the eagerly awaited attack of III Corps made itself felt.

The 11 Inf Bde of 6 ID (FML Gelb) and all of 22 LW ID (GM von Schmidt-Fussina) arrived in Nowe Miasto around 8:00 AM. GdI Boroevic had intended to strike through Wolcza Dl. and Blozew Grn. into the flank of the enemy units between Blozewka and Strwiaz. Because of the Russians' advance from the heights at Czyszki, this plan couldn't be carried out. Instead, GdI Colerus deployed 11 Inf Bde next to 12 Bde at Wolcza Dl. He placed 22 LW ID under FML von Henriquez, and sent it against the slopes at Czyszki. 28 ID (FML Kralicek), which was still on the way, was ordered to deploy behind the left wing of 20 Hon ID; it would advance along with the Honveds against the Wegrzeliska Heights.

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352 FML Henriquez, commander of 17 ID, at this time was leading troops from four different divisions on the extreme north wing of 2nd Army. From VII Corps he had parts of 34 ID and IR # 37 from 17 ID, and also led IR # 2 (from 16 ID) and two battalions of 20 Hon ID.
The attack of 6 ID and 22 LW ID affected the entire front between Strwiaz and Blozewka. 20 Hon ID gained ground toward Felsztyn and the Wegrzeliska Heights. Farther north, 6 ID moved through Wolcza Dl. and Blozew Grn., but couldn't break through to Koniow. 34 ID, relieved by the attack of 22 LW ID, recovered its former positions. Both divisions, however, were kept from advancing further by the Russians' flanking fire from the Czyszki and Magiera Heights. Thus, although the day was filled with bitter combat there was no final decision. The self-sacrificing intervention of III Corps had prevented the threatened breakthrough to Dobromil and Chyrow, and driven the Russians onto the defensive. However, the intrepid defenders of the enemy positions between Blozewka and Strwiaz still held off all our attacks. Boroevic and Böhm-Ermolli ordered the offensive to continue on 17 October. The AOK reallocated the command responsibilities: all units north of the Strwiaz (thus including VII Corps) were placed under GdI Boroevic; the divisions fighting farther south were led by GdK Böhm-Ermolli.

Early on 17 October, VII and III Corps gained a little ground, then came to a halt. Held in check by the Russians on the Magiera and Czyszki Heights to the north and on the Wegrzeliska Heights in the south, the intermingled and improvised battle groups of both corps exhausted themselves in fruitless frontal assaults. Because of the ammunition shortage, the artillery could provide only slight support to the infantry in these difficult actions. In the afternoon, while the troops weakened by the attack paused for breath, there were significant Russian counterattacks on both sides of the Strwiaz and against 22 LW ID, which had worked its way out of the Blozewka valley to the southern slopes of the Czyszki and Magiera Heights. When night fell, III and VII Corps had been completely forced onto the defensive.

Actions south of the Strwiaz

While the series of attacks and counterattacks followed each other between Blozewka and Strwiaz, the combat of XII Corps was more like an extended exchange of fire, that was carried on by both sides with great intensity. In the spirit of the Army command of the evening of the 15th, GdI Kövess had ordered the attack to be "energetically continued" on 16 October. However, on that day XII Corps was unable to gain any significant successes against the enemy's strong positions. GdK Böhm-Ermolli once again demanded in the evening of the 16th that XII Corps maintain its offensive. Nonetheless, the strong
counterattacks by the Russians, who were seeking to break out of their trenches, obliged GdI Kövess on the 17th to restrict the battle groups under his command to holding the lines they already had taken. He was still waiting for a success by III Corps and for the envelopment of the Russian south wing by IV Corps.

On the right wing of 2nd Army there was another succession of attacks, flanking maneuvers and counterattacks. Following the directions of 2nd Army HQ, Tersztyanszky sought to break through to Sambor and Stary Sambor. On the evening of the 15th he ordered Archduke Joseph to again attack most energetically with 31 ID. In the night of 15-16 October, however, parts of the 4th Russian Rifle Bde opened a counterattack on the right flank of 31 ID. In the morning of the 16th the Russians stormed forward a second time and held 31 ID and Peteani's Group in place on the heights by Terszow and in front of the southern approaches to Stary Sambor.

On Tersztyanszky's extreme right wing, 38 Hon ID came up against a new Russian position at Uroz which it wasn't able to overcome. To guard the right flank of the 38th, the 8 CD, 5 Hon CD and remnants of 102 Lst Inf Bde assembled in the Boryslaw area on 16 October. The Russian forces which had been sighted in that sector on the day before had meanwhile disappeared; apparently they were deploying against the flank of 38 Hon ID. Thus Tersztyanszky's Group was still beset by uncertain circumstances, and split up in isolated groups in the mountains between Stary Sambor and Boryslaw.

There was also a broad gap between 31 ID and Karg's Group, which apparently had been detected by the enemy. While 38 Hon ID was engaged at Uroz in an attempt to break into the Dniester plains, on the afternoon of the 16th the Russian 4 Rifle Bde advanced against the weakly held center of IV Corps. FML Karg had to bend the left flank of 38 Hon ID back to the heights north of Stronna. At the same time, the pressure on the right flank of 31 ID was increasing. To prevent this Division from being outflanked, GdK Tersztyanszy (who didn't know that 38 Hon ID was also in a critical situation) ordered FML Karg "to send all available forces against Zwor, while holding the ground already won." This was the end of the outflanking maneuver of Tersztyanszky's Group, which was supposed to be decisive. The stubborn resistance of the Russian 12 CD and 2 Combined Coss

Div, which Brussilov had placed between the Bystrzyca and Boryslaw to guard his flank, and the counterattacks of 4 Rifle Bde had thrown Tersztyanszky's encircling group back onto the defensive 354.

The Russian units continued to attack on 17 October. 38 Hon ID held its ground on the heights by Uroz and north of Stronna, and 31 ID did the same south of Stary Sambor. On the extreme right wing, 5 Hon CD and 8 CD moved from Boryslaw toward the north to protect the flank of 38 Hon ID.

GM Hofmann's Group advances on Stryj

While Böhm-Ermolli's right wing was thus forced onto the defensive between Stary Sambor and Boryslaw, the left wing of Pflanzer-Baltin's forces - GM Hofmann's newly created group - was nearing the city of Stryj.

On 10 October, GM Hofmann had organized the troops assembled west of the Talabor Valley (which totalled about 26 March and Landsturm battalions, 3 squadrons and 4 batteries) under the 55 ID (Col Fleischmann, with 129 and 130 Inf Bdes) and the 131 Inf Bde (Col Berger). On 12 October, Col Fleischmann began to advance from Slawsko and Tucholka; on the 14th he drove his opponent, 2 Kuban Coss Div, back through Skole. On the next day he drove the Cossacks farther back at Synowodsco. 55 ID, which was requested by Böhm-Ermolli to advance as quickly as possible, collided near Lubiniec on the 16th with 71 ID, which had hurried up to support the Kuban Cossacks. However, the Russians were outflanked on the west by 129 Inf Bde, and fell back to Stryj. Col Fleischmann held on his course, and forced the enemy to also evacuate the city, which he entered on 20 October. Berger's (131) Brigade arrived at Stryj the same day, after advancing through the Wyszkow Ridge and Bolechow during continuous actions with parts of 1st Kuban Coss Div.

354 Translator's Note: It was at this time that the Russian 4 Rifle Bde (later a Div) began to emerge as the most formidable opponent of the Austrian forces; between 1914 and 1917 it would take 70,000 prisoners
5. The unsuccessful offensive over the San

(see volume 1 sketch 23)

Meanwhile, in 4th Army's sector the blood of thousands of brave soldiers was reddening the high waters of the San River.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was convinced that the Russians on the right bank of the river were only rear guards, and that the best way to drive them away would be an immediate offensive. He wanted the three corps in the first line (XVII, II and XIV) to accomplish this simultaneously between Jaroslau and Lezajsk. At the very least he wanted XVII Corps to break through at Jaroslau, and provided it with all available heavy batteries; he also hoped that the Corps would receive support from its neighbor, 3rd Army.

14 October

At dawn on the gloomy, cloudy autumn morning of 14 October, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand opened the fighting for the various crossing points on the San with a heavy cannonade. The defiant Russian batteries immediately responded. Soon thereafter there was also a hot exchange of small arms fire between the two banks.

The XVII Corps (19 ID and 41 Hon ID) attempted to cross in the immediate area of Jaroslau. It could not break through because the poor visibility made it impossible for the artillery to effectively silence the strong Russian positions on the east bank.

II Corps also failed to cross the river. The advance elements of 13 LW ID at Nielepkowice were ordered to cross on rafts which the LW regiments themselves had laboriously constructed; they would secure the area so that a bridge could be built to bring over the following units. Under cover of its artillery, the Vienna LW Div advanced to the river bank in the morning twilight. Although they fought for many hours, they had such heavy losses from enemy fire that they had to withdraw from the exposed position on the bank when night fell.

4 ID had no better fortune. It was supposed to cross above Sieniawa, helped by a feigned attack by 25 ID. However, as the heavy bridging equipment was brought up, it sunk up to its axles in the morass; some of it wasn't in position until late
afternoon. Because of the poor visibility and lack of heavy howitzers, here also it was impossible to overcome the Russians in the strong defenses along the river bank. Under these circumstances, 4 ID failed to carry out its crossing.

The action of XIV Corps was more successful, where 8 ID under GM von Fabini was directed to cross to the east bank at Rzuchow. When the first echelon of the Division began to move at dawn, the enemy laid down an overwhelming artillery barrage on the crossing point. At the same time, bursts of machine gun fire swept over the rising waters. Many of the pontoons were hit by the Russians and sank with their crews in the muddy yellow water of the San, or were driven away by the current. Nonetheless some brave units did reach the other bank: FJB # 13, the Ist Bns of KJR # 3 and KJR # 4, and two companies each from IR # 28 and # 59. These weak forces were immediately hit by the Russians' cross fire, but maintained themselves on the eastern bank with heroic stubbornness. It was hoped that further troops could follow, and that by night the entire 8 ID could be brought over the river. However, the heavy enemy fire made it impossible for any further units to cross. XIV Corps HQ, after consultation with Army HQ, brought up 15 ID of VIC orps from Lezajsk to Dembno; there it would seek to move over the San along with 25 ID.

15 October

The bloody battle for possession of the San crossings continued on 15 October. Beginning at daybreak, the entire artillery of 4th Army fired round after round against the Russian positions on the east bank to prepare the way for the three corps to cross the San. 13 LW ID was once again brought down to the river; it made a vain attempt to drive away the Russians dug in on the opposite bank by a fire fight. 4 ID brought its bridging boats into the water at noon, but the hail of enemy fire thwarted all attempts to cross over. The Russian batteries were equally effective against the crossing points at Dembno; they mercilessly pinned down 25 ID and 15 ID (which came up from Lezajsk) on the west bank.

Similarly, XIV Corps failed in all further attempts to ship over reinforcements to the weak forces at Rzuchow. In the evening of 15 October these gallant units were still maintaining themselves on the east bank, but their position was becoming desperate. Pinned down by cross fire, the fully exhausted men were deployed between the flooded San and one of its channels, also at high water; hungry and freezing, they sank up to their hips in the
mud of the swampy ground. The Bozen Division had already lost about 2,000 men, but it remained impossible to send further units to the other bank. Because of this hopeless situation, FML Roth posed a question to his Army commander that evening: "whether the general situation demanded that the crossing of the San at Rzuchow be carried on regardless of conditions." It was unwise to talk about attacking "at any cost", because such an extreme course could have very dire consequences. In this situation, 4th Army HQ advised FML Roth to spare his troops "any excessive casualties." HQ also delegated to XIV Corps the authority to decide for itself whether the detachments which had crossed the San at Rzuchow should be brought back to the west bank.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had not yet given up hope of breaking through at Jaroslau with XVII Corps. However, if the crossing there also failed, he would wait for success by the north wing of 3rd Army. On the evening of the 15th, XVII Corps was able to establish three battalions of 19 ID (FML Lukas) on the east bank opposite Jaroslau. Another five and half battalions were shipped over that night. If bridges could be built over the San under the protection of these advance guard battalions, and a great mass of troops were able to cross, perhaps the Russian lines at Jaroslau would be broken.

16 October

On 16 October the sun spread its rays over the foggy terrain along the San after four weeks of rain; however, it didn't bring any luck to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army. During the course of the day it was possible to build a military bridge and some emergency bridges over the San at Jaroslau; the advance guard of XVII Corps on the east bank was increased to 12 battalions (parts of both 19 ID and 41 Hon ID). These forces, however, were not sufficient to break through the strong Russian positions along the bank. Because of this situation, the intervention of the neighboring IX Corps was awaited with understandable longing.

4th Army HQ had already asked Boroevic to support the attack of XVII Corps on the evening of the 14th. At this point IX Corps had only advanced weak outposts down to the river, and on this day it was redeploying because of the transfer of III Corps to the area south of Przemysl. Its 26 LW ID was at Radymno and 10

355 Schemfil, Das k.u.k. 3. Regiments der Tiroler Kaiser Jaeger im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Bregenz, 1926). pp. 64 ff.
ID upstream from Jaroslau. Because the prospects for crossing the river seemed unfavorable in this sector, FZM Friedel suggested that IX Corps should move to the east bank at Jaroslau behind XVII Corps. However, on the evening of the 15th the AOK ordered Boroevic to "most actively work with" XVII Corps in its combat; therefore he denied the request of IX Corps HQ and told them to begin crossing the San in their own sector as soon as possible. On the evening of the 16th, FZM Friedel was considering whether to cross at Radymno. However, since 4th Army hadn't been able to exploit its success its success at Jaroslau up until that point, and since the bridging equipment couldn't be brought up in time, IX Corps HQ finally decided to postpone the crossing until the morning of the 17th.

While these events were taking place in the XVII and IX Corps' sectors, the southern group of 13 LW ID (LW IR # 1), encouraged by the initial success at Jaroslau, had again placed their rafts in the water at dawn on 16 October. However, the Russians detected this crossing attempt in time and shattered the undertaking with heavy cannon and machine gun fire despite all the self-sacrificing courage of the Vienna Landwehr regiment. 13 LW ID made no further crossing attempts due a lack of bridging equipment.

The battle on 16 October was nothing more than a hot exchange of artillery for the other divisions of II Corps, and for XIV Corps. The course of events to date convinced 4th Army HQ that the prospects were poor for a frontal assault against the strong Russian positions on the east bank, protected by the San. Therefore at noon they ordered II and XIV Corps to avoid isolated attacks which caused heavy casualties. In the afternoon the AOK informed Archduke Joseph Ferdinand that because of the heavy Russian counterattacks at Chyrow the III Corps of 3rd Army would have to be used in direct support of the hard-pressed 2nd Army. Thus there was no longer any prospect of relief by a flank attack by the left wing of 3rd Army, as originally planned. Despite the increasingly unfavorable situation, 4th Army HQ wanted to continue the heavy actions for possession of the San. It was obvious that the Jaroslau area, where parts of XVII Corps were already firmly established on the east bank, would be the starting point for further operations. To make the attack at this decisive point as powerful as possible, Army HQ placed 27 ID of VI Corps and 13 LW ID under FML Kritek on the evening of the 16th. 4th Army ordered further that XVII Corps, reinforced by these units, would first capture all of the old Jaroslau bridgehead; thereafter II, XIV and VI Corps would cross the San (in that order).
In the night of 16-17 October, as the fighting on the San slackened off for II and XIV Corps, brave pioneers brought the last remnants of the advance guard units of 8 ID at Rzuchow back to the west bank along with all their wounded. Meanwhile the fighting at Jaroslau was increasing in intensity for XVII Corps. The portions of 19 ID and 41 Hon ID which had reached the east bank were heavily attacked by the Russians, but were able to hold the ground they had captured.

17 October

In the early morning hours of 17 October, 3rd Army believed the moment had finally come to send half of 26 LW over the San at Radymno. The operation failed because of insufficient artillery preparation, despite the devotion of the Germans and Czechs of LW IR # 9, which suffered heavy losses. This misfortune strengthened the Army commander in his conviction that it was more advisable to seek success south of Przemysl rather than on the San. Since III Corps had been drawn into the actions of 2nd Army and for the foreseeable future would not be available to launch a decisive attack in the Przemysl area, Boroevic returned to an idea of several days earlier: he would send XI Corps to the sector south of the fortress. The Corps would join Tschurtschen-thaler's Group in an attack in the direction of Mosciska. IX Corps would abandon its attempt to cross the river, and instead would take over the defensive sector along the San hitherto held by XI Corps. The AOK agreed to this plan, and simultaneously ordered 4th Army to extend its right wing to a point half way between Jaroslau and Radymno.

However, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was still determined to break the Russians' resistance. Because he finally had a foothold on the east bank at Jaroslau, he anticipated continuing his attack from that point; the fact that the high waters were now receding would be helpful. In this more favorable setting, 41 Hon ID would cross the river directly below Jaroslau on the morning of 18 October while 13 LW ID crossed at Nielepkowice. To enable FML Kritek to bring all his units to the east bank as quickly as possible, new bridging equipment was taken from II and XIV Corps and placed at his disposal. The other corps, which had now abandoned their fruitless crossing attempts, would prepare to resume the offensive as soon as the Army's right wing had extended its penetration on the east bank at Jaroslau.

356 The original text refers to the 9th as a "German Bohemian" unit; however, 23% of the personnel were Czechs.
However, events were to take a different turn. In the night of 17-18 October new orders arrived from the AOK which placed 4th Army on the defensive "to guard the west bank of the San from Przemysl downstream to its mouth."

6. The decision to send 1st Army north of the Vistula

(see volume 1 leaflet 17)

As noted previously, the AOK had ordered the 1st Army to send three further divisions to follow 5 ID, which was already in the area southeast of Zwolen. Therefore the commander of 1st Corps, GdK Kirchbach, was told to proceed through Ozarow with 12, 33 and 46 ID as well as the Polish Legion. 106 Lst ID took up security duty along the Vistula in place of 46 LW ID; 43 LW ID, released from quarantine, took the place of 33 ID under V Corps. Kirchbach's leading units reached the Kamienna on 14 October. Korda's Cavalry Corps (3 and 7 CD) reached the area around Radom after a strenuous ride.

GdI Conrad agreed to place Kirchbach's three divisions under 9th German Army, but only with a heavy heart. Since the disappointments of the first weeks of the war he bitterly mistrusted the selfishness of his allies. At this time he told his aide-de-camp, 1st Lt Kundmann, "The Germans have regularly left us in the lurch. The first time was on a large scale in France, the second was during their two failures to advance on Siedlec."357 Hindenburg's wide extension of his front toward Warsaw - which anyway had been rather limited by extant conditions - was also in the eyes of the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff a sort of "Extra Tour" which more or less fell outside of the bounds of a combined war effort. On the evening of the 14th he told Hindenburg that there could be no question of his sending any further forces to the left bank of the Vistula to follow the four infantry and two cavalry divisions already allotted. If the Colonel General needed further assistance he should either request his own high command for further reserve units or order 8th Army to cooperate more closely by sending further troops to 9th Army or itself advancing over the Narew.

The idea of a flank attack at Ivangoord

357 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 139
In the same hours, however, there arrived new and unfavorable news from the battlefield at Ivangorod. Here the Germans in fact had been unable to drive the Russians completely over to the east bank of the Vistula. Moreover, Cpt Fleischmann, in an apparent attempt to increase Conrad's interest in this sector, painted the position in even blacker colors than were realistic. Fleischmann's warnings had the desired effect. Already on the next morning (the 15th) Conrad was busying himself with the details of a plan for bringing the entire 1st Army to the left bank of the Vistula. The decision to act was made by evening, but the Chief of Staff set certain conditions on the Army's employment. Except for FML Korda's Cavalry Corps, the troops of 1st Army would not move north of the Radomka River, and they would fight only in one body, always under the command of the k.u.k. AOK. The plan was to send them from the south to fall upon the flank of the Russian units who were advancing from Ivangorod. The implementing agreement was sent to the Germans through Cpt Fleischmann on the evening of the 15th.

By coincidence, the same idea of a flank attack from the south had occurred to GdA Gallwitz, commander of the Guard Reserve Corps which was fighting at Ivangorod. Ludendorff, however, felt that it was too dangerous to first voluntarily allow the Russians to move over the Vistula. Moreover, even at best such a maneuver would lead only to a tactical success. In Ludendorff's opinion, a strategic decision could be won only by an attack toward Warsaw by all available German and Austrian troops. However the k.u.k. high command wouldn't go along with this plan. Until the 1st k.u.k. Army assembled on the Ilzanka, the resentful 9th German Army HQ intended to pull its units back from Warsaw and Ivangorod to the line Lowicz-Rawa-Radom (unless they were forced to do so earlier by the enemy).

This decision however was not consistent with Conrad's thinking, since it would allow the enemy to move toward the south rather than enticing him to bring forward his left flank (the target of the Ivangorod plan). Therefore Conrad responded that in his opinion the German units in front of Warsaw should under all

359 German official history, Vol. V, pp. 466 f.
360 GM Max Hoffmann, who at this time was Ludendorff's principal staff officer, felt that the "coup" against Warsaw was "the most brilliant operation of our campaign to date." Thus his opinion was diametrically opposed to Conrad's. See "Die Aufzeichnungen des General-Majors Hoffmann", by K.F. Nowak (Berlin 1926), Vol. I, p. 58.
circumstances hold their ground, and that the units opposite Ivangozod should move toward Warsaw. This would secure the most favorable opportunity for the attack of 1st k.u.k. Army to succeed. Hindenburg made an effort to meet Conrad's wishes on the 16th when he sent GdK Mackensen a "secret situation summary" in which he stated that the "movement to the rear should take place as late as possible." The German commander opposite Warsaw himself had no intention of voluntarily giving up the ground which had cost his men so much blood, even though his two and half corps were facing about five or six Russian corps. On the 18th his detachment was still fending off enemy attacks. The k.u.k. cavalry were already fighting successfully in Mackensen's group: one brigade of 3 CD was in his right wing north of Gora Kalwarja and 7 CD, after a march of 180 km, was in his left wing at Sochaczew.

However, it was clear that the Germans in front of Warsaw could not hold out indefinitely against the threat of being outflanked. At this point the allies reckoned that the enemy had a superiority of 30 infantry divisions in the Polish-Galician theater of operations. There were many reports that a whole enemy Army, the 5th, was moving up from reserve at Lublin to Garwolin whence it could intervene in either the Warsaw or Ivangozod sectors.

Meanwhile the 1st k.u.k. Army had pulled V Corps from the San security forces and set it in march toward the north. Because of the threat to the German 9th Army and the slight successes won by the k.u.k. 4th Army in its vain attempts to cross the San, the Aus-Hung. AOK decided early on the morning of 17 October to have GdK Dankl move the last of his units on the lower San to the left bank of the Vistula. These were X Corps and Hauer's Cavalry Corps (2 and 9 CD). Only 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes would stay in place; they came under command of 4th Army, which now became responsible for securing the San as far as its confluence with the Vistula. That Army would renew its attempt to cross the San after "the action of 3rd and 2nd Armies" was successful. 4th Army was to assemble a strong reserve at Wilcza Wola which could either operate against any Russian attempt to cross the San or reinforce 1st Army, depending on the situation.

Renewal of the command question

The fact that the Aus-Hung. forces directed against Ivangozod were being further strengthened did not prevent the German 9th Army from continuing to seek a united military command in Poland, in which they would give orders to the k.u.k. 1st Army.
The common opinion on Hindenburg's staff was that the offensive against Warsaw, which they considered the only operation that offered much chance of success, had been ruined by the attitude of the Aus-Hung. high command. They shared this opinion with their own high command (OHL) at Mezieres. In the night of 17-18 October the German emperor sent a telegram to his imperial ally with the request that the command question be settled in accordance with Hindenburg's wishes. Emperor-King Franz Joseph advised Archduke Frederick to make concessions "where possible." At Conrad's urging, however, the Archduke advised his supreme war lord that they should not accede to the wish of the German Emperor. The AOK was rightly concerned that the German 9th Army HQ, if placed in charge of 1st Army, might lead it in a fashion contrary to the interests of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the k.u.k. Chief of Staff was still outraged that at the start of the month his ally had refused to place the German 9th Army under overall Aus-Hung. command. Just as Emperor Wilhelm had done on that occasion, now the Habsburg monarch replied in an extremely friendly-sounding telegram; he would not place Dankl under Hindenburg.

Further plans for the Galician sector

While Conrad intended the flank attack on Ivangorod to relieve the situation in Poland, he still was placing the main focus of the campaign on the front in Galicia. Until now the offensive which was supposed to bring a decision had not produced any satisfactory results. Despite great sacrifices, the 4th Army had fought in vain to capture the east bank of the San. Also 3rd Army was bogged down on both sides of Przemysl. The distinguished III Corps, which had tried to break the enemy's line south of the fortress, had been drawn into the frontal assault of 2nd Army, which itself was placed increasingly on the defensive by Russian counterattacks in the last few days. Tersz-tyanszky's Group was split up in mountain fighting, while the Russians were sending further reinforcements to this sector to checkmate the Austrian offensive from this extremely sensitive direction.

361 The diary of the German OHL has this to say about the issue: "The main difficulty in the East stems from the leadership of the allied troops. Time is lost because the Austrians aren't subordinate to us. The Austrian 1st Army would gladly place itself under us. The main hindrance is Conrad. We urgently need a telegram from the Emperor himself to secure the subordination of the Austrian 1st under our 9th Army." (German official history, Vol. V, p. 467)
The supply situation of the k.u.k Armies still left much to be desired. Because so many rail lines had been destroyed in central Galicia, traffic on 10 October had to stop at the stations of Lawoczne, Hajasd, Lupkow, Jaslo, Strzyszow, Czarna and Szczuczin. From these points, munitions and rations had to be hauled to the Armies in wagons and trucks over the atrocious roads. The slow unloading in the crowded rail stations led on 14 October to such serious bottlenecks on the tracks that it was necessary to suspend all further train shipments for 24 hours, even though there was already pressing need for food and ammunition at the front. Thanks to the exertions of the railroad and supply troops as well as civilian rail personnel it was in general possible to master these extraordinary difficulties. However, the reconstruction of the destroyed Csortbadom Viaduct at Hajasd, the San bridges at Zagoz and the Wislok bridges at Rzeszow was very time-consuming. Trains couldn't reach Turka and Przeworsk until the 18th, and Chyrow on the 25th. The line to Przemysl remained broken until 28 October while destroyed bridges were being restored at Ustrzyki Dl., Kroscienko and Nizankowice.

The shortage of ammunition was even more serious than the difficulty in transporting it to the front. The enormous expenditure of ammunition in the long actions of the first weeks of the war had exhausted the stores which had been accumulated in peacetime. The new supplies being produced by our war industries were not nearly sufficient to make up the difference. The shortage of shells for the useful howitzers was particularly vexing.

The insufficient means at the disposal of the high command were now, as in so many other areas, costing the infantry much bloodshed. Supply officers had to dip into the reserve provisions of fortress Przemysl and of the defenses of south Tyrol and Carinthia to overcome the most serious shortages.

The fighting was demanding great exertions from the troops, who had also been beset by bad weather until it finally had improved in the last few days. Hundreds of men were still dying horribly each day in the trenches and hospitals from cholera. Dysentery, typhoid fever and other diseases had also appeared. The campaign's unfavorable effect on troop morale is illustrated by the fact that this was the phase of the war in which there was the relatively largest number of cases of self-mutilation, especially in regiments recruited in areas of backward culture. Despite such incidents, however, most of the troops were still
The suggestion of 3rd Army that its attack should be bolstered by sending XI Corps to the sector of Tschurtschenthaler's Group was gladly approved by the AOK. On 16 and 17 October, GdK Böhm-Ermolli was also submitting plans for continuing the offensive. He wanted to strengthen the striking power of his Army's right wing as much as possible. Böhm-Ermolli wanted Pflanzer's east wing, advancing from Maramaros-Sziget toward Stanislau and Kolomea, to be diverted toward Skole and Stryj to support 2nd Army. Also, he wanted troops of 3rd Army to relieve his VII Corps, which would be transferred to Tersztyanszky's sector. However, Conrad felt that the situation in Poland was too critical to permit these maneuvers, which would take up too much time. The only reinforcement which the right wing of 2nd Army in fact received were three German Austrian Landsturm Territorial Bdes which had been raised in the interior (1st and 2nd Bdes at Vienna, 12th Bde at Linz). They were sent to the Uzsok Pass.

Thus the continuation of the attacks south of Przemysl depended above all on the striking power of the east Galician XI Corps.

7. The offensive of 3rd and 2nd Armies bogs down (18-22 October)

(see volume 1 sketch 26 and 28)

In the night of 17-18 October, before XI Corps began its operation, the Russian VIII Corps opened a new attack on the south wing of the k.u.k. 3rd Army. With full fury they stormed forward from the heights at Czyszki and south of the Blozewka onto the north flank of Colerus' group. In the morning the 22 LW ID had to give way after suffering considerable losses; this uncovered the left wing of 34 ID, which had to evacuate Blozew Grn. The next unit in line, 6 ID, in turn had to pull its north wing back to Wolcza Dl. The Russian attack was approaching nearer and nearer to Nowe Miasto. However, 34 ID stopped the enemy drive west of Blozew Grn and 22 LW ID held firm east of Nowe Miasto.

Farther north, meanwhile, XI Corps had opened its attack along with FML Tschurtschenthaler's Group. The Russian XII Corps offered stubborn resistance. The attackers made only a slight advance at Myziniec and Tyszkowice. A more substantial success
was achieved in the afternoon on the south wing, where the Ist Battalion of Landes-Schützen Regt # I broke into the trenches of the commanding Magiera Heights and overwhelmed the defenders.

The action continued on the 19th. GdI Colerus now ordered the hard-pressed regiments of III and VII Corps to renew their attacks. Because of severe Russian artillery fire from the Wegrzeliska Heights, 20 Hon ID and 28 ID were unable to break through to Felsztyn and Koniow. Parts of 6 and 34 ID were able to retake Blozew Grn. However, the hotly-contested farm house at Antonowka (southeast of Blozew Grn.) and the town of Towarnia — both of which had been made strong points on the north approaches to Wegrzeliska — remained in enemy hands. North of the Blozewka, the 22 ID from Graz advanced to the eastern edge of Sanoczany; on its left the 23 Hon ID, which had been brought up from the Przemysl garrison, reached Hruszatyce. The Magiera Heights were held by 122 Inf Bde against heavy attacks by the Russians, who wished to recover this position which was so important to their own hopes of developing an offensive. In XI Corps, 30 ID captured several stretches of trenches at Myziniec and 11 ID made some headway at Chraplice. Parts of 11 ID also supported the advance of the Landes-Schützen against the much-contested "Baum Heights" by Tyszkowice; after several changes of fortune, the heights were finally secured by an attack personally directed by the commander of 88 L-Sch Bde, GM Prince Schönburg-Hartenstein.

South of 3rd Army, the exhausted XII Corps had already struggled in vain on 16 October in front of the strong positions of Russian XXIV Corps on the heights. Therefore GdI Kövess had refrained from further fruitless attacks and in the next few days sought to wear down his opponents by trench warfare. Only gradually and under great difficulties could the artillery be brought into position in the area of Lysa Gora with its scanty roads. In places where a battery finally began to open fire it was greeted with ringing cheers by the infantry, who in the first decisive attacks had felt abandoned by their sister weapon. The troops of XII Corps, who were now advancing by slow steps to within a few hundred paces of the enemy lines, still suffered every day under the heavy fire of Russian artillery. At night there were enemy counterattacks which alarmed the entire front, led to heavy fire fights, and prevented the occupants of the trenches from getting rest. Under these circumstances, GdI Kövess felt it was impossible to carry out an

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362 By the start of November the monastery at Chyrow was caring for about 11,000 wounded from VII and XII Corps.
offensive using his own forces. The impulse would have to come either from 3rd Army or from Tersztyanszky's Group.

However, the next 24 hours proved that such an impulse could no longer be expected from 3rd Army. The south wing and center of the Army tried to continue the offensive on 20 October, despite the distressing shortage of ammunition that was affecting the entire Aus-Hung. Army. VII and III Corps made no further progress in their attack through the forested area west of the Wegrzeliska and the line Blozew Grn.-Sanoczany-Hruszytce. The regiments of FML Tschurtschenthaler and of XI Corps also stormed the enemy positions in vain; although they made several minor penetrations, they were denied any decisive success. GdI Boroevic didn't hesitate to draw the necessary conclusion from these events, which was anyway true of tactical situations in all periods of military history. Unless sufficient ammunition was available, attacks should only be undertaken in sectors where they could succeed without substantial artillery support.

However, it would be an error to suggest that Brussilov was lightly brushing off the pressure which his opponents were exerting with their last strength. On the contrary, the Russians suffered some anxious days prior to the evening of 20 October, when Boroevic went over to the defensive. Already on 12 October the advance of the k.u.k. 2nd Army had forced General Brussilov to send his reserves (34 and 31 ID of 3rd Army) from the San to Sambor. The advance on Stryj by GM Hofmann's Group, whose strength was greatly exaggerated by the Russians, gave them further concerns. When 2 Kuban Coss Div gave up the outlet from the mountains at Synowodsko, Brussilov hastened to withdraw 78 ID from the "blockading" Army and sent it by rail through Lemberg to Mikolajow 363. Shortly thereafter he learned that Stryj had fallen. At the same time there were fierce attacks and counterattacks south of Przemsyl and Chyrow, during which the XII Russian Corps felt that it was greatly imperilled. Brussilov's staff began to discuss a possible retreat. However the energetic general was not intimidated. To prop up his left wing against encirclement in the area Sambor-Stryj he had available the two divisions summoned from 3rd Army (34 and 31 ID) as well as the 78th. 9 and 10 CD were sent to help the hard-pressed XII Corps, along with 60 ID from the "blockading Army" (which was untroubled by the Austrians, except for a few minor sorties). These reinforcements to XII Corps were joined by 65 ID, transferred by Brussilov from VIII Corps which was not

363 Korolkov, "Overview", pp. 87 ff. and 93
seriously threatened by the enemy. Thus the tenacious Russian commander intended to master the critical situation.

The right wing gives way on the edge of the Carpathians

The right wing of the k.u.k. 2nd Army began to feel the first effects of Brussilov's counter-measures on 18 October; the 5 and 8 CD, which had been sent to guard the flank, collided at Nahujowice (west of Drohobycz) with advance elements of 34 Russian ID, advancing from Sambor. In this sector the 102 Lst Inf Bde, which had melted away to a few companies, was obliged to give way on the 19th. Then the two cavalry divisions also gave up the fight and pulled back to the area southwest of Boryslaw. These events forced 38 Hon ID to bend back its right wing. The enemy continued his attack on the 20th. A larger Russian cavalry force (Combined Coss Div and 12 CD) pressed against the k.u.k. horsemen southwest of Boryslaw. The Russian 34 ID attacked the right wing of 38 Hon ID southeast of Podbuz. Also the right wing of k.u.k. 31 ID suffered under the pressure of Russian 4 Rifle Bde; to strengthen the endangered position the division commander, Archduke Joseph, brought up three battalions from the 2nd Lst Terr Bde (which had arrived at Turka) and two March battalions.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli was meanwhile making every effort to use the flanking position of Tersztyanszky's and Hofmann's Groups to improve the general situation. On the 19th he once again asked the AOK to return VII Corps to his Army for this purpose, but Boroevic prevented this from happening. On the other hand, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin tried to help by ordering Hofmann's Group to send its main body toward Drohobycz to relieve the greatly imperilled IV Corps. In conjunction with this operation, on the evening of the 20th Böhm-Ermolli ordered IV and XII Corps to pin down the enemy in their sectors by continuing their attacks.

However, the offensive by 2nd Army met with no success. In XII Corps, FML Fox and 35 ID fought their way from the Jankow Heights to a point a little closer to Stary Sambor. 31 ID and the Viennese 2 Lst Terr Bde (deployed farther east) also gained a little ground. However, Tersztyanszky's right wing began to crumble. The enemy 34 ID attacked the eastern battle group of 38 Hon ID and, assisted by Russian cavalry, the 5 and 8 CD southwest of Boryslaw. The Honveds were pushed back to Podbuz, and the 5 and 8 CD retreated behind the Bystrzyca.

364 Ibid., pp. 93 ff.
GdK Böhm-Ermolli called up 1 CD from Stary Sambor to Swidnik, and ordered Fox' Group and Tersztyanszky's left wing to provide relief by energetically continuing their offensive. However, Tersztyanszky's lines were now brittle, and gave way again. 38 Hon ID fell back from Podbuz to the heights west of Smolna, thus uncovering the flank of 2 Lst Terr Bde and forcing the center of the Corps to give way. Under these circumstances, Archduke Joseph and FML Fox had to cancel the renewal of their attack, especially since on the night before the 31 ID had already lost the ground it had gained on the Kundieska Heights.

GdK Tersztyanszky cast his eyes in vain toward the east, where he was still awaiting the advance of Hofmann's 55 ID.

Col Drda's Group (129 Bde and parts of 130 Bde) had been sent toward Drohobycz. On 21 October it collided with the 31 Russian ID southeast of the town; under heavy enemy pressure it soon had to turn back to Ulyczno. The other units of Hofmann's Group (131 Bde and the rest of 130 Bde) fared no better. They encountered desperate resistance on 21 October from the Russians' previously defeated 71 ID and 2 Kuban Coss Div at Dobrzany (north of Stryj). That evening the 78 ID, which had been hastily sent by rail to Mikolajow, arrived to support the defenders and immediately launched a counterattack. After a bitter action against the now larger Russian force, the k.u.k. 55 ID had to abandon the briefly recovered city of Stryj on the afternoon of the 22nd. While these actions occurred at Stryj, Col Drda's Group was marching back and forth between Drohobycz and Stryj. Drda had made a new advance toward Drohobycz on the morning of the 22nd, but a command from Hofmann recalled him to attempt a flank attack in the area west of Stryj. However, by this time the situation could no longer be restored. In the night of 22-23 October, Hofmann gave up his offensive and took his badly weakened 55 ID back to a delaying position between Ulyczno and Morszyn.

The advance of the Russian reinforcements (34, 31 and 78 ID) at Podbuz, Borysław and Stryj had destroyed any hope that Hofmann's and Tersztyanszky's Groups could complete their outflanking operations. Based on this turn of events, on the afternoon of 22 October Böhm-Ermolli again urgently requested Conrad to bring parts of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe to Skole, whence they could make a decisive advance on Stryj. At the same time he urged that the troops from 2nd Army who'd been fighting under 3rd Army should return to his command. He told XII Corps that if necessary it should pull its right wing back to the eastern edge of the Jankow Heights and to the hills farther south.
to this position, Tersztyanszky's Group should offer determined resistance between Luezek Grn. and Swidnik until the intervention of the hoped-for reinforcements.

8. The first Russian attack over the San (18-23 October)

(see volume 1 sketch 23 and 27)

The unsatisfactory fighting by the Armies of Böhm-Ermolli and Boroevic was accompanied by a crisis in 4th Army which was depressing more for psychological than for tactical reasons.

As noted above, on 17 October the AOK had ordered Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to take over defense of the San down to its mouth and to hold a strong force in reserve. Therefore he decided to set up the following deployments by 20 October:

- XVII Corps (13 LW ID, 19 ID, 41 Hon ID) from the Jaroslau bridgehead to the mouth of the Wislok;
- II Corps (4 and 25 ID) from XVII Corps' sector nearly as far as Tarnogora, north of Lezajsk;
- 39 Hon ID to a position south of Rudnik;
- 6 and 10 CD between Rudnik and a point south of Nisko (as replacements for 2 and 9 CD - FML von Hauer's Cavalry Group - which were assigned to 1st Army)
- XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID; 11 Hon CD; 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes) in the position hitherto held by X Corps (which would be moving to join the rest of 1st Army);
- VI Corps (15 and 27 ID) would be the Army's reserve, in the area north of Wola Ranizowka.

XIV Corps and 15 ID would pull out of their original positions at the front to move to their new assignments, while XVII and II Corps stretched their lines toward the north. The planned movements, however, were crossed up grievously by the enemy.

Dimitriev, urged by Ivanov and Brussilov, had meanwhile decided to abandon a purely defensive stance. Because of the width of his sector, he felt he was too weak to prepare a wide-reaching operation. However, in each of his Corps areas he brought together "maneuver groups"; their mission was to launch attacks over the San to upset the Austrians' plans and prevent them from transferring further units to the north. There were four maneuver groups: two drawn from XXI Corps (in front of Nisko and Rudnik), one drawn jointly from XI and IX Corps on both sides of the mouth of the Lubaczow, and one from X Corps, which consisted of 9 ID downstream from Radymno. The two groups from XXI Corps
would cross the San in the night of 17-18 October and the group from XI and IX (which was the strongest) would become active 24 hours later. 9 ID would begin operations on the 20th.

18 October

33 Russian ID, crossing upstream from Rudnik on 18 October, first came upon 9 CD (FML Hauer) and the north wing of 39 Hon ID (FML Hadfy). Hauer immediately called 2 CD up to the battlefield; FML Arz, commander of VI Corps, sent about nine battalions under GM Molnar by evening. Two battalions of X Corps' 24 ID, the next unit to the north, joined Molnar's group. However, none of the combined efforts of these units forced the enemy back. The Russians built a bridge over the now-falling waters of the river.

Somewhat later than the force at Rudnik, the Russian 44 ID crossed the San southeast of Nisko. Here also the enemy built a bridge. The battalions of FML von Langer's 24 ID on the scene, reinforced by detachments of 45 LW ID (GM Smekal), were not able to master this intrusion. The area captured by the Russians was so small that X Corps HQ didn't believe it should postpone its departure to the north because of this incident. On the other hand, 1st Army HQ wanted to make sure that its rear was as secure as possible during the upcoming actions north of the Vistula, and ordered X Corps to first drive the Russians from the west bank of the San before rejoining the Army's main body.

In similar fashion the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, who had learned from an intercepted Russian radio broadcast that the Russian crossing attempts were merely a demonstration, ordered that the left bank of the San should be recovered. Therefore FML Roth, who with XIV Corps was marching north and had reached the area northwest of Lezajsk, was told to hurry to assist the troops engaged at Rudnik with his own Corps plus 6 and 10 CD and all available parts of VI Corps, unless the Russians had already been beaten on the 18th. Apparently the 4th Army HQ believed that the situation at Nisko, where it was reported at noon that the Russians were building a bridge, could be mastered by X Corps alone.

19 October

The fighting at Rudnik and Nisko dragged on during the 19th. GM Molnar's Group at Rudnik had won some local successes by attacking in the night and at dawn, but had failed to break through. However FML Arz, who as commander of VI Corps was
overseeing the actions in this sector, felt he was strong enough to do without help from XIV Corps, which was moving down the San. On the other hand, the situation of 24 ID southeast of Nisko was getting worse because the Russians had taken the much-contested village of Nowawies. As a result, GdI Meixner was glad to learn that Roth had decided to intervene with XIV Corps at Nisko rather than Rudnik. This could not happen until the 20th, because FML Roth's tightly massed troops just reached the area around Jezowe on the 19th; his artillery, which was especially needed, was even farther back because it had left its old positions after the infantry.

Meanwhile, the k.u.k. XVII Corps had been unpleasantly surprised on the night of 18-19 October by the Russian attack on both sides of the mouth of the Lubaczowka. The attack penetrated the point at which 41 Hon ID and 13 LW ID came together, and rolled up the flank of the latter division toward the north. The commander of the 13th, FML Kreysa, sent LW IR "Vienna" # 24 to contain the breakthrough. FML Kritek, with the consent of Army HQ, diverted 54 Inf Bde of 27 ID, which had been marching to the assembly area of VI Corps, into the new action. 25 ID, the northern neighbor of 13 LW ID, sent several battalions and some artillery to help out. At noon the XVII Corps pronounced the situation "hopeful." In the event the Russians pulled back somewhat, but still held fast on the western bank of the river.

Although the Russians' crossing of the San was more irritating than serious, it still made the high command very uncomfortable. With scarcely concealed criticism, Col Metzger used the Hughes apparatus 365 to ask the General Staff Detachment of 4th Army HQ how their Army, whose 13 divisions faced 6 or 7 Russian divisions, could "most effectively...change the general situation." GdI Conrad was thinking primarily of an attack by the Army's right wing, which was already standing east of the San at Jaroslau; this would also provide considerable relief to 3rd Army. 4th Army HQ, however, proposed that the Russians should first be driven completely back over the San. Then a force of 3 or 4 divisions could leave the front and assemble on the southern wing as a strong battle group which would be available if needed to intervene in the actions of 3rd Army.

365 After the first weeks of the war, the higher HQ of the Aus-Hung. Army almost always communicated using the Hughes apparatus rather than the telephone. The apparatus allowed dictated messages to be produced on paper tapes that were rolled around spools. Thus both parties would have instant written transcripts of their conversation.
That night the AOK responded to this proposal with an order that betrayed their impatience:

"The fact that the enemy was able to cross the San in four places in the face of the troops of 4th Army indicates that he is confident that he cannot suffer heavy losses. The next task of the 4th Army is not merely to drive the enemy back over the river, but to destroy him using the 10 divisions we have available...By the evening of 20 October there should be no enemy left on the left bank of the San, so that X Corps can march as ordered over the Vistula without further hindrance."

20 October

There was a new Russian crossing attempt on 20 October. 9 ID of X Russian Corps came over the river both up- and downstream of Radymno and dug in after penetrating the positions of 10 ID (in IX Corps, 3rd Army). Our counterattacks were unsuccessful.

At Nielepkowice the Russians had already been very strenuously engaged since the preceding night in an attempt to widen their position west of the San. This forced the defending XVII Corps to use up all of its own reserves and in the morning also the reinforcements it had received. Therefore in the afternoon the HQ of 4th Army decided with a heavy heart to also place its last remaining reserve (part of 29 Inf Bde, which had been pulled out of the San defenses at Lezajsk) under XVII Corps. An observer from the AOK reported that evening that the troops had been fighting day and night for a long time, were very exhausted, and after the unsettling marches back and forth were no longer particularly eager for battle. As elsewhere, the situation of the artillery was especially unfavorable. The gunners had intervened successfully in stemming the Russian offensives, but lacked the ammunition to support the counterattacks which had followed.

Roth's Group, engaged against XXI Russian Corps at Rudnik and Nisko, fared no better than the k.u.k. XVII Corps. GM Molnar's group had attempted to change their luck with an attack at Rudnik in the morning twilight. They had a few dearly-bought local successes, but finally lost ground on the right wing. The situation was so dangerous that FML Roth had to unconditionally release his Group's reserve - seven battalions of 27 ID - to VI Corps. Thus the force in front of Rudnik had grown to 19 battalions and was placed under the direct leadership of GM Kosak, the commander of 27 ID; they made a new attack toward
evening, again without success. At least FML Hauer's two cavalry divisions (2 and 9) could leave the line for employment elsewhere.

Meanwhile XIV Corps had sent its advance elements in the night of 19-20 October to the edge of the woods south and southeast of Nisko, where they could cover the deployment of the artillery as it gradually arrived. At the same time all of IR # 59 was deployed southeast of Nisko, because 24 ID was having difficulty holding its ground east of the town. Thus the 59th was available early on the morning of the 20th to check a heavy Russian attack which drove the defenders west of Nowawies back to the railroad. FML Roth planned to send his main body forward around 5:00 PM, after careful preparation. However, the advance of IR # 59 soon drew all of GM Horsetzky's 3 ID into the action. 8 ID arrived on the battlefield after noon. At 5:00 PM the XIV Corps and parts of X Corps were engaged along the entire front around the Russians' San bridgehead. Even this strong force was unable to prevail, despite heavy sacrifice. The Bozen Division was stuck in the swamp that covered Nowawies toward the south. The Linz Division was engaged in stubborn fighting in the town of Wolina (west of Nowawies) and the woods to its left. IR # 14, separated from the rest of its Division, attacked along with FML Langer's hard-pressed central Galician battalions through Nisko against the enemy's west flank, but couldn't break through.

21 October

FML Roth's attack continued at dawn on the 21st; it was hoped above all that the two wings could advance. The enemy held the Austrians fast, however, by their concentrated fire and especially by flanking shots from the batteries deployed on the higher eastern bank of the San. In the course of the day, FML Roth finally agreed to the suggestion of FML Langer, who said that since the flanks couldn't advance a decision should be sought on the next day in the center, the sector of 3 ID. Despite continuing requests from higher HQ to relieve X Corps from the line, such a course was unthinkable until the enemy had been driven away. At the moment 4th Army had no reserves to commit except for the four cavalry divisions in the area of XIV Corps (2, 6, 9 and 11 CD).

21 October also passed without any noteworthy progress at Rudnik. FML Arz decided to try out a "siege-like attack", which could not take place until the night of 22-23 October. The seven battalions of 27 ID behind the lines would relieve the
most damaged units at the front. There was a report that the Russians had also forded the river 10 km upstream from Rudnik, but fortunately this proved to be only a rumor.

XVII Corps endured very difficult hours on 21 October. FML Kritek had planned to continue the attack using the 29 Inf Bde 366. However, the Russians anticipated him; they brought fresh forces over the San which increased their strength to about one and a half divisions, and themselves opened an attack in the early morning. Soon the Corps HQ was concerned about its imperilled heavy artillery, and considered giving up ground in the direction of Przeworsk. The 41 Hon ID, already partly crippled, and 13 LW ID desperately defended themselves against the enemy, who was admirably supported by his artillery on the eastern bank. The situation began to improve after noon. Battalions of 15 ID intervened under the command of FML Schenk, and the neighboring II Corps – foregoing a river crossing attempt which had been ordered – also sent reinforcements to help. At this point the worst seemed to be over, and the Russians were even being pushed somewhat back.

Meanwhile, detachments of XVII Corps' 19 ID, southeast of Jaroslau, had been obliged to cooperate in the actions around Radymno. Here the 10 ID, strengthened by battalions of 26 LW ID, had driven the Russians over the river south of the latter town. On the other hand, the Russians north of Radymno held stubbornly onto the ground they had won; therefore GdI Boroevic felt he must ask for more powerful help from 19 ID.

The AOK observed the San actions of 4th Army with great concern. The fighting at Ivangorod was growing ever more intense, and thus from hour to hour the departure of all of X Corps from the lower San was of the utmost urgency. On the other side of the front, GdI Conrad felt the moment had come to move parts of IX Corps through Przemysl to the battlefield south of the fortress, because here also the offensive needed fresh energy. Angrily he informed 4th Army HQ:

"In a war against a significantly larger enemy, the overall leadership cannot succeed in a situation in which a strong Army of 10 infantry divisions, supported by 3 divisions from one neighboring Army and 2 from another and thus totalling 15 divisions, spends several days fending off a

366 This Bde's strength had been diluted because two of its battalions had been detached by error to join the fighting at Rudnik.
diversionary attack of a few enemy divisions. This state of operational helplessness in 4th Army, which considers it impossible to cross the river while the enemy has done so with relatively weaker forces, can have the most serious consequences for our other units, both for 9th and 1st Armies in Russian Poland and for 3rd and 2nd Armies south of Przemysl. The situation must be quickly ended.\textsuperscript{367}

After an admonition to hold lower ranking commanders responsible for their inadequacies, the order from AOK continued:

"It is not advisable to attack the enemy who have crossed the river and entrenched themselves, because this will waste time and manpower. It would be much better to cross the river ourselves in neighboring sections and then attack the enemy from the eastern bank....Only the most active intervention by commanders of all ranks can put an end to this crisis of 4th Army, which is most dangerous to our overall situation."

\textbf{22 October}

In the morning of 22 October, GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand instructed XVII and II Corps, as well as FML Roth's Group, to operate as instructed by the latest order from the AOK. Nonetheless, it was felt that Army HQ did not have much faith in the feasibility of the order. The corps commanders continued to present counter-proposals. XVII Corps asked that they first be permitted to continue the attack they had already initiated on our side of the San; they were concerned that the redeployment of some units to create a striking force might be interpreted by the troops as a retreat and harm morale. The attack which was launched together with IX Corps upstream from Jaroslau as well as the attack south of Sieniawa did gain some ground, although they still failed to drive the enemy completely from the west bank. II Corps asserted that it had already given up about a division's worth of men to the XVIIth, and that north of Lezajsk it was threatened by a concentration of Russian troops; therefore it could not risk a river crossing at the present time. Although GM Kosak of 27 ID informed VI Corps that he could forego the attack at Rudnik and himself cross the San at Krzeszow, his Corps commander didn't concur. Therefore the operation planned for that night was postponed until the next morning.

\textsuperscript{367} Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 223 f.
The regiments of FML Roth and the attached portions of the X Corps had once more begun their attack at Nisko early on the 22nd. While 8 ID pinned down the enemy on the right and 24 ID did the same on the left, 3 ID advanced against the middle of the semi-circular Russian line. Each piece of ground was dearly bought, but toward noon the situation at Wolina seemed quite hopeful; the town was fully in the hands of IR #59, and 1,000 Russians had been taken prisoner. Thus the XIV Corps HQ was dismayed when at the same hour a motorist forwarded the Army’s command for an attack over the San. FML Roth objected by telephone, and Army HQ willingly agreed with him. After the enemy had been driven from the west bank, the crossing would proceed without further delay; the main priority was the relief of X Corps, which was so badly needed north of the Vistula.

As evening fell, however, it became evident to XIV Corps HQ that its hopes of a full success on 22 October had been premature, so Roth was planning to resume the offensive on the next day from the positions he had won. However, he received a new order from Army HQ, apparently by telephone. He was to relieve X Corps regardless of the situation at Nisko and Rudnik, and only afterwards was he to cross the San. Roth decided to begin the redeployment on the evening of the 23rd and hoped to complete it on the 25th. X and VI Corps were advised of the new situation on the morning of the 23rd. VI Corps, along with 10 CD, would take over the defense of the San from a point south of Tarnogora to one south of Nisko. XIV Corps, along with 1st and 110 Lst Inf Bdes and 6 CD, would take over the sector hitherto held by X Corps between Nisko and the mouth of the San.

23 October

The actions on the San continued spasmodically on 23 October. That evening GdI Archduke Joseph Ferdinand issued a new order to summarize all of the directives received in the last 24 hours:
\begin{itemize}
  \item XVII Corps would advance on the east bank of the San;
  \item II Corps would mount diversionary attacks;
  \item XIV Corps would relieve the Xth;
  \item VI Corps would take over the sector between the IIInd and XIVth, while creating a strong reserve force.
\end{itemize}
These dispositions were in accordance with the will of the AOK and were supposed to release 4th Army from its crippling inactivity. However, it was doubtful that the troops possessed the necessary strength to carry out an offensive.

Reflections on the state of 4th Army
The disturbing fact that for five days the Army had completely lost the initiative to a demonstrably weaker enemy, and the resultant reproachful remonstrances from the high command caused Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to make inquiries regarding the Army's condition. The results of the inquiries were roughly the same in all units. With a few exceptions the conduct of the troops was described as first rate. The comments of Col von Lerch, the Chief of Staff of XVII Corps, regarding the regiments of his own Corps are pretty much representative of those from other units. Beginning on 4 October the Corps had suffered from the unfavorable weather conditions on the roads and had fought its first actions without its artillery, which was lagging far in the rear. Since 19 October it had been engaged without interruption in a combat of attrition. At this point of the war nationalistic unrest had little effect on the troops, as indicated by the assertion of XVII Corps HQ that of its three divisions the best was 19 ID, with a Czech majority. In similar fashion the X Corps HQ gave unstinted praised to several of its central Galician regiments. The reports indicated that the lack of training for the replacement troops was a negative factor and certainly a major reason for the enormous casualties. In XIV Corps, which had fought as hard as any part of the Army, none of the regiments had much more than 2,000 men left at the end of the actions on the San; most had a combat strength of about 1,500. XVII Corps had lost about 3,000 men in the fighting south of Sieniawa. The crippling lack of officers was also cited. It had become common for reserve ensigns to command companies, and young lieutenants to command battalions. The vigor of such officers was clearly suffering under the unrelenting pressure of their responsibility.

However, these circumstances - except perhaps for the lack of replacement personnel - also affected the enemy; they are not sufficient in themselves to explain the unsatisfactory outcome of the combat on the San. The causes are to be sought primarily in the tactics of the lower level of leadership, which in turn were limited by the inferiority of our artillery. More and more complaints about the insufficiency of artillery support were filling unit reports, even to the point of untruth. The basis of these complaints was the ongoing lack of ammunition. Batteries often had to cease fire in the midst of action because they had only a few shots left. However, the artillery also had insufficient mobility because there was a great lack of horses. These evils led to another, which was to expect more than proper of the infantry. At Rudnik, for example, a force of about one and half Russian infantry divisions confronted an Austrian force with twice as much infantry, including some excellent regiments.
However, neither superior numbers nor the self-sacrificing willingness of individual soldiers was sufficient to prevail against the intervention of the enemy artillery posted on the higher east bank where they couldn't be reached, and against the Russians' masterful use of the terrain.

It would perhaps be an exaggeration to state that the troops were in a state of tactical helplessness during the October campaign of 1914. However, during these weeks the fighters on the San as well as all other Aus-Hung. soldiers had considerable doubts about the correct methods and equipment to be employed. The lessons of the first campaign had already destroyed the faith of both the troops and their leaders in much of what they had learned in peacetime training. However, they had neither the time nor the opportunity to replace their old theories with new ones.

This development, which - as already noted - affected almost all of the Aus-Hung. armed forces in this phase of the campaign, was a major reason why the Russians under Dimitriev were able to pin down superior opposing forces for several days against the will of the k.u.k. AOK. The Russian 3rd Army had forced substantial portions of the Austrian X Corps to postpone their scheduled march to the north, and had also hindered IX Corps from moving to the battlefield south of Pzemysl. Dimitriev's soldiers had certainly achieved as much as could be expected.
E. The Battle of Ivangoled (22–26 October)

1. Dankl attacks the 4th Russian Army

(see volume 1 leaflet 17 and sketches 30, 31, and 32)

Meanwhile the main body of the k.u.k. 1st Army south of Ivangoled had entered into new and heavy actions of decisive importance.

GdK Karl Kirchbach's Ist Corps (5 & 12 ID, 46 LW ID), the first sent to the north, had relieved the German troops on the Vistula upstream from Ivangoled. Further south, 106 Lst ID and 35 Lst Inf Bde were watching the river between Zawichost and Solec, where by 19 October they had allowed 38 German ID (of XI Corps) to go into reserve. Most of FZM Puhallo's V Corps (14 and 33 ID, 43 LW ID) was approaching the Ilzanka on the 19th, while 37 Hon ID reached Tarlow. In accordance with Conrad's plan for an offensive (described above), the AOK ordered GdK Dankl "on 20 October to hold the four divisions coming up from the south [# 14, 33, 37 and 43] on the Ilzanka in readiness for an offensive against the enemy forces advancing out of Ivangoled; Kirchbach's group, along with the Guard Reserve Corps, should pull back toward the west in order to later join the general advance of 1st Army." GdK Dankl intended to mount this attack on 22 October with his left flank through Jedlnia, and for this purpose had arranged with HQ of 9th German Army that the Guard Reserve Corps, then at Kozienice, would cooperate in the operation from the direction of Glowaczew.

As planned, the k.u.k. Ist Corps and the German troops had left their positions on both sides of Ivangoled and at Kozienice in the night of 19–20 October and moved to the west, thus clearing the way for Dankl's thrust to the north. On the evening of the 21st, the seven divisions of 1st Army stood in a wide arc which reached from the mouth of the Ilzanka to east of Radom, opening toward the northeast. They were prepared to pounce upon the Russian columns moving out of the Vistula bridgeheads at Kozienice and Ivangoled. In the Guard Reserve Corps, at this time only 3 Gd ID had reached the left bank of the Radomka at Glowaczew; 1 Gd Res ID spent the night in the area of Radom 368.

Meanwhile the bulk of 9th German Army in front of Warsaw had

368 German official history, Vol. V, pp. 474 f.
fallen back to a line south of Lowicz, Rawa and Nw. Miasto. At Warka its right flank was guarded by the k.u.k. 3 CD, placed under German XX Corps. The extreme left wing was guarded by FML Edler von Korda's Cavalry Corps, which consisted of k.u.k. 7 CD and the German 8 CD. German Landsturm watched the wide area from Lowicz north to the Vistula.

Thus on 21 October the allies had assembled their units for a new action. Hindenburg wanted first to intercept the anticipated Russian attack out of Warsaw, while the k.u.k. 1st Army outside Ivangoerd hit the enemy in the flank and drove him over the Vistula. The role entrusted to GdK Dankl was not without risks. On the one hand, it was hoped that the Russians really would move out of Ivangoerd, but on the other hand a precondition of success was that they did not do so with too large a force. If both hopes were fulfilled, then the boldness of the plan should certainly lead to a great success.

Deployment of the opposing forces

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch had fixed 18 October as the date for the general offensive by the "steamroller" consisting of 2, 5, 4 and 9 Armies. However, the transport of 5th Army by rail from the Lublin area to the Vistula below Warsaw was beset by numerous delays, so the unleashing of the "steamroller" was postponed several times. Meanwhile, the left wing of 2nd Army in front of Warsaw had at least advanced toward the south to open the way over the Vistula for the first elements of 5th Army at Gora Kalwarja. Just downstream from Ivangoerd, the 4th Army had suffered setbacks at the hands of 9th German Army on 10 and 11 October, and since then had engaged in bitter fighting to enlarge the bridgehead on the left bank of the river at Kozienice. Since the Russian high command had learned of the transfer of Aug-Hung. troops toward Ivangoerd and also reckoned on the arrival of German reinforcements, they urged the commanders of both the Fronts to begin the long planned and long postponed general advance from the central Vistula. Before this took place, the Grand Duke received the surprising report that the enemy was pulling back from both Warsaw and Ivangoerd. He believed he had already won the decision, and on 22 October ordered the 2, 5, 4 and 9 Armies to initiate a pursuit toward the line Kutno-Tomaszow on the Pilica-Sandomierz.

Meanwhile the commander of 4th Russian Army, General Evert, had already begun to follow up the withdrawing enemy at Kozienice. On the evening of the 21st the XVII Corps reached the area south of Brzuza and Augustow, while III Caucasian Corps and half of
75 ID reached Garbatka. The advance would continue the next day with all parts of 4th Army. General Evert intended to send the Ural Coss Div and XVI Corps over the bridges at Pawlowice to follow XVII Corps, while the Grenadier Corps and Trans-Baikal Coss Bde crossed the river farther north at Tarnow. 9th Army, which had assembled its main body in the area southeast of Ivangorod, would cross the Vistula with the Guard Corps at Ivangorod, XXV and XIV Corps at Novo Alexandria, and XVIII Corps between Kazimierz and the mouth of the San. However, since the movement of these reinforcements was delayed, the XVII and III Caucasian Corps were advised to only advance to Jedlnia and the area on both sides of the Policzna on 22 October.

Around noon, as the two Russian corps began to carry out this short march, they were surprised by the attack of Dankl's Army.

GdK Dankl had issued his order for the attack at 9:00 AM on 21 October. He assumed that the Russians would follow the allied troops withdrawing from the Gora Pulawska-Kozienice line, and directed that the enemy forces should be driven over the Vistula on 22 October. V Corps should send its western columns through Zwolen and Czarnolas to reach the Zwolen-Gora Pulawska road around 10:00 AM. Ist Corps should move its eastern columns through Zwolen toward Stary Zawada and its western columns along the road through Jedlnia to Kozienice; it would cross the Brzezinki-Jedlnia line around 8:00 AM. The Gd Res Corps (GdA von Gallwitz), which was on the right wing of 9th Army, should envelop the eastern flank of the enemy at Glowaczew as soon as the fighting started. 43 LW ID would march through Kazanow and begin to reach Brzezinki at 10:00 AM; there it would be available as a reserve under 1st Army HQ. At the end of the order for the offensive, it was stated that "The general situation makes it necessary that the Russians should be driven back during the course of 22 October."

Although it was thus Dankl's intention to carry out the thrust to the Vistula on 22 October with all his forces, doubts soon were raised as to whether decisive actions would take place on that day. According to reports received through the evening of the 21st, only Russian advance guards had moved out of Ivangorod and Kozienice toward the south. A message from V Corps stated that several of its reconnaissance patrols had encountered weak enemy units in the forests by Gora Pulawska. There the Russians were building a bridge and had assembled strong forces on the eastern bank of the Vistula. 1st Army HQ at first gave little credence to the testimony about bridge construction at Gora.

Pulawska, but received further warning from an intercepted radio message indicating that XIV Russian Corps would be marching north from Opole to that area on 22 October.

On the evening of the 21st, FZM Puhallo was directed to throw back the enemy forces which had come over the river at Nowo Alexandria and to destroy the alleged bridges at Gora Pulawska. At the same time the Gd Res Corps was requested to intervene on the 22nd, so that if possible it would reach Kozienice at the same time as the left wing of Ist Corps.

22 October

Dankl's Army strode forward early in the morning of 22 October.

FZM Puhallo, the commander of V Corps, wanted to deploy his three divisions (14 and 33 ID, 37 Hon ID) in an oblique order of battle with the right wing forward in echelon; they would advance in one bound to the high ground along the Vistula below Nowo Alexandria, thus gripping the enemy in the flank as deeply as possible. Puhallo believed that an unbroken line inclining toward the right could advance without concern because it was improbable that any major enemy forces could cross the highly swollen river in any location other than the permanent bridgehead at Ivangoz. Just before the advance began, a new detachment which had been sent to reconnoiter the alleged crossing point at Gora Pulawska reported that the weak Russian forces reported in the forests the day before had long disappeared and that there was no sign of bridge construction. Nonetheless, FZM Puhallo adhered to the orders of Army HQ by telling his right wing division - 37 Hon ID - to protect itself from the direction of Gora Pulawska with a strong column under GM Paul Nagy.

Around 10:00 AM the 37 Hon ID and 33 ID had reached the area west of Lagow, 5 ID had crossed the road at Zwolen, and 46 LW ID and 12 ID were approaching the villages of Czarna and Jedlnia. The day seemed to be starting off well. Then there were two surprising reports. The first was that the enemy had crossed the Vistula on a bridge south of Jozefow. The second was that some Russian companies had come over by boat at Kazimierz during the morning. GM Münzel, commander of 35 Lst Inf Bde, sent his sector reserves against the enemy that was supposed to have crossed at Jozefow. FML Weber sent four battalions and two batteries of 37 Hon ID toward Kazimierz with orders to drive the weak Russian forces in that area back over the river. These Russian crossing attempts appeared to be merely demonstrations,
so the advance of Dankl's Army continued undisturbed and in high gear.

Around noon the extreme right wing of 37 Hon ID had turned aside to protect the Army's flank in the direction to Gora Pulawska. Puhallo's other two divisions and Ist Corps continued to move north. The heads of their marching columns were somewhat north of the road running east from Radom through Zwolen to Gora Pulawska, and were approaching the line Czarnolas-Policzna-Zagozdzon-Jedlnia. Suddenly Russian columns appeared on all the lines of march toward the north; apparently they were themselves moving south. The Aus-Hung. divisions quickly deployed for battle, as heavy skirmishing and cannon fire opened up along the entire front. The Battle of Ivangorod had begun.

There was a gap in the Russian dispositions east of Czarnolas to the Vistula, because the Guard Corps had not yet come up from Ivangorod. Here FML Rebracha's k.u.k. 33 ID encountered the first Russian advance guards around 1:00 PM. FML Martiny was commanding 14 ID, the next unit to the east; when he heard that fighting had started, he hastened his advance, and with his left column pushed back a weak enemy force around 3:00 PM. Martiny's right column was meanwhile unopposed as it continued to advance toward Gniewoszow. Elements of Russian 75 ID at Czarnolas, threatened in their flank, abandoned the field and hurried back toward Garbatka. Advance units of 14 and 33 ID pursued the retreating enemy. However, they came up against strong resistance northeast of Policzna, where the lead brigade of the Russian Guard Corps had hurriedly arrived from Ivangorod and enabled the beaten 75 ID to rally.

Meanwhile the Ist k.u.k. Corps was also heavily engaged with the enemy. 5 ID (FML Scotti) was advancing with 9 Inf Bde on the right and 10 Inf Bde on the left; they encountered heavy fire from Russian riflemen at and west of Policzna, which brought their movement to a halt. 46 LW ID (GM Brandner) drove back the Russian advance guards at Susko Wola, but then encountered an enemy force of apparently division strength farther north and could not break its resistance.

The action by FML Kestranek's 12 ID developed hopefully. When its advance guard appeared in front of Jedlnia at 10:00 AM, they found the town barricaded by the Russians. Enemy forces were also sighted north of Jedlnia, where the major highway led through the forest toward Kozienice. FML Kestranek sent his men forward in an enveloping attack on both sides of the enemy, in order to open up the way to Kozienice. At the same time GdK
Karl Kirchbach, the corps commander, asked the German Gd Res Corps to attack from Glowaczew toward Stanislawica; this would cut the Russians units at Jedlnia off from their escape route to Kozienice. Around noon the troops of 12 ID stormed the burning town of Jedlnia and drove the wavering enemy units into the woods south of Augustow. Parts of Russian XVII Corps, coming up as reinforcements from Augustow, were caught up in the precipitate retreat of the advance guards from Jedlnia and fell back to a position directly south of Kozienice; this left the right flank of III Caucasian Corps completely open.

Now the Ist Corps HQ was waiting with great tension for the intervention of the Gd Res Corps. The Russian outposts which had been sent forward to the Radomka west of Stanislawow already felt threatened by German troops from the direction of Brzuza, and retreated to Stanislawica. If 12 ID could keep up its momentum while the Gd Res Corps advanced toward Kozienice as was anxiously expected, the Russian XVII Corps would be assaulted from two sides, separated from III Caucasian Corps, and thrown into the Vistula. However, around 3:00 PM the Gd Res Corps reported that it felt threatened in its flank and rear because of the withdrawal of the Aus-Hung. 3 CD from Warka to Stromiec and because of the appearance of Russian forces on the lower Pilica. Therefore, "an advance in the direction of Stanislawica, for which the Gd Res Corps couldn't use more than a brigade anyway because of its current deployment, was no longer possible today." Due to this uncertain situation, it didn't seem advisable to send the troops of 12 ID forward into the great forest south of Kozienice. When evening finally fell, FML Kestranek's tired regiments were standing in place south of Augustow and Marjanow.

Reactions of the opposing commanders

Under the influence of the first reports that arrived from the battlefield in 1st Army HQ at Ostrowiec, it was believed that the Army was opposed only by advanced Russian reconnaissance detachments. The opinion was the same at HQ of 9th German Army where, as Cpt Fleischmann reported at noon, it appeared that the Russians were not moving strong forces through Ivango rod. However, at 4:00 PM there arrived news from Ist Corps that 46 LW ID had collided with an equally strong enemy force and had come to a halt at Januszno. To enable 46 LW ID to move forward, the Army HQ ordered Ist Corps to have 5 ID outflank this enemy group and advance through Garbatka to Brzeznica. At the same time, FZM Puhallo was ordered to have 33 ID wheel toward its left through Sarnow to Klasztorna Wola, while 14 ID and 37 Hon
ID prevented the Russians from breaking over the Vistula upstream from Gniewoszow.

As far as 1st Army HQ could tell from glancing through the reports received by evening, V Corps had reached the area west of Gora Pulawska and on both sides of Sarnow, and Ist Corps was north of Policzna, Januszno and Augustow and south of Stanislawow. 5 ID had not undertaken the outflanking maneuver against the enemy standing in front of 46 LW ID which Army HQ had ordered at 3:00 PM. Nonetheless, the general situation of 1st Army was deemed favorable. Ist and V Corps reported that their troops had collected increasing numbers of prisoners during the day. Army HQ estimated the strength of the enemy forces defeated on the 22nd as about one and half divisions. Admittedly they had no idea how many additional enemy units were in the Ivangorod bridgehead and in the vicinities of Nowo Alexandria and Kozienice. However, there was no evidence to contradict the impression that "not many Russians were coming out of Ivangorod." It was hoped that by steady work the objectives of the action would be accomplished on 23 October. Moreover, a quick decision seemed all the more necessary since the approach of strong Russian forces in the rear of the Gd Res Corps at Warka made it likely that 1st Army would soon need to intervene over the Radomka. For the next operation, GdK Dankl decided to weaken his right wing in favor of his center; thus the Army's main body could drive northwest on Ivangorod and catch the enemy around Kozienice in a pincers. The orders of 1st Army HQ on the evening of the 22nd incorporated these ideas, and stated:

"On 23 October the 33 ID should blockade the [Ivangorod] fortress on a line between the Vistula and the railroad at Klasztorna Wola. 37 Hon ID, on the Vistula upstream from Opatowka, should prevent the Russians from crossing the river. 14 ID will be placed under Ist Corps and will advance to Policzna. As the Russians are driven away from Ivangorod, Ist Corps will push them back against the Vistula; also it will bottle up the fortress between the railroad and the Vistula west of 33 ID. 43 ID will be placed under Ist Corps and deploy on the Corps' western wing."

The Russians had been fully surprised by the attack of Dankl's Army, which had brought the advance of their XVII and III Caucasian Corps to a standstill on 22 October. General Ivanov now exerted himself to accelerate the river crossing by 9th Army. In the night of 22-23 October the entire Guard Corps
hurried out of Ivangorod and filled the gap that had opened in the Russian line between Czarnolas and the Vistula. Pontoneers finished building a bridge at Nowo Alexandria in the evening, and during the night General Letschitzky sent XXV Corps across in the direction of Gora Pulawska. The Grenadier Corps at Tarnow and XVI Corps at Pawlowice crossed the Vistula more slowly. Expecting these forces to arrive, Generals Evert and Letschitzky both ordered an offensive for the 23rd. The Grenadiers should first advance between Pilica and Radomka to the line Warka-Ryczywol. XVI Corps would reach the Kozienice area and its advance elements would intervene in the fighting by XVII Corps. The XVIIth would drive toward Radom, along with III Caucasian Corps. The Guards would be sent toward Zwolen, and XXV Corps would advance from Gora Pulawska along the road to Zwolen, against the right flank of Dankl's Army. Meanwhile General Letschitzky ordered XIV Corps, still on the east bank of the Vistula, to proceed to Nowo Alexandria by forced marches.

Thus the Army commanders on both sides summoned their men to attack. As dawn approached on the gloomy autumn morning of 23 October, a great encounter battle developed on the fields between the Vistula and the Radomka.

2. The 9th Russian Army intervenes (23-24 October)

(see volume 1 leaflet 18 and sketch 32)

23 October

On the night of 22-23 October, FZM Puhallo instructed 37 Hon ID to prepare to attack Gora Pulawska. He estimated the strength of the Russians who'd come over to the west bank of the Vistula to be currently about two regiments. However, when the Honveds advanced on the morning of the 23rd they soon found that Gora Pulawska was already occupied by a much stronger Russian force. Therefore FZM Puhallo also called up GM Nagy's Group, which on the evening before had driven back some weak Russian units which had crossed at Kazimierz. The intervention of this Group made it possible to prevent the Russians from breaking out of their bridgehead and for the Austrian attack on Gora Pulawska to continue. However, the counterattacks of the Russians intensified around noon on the road toward Zwolen. FZM Puhallo ordered 33 ID to send any available reserves to strengthen 37

Hon ID. The 33 ID could only give up very small forces, since it was itself engaged in heavy actions. Because 14 ID had transferred to Ist Corps, the 33rd was solely responsible for the attack from Czarnolas toward the Vistula. As its left wing approached the southern approaches of Ivangoord it came under heavy artillery fire. Nonetheless, by evening it had captured Sarnow after suffering many casualties. Meanwhile enemy resistance had visibly stiffened against the Division's right wing, where the Russians were positioned in strength on the high ground along the Vistula between Gniewoszow and Gora Pulawska. They were threatening to go over to the offensive.

In accordance with the Army order of the evening of 22 October, the commander of Ist Corps - GdK Kirchbach - sent his units forward in a concentric attack on Kozienice. 5 ID's assignment was to thrust its right wing through Policzna toward the northeast. 46 LW ID should attack with its main body through Bogucin to Brzeznica and its left column east of Augustow toward Kocielki. 12 ID would advance to the area west of Kozienice. Kirchbach intended to use the units which Army HQ had just placed under Ist Corps, the 14 ID and 43 LW ID, to strengthen both of his attacking wings. Thus 14 ID would move through Policzna on the immediate right of 5 ID, while 43 LW ID would first send its main body through Jedlnia and the rest to Zagozdzon.

As ordered, the 9 Inf Bde of 5 ID moved together with 14 ID out of the Policzna area toward the northeast. After a hot action, the Moravian Germans and Czechs of the gallant IR # 93 captured a hamlet north of Policzna from the enemy. Then the Russians' furious defensive fire pinned the attackers to the ground. Farther west, on the north edge of Anielin, 10 Inf Bde had to dig itself in, because parts of III Caucasian Corps had anticipated its attack.

In the center of Ist Corps, GM Brandner and the bulk of his 46 LW ID were held in place east of Zagodzon (on the railroad heading to Ivangoord) by strong pressure from III Caucasian Corps. After the attack of 12 ID gained ground around Augustow, 46 LW ID was also able to resume its attack. The Division drove the enemy out of the land directly north of the railroad and parts forced their way into Bogucin. However, a counterattack by Russian reserves soon drove the Landwehr back to the railroad.

Meanwhile the left wing of Ist Corps was engaged in bitter fighting in the woods. FML Kestranek had sent 12 ID toward
Kozienice in two groups. In this area the XVII Russian Corps was attempting to advance to Marjanow and Augustow. Around noon the right wing group of 12 ID and the detached left column of 46 LW ID collided with the advancing enemy at Augustow. In an impetuous attack the Russians were thrown back and pursued. However, the enemy's heavy artillery fire made it impossible for the regiments of Ist Corps to break through at Kocielki. Meanwhile the defeated enemy group was backed up by the hurriedly committed advance brigade of the Russian XVI Corps and its retreat was halted.

While these events took place on the right wing of 12 ID, its left wing had reached Marjanow. Here the battle group's further advance was halted by heavy fire which suddenly erupted from Stanislawow. 43 LW ID, which had come up from Jedinia on the left of 12 ID, also held its ground in front of Stanislawow and waited for the intervention of the Gd Res Corps. However, the Germans at first could send only their 6 Gd Inf Bde through Glowaczew to Brzuza, because the left wing of 3 Gd ID (5 Gd Inf Bde) was held fast on the left bank of the Radomka by Russian forces advancing north of Ryczywol and at Warka. Finally the 1 Gd Res ID moved up to Glowaczew at noon to take over the defenses toward the north, and the left wing of 3 Gd ID was able to move to the southeast after 6 Gd Bde. This advance threatened the right wing of XVI Russian Corps at Stanislawow, so it quickly pulled back to Kozienice. 43 LW ID and 12 ID were unaware of this favorable change in the situation, and remained in place in front of Stanislawow. Meanwhile air reconnaissance reported that a whole Russian corps was crossing the Vistula at Tarnow, so GdA von Gallwitz ordered 5 Gd Inf Bde to return to the left (north) bank of the Radomka 371.

During these actions in front of Ivangorod, the situation on the western wing of the 9th German Army in front of Lowicz was becoming quite critical because of an outflanking maneuver by greatly superior Russian forces. On the morning of 23 October, GO Hindenburg sent Prince Joachim of Prussia to HQ of 1st k.u.k. Army to report to GdK Dankl that 9th German Army must pull back further. He also asked whether the k.u.k. 1st Army could launch a relief attack over the Pilica.

GdK Dankl was prepared to intervene in the heavy fighting of 9th Army as soon as the enemy in front of Ivangorod was defeated. Meanwhile, however, the prospects in this sector were becoming less favorable. Around noon, Cpt. Fleischmann forwarded a

371 German official history, Vol V., pp. 480 ff.
deciphered Russian radio message which inferred that 8 to 10 Russian infantry divisions had already crossed the Vistula bridges at Nowo Alexandria, Ivangorod and Pawlowice, and that further units were approaching. Late in the morning there was a completely surprising report that the enemy had also built a bridge at Brzescie, upstream from Kazimierz, and was across the Vistula. If this report were true, the eastern wing of the Army was in great danger. An inquiry to V Corps HQ confirmed that the bridge existed. The Chief of Staff of 1st Army (GM Kochanowski) and the Chief of the General Staff Detachment (Col. Freih. von Waldstättten) considered retreat because during the night the enemy would be able to bring over strong forces over the Vistula to create a firm foothold on the west bank. V Corps had no substantial reserves left to drive the Russians back, since they had sent 14 ID to Policzná to attack Koziennice. GdK Dankl, however, was still determined to continue the battle. In the evening he ordered GdK Kirchbach to immediately set troops in motion toward Lagow in support of V Corps. He asked the Gd Res Corps to attack again toward Koziennice, even though the situation in the rear of his German neighbors made it unlikely that they could send any substantial support.

Dankl's staff was thus beset with anxiety and fear when it received news from FZM Puhallo that the situation at Brzescie was still unclear and that V Corps didn't believe it was necessary to retreat yet. Therefore GdK Dankl gave V Corps the authority "to pull back toward Zalazy when necessary."

24 October

FZM Puhallo gave little credence to the enemy threat from Brzescie; therefore he wanted to continue the attack on Gora Pulawska on the morning of 24 October with 37 Hon ID, reinforced by 4 infantry battalions and the howitzer battalion of 33 ID. He was all the more confident because he expected that 14 ID, which had been sent to 1st Corps, would be returned to him. However, the Russian attacks against the right wing of 1st Corps had already been growing stronger in the late evening of the 23rd. A gap developed between 5 and 14 ID, which obliged GdK Kirchbach to recall some of the troops who had been ordered to Lagow to support Puhallo. Nonetheless, the forces assembled at Lagow by early on 24 October consisted of 10 companies from V Corps, a few Landsturm detachments, and the first squadrons of 11 Hon CD, which was coming up from the south. When these troops advanced against Brzescie, they proved that the Russians had only shipped weak forces over the river there.
Meanwhile the 37 Hon ID had attacked east toward Gora Pulawska. During the morning its south wing drove the enemy back toward the Vistula, but the north wing was unable to move ahead. 33 ID had only been able to send one infantry battalion and its howitzers to support 37 Hon ID, because it was confronted by a strong opponent. Around noon the 3rd Russian Grenadier Div began to counterattack out of Gora Pulawska. It was defeated by the powerful artillery fire of the k.u.k. V Corps. Reinforcements joined the Russians during the afternoon. Their 45 ID (of XIV Corps) crossed over from Nowo Alexandria to the west bank of the Vistula and gave new impetus to the attack of XXV Russian Corps. The exhausted Honveds were not able to withstand this new assault by greatly superior forces, and they pulled back to the area east of Lagow. 33 ID was able to hold its ground in front of Gniewoszow; however, in the evening it had to pull back its right wing because of the defeat of 37 Hon ID.

The east wing and center of Ist Corps—14 and 5 ID, 46 LW ID—suffered under the fire of heavy Russian guns throughout the day, and remained pinned down. Russian attacks led to a temporary crisis at Policzna, but were finally staved off by 5 and 14 ID.

On the left wing of Ist Corps, 12 ID and 43 LW ID resumed their attack in the early morning. By noon they fought their way forward to the edge of the woods in front of Stanislawica. Thus they had come up as far as GM Urbanski's Group (parts of 43 and 46 LW ID), which was advancing on Kocielki. Any further attack was precluded by the intense defensive fire of Russian XVII Corps.

Since most of the Gd Res Corps was held in place by the threatening enemy attack from Ryczywol and Warka, only 5 Gd Inf Bde was engaged on the left of the k.u.k. 43 LW ID; the advance of the Guards was halted several kilometers east of Brzuza. In the afternoon the Russians counterattacked on the road from Kozienice and the area farther east. The result was that after oscillating actions the 12 ID, 43 LW ID and Urbanski's Group had to pull back in the evening to Augustow and Stanislawow.

The 1st Army HQ had watched the unfolding events on the Army's eastern flank with increasing tension in the night of 23–24 October. On the morning of the 24th they finally ascertained from Puhallo's report that the Russians had only brought one or

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two battalions over the river at Brzescie and that the V Corps reserve (about 9 companies, 1 squadron and 4 batteries) was deploying to drive them back. From V Corps' further reports it was learned that 37 Hon ID was making progress in its advance on Gora Pulawska. The left wing of Ist Corps was also advancing at this time toward Koziennice. The reports from 35 Lst Inf Bde and 106 Lst ID were also encouraging. The Russians were active around Solec and had occupied a large island in the Vistula upstream from Jozefow with weak forces. However, they had not come over to the west bank of the river; moreover, if necessary the units guarding the Vistula could be reinforced by the advance elements of 2 ID coming up from Sandomierz (BH IR # 4 and a battery, under GM Pöschmann), and by 2 and 9 CD.

Then at 2:00 PM there arrived an unwelcome message from V Corps: "37 Hon ID cannot hold its ground and must pull back." This was all the more troublesome because it was evident that 2 or 3 Russian divisions had established a firm hold on the left bank of the Vistula opposite Nowo Alexandria. Against this superior force, FZM Puhallo had only some insufficient portions of 33 ID available to mount a counterattack from the north. It was feared that the Russian advance could not be stemmed and that 37 Hon ID would soon be outflanked in its temporary new position east of Lagow. In this very precarious situation, GdK Dankl returned 14 ID, which he had taken from the Army's right wing, to FZM Puhallo. He also decided to break off the battle; the order to retreat was issued at 3:00 PM. The Vth and Ist Corps would first pull back to the line Siekierka-Zwolen-Jedlnia-Jastrzebie in the night of 24-25 October. Then, unexpectedly, both corps commanders spoke out against a retreat.

When Ist Corps received Dankl's order to retreat around 5:00 PM, GdK Kirchbach knew that his left wing was still engaged in a fluid combat. He hoped that the fighting in front of Koziennice would turn out favorably, and didn't want to send his troops into a dangerous retreat at night through heavily forested ground as long as V Corps might be able to stand fast. FZM Puhallo also wished to continue fighting. He reported that 37 Hon ID was in good order, that his units formed an unbroken line, and that the flank at Brzescie was secure.

Based on these confident reports from his two corps commanders, GdK Dankl postponed a final decision about retreating for another day. At 8:15 PM he ordered V and I Corps to hold their positions and to report back at 9:00 AM on the 25th whether and when they could resume the offensive.
In these difficult hours for GdK Dankl, the Russians were also not particularly sanguine about their situation. The XXV Corps, which had only been able to hold off the Austrian attacks with difficulty prior to the intervention of XIV Corps, was sitting drained of strength in its camps on the blood-soaked ground of Gora Pulawska. The Guard Corps had struggled in vain in several attempts to break the center of Dankl's Army at Policzna; the neighboring III Caucasian Corps had shown little enthusiasm about supporting the Guard's offensive. The failure of XVII Corps to advance toward Radom was also a source of concern; the many clumps of forest in the sector south of Koziencice had made it difficult to counteract the enemy's tactical maneuvers, and had also impeded employment of the artillery. The hoped-for intervention by the XVI and Grenadier Corps had not taken place. The XVIIth had arrived only in time to prevent the defeat of XVII Corps, while the Grenadiers were very dilatory in their advance between Radomka and Pilica. Despite a considerable superiority in numbers, the situation around Koziencice seemed so tense that General Evert decided to have the bulk of 4th Army stay in place for the time being. He would await the arrival of the Grenadier Corps and the intervention of the left wing of 5th Army from the direction of Warka. On the other hand, General Letschitzky ordered his 9th Army to continue its attack on 25 October. Three of his corps (Guard, XXV and XIV) were supposed to reach the line Sucha-Zwoeln-Siekierka 373.

3. The battle is decided (25–26 October)

(see volume 1 leaflet 18)

25 October

On the morning of 25 October the Russians advanced only with great difficulty and slowly on both sides of the road from Gora Pulawska against the right wing of Dankl's Army, which had been bent back. Stronger pressure from the enemy had become noticeable during the night at Grodek, and had delayed the transfer of 14 ID from this sector to Lagow. By noon 9 battalions of the 14th had assembled behind 37 Hon ID, which was exhausted from fighting. Meanwhile however the Russians coming out of the forests around Tomaszow were already so close to the Honveds' new positions that it was no longer possible to relieve them. Fighting broke out around 3:00 PM northwest of Janowiec;

with the support of the leading troops of 14 ID the 37 Hon ID was able to repulse the enemy.

On the right wing of GdK Kirchbach's Ist Corps, by 5 ID and 46 LW ID, the battle had bogged down into trench warfare. On the Corps' left wing the 12 ID and 43 LW ID resumed their attack toward Kozienice. After their setback on the evening of the 24th, these two divisions found themselves pushed back into the large forests south of Augustow and Marjanow. To win a better position, GdK Kirchbach wanted to capture the towns of Kocielki and Stanislawica. The operation to achieve this goal started vigorously early on the 25th. 12 ID recaptured Augustow in the morning; 43 LW ID reached the eastern edge of Stanislawow and Marjanow. Then however the approach of the autumn night, enemy fire, and the exhaustion of the troops brought the advance to a halt.

On 25 October the 5 Gd Inf Bde was engaged in defensive fighting against greatly superior enemy forces toward the north and east. Between Radomka and Pilica the rest of GdA von Gallwitz' Gd Res Corps - with its left flank covered by parts of XX German Corps and by the k.u.k. 3 CD - attacked the Russian Grenadier Corps. The Germans drove this enemy force back to the north and captured a great number of prisoners 374.

The reports received by 1st Army HQ through the evening of 25 October gave the staff the following picture. On the Army's right wing the situation again seemed to be under control; the enemy was entrenching in front of Gora Pulawska. The relief of the hard-pressed 37 Hon ID by 14 ID was reported to be in progress. The right wing of V Corps was covered by 11 Hon CD, which had come up from the south. In the center the 33, 5 and 46 ID had held and strengthened their positions; the Russian attacks had slackened off in their sectors. 12 ID and 43 LW ID were still attacking toward Kozienice in the morning. Despite having suffered heavy casualties, the mood of Ist Corps remained confident. On the other side, there were signs that the Russians were being worn down. Since the neighboring Gd Res Corps wanted to continue its attack from the west on the 26th to drive the enemy from Radomka, GdK Kirchbach once again urgently advised against a retreat. It was expected that 2 ID from X Corps would appear behind V Corps on 27 October. The two other divisions of X Corps, 24 and 45 ID, would follow from the San on the 29th. Also there were two cavalry units, 2 and 9 CD, riding toward Radom. Because of these altered circumstances, GdK Dankl

374 German official history, Vol. V, p. 482
decided to continue the battle. On the evening of 25 October he ordered the 1st and V Corps' commanders to stand fast until the arrival of X Corps. Perhaps the approaching reinforcements could still wrest the decision from the larger Russian forces.

Meanwhile the changing course of the battle was also monitored by Letschitzky, who looked forward to a victory, and Evert, who feared a defeat. The actions on 25 October had brought no relief to 4th Army, whose position was worsening. The Grenadier Corps, which had been supposed to help Klembowsky's Group (XVII and XVI Corps), had instead been defeated between the Radomka and the Pilica and thrown back toward the Vistula. Neither Klembowsky's Group nor the III Caucasian Corps were in any position to attack; they had either themselves been attacked by the enemy or held fast in their trenches by the Austrians' defensive fire. General Evert even feared that the troops who had been driven back near Kozienice, and who had inadequate means of recrossing the Vistula to their rear, would not be able to hold on. He ordered General Klembowsky to prepare a fall-back position from which a footing on the west bank of the Vistula could be maintained if another setback occurred.

However, the outlook for the 9th Russian Army was perceptibly growing better. On its southern wing the XXV and XIV Corps had won sufficient elbow room to launch a decisive thrust into the enemy's right flank. General Letschitzky ordered both corps to exploit their successes to date by forcefully continuing the offensive.

On the evening of the 25 October, around 8:00 PM, this new Russian attack hit the right wing of the k.u.k. V Corps and drove back 37 Hon ID. The intervention of 14 ID, coming up from Lagow, enabled the wavering Honveds to rally; however, a counterattack in the dark was unable to recover the ground lost to the enemy. Meanwhile, the Russians were beginning to outflank 37 Hon ID from the south; in the evening an attacking enemy column reached Baryczka. 11 Hon CD, which was supposed to protect V Corps' right wing, fell back toward the west.

On the left wing of k.u.k. V Corps, the 33 ID was holding its new positions southwest of Gniewoszow and wasn't attacked in the evening; however, the right wing of its neighbor to the west, 5 ID, was heavily engaged. To open the way to Zwołen on the night of 25-26 October, General Letschitzky ordered the Gd Rifle Bde and parts of 75 ID to break through at Policzna. This enemy

force launched such a heavy blow that the right wing of 5 ID and some troops from 14 ID who'd stayed in this sector were thrown back. A gallant group held onto the walled cemetery at Policzna long enough so that reserves could hurry to the scene and thrust back the dangerous Russian attack.

*(see volume 1 leaflets 17 and 18)*

26 October - The decision to retreat

This fighting which raged in the night of 25-26 October on the right wing of V Corps and in 5 ID's sector was one of several factors that obliged Dankl the next morning to decide on a retreat.

The Russians had begun heavy attacks against the new front of the 9th German Army on the Rawka; although the Germans held off the attacks, their position farther north was no longer tenable. On the evening of the 25th the German liaison officer at Ostrowiec confidentially informed GdK Dankl that a greatly superior enemy force was advancing west between the Rawka and Vistula and threatening to outflank the German left wing. The Gd Res Corps would have to pull back to Jedlinsk by 27 October so that it could transfer to the threatened German left. Moreover, because of the Russian maneuvers the entire 9th Army would probably have to retreat toward the southwest on the 28th.

The impact of this report was all the greater because the k.u.k. 1st Army couldn't linger in front of Ivangorod any longer if its left flank was no longer covered by the German Gd Res Corps. It was learned through trunk-calls that GdI Conrad had suggested to 9th German Army HQ that they should attack over the Pilica with the Gd Res, XX and Landwehr Corps to save the situation in front of Warsaw at the last minute. However, such a bold maneuver, which Hindenburg himself had earlier planned with the k.u.k. 1st Army, was no longer feasible because 1st Army - pinned down in front of Ivangorod - was still not free to guard the Germans' rear.

In the night of 25-26 October, 1st Army HQ heard that the Russians were again attacking the right wing of V Corps and that it would not be possible to relieve 37 Hon ID. The reports of V Corps on the morning of the 26th indicated that the situation on the Army's southern wing was becoming increasingly critical. To top everything else, news arrived that the Russians had established a foothold on the west bank of the Vistula south of the Ilzanka (by Solec). 2 ID, which had been marching toward
Tarlow, had to be diverted against this new threat. Perhaps it would be necessary to employ further units of X Corps just to guard the rear of 1st Army.

And so GdK Dankl saw that the last chances disappear which had induced him to keep the battle going. At 10:00 AM he wired the AOK at Neusandez that "early the next morning he would pull the forces engaged by Ivangorod back to the Ilzanka and the area just northeast of Radom."

**Actions on 26 October**

Meanwhile the fighting was continuing. In the morning Letschitzky sent his three corps forward for a decisive attack. On his right wing, strong forces drove the unit covering Puhallo's flank – 11 Hon CD – back to Siekierka. The Russian 13 CD and 1 Don Coss Div rode upriver along the west bank of the Vistula to outflank the Austrians. On the heights northwest of Janowiec the Russian XXV Corps and parts of the XIVth drove GM Willerding's Group – troops from 14 ID and 37 Hon ID – toward the west. FZM Puhallo ordered GM Willerding to counterattack toward Lagow to re-establish the front. Meanwhile Puhallo reported to Army HQ at 9:00 AM that he had decided to "stand firm whatever happened", and asked that parts of X Corps be brought up to help by forced marches. Soon afterwards, however, it was apparent that the enemy's outflanking maneuver in the south had made the situation extremely critical. Therefore Puhallo gave permission to the groups fighting on the right wing to pull back toward Siekierka and on both sides of Zalazy.

While the Russians were making the position of the south wing of the k.u.k V Corps precarious, they were also approaching ever nearer to the lines of 33 ID. Around noon the Russian Guard infantry delivered a blow that led to the collapse of the Division's line. FZM Puhallo now ordered his whole Corps to retreat toward Kijanka and Zwolen.

1st Army HQ had still not published its order to retreat, but these developments in V Corps' sector finally made publication necessary around 1:00 PM. The order stated that V and Ist Corps should go back to the line Zwolen-Jedlnia by the end of the 26th, and would continue to retreat through Zwolen and Radom on the 27th.

While the stream of events had engulfed V Corps, the 1st Corps was still holding fast. The 5 ID stood its ground by Policzna in a heroic action against the increasing Russian pressure.
However, it had to pull back its right wing when 33 ID was defeated around noon. The left wing of the 5th - 11 Inf Bde - and the neighboring 46 LW ID had been under fire since early morning from heavy guns which the enemy had dragged from the Ivangorod fortress onto the battlefield. Nonetheless, General Evert still held back his Caucasians, because he wanted to wait for progress by Klembowsky's Group. Since dawn Klembowsky had been engaged in bitter fighting against 12 ID, 43 LW ID and the 5 Gd Inf Bde, dug in at Augustow, Marjanow and Sewerynow. Around noon the Russians penetrated the positions of 43 LW ID, but the Division was able to still hold its line by employing all its reserves.

Meanwhile GdK Kirchbach had received Dankl's order to retreat. He wanted to wait until darkness before withdrawing his Corps, but he was overtaken by events. Around 3:00 PM the Russian 47 ID was able to enter the forest west of Augustow and broke through the right wing of 43 LW ID. Threatened in its flank and rear, the Division gave up the action and pulled back to the Leniwa. The retreat of 43 LW ID now forced 12 ID to pull back toward Jedlnia. The commander of Ist Corps had no choice but to order the immediate retreat of his entire force.

While the left wing of Dank's Army thus fell back in the afternoon, the 5 Gd Inf Bde was still in action east of Brzuza; the other troops of the Gd Res Corps between Radomka and Pilica were pursuing the Russian Grenadier Corps, which they had defeated the day before, toward the north. The Russians were moving around the right wing of Dankl's Army and had broken through the middle of his front, and were now also endangering the flank of the Gd Res Corps as it projected far toward the north. The Guard Reserves first learned of Dankl's retreat around 4:30 PM. Despite the muddled situation at the moment

376 This incident led to sharp controversy in post-war literature. See Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 264 ff. German Official History, Vol V. p. 483. GM Hoffmann, "Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten" (Munich, 1923), pp. 60 f. Lt Col Joly, "Wie war es bei Ivangorod?" (in the Reichspost of 25 Dec 1923). Lt Col Oskar Freih. von Wolf-Schneider, "Der Gefreite des Generals Hoffmann" (in Austrian Wehrzeitung for 24 October and 7 and 14 November 1924). Translator's Note - The best quick summary of the incident is in Stone, "Eastern Front", p. 99: "A German communications corporal overheard a message from one Austrian unit to another, to the effect that the Austrians were to retreat, but not to tell their German neighbours that they were doing so. It turns out that this
the battle was broken off, the crisis was mastered.

Rear guards of V Corps continued their brave resistance at Zalazy and Czrnolas until 4:00 PM and made it possible for the Army's right wing to carry out an orderly retreat. Between 4:00 and 5:00 PM the 5 and 46 ID were able to break off contact with the enemy without being disturbed. The Gd Res Corps, whose advance had been already been stopped by GdA Gallwitz in the morning, were also able to disengage in the evening without interference from the Russians. When the k.u.k. troops reached the line from the mouth of the Ilzanka through Zwolen to Jedlnia in the night of 26-27 October, they had already left the enemy behind. The Gd Res Corps reached Glowaczew that night. The Russians had recognized that their opponents were pulling back, but were exhausted from the bloody struggle and content to remain on the battlefield they had won with such exertions. Only 37 Hon ID and 11 Hon CD, on the extreme right wing of Dankl's retreating Army, were sharply harassed by Russian horsemen.

The detachments of XVII Russian Corps which had crossed to the left bank of the Vistula at Solec were held in check by 35 Lst Inf Bde and the advance elements of 2 ID (X Corps), which had hurried to the scene.

The bold maneuver at Ivangorod - to allow the enemy to cross the river and then to strike him before he could deploy all of his numerically superior force - had not succeeded. The Russians had exploited their opportunity by quickly bringing 17 divisions into action; in the last two days of the battle the allies had only 9 and 1/2 divisions to oppose them on the Ivangorod battlefield. The k.u.k. 1st Army command had persevered with the original plan until the last moment with praiseworthy perseverance, and had sent 12,000 captured Russians back to the rear. Several days later the Army commander wrote to his wife: "Although my emotions were greatly opposed to the retreat, my reason forced me to this decision. Despite all the urging of my subordinates, for a whole day I retained the hope that the situation would still improve. However, it did not; the Germans had to pull back, and therefore so must I..." 1st Army had

was bungling rather than bad faith." 377  German official history, Vol. V, p. 484
378  Pastor, "Dankl", pp. 23 ff.  Translator's Note - The Germans, of course, claimed that they had to pull back because the Austrians did. In reality, both of the allies were forced to retreat because they were confronted by overwhelming
suffered casualties of 40,000 to 50,000 men.
F. The Battle of Przemysl-Chyrow, Second Phase (23 October-2 November)

(see volume 1 sketch 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, and 34)

1. Actions of 2nd Army, 23 to 27 October

On the days when the k.u.k. 1st Army was struggling against a superior enemy in front of Ivangorod, GdI Conrad was also facing an unpleasant situation in Galicia. 4th Army was tied down in fighting with the Russians between Jaroslau and Nisko to such an extent that only some of the 1st Army units still on the lower San could be relieved from their positions for transfer to the north bank of the Vistula (these were 2 and 9 CD, 11 Hon CD, and a detachment from X Corps under GM Föschmann – BH IR # 4 plus a battery). Despite the intervention of XI Corps, the attack of 3rd and 2nd Armies had bogged down in front of the strongly constructed Russian lines. The chances of success diminished daily because of the continuing difficulty of bringing up ammunition and the general lack of shells for the artillery.

Only on the eastern wing of the Austrian forces in the Carpathians was there still an opportunity for a decisive success if a new operation could be mounted through Turka and Skole toward the north. However, there were two obstacles in the way of the creation of a new offensive force by GdK Böhm-Ermolli:

. Use of the newly created Armeegruppe Pflanzer-Baltin was hampered by its special mission of guarding the border territories against Romania, and
. Boroevic believed he could not spare VII Corps (which, as noted above, had been attached to him from Böhm-Ermolli).

Conrad sought to change this situation with his orders of the evening of 22 October. He directed 3rd Army to have IX Corps complete the task of driving the enemy forces entrenched on the west bank of the San back over the river; then the Corps would itself advance over the river, if possible, in an outflanking attack toward the southeast. To cover IX Corps, the XVIIth would also thrust forward on the east bank of the San. At the same time, Pflanzer-Baltin was ordered to relieve 2nd Army by sending Hofmann's Group through Borysław; Attem's Group (56 ID and the Polish Legion) would reach Delatyn and Nadworna, then swing northwest through Dolina toward Stryj.

However, while Conrad was thus making efforts to get the operations in Galicia moving again, the situation on the right
wing of 2nd Army was becoming very unfavorable.

After the Russians had succeeded in preventing the Austrians from breaking through their lines south of Przemysl, General Brussilov decided to just hold the line in that sector. On the east wing, however, he would exploit the successes already won by sending XXIV Corps and the Dniester Group to drive back the enemy's right flank in the direction of Skole and Turka.

**Tersztyanszky falls back on Turka**

Already on 22 October the weak units of Hofmann - 55 ID and 131 Inf Bde - had to fall back under heavy pressure from superior Russian forces (31, 78 and 71 ID; 1 and 2 Kuban Coss Divs); they retreated into the mountains at Uliczno and Zulin (see volume 1 sketch 28). The fate of IV Corps was no better. On the 23rd, the Russian 34 ID attacked through Podbuz to Turze; this caused the three cavalry divisions which were guarding Tersztyanszky's right (5, 8 and 1 CD) to fall back up the Stryj valley to Isaje; 38 Hon ID retreated to the heights west of Turze. Since the attacking Russians were pushing continuously south and west around the flank, 2nd Army HQ decided to pull IV Corps back to the heights north of Turka. This would create a gap between IV Corps and the south wing of the XIIth, which would be covered by two of Tersztyanszky's cavalry divisions (5 and 8 CD), by 40 Lst Inf Bde, and by 4 CD (which was transferring from 3rd Army). If these units were insufficient to maintain the connection between IV and XII Corps, and if the Russians attacked over the upper Dniester against the vital communication line running across the Strwiaz valley to Przemysl, Böhm-Ermolli planned to thwart the enemy advance by having IV Corps attack from the south.

Tersztyanszky abandoned his collapsing battle lines on the night of 23-24 October, beginning on the left wing. He was able to save his badly reduced units from encirclement by the enemy only by forced marching and by abandoning guns which were stuck in the mountains. The Russians immediately noted that their opponents were retreating, and Brussilov ordered his flanking divisions to pursue. The advance guards of the Russian 4 Rifle Bde and 34 ID had already appeared in front of Luzek Grn. and Turze on the evening of the 24th. The 2 Combined Coss Div and 12 CD rode through Swidnik up the Stryj valley and sought to reach Turka. The Russians pursued Hofmann's Group with the same eagerness. The right wing of the widely dispersed 55 ID was attacked on 24 October at Uliczno by the 2 Kuban Coss Div, and had to pull back to Orow. On the same day, parts of 1 Kuban Coss Div appeared in front of Mizun Str. and forced a detachment...
of 55 ID back to Zakla. Thus the path through the Mizunka valley into the rear of Hofmann's group was now open to the Russians. Therefore GM Hofmann continued his retreat into the mountains on the night of 24-25 October, and set up a blocking position north of Skole.

Meanwhile, in Tersztyanszky's Group the 31 ID and 38 Hon ID deployed on the heights north and northwest of Turka. 17 Lst Terr Bde, brought up as reinforcements from Uzsok Pass, was on the right side of 31 ID. Still further east, 1 CD covered the right flank of IV Corps and detached HR # 12 with a battery to Zawadka to block the route which led through Rybnik to Mohnate in the rear of the Corps. XII Corps stretched its right wing down to the heights south of Terszow. Between Luzek Grn. and Rozlucz the front was occupied by the weak 40 Lst Inf Bde, the only unit available. To fill this gap, 5 and 8 CD were coming up to Holowiecko; also the 4 CD, which had reached Kroskienko on the evening of the 24th, moved quickly forward the next morning toward Mszaniec.

2nd Army stands on its new line

On 25 October the IV Corps was not disturbed and was able to prepare its new positions for defense. On the other hand, there was serious fighting in the weakly held sector between Tersztyanszky's Corps and the XIIth. The Russian 4 Rifle Bde crossed the Dniester at Luzek Grn. and sought to roll up the right wing of XII Corps from the south. The Russian 34 ID south of the Dniester sent its advance elements forward at Mlyny and pushed back the weak outposts of 40 Lst Inf Bde.

The actions starting at Luzek Grn. and Mlyny indicated that the enemy was preparing to break through between XII and IV Corps. It was doubtful whether the three cavalry divisions moving to the area would suffice to prevent the Russian advance over the upper Dniester. However, GdK Böhm-Ermolli hoped that the commitment of fresh infantry units would enable him to win the decision on his right wing which he had been seeking in vain. Once again on 25 October he asked the high command to return VII Corps, which was still fighting north of the Strwiaz. At the same time he ordered GdK Tersztyanszky to advance again as soon as possible from the south against the flank of the Russians who were attacking on the upper Dniester.

With reference to the apparently critical situation between the XII and IV Corps, Conrad ordered Gdi Boroevic on the same afternoon (25 October) to "support 2nd Army with all available
means and to place at its disposal the available parts of Colerus' Group."

Therefore in the night of 25-26 October GdI Colerus pulled nine weak battalions of VII Corps out of the front between Blozewka and Strwisz, concentrated them at Chyrow, attached an additional March battalion and five batteries, and placed them under FML Krautwald with instructions to move to Lawrow.

Before these reinforcements were in place, the situation of the south wing of 2nd Army grew more critical. On the morning of the 26th the Russians sent 4 Rifle Bde to outflank the k.u.k. XII Corps from the south. The Russian 34 ID, followed by 31 ID, moved farther west between Luzek Grn. and Jasienica. In front of this enemy force, 40 Lst Inf Bde pulled back to Holowiecko, where 5 and 8 CD had arrived the evening before. Meanwhile Fox' Group (the strengthened 35 ID) was heavily attacked and was forced to pull its right wing back to the south slope of the Jankow Heights. To guard Fox' flank, the divisional cavalry squadrons of XII Corps hastened forward from the area west of Stary Sambor, and the 4 CD from Mszaniec. GM Berndt's horsemen - dismounted for the action - fell upon a Russian group which had penetrated to Lawrow and broke it apart; then they established a strong position on the Palczynskie. The divisional cavalry sent by GdI Kövess set themselves up on the Kopyla Heights (northeast of Lawrow), where they could guard the pulled-back flank of XII Corps.

While these actions were raging, Krautwald's Group was marching from Chyrow; they couldn't reach Lawrow until the evening of the 27th. To prevent a breakthrough before these reinforcements could arrive, GdK Böhm-Ermolli sent three March battalions under Lt Col Wejmelka 379 to Mszaniec in the morning of the 26th. On the next day (27 October) the Russians sought to break through to Mszaniec and roll up the south wing of XII Corps. FML Lehmann's Group (5 and 8 CD, 40 Lst Inf Bde) were able to hold onto the heights by Holowiecko, while the outflanking of the front northwest of Stary Sambor was prevented by the steadfastness of 4 CD, the horsemen of XII Corps, and Fox' Group.

In these hours of increasing tension, GdK Böhm-Ermolli reported to the AOK at noon on the 27th that the overall situation was threatening. He did this in the hope that he would achieve the long-sought commitment of the entire VII Corps for a decisive

379 Lt Col Wejmelka was detached from the staff of 2nd Army HQ.
attack on his right wing. However, GdI Conrad replied to 2nd Army HQ that "besides the units already approaching - the two Lst Terr Bdes [1 and 12], Krautwald's Group and some March battalions - the transfer of additional troops was impossible. The AOK confidently awaited a coordinated operation by Krautwald's, Wejmelka's and Tersztynszky's Groups plus the three Cavalry Divisions [5, 8 and 4], which would defeat the enemy's attempt to break the line."

In the evening the troops deployed between XII and IV Corps were still holding off the Russian attacks. Fox's Group gallantly held the Jankow Heights, although they had to commit their last reserves (105 Lst Inf Bde) and overcome several difficult moments. Krautwald's Group was now arriving at Lawrow. In the night of 27-28 October they strengthened the front of 4 CD with three battalions; GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered Krautwald to attack in the direction of the Holownia Heights.

Farther south, the March battalions which 2nd Army HQ ordered up from Ustrzyki Dl. had reached Lehmann's group. Böhm-Ermolli had also sent 2 Lst Terr Bde, hitherto held as a reserve, to Holowiecko to aid Lehmann. Although these reinforcements were numerically weak and had little combat strength, they at least filled up the holes in the front. Meanwhile Tersztynszky had begun to attack at Turka. In the course of 26 and 27 October the 31 ID gained a footing on the heights west of Isaje. 38 Hon ID advanced through the heights by Rozlucz. Both divisions encountered stubborn resistance. Initially the Russians had sent only cavalry - 12 CD and 2 Combined Coss Div - toward Turka to protect the flank of the group attacking farther north. When they learned that the Hungarians were attacking at Turka they quickly sent infantry reinforcements to the scene.

Behind Tersztynszky's Group, the arrival of 1 and 12 Lst Terr Bdes, coming up by rail from the interior, was anticipated. These units would protect the right flank and rear of IV Corps toward the east, because it was doubtful that Hofmann's Group would be able to hold Skole. However, the danger of a Russian thrust through Mochnate no longer existed. The Russians had followed Hofmann's Group by sending 2 Kuban Coss Div and 78 ID to Synowodsko and 1 Kuban Coss Div and 71 ID to Mizun Str.; however, on 27 October they halted their pursuit. Pflanzer-Baltin's advance over the eastern Carpathians compelled the Russians to divert the majority of their Dniester Group toward Dolina and Kalusz to protect the left flank.
2. Relief attacks on both sides of Przemysl, 23–28 October

(see volume 1 sketch 26, 27, and 29)

As the Russian counterattacks on the right wing of the k.u.k. 2nd Army grew stronger daily, GdI Conrad asked 3rd Army HQ on 21 October when and where it planned to resume operations. GdI Boroevic now came forward with new plans for an attack. He wanted to thrust with IX Corps out of Przemysl through Torki (north of Medyka) and destroy the opposing Russian lines. However, the shortage of munitions would first have to be rectified. Also, it was not feasible to concentrate IX Corps in this sector as long as the enemy still was in position on the west bank of the San at Radymno. Thus Boroevic couldn't fix a time when the operation would begin.

Meanwhile trench warfare continued on the hotly contested and blood-soaked ground southeast of Przemysl. The enemy launched probing attacks on the north wing of XI Corps, which were repulsed. The 44 LW ID and 30 ID gained some ground in an attack by Mizyniec. After two days of bitter fighting, these units stormed the castle of Mizyniec and the heights to its northeast on 25 October. These local successes, although won with great self-sacrifice, weren't wearing down the enemy. While the setback on the south wing of 2nd Army made an advance by 3rd Army ever more urgent, the high command suggested to 3rd Army that it seize the Russian positions on the heights by a surprise night attack, if the lack of artillery ammunition made preparation of a large scale set piece offensive impossible.

Therefore GdI Boroevic ordered the entire 3rd Army to sortie forward on 26 October. At 4:30 PM, after a short artillery bombardment, the troops of Generals Colerus, Tschurtschenthaler and Ljubicic all along the front from the Blozewka to Pleszowice came out of their cholera-infested trenches to advance against the strong positions of the enemy. There was no noteworthy success; therefore 3rd Army, weakened by diseases, was finally compelled to go over to the defensive.

Also the k.u.k. 4th Army, which Conrad had already urged on 19 October to attack over the San to relieve 3rd Army, remained stuck on the left bank. On the afternoon of the 23rd, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand ordered FML Kritek to carry out the already discussed thrust over the San at Jaroslau in the night of 24–25 October with the bulk of 13 LW ID, 41 Hon ID, and attached troops of II and VI Corps. By a peculiar coincidence, General Dimitriev had chosen to make the main effort of his own
continuing attacks at the point where Archduke Joseph Ferdinand wanted to withdraw forces for his planned operation.

During 23 October Russian pressure was already intensifying against the north wing of the k.u.k. XVII Corps. Because of the tense situation the II Corps had to divert its reserves to place them at the disposal of its hard-pressed neighbor at Grodzisko. In the morning of the 24th parts of IX Russian Corps moved forward out of their bridgeheads at Nielepkowice. Around evening there followed a more powerful attack by XI Russian Corps upstream from the mouth of the Wislok. After losing a little ground, the Austrians held off both attacks. Then the fighting on the north wing of XVII Corps finally petered out.

FML Kritek now wanted to concentrate an attacking group behind 41 Hon ID to finally launch the much-delayed attack at Jaroslau on the 26th. Meanwhile, however, Boroevic had asked the AOK, "not to pursue two goals at once - the San crossing by IX Corps below Przemysl and that of the XVIIth at Jaroslau - but rather to seek success by concentrating all available units at Radymno." GdI Conrad declared his agreement with this viewpoint and issued the following order to 3rd and 4th Armies on the evening of the 24th:

"Of all the attacks mounted by the enemy over the San, the most irritating to us is the one at Tuczepy; it prevents the wings of 4th and 3rd Armies from taking part in the main decision at Przemysl and blocks the railroad and highway from Jaroslau to Przemysl. To ensure that the enemy is driven away [from this position] the 19 ID with all its available units is placed temporarily under IX Corps. 4th Army HQ will support the action of IX Corps with all available heavy artillery."

On the next day the AOK received an alarming report about FML Kritek's units, which were in seriously weakened condition; during the fighting on the San his group had lost about 10,000 men because of combat casualties, cholera, and other factors. Therefore the AOK instructed 4th Army HQ to restrict the use of XVII Corps, if necessary, to holding the left bank of the San, while placing all superfluous units at the disposal of IX Corps for its offensive.

Early on the morning of the 26th, IX Corps was moving up its attack group to drive the enemy out of the position he'd established on the left bank of the San at Radymno. At this time a new Russian attack took place in the sector of 10 ID and
broke over the Jaroslau-Radymno road. Here some entire detachments - parts of the Czech IR # 36 from Jungbunzlau - gave up to the enemy without offering serious resistance. The shaken battle lines were restored with the help of the Corps' reserve (troops of 26 LW ID). Meanwhile the units designated by XVII Corps to cooperate with our own planned attack - in total twelve battalions from 19 and 4 ID - were also drawn into the affair. A counterattack in the afternoon by parts of IR # 49 and 99 against the Russian right flank drove the enemy back toward the San.

That evening the AOK placed IX Corps under 4th Army at the request of 3rd Army HQ. Informed of the setback to 10 ID, they ordered Archduke Joseph Ferdinand "to prevent any further crossing attempts by the enemy along the San between Przemysl and the river's mouth, and to hold the enemy south of Jaroslau in check so that he cannot operate against 3rd Army."

Thereupon Archduke Joseph Ferdinand ordered IX Corps to resume its attack. In difficult fighting, troops from 4, 19 and 10 ID and from 26 LW ID were able to drive the enemy around Tuczepy back toward the San in one or two areas. This operation, however, brought IX Corps to the end of its combat strength. On 29 October, when the units from 4 ID were pulled from the front for other employment, the Corps desisted from further attacks.

3. Continued fighting on the lower San, 23–26 October

During the fighting at Radymno, there were also new actions on the left wing of 4th Army. Here on the evening of the 23rd Archduke Joseph Ferdinand ordered XIV Corps to take over the task of guarding the San between Nisko and the river's mouth. This would enable X Corps to begin its long-delayed march to rejoin 1st Army in front of Ivangoed. Only 1st and 110 Lst Inf Bdes, plus 6 CD, would stay on the very lowest stretch of the San, while VI Corps would be responsible for guarding the river upstream from Nisko.

Caution would be necessary when these movements began on the evening of the 23rd, because the enemy was vigilant. Early on the 24th the Russians attacked once more at Nisko. After the gallant 3 ID had defeated this attack the X Corps was able to leave the line without interruption.

On the afternoon of the 25th the 4th Army HQ learned from an
intercepted enemy radio message that the 44 Russian ID would make a new attack at Nisko, and that further river crossings were planned for the night of 26–27 October - by 46 Russian ID at Brandwica and 80 ID at Radomysl. In response, VI k.u.k. Corps would pull strong forces out of the line as quickly as possible and assemble them at Jezowe, ready to support the Army's left wing. However, this movement was delayed because VI Corps was troubled by Russian thrusts at Rudnik and further threats to cross the San elsewhere. Finally, on the 26th FML Arz sent 10 CD, now under his command, to the relatively quiet sector at Krzeszow, thus freeing the troops of 39 Hon ID in that area to march to Jezowe.

Before these reinforcements could assemble behind XIV Corps, the Russians sent parts of their XXI Corps to the west bank of the San at Brandwica in the night of 26–27 October. The k.u.k. 8 ID, which had relieved 45 LW ID in this sector, immediately launched a counterattack; it was able to drive the enemy back at the crossing points only after hard fighting. On the next day (early on the 27th), parts of 3 ID shattered a new Russian attack at Nisko.

Therefore the X Corps, which for so long had been pinned down on the San, was able on 25 and 26 October to march behind the line held by XIV Corps and 1st and 110 Lst Inf Bdes to the Vistula bridges at Sandomierz and rejoined 1st Army.

4. The new advance of 2nd Army, 28 October–2 November

(see volume 1 sketch 34)

In the last days of October, while the Armies of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and of GdI Boroevic stayed in place in the San valley and on the hills south of Przemysl, the situation in the Carpathians began to turn in favor of the k.u.k. 2nd Army. Here GdK Böhm-Ermolli, following the orders of the AOK of 27 October, directed that the powerful counterattack which he had been preparing should begin on the 28th. Lehmann's Group (5 and 8 CD, 40 Lst Inf Bde) would attack on both banks of the Dniester along with 2 Lst Terr Bde and Lt Col Wejmelka's three March battalions; Krautwald's Group (troops from 17 and 34 ID) and 4 CD would attack from Lawrow toward Luzek Grn.; IV Corps would continue its advance farther south.

In accordance with these orders, on the afternoon of the 28th
FML Krautwald - after thorough artillery preparation - drove the Russians back from the heights west of Luzek Grn. Meanwhile Wejmelka's March battalions were also advancing from Mszaniec, and along with 5 and 8 CD pushed the enemy back north of Holowiecko. 8 CD advanced as far as Mlyny, while 2 Lst Terr Bde attacked the heights east of Holowiecko. Opposite Tersztyanszky's Group (17 Lst Terr Bde, 1 CD, 31 ID and 38 Hon ID), the Russians were able to hold onto the heights northwest of Isaje and north of Rozlucz. To guard Tersztyanszky's right flank, the 1st Lst Terr Bde was sent to Rybnik, while 12 Lst Terr Bde marched to Skole to strengthen Hofmann's Group.

Thus on the evening of the 28th the situation between the k.u.k. IV and XII Corps was completely favorable. GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided to continue the offensive on the 29th. On this day the 31 ID occupied the Matiu Heights and advanced its left wing toward Mlyny from the south. This threatened to outflank the Russian group on the Laniski Heights from the east; in the night of 29-30 October they evacuated their positions, which 38 Hon ID had been unable to take by frontal assault. Krautwald's Group also made further progress on the 29th. Along with the south wing of XII Corps they drove forward in heavy fighting to the heights west of Terszow and worked their way up to the western slope of Holownia Hill.

The fighting continued on 30 October. On the south wing of XII Corps, Fox' Group was hit by heavy Russian counterattacks, but was able to hold its ground on the heights west of Terszow. FML Krautwald's Group fought its way forward on the Holownia Heights up to the main Russian positions. Its right wing, with Wejmelka's Group, reached the northern edge of Strzylki. Holownia Hill was now being encircled from the south. 40 Lst Inf Bde reached Mlyny. The 5 and 8 CD assembled by the village of Holowiecko. The 2 Lst Terr Bde pushed forward to the Werszki Heights, but couldn't take the Russian position on the hills. Toward evening the 38 Hon ID advanced through Jasiencza Zamkowa, and the left wing of 31 moved forward from the summit of Matiu toward Topolnica; this forced the Russians to evacuate the Werszki Heights.

For 31 October, Böhm-Ermolli ordered the Groups of Fox, Krautwald and Wejmelka to attack the Holownia Heights, while the two Landsturm Brigades on the left bank of the Dniester and 38 Hon ID on the right bank thrust forward to Luzek Grn.

This day brought a decision after four days of persistent offensive actions. Krautwald's Group - supported by Wejmelka's
Group and parts of 2 Lst Terr Bde placed under its command - stormed the important Holownia Heights around noon. Along with the south wing of Fox' Group, Krautwald drove the Russians back over the Dniester at Luzek Grn. and Terszow. Meanwhile 38 Hon ID had advanced to the heights around Topolnica. 31 ID, which didn't encounter serious resistance, was able to send one regiment to Turze and another down the Stryj valley to Swidnik. In the night of 31 October-1 November the Russians in front of the entire south wing of 2nd Army began to retreat.

The advance against the new Russian positions

On the morning of 1 November, Tersztyanszky swung to the east with 31 ID and 76 Bde of 38 Hon ID toward Swidnik and Bystrzyca, to oppose a Russian column which reportedly was marching against the right flank of IV Corps. However, his troops reached their objectives in the evening without encountering enemy resistance. The way into the Russian flank seemed once more to be open. Tersztyanszky's other units - 75 Bde of 38 Hon ID, 2 Lst Terr Bde and the rest of 40 Lst Inf Bde, had meanwhile not advanced further through Topolnica and Luzek grn. The 5 and 8 CD, which had now been placed under Tersztyanszky again, took up a position behind the two Landsturm Bdes. Krautwald's Group established itself firmly on the east slope of Holownia Hill and on the heights directly west of Luzek Grn. Farther north, the south wing of Fox' Group, in conjunction with Krautwald's Group, came up to the Dniester. 4 CD was held in readiness at Lawrow and Lenina wk.

Because of these recent successes, GdK Böhm-Ermolli hoped to continue "a further advance with favorable prospects." In the afternoon he ordered a "pursuit." XII Corps would take possession of Stara Sol and Stary Sambor, while Krautwald's and Tersztyanszky's Groups would advance between the Dniester and Stryj up to the line Koblo Str.-Blazow-Podbuz. At the same time he asked Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe, which was fighting on the northern slopes of the eastern ranges of the "Forest Carpathians" to undertake an energetic attack; he also called upon Boroevic to join the general offensive of 2nd Army. This was Böhm-Ermolli's last attempt to win a decision by falling upon the Russians' southern wing.

In the evening hours of 1 November, Krautwald's and Fox' Groups climbed out of the Dniester valley and moved through the heights east of Luzek Grn. and Terszow toward the north to attack the Russian flank. However, they came up against fresh resistance south of Stary Sambor, on the Kundieska, Lisyj and Zalarski
Heights. The Russians were also standing fast in front of XII Corps between Stary Sambor and Stara Sol. The defeated left wing of Brussilov's Army had rallied to defend itself at Zwor, Podbuz and Boryslaw.

On the morning of the 2nd, GdI Kövess sent the entire XII Corps to attack the main enemy positions between the Blozewka and Stary Sambor. FML Krautwald and his Group moved against the Kundieska Heights and Zwor. Here and there the troops were able to win some ground with their initial onset. However, in the first hours of the morning the attack had already come to a standstill along the entire line in front of the main Russian positions.

While the Army's left wing was again stuck in place, the advance of Tersztyanszky's Group on the right was gaining considerable ground. On the extreme right wing, the 1st Lst Terr Bde marched down the Stryj valley to the area of Rybnik and Schodnica. Archduke Joseph and his 31 ID drove through the abandoned Russian trenches through Zalokiec to a point south of Podbuz. There, however, he came upon Russian works which blocked the way into the Bystrzyca valley toward Sambor. On the left of the 31st, 38 Hon ID moved forward in continuous skirmishing to Stronna, and occupied the Wydilok Heights. Archduke Joseph wanted to continue his offensive with 31 ID against the new Russian positions, but this was not to be. GdK Böhm-Ermolli's attempt to outflank the Russians' left wing, which he had carried on with a fierce determination to win since the operations had begun, had already been overtaken by the development of the general situation.

5. Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe crosses the Carpathians, 22 October-6 November

(see volume 1 sketch 33)

Under Pflanzer-Baltin's group, far away from the scene of operations at Stary Sambor and Turka, in the third week of October the 56 ID (FML Attems) was advancing through the Jablonica Pass toward Delatyn and FML Durski's part of the Polish Legion was moving through the Pantyr Pass toward Nadworna. Their progress was marked by continuous skirmishing against the 1st Terek Coss Div. Even farther removed from the principal battlefield was the detachment of Lt Col Fischer; since the departure of 43 LW ID and 35 Lst Inf Bde from the Bukovina he had carried on a bold guerilla warfare in the province, and had been able to hold onto its capital
(Czernowitz) until 15 September. Now he had once more advanced over the Sereth with his Streifkorps of 3 battalions (Gendarme and Landsturm home defense troops) and re-entered Czernowitz on the evening of 20 October. 380. Behind these advancing units, the 52 ID and 54 ID were assembling at Felső Visso and Kirlibaba. Their movement out of Transylvania had been delayed by the objections of the Hungarian Minister-President, Count Tisza, who didn't want to leave the territory bordering on Romania devoid of troops. The formation and concentration of the Armeegruppe, which had been stamped out of the ground, was a brilliant performance by the Group's energetic commander and his Chief of Staff Colonel Soos.

This was the situation on 22 October when GdK Pflanzer-Baltin received an order from the high command to send Attens' and Durski's groups toward Dolina and Stryj to relieve the k.u.k. 2nd Army. The Polish Legion first moved to Solotwina. For the time being 56 ID had to stay behind at Nadworna to reorganize its supply services, which had been disrupted by the destruction of many of the bridges in the area. Meanwhile the 52 ID (FML Schreitter) had left Felső Visso, and on the 27th had crossed the Jablonica Pass to Tatarow. At this time the 54 ID (FML Schultheisz), which had assembled at Kirlibaba, was marching through Seletin and Uscie Putilla to Kuty. GdK Pflanzer-Baltin, who had established his HQ on the 24th at Maramaros-Sziget, had made both of these units mobile in an extraordinarily short time using all available means (such as trains of oxen); he gave them far-reaching goals. 54 ID would thrust through Kuty to Sniatyn to confront the parts of 7th Russian Army — apparently 64 ID and some Opolcheniye (militia) — which had appeared in north Bukovina. Pflanzer-Baltin sent three battalions by rail to reinforce Lt Col Fischer, whose Group was guarding the line of the Fruth River from Czernowitz to Sniatyn. Pflanzer planned to send 52 ID through Delatyn and Kolomea. However, on the afternoon of 27 October the AOK ordered him to restrict the tasks of the units which had crossed the mountains at Jablonica Pass and farther east to small-scale warfare and defense of the entrances to the Carpathians. The Polish Legion (now at Nadworna-Solotwina) and 56 ID would reinforce and support Hofmann's Group, engaged at Skole.

Pflanzer-Baltin had meanwhile gained the impression that the appearance of 54 ID in front of Kuty had diverted the Russian reinforcements away from Czernowitz toward the southwest, and

380 For his accomplishments, the future GM Fischer was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.
that the appearance of 56 ID at Nadworna had similarly caused the Russians to move units from the front of 55 ID to Stanislau. From the directives of the AOK on 27 October, he had learned that 2nd Army was supposed to halt the enemy's advance on its southern wing by launching a counterattack. Based on these premises, he inquired of Neusandez whether it would be best on the 29th to:

. send 52 ID to seize Kolomea in a coup de main,
. leave 56 ID to guard the lines of communication through the Jablonica Pass to Nadworna, and
. have the Polish Legion advance to Perehinsko to support 55 ID.

Limitations on Pflanzer's operations

Although Conrad appreciated Pflanzer-Baltin's energetic and courageous leadership style, he felt unable to fully exploit the possibilities of the still scanty forces in the Carpathians. The retreat of the allies in Poland and the failure to win a decision in Galicia were already raising new concerns about Romania, where on 10 October King Carol I, a true friend of the Central Powers, had died. Therefore on 28 October the Military Chancellery of Emperor Franz Joseph warned the AOK that they should employ Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe - which was too weak anyway to achieve any decisive success - on its original task of guarding the borders of Transylvania. On the night of 29 October, Pflanzer-Baltin received this order from Neusandez:

"Durski's Group - 56, 52 and 54 ID - should discontinue their offensive. Deploy the main body so that it can fulfill its primary mission of defending the Carpathians. Rail transport may soon be available for Durski's Group. Perhaps transport can also be arranged for the units which had come from Transylvania."

Following this restrictive order from Conrad, Pflanzer-Baltin now pulled his forces back closer to the Carpathian passes. By 30 October, 56 ID and the Polish Legion were supposed to be at Delatyn, 52 ID at Tatarow and 54 ID at Kuty. However, before the new orders even reached all the units spread out widely through the mountains, they were already engaged with the enemy.

For General Brussilov had meanwhile directed parts of the Dniester Group - half of 78 ID and half of 71 ID - to move from Skole to Stanislau. The Polish Legion and 56 ID had already been heavily attacked north of Nadworna on 29 October, and in the evening they were thrown back into the mountains after

381 Korolkow, "Overview", pp. 96 f.
suffering heavy losses. In the next few days FML Durski and his Poles fell back through Pasieczna to Rafailowa. 56 ID conducted a fighting retreat through Delatyn back to Mikuliczyn, where on 31 October it established contact with 52 ID, which was coming up to Tatarow.

The 54 ID received the order to pull back to Kuty on 31 October. At this time it had already reached Sniatyn and on the 30th had driven a weaker enemy force back between Kosow and Zablotow.

Meanwhile the right wing of 2nd Army had been able to go over to the offensive again. Because of this change in the situation and a request from GdK Böhm-Ermolli (noted above), on 1 November Pflanzer-Baltin ordered Hofmann's Group – reinforced by several Landsturm and March battalions and by 12 Lst Terr Bde – to make a new attack toward Stryj in cooperation with IV Corps. After some hard fighting, on 4 November the 55 ID was able to drive the Russians (half of 71 ID, half of 78 ID and 2 Kuban Coss Div) from the heights at Synowodsko. However, 131 Inf Bde, which had been sent to Bolechow, was thrown by an enemy counterattack back to Mizun Str. GM Hofmann ceased his attack on the 5th. Because of the general situation, he now received an order not to proceed further through the outlet from the mountains at Synowodsko, but rather to be content with guarding the Carpathian passes.

The Russians followed 56 and 52 ID through Delatyn up the Pruth valley to Dora with parts of 1 Terek Coss Div and of 71 and 78 ID. On 2 November Pflanzer-Baltin decided to initiate an encircling movement against this force. He ordered 54 ID to advance to Jablonow on the 3rd and then to attack the rear of the Russian group at Dora – even though the Division, which had just pulled back from Sniatyn to Kuty, had moved 200 km since 24 October and badly needed rest. FML Schreitter's Group (56 and 52 ID) was ordered to pin down the enemy in their front and attack his western flank. A group under Col Sarkany (two battalions and a battery), which had come from Czernowitz to support 54 ID, would advance from Jablonow through Myszyn toward Kolomea. Finally, FML Durski was ordered to once more advance with his Polish Legion through Pasieczna toward Nadworna.

The Russians didn't wait for this concentric attack, but pulled back from Dora to Delatyn under cover of rear guards. On 4 November the 54 ID came up against a Russian blocking position in front of Zarecze; after a prolonged action, it broke through the position on the 5th and thrust forward to the Pruth. FML Durski, who had taken the Polish Legion back through the Pantyr
Pass for rehabilitation, committed just one and a half battalions and four guns as his share of the operation; nonetheless the Poles were able to take Pasieczna in a surprise attack on the morning of the 5th. When Russian reinforcements hurried to the area, Durski pulled his group back once more to Zielona. Thus the outflanking maneuver on the left had failed. Also the right outflanking column, led by Col Sarkany, couldn't break through; the enemy at Myszyn blocked its route to Kolomea. On 6 November the central group of FML Schreitter (56 and 52 ID), which had been holding back, finally attacked Delatyn from the south. At the same time the 54 ID managed to advance over the Pruth at Zarecze; the Russians were forced to retreat from Delatyn toward Nadworna. Meanwhile, however, Sarkany's Group had pulled back from Myszyn into the mountains by Kosmacz, and left the important road to Kuty open to the enemy. The consequent exposure of FML Schreitter's right flank, as well as a report that the Russians were bringing up reinforcements from Nadworna, caused him to halt the action at Delatyn at nightfall. 54 ID now turned quickly back to Jablonow to reach the road to Kuty before the Russians arrived. FML Schreitter led 52 and 56 ID back into the mountains around Mikuliczyn.

This was the end of Pflanzer-Baltin's exciting first offensive campaign. His Armeegruppe, made up of hastily assembled Landsturm units with a great mixture of weapons, had not had sufficient strength to sustain a thrust deep into the still weakly held Russian flank on the Dniester. Thus he had not been able to influence the course of events on the main battlefield.

6. The second Russian offensive over the San, 29 October–2 November

(see volume 1 sketch 29)

While Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's units were pinned down along the San, his opponent Dimitriev was also unable to advance out of his bridgeheads on the river. On 27 October the Russian armies in Poland, after driving their opponents from Warsaw and Ivangorod, initiated a pursuit. To secure the left flank of this advance from the middle reaches of the Vistula, General Ivanov created a special attacking group under General Krusenstern on the inner flanks of the 9th and 3rd Armies; it consisted of 80, 23 and 46 ID plus 3 Caucasian Coss Div. Krusenstern was instructed to attack over the lower San, to drive his opponents west along the south bank of the Vistula and
thus to enable Dimitriev's Army to finally force the line of the San.

Before Krusenstern's Group was ready to attack, the XXI Corps on Dimitriev's right wing made an attempt to enlarge its bridgehead at Nisko. In the night of 28-29 October the Russian advance guards made a violent attack on Racławice. The k.u.k. 3 ID, on the right wing of XIV Corps, resisted bravely but was unable to keep the Russians from penetrating into the village. The enemy sought to advance farther late in the morning of the 29th, but this time his attack broke down with bloody casualties in the defenders' fire. The Russian XI and IX Corps also renewed their attacks at Lezachow and Nielepkowice on the night of 30-31 October. Meanwhile Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had received an order from the AOK to send 4 ID, whose troops were at the front under both XVII and IX Corps, by rail to reinforce 1st Army in Poland. The units of 4 ID had already left the line, but now had to be placed under FML Kritek once more; some of them returned to the front to prevent an enemy breakthrough against 13 LW ID and 41 Hon ID. Although the enemy was driven back into his bridgehead positions during the 31st, the 4 ID was thus still held on the San; its departure was delayed for two days.

While these events took place in XVII Corps' sector, the Russians kept up a heavy fire fight at Nisko and Brandwica to cover the preparations for the projected offensive by their XXI Corps and Krusenstern's Group. However, 4th Army HQ was informed of the enemy's intentions by intercepted radio messages and prepared counter-measures, including the placement of 39 Hon ID (in reserve at Jezowe) under XIV Corps. On the evening of 30 October FML Roth sent the Honveds to the area west of Nisko to add fresh strength to 3 ID, which had been weakened by the exhausting actions at Racławice. In the night of 31 October-1 November the 77 Bde of 39 Hon ID relieved the north wing of 3 ID. The relief had scarcely been completed when the Russians made a surprise attack on the Honveds. Nisko was lost; the Russians advanced into the artillery positions and against the exposed flank of 3 ID. The situation became critical. Fortunately the Alpine troops were able to hold onto their outflanked positions. After the arrival of reinforcements the 39 Hon ID launched a counter-attack, but was unable to drive the enemy back to the river. In the evening hours of 1 November the reserve force of XIV Corps, 5 Inf Bde, came up from Jamnica; however, it was already too late for an attack. On the next morning the Bde (under GM Schneider) penetrated into Nisko after

a sharp fight and thus put an end to the Russian advance.

On the same night that the Russians stormed Nisko (31 October–1 November), the advance guards of Krusenstern's Group crossed the San at Brandwica. However, this attack had been anticipated and the troops of GM Fabini's 8 ID were ready for it; after a stubborn fight they drove the enemy back over the river during 1 November.

Thus the attack of Group Krusenstern over the lower San had broken down. The resistance of k.u.k. XIV Corps had ensured that the San front remained intact, thus enabling 1st Army to set up a new line on the Opatowka after its retreat from Ivangorod 383.

383 Translator's note - The original text refers to the "heroic" resistance of XIV Corps, but this is only another attempt to inflate the achievements of German-speaking units. Considering the relative size of the two forces, and the fact that the Russian plans had been intercepted, there was nothing particularly "heroic" or unexpected about this victory.
G. The Major Regrouping by the Allies

1. 1st Army retreats from Ivangorod to the Opatowka, 27-31 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 19 and sketch 35)

Conrad had first considered deploying the k.u.k. 1st Army behind the Kamienna alongside the front in Galicia on 24 October, when Dankl reported his initial intention to order a retreat from Ivangorod. Conrad didn't want to take 1st Army farther back to a position west of the mouth of the San, because that would make it impossible for the other k.u.k. Armies to remain on the San. In turn, this would lead to a new encirclement of Przemysl, whose supplies had been greatly reduced through consumption by 3rd and 2nd Armies, and needed to be replenished 384.

Thus Conrad felt that if a retreat from Ivangorod and Warsaw by the allied wing in Poland was necessary it should be short because of the situation in Galicia. On the other hand, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were of the opinion that 9th German Army should fully disengage from the enemy to regain operational freedom. The Germans had already begun to prepare substantial destruction of the Polish railroads on 10 October when they became aware of the Russian plans for attack from Warsaw and Ivangorod 385. As the prospects for a decisive Aus-Hung. success in Galicia continued to diminish, Hindenburg was working on plans for a new operation 386. The basic concept was that 9th Army would conduct a long retreat to the Silesian border to free itself of the threat of being outflanked from the north. Then it would seek to thrust against the flank of the advancing Russians from another sector. However, the German commanders first wished to see the result of the operation of the k.u.k. 1st Army at Ivangorod. As long as this Army was in place, GO Hindenburg didn't give up hope that he could still carry out a successful thrust over the Pilica toward Warsaw 387.

While awaiting the arrival of the k.u.k. X Corps, on 24 October

385 German official history, Vol. V, p. 448
387 German official history, Vol. V, p. 485
GO Hindenburg also suggested that further reinforcements be sent to 1st Army in front of Ivangoord. Conrad turned down this request on the grounds that he could not divert further units from Galicia to Russian Poland before winning a decisive success southeast of Przemysl. On the next day—as the situation of 9th German Army west of Warsaw became ever more precarious and it also became doubtful whether the k.u.k. 1st Army would be able to hold its ground before Ivangoord—Hindenburg prepared for retreat by ordering the immediate construction of a defensive line from Noworadomsk to Wielun. The Battle of Ivangoord was decided on 26 October. At 9:00 AM on the 27th Hindenburg ordered a retreat; the first goal of the right wing of 9th Army was the line Andrejew-Noworadomsk, while the left wing pulled back into the prepared position Noworadomsk-Wielun. "It was believed that the Aus.-Hung front on the right would face toward the north, and would run down to the mouth of the San. If the Russians advanced against this front, which covered Galicia and Upper Silesia, they would be vulnerable to a thrust from the west into their flank and rear." If reinforcements from the West front were not available, the 9th German Army would carry out this thrust with its own forces. It was still unclear whether the flank attack could be mounted from the area around Thorn in the north; however, on 28 October preparations had already been completed to immediately transfer two corps by rail to the north.

On the afternoon of 27 October, Conrad learned how far his allies were going to retreat. He didn't know about their new plan, and immediately objected against such a far-reaching withdrawal by 9th Army. In Galicia the chances for success were improving; the railroad to Chyrow was again intact and more substantial supplies were beginning to flow to the armies in that sector. There was hope that a decisive victory could still be won southeast of Przemysl. However, the attack at Przemysl could continue only as long as 4th Army remained on the San. This in turn was possible only if 1st Army remained behind the Kamienna or at least behind the Opatowka. Therefore Conrad felt that the withdrawal of 9th German Army was acceptable only if it ended on the line Kielce-Widawa; otherwise the Russians would outflank 1st Army and be able to attack the San front from the rear. Anticipating that Hindenburg would go along with his thinking, Conrad ordered the 1st Army to pull back in step with the Germans to a line running from Kielce through Opatow to the mouth of the San; there it would offer stubborn resistance. Perhaps it would be possible to hold off the Russian offensive.

in this position, connected with the San front, until the
arrival of the hoped-for reinforcements from the West. On the
evening of the 27th GdI Conrad sent a telegram to GO Moltke in
which he declared that "a substantial success in the West would
require long fighting. Here in the East, where the enemy is
energetically exploiting his superior force of 30 divisions, the
quick intervention of strong German forces by 9th Army could
permanently improve the situation. This will prevent the
opening of the road to Berlin to the enemy, the isolation of 8th
German Army [in East Prussia] and the abandonment by us of the
ground we have gained to date. Quick action in this matter will
be decisive for the overall military situation and thus for the
fate of Germany and Austria-Hungary."389

Operations and prospects of 1st Army

Meanwhile, the k.u.k. 1st Army had retreated on 27 October
behind the Ilzanka and to the area around Radom. The enemy
didn't interfere. Only 37 Hon ID on the extreme right wing
suffered from flanking attacks and had to pull back all the way
to a line behind the Krepianka, pursued by Russian cavalry. To
shake off this enemy force, 11 Hon CD made a short sortie to
Solecka Wola. The first unit of X Corps to arrive - 2 ID -
guarded the Vistula between the mouths of the Krepianka and
Kamienna, along with 35 Lst Inf Bde which was already in
position. The rest of X Corps (24 ID and 45 LW ID) were
approaching Ozarow to complete their junction with 1st Army. In
the next few days, Dankl's Army pulled back over the Kamienna as
planned, onto the line from the mouth of the San through Opatow
to Kielce. On 28 October the 2 ID and 35 Lst Inf Bde fought
rear guard actions as they left the Vistula around Solec to move
southwest on the flank of V Corps. On the next day, 37 Hon ID
at Ostrowiec and 33 ID at Rzepin skirmished with Russian advance
guards. In the night of 30-31 October, after four days of
forced marching, Dankl's Army was deployed on the new defensive
line as ordered by the AOK. On the right wing, X Corps took up
a position behind the Opatowka with 106 Lst ID, 45 LW ID and 2
ID. Around Klimontow, 24 ID assembled as the Corps reserve,
while 35 Lst Inf Bde was held in readiness as the Army reserve.
In the middle of the front, V Corps held the area west of Opatow
and northeast of Lagow with 14 and 33 ID. 11 Hon CD was in the
second line as V Corps' reserve. The badly unnerved 37 Hon ID
had left the line and went back to the Nida for rehabilitation.
On the Army's left wing the 1st Corps was at Gorno and east of
Kielce with 5 ID, 46 LW ID and 12 ID. One brigade of 43 LW ID

389 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 300
GdK Dankl anticipated the upcoming operations with great concern. In a report to the AOK on 28 October he had already expressed reservations about the feasibility of holding the 90 km line from the mouth of the San to Kielce. He had just his own 11 1/2 divisions, which had an average strength at most of 7,000 to 8,000 men. 1st Army's supply of ammunition was also extraordinarily unsatisfactory. It was feared that the long line could be broken by the Russians in two or three days at most.

GdK Dankl suggested to the AOK that his Army should retreat on the right of 9th German Army to the west, into the area north of Cracow. However, Conrad could not agree to let 1st Army pull back so far to the rear without offering any resistance. On 28 October he answered Dankl: "Because of the enemy's great numerical superiority it is now essential to fight for time. At least for the present the 4th and 3rd Armies cannot give up the San line to retreat to the Dunajec or to the Cracow area. Above all we must complete restocking Przemysl with supplies, as we have been doing for several days now. If 1st Army were to immediately pull back to Cracow...this would surely allow the enemy's larger forces to follow our 1st and the 9th German Armies and at the same time proceed over the Vistula into the flank and rear of our other armies. This would compel our retreat over the Carpathians, which is totally unacceptable for several reasons. We must make certain that as soon as the retreat of 1st Army is necessary the 4th and 3rd Armies can pull back on its flank to the west between the Vistula and Carpathians." Thus 1st Army must offer "stubborn resistance" on the line between Kielce and the mouth of the San. Reinforcements would be sent to the Army. If nevertheless further resistance became impossible, then the Army should pull back behind the Nida downstream from Andrejew, while the 3rd and 4th Armies would move to the line they had held at the end of September on the Dunajec and the Biala.

Discussions with the German high command

At this point Conrad still hoped that his Galician armies could perhaps remain in place to fight in their current positions, if GdI Falkenhayn - the new Chief of the German General Staff - agreed to the proposed quick movement of substantial forces from
the West. On the evening of 28 October he was invited by GdI Falkenhayn to attend a conference at Berlin on the morning of the 30th; however, his urgent requests for reinforcements remained unanswered. Conrad replied to GdI Falkenhayn that because of the tense situation on the Aus-Hung. front "even a brief absence from here [Neusandez] was unfortunately impossible." A direct oral conference was possible only in Neusandez; otherwise he would send a written summary of his views with his aide-de-camp to Berlin. 390

GdI Conrad shared the contents of this written summary with GdI Falkenhayn by telegram on the evening of the 28th. In this significant message, Conrad estimated that to the southeast of the upper Vistula there were 26 1/2 Russian divisions (424 battalions) against 28 Aus-Hung. divisions (364 battalions). He was confident that his divisions, despite their diminished strength, could hold their ground; however, they could neither attack nor send units to other fronts. Northwest of the Vistula there were 40 to 42 Russian divisions (640 to 672 battalions) advancing against 24 1/2 allied divisions (300 battalions). "Here the enemy had more that a 2 to 1 advantage, which he will eventually be able to utilize." As soon as the allied forces could no longer hold their ground at and west of the mouth of the San, the eastern wing of the Aus-Hung. forces would also have to retreat; the recently relieved fortress of Przemysl would again be left on its own. 2nd Army would have to pull back into the Carpathians; 3rd and 4th Armies would move west between the Carpathians and Vistula – initially to the Dunajec and later to the Cracow area. On the left, 1st Army would remain in contact with the German 9th Army. Under such conditions, only the quickest possible concentration of substantial forces on the left of 9th German Army could win a decision. These reinforcements should be deployed so as to hit the advancing Russians in their right flank, around the line Kreuzburg-Kalisz-Konin. The Germans would have to decide which forces could be diverted in support to Thorn from their 8th Army (in East Prussia), but there was no doubt that the decisive area was in Poland west of the Vistula. "I think", wrote Conrad, "that the primary theater of the war – which in the first six weeks was in the West in the French area of operations – is now in the East, in Russian Poland. Here there is a greater danger to Germany than anywhere in the West. Once we have dealt with Russia, then we can strive for a decision in the West with much greater confidence. If victory in the East is of decisive importance, it must be sought immediately and with strong

forces. At least 30 German divisions should be deployed on the left of 9th Army. If this doesn't happen, the k.u.k. Armies will continue to resist the Russian advance as much as possible, even if forced to do so after a retreat to the line on the Danube between Vienna and Budapest. It is noteworthy that the Chief of the Aus-Hung. General Staff, who didn't know about Hindenburg's plans, had the same idea of a flank attack against the Russian "steamroller" as the German commander. The difference was that Conrad would have given the mission to the hoped-for reinforcements from the West rather than to Hindenburg's own 9th Army.

GdI Falkenhayn countered with a new request for Conrad to appear personally at Berlin. The latter, however, stuck to his decision to let his aide-de-camp represent him. Meanwhile, at noon of the 29th, he learned about the preparations to divert the German 9th Army north to the area around Thorn. If his allies separated themselves from the left flank of the Austro-Hungarians, it was doubtful that the k.u.k. 1st Army could remain on the Opatowka. Thus Conrad felt compelled to issue preliminary orders on the evening of the 29th for the withdrawal of his forces to the Dunajec-Biala line. However, he didn't give up his attempts to have Hindenburg's Army stay in place directly next to 1st Army; this would keep the enemy from outflanking his left wing "before the new German offensive could have an effect." Still hoping for the intervention of the requested major German reinforcements on the left of their 9th Army, he felt it was necessary that Hindenburg's and Dankl's Army should operate together against the southern front of the Russians in Poland. Based on these considerations, on 30 October he asked GO Hindenburg to position three corps (Gd Res, XX and the Landwehr Corps) "in echelon to the left rear of 1st Army, therefore in the area Wegleszyn-Włoszcowa-Malouszyn"; from there they could launch a surprise attack to the northeast as soon as the enemy tried to move around the western wing of 1st Army. The other units of 9th Army should cover this attack on its left flank, in the area around Przedborz. The 2, 3 and 9 CD between Kielce and Przedborz would conceal the preparation of the attacking group. Hindenburg turned down this idea on the grounds that the enemy was pursuing 9th Army too hard and their flank had already moved through Lodz; Conrad's suggestion would lead to the destruction of 9th Army. He agreed, as already promised, to leave the Gd Res Corps to guard the flank of the allied 1st Army and intervene in its actions. The rest of 9th German Army, however, would concentrate in the area Czenstochau--

Wielun. Hauer's Cavalry Corps, stationed on the left of the Gd Res Corps, was placed back under the Aus-Hung. AOK. On this day (30 October) the 3 CD of Hauer's Corps was suffering heavy casualties in actions to guard the retreat of the columns of the Gd Res Corps.

On the next day (31 October), Conrad's aide-de-camp Lt Col Kundmann returned from the Berlin conference. Now Conrad learned that Falkenhayn was seeking a decisive success in Flanders. He would not transfer strong forces from the West to the East because the Western front might be overwhelmed before major blows could be struck in the East. Thus the campaign in the West would go on, and the East must hold out until it was decided.

On the same day Conrad sent the DOHL a telegram in which he once more declared that the commitment of large forces in the East would make "success achievable and thus lead to a favorable military and political decision." He hoped that with this telegram he might yet win his ally over to the Eastern strategy.

Yet GdI Falkenhayn was content to strengthen the 9th German Army at this time with just three cavalry divisions from the West.

The Russians approach the front of 1st Army

While these negotiations were going on, 1st Army HQ had approached the AOK with a request that they be allowed to pull back to the Nida on the 31st; otherwise they would become engaged in heavy fighting which would cause unnecessary casualties and make it doubtful that resistance could be maintained on the Nida in the future. According to reports available on the morning of the 31st, the 9th Russian Army had already crossed the Kamienna. Its leading elements were expected to collide with the right wing and center of 1st Army in a few hours. The 4th Russian Army had reached the area on both sides of Sydłowice; apparently it was advancing with its left wing (III Caucasian Corps) east of the railroad from Radom, while the main body (XVII, XVI and Grenadier Corps) were west of the railroad. They would be able to outflank 1st Army as early as 1 November. Under these circumstances, GdK Dankl stressed the great danger that might attend a retreat from the line of the Opatowka if the enemy continued on his apparent line of

392 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 40
march. His right wing, which lay far from the Nida, would have to make a diagonal movement along a front facing to the north, and it was doubtful that most of it would reach the Nida in time.

These developments caused Conrad on the morning of the 31st to again request HQ of German 9th Army "that the three German corps (Gd Res, XX and Landwehr) which were to proceed to the area Checiny-Malogoszcz-Włoszczowa-Maluszyn on 31 October should stay in that area for commitment to action and not be moved further back or to the west. If they pull back, overwhelming pressure against the wing of 1st Army at Kielce would lead not only to the retreat of all the other Aus-Hung. armies, but also disrupt the connection between 1st and 9th Armies; cooperation of the Aus-Hung. armies in further actions would be impossible." This would inevitably have severe consequences "for the general situation of Austria-Hungary and also for Germany because of the political circumstances and the attitude of hitherto neutral states." 395

With a heavy heart, GO Hindenburg promised that besides the Guard Reserves the XX Corps would also for the time being remain in place between Kielce and Noworadomsk. In response to this decision, at 7:00 PM on 31 October GdI Conrad ordered 1st Army to hold its ground on the line between Kielce and the mouth of the San.

2. The action on the Opatowka and decision for a general retreat, 31 October–2 November

(see volume 1 leaflet 19 and sketch 35)

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch had issued his orders for the pursuit on 27 October. 2nd and 5th Armies would advance to the line Kutno-Lodz-Tomaszow, while 4th and 9th Armies would reach the line Opoczno-Szarzykso-Sandomierz. General Ivanov wanted to turn aside toward Galicia, where his opponent was still deployed on the San. While the Southwest Front here drove the Aus-Hung. Army from the field, the armies of the Northwest Front would repeat their August attacks and conquer East Prussia.

By 30 October the 4th Army had reached the area around Szydlowiec and further west; it had the Grenadiers, XVI Corps,

395 Conrad, Vol. V., p. 342
XVII Corps (plus 61 and 81 ID), III Caucasian Corps (plus 75 ID), the Ural Coss Div, and Trans-Baikal Coss Bde. 9th Army already had sent its advance guards over the Kamienna on both sides of Ostrowiec. It had the Guard Corps (plus Gd Rifle and Gd Cav Bdes), XXV Corps, XIV Corps (plus 2 Rifle Bde), 1 Don Coss Div, and 13 CD. Group Zayontchovsky (83 and 37 ID) was placed under 9th Army; it was crossing the Vistula at Solec and Jozefow. The other parts of XVIII Corps would cross later at Annopol. General Letschitzky continued the pursuit with 9th Army on 31 October. He had been ordered by General Ivanov to attack toward Sandomierz; from there he could cross back over the Vistula and advance to Rzeszow, thus opening the way over the San to 3rd Army.

Preliminary actions

Meanwhile Dankl's Army had made its last preparations on the defensive position. When the first units of the Russian XIV Corps approached Opatow at noon on 31 October and attacked the front of the 2 Austrian ID, GdI Meixner sent his Corps reserve (24 ID) into action. Supported also by units of V Corps (parts of 14 ID and of 11 Hon CD), 2 ID brought the enemy to a halt southeast of Opatow. X Corps HQ expected a heavier attack during the night against their right wing. To prevent the Russians from crossing the Vistula into the rear of 4th Army, GdK Dankl ordered the bridges at Sandomierz to be destroyed that night.

In the evening the enemy's advance units also began to appear against V Corps, which awaited the Russian attack with fortitude despite the casualties the units had suffered and the absence of 37 Hon ID. Only Russian cavalry emerged in front of Ist Corps. The divisional artillery of 43 LW ID broke up a Russian advanced column with a burst of fire.

On the night of 31 October-1 November, 1st Army HQ learned from a deciphered radio message that the Russian 4th Army planned to temporarily stay in place because of supply difficulties. Thus there seemed no immediate danger of a sweeping advance around the Army's left wing. 5 ID (now commanded by FML Habermann) carried out a successful sortie during the night at Bieliny, on the right wing of Ist Corps. The enemy was holding back opposite the Army's right wing, and dug in with weak forces along the Opatowka. In the sector of 2 ID, where the Russians had attacked on the evening of the 31st, GdI Meixner wanted to launch a major counterattack with parts of 24 ID and the reserves of 45 LW ID. Thus 1st Army HQ still had hope that the
Army would be able to hold its position. Meanwhile the Russians made thrusts against the junction between X and V Corps in the morning of 1 November. At first 2 ID gave way, but soon was supported by troops from 14 and 24 ID and from 45 LW ID, and drove the enemy back to Opatow.

The Russians also attacked the left wing of V Corps in the morning, and drove 33 ID back on the heights northeast of Lagow. Because of the consequent danger of being outflanked, the neighboring divisions (5 ID on the left, 14 ID on the right) also had to pull back somewhat in the evening.

On the Army's left wing, 12 ID and 46 LW ID weren't attacked on 1 November; however, the advance guards of III Caucasian Corps moved up very close to their positions.

On the Russian side, meanwhile, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch was concerned that the Germans, driven away from Warsaw, would regain the operational initiative. Therefore he ordered his central Armies (2nd, 5th, 4th and 9th) to continue their pursuit on 31 October to the line Uniejow (on the Warta)-Lask-Przedborz-Checiny and to the Koprzywianka. On the same day the Russian 9th Army on the Opatowka, which expected to encounter only the rear guards of Dankl's Army, had discovered his main body. Now General Ivanov directed 4th Army to advance to Checiny and Morawica with its left wing (III Caucasian and XVII Corps), to fall upon the flank of the enemy forces standing fast on the Opatowka and to cut them off from the Nida. General Letschitzky, commander of 9th Army, decided to make his main attack with the right wing (XXV and Guard Corps); in cooperation with Evert's Army they would throw the enemy into the Vistula.

GdK Dankl was once again well informed about the Russians' undertakings through deciphered radio messages. Seven Russian corps were identified in front of the k.u.k. 1st Army, of whom two or three extended beyond the left wing. Furthermore, it was known that General Evert had made Kielce the goal for III Caucasian and XVII Corps on 2 November. Already in the night of 1-2 November, Dankl had informed the AOK about the unfavorable situation. Again he advised that in case the Ist Corps could not hold against the attack of the superior Russian forces there would be a danger that 1st Army could be driven up against the Vistula; therefore he wished a bridge to be prepared over the river at Szczucin. The high command on the other hand ordered

1st Army that it should not fall back to the Vistula under any circumstances, but should retreat if necessary to the Nida and there offer renewed resistance.

The decision on 2 November

While the attention of 1st Army HQ was thus fixed on their left wing, the principal advance of the Russians on 2 November was against the Army's right. Because of a delay in transmitting orders and hindrances to the deployment of the Guard Corps, Letschitzky's left wing was the first to open the attack.

2 ID was already driven back through Wlostow in the morning. Reinforced by half of 24 ID, it counterattacked and was able to retake Wlostow. Rozki, which had also been taken by the Russians, was recaptured by 45 LW ID and 106 Lst ID. However, in the early afternoon the 2 ID was attacked once more, and this time gave in to the enemy pressure. The infantry pulled back to the south without any protection from Russian gunfire; the Aus-Hung. artillery was unable to help because of the catastrophic shortage of ammunition.

Meanwhile, GdI Meixner had already informed his Army commander about the critical situation at noon and recommended that the whole X Corps should pull back to the Koprzywianka when darkness fell 397. The misfortune of 2 ID now made this retreat imperative, and GdI Meixner issued the necessary orders at 3:30 PM. In the course of the afternoon, 106 Lst ID established a firm position on the lower Koprzywianka. To its left, 45 LW ID was in a temporary position at Klimontow; 24 and 2 ID then held the line as far as Iwaniska, where 11 Hon CD would cover the open flank of V Corps. The withdrawal of X Corps also affected V Corps. A thrust by parts of XXV Russian Corps through Wlostow ripped open the right wing of V Corps. The Russian columns which had broken through then set upon 14 ID and drove it back to the heights at Iwaniska. Now the right wing of 33 ID, whose front was still holding out, had to bend back. Half of 43 LW ID was brought up from the Army's left wing and deployed to support V Corps. Ist Corps was still standing in its old positions; despite expectations, it wasn't seriously attacked on 2 November. Only on its right wing (by 5 ID) did an action by advance guards develop in the evening. The two Russian corps which were supposed to mount the outflanking attack through

397 FML von Kralowetz, "Das k.u.k. X Corps im Herbstfeldzug 1914 gegen Russland" (unpublished manuscript in the military archives)
Kielce (III Caucasian and XVII) spent the day rethinking their plan of attack because they had found their opponent in an unexpected position.

However, even though the Russian maneuver through Kielce had not yet been initiated, in a few hours our forces in that sector would also be engaged by a larger enemy group. After the setback to the Army's right wing it was questionable whether the over-taxed regiments on the Koprzywianka would be able to stand fast. The latest defensive actions had brought the troops of 1st Army near the limit of their strength. They had already suffered heavy losses in front of Ivangorod and badly needed to rest. This factor and, above all, the catastrophic lack of artillery ammunition made further retreat seem urgent. So at 5:30 PM the 1st Army HQ asked the AOK to approve a march back to the Nida.

Meanwhile a decision in this sense had already been made at Neusandez. Since cooperation with the 9th Germany Army on the left of the k.u.k. 1st could not longer be counted on, and since the left flank of 4th Army was already being left open by the loss of the Opatowka line, the Armies southeast of the Vistula would no longer be able to escape the danger of being outflanked from the north. Because of this situation, the AOK made the difficult decision to once again abandon the positions on the San and south of Przemysl which they had defended with such sacrifices. Between 5:00 and 6:00 PM they issued orders for a general retreat. To delay the enemy, the Aus-Hung. high command instructed 1st Army to begin its march in the night of 2-3 November to a position behind the Mierzawa and the lower Nida, on which it would offer stubborn resistance. The 9th German Army was requested to have its Gd Res Corps protect the left wing of 1st Army and to pull back to Andrejew and the area to its west. The other k.u.k Armies would go back to the vicinity of Bartfeld, to the Biala, and to the Dunajec. There they would reorganize their units, replenish their weakened strength, and receive fresh ammunition and equipment.

With these orders, GdI Conrad was pulling the k.u.k. Army — after four weeks of extraordinarily strenuous operations — back to essentially the same positions it had held prior to the October offensive.
3. Building a new front by Cracow and Czenstochau
[Czestochowa]

(see volume 1 leaflets 19 and 20)

The overall military situation of the allied Central Powers was grim at the beginning of November. The German advance in France had come to a standstill after the disruption of the Marne campaign, and it already seemed that the great undertaking at Ypres would not result in the hoped-for decisive success. In the East the Russians were threatening to advance into Silesia, west Galicia and Hungary. It was true that in Serbia an Aus-Hung. offensive was now in motion, and meanwhile Turkey had entered the war against England, Russia and France; on the other hand, further Russian victories could bring Italy and Romania over to the side of the Entente. Despite this danger, GdI Falkenhayn - who was finally named Chief of Staff to the German field armies on 3 November - held fast to his decision that a decision must first be sought in France by the Flanders offensive. For the time being only delaying actions should be fought in the East, until considerable reinforcements could be sent from the West in about six weeks. At this point the German 9th Army received just 3 cavalry divisions from the West.

In these fateful days, on 1 November GO Hindenburg was named "Commander-in-Chief of all German forces in the East", while GdK Mackensen became the new commander of 9th Army. Simultaneously with this reorganization of the command structure on the German portion of the front, on 1 November the German Emperor sent a message to Vienna to renew the attempt to place all Aus-Hung. units operating northwest of the Vistula under the orders of GO Hindenburg. Because of Conrad's objection, Emperor Franz Joseph denied this request with the assurance that the k.u.k. high command was carrying out all its tasks "in the fullest understanding with GO Hindenburg" and that therefore it was not "important" that 1st Army be placed under the German commander.

At the same time in Berlin, Under Secretary of State Zimmermann had suggested another possible solution to the command question in the East (it later transpired that this was done without the knowledge of the German high command). Zimmermann said that Archduke Friedrich could be named commander-in-chief of the entire front with Ludendorff as his Chief of Staff; Conrad could lead the Aus-Hung. armies under this supreme headquarters. This suggestion was forwarded to Neusandez on 4 November in a telegram from the Imperial military chancellery. Conrad felt that any advantage to this approach could be achieved more
simply by placing Hindenburg under the AOK. He ascribed the idea primarily to mistrust of his leadership, which originated in certain hostile circles at Vienna and Budapest. In his answer, he said that "the insertion of an additional layer between the high command and the [four] army headquarters" would be inappropriate and continued: "The proposal would place operational leadership entirely in the hands of General Ludendorff; this clearly indicates that trust in me has been lost. Under these circumstances I must look forward to my resignation, in the most loyal fashion and without expressing indignation." Archduke Friedrich's position was that he completely agreed with the establishment of a united command in the East, "but under no circumstances under the control of a German chief of staff." The heir to the throne, Archduke Charles, was sent to Vienna to convey these opinions. In gracious telegrams, the Emperor assured both the commander-in-chief and his chief of staff that his confidence in them was undiminished. Zimmermann's idea was buried.

Meanwhile, on 3 November Hindenburg had issued orders to carry out his new operational plans. The XI, XVII and XX Corps would move by rail to the area around Thorn, where they would be reinforced by parts of the garrisons of Breslau, Posen and Thorn, and by 3 infantry divisions from East Prussia (XXV Reserve Corps plus 36 Res ID from Ist Reserve Corps). This force would advance between the Warta and Vistula Rivers against the north flank of the advancing Russians. The Gd Res Corps, Bredow's Div, 35 Res ID and the Ist Corps were placed under GdI Woyrsch with the mission of covering the left wing of the Austrians as well as Upper Silesia. FML Korda's Cavalry Corps plus 5 CD (which had arrived from the West) were ordered to prevent any penetration onto German territory by Russian cavalry by Kalisz.

Evacuation of the Przemysl-Chyrow battlefield (3-4 November)

While the 9th German Army was moving to the railroad stations by Czenstochau and Wielun, the Austro-Hungarians were retreating to the Nida-Dunajec line and into the Carpathians. On 3 November the k.u.k. 2nd Army began to pull back in echelon, pivoting on its right wing to Turka, behind the upper Dniester, and to Chyrow. The enemy did not follow up. Only the rear guard of Krautwald's group had to fend off a pursuing Russian column on the 4th. In the evening of the same day the 3rd Army also left

its defensive positions southeast of Przemysl, and went back to
the area around Bircza, covered by rear guards. IX Corps, which
once more came under 3rd Army, was still on the San. The 23 Hon
ID went to reinforce the garrison of Przemysl, along with 85 LW
Bde (which was replaced within 30 ID by the 88 L-Sch Bde).
Early on the 5th, GdK Böhm-Ermolli let Krautwald's Group fall
back to Mszaniec, XII Corps to Kroscienko, and VII Corps (which
had returned to 2nd Army) through Dobromil to Michowa. Some
rear guards posted at Dobromil—parts of 17 and 28 ID—were
attacked by the Russians and pushed back. The IV Corps was
still in place in the area north of Turka.

Because 1st Army had given up the Opatowka line, the left wing
of 4th Army had to pull back on the 3rd to Kamien and
Tarnobrzeg; Archduke Joseph Ferdinand wanted his right wing to
begin its retreat from the San on the night of 3–4 November.
However, on the morning of the 3rd the AOK ordered that XVII
Corps should hold onto the high ground at Jaroslaw-Przeworsk
until noon on the 4th to protect the left wing of 3rd Army; they
also stated that it was desirable that other parts of 4th Army
should withdraw from the line Tarnobrzeg-Lezajsk at the same
time. Therefore Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, by agreement with IX
Corps, decided that the right wing would delay its march to the
rear until the night of 4–5 November.

Meanwhile the Russians noted that their adversaries were
beginning to retreat from the lower San. On 4 November, General
Krusenstern's Group crossed the river and advanced slowly along
the south bank of the Vistula toward Tarnobrzeg. Now General
Dimitriev also ordered his 3rd Army to pursue. At dawn on 4
November several detachments of the XI and IX Russian Corps left
their bridgeheads at Nielepkowice and further downstream to
advance into the positions of the k.u.k. XVII Corps. There,
however, the Russians were killed or taken prisoner by the brave
defenders. Because the enemy in this area seemed exhausted, GdI
Kritek decided to strike a heavy blow as the last act of the
sanguinary fighting on the San. He ordered his whole Corps to
attack in the first hours of the afternoon. By dusk the 13 LW
ID and 41 Hon ID drove the Russians out of their positions on
the west bank of the river, and in places advanced as far as the
Russian batteries. They took 2,000 prisoners and 13 machine
guns; 24 Russian guns were wrecked because they couldn't be
hauled away before the action was broken off. In the night of
4–5 November the XVII and the neighboring IX Corps gave up the
hotly contested positions on the San; they first moved back to
the area on both sides of Przeworsk. The disengagement took
place without interference from the enemy except for some long-
range artillery fire.

Dankl's Army, on the other hand, suffered rather severely from Russian pursuit after the action on the Opatowka. Its right wing disengaged from the enemy in heavy fighting in the night of 2-3 November. Then the III Caucasian Corps, supported by parts of the Guard Corps, attacked Kielce at dawn and drove back the rear guards of k.u.k. Ist Corps. Throughout the day the Russians pushed ahead to the Czarna Nida, through Rakow and in the Koprzywianka sector, but held back in the area northwest of Kielce. In the night and early on the 4th the k.u.k. 1st Army continued its march back to the Nida. There they were to stay as long as possible to provide time for the 4th and 3rd Armies on the Wisloka and lower San to carry out their own retreats.

Effects of the redeployment of 9th German Army

Meanwhile, however, Cpt. Fleischmann reported to Neusandez on the evening of 2 November that 1st Army would not be able to stop for any appreciable time on the Nida.

"In the opinion of the German high command, the position on the Nida is not far enough back from the original line on the Opatowka to enable 1st Army to replenish itself and prepare for lengthy resistance. Moreover, the duration of any resistance on the Nida is rather limited by the danger that this position and also any position which the German army might occupy that was too close to the Nida line could soon be outflanked. The [German] Eastern HQ believes that a retreat of the Aus-Hung. forces until their left flank is level with Cracow is the best means to free the forces of the German army 399 for a new offensive operation in Poland...The Eastern HQ recommends that the reinforced 1st Army should first retreat to a line on the lowest reaches of the Nida and southeast of the town of Pilica, while 9th Army takes up a line somewhere around Mrzyglod, Czenstochau, Wielun and farther north."

Conrad didn't agree with these suggestions. However, on the next day (3 November) he learned that the Germans were carrying out their operations anyway. Therefore he declared that he concurred with the transfer of 9th Army to the north; he wished only that the Gd Res Corps would remain in place directly to the left of 1st Army to guard its flank. On the evening of the same

399 This refers primarily to the Gd Res Corps on the left of 1st Army.
day he said he was willing to support the German offensive from Thorn with a thrust from the south. He now planned, when the situation permitted, to either
. Bring 4th Army and perhaps part of 3rd Army over the Vistula between the Dunajec and Wisloka to intervene in 1st Army's actions with a flanking attack, or
. Strike the advancing enemy forces south of the Vistula with a sudden counterattack.
Therefore the 3rd Army would deploy during its retreat in such a fashion that it could either swing toward the north or fall upon the enemy from the south as he moved through Jaroslau. For the same reason, while the 2nd Army retreated in echelon southeast of 3rd Army it would be ready to strike the flank of the enemy as he marched west in the area south of Przemysl. However, if strong Russian forces attacked over the Carpathians from Sambor, the 2nd Army should have Tersztyanszky's Group, which was gradually falling back, ready to go over to the offensive south of the Carpathian watershed.

The actual course to be followed in each sector depended on the activity of the enemy. However, the general concept was the same as that of Hindenburg, and influenced the operations of the allies for the next few weeks — as the Russian "steamroller" advanced toward Prussian Silesia and Posen it would be countered by a pincers movement from the lower Vistula and the Carpathians. On a rather larger scale it was an attempt to carry out in the lands west of the Vistula the concept of the Chief of the Aus-Hung. staff for operations east of that river when the war began, when he tried to make Siedlec the objective of the allies.
4. The retreat toward Cracow and transfer of 2nd Army to Prussian Silesia

On the night of 4-5 November, the 1st Army was deployed on the Nida and Mierzawa Rivers. It had lost more than a third of its strength in front of Ivangorod and on the Opatowka, and its ammunition supply was low. The hope that the Russians might limit their advance was in vain according to the latest reports. The Russian armies were apparently moving with their right wing in the van and had already reached the line Busk-Andrejew-Przedborz. Of the Austrian reinforcements summoned from Galicia, only six weak infantry battalions had arrived at Miechow. On 30 October the AOK had ordered the chief of the railroad service to transport 4 ID and then 44 LW ID from Przeworsk through Rzeszow and Cracow toward Kielce, beginning on the 31st. However, as noted above, some actions in XVII Corps' sector had postponed the start of this movement until late in the evening of 1 November. The double-tracked rail line which had just been restored as far as Jaroslau was packed with trains going back and forth while supplying 4th and 3rd Armies, and therefore the two divisions didn't arrive at Cracow until the evening of the 4th. Meanwhile, however, Kielce and Andrejew had been lost, and the stretch of tracks running through German territory was clogged with trains engaged in evacuating the area. This further hampered the troop movements. Finally only the infantry were able to take the rails to the area of Wolbrom and Miechow; the artillery, supply trains and supporting units had to make their way forward on foot or horse.

Under these circumstances, 1st Army HQ reported to Neusandez early on 5 November that the Army would already be outflanked by the enemy from the north during the day; they expected to be attacked on the flank and in front on 6 November, at which time they would no longer be able to withdraw to the west. Therefore they suggested to the AOK that they should avoid serious fighting and pull the 1st Army back so far that the Russian offensive would lose momentum by itself due to supply difficulties. At the same time Capt Fleischmann telegraphed Neusandez to report that the Gd Res Corps, which hitherto had been assigned the task of covering the left flank of 1st Army, would move back on the 6th along with the LW Corps to Mrzyglod and Czenstochau to guard the Silesian border. Therefore Hindenburg considered that a further withdrawal by the left wing of 1st Army was necessary.

Since there was no longer any possibility of remaining on the
Nida, GdI Conrad decided on the morning of the 5th to pull 1st Army back to the Cracow area. However, it would not send its left wing toward Cracow itself – as had been suggested by the Germans – but rather would send the right wing in that direction. The new line would run northwest from Cracow to the town of Kromolow, where it was hoped a link could be maintained with the German troops. At the same time Conrad ordered 4th Army "to make the most strenuous possible marches to reach 1st Army and to send forward a division at noon on the 6th by rail from Rzeszow." 4th Army HQ selected 13 LW ID for this mission. Along with 106 Lst ID (which was already on the south bank of the Vistula at Przykop), the LW division would guard the Vistula upstream from the mouth of the Dunajec to ensure that the enemy didn't break the communications between 1st and 4th Armies.

These orders initiated the large-scale movements that led to a complete regrouping of the Aus-Hung. armies. As yet the concept of concentrating the bulk of the k.u.k. forces on the Silesian border and to cover the roads to Moravia had not changed Conrad's intention of employing 2nd and 3rd Armies in the Carpathians. Then the 2nd Army HQ contacted the AOK in the late evening of 5 November with an important suggestion.

Plans for the transfer of 2nd Army

It was Böhm-Ermolli's opinion that a strong blow from the area of Turka and Skole against the Russian left wing could lead to "a considerable partial success in Galicia." However, a prerequisite for such an operation would be that the 2nd Army would have to be reinforced by a corps and also by the 4 CD (which on 1st November had reverted to 3rd Army); Pflanzer-Baltin's Group would also have to give direct battlefield support to 2nd Army. Since, however, "even a successful operation in Galicia could only have a slight influence on the general situation", Böhm-Ermolli suggested to the AOK that four divisions from 2nd Army and two or three from 3rd Army should transfer to the northern wing of the k.u.k. forces in Poland, "where perhaps they could render decisive service in cooperation with the Germans." This idea fell on fruitful soil in Neusandez.

In the afternoon of 6 November, the high command ordered much of 2nd Army – the Army HQ, XII Corps [16 and 35 ID], IV Corps [31 and 32 ID], and Hussar Regt # 4 – to move from the Carpathians to Prussian Silesia. The following units would remain to secure the routes through the Carpathians from the Uzsok Pass through the valley at Dukla – VII Corps [17 and 34 ID, 20 Hon ID, 103
and 105 Lst Inf Bdes] and Karg's Group [38 Hon ID; 1, 2 and 17 Lst Terr Bdes; 102 Lst Inf Bde; 1, 5 and 8 CD]. These units would be placed under 3rd Army. Furthermore, the AOK ordered II Corps (25 ID and the remainder of 4 ID) to leave 4th Army and move through Cracow to 1st Army.

On the next day (7 November), the high command ordered Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to pull back with XIV and VI Corps behind the lower Dunajec on the 8th, and to march with 4th Army toward the west on the 9th. This movement would be covered by XVII Corps on the Dunajec and by 106 Lst ID and 13 LW ID along the Vistula upstream from the mouth of the Dunajec. The main body of the Army should be in position at and east of Cracow in the night of 9-10 November so that it could attack north from this area into the left flank of the enemy advancing north of the Vistula.

While the high command was taking these actions, the withdrawal of 1st Army without fighting to the line Skala-Kromolow led to lively arguments with our German allies.

The German Eastern HQ wanted the Aug-Hung. left wing to stay in place for a while to prevent a premature Russian advance which could interfere with the transport of 9th Army. When however the 1st Army did retreat, all of the Aus-Hung. forces should "pull back in stages toward the south, with their left wing on the fortress of Cracow, and draw the Russians after them." If the Russians thrust into the large gap that would develop between the two allied armies, this would make the German attack from the north even more effective. Meanwhile the Austrians - in a strong defensive position in the Carpathians with the great fortress of Przemysl to their front and the Cracow fortress to guard the left wing - would find an opportunity to gather strength for a new stroke at a decisive point. These operational considerations were also influenced by opinions formed by some officers in the German HQ during the recent campaign; they seemed to prefer to once again be able to operate in an area completely removed from their allies.

Separation from the Germans, however, was exactly what Conrad was trying to avoid; this was the reason he was sending 2nd Army

400 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 50. Translator's note - In fact by this point many German officers were already thoroughly disgusted with having to work with Austrians. The blunt Max Hofmann had commented that the Austrians "aren't out for business as we are", and called them "brutes."
from the Carpathians to Prussian Silesia and 4th Army to the operational zone of 1st Army by Cracow. His willingness to denude the defenses of the Carpathians in order to maintain the link with his allies was based in part on his feeling that his own Army had already bled too much to operate by itself without great danger. There was another motive, one which he expressed in a letter to GdI Bolfras on 1 January 1915 but which had already been applicable seven weeks earlier when the 9th German Army was leaving the area north of Cracow. He didn't want his allies to again have an opportunity, as at the beginning of the war, to campaign entirely as they desired. He preferred that they should tailor their strategy to the needs of coalition warfare and of both allies. This could only be achieved if the forces operated side by side. This is why Conrad opposed the departure of the Gd Res and LW Corps and was sending 2nd Army to Prussian Silesia.

Thus the headquarters of Hindenburg as well as of Archduke Friedrich were already experiencing the emotional difficulties that have always attended wars conducted by alliances.

The assembly of forces around Cracow

When Dankl's Army began to retreat from the Nida early on the morning of 6 November, the enemy had already gone around their flank to the north. On the 5th, General Evert had sent three corps – the Grenadiers, XVI and XVII – to the Pilica south of Przedborz, to Wloszczowa and to Wegleszyn. He ordered the III Caucasian Corps to strike south between the Nida and the Nidzica; this would cut off his opponent's retreat to Cracow and drive him east into the arms of Letschitzky's Army. To carry out this maneuver, the III Caucasian Corps had already reached the area around Andrejew on the evening of the 5th. On the 6th, the two corps on Evert's left wing (XVII and III Caucasian) swung toward the south. The XVII Corps was held up at Naglowice by the rear guards of the German Gd Res Corps. III Caucasian Corps, supported by the "Warsaw" Gd Cav Bde and 1 Dn Coss Div, moved from Andrejew toward the Mierzawa sector, where it came up against Dankl's left wing. The Russians were unable to break the desperate resistance of the Aus-Hung. rear guards until late in the evening.

On the next day (7 November), the larger Russian units forced their way over the Nidzica at Dzialoszyce and Skalbmierz. These sharp rear guard actions caused heavy casualties to the k.u.k. 33 ID (of V Corps) and 5 ID (of Ist Corps). At Skalbmierz a large number of wagons were captured by the Cossacks. On the
8th, the 24 ID of X Corps also was drawn into action north of the Szreniawa. In the night of 8-9 November most of the hard-pressed 1st k.u.k. Army finally was able to break contact with the enemy, and drew up on the new line of resistance northwest of Cracow. To their north, the German Army Detachment of GdI Woyrsch was in position between Zarki and Czenstochau; it consisted of half of the Gd Res Corps 401, Bredow's Division, the Landwehr Corps, and 35 Res ID. On Woyrsch's left there was a gap of almost 180 km between Czenstochau and the Warta River; it was covered only by Korda's Cavalry Corps (k.u.k 7 and German 8 CD) plus about eight and a half German Landsturm battalions guarding the border. Units of General Novikov's cavalry had already crossed the central Warta on 1 November. Korda's Cavalry Corps advanced against this enemy at Kozminek, and on 3-4 November drove them back over the Warta. Meanwhile the 5 German CD had arrived from the West. On 5 November the German GdK Ritter von Frommel assumed command of the Aus-Hung. 7 CD and the two German CD (# 5 and 8).

Meanwhile in Galicia the retreat of the k.u.k. 4th Army took place without any noteworthy interference from the enemy. The Army was already behind the Wisloka on 6 November, and reached the Dunajec on the 8th. The 41 Hon ID, acting as rear guards for XVII Corps, fended off pursuing Russian cavalry on the 7th and 8th at Bratkowice and Sedziszow. On the 9th, the XVII Corps stayed on the Dunajec with 6 and 10 CD, while Archduke Joseph Ferdinand led XIV and VI Corps back to the Raba.

In these days the already tired troops of 4th Army were asked to make very strenuous marches so that they would be on time for the planned relief attack over the Vistula at Cracow. GdK Dankl visited Neusandez on 8 November and gave Conrad his opinion that in the event of a new Russian attack his 1st Army would hardly be able to hold its new position for more than a day. The artillery trains and support units of 4 ID and 44 LW ID - which under the command of FML Tschurtschenthaler were supposed to protect Dankl's left wing, assisted by Hauer's Cavalry Corps (2, 3 and 9 CD) - were still not completely in place. Several days would pass before the arrival of II Corps (25 ID and the rest of 4 ID), which was being delayed by the evacuation of central Galicia and the movement of 80,000 civilians from the Cracow fortress. GdK Dankl was convinced that the Russians would mount an overwhelming attack in a very short time against the still lightly held front of 1st Army. On 9 November, with the consent

401 One division of the corps - 3 Gd ID - had left by rail on 10 November to take part in the offensive from Thorn.
of the AOK, he therefore pulled his right wing back from the Skala-Jangrot line behind the steep banks of the Pradnik Brook. This would further delay any Russian attack on the threatened southern wing and make more room available for the planned thrust of 4th Army out of Cracow.

However, it was doubtful whether 4th Army would be immediately able to attack out of Cracow. Its troops were also in bad shape after their previous fighting on the San and the strenuous marches to the rear. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had to report to the high command that "continuation of the operations is precluded for now." Under these circumstances, it was feared that the 1st Army, with its combat strength greatly reduced, would be unable to withstand the expected attack by greatly superior Russian forces until 4th Army could intervene from the south. This might lead to the piecemeal commitment of the 2nd Army - which was moving by rail from the Carpathians through Hungary and Moravia to Oderberg - in the area immediately north of Cracow instead of on its intended new position at Czenstochau.

On 8 November, GdI Conrad asked the German Eastern HQ if he could use the German rail line Oderberg-Ratibor-Oppeln to deploy 2nd Army. This movement was now welcomed by GO Hindenburg, since it would add to the security of Silesia. He only wanted the Aus-Hung. 1st Army "to stay in place until the reinforcements arrive. He would not further reduce Woyrsch's Army Detachment, which from this day onward would be independent of the 9th Army."

The prospects of the allies on 9-12 November

This was the situation on 9 November when the high command moved from Neusandez to Teschen. The unfavorable circumstances are reflected in the orders which the AOK issued that day. On 10 November the 1st Army should hold its position northwest of Cracow and then report whether it could continue to hold on the 11th. 4th Army in the area east and southeast of Cracow, covered toward the east by XVII Corps, would prepare on the 10th for its offensive toward the north. However, if the situation of 1st Army didn't permit it to stay in its present position, there was a plan to pull this Army behind the Przemsza to the area Oswiecim [Auschwitz]-Tarnowitz; in this scenario 4th Army would fall back to Cracow and the area to its west, and from there launch its flank attack under cover of the fortress.

402 German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 53 f.
Conrad even thought it might be necessary to pull the k.u.k. forces back to the area running from Mährisch-Weisskirchen to Troppau and Jägerndorf, although it would then be difficult to maintain the link with the German units.

In these days of growing tension, the Cracow fortress prepared for the arrival of the Russians. The high command intended to reinforce the garrison (95 Lst Inf Bde) with 45 LW ID and 106 Lst ID, and therefore would keep those two divisions from participating in the actions in the open field. The enemy radio messages which were intercepted almost daily indicated that the Russians were holding back near the Silesian border and in Galicia. However, even if they were not pushing ahead at the moment, they were still just a few days' march from the allied front in Poland and could resume their advance at any time. Although an attack was anticipated from hour to hour, 9 and 10 November both passed without the appearance of the Russians opposite 1st Army. Neither Dankl's Army nor Woyrsch's Detachment were engaged on the 11th. Apparently the Russians' main body had advanced only to the Szreniawa and Pilica sectors; only small detachments had moved further ahead. Thus the tension of the uncertain situation was still present.

Lt Col Hentsch of the German Supreme HQ visited Teschen on 10 November. Falkenhayn had sent him to tell Conrad that the Germans contemplated sending five or six corps from the West to operate along with parts of both their eastern Armies in the Thorn sector 403. Because Conrad expected this major offensive to begin on 22 November, he wanted to prepare his own 4th, 1st and 2nd Armies to attack at the same time. However, Mackensen's Army began its surprise attack between the Vistula and Warta on the 12th. Since the Russians were still extremely hesitant about advancing on the Cracow-Czenstochau front, Conrad would have preferred that the Germans waited until the anticipated reinforcements from the West had arrived and until the k.u.k. 2nd Army had filled the gap in the front near Silesia. He wanted to deploy 2nd Army north of Woyrsch's Detachment, and then have the two groups initiate joint operations. The left wing of 2nd Army would deploy at Kreuzburg 404. However, the German Eastern command would agree to this plan only under the condition that the k.u.k. 2nd Army come under Woyrsch's command. Conrad refused this condition, so new negotiations ensued.

Finally it was agreed that the north wing of 2nd Army would detrain at Lublinitz. After strong Aus-Hung. forces were in place behind the line Zarki-Czenstochau, 2nd Army would relieve Woyrsch's Army Detachment, which would shift toward the north. However, this agreement was never implemented because in the meantime the Russians opened an offensive that threatened to break into Prussian Silesia.

5. The Russian advance

(see volume 1 leaflets 19 and 20)

The Russian advance in Poland was greatly delayed by substantial destruction to the road and rail network, and by logistical problems. The armies didn't reach the line Uniejow-Piotrkow-Kielce and the Opatowka River until 2 November. On the same day the Stavka issued "general directives" for the invasion of Silesia. Under these significant orders, the central armies (2, 5, 4 and 9) would halt after reaching the line Kolo-Czenstochau-Oswiecim, which would become the starting point for the eventual "thrust deep into Germany between the Vistula and Sudeten." The Russian leadership intended to launch the decisive attack through Silesia into the heart of Germany only after their two lagging wings in East Prussia and Galicia had come as far west as had the center. To protect the northern flank of the great attacking force in Poland, a new 1st Army had already been formed on 25 October under General Rennenkampf in the area northwest of Warsaw. It consisted of two corps from 10th Army (Ist Turkestan and VI), and two which had arrived from the Far East (V and VI Siberian). This Army was ordered on 2 November to advance through Mlawa and Wloclawek, while 10th Army on the East Prussian border drove the German 8th Army behind the Masurian Lakes. The armies in Galicia (3, 11 and 8) would push their opponents back from the San to Cracow, and blockade the Przemysl fortress; the Russian southern flank would be covered by sending units forward to the Carpathian passes while cavalry raided into Hungary.

The further Russian movements were slow and difficult. By around 10 November the 2nd and 5th Armies were on the line Uniejow-Lask east of the Warta and in the vicinity of Noworadomsk. The right wing of 2nd Army was about 90 km southwest of the Vistula. After the action on the Opatowka, the advance of 4th and 9th Armies had ended on the Nidzica and upper Pilica. The 10th Army was pinned down on the Angerapp in East

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Prussia in front of the trenches of 8th German Army. Two of the corps of 1st Army (1st Turkestan and VI), along with 6 CD and 4 Don Coss Div, were north of the Vistula and advancing through Mlawa; another Corps (V Siberian) with a combined Coss Div 406 was just south of the Vistula at Wloclawek to provide flank protection to the large forces assembled in Poland. The VI Siberian Corps was behind the lines in echelon at Plock.

The advance in Galicia had also not made much progress. Only Krusenstern's Group (parts of XVIII Corps) from 9th Army had reached the lower Dunajec. Between this force and Rzeszow there was a great gap in the Russian line. To support the investment of Przemysl, the bulk of 3rd Army had held back in the area Sedziszow-Blazowa, in close proximity to the blockading (11th) Army. Most of 8th Army had turned toward the Carpathians and had advanced to the upper San and Dniester.407

The cavalry divisions of 3rd Army went forward to the Wisloka, but had lost all contact with the enemy. The cavalry corps of Charpentier and Novikov, which had ridden west in front of 2nd and 5th Army between Kolo and the town of Warta, had encountered resistance around Kalisz from Korda's Cavalry Corps (as noted above). Reconnaissance by 4th and 9th Armies had determined that there were German troops in a fortified position east of Czenstochau and Aus-Hung. units northwest of Cracow. It was believed at Russian headquarters that the Germans intended to counterattack between Czenstochau and Wieluna and at Kalisz, and that their northern flank was secured only by cavalry. Parts of the Aus-Hung. forces were believed to be north of the Vistula (northwest of Cracow), while the majority were on the line Cracow-Neusandez and another group had pulled back into the Carpathians.

On 10 November the Stavka had already begun to receive reports that German troops were appearing in the neighborhood of Thorn. However, at first these reports were dismissed as of little significance because it was known that the newly-built German reserve corps had been sent to France. The transfer of significant German forces from the West was considered highly

406 Translator's Note - There was no "Combined Coss Div" present in this sector. Perhaps this was a temporary grouping of the Gd Coss Bde and Ussuri Cav Bde, both of which were in the vicinity of Warsaw (?).
However, the Stavka was anxious because the Germans who had been driven away from the middle Vistula had regained their operational freedom by breaking off contact and would be able to exploit their excellent railroad network. With this foreboding, on the evening of the 10th the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch asked Russky and Ivanov when their armies would again be in motion. At the same time the Stavka urged the latter general to quickly advance south of the Vistula toward Cracow with "the strongest possible force."

General Ivanov was pursuing other goals. Unlike the Stavka (and Danilov in particular), he didn't consider the Aus-Hung. army—which was withdrawing voluntarily in Galicia and whose combat strength remained unbroken—a negligible opponent. He also anticipated that stronger Aus-Hung. forces might appear in the Carpathians and therefore felt it would be dangerous to send 3rd Army against Cracow before 8th Army had seized the crossing points through the mountains. Before advancing between Cracow and Posen into Germany, the commander of the Southwest Front wanted to first render the Aus-Hung. forces harmless with a combined blow by 5th, 4th and 9th Armies, then have 3rd Army encircle the strong fortress of Cracow.

Meanwhile, however, on the evening of the 10th the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch issued binding orders to both of his Front commanders. In these new "Basic directives for the advance to Germany", the Stavka made the destruction of German resistance on the Kalisz-Czenstochau line the first goal. For this purpose, the 5th and 4th Armies would attack the supposed main German body on both sides of Czenstochau with superior forces. 2nd Army would outflank the supposed position of the German left wing between Wilun and Kalisz. To carry out this operation, 4th Army was placed under General Russky. 9th Army would meanwhile move forward to the northern edge of Cracow and thus cover the advance of the Russian center. The attacking armies would cross the German border and reach the line Kempen-Oswiecim; there they would dig in and make this position their base for further advances. The Stavka wanted the operation to begin on the 12th or at latest on the 13th.

While preparing these orders on the 10th for the invasion of Silesia, the Russians knew practically nothing about the movements of their adversaries. In the next few hours they received a little information on this subject, although not

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408 Danilov, pp. 331 ff.
enough to fully clarify the confusing general situation. The two cavalry corps (Charpentier's and Novikov's) were attacked on the 11th and 12th by Frommel's allied cavalry corps and again driven back over the Warta. At the same time the German 6 and 9 CD entered Poland between the Warta and Vistula (they were covering preparations for Mackensen's flank attack). Now the reports of the transfer of German units to Thorn began to intensify, especially on the 12th. This increased the uncertainty at Russian supreme HQ. Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch began to reckon with the transfer of the German 9th Army to the north. His new concern caused him to postpone the beginning of the attack by 5th, 4th and 9th Armies from November 12 to the morning of the 14th. The goal which he now established was "the capture of the German rail line running from Pleschen-Lublinitz, to intercept dangerous enemy troop movements." 410

6. The Aus-Hung. army prepares for its new offensive

(see volume 1 leaflet 20)

After 6 to 8 days of constant marching to the rear, on 12 and 13 November the k.u.k. 4th Army had its XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID) and VI Corps (27 ID and 39 Hon ID) ready as planned in the area just south of Cracow. 106 Lst ID had joined the garrison of the fortress. 15 ID and 13 LW ID were in the second line by Wielicza behind the Army's right wing. GdI Kritek guarded the right flank on the Vistula east of Cracow and on the Raba to a point upstream of Myslenice; he commanded his own XVII Corps (41 Hon ID and 19 ID) plus a combined Landsturm Div under GM Karl Matasic (1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes). The 6 and 10 CD were stationed still farther east, at Bochnia, and had pushed reconnaissance squadrons forward to the Dunajec, where only Russian cavalry had appeared thus far.

Dankl's Army had also found time to reorder itself. In its entrenched positions west of Skala and at Zarki it felt strong enough once more to successfully resist the enemy. FML Kuk had filled the dangerous gap between the Cracow fortress and 1st Army by deploying 45 LW ID and 95 Lst Inf Bde. North of 1st Army, Woyrsch's Army Detachment was standing firm between Zarki and Czenstochau, although the situation on its own left flank was unclear. Hauer's k.u.k. Cavalry Corps (3 and 9 CD), which

410 Korolkov, "Overview", pp. 120 ff.
was supposed to guard Woyrsch's flank, first had to be relieved by II Corps; therefore it couldn't leave the north wing of 1st Army for Wielun before 14 November. Also the first elements of 2nd Army were detraining far behind the front, at G. Strehlitz and Vossowska; they consisted of 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries from IV Corps plus 12 battalions and 2 batteries of XII Corps. The transport of 2nd Army was requiring the use of a large number of secondary rail lines running deep into the interior of the Monarchy through Hungary, Lower Austria and Moravia.

Deployment of 2nd Army

On the northernmost line in Hungary (Mezőlaborcz-Kaschau-Sillein), just 12 trains per day were bringing XII Corps to Oderberg. The other trains had to detour through Miskolcz and Losoncz. The transports of IV Corps had to be routed through Csap, Debreczin, Szolnok, Budapest, Marchegg, Gänserdorf and Prerau to Oderberg, where three secondary lines merged into one. The first transports left Mezőlaborcz and Sianki on 8 November. There were few cars available for carrying secondary equipments, although more were being brought up from the Budapest and Vienna areas. Moreover, trainloads of wounded and of refugees had to be moved from the stretch of track south of Przemysl (which was being abandoned) through Zagorz and Mezőlaborcz; from Przemysl alone there were 15,000 wounded. This had to be accomplished before XII Corps would have room to load onto the trains. Since the AOK wanted the tired troops to be well supplied with rations during the rail transport and to have their equipment replenished, there were additional delays in the crowded stations. On top of these problems, the Russians began to advance into the sector where 2nd Army was entraining; thus 32 ID, which was to be transported with XII Corps, had to briefly return to the front at Lisko.

While the k.u.k. 2nd Army was still assembling at G. Strehlitz, Conrad and Hindenburg learned from deciphered radio messages that the main Russian army in Poland was to continue its advance "deep into Germany." The thrust would involve 11 corps on a front of more than 200 km; the north wing would move just south of the Warta through Jaroczyn toward the Silesian border and Posen. Thus the German 9th Army would soon be engaged toward its south, and there was no more time to shift Woyrsch's Army

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411 Ratzenhofer, "Truppentransporte zu Kriegsbeginn" (in Militärwissenschaftliche und Technische Mitteilungen; Vienna, 1930; Heft I/II)
Detachment north - as the Germans wanted - to enable 2nd Army to deploy on Woyrsch's right. Now Conrad's decision to rush 2nd Army to Silesia, made almost in defiance of the wishes of his allies, was justified.

On 13 November, Hindenburg asked the k.u.k. high command to cancel the plans for relieving Woyrsch's Army Detachment and instead to deploy the 2nd Army as quickly as possible at Rosenberg and Kreuzberg. The Army would then enter a position north of Woyrsch, as Conrad had planned from the start, to prevent an outflanking maneuver by the enemy. The k.u.k. AOK ordered GdK Böhm-Ermolli to immediately march the troops who had already detrained toward the north. Thus they would be available to deal with any threat to the flank of Woyrsch's Army Detachment, and would cover the deployment of the rest of 2nd Army in its new detraining areas by Lublinitz (XII Corps) and Rosenberg-Kreuzberg (IV Corps). At the same time, GdK Dankl was instructed to hasten the movement of 3 and 9 CD toward Wielun. The railroad offices were ordered to continue the movement of 2nd Army with the fastest available trains.

Conrad quickly reached an agreement with the allies, under which effective 14 November the k.u.k. 2nd Army would be in Woyrsch's jurisdiction and that general would be placed under the AOK.

Finally, on the 13th Conrad issued his basic ideas for the new operations as follows:

"The 2nd Army will assemble in the area Lublinitz-Rosenberg-Kreuzburg in echelon behind the north wing of GdI Woyrsch's Group to oppose any [enemy] outflanking maneuver. GdI Woyrsch has been ordered by the German Eastern HQ to hold his current position. 1st Army is ready to go over to the offensive, beginning with the south wing, as soon as the advance of 4th Army begins to become effective. The main body of 4th Army will intervene north of the Vistula with a flank attack, using the fortress [Cracow] to make its appearance as surprising as possible."

412 In fact, on 17 November it was possible despite all difficulties to reach a maximum traffic of 30 trains in the Miskolcz area and of 18 trains in the Debreczin area. Between 10 and 23 November (when the movement ended), 333 full-sized trains had passed through Oderberg carrying parts of 2nd Army. Thus an average of 26 trains had moved through the town every day for 13 days. Traffic was at its height from 18 to 20 November, when the total reached 40 trains per day.
Thus the 1st and 4th Armies in the south, like Mackensen's 9th Army in the north, were making a pincers attack. To make the impact of 4th Army as great as possible, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would advance with his strong right wing only after the enemy had committed his strength in a frontal action with 1st Army and was fully tied down along the northern side of Cracow. However, Conrad already knew that south of the Vistula the Russian XVIII Corps - probably reinforced with one or two extra divisions - had reached the lower Dunajec. Therefore GDI Kritek would have to protect the flank and rear of 4th Army with XVII Corps, 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes, and 6 and 10 CD; he would first confront the advancing enemy on the Raba, and then at Wieliczka-Myslenice and the area farther south.

In a supplementary order on 14 November, it was stated that 4th Army should be held in readiness in the area of the Cracow fortress so that "it could intervene in the expected fighting after short marches toward the north and northeast with a flank attack that should decide the battle." To make the attacking wing as powerful as possible, it would be joined by 106 Lst ID and 45 LW ID (which had been sent into the fortress). Moreover the fortress commander, FML Kuk, should place his mobile guns at the disposal of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

The Russians hang back, so the allies attack

While these measures were being taken, the large groups of Russians between Czenstochau and Cracow were moving up against the allied positions only with great hesitation. The first actions between the reconnaissance detachments of Dankl and Woyrsch and the enemy advance guards developed on 13 November. On the next day stronger Russian forces appeared in front of Woyrsch's group and the north wing of 1st Army, but didn't attack. GdI Conrad, however, expected that the advance of the 5th and 4th Russian Armies would lead to actions on 15 November at the latest. Böhm-Ermolli had not yet assembled all his forces, and Hauer's Cavalry Corps was still riding toward Wielun. However, there was no immediate threat of an overwhelming attack by the 5th Russian Army. The enemy had not advanced far past Noworadomsk, and meanwhile the parts of k.u.k. 2nd Army which had already arrived were deploying on the left behind Woyrsch's Army Detachment. The Eastern Command had taken three Landsturm Brigades with several squadrons and batteries from the fortresses of Breslau and Posen and combined them into the Corps "Breslau" and "Posen." These units were placed in the front by Kempen and Kalisz, and would advance over the middle Warta with Fromm's Cavalry Corps. And - most important of all -
Mackensen's attack from Thorn had begun successfully on the 12th; it was still proceeding well and had already penetrated to Gostynin and Kutno, into the Russian flank.

Conrad felt that the time had now come for his own attack. He still had no certain knowledge of the activities of the 9th Russian Army. Based on reports received through the morning of 15 November, however, it seemed that its right wing (XIV and Guard Corps) would participate in the attacks toward the west by 4th Russian Army; its left wing (XXV Corps) would guard the area northwest of Cracow. It was now known that XVIII Russian Corps had crossed to the north bank of the Vistula at Nowy Korczyn. Moreover, Russian cavalry had crossed the Dunajec and other forces - probably XXI Corps - were following them.

This was the situation in the afternoon of 15 November when Conrad issued his order to attack. It stated: "4th Army will begin the offensive early on 16 November, if possible by surprise...It is important to break through on the 16th to the line from Nowe Brzesko through Proszowice to the heights east of Slomniki. This will give 1st Army room to launch its own flanking attack, which can take place on 17 November in a decisive direction." As already ordered on the 13th, the 1st Army would be prepared early on the 16th to join the advance of 4th Army.

In the evening of the same day (15 November), a telegram from GO Hindenburg arrived at Teschen. It suggested that the AOK should let the Russians exhaust themselves and to postpone the attack by the Aus-Hung. 4th Army until the success of 9th German Army began to take effect. 413 Conrad, however, stuck to his decisions. If he waited any longer, he might lose the advantage of surprise, or the Russians in Poland might save themselves from the planned pincers attack by a timely retreat. 414

The Chief of the Aus-Hung. staff also considered a quick decision to be necessary because the 8th Russian Army was advancing in the Carpathians; the 3rd Russian Army, believed to be at Jaslo-Krosno, could move into the gap in the front in west Galicia in about 8 days. Conrad estimated that his chances of a major victory at Cracow were good. He trusted in the bravery and perseverance of the k.u.k. troops, and such hopes made him confident that 4th Army would soon break into the enemy front.

413 German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 238 f.
414 Conrad, Vol. V., p. 499
H. The Battles of Cracow and Czenstochau

1. Organization of the allied forces

The following were the units available in mid-November (changes in organization are noted through the end of December 1914). The Armies are shown in north-south order. Details about German organization are provided only for units serving in the Austrian zone (south of Lodz).

8th German Army
- Ist Corps - 1 and 2 ID
- 3 Res ID
- Jacobi's LW ID [6 and 34 Bdes]
- Königsberg LW ID (later 6 LW ID)
- Einem's LW ID [33 and 70 Bdes]
- 9 LW Bde
- 1 Cav Div
- Garrisons at Königsberg, Pillau and Lötzen
- Gains - In Nov gained 3 Cav Bde (from 4 CD), in Dec gained 5 Inf Bde

German Graudenz Corps (independent) - Divs of Wernitz and Breugel

9th German Army
- XI Corps - 22 and 38 ID
- XVII Corps - 35 and 36 ID
- XX Corps - 37 and 41 ID
- Ist Res Corps - 1 and 36 Res ID
- XXV Res Corps - 49 Res ID; half of 50 Res ID
- 3 Guard ID
- Thorn Corps - Half of 50 Res ID; Westernhagen's Div; 21 LW Bde
- Doussin's LW Bde
- Richthofen's Cav Corps - 6 and 9 CD
- Frommel's Cav Corps
  - 5 CD - 9 Bde [DR # 4, UR # 10], 11 Bde [CR # 1, DR # 8], 12 Bde [HR # 4, 6]; Horse Arty Bn/FAR # 5
  - 8 CD - 23 Bde [Saxon Gd Horse, UR # 17], 38 Bde [JPR # 2, 6], 40 Bde [Saxon Carabiniers, UR # 21]; Horse Arty Bn/FAR

Translator's Note - This material is not in the original, but has been added from the Hungarian official history, except for details on German unit organization which come from various German sources.
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# 12

. 7 Aus-Hung. CD - 11 Bde [DR # 10, UR # 2], 20 Bde [DR # 12, UR # 3]; Horse Arty Bn # 1

. Gains - In November gained Corps Posen [1 & 2 Posen ID], II Corps [4 ID, half of 3 ID (other half, 5 Bde, to 8 Army)], half of XXIV Res Corps [48 Res ID; other half, 47 Res ID, to 4 Aus-Hung. Army]; 1 ID (from 8 Army). In December gained XIII Corps [26 ID, 25 Res ID], III Res Corps [5 and 6 Res ID], Hollen's Cav Corps [2 CD, 4 CD (minus its 3 Bde)]

2nd Army (47 bns, 62 sqdns, 38 batteries)

. IV Corps

. 31 ID - 61 Bde [IR # 32, 69], 62 Bde [IR # 44, BH IR # 3], FKR # 10, Ist Bn/FHR # 4

. 32 ID - 63 Bde [IR # 23, 70], 64 Bde [IR # 6, 86], FKR # 11, II Bn/FHR # 4

. Heavy How Bn # 4

. XII Corps

. 16 ID - 31 Bde [IR# 2, 82], 32 Bde [IR# 31, 64], FKR # 36, Ist Bn/FHR # 12

. 35 ID - 69 Bde [IR # 50, 51], 70 Bde [IR # 62, 63], FKR # 35, II Bn/FHR # 12

. Heavy How Bn # 12

. Hauer's Cavalry Corps

. 3 CD - 10 Bde [DR # 3, UR # 7], 17 Bde [UR # 4, HR # 1], Horse Arty Bn # 2

. 9 CD - 1 Bde [DR # 4, 13], 9 Bde [DR # 1, UR # 6]; Horse Arty Bn # 9

. Independent - HR # 4

. Gains - On 5 December gained 27 ID

Woyrsch's German Army Detachment

. Landwehr Corps

. 3 LW ID - 17 Bde [LW IR # 6,7], 18 Bde [LW IR # 37, 46]; LW Cav Regt # 1; Ersatz Arty Bns # 20, 41, 54

. 4 LW ID - 22 Bde [LW IR # 11, 51], 23 Bde [LW IR # 22, 23]; 4 LW Cav Bde [LW Cav Regt # 2, Ersatz Cav Regt]; Ersatz Arty Bns # 6, 42, 56

. 1 Gd Res ID - 1 Bde [Gd Res IR # 1, 2; Gd Res Jaeger Bn], 15 Bde [Res IR # 64, 93; Gd Res Schützen Bn]; Gd Res DR; Gd Res FAR # 1 and 3

. 35 Res ID - 5 LW Bde [LW IR # 2, 9], 20 LW Bde [LW IR # 19, 107]; Res Heavy Cav Regt # 3; Ersatz Arty Bns # 35, 81

. Bredow's Div - Units obscure; included 19 LW Bde

1st Army (176 bns, 75 sqdns, 121 batteries)

. II Corps
4th Army (128 bns, 55 sqdns, 89 batteries)
. VI Corps
  . 15 ID - 29 Bde [IR # 5, 66], 30 Bde [IR # 60, 65]; FKR # 17; Ist Bn/FHR # 6
  . 27 ID - 53 Bde [IR # 25, 34; FJB # 29], 54 Bde [IR # 67, 85]; FKR # 16; II Bn/FHR # 6
  . 39 Hon ID - 77 Bde [HIR # 9, 11], 78 Bde [HIR # 10, 16]; FKR # 18; Hon FH Bn # 3
  . Heavy How Bn # 6

. XIV Corps
  . 3 ID - 5 Bde [IR # 28, 59], 15 Bde [IR # 14, KJR # 2]; FKR # 42, II Bn/FHR # 14
  . 8 ID - 16 Bde [FJB # 1, 13, 14, 16, 18], 96 Bde [KJR # 3, 4], 121 Bde [KJR # 1; FJB # 27]; FKR # 41; Ist Bn/FHR # 14
  . 13 LW ID - 25 Bde [LW IR # 1, 24], 26 Bde [LW IR # 14, 25]; LW FKR # 4; LW FK Bn # 13, LW FH Bn # 13
  . Heavy How Bn # 14

. XVII Corps
  . 19 ID - 37 Bde [IR # 35, LW IR # 29; FJB # 6, 22], 38 Bde [IR # 75, 88]; FKR # 22; II Bn/FHR # 8
  . 41 Hon ID - 40 Bde [HIR # 12, 32], 82 Bde [HIR # 20, 31]; Hon FKR # 7, II Bn/FHR # 12. At end of Nov the Div was temporarily dissolved due to losses, and all units served combined under HQ of 82 Bde
  . 45 LW ID - 89 Bde [LW IR # 18, 33], 90 Bde [LW IR # 17, 34]; FKR # 28; LW FK Bn # 45, LW FH Bn # 45
  . 106 Lst ID - Bde Pfeiffer [k.k. Lst IR # 13, 15, 31]; Bde Kökh [k.k. Lst IR # 6, 25, 38]; 4 cannon & 2 howitzer batteries

. Independent
  . Matusic's Combined Lst ID - 110 Bde [k.k. Lst IR # 16, 32; 13 & 14 Comps of Fort Arty Regt # 2], 1 Bde [k.k. Lst IR # 1, 2; Res FK Batty # 42]
  . Pilsudski's Polish Legion (on 23 Nov = 1st Polish Legion Bde) - 1st Legion IR (of 6 bns); 2 sqdns, 2 batteries
  . 6 CD - 5 Bde [DR # 6, 8], 14 Bde [DR # 11, HR # 11]; Horse Arty Bn # 10
  . 10 CD - 4 Bde [HR # 10, 13], 8 Bde [HR # 9, UR # 12]; Horse Arty Bn # 4

. Gains - 11 CD (24 Nov), 47 German Res ID * (1 Dec), VI Corps with 39 & 45 ID (6-8 Dec), 15 ID (8 Dec); on 25 Dec gained all the following: Szurmay Group (38 ID, Kornhaber ID), VI Corps (39, 45 ID), IX Corps (10, 26 ID), Ljubicic Group (XI Corps with 11 & 30 ID plus indep 4 ID), indep 6 ID and half 22 ID

. Losses - VI Corps with 15, 27 & 39 ID plus indep 45 ID (all on 28 Nov), VI Corps (39, 45 ID) again plus 10 CD (on 15 Dec)
* 47 German Res ID had 93 Bde [Res IR # 217, 218], 94 Bde [Res IR # 219, 220], Res Jaeger Bn # 19, Res FAR # 47
Cracow garrison  (39 bns plus fortress artillery)
  . 95 Lst Bde [k.k. Lst IR # 7, 8, 28; two batteries]
  . Lst Terr Bdes - 2nd [7 bns], 10th [8 bns]
  . Fortress artillery of the garrison

3rd Army  (159 bns, 107 sqdns, 111 batteries)
  . XI Corps
  . 11 ID - 21 Bde [IR # 15, 55], 22 Bde [IR # 58, 95]; FKR # 33; Ist Bn/FHR # 11; attached II Bn/FKR # 20 (from 23 Hon ID)
  . 30 ID - 60 Bde [IR # 30, 80; FJB # 24, 30], 88 Bde [L-Sch Regts # II, III]; FKR # 32; II Bn/FHR # 11
  . Heavy How Bn # 11
  . IX Corps
  . 10 ID - 19 Bde [IR # 36, 98; FJB # 2], 20 Bde [IR # 18, 21; FJB # 21]; FKR # 25, II Bn/FHR # 9
  . 26 LW ID - 51 Bde [LW IR # 11, 12, 30], 52 Bde [LW IR # 9, 10]; FKR # 26; LW FK Bn # 26, LW FH Bn # 26
  . Heavy How Bn # 9
  . III Corps
  . 6 ID - 11 Bde [IR # 7, BH IR # 2], 12 Bde [IR # 17; FJB # 8, 9]; FKR # 9, Ist Bn/FHR # 3
  . 22 LW ID - 43 Bde [LW IR # 3, 26], 44 Bde [LW IR # 4, 27]; FKR # 7; LW FK Bn # 22, LW FH Bn # 22
  . 28 ID - 55 Bde [IR # 87, 97; FJB # 20], 56 Bde [IR # 27, 47; FJB # 7]; FKR # 8, II Bn/FHR # 3
  . Heavy How Bn # 3
  . VII Corps
  . 17 ID - 33 Bde [IR # 39, 101], 34 Bde [IR # 33, 46]; FKR # 19; Ist Bn/FHR # 7
  . 20 Hon ID - 39 Bde [HIR # 3, 4], 81 Bde [HIR # 1, 17]; Hon FKR # 8; Ist Bn/FKR # 20
  . 105 Lst Bde - k.k. Lst IR # 3, 4; Res Arty Batty # 18
  . Heavy How Bn # 7
  . Group Krautwald
  . 34 ID - IR # 29, 43, 61, 96 (no Bde HQ); FKR # 21; II Bn/FHR # 7
  . 17 Lst Terr Bde - Lst Terr Bns # 227 to 235
  . 40 Lst Bde - No units assigned (HQ was being dissolved)
  . Group Karg (25 Nov = Group Szurmay)
  . 38 Hon ID - 75 Bde [HIR # 21, 22], 76 Bde [HIR # 23, 24]; Hon FKR # 5, FKR # 34
  . 1 Lst Terr Bde - Lst Terr Bns # 5, 7, 8, 9
  . 2 Lst Terr Bde - Lst Terr Bdes # 10, 11, 15, 16
  . (In Dec, remnants of 1 & 2 Lst Terr Bdes made up a Combined Lst IR in 56 ID)
Austria-Hungary's Last War, 1914-1918

Vol 1

. k.u. Lst IR # 102 (remnants of 102 Lst Bde)
. Independent cavalry divisions
  . 1 CD - 6 Bde [HR # 7, 14], 7 Bde [HR # 12; the HR # 4 was detached to 2nd Army]; no artillery
  . 4 CD - 18 Bde [DR # 9, UR # 13], 21 Bde [DR # 15, UR # 1]; Horse Arty Bn # 11
  . 5 Hon CD - 19 Bde [HHR # 1, 8], 23 Bde [HHR # 6, 7]; one battery of Horse Arty Bn # 6
  . 8 CD - 13 Bde [DR # 7, UR # 8], 15 Bde [DR # 2, UR # 11]; Horse Arty Bn # 6
. Gains - Kornhaber ID * (24 Nov), 56 ID (25 Nov), 11 Lst Terr Bde (10 Dec), VI Corps (39 & 45 ID) plus 10 CD (all on 15 Dec); on 16 Dec the following: X Corps (2, 24 ID), XVIII Corps (44 ID, 59 Bde)
. Losses - Ljubicic Group (XI Corps plus 4 CD) and 17 Lst Terr Bde (all on 17 Nov); on 25 Dec all of the following: Szurmay Group (38 ID, Kornhaber ID), VI Corps (39, 45 ID), IX Corps (10, 26 ID), 6 ID, half of 22 ID
* Kornhaber's ID = 200 Bde [Hon Bns # 401-408 and a combined battery] and 201 Bde [Hon Bns # 409-416 and a combined battery]

Group Pflanzer-Baltin (78 bns, 5 sqdns, 23 batteries)
. 52 ID - 123 and 124 Bdes (8 bns); 1/2 sqdn, 2 batteries
. 54 ID - 126 and 128 Bdes (9 bns); 1 sqdn, 2 batteries
. 55 ID - 129 and 139 Bdes (17 bns); 1 sqdn, 8 batteries
. 56 ID - 132 and 133 Bdes (6 bns); in Dec gained a combined Lst IR (from 1 & 2 Lst Terr Bdes)
. 131 Bde - 7 bns, 1/2 sqdn, 3 batteries
. 12 Lst Terr Bde - 9 bns
. 7 Lst Etappen Bde - 6 bns, 2 sqdns
. Durski's Polish Legion - Legion IR # 2 and 3 (9 bns); 2 sqdns, 3 batteries
. Fischer's Streifkorps - 8 bns
. Gains - Lst Huss Regt # 1 (5 Dec), rest of 1 Lst Huss Bde (20 Dec)
. Loss - 56 ID (25 Nov)

Przemysl garrison (65 bns, 7 sqdns, 4 batteries, 43 fort arty comps, 49 Landsturm arty detachments)
. 23 Hon ID - 45 Bde [HIR # 2, 5], 46 Bde [HIR # 7, 8]; Hon FKR # 2
. 85 LW Bde - LW IR # 19, 35
. 93 Lst Bde - k.k. Lst IR # 10, 35
. 97 Lst Bde - k.u. Lst IR # 9, 10, 11, 16
. 108 Lst Bde - k.k. Lst IR # 21; Tyrol Lst IR # II
. 111 Lst Bde - k.k. Lst IR # 17, 18, 33, 34
. Hon March Regts # 3 and 4
. Fortress artillery of the garrison

2. The fighting begins

(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketches 36, 37, and 38)

4th Army HQ issued its orders for the offensive to start at 6:00 AM on the next day, in accordance with the overall directions of the high command:

- FML Roth with XIV Corps (8 and 3 ID, 13 LW ID) and 106 Lst ID would advance between the Vistula and a line running southeast from the road leading to Slomniki; the main objective was Proszowice.
- FML Arz with VI Corps (39 Hon ID, 45 LW ID) would advance on the west flank of XIV Corps, mainly toward Slomniki.
- 15 and 27 ID were in the Army's reserve.

Because the enemy forces south of the Vistula were approaching so slowly, it would likely be possible to also deploy the bulk of XVII Corps north of the river; therefore GdI Kri tek would have 19 ID and half of 41 Hon ID available by Wieliczka at 12:00 noon. To cover the area south of the Vistula, a group under FML Nikic was left in their original positions - 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes, 6 and 10 CD, and the rest of 41 Hon ID (i.e., 82 Hon Bde).

16 November

In the night of 15–16 November, 4th Army began its march to the appointed jumping-off points. Numerous traffic jams delayed the advance, so that the divisions were many hours late when they began their attack on the left wing of 9th Russian Army. Around 1:00 PM the XIV Corps had marched almost 20 km without seeing any action and its advance guards had reached the prewar border northeast of Prusy. Under VI Corps, the 39 Hon ID was on the heights at Michalowice around noon when it came under heavy fire from the northeast; 45 LW ID had reached the area around Smardzowice without any fighting. When the tired troops of both corps resumed their advance after a short rest break, they began to sight the enemy (Russian XXV Corps) on the heights southwest of Proszowice and Slomniki. The Russians had already gone over to the defensive and confronted the k.u.k. 4th Army with a fortified position. XIV Corps won only a very small amount of ground before the autumn night fell early. VI Corps fought its way forward with the right wing to Goszcza and the area to its west and with the left wing to the heights at Rzeplin.
In 1st Army, GdK Dankl had ordered X Corps (24 and 2 ID, 35 Lst Inf Bde and 11 Hon CD) to attack as soon as the advance of 4th Army became effective on the 16th. The Corps would strike through Skala toward Miechow. FZM Puhallo and V Corps (14 ID, 37 Hon ID, 33 ID and 36 Lst Inf Bde) would join in the attack later on the right of the Xth; initially, however, 33 ID was in the Army's reserve while 36 Lst Inf Bde was on the lines of communication.

Following these orders, Dankl's right wing - X Corps and 14 ID of V Corps - began to advance in the afternoon of the 16th. They didn't meet resistance, but had to overcome considerable technical difficulties as they advanced by darkness to the west edge of the stony ravine through which the Pradnik Brook flows, and to the area just to its north. Meanwhile the Russians were moving closer to the Army's left wing - Ist Corps (5 ID, 46 LW ID, 12 ID and a regiment of the Polish Legion), FML Tschurtschenthaler's Group (44 and 43 LW ID, 101 Lst Inf Bde) and II Corps (4 and 25 ID, 2 CD) - and to Woyrsch's Army Detachment.

There was a surprising change in the situation in front of the k.u.k. 2nd Army, which was marching into the area Parzymiechy-Dzierzniki, and in front of Mackensen's right wing. From the enemy's radio traffic it was learned that the 2nd Russian Army was moving back from the Warta, and that 5th Army had stopped its advance. Because of the successes of 9th German Army, which had already reached the upper reaches of the Bzura, GO Hindenburg now believed that the Russians might soon initiate a retreat from western Poland. Therefore on the evening of the 16th he asked the k.u.k. high command to immediately attack along the entire front of 4th and 1st Armies and of Woyrsch's Group. At the same time the south wing of 9th German Army would move the Breslau and Posen Corps forward along with Frommel's Cavalry Corps. Thereafter, as the front contracted, Hindenburg wanted to pull the remaining half of the Gd Res Corps (1 Gd Res ID) from Woyrsch's command and employ it east of the lower Vistula with the corps expected from the Western front.416

Conrad's orders reflected the Germans' desire for a general offensive. The cautious advance of the Russians against the north wing of 1st Army and Woyrsch indicated that they might be pulling units from this sector to reinforce the defense against 9th German Army in the north. In these circumstances, it was becoming more possible that the 4th and 9th Russian Armies might retreat. Therefore GdI Conrad ordered that on the 17th the

416 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 103
attack of the k.u.k. 4th Army would continue, while all of 1st Army and Woyrsch's Group joined in.

Conrad urged 4th Army, whose advance had been delayed on the 16th, to make up "for the costly time lost on 16 November by an energetic attack and pursuit" and to use every minute of the short late autumn day to good account. They were to "hurl the enemy back and to pursue him without pause until reaching the line running from east of Miechow to the mouth of the Nidzica. 1st Army and the German divisions of Woyrsch's Army Detachment would attack to the line Miechow-Plawno (south of Noworadomsk). The parts of 2nd Army at the front should reach Popow-Dzialoszyn. If the enemy himself went over to the offensive against Woyrsch, he would be repulsed and then hit by a flanking attack on his north wing by German 35 Res ID and 2nd Army.

The orders which the k.u.k. high command issued for the offensive indicate how strong was its will to put all former disappointments aside. Everything indicated that only a double attack from Thorn and Cracow could strike a decisive blow against the enormous masses of the Russian steamroller. If only our own strength was sufficient against the enemy's gigantic forces! Once more on 16 November Conrad - like a voice crying in the wilderness - turned to the DOHL to request reinforcements from the West front. Once again the response wasn't encouraging. Falkenhayn stated that the movement wouldn't begin until the 22nd; the first troops would reach the Vistula sector on the 28th. He would send five or six corps to follow the thee cavalry divisions that had already reached the East. Because of the successes which Mackensen was winning, he didn't understand why Conrad still considered the situation urgent.

In turn, Conrad angrily sent an answering telegram to his German colleague on 17 November; he said that he could not fully comprehend Falkenhayn's concern about the West front in an hour when decisive fighting was in progress in the East. Conrad had left just 11 Aus-Hung. divisions facing 50 Russian divisions in Galicia so that he could hurl 26 divisions against the enemy facing Germany; he had chosen to ignore the great danger to the inner provinces of the Danube Monarchy. However, he could not allow this great disparity of forces in Galicia to continue for long, and therefore let GdI Falkenhayn know that the campaign must be decided quickly. As soon as success was won north of Cracow, the k.u.k. 4th Army would have to return to Galicia as soon as possible to match its strength against the Russians there and in the Carpathians.
17 November

Meanwhile the Battle of Cracow had already reached its high point.

On the evening of the 16th, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had ordered 27 ID to join FML Arz and 15 ID to join FML Roth at the front. GdI Kritek would cross to the north bank of the Vistula early on the 17th from Wieliczka with XVII Corps (19 ID and half of 41 Hon ID); he would proceed on the right of XIV Corps to outflank the Russian left at Nowe Brzesko. FML Nikic's Group was ordered to move east to Bochnia and the lower Raba.

When the k.u.k. 4th Army launched its decisive attack at 6:00 AM on 17 November, it encountered very stubborn resistance along the entire line. The 8 and 3 ID fought their way forward on both sides of the Cracow-Proszowice road up to the heights of Biorkow. 13 LW ID, which on the evening before had been stopped at Goszyce, sought to advance through that town toward the north; the Division won some ground in the morning, but lost it in the afternoon when a Russian counterattack forced its right wing to waver. Meanwhile, 15 ID was inserted on FML Roth's extreme right and won some successes at Glew. Farther east, the 19 ID of XVII Corps advanced through Igolomia in the evening hours. Now 4th Army HQ reassigned 15 ID and 96 Inf Bde from Roth to Kritek, whose command henceforth included 19 ID, half of 41 Hon ID, 15 ID and half of 8 ID. The Army ordered FML Nikic to hold reserves ready at Chobot on the south bank of the Vistula and to use their artillery to support Kritek's attack with flanking fire.

In Arz' Corps, the attack of 39 Hon ID and of 27 ID - which had entered the line on the Honveds' left - moved forward to the enemy lines at Goszcz. 45 LW ID, which was supposed to thrust through Iwanowice, had instead turned toward the northwest because the Russian Guard Corps had dug in around Skala, at the junction of 4th and 1st Armies.

GdK Dankl wanted to assist the actions of Arz' Group by advancing parts of X Corps through Skala; meanwhile the bulk of 24 and 2 ID would break through the Russian front in the direction of Miechow, and V Corps would take the heights south of Wolbrom.

However, the attack of 1st Army on 17 November soon came to a halt. Parts of the Russian Guard themselves went over to the offensive against X Corps and gained ground by Skala; thick fog
made it difficult for the Aus-Hung. batteries to spot the enemy. Therefore GdK Dankl was forced to commit his reserves – 35 Lst Inf Bde and most of 33 ID – to this sector. On the other hand, the southernmost unit of Ist Corps – 5 ID – was able to take Golaczowy from the enemy in the evening; 37 Hon ID captured the town of Jangrot in a night action. The advance of the inner wings of the Russian 9th and 4th Armies made itself felt opposite Ist Corps, Tschurtschenthaler's Group, and II Corps. In this sector, 25 ID was supposed to capture the limestone crags by Kotowice and Rzedkowice. 4 ID and the Prussian 1 Gd Res ID at Zarki would attack in conjunction with 25 ID. However, in the middle of preparations a surprise Russian offensive drove back the left wing of 4 ID while 25 ID was already engaged against the enemy's main positions.417

Late on the evening of the 16th, GdI Woyrsch had learned from an intercepted radio broadcast that the Russian 4th Army would attack his front on the 17th. On the other hand, the right wing of the Russian 5th Army (V Corps), which was known to be at Noworadomsk, was reported to be moving back toward the northeast. In this situation, Woyrsch decided to let the enemy wear himself out by a frontal attack; meanwhile he would prepare a flanking coutnerattack against the north wing of Russian 4th Army (the Grenadier Corps) east of Czenstochau. For this purpose, on the night of 16-17 November he ordered the left brigade of 35 German Res ID and the available units of the k.u.k. 2nd Army – 16 and 31 ID – to be ready between Klobucko and Popow. 35 ID, which had just detrained, was to follow them to Popow.

The long advance of 2nd Army on 17 November from its encampments at Parzymiechy-Dziejtrzniki to its deployment area was delayed by some destroyed bridges. Meanwhile the Russian advance toward Czenstochau had been proceeding since dawn. Therefore the German 35 Res ID opened its attack in the morning and gained ground as far as the woods west of Mykanow in light actions with the Russian Grenadiers. On their left the k.u.k. 16 ID reached Ostrowy without meeting opposition. 31 ID, which had been misrouted toward Dzialoszyn by an Army order issued in the evening of the 16th 418, didn't have its main body assembled in the Popow area until the morning of the 18th. On the evening of the 17th, Hauer's Cavalry Corps – which was supposed to thrust

418 Kiszling, "Die k.u.k. 2. Armee vom 10. November 1914 bis zum Jahresschluss" (a manuscript in the military archives)
to Kaminsk - was still standing on both sides of the Warta at Dzialoszyn, where it was working to replace the destroyed bridges. North of the k.u.k. 2nd Army - which had advanced in a great hurry almost without any supply trains or supporting services - the Breslau Landsturm Corps reached Wielun.

These events of 17 November disappointed the AOK at Teschen. They had hoped that 4th and 1st Armies would deliver a decisive blow over the Szreniawa. Instead, trench warfare had developed on the entire front between Cracow and Czenstochau. The attack of XVII Corps along the north bank of the Vistula seemed to be making better progress; the diversion of 5th Russian Army to the north, as reported by radio broadcasts, seemed to present an opportunity to outflank the Russian 4th Army at Noworadomsk. Therefore the offensive would continue on the 18th. GdI Conrad directed 4th and 1st Army to have their VI and X Corps cooperate in capturing the Skala heights as soon as possible. This would enable 4th Army and the south wing of 1st Army to move forward quickly. GdI Woyrsch was ordered to send all available units of 2nd Army into a flanking attack on the enemy right wing. At the close of these orders, the Armies were spurred into exerting their strength to the utmost with some scornful words:

"The result of tomorrow's attack is of decisive importance for the course of the entire war. We are not confronted with superior forces.\(^{419}\) The enemy is exhausted and lacks ammunition and supplies. His units are under strength. Always remember that lost time cannot be regained. The unbreakable will of all commanders and their personal influence in combat must be vigorously utilized to ensure success."

Events on the Russian Side

The following was the disposition of the Russian forces in mid-November 1914.\(^{420}\)

\(^{419}\) Actually, between Cracow and Czenstochau the allies had 32 divisions (384 battalions) engaged against 23 Russian divisions (368 battalions). However, the effective strength of the allied battalions - at least in the Aus-Hung. units - was less than that of their Russian counterparts.

\(^{420}\) This information is an expanded version of the original; the additional data is from the Hungarian official history and some Russian sources.
NORTHWEST FRONT (Ruszky)

. 1 Army (Rennenkampf)
   . Left of the Vistula - V Sib (6 Sib Rif Div only; 10 Sib Rif Div not at the front), VI Sib (13 & 14 Sib Rif Divs)
   . Right of the Vistula - VI (4 & 16 ID), I Turkestan (11 Sib Rif Div; 1 & 2 Turk Rif Bdes); 6 Cav & 4 Don Coss Divs; Ussuri Cav Bde

. 2 Army (Scheidemann) - I (22 & 24 ID), II (26 & 43 ID), IV (30 & 40 ID), XXIII (3 Gd ID *), II Sib (4 & 5 Sib Rif Divs);
   Novikov Cav Corps [5, 8 & 14 CD]; 50 & 79 ID; Charpentier Cav Corps (Caucasian CD, Gd Coss Bde, 1st Astrakhan Coss Regt)
   * 2 ID of XXIII Corps, smashed at Tannenberg, was rebuilding at Novo Georgievsk; 1st Rifle Bde was attached to XXIII Corps in its stead

. 4 Army - Was attached only for 14-17 Nov; see SW Front, below
. 5 Army (Plehve) - V (7 & 10 ID), XIX (17 & 38 ID), I Sib (1 & 2 Sib Rif Divs); 5 Don Coss Div, half of Turkestan Coss Div

. 10 Army (Sievers)
   . Corps - III (25 & 27 ID plus 3 Rifle Bde), XX (28 & 29 ID plus 53 ID), XXII (1, 2, 3 & 4 Finnish Rifle Bdes), XXVI (maybe 64 & 84 ID?), II Cauc (Cauc Gren Div & 51 ID), III Sib (7 & 8 Sib Rif Divs)
   . Indep ID - 56, 57, 68, 73, 76, 77 (and maybe 64 & 84 ?)
   . Inf Bdes - 1 Cauc Rifle; 7, 8, 14, 16, 17, 20 Opolcheniye
   . Cav Divs - 1 & 2 Gd; 1, 2, 3, 4, 15
   . Cav Bdes - 1, 4

. Fortifications - The Narew Group HQ was over the fortified areas of Warsaw & Novo Georgievsk; troops were: XXVII [63 ID plus four opolcheniye bdes], 59 ID, half of 2 ID, a border watch bde, and two independent opolcheniye bdes

SOUTHWEST FRONT

. 3 Army (Dimitriev) - IX (5 & 42 ID), X (9 & 31 ID), XI (11 & 32 ID), XXI (33 & 44 ID); 7 & 16 CD; 3 Don Coss & 3 Cauc Coss Divs

. 4 Army (Evert) - Grenadier (1 & 2 Gren Divs), XVI (41 & 47 ID), XVII (3 & 35 ID plus 81 ID), III Cauc (21 & 52 ID plus 75 ID); Ural Coss Div; Transbaikal Coss Bde

. 8 Army (Brussilov) - VII (13 & 34 ID), VIII (14 & 15 ID), XII (12 & 19 ID), XXIV (48 & 49 ID); 3 & 4 Rifle Bdes; 65 ID, 12 Sib Rif Div; 10 & 12 CD; Terek Coss Divs

. 9 Army (Letschitzky) - Guard (1 & 2 Gd ID plus Gd Rifle and Gd Cav Bdes), XIV (18 & 45 ID plus 2 Rifle Bde), XVIII (23 & 37 ID plus 80 and 83 ID), XXV (3 Gren Div & 46 ID); 61, 70 ID; 13 CD; 1 Don Coss Div

. 11 Army (Selivanov) - XXVIII (58 & 60 ID plus 69 ID) and half of XXIX (82 ID); 9 & 11 CD (The XXX Corps was formed & added in
Dec)
. Dniester Group - 71 ID; 78 ID (from XXIX Corps); "some" opolcheniye; 2 Comb Coss Div; 1 & 2 Kuban Coss Divs

OTHER
. Caucasian Army - I Cauc (20 & 39 ID) and II Turk Corps (4 & 5 Turk Rif Bdes); 1, 2 & 3 Kuban Plastun Bdes (# 2 & 3 made up of reservists); 66 ID; 2 Cauc Rifle Bde; 1 & 2 Cauc Coss Divs; Kuban, Transcaspian & 1 Siberian Coss Bdes
   (Reinforced in Dec by 3 Cauc Rifle Bde [reservists] and 3 Kuban Coss Div)
. St Petersburg District, or 6 Army - 55, 67 & 74 ID; Orenburg Coss Div; "some" opolcheniye
. Odessa District, or 7 Army - 62 ID; Don Coss Regt # 7; "some" opolcheniye
. In Turkestan - 6 Turkestan Rifle Bde
. In Siberia - IV Sib (3 & 9 Sib Rif Divs); 10 Sib Rif Div; the Trans-Amur Border Watch
. In formation or rebuilding - XIII (1 & 36 ID), XV (6 & 8 ID); 3 Cauc Rifle Bde, 3 Turk Rifle Bde, some opolcheniye bdes; half of the Turkestan Coss Div; 3 Kuban Coss Div, Caucasian Native Horse Div, 2 & 3 Transbaikal Coss Bdes

(see volume 1 leaflet 20)

On November 12, the Russian 5th, 4th and 9th Armies had been ordered by Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch to attack on the Kalisz-Czenstochau front. On the morning of the 14th they began to move very cautiously from the Widawka, Pilica and Nidzica; by the evening of the 15th they still had not crossed a line running from Dzialoszyn to a point east of Czenstochau and thence through Pilica (town) and Miechow and along the Szreniawa River. On the 15th the surprise attack by the Germans from Thorn had already caused the 2nd Army, standing in place east of the Warta, to be outflanked. The Germans had reached Gostynin, Kutno and Leczyca, and had smashed the south wing of 1st Russian Army (deployed between the left bank of the Vistula and Wloclawek) as well as the north wing of 2nd Army (II Corps). When General Ruszky became aware of this dangerous situation, he immediately cancelled the advance of 5th and 4th Armies.

However, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch didn't consent to this measure. He ordered General Ruszky to continue the attack toward Czenstochau-Zarki, but at the same time directed him to send V Corps of 5 Army by train to Skierniewice to parry the German thrust. The left wing of 2nd Army and most of the 5th should pivot toward the northwest; thus they in turn would
outflank the Germans who were advancing toward Kutno. General Ruszky was no longer in a position to carry out these directives. The German breakthrough toward Kutno forced him to avoid encirclement by pulling all of 2nd Army back quickly to Lowicz-Lodz-Zdunska Wola. Also the entire 5th Army retreated to Noworadomsk, whence it could march to Lask and Zdunksa Wola on the left of 2nd Army. The result of these maneuvers was the creation of a large hole in the line between 5th and 4th Armies. Therefore on 17 November the Grand Duke was obliged to once more place 4th Army under General Ivanov, and advised him to take measures to protect his northern flank.

General Ivanov acted quickly and decisively. He assembled the Ural Coss Div and Trans-Baikal Coss Bde of 4th Army along with 13 CD of 9th Army on the upper Widawka, and placed them under the cavalry general Prince Tumanov. Ivanov ordered General Evert to extend the north wing of his 4th Army (the Grenadier Corps) north to Noworadomsk.

However, danger of encirclement had also arisen in the south, in the sector of 9th Russian Army, due to the Austrian attack out of Cracow. Here General Letschitzky had already taken measures to strengthen his front. He brought Krusenstern's Group (23, 46 and 80 ID), which had been south of the Vistula, over to the north bank at Nowy Korczyn and to Skalbmierz; its units were once more reunited with the main body of the Army. As the enemy's attack out of Cracow developed, Letschitzky brought up XVIII Corps from Skalbmierz to Slomniki, where it entered the line between the XXV and Guard Corps. He also prepared bridges on the Vistula downstream from the mouth of the Dunajec, so that units from 3rd Army, approaching in Galicia, would be able to cross the river. General Ivanov had ordered 3rd Army to speed up its advance as much as possible; it would deploy three corps between the Raba and Dunajec to support the actions of 9th Army. Finally, on the evening of the 17th Ivanov ordered 4th and 9th Army to carry on their attack (although it was already flagging) "until the enemy is destroyed."\(^{421}\)

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3. The battles continue – 18 to 20 November

(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketches 36, 37, and 38)

18 November

Bitter fighting raged on 18 November. GdI Kritek's group on the right wing of 4th k.u.k. Army – 19 ID, half of 41 Hon ID, 15 ID and 96 Inf Bde – overcame the stubborn resistance of the left wing of XXV Russian Corps and drove it back to Wawrzenczyce and farther north. On the preceding night, 3 ID of XIV Corps had already stormed the hotly contested heights at Biorkow, and 8 ID took Wronin in the morning. On the left of 3 ID, the 13 LW ID (reinforced by parts of 106 Lst ID) sought to take the opposing Russian lines. In the morning the gallant LW IR # 24 advanced into Wilkow for the third time, while in the afternoon the LW IR # 1 captured Goszyce. Now the right wing of XXV Russian Corps was wavering. However, heavy counterattacks anchored the enemy positions and drove back the Viennese Landwehr. The Austrian attack hadn't been supported by heavy artillery and thus could not prevail against the well-fortified villages, from which the enemy maintained constant fire.

On the right wing of VI Corps, 39 Hon ID advanced northwest of Goszczna in a difficult action, but then came to a halt. 27 ID and 45 LW ID, which were sent in the direction of Iwanowice and were supposed to cooperate with X Corps in driving the enemy from the Skala area, gained some ground around Rzeplin at the outset; however, they were counterattacked by XVIII Russian Corps – which had been inserted in the front between Skala and Iwanowice – and driven back toward the southeast. As the situation of VI Corps continued to worsen, FML Arz asked his Army commander for help. In the evening Archduke Joseph Ferdinand sent up 95 Lst Inf Bde from the Cracow fortress (nine battalions under Col. Piasecki) to reinforce Arz' endangered Corps. The Archduke asked GdK Dankl to use 11 Hon CD to plug the gap which was opening between 4th and 1st Armies.

The two corps on the right of Dankl's Army – V and X – had meanwhile worked their way forward east of the deep ravine at the Pradnik Brook and on both sides of Jangrot; they reached the enemy's main positions, but encountered insurmountable resistance from the Russian Guards, who in places launched counterattacks. 33 ID, the Army's reserve, joined the action but could not prevail.
The battle seemed to be developing more favorably in the center of 1st Army. There the 5 ID advanced to within cannon range of Wolbrom. 46 LW ID and 12 ID farther north were able to gain only a little ground, but Tschurtschenthaler's Group had better fortune. LW IR "Linz" # 2 of 44 LW ID made a spirited attack and by evening had reached the heights east of Podzamcze. The XIV Russian Corps was in serious danger, and had to commit all available units, even its sapper companies, to prevent the Landwehr from breaking through to Pilica 422.

II Corps also gained substantial successes, together with the German 1 Gd Res ID which joined the attack with its right wing. Although the Corps couldn't take the town of Kotowice away from the Caucaskan, Rzedkowice was won after heroic fighting by IR # 4 and parts of # 84. 4 ID reached the area southeast of Rzedkowice.

North of Dankl's Army, Woyrsch's Detachment between Zarki and Czenstochau spent 18 November on the defensive against a larger enemy force. On the south wing of the k.u.k. 2nd Army, the German 35 Res ID was unable to break through at Mykanow. Farther left, the k.u.k. 16 ID was supposed to outflank the enemy, but by nightfall it had not advanced through Cykarzew. 31 ID was ordered to attack toward Noworadoms; it crossed the Warta, but was delayed by its long marches and by the destruction of many bridges, and only reached Brzeznicia. Hauer's Cavalry Corps was engaged against Russian horsemen, and advanced to the area around Pajeczno. It still had not ridden around the Russians' northern flank.

Weaknesses in the k.u.k. position

After the great expectations which the AOK had harbored on the evening of the 17th, the events of 18 November were another severe disappointment. In the morning an intercepted radio message showed that the Russians had by no means given up the battle, and that despite the departure of their 5th Army the 4th and 9th were supposed to attack on 19 November. Reports that arrived during the day indicated that - with the exception of the right wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army - the Aus-Hung. and German troops were moving forward only slowly between Cracow and Czenstochau; parts of VI Corps, moreover, even had to fall back due to Russian counterattacks. Meanwhile in Galicia the 8th

422 Korolkov (in "Overview", p. 174) reports that XIV Russian Corps had suffered extraordinarily heavy casualties. Many of its companies had been reduced to just 40 riflemen.
Russian Army was advancing into the Carpathians, while the bulk of 3rd Army (XI, IX and X Corps) was south of the Rzeszow-Tarnow railroad and marching to the west. Although this strong enemy force was still in the area northeast of Jaslo and Krosno, it was nonetheless necessary to win a quick decision at Cracow; it was only a matter of time before the 4th Army would have to return south of the Vistula to limit the Russians' intended advance into west Galicia or to assist the hard-pressed 3rd Army in the Carpathians.\footnote{Conrad, Vol. V, p. 526}

Because of this pressing need, on the evening of the 18th the AOK once more ordered a "general attack" by 4th and 1st Armies and by Woyrsch's Army Detachment. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was directed to send strong forces on his right wing through Proszowice and farther east and to outflank the 9th Russian Army. GdK Dankl would make his left wing the principal attacking force; it would break through to Szczekociny and Andrejew with help from the German 1 Gd Res ID. GdI Woyrsch would have his Detachment attack over the heights north of Szczekociny, while he sent the k.u.k. 2nd Army to outflank the Russians' northern wing. Conrad's order ended with the words "Finally break the enemy's resistance, then pursue him."\footnote{Conrad, Vol. V, p. 529}

However, earlier events had weakened the k.u.k. forces to such an extent that they were no longer sufficient for such a mission. Because of the weeks-long fighting in October and losses during the subsequent marches and large-scale troop transfers, the units were not fully up to their authorized strength despite the infusion of replacements.\footnote{By an estimate of the AOK, the combat units of the k.u.k Armies on the Russian front were lacking about 295,000 men at the end of November 1914. They reckoned further that through the end of November the infantry - which had started the war with 900,000 men - had lost about 845,000. Their replacements included 469,000 men from the 1st through IV March Battalions of the regiments, plus 81,750 men from dissolved Landsturm units.} Shortage of ammunition continued to be a significant problem; the reserve supplies which existed prior to mobilization had long been fully used up. New supplies were still being consumed quickly and in great quantities; at this time the Monarchy's factories weren't able to provide shells in timely fashion and in sufficient quantity. This had bitter consequences. The infantry was forced to attack the Russians in strongly fortified positions,
and suffered from the defensive fire of the enemy's well protected quick-firing and long-range modern artillery and machine guns. The Aus-Hung. artillery, especially the howitzers, lacked the necessary ammunition to support the infantry, which thus could not win the quick offensive victory which was necessary.

19 November

The 19 ID, on the right wing of Kritek's Group, was able to drive the Russians further back on 19 November toward Nowe Brzesko; 15 ID also gained some local successes. Prisoners were taken from the enemy, but the hoped-for decisive victory was not gained. XIV Corps was forced over to the defensive by the counterattacks of XIX Russian Corps. VI Corps had been ordered by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to capture the Slomniki area and thus to threaten the rear of the enemy facing 1st Army; however, the Corps was now beset on its entire front by XVIII Russian Corps' counterattack. 39 Hon ID could not hold out against the heavy pressure; it had heavy losses and had to pull back at Goszczza. On its left, the 27 ID and 45 LW ID (the latter reinforced by 95 Lst Inf Bde) held their ground south of Rzeplin. During the morning the 11 Hon CD came up to plug the gap between VI and X Corps.

The X Corps on the right wing of Dankl's Army attacked toward Skala, but was unable to break through the forward Russian positions. V Corps made some progress on both sides of Jangrot. Under Ist Corps, the gallant 5 ID advanced through the low ground along the Przemsza toward Wolbrom and took the heights that lie in front of the town. Farther left, however, 46 LW ID couldn't advance at all. On the 18th the 12 ID, aided by the advance of Tschurtschenthaler's neighboring group, had reached a point south of Kocikowa; however, on the 19th the Division was unable to push forward any further against the unshaken center of Russian XIV Corps. Similarly the 44 LW ID of Tschurtschenthaler's Group, which had driven back the right wing of XIV Russian Corps on the heights northwest of Pilica on the 18th, could advance no further on the 19th. This was because the 43 LW ID was still hanging back at Zerkowice, while 1 Don Coss Div barred the route into the joint between 9th and 4th Russian Armies. II Corps, on Dankl's left wing, sent 4 ID to attack Lgota Murowana (held by the badly-weakened III Caucasian Corps) but it was defeated. Strong Russian counterattacks and heavy artillery fire kept 25 ID pinned down in its trenches at Rzedkowice and Kotowice.
The expected Russian attack on Woyrsch's Army Detachment on 19 November was negligible, but Woyrsch's own attempts to mount an offensive failed and he went back to the defensive. The k.u.k. 2nd Army sent 16 ID and parts of 35 ID into an unsuccessful attack on the north wing of the Russian 1st Grenadier Div, which was bent back toward Klekoty. North of the Warta, 31 ID was bogged down in action with enemy units in entrenched positions. Hauer's Cavalry Corps reached a position about two hours' march northwest of Noworadomsk. Corps Breslau, a day's march farther north, was advancing toward Szczercow and Widawa.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli — who had moved his HQ from Oppeln to Rosenberg on the 18th — intended on 20 November to send the now complete 35 ID through Klekoty to outflank the 1st Russian Gren Div, which was standing south of the Warta. 32 ID was still arriving; when it was ready, Böhm-Ermolli intended to send it north of the Warta to deal with the forces which the Russians were apparently deploying to guard their flank at Noworadomsk (2 Grenadier Div and a large cavalry group).

The situation now demanded a ruthless advance by the k.u.k. 2nd Army. The German 9th Army had encountered new resistance by a larger enemy force in front of Lodz. Two corps of the Russian 5th Army were menacing Mackensen's southern wing. The Russians had also pulled units from the front of their 4th Army, apparently for use against the German 9th Army. On the afternoon of 19 November, GO Hindenburg was concerned for his south wing, and through Cpt. Fleischmann asked the Aus-Hung. high command to have the k.u.k. 2nd Army "move forward better." Its intervention could be "the most decisive operation of the campaign."\(^{426}\) GdI Conrad agreed with this opinion and ordered 2nd Army to carry out its offensive without waiting for the assembly of all its forces.

A quick decision at Cracow was equally important. The Russian advance south of the Vistula, although slow, was still proceeding. The day on which the front in west Galicia must be reinforced was coming closer. On the evening of 19 November another appeal went out from Teschen to the Army commanders to win a complete victory. The conditions seemed favorable. As soon as the enemy was thrown back, he should be pursued with every available man and with the expenditure of the Armies' last strength.

20 November

\(^{426}\) German official history, Vol. VI., p. 190
On 20 November the XVIII Corps fought its way forward into the position of XXV Russian Corps in front of Nowe Brzesko. Farther left, XIV Corps' 8 ID advanced in the Wierzbno area; however, its 3 ID and 13 LW ID made no appreciable gains in their attacks at Biorkow, Goszyce and Wilkow. As previously, FML Arz and his units were held in place by Russian XVIII Corps at Goszcz and south of Rzeplin. Since there were no prospects of success in the direction of Słomniki, Arz had finally assembled an attacking group of six battalions and three batteries at the junction of VI and X Corps, with which he planned to thrust against the heights of Skala. FML Kuk, the fortress commandant of Cracow, had detached nine battalions of the garrison under GM Schwarz for service in the field; Army HQ placed them at the disposal of GdI Kritek.

The right wing corps of 1st Army - the X and V - could gain no ground on 20 November against the strongly held lines of the Russian Guards. 5 ID of 1st Corps encountered increasing resistance in front of Wolbrom, where the Russian XIV Corps had been reinforced in the night by Guard troops. The Alpine regiments of 44 LW ID were continuing the successful attack toward Pilica they had started on the 18th; however, a setback to 12 ID in the forested area southwest of Pilica forced the Landwehr to halt in front of the new Russian defensive position. The II Corps, which had intended to advance its right wing and center toward Zdow, could not do so; it was weakened considerably by the earlier fighting, and the only support it received from the allied 1st Gd Res ID was some artillery fire.

GdI Woyrsch had learned from an intercepted radio broadcast the night before that the Russians in his front were not only planning to stand fast, but also wanted to throw back and destroy the enemy forces threatening to outflank them north of the Warta at Noworadomsk; another enemy division was being pulled from the area south of Czenstochau and sent north. Therefore Woyrsch ordered his entire Army Detachment to attack on 20 November. However, the Germans were unable to advance on the Zarki-Czenstochau front. On the other hand, Böhm-Ermolli's offensive was initially successful. The Russian advance positions between Mykanow and Klekoty were taken by the German 35 Res ID and k.u.k. 16 ID, while the k.u.k. 35 ID advanced through the woods south of the Warta into the enemy flank. However, the Russian 1st Gren Div held fast in its main position, and also defended itself stubbornly against the

427 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 244
outflanking maneuver of the k.u.k. 35 ID. The further attack by the tired Aus-Hung. and German troops had to be postponed until the next morning. North of the Warta the 31 ID (of IV Corps) and Hauer's Cavalry Corps gained ground at first. In the afternoon, however, they were driven back to the west by a counterattack of the 2 Gren Div (which had reached the Noworadomsk area) and of Prince Tumanov's Cavalry Corps (Ural Coss Div, 13 CD, and the Trans-Baikal Coss Bde).

Therefore there had only been local successes in various sectors on 20 November. Nonetheless, the high command at Teschen was confident, because reports indicated that the 9th German Army would win a decisive victory over the 2nd and 5th Russian Armies at Lodz - who were under attack from three directions. The defeat of the northern wing of the Russians' armies would probably force the armies fighting between Cracow and Czenstochau to also retreat. These hopes lay behind the belief that a continuation of the offensive on 21 November would bring decisive success.428 Quick success was becoming even more essential, because in Galicia the bulk of the 3rd Russian Army had reached the Dunajec.

4. 3rd Russian Army advances to the Dunajec - 16 to 24 November

(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketch 39)

The Russian 3rd Army - XXI, XI, IX, X Corps, half of VII Corps, 7 and 16 CD, 3 Cauc and 3 Don Coss Divs - had been ordered to protect the left flank during the attack against Prussian Silesia. However, it had lost a lot of time in its advance toward Cracow. At first General Dimitriev left the pursuit of the withdrawing enemy to his cavalry divisions. With the bulk of his Army he stayed in place after crossing the San, because he had to give up forces for the blockade of Przemysł and because his corps had lost more than a third of their strength from casualties and the difficult fighting on the San. 13 ID of VII Corps transferred to 8th Army in the Carpathians (where it was attached to XII Corps). In mid-November, when the 11th Army (XXVIII and XXIX Corps, 9 and 11 CD) had deployed around Przemysł, Dimitriev advanced to the line Debica-Dynow, with his right wing pushed forward. Apparently his cautious movement was influenced by the fact that his 3rd Army was supposed to guard

the west flank of 8th Army as well as to support the operations of the 9th.

On 16 November - the day when the Battles of Cracow and Czenstochau began - the flank of 4th Army south of the Vistula was protected by FML Nikic's Group between Gdow and Niepolomice. It had 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes, half of 41 Hon ID, and 6 and 10 CD. On Nikic's left there was a large gap in the line in west Galicia, covered only by FZM Ljubicic's XI Corps of 3rd Aus-Hung. Army. This Corps had been brought up in mid-November from the Carpathian watershed. At this point Dimitriev's Army had XXI Corps on the Dunajec downstream from Tarnow; the XI Corps was crossing the Wisloka, while IX and X were still in the area northeast of Jaslo.

GdI Conrad was well informed about the movements of 3rd Russian Army thanks to intercepted radio broadcasts, and wanted to strike a blow against the somewhat isolated XXI Russian Corps. On 16 November, FML Nikic's Group was instructed to advance from its position in the sector between Bochnia and the mouth of the Raba. At the same time, GdI Boroevic ordered XI Corps to move north from the west bank of the Dunajec to the Rajbrot area. On 17 November, after the position of 3rd Russian Army was further clarified, GdI Conrad placed Nikic's Group under FZM Ljubicic, who in turn was placed directly under the AOK. Conrad ordered Ljubicic to use his entire force to delay the enemy's advance over the Dunajec downstream from Neusandez and to attack the leading enemy corps - the XXI - from the south near Tarnow.

On the morning of 18 November the advance guard of XI Corps (Col. Rettich's detachment of one battalion, seven squadrons and two batteries) reached Tymowa, where they encountered Russian units which had crossed the Dunajec. Three battalions of 30 ID, which had been sent through Czchow, intervened in the action and drove the Russians back toward the northeast. 10 CD of Nikic's Group had driven Russian cavalry back over the lower Uszwica on the day before; however, when the Division was confronted by Russian infantry it withdrew to the lower Raba.

Meanwhile the high command at Teschen learned around noon from a deciphered broadcast that the XXI Russian Corps had crossed the lower Dunajec on the 18th. This unit could also be shifted to reinforce the Russian 9th Army on the north bank of the Vistula. Therefore in the afternoon FZM Ljubicic was ordered that if XXI Russian Corps did try to cross the Vistula, he should hold it in place with an attack by Nikic's Group. If, on the other hand, the Russians continued to advance west, on 19 November the XI
Corps should attack them from the south through Brzesko. In this case, XI Corps would leave a covering force to guard its own flank toward Zakliczyn and Wojnicz in the east, while Nikic's Group fell back to the lower Raba.

Early on the 19th, however, it was evident that the XXI Russian Corps had temporarily halted its advance, apparently to await the approach of the main body of 3rd Army which had been lagging behind. However, a further radio message revealed that the XXIst was still under orders to ease the difficult situation of XXV Russian Corps (engaged directly north of the Vistula) by an attack on both sides of the river. FZM Ljubicic therefore decided to have XI Corps advance toward the northeast, while leaving a strong covering force facing due east. But the situation of XI Corps was becoming precarious, as was revealed by a report which arrived in Teschen on the evening of the 19th from GdI Boroevic. He stated that the 4 CD of his 3rd Army, which was patrolling east of the upper Dunajec, had fought an overwhelming enemy force for several hours and then had pulled back to Altsandez. This forced the high command to order FZM Ljubicic to send 6 and 10 CD as quickly as possible to Myslenice, while 1st Army would send 11 Hon CD to Sucha by 21 November. These three cavalry divisions, along with some Polish Legionnaires stationed at Sucha and four Etappen battalions at Lubien, would all be led by FML Baron Nagy, the commander of 11 Hon CD. Their mission was to protect the railroads from Cracow to Oswiecim and Teschen plus the lines of communication of 1st and 4th Armies.

Meanwhile, by the evening of the 19th FZM Ljubicic had advanced 30 ID to the area northeast of Tymowa, 11 ID to Brzesko, and Nikic's Group to the area farther northwest, after minor actions. 10 CD had been attacked at Uscie Solne, 6 CD had driven a weaker enemy force over the Dunajec at Zakliczyn, and Col. Resch's Detachment from 30 ID was guarding the Dunajec farther upstream.

Since there were increasing signs that XXI Russian Corps intended to cross to the north bank of the Vistula, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand asked the AOK by telegram on the evening of the 19th to have Ljubicic's Group mount a powerful attack on the 20th. This would keep the Russians from advancing against the right flank of 4th Army.

On 20 November, however, the enemy prevented any further advance by Ljubicic's Group against the XXI Russian Corps west of the Dunajec; the Austrians were halted just east of Brzesko and west
of Szczepanow-Szczurowa. Meanwhile the Russian XI Corps reached the Dunajec south of the Debica-Tarnow rail line. Its advance guard crossed the river in the evening; Col. Gruber's group of five battalions and four batteries, which had been sent to Zakliczyn to relieve 6 CD, suffered heavy losses and pulled back to Tymowa. In this situation FZM Ljubicic decided to continue attacking with Nikic's Group, but to have XI Corps hold its ground "to the utmost" against the enemy advancing from the east.

When Nikic's Group continued its attack on 21 November, it gained only a little ground. The Russians held back in front of 30 ID, which had been positioned facing the east between Czchow and Brzesko. On 22 November Nikic attacked again with 11 ID, 82 Hon Inf Bde and 110 Lst Inf Bde, but was pinned down on the middle Uszwica by a well entrenched enemy. Farther to the left the Viennese 1st Lst Inf Bde (Col. Brauner) stayed in place at Ujscie Solne. The Russians still failed to make the attack on 30 ID which had been anticipated from hour to hour.

Meanwhile on the evening of the 20th Ivanov directed General Dimitriev to send two corps to the north bank of the Vistula to intervene in the action of the hard-pressed 9th Army. On the other hand, Dimitriev didn't continue his advance south of the river toward Bochnia. He first sent 7 CD and one brigade of XXI Corps over the Vistula. As the IX Corps came up, he had it relieve the XIth at Zakliczyn-Wojnicz; XI Corps, in turn, relieved the rest of XXI Corps in the Szczurowa-Szczeapanow sector. This freed all of XXI Corps to support 9th Army. At the same time the X Corps, which had reached Grybow, was diverted through Tarnow toward the Vistula.

As usual, GdI Conrad learned about this northward shift of the components of 3rd Russian Army from enemy radio traffic. In the night of 22-23 November he responded by ordering FZM Ljubicic to send all available units of Nikic's Group to the north Vistula bank, where they could continue to fight XXI Russian Corps.

In accordance with orders, on 23 November the bulk of Russian XXI Corps hurried over the Vistula at Rogow while much of Nikic's Group - 82 Hon Inf Bde and parts of 110 Lst Inf Bde - did the same at Nowe Brzesko. 1st Lst Inf Bde and the rest of 110 Bde stayed behind under Col. Brauner to cover the river crossing. As previously, XI Corps held a line from north of Brzesko to Czchow; Col. Resch's detachment was at Rajbrot. FML Nagy's new group deployed 11 Hon CD at Sucha; 6 CD and two Landsturm Etappen battalions were at Myslenice. Two battalions
of the Polish Legion with artillery had been sent further east. A strong Russian mounted force - 16 CD, 3 Cauc Coss Div and 3 Don Coss Div - were crossing the Dunajec at and north of Neusandez in the direction of Rajbrot and Limanowa. IX and XI Russian Corps had now marched to the line Zalkiczyn-Szczurowa; their leading units were pushing against the k.u.k. 11 ID north of Brzesko and against 1st Lst Inf Bde at Ujscie Solne. The situation seemed threatening, so FZM Ljubicic decided to concentrate XI Corps, which was widely dispersed; early on the 24th it would deploy on the lower Raba and in the area south of Bochnia, where it would attempt to halt the enemy. This was consistent with an instruction from Teschen on the 21st, in which Ljubicic had been told not to let XI Corps be broken up by a superior Russian force. The high command intended "to send units from the north to the south bank of the Vistula."

When the Russians marched toward Bochnia on 24 November, they were no longer opposed by Aus-Hung. rear guards; however, IX Russian Corps didn't move through Brzesko. Attempts by the Russian XI Corps to cross the lower Raba were frustrated by Col. Brauner's gallant Landsturm group.

5. 4th k.u.k. Army's action north of Cracow is decided (21-24 November)

(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketches 37 and 38)

GdI Conrad had meanwhile taken advantage of the slow advance of the Russian 3rd Army south of the Vistula to continue the attacks at Cracow and Czenstochau. In his orders for 21 November he anticipated a general Russian retreat, and therefore demanded the troops to exert their last strength, even though they were already exhausted and suffering from the effects of the first winter storms.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli would make every effort to bring the last elements of IV Corps (32 ID) forward from their rail stations, would take Noworadomsk, and move forward as far as possible toward Przedborz. The units fighting to the south of 2nd Army - the German 35 Res ID and LW Corps - would continue their successful flank attack at Mykanow and quickly reach the line Plawno-Sw. Anna. The south wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment and the 1st Army should also continue their offensive. "Where strong points in the enemy line make it difficult to advance, only our weaker units should be deployed; our reserves should be committed in areas where the situation gives more promise of
success." It was the duty of the commanders on the spot to
detect specific promising sectors. A breakthrough in the area
Wolbrom-Pilica (town) would be especially useful, because
pressure from Wolbrom toward the southeast and from Pilica
toward the north would assist the advance of V and X Corps as
well as of II Corps and 1st Gd Res ID. The left wing of 4th
Army should take Skala and then, along with the right wing which
was already victoriously advancing, move as far as possible in
the general direction of Proszowice.

When these orders arrived at Cracow in the night of 20-21
November, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had already ordered his 4th
Army to continue the attack "without pause and in all places
with full energy." A major success already seemed to be
developing on his right wing. On the afternoon of the 20th a
detachment of four battalions and one battery from Nikic's
Group, which 4th Army HQ had sent along the south bank of the
Vistula around the Russian flank, had managed to cross the river
at Nowe Brzesko. This relatively weak force had firmly
established itself that evening in the flank and rear of the XXV
Russian Corps near the Szreniawa. At the same time, 3 ID
launched a night attack that took the enemy positions north of
Wierzbno. Letschitzky's entire left wing, believing it was
under attack from superior forces that would break through,
began to retreat. GdI Kritek immediately sent his units forward
in pursuit to roll up the enemy wing from the right.

21 November

Reports which arrived during the morning indicated that the
Russians were pulling back in front of the k.u.k. XVII Corps.
Along with the offensive success of 3 ID the night before, this
gave 4th Army HQ the impression that the long-sought decision
had now been won. In this mood, at 10:30 AM Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand told Kritek's Group and XIV Corps to continue their
"victorious advance" with their inner wings through Proszowice
to Skalbmierz and to pursue the enemy "by expending all of their
strength." At the same time he told FML Arz to advance toward
Slomniki with the main body of his VI Corps. He reported to the
high command that the enemy was still holding opposite his left
wing, but that otherwise was pulling back.

When this cheering message arrived at Teschen, GdI Conrad also
believed he was on the verge of success. Russian radio traffic
indicated that General Letschitzky was urgently seeking news
about 3rd Army and wanted to know when XXI Corps would finally
intervene north of the Vistula. Moreover, the Russian XIV Corps
fighting at Pilica was asking for reinforcements, and the reports about the German attack at Lodz were mostly favorable. Therefore at 3:30 PM the k.u.k. high command ordered the pursuit to begin. "The center and right wing of 4th Army are advancing successfully toward Slomniki and Proszowice. We are confidently awaiting a complete success today on the north wing of Woyrsch's group." Since "the 2nd and 5th Russian Armies are also hard pressed by the flank attack of 9th German Army, the enemy may initiate a general retreat on 21 November or in the night of 21-22 November. Careful reconnaissance and air patrols should determine the enemy's retreat routes; a ruthless pursuit will bring great advantages..." This confident message reflects great hopes and expectations, none of which would be fulfilled.

The whole right wing of 4th Army did move forward in the afternoon. The enemy left rear guards behind, but they were driven away despite their gallant defense. By the time darkness fell the XVII and XIV Corps had reached the Szreniawa. 8 ID even managed to cross that river at Proszowice. However, the enemy had once again dug in along the Szreniawa and brought the advance to a halt. 13 LW ID, which advanced along with 106 Lst ID through Goszyce and the area to its west, encountered new resistance on the heights southwest of Przeclawice and couldn't break through. 39 Hon ID gained even less ground, while 27 ID and 45 LW ID were still fighting in their old positions.

At 7:00 PM Archduke Joseph Ferdinand once again gave his corps the same goals for their "pursuit." He hoped that Ljubicic would be able to hold his ground south of the Vistula, while mobile artillery detached from the Cracow fortress - a total of 14 heavy batteries, including two batteries of 30.5 and two of 24 cm mortars - would perhaps still win the day for 4th Army.

22 November

The greatest possible haste was now necessary. Pilots from 4th Army who flew on 22 November to scout toward the east observed that a bridge had been built over the Vistula at Rogow and that some enemy troops were marching along the north bank toward the flank of the k.u.k. XVII Corps. (These were the Russian 7 CD and a brigade of XXI Corps which were hurrying to the aid of the beleaguered 9th Army.) Because of this report, GdI Kritek sent three battalions and two batteries of 15 ID under Col. Graf Zedtwitz to the heights north of Koszyce. Farther to the left, the XVII and XIV Corps were able to take parts of the foremost Russian lines north of the Szreniawa and south of Przeclawice, despite very heavy opposition. VI Corps, however, which had
been ordered to break through to Slomniki with 39 Hon ID and the newly assigned 13 LW ID, could not advance.\textsuperscript{429} On the line Iwanowice-Skala and farther north the Russian XVIII Corps continued to counterattack. Around noon the 95 Lst Inf Bde at Rzeplin was pushed back, so FML Arz asked his Army commander for further reinforcements. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, concerned that the Russians could break through between 1st and 4th Armies to cut the important Cracow-Trzebinia rail line, sent GM Roschatt's Landsturm Bde to help VI Corps; it had six battalions and one quarter squadron, and had been placed at the disposal of the field forces from the garrison of Cracow.

Meanwhile Conrad was trying to drive the offensive forward. He issued an order at noon on the 22nd that included these exhortations: "Now we must aim at securing and increasing our success. 4th Army should provide reliable security toward the east and by all means prevent the enemy from crossing [the Vistula] at Rogow...While pursuing the defeated enemy, substantial forces should work toward his right flank and rear, which are still in place by Slomniki, Iwanowice and Skala. The Skala area must be taken today in a combined assault by the inner wings of 1st and 4th Armies." Another order was issued from Teschen at 9:00 PM: "To hasten a decision against 9th Russian Army, a broad advance by the right wing of 4th Army is urgently necessary on 23 November. Units sent to prevent the intervention of parts of XXI Russian Corps must be strong, and above all must be pushed far forward."

The mood at 4th Army HQ was still confident. Since the advance of Russian XXI Corps to the north bank of the Vistula had not yet had an effect, the situation on the right wing of 4th Army as it fought on the Szreniawa didn't seem so threatening. Also interrogation of prisoners led to hopes that the Russians were at the end of their resistance. Therefore Archduke Joseph Ferdinand told XIV and VI Corps to attack all along their front at 3:00 AM on 23 November. GdI Kritek's task was to drive back the Russian forces which were approaching from Rogow, or at least to prevent their intervention. However, if the pressure from the east became overwhelming the right wing of Kritek's Group should bend back toward the west.

Soon after Army HQ issued this order they received a new message from the high command. It indicated that Ljubicic's Group couldn't keep the enemy in check on the lower Dunajec; it was anticipated that besides the entire XXI Russian Corps some

\textsuperscript{429} Arz, pp. 40 f.
additional elements of their 3rd Army would intervene north of the Vistula. It was intended to use Nikic's Group (10 battalions and 4 batteries) to reinforce XVII Corps.

23 November

In these hours of increasing tension, the bitter fighting for possession of the heights north of the Szreniawa burst out anew in the night of 22-23 November and on the morning of the 23rd.

8 ID once again stormed forward through the icy cold and took the Russian trenches north of Proszowice. However, when it wished to thrust further ahead through Klimontow it was brought to a halt by enemy flanking fire from the east. To give 8 ID more room to fight, FML Roth asked the neighboring XVII Corps to advance. GdI Kritek, however, had postponed his further attack until 24 November because his troops were completely exhausted and he was short of ammunition. Also he wished to strengthen his east wing with Nikic's Group, which would not be assembled north of the Vistula before evening.

In the center of 4th Army, the 13 LW ID opened its attack at dawn on the 23rd, but could not advance through Szczepanowice. As previously, the other divisions of VI Corps could not prevail either against the enemy, who stood fast on the defensive. Meanwhile the Russians began to push against the right wing of 4th Army.

During the 23rd the majority of XXI Russian Corps crossed the Vistula at Rogow. The brigade which had been sent ahead, along with 7 CD, advanced on the same day up to the woods north of Koszyce, where they attacked the extreme right wing of the k.u.k. XVII Corps around noon. In the afternoon the Russians also made isolated attacks farther west against the groups of XVII and XIV Corps fighting on the heights north of the Szreniawa. On the other hand, aerial reconnaissance reported that Russians were moving from Slomniki north toward Miechow. Another report indicated that the enemy was evacuating his radio station from Miechow.

The k.u.k. 4th Army HQ concluded from these reports that the Russian 9th Army was about to retreat, and therefore ordered GdI Kritek to proceed on the morning of the 24th according to the situation. He could either continue his attack against the former east wing of the enemy (XXV Corps) or direct it against the Russian reinforcements coming up from Rogow (XXI Corps). At the same time, both Kritek's Group and VI Corps should provide
diversionary attacks and artillery support to help Roth's Group in its action on the north bank of the Szreniawa.

24 November

In the night of 23-24 November fighting once more raged along the Szreniawa. Just before sunrise the mixed units of 3 and 8 ID at Klimontow were suddenly attacked and thrown back. With difficulty, IR # 59 and FJB # 27 were able to drive the enemy back in a bitter hand to hand action. However, the situation of XIV Corps remained serious because the Russians continued to attack and our own troops had suffered heavy losses.

Meanwhile FML Arz had begun to attack with the right wing of VI Corps (13 LW ID and 39 Hon ID). After a difficult action the Viennese Landwehr Division at 8:00 AM stormed the burning farmhouse at Polanowice (west of Szczepanowie) and took 700 Russian prisoners. 39 Hon ID also was able to gain some ground south of Slomniki. However, as the morning went on the battle on the left wing of 4th Army again became a futile stationary action, while Russian counterattacks continued to target XIV Corps on the Szreniawa.

Army HQ had already learned about the tense situation of XIV Corps in the morning. Soon thereafter an intercepted Russian radio message brought the unwelcome news that the Russians planned to attack on the 24th along the entire front of 9th and 3rd Armies. This was the end of any hopes that the Russians were retreating. Because of the great exhaustion of the troops and the significant shortage of artillery ammunition, 4th Army HQ was greatly concerned about the expected enemy attacks. They ordered FML Roth to hold the heights south of the Szreniawa at any cost, because if the Russians pushed XIV Corps back they would be able to cut Kritek's Group off from Cracow.

Meanwhile GdI Kritek led XVII Corps across the lower Szreniawa to protect the Army's right flank against the oncoming XXI Russian Corps by launching an attack. At first the enemy was held at bay. Then, however, the Russians pushed 38 Inf Bde (19 ID) back to the Szreniawa southeast of Klimontow. This created a danger that the east wing of XVII Corps could be separated from the west wing and thrown into the Vistula. Therefore Army HQ authorized GdI Kritek at 5:00 PM to pull his right wing back to the southern bank of the Szreniawa and to a point north of the mouth of the Raba. At 6:00 PM the other corps were ordered not to attack on 25 November; instead they would hold the lines they currently occupied until again told to resume the
offensive.

Thus the long and bloody attempts by the k.u.k. 4th Army in front of Cracow to move around the left wing of the Russians had ended in failure. Since 16 November the Army had taken 9,000 prisoners and 7 machine guns from the enemy. However, its own losses included 14,000 wounded and 4,000 sick (the total number of fatal casualties is unknown).

6. The end of 1st Army's battle (21–25 November)

(see volume 1 sketch 38)

The 1st k.u.k. Army, like the 4th, was unable to reach the "pursuit goals" which it was given on the afternoon of the 21st by the high command (Miechow, Zarnowiec and Szczekociny). After the Russians sent parts of the Guard Corps to the north to support XIV Corps, and stretched XVIII Corps toward the right, they began to launch heavy counterattacks against the joint between the 4th and 1st Armies on 21 November. 35 Lst Inf Bde, deployed opposite Skala, repulsed the attackers with heavy losses; however, the right wing of X Corps pulled back somewhat. The left wing of X Corps and the V Corps barely moved forward, although a thrust by 5 ID gained some new ground toward Wolbrom. Under II Corps, the Viennese 25 ID was still held on the defensive by III Caucasian Corps in front of the strongly fortified position at Kotowice and the heights of Rzedkowice; the Division already had 60% casualties by Kotowice. The Corps' 4 ID tried to break through to Lgota Murowana; however, it was unsuccessful because its reserves had to be put at the disposal of the neighboring 43 LW ID, which had been pushed back by a Russian counterattack.

When Dankl's weakened divisions attacked again on 22 November, the right wing once again foundered on very stout resistance in front of Skala. X Corps was able to work its way up to the strong lines of the Russian XVIII Corps, but then had to halt its attack; enemy counter-punches forced the Corps back to its old defensive positions.430 The situation was no better for V Corps; after a meager advance it was hit by a Russian

430 X Corps now had a rifle strength of not more than 15,000, of which 35 Lst Inf Bde had 2,000 rifles. 33 ID had reported that it couldn't attack any longer because of its reduced size.
counterattack that brought its movement to a halt.

The fighting of Ist Corps and Tschurtschenthaler's Group developed more favorably. While 5 ID and 46 LW ID took the heights directly west of Wolbrom, 44 LW ID broke through the right wing of the Russian XIV Corps. The LW IR "St Pölten" # 21 and L-Sch Regt # I had launched a surprise attack at dawn under Col. Hentke; they reached the west part of Pilica and took over 2,700 prisoners and 19 machine guns.\(^{431}\) However, this brilliant success was not enough to decide the battle. The defeated XIV Russian Corps pulled back on both sides of Pilica town, but assembled for new resistance in a position farther back. At the same time the left wing of III Caucasian Corps held off the attacks of 4 ID, although the Caucasians suffered heavy losses.\(^{432}\) The Russians also stood fast against 25 ID and GdA Gallwitz' Group (1st Gd Res ID and Bredow's Division) to its left.

On 23 November the battle in 1st Army's sector increasingly bogged down on both sides into trench warfare. Around noon there arrived at 1st Amy HQ in Bendzin the order that directed 1st and 4th Army to take the Skala area that same day. A further order told 1st Army to have V Corps capture Wolbrom as soon as possible. Since further attacks at Skala were for the time being impossible due to the enemy's strength, that evening GdK Dankl ordered the exhausted troops of X and V Corps to remain in their positions. He commanded Ist Corps and Tschurtschenthaler's Group to continue their attack toward the east, while II Corps should exploit the success of 44 LW ID by thrusting north from the Lgota Murowana area in a bid to outflank the south wing of 4th Russian Army.

However, a complete breakthrough into the Russian center was not possible. On 23 November, FML Tschurtschenthaler could not carry out an attack against the enemy on the limestone heights at Pilica, because his neighbor on the right (12 ID) was lagging behind. Similarly Ist Corps was unable to capture Wolbrom because the attempt by II Corps to break through toward Lgota Murowana and the flank of 4th Russian Army was shattered by the

\(^{431}\) According to Korolkow ("Overview", pp. 170 ff.) the division on the right wing of Russian XIV Corps was "in total disarray", and its rifle strength had sunk to 2,000.

\(^{432}\) Since 18 November the III Caucasian Corps had lost 4,500 men taken prisoner, 2 guns, and 18 machine guns; its regiments now had only 300 to 400 riflemen apiece (Korolkow, "Overview", pp. 171 ff.)
stout resistance of III Caucasian Corps. Under these circumstances, GdK Dankl asked the high command on the afternoon of 24 November to reduce the role of 1st Army for the time being to the defensive.

The AOK hereupon allowed 1st Army to cease its attacks. In eight days of battle the Army had taken almost 17,000 prisoners, 41 machine guns and 2 artillery pieces from the enemy. However, its own total casualties (dead, wounded and sick) were 30,000 men. The enemy was also worn out. In the next few days they remained quiet, while sending more forces toward the north because they continued to fear that their right wing might be outflanked.

7. 2nd Army's actions on the northern wing (21-28 November)

(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketches 37 and 41)

On 21 November the k.u.k XII Corps, German 35 Res ID and northern wing of the German LW Corps attacked in the Warta River sector north of Czenstochau. 16 ID threw the Russian Grenadiers out of Cykarzew and stormed Rusinow in a difficult action. The Aus-Hung. 35 ID advanced through Klekoty and Wilkow deep into the Russian flank, but then was itself threatened from the north.

North of the Warta, 31 ID was pushed out of Brzeznica by new Russian attacks. At this critical moment, the divisional commander GdK Archduke Joseph left to take over VII Corps. GM Dani took over 31 ID temporarily until the arrival of the new commander, FML Freih. von Lütgendorf. Hauer's Cavalry Corps, already seriously weakened by casualties, pulled back even further west, to the area just east of Pajeczno.

Unconcerned about the dangers to the north, GdK Böhm-Ermolli ordered GdI Kövess to exploit the success at Wilkow with a new attack. At the same time he placed Hauer's Cavalry Corps under GdK Tersztynszky, who was ordered to do everything possible to keep the Russians from moving against the flank and rear of 35 ID. Five battalions, two squadrons and seven batteries of 32 ID had meanwhile arrived behind the north wing of 2nd Army. With these fresh forces, Tersztynszky should again strike the enemy.

433 Archduke Joseph succeeded FML Fail-Griessler as the third commander of VII Corps since the war began.
north of the Warta in the direction of Noworadomsk.

Early on the 22nd, FML Fox and his 35 ID moved forward to complete the flanking maneuver through Wilkow and Klekoty. He was suddenly attacked by strong enemy units from the south, east and north east. General Evert had pulled the Russian 47 ID out of the front of XVI Corps and sent it through Plawnor to hit the Transylvanian division in the flank and rear. FML Fox had to give up the ground he had won; 35 ID, after suffering heavy losses, pulled back toward Prusiecko.

On the north bank of the Warta, GdK Tersztyanszky wanted to attack with IV Corps at noon on the Brzeznica-Noworadomsk road. Hauer's Cavalry Corps was to strike from the north into the rear of the 2nd Russian Gren Div, which had come up to Jedlo. However, IV Corps failed to advance; the appearance of some weak Russian forces on the left flank of the position where 64 Inf Bde (of 32 ID) was deployed caused delays, and the Bde didn't take its place in line on the left of 31 ID until the evening. Moreover, when Tersztyanszky learned of the retreat of 35 ID toward Prusiecko, he thought it was advisable to stay on the defensive. Meanwhile GdK Hauer's horsemen (3 and 9 CD) had reached the area just southeast of Struza after some minor fighting.

Thus Böhm-Ermolli's Army was standing on a rectilinear front facing east between Cykarzew and Struza. There was no link with the southernmost column of the German Corps Breslau around Szczercow. Reports that "a large Russian infantry force" was moving into this gap on the Army's north flank caused concern at 2nd Army HQ. The Hungarian troops announced that they had taken 2,000 prisoners, but they had suffered heavy losses themselves and were tired from their great exertions. Since the other half of 32 ID was the only remaining reserve, success could no longer be expected without the commitment of substantial reinforcements. On the evening of the 22nd GdK Böhm-Ermolli asked the AOK for two divisions from 1st Army as well as for a supporting attack at Czenstochau and further south. Since 1st Army was already heavily engaged, GdI Conrad had no units to spare; also it was impossible for the German troops at Czenstochau to launch supporting attacks because they were outnumbered by the enemy. Under these circumstances, GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided to stay in place for the time being. It

434 According to Korolkow ("Overview", p. 175) the Russians had taken 4,500 prisoners and 21 machine guns.
435 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 245
was necessary to give the units time to rest and reorganize.

Then a new danger arose on the north flank of 2nd Army. Corps Breslau, which had advanced over the Widawka, suddenly pulled back on the 23rd toward Rusiec and the area to its north. Prince Tumanov's Russian Cavalry Corps, which had been fighting Hauer's Corps for the last few days, could perhaps thrust into the rear of 2nd Army and threaten its lines of communication. Also, intercepted radio messages indicated that the Russians wished to attack again on both sides of the Warta on the 24th. It seemed that they were lengthening their north wing toward Piotrkow.

The Russian attack which was anticipated on 24 November, however, materialized only in the sector of the k.u.k. 35 ID. After commitment of reserves, the Division threw the enemy back directly west of Prusiecko. North of the Warta, Hauer's Cavalry Corps advanced toward Szczercow under cover of scouting parties to attack Tumanov's horsemen. The two Aus-Hung. cavalry divisions came up against the enemy at Chabieliace; they stayed in place, intending to resume their advance on the next morning.

During the day, 2nd Army HQ received reports from pilots that several columns behind the Russian front were marching toward the north. GdK Böhm-Ermolli believed that the entire Gren Corps would deploy north of the Warta for an enveloping attack. Therefore he placed the main body of 32 ID, which had now fully arrived, behind the north wing of 31 ID. Hauer's Cavalry Corps would cover the left flank.

In the night of 24-25 November the enemy sought to advance into Brzeznica, but a quick counterthrust by 31 ID drove him back. Also the 35 ID had to withstand new Russian attacks in the night and during the course of the 25th. There was scarcely any enemy activity against 16 ID; the fighting also slackened off for Woyrsch's Army Detachment.

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436 Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 161
437 The arrival of 32 ID marked the point at which the rail transport of 2nd Army - the first major operational rail movement of the war - was successfully completed. Considering how many lines were evacuated during the operation due to the enemy advance, and how many lines running deep into the interior had to be used as substitutes, the movement was a considerable achievement by both the military and civilian rail offices.
Therefore GdI Woyrsch pulled 1st Gd Res Bde of 1 Gd Res ID out of the front by Zarki and sent it north to support 2nd Army. On the morning of the 25th the Brigade arrived at Pajeczno. GdK Böhm-Ermolli placed it under GdK Tersztyanszky, to make the north wing of IV Corps as strong as possible in anticipation of the new offensive by the Russian Gren Corps.

Meanwhile Hauer's Cavalry Corps at Chabielice was attacked and fell back toward the southwest. However, it was now clear that the only opponents on the Army's north flank were about two and half Russian cavalry divisions; GdK Böhm-Ermolli decided to take advantage of this favorable opportunity. He wanted to first strike a blow through Szczercow with Hauer's cavalry and the 1st Gd Res Bde, then to thrust from the area of Chabielice and Rekle deeper into the flank of the Russian Gren Corps. The Army order implementing this plan was issued late in the evening of the 25th, and contained this caveat: "The offensive [toward the east] will take place only if the enemy division which aerial reconnaissance reported on 24 November to be marching toward Noworadomsk has not appeared in the area farther northwest."

This sentence clearly shows concern about a possible threat from Noworadomsk. It also shows that 2nd Army, which lacked reserves, faced a difficult situation as the enemy extended his front to the north.

On 26 November, the Russians attacked again early in the morning and in the afternoon at Prusiecko, but were defeated by the Aus-Hung. 35 ID. On 2nd Army's north wing the 1st Gd Res Bde and Hauer's Cavalry Corps drove detachments of Tumanov's Russian Cavalry Corps over the Sosnia River at Struza and further downstream. On the next day (27 November) both units continued to advance. A stronger Russian column with artillery was reported to be approaching from Szczercow. This caused concern to IV Corps HQ, which believed that Hauer's cavalry would be unable to stand fast because of the losses they had already suffered. At 1:00 PM GdK Tersztyanszky ordered 1 Gd Res Bde and Hauer's Corps to pull back behind the Sosnia. Meanwhile, however, FML Hauer reported that his Corps had halted at Chabielice, just east of the river.

Hauer's report made no mention of an enemy column coming from Szczercow. In the afternoon it was determined that the news about a Russian advance in this area was incorrect. 1st Gd Res Bde was ordered to resume its offensive. However, the result of

these contradictory messages was that in the evening of the 27th the Gd Reserves and Hauer's horsemen were in the same areas as on the day before, although the Russians hadn't sent any units over the Widawka to oppose them.

For 28 November the 2nd Army HQ ordered GdK Tersztyanszky to again try to attack toward Szczercow. For this operation he could also use parts of 32 ID who hitherto had been standing guard toward the east at Rekle.

At 11:40 AM on the 28th, while this offensive was in motion, 2nd Army HQ received a new order from GdI Woyrsch. The units on the left wing of 2nd Army (32 ID, 1 Gd Res Bde and Hauer's Cavalry Corps) should stay in place in a secure position to await the now imminent arrival of reinforcements from the Western Front. Then they would take part in a more powerful thrust toward Noworadomsk. GdI Woyrsch didn't think it would be useful to undertake actions against Tumanov's cavalry on the Widawka, because the Russian horsemen could avoid the attack by a partial withdrawal; thus our own troops would use up their strength without winning any substantial advantage.

GdK Böhm-Ermolli, however, let the orders already issued for an attack toward Szczercow to stand. He wanted to free his north flank from the threat of "such a strong mass of Russian cavalry" on the Widawka; then he would be able to attack Noworadomsk with greater strength and without concerns about being outflanked from the north.

Meanwhile the 1 Gd Res Bde had pierced the Russian cavalry screen and took Szczercow at noon. In the afternoon they drove the enemy another 2 or 3 km back over the Widawka; after colliding with detachments of V Russian Corps, they pulled back to Szczercow and the action ended.

Hauer's Cavalry Corps, on the left of the Prussian Guard Reserves, also fought successfully against the Russian horsemen. In the afternoon the 3 CD entered Rusiec, where they established contact with the right wing of Corps Breslau.
8. The Battle of Cracow is broken off - Conrad's new plans (24-30 November)

(see volume 1 sketch 38, 39, 40, and 42)

After a long advance between the Warta and Vistula, in the third week of November the 9th German Army had almost encircled the Russians near Lodz - 2nd Army and large parts of the 5th - from three sides. On 20 November communications were already broken between the encircled corps and their comrades; their radio stations failed to answer inquiries. On the evening of the 21st the only area not cut off by the Germans was a small stretch south of Lodz, about 20 km wide. Then, however, an attack from Skiernewice by three corps of 1st Russian Army plus the advance of Charpentier's and Novikov's Cavalry Corps and parts of V Russian Corps from the east and south placed the Germans themselves in great peril. GdI von Scheffer-Boyadel's Group (XXV Reserve Corps and 3 Gd ID) were cut off from the rest of 9th Army. Although they saved themselves from destruction by an extraordinarily daring breakthrough (23-24 November), the Germans' encirclement movement at Lodz could not be resumed. The center of 9th Army stood its ground, but the left wing - which had carried out the encircling movement toward the east - pulled back to the west. The right wing on the Widawka stayed in place, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from the Western Front.

GdI Conrad had already learned of the Germans' anticipated change in plans in the night of 22-23 November. The hope that the Russians in south Poland would soon retreat now had to be given up. Until this point the Aus-Hung. armies had reported the capture of 28,000 prisoners, 48 machine guns and 2 guns; their own losses, however, had mounted to 70,000 or 80,000 men. The divisions had lost nearly half of their combat strength. Conrad saw that his attack north of Cracow had run out of steam. South of the Vistula the Russians had crossed the Dunajec and threatened more seriously every day to invade Hungary. The front in Galicia needed substantial reinforcement as soon as possible.

Discussions regarding German reinforcements

A few hours before news of the outcome of the Battle of Lodz arrived at Teschen, GdI Conrad had learned that the II German Corps was being sent to the East. In the night of 22-23 November he sent a wire to Mézières to inquire whether further
German units would follow, how strong they would be and where they would deploy. A major victory against Russia could still be won if these reinforcements totalled at least ten divisions. On the next morning, GLt Freytag-Loringhoven told him that a total of four divisions would be shipped to the German eastern armies. GdI Conrad didn't anticipate that the situation would be changed through such "reinforcement by installments." Meanwhile the Russians were concentrating around Piotrkow, apparently for a large-scale attack on 2nd Army. Therefore Conrad felt it would be best if the oncoming reinforcements were sent to the north wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment and the south wing of the German 9th Army; they could carry out a simple west to east thrust against the 5th Russian Army.

Meanwhile, however, Hindenburg and Ludendorff received the impression from Capt. Fleischmann that the situation south of the Vistula was even more serious than was the case; therefore they asked the DOHL for two or three more corps. At Fleischmann's suggestion, the additional units would be used at Cracow for a blow against the Russian left wing.

Conrad learned of this idea on the evening of the 23rd. Capt. Fleischmann reported that the II Corps would detach at Kalisz and at least one division at Kreuzburg. He believed that if a further two or three corps could be obtained from the West it was quite possible that they would be sent to Cracow. Conrad let Capt. Fleischmann know that the arrival of three or four German divisions at Cracow or farther south would be welcome. However, he also felt that definite decisions were needed soon regarding the number and intended deployment points of all the reinforcing divisions.

Dimitriev's Army meanwhile had gone into action and on 24 November pushed against the right flank and rear of the k.u.k. 4th Army on both banks of the Vistula. In this difficult situation, on the night of 24-25 November the AOK at Teschen advised FZM Ljubicic's Group that when necessary it should fall back from the lower Raba to a shorter position which had been prepared between Niepolomice and Dobczyce. 4th Army should pull Kritek's Group back along the heights south of the Szreniawa to a point north of the mouth of the Raba, while keeping the other units in their current positions. However, Ljubicic should

440 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 576
441 German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 251 ff.
avoid a decisive thrashing. Therefore if necessary he would
retreat even further, to the line Wilieczka-Dobczyce-Kamienik
Heights. If this happened, Kritek's and Roth's Groups would
pull back at least as far as the pre-war frontier, while Arz' Group
in its current position would cover the withdrawal of the
Army's eastern wing. Furthermore, GdI Conrad now discussed with
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and FZM Ljubicic a plan he'd long
considered for moving a strong force south of the Vistula,
covered by the Cracow fortress; it would work with Ljubicic's
Group to drive the enemy back from this sector.

In the same night, GdI Falkenhayn sent an answer to Teschen in
reply to Conrad's telegram of 23 November. He said that to date
two corps were moving from the West; one division would follow
on the next day, and an additional corps thereafter. Moreover,
he would seek to make yet another corps available. GdI Conrad
should discuss the placement of the new units with the German
Eastern HQ. On the morning of the 25th, GdI Conrad told GO
Hindenburg that in his opinion the reinforcements should join
9th German Army, so that it could resume its thrust through Lodz
toward the southeast.

Thus the AOK had dropped the idea of seeking a decision by
committing strong German forces at Cracow. Perhaps this was
partly due to a desire to avoid tarnishing the prestige of the
Aus-Hung. Army by inserting several German corps into their
lines. However, the primary motive was operational
considerations. Conrad fully agreed with the DOHL that
commitment of the reserves by Lodz when they arrived was the
most promising course; therefore he requested only one division
to reinforce the front south of the Vistula. GO Hindenburg was
somewhat reluctant to go along, but the situation in west
Galicia was becoming quite serious. Finally Hindenburg agreed
to send the German 47 Res ID to Cracow; its first trains would

### The Russian advance further along the Vistula

Meanwhile the actions of the k.u.k. 4th Army had not yet ended.
In the night of 24-25 November the east wing of Kritek's Group
was almost unopposed as it pulled back from the lowest reaches
of the Szreniawa to the heights north of the Raba's mouth.
However, on Kritek's left wing the Russians broke through
northeast of Proszowice and threw 15 ID, now reduced to brigade
strength, back toward the south. This advance threatened the right wing of XIV Corps, which was still on the heights north of the Szreniawa. Therefore FML Roth had the troops of 8 and 3 ID who were fighting at Opatkowice disengage from the enemy; he pulled his right wing back at Proszowice.

On 25 November an attack seemed to be brewing against the thinly held lines of 13 LW ID at Polanowice; Archduke Joseph Ferdinand sent three battalions of GM Roschatt's Lst Inf Bde to reinforce the threatened sector. He ordered FML Arz to use any means necessary to prevent a breakthrough between VI and XIV Corps, which would endanger the Army's right wing. At the same time he was taking measures to evacuate the battlefield. During the day, however, the Russians didn't make any serious attacks against either the right wing or VI Corps. Therefore Archduke Joseph Ferdinand asked the high command to ensure that XI Corps south of the Vistula didn't pull back unless confronted by a much stronger enemy; this would enable 4th Army to retain its positions south of the Szreniawa.

In the afternoon of the 25th, the AOK at Teschen issued an order that for the first time noted that it was necessary to let the enemy wear himself out against the trenches of the Armies north of Cracow. South of the Vistula the lines should be held "until the intervention of new units would bring us victory in the battle." Ljubicic's Group was now placed under 4th Army, which was given new general guidelines: the troops were to be pulled back only when necessary due to overwhelming pressure and then as little as possible. An enemy advance through the prepared position Wieliczka-Dobczyce should be opposed by all possible means. Nagy's Group (6 CD, 11 Hon CD and the Polish Legion) would suffice to cover the line Tymbark-Chabowka and the Nowytarg (Neumarkt) area, unless the enemy sent strong infantry units into the area. Arz' Group should be ready to prevent an enemy breakthrough northwest of Cracow against the Cracow-Krzeszowice rail line. When 4th Army's front had pulled back to a line including the north and east sides of the Cracow fortress, the units earmarked for the fortress garrison would be placed under FML Kuk.

Because of these directives, 4th Army HQ modified the orders for a retreat which it had already prepared at noon. The units were given notice that they should count on a long stay in their present positions and therefore should prepare strong defenses. 13 LW ID and 106 Lst ID were returned to XIV Corps. 15 ID would be sent as quickly as possible to the left wing as an Army reserve. On 26 November, FML Nagy's Group as well as the 1 and
110 Lst Inf Bdes would come under FZM Ljubicic. All of the Army's original units as well as Ljubicic's Group were ordered by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to withdraw "only when confronted by a definitely larger enemy force and when absolutely necessary." However, on that very evening parts of XXI Russian Corps forced their way over the lower Szreniawa. The right wing of Kritek's Group therefore felt that they were under attack by an overwhelming enemy and in the night of 25-26 November retreated to the heights east of Nowe Brzesko.

The advance of the Russians south of the Vistula was not effective on the 25th. However, as it began to grow light on the 26th, their XI Corps crossed the lower Raba and drove Col. Brauner's group back to the line Dzievin-Grobla. At the same hour the enemy IX Corps attacked Bochnia, which was defended by 11 ID. Farther south, superior Russian forces advanced from Lipnica against 30 ID. The 10 CD, which had been sent to Rajbrot, had already pulled back to Dobczyce on the night of 24-25 November, because it badly needed to recuperate. At 9:00 AM on the 26th, FZM Ljubicic reported that his totally exhausted troops were no longer capable of prolonged resistance on the widely extended front between the Vistula and the Gdow-Muchowka road. By this time 11 ID had suffered substantial losses and fell back at Bochnia under heavy Russian pressure. Therefore at 9:45 AM FZM Ljubicic ordered his entire Group to retreat to the prepared position Dobczyce-Niepolomice.

To coordinate with this movement, on the afternoon and evening of the 26th Archduke Joseph Ferdinand also pulled the 4th Army units on the other side of the Vistula back from the heights south of the Szreniawa to the pre-war border. The Russians north of the Vistula were content to occupy the positions evacuated by the Archduke's Army. South of the river they pushed ahead into the woods east of Niepolomice and to the area west of Bochnia and Lapanow. Still farther south, Russian mounted troops were engaged with FML Nagy's Cavalry Corps west of Limanowa.

The decision to attack south of Cracow

From the carefully monitored Russian radio traffic, GdI Conrad had meanwhile learned that X Russian Corps was being moved to the mouth of the Dunajec. If the enemy hadn't deliberately sent this broadcast to mislead the Austrians, this meant that there was a wide gap between the 3rd Russian Army and the west wing of their 8th Army (which was advancing in the Beskids), covered only by cavalry. GdI Conrad now wanted to take advantage of
this favorable situation. On 26 November he decided to strike the enemy units advancing south of the Vistula with a surprise thrust toward the east. In the afternoon he ordered:

"4th Army should pull its east wing back under the enemy pressure in coordination with FZM Ljubicic's Group south of the Vistula, which is under its command. Ljubicic's Group will gradually be reinforced by XVII Corps and by the German 47 Res ID (which will arrive by rail at Skawina and Podgorze through 29 November). It will hold a line, at the worst, running from Dobczyce to Wieliczka, with its north wing at Cracow; its south wing should be strong. Furthermore, the main body of 4th Army, as it gradually pulls back to the Cracow fortress, will detach three divisions (XIV Corps and 13 LW ID) to make a surprise move to the south. They will make a major attack on the enemy south of the Vistula. Nagy's Group will deploy as far forward as possible to cover the south wing."

That evening, Col. Metzger asked the Chief of the General Staff Detachment of 4th Army, Col. Paic, to consider whether it might be preferable not to send XIV Corps on an attack due east, but rather to move it by rail to a position farther south where its thrust would be more effective.\footnote{GM Josef Paic, "Tätigkeit des k.u.k. 4. Armeekommandos vor und während der Schlacht bei Limanowa" (a manuscript in the military archives)} Col. Metzger believed that the Russians would seek to outflank our forces in the area south of Dobczyce. As a countermeasure, the AOK proposed to fall on the Russians' own flank from the Makow-Chabowka line; hopefully the west wing of Boroevic's 3rd Army would be able to cooperate. At 11:00 PM, Col Paic repled to Teschen - "4th Army HQ will carry out a flank attack from the south against the enemy south of the Vistula; for this purpose we plan to deploy XIV Corps and 13 LW ID in the area Chabowka-Jordanow."

Thus the AOK's command on the afternoon of the 26th and the subsequent exchange of ideas on the Hughes apparatus show how quickly the original plan for a simple west-east thrust developed into a major flank attack from the southwest.

Conrad's plan was opposed by the German Eastern HQ, which at this time was preparing a new attack at Lodz. The Germans were concerned that weakening of the Aus-Hung. front north of Cracow would lessen the pressure on the enemy in south Poland.\footnote{German official history, Vol. VI, p. 299} This
in turn would release Russian forces to make the German offensive more difficult. To forestall this development, GdI Conrad ordered Woyrsch's Army Detachment to prevent any transfer of enemy units to the north against 9th German Army and to support that Army's attack "by a maneuver on the north flank." The southern wing of 1st Army would remain in place, but would immediately attack if any Russian units transferred from its sector. VI Corps, which had been reassigned from 4th Army, now was on Dankl's southern flank, resting on Cracow.

Plans and situation of the Russians

While most of the k.u.k. 4th Army was falling back toward Cracow, General Dimitriev had great hopes for victory. He believed that the enemy was "now retreating in confusion" and "demoralized." He asked General Ivanov to continue the pursuit energetically with 3rd and 9th Armies. He hoped to seize the forts at Cracow by a *coup de main* that wouldn't cost many casualties.

However, Ivanov's staff didn't believe the situation was quite so promising. As November ended, the striking power of the Russians in Poland was exhausted; only in Galicia were they still on the offensive. Moreover, on 26 November Stavka learned of the arrival of three German corps from the west; it was anticipated that they would deploy against the gap between the Northwest and Southwest Fronts. The Stavka had no further reserves to defend against this stroke. To close the dangerous gap between the two Army Groups, Ivanov relieved III Caucasian Corps (fighting under 9th Army at Zarki) with XXV Corps of 9th Army and relieved the half of XVI Corps which was in front of Czenstochau with troops of XVII Corps. The units thus made available would move to Ivanov's north wing west of Piotrkow. Tumanov's Cavalry Corps (13 CD, Ural and 5 Don Coss Divs, and Trans-Baikal Coss Bde), which was already in this sector, would hold its ground on the Widawka on both sides of Szczercow. Behind these three and a half cavalry divisions, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch deployed General Gillenschmidt's Guard Cavalry Corps— which had arrived from Lithuania—east of Belchatow. However, there was also an endangered area between 3rd and 8th Armies in Galicia; therefore Ivanov told General

445 Korolkow (in "Overview", p. 279) estimates that the Russian 3rd Army had already taken 7,000 prisoners plus 28 guns and 20 machine guns. The figures are considerably exaggerated. The only artillery lost were 10 pieces taken from the k.u.k. XI Corps at Bochnia.
Dimitriev to dispose his forces in such a fashion that he would be able to protect the flank of the units south of the Vistula if necessary. On 26 November Ivanov finally, as if warned by a premonition, told 8th Army in the Carpathians to assemble a strategic reserve in the vicinity of Neusandez.

While 4th and 9th Russian Armies stayed in their trenches and prepared to carry out the troop transfers as ordered, Dimitriev and his 3rd Army continued to push against the Austrians as they withdrew toward Cracow. Dimitriev's X Corps was now in line north of the Vistula. South of the river, FZM Ljubicic's thoroughly worn out troops reached their new positions between Niepolomice and Dobczyce in the night of the 26th and the early morning hours of 27 November. The XI Russian Corps soon caught up with them; around noon the enemy's advance guards pushed back the north wing of 11 ID toward Podleze. Meanwhile the IX Russian Corps appeared in front of 30 ID east of Gdow, while enemy cavalry sought to penetrate to the road from Dobra. Therefore FZM Ljubicic decided that when night fell he would withdraw his whole group to a line running from the Kamienik Heights through Siepraw to a point west of Wieliczka.

4th Army moves back into Galicia

Thus it was high time to reinforce Ljubicic's Group and begin the offensive south of the Vistula. On the afternoon of 27 November, GdI Conrad ordered the initiation of the troop transfers already discussed. However, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand felt that for the moment this was impracticable because the troops still needed rest. Therefore it was decided that XVII and XIV Corps would march back through Cracow beginning early on 28 November.

On this day the bulk of 4th Army left its positions at Koscielniki-Wieclawice and pulled back to Cracow. These troops were dispirited after the enormous difficulties and sufferings of the past few weeks. The 106 Lst ID plus 1 and 110 Lst Inf Bdes became part of the Cracow fortress garrison. FML Smekal's Group (27 ID, 45 LW ID and 95 Lst Inf Bde) occupied the gap around Bialy Kosciol between the south wing of X Corps and the outer works of the fortress. The VI Corps (39 Hon ID and 15 ID), which had been reduced to just 8,000 rifles, went into reserve; on 28-29 November its main body marched to the area north of Krzeszowice, while one brigade deployed southeast of Olkusz. Smekal's units and VI Corps were reassigned from 4th to 1st Army. The XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID) went to Cracow, whence it would move further south on the 29th. XVII Corps, which had
already sent advance guards over the Vistula in the night of 27-28 November, moved to the Kosocice-Prokocim area and came under the orders of FZM Ljubicic. The trains carrying the first elements of German 47 Res ID (GLt von Besser) were arriving at Skawina and Podgorze.

As in mid-November, the forts around Cracow covered the transfer of 4th Army. The right wing of 3rd Russian Army (X and XXI Corps) approached the outer line of forts with caution out of respect for their heavy guns. For the last few days the entire front of 1st Army had been quiet, aside from occasional exchanges of artillery or skirmishing fire. Both sides were entrenching their positions.

South of the Vistula, on the morning of the 28th FZM Ljubicic deployed XI Corps in a line running south from the fortress through Siepraw to the foothills of the western Beskids at Lubien. 10 CD pushed forward from the area west of Dobczyce toward Myslenice. FML Nagy's Cavalry Corps - 11 and 6 CD reinforced by part of the Polish Legion 446 - were in the defiles in the hills by Dobra. Nagy was attacked by Russian cavalry which threatened his north flank; consequently on the 29th he pulled back to Kasina Wk. On this day the 13 LW ID had already detrained at Chabowka; it immediately marched toward Mszana Dl. to cover the deployment of the XIV Corps, also coming up by train. The wing of 3rd Russian Army south of the Vistula (XI and IX Corps) had meanwhile reached the area west of Niepolomice and Dobczyce; on the morning of the 29th it sent a column against the center of 11 ID. FML Kuk expected the Russians to attack both the north- and southeast fronts of his fortress.

In the afternoon of the 29th, GdI Conrad placed 45 LW ID of 1st Army at the disposition of FML Kuk if needed to fend off an enemy attack on Cracow's northeast front; he ordered 4th Army to strike the enemy south of the Vistula and drive him north toward the river. XIV Corps and the available parts of German 47 Res ID should immediately march on foot toward the south to outflank the enemy's southern flank. (It was believed at Teschen that the rail line Cracow-Sucha-Jordanow was no longer available for our units.) The 13 LW ID, covered toward the east by FML Nagy's Cavalry Corps, would advance into the rear of the enemy.

4th Army HQ was surprised by this sudden change of plans, and reluctant to stop the troop trains of XIV Corps; they believed

446 Another brigade of the Polish Legion was with Pflanzer's Armeegruppe.
that sending the men forward on foot would cause a very serious delay to the planned attack. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand also hoped that XI Corps could hold out in the meantime. He told the high command that the railroads were still functioning, and asked that XIV Corps' original movement should continue. The AOK agreed.

Orders are issued for the new offensive

At noon on the next day (30 November), Archduke Joseph Ferdinand ordered FZM Ljubicic to hold his present positions around Cracow with XI and XVII Corps. In addition to his own XIV Corps (3 and 8 ID), FML Roth was placed in charge of 13 LW ID, German 47 Res ID, Nagy's Cavalry Corps, and the independent 10 CD. He was told to have his forces ready in the area Mszana Dl.-Chabowka-Jordanow; on 2 December he could begin his offensive against the flank and rear of the enemy advancing south of the Vistula against 4th Army. On the left of Roth's group, Ljubicic's Group would hold their positions until they would be able to advance in conjunction with their neighbor's progress.

This order for the offensive was consistent with some guidelines issued by the AOK in the evening of the same day. The AOK prescribed that 4th Army should be directed against the south flank and rear of the enemy; with a strong right wing it should advance generally in the direction Trzciana-Bochnia. Nagy's Cavalry Corps, reinforced by some infantry, would cover the offensive against a possible counterattack from Neusandez. Nagy should begin moving east on 1 December in order to fall on the flank and rear of any enemy force approaching from that direction.

These significant orders from GdI Conrad and 4th Army HQ laid the foundations for the new operations in Galicia. Only a few days after the end of the indecisive fighting at Cracow, 4th Army was being led into new and heavy combat.

I. The First Major Actions in the Carpathians

(see volume 1 leaflets 19 and 20)

1. The dual assignment of the k.u.k. 3rd Army

When the Russians learned of the general retreat of the k.u.k. armies from the San and the heights around Chyrow on 5 November, General Ivanov ordered 11th Army to besiege Przemysl. The 3rd Army would occupy the line Lancut-Dynow, while the 8th advanced
from the Bircza-Sanok-Chyrow area. These two armies would cooperate in the blockade of the fortress on the San; they would march ahead to the Dunajec and into the Carpathians (respectively) after 11th Army was in position around Przemysl.

Accordingly, through 8 November the main body of 3rd Army was deployed in the area on both sides of Rzeszow, with its left wing in echelon. X Corps stayed by Radymno, where it was rejoined by its 31 ID (which had been detached to 8th Army). 11th Army deployed half of XXIX Corps on the north front of Przemysl, while XXVIII Corps plus 9 and 11 CD surrounded the fortress on the east, south and west. At this time Brussilov placed XII Corps at Bircza, where it would be able to support the besieging Army; he sent the bulk of his 8th Army (VII and XXIV Corps, 3 and 4 Rifle Bdes, 10 CD) ahead to Tyrawa-Woloska and Lisko. His left wing (34 ID, 12 CD and 2 Comb Coss Div) was reinforced in the first days of November by 65 ID from 11 Army and 12 Sib Rifle Div from the Far East. General Eck was placed in command of these troops and was directed to advance on the upper San (north of Turka) toward Synnowodsko and Bolechow. He would cooperate with the right wing of the Dniester Group (2 and 1 Kuban Coss Divs; parts of 71 and 78 ID).

On the 6th, GdI Conrad ordered the XII and IV Corps to transfer out of the Carpathians to the extreme left wing of the Aus-Hung. armies. On 7 November he ordered the k.u.k. 3rd Army "to hurl back, or at least to halt, any advance of enemy units from the Przemyśl area, whether it was directed west through Galicia or [south] over the Carpathians." To fulfill "this difficult independent assignment", the 3rd Army should combine "the stubborn defense of the Carpathian crossings west of the Uzsok Pass (inclusive) by a detachment with the most active participation of the main body." In further operations, the Army should be prepared to pull back through the Carpathians toward the southwest in response to enemy pressure. If the enemy attempted to cross the Carpathians with strong forces, 3rd Army "should oppose this attack south of the mountain crests."

Around the time that these orders arrived at 3rd Army HQ, IV and XII Corps were pulling back from Turka and Lisko to the stations where they would entrain. On 5 November there was a rear guard action at Dobromil and the enemy was apparently making a serious...

447 The other half of the Corps was 78 ID; it had been sent to reinforce the Dniester Group and hadn't yet returned to 11th Army.
advance through Chyrow. GdI Boroevic felt that his immediate task was to stand in place north of Turka and on the upper San to cover the departure of 2nd Army. For this purpose he had Karg's Group (38 Hon ID; 1 and 2 Lst Terr Bdes; 1, 5 and 8 CD), Krautwald's Group (34 ID and 17 Lst Terr Bde), and VII Corps (17 ID, 20 Hon ID; 105 and 103 Lst Inf Bdes).\footnote{449} GdI Boroevic would first lead the majority of 3rd Army - III, IX and XI Corps plus 4 CD - back to the north edge of the Carpathians at Rymanow, Krosno and Jaslo.

GdI Boroevic's plans

The intentions of the enemy were still unknown. The commander of the k.u.k. 3rd Army had no idea whether he would be confronted by a rapid offensive thrust. His troops were greatly weakened through casualties, illness and the extraordinary exertions of the previous operational period, so that a more defensive stance now seemed to be necessary.\footnote{450} The broad Eastern Beskid Mountains, which had ridges and deep valleys running alongside and across the lines of communication, offered an opportunity for the defenders to hold in check a much larger enemy force by intelligent use of the terrain. By entrenching at the principal crossing points and on the commanding heights, the attackers could be forced to use time-consuming and strenuous alternate routes to get around the defenses. However, when the defenders were threatened with encirclement they could fall back to the next position to repeat the process again. These delaying tactics were the best plan, now that Poland had become the main theater of operations. The main objective was to play for time until the situation in Poland once again permitted the reinforcement of the Carpathian front. Regardless of whether the fighting would be strictly defensive or whether it would include an offensive thrust against Krosno, the difficulties of mountain warfare would affect the outcome.

In the wide territory that the tired soldiers of the 3rd Army had to defend, there were five major transportation routes - the Uzsok Pass, the Baligrod-Cisna road, the Lupkow-Beskid Pass, the

\footnote{449} The Landsturm formations which had belonged to 2nd Army were greatly under strength. Toward the middle of November the 103 k.u. Lst Inf Bde was broken up to reinforce 20 Hon ID; 40 k.k. and 102 k.u. Lst Inf Bdes were broken up to reinforce IV Corps.

\footnote{450} The average strength of the divisions was little more than 6,000 riflemen; each artillery piece had at most 100 rounds of ammunition available.
Dukla depression, and the Konieczna Pass — which led to the Hungarian plains. It was not considered advisable to defend just these five routes with widely separated battle groups concentrated for decisive action on the most important heights; this was because of the diminished strength of the troops and because there were other points to cross the mountains between the major routes. However, the rest of the road network was quite scanty; since there were very few lateral connections between the routes into Hungary, reserves could not be quickly moved from one sector to another. Whenever it rained, the streams in the valleys overflowed their banks and created swamps which hindered the transport of munitions and other supplies. The numerous forests were another hindrance to movement. The lack of shelter, the inadequate resources in the area, and the unfavorable weather at this time of year all added to the difficulty of mountain warfare.

The new operations in the Carpathians began with all these disadvantages. The troops and commander of the 3rd Army, after all the stress and sacrifice of the October campaign, had before them a very difficult twofold task: to halt for as long as possible any Russian movement toward Cracow in the west or through the Carpathian passes.

The Russian advance begins

After the leading elements of XXIV Russian Corps had already skirmished with the rear guards of XII k.u.k. Corps at Ustrzyki Dl., they encountered further resistance the next day (8 November) in front of Sanok and Lisko. Here FML Csanady with much of VII Corps (20 Hon ID, 103 and 105 Lst Inf Bdes) was holding the San crossing points. In the afternoon, when the Russians pushed their way over the river between the defenders' outposts, FML Fail-Griessler brought up 32 ID — which was supposed to be leaving by rail — in support. In the night of 8–9 November, GdI Boroevic ordered Fail-Griessler to hold the San crossings. However, on the next day more and more enemy units managed to cross the river. FML Fail-Griessler gave up his resistance and with the permission of the Army commander fell back to a holding position between Zahoczewie and Bukowsko. Karg's Group was still in place at Turka, while FML Krautwald's Group (34 ID and 17 Lst Terr Bde), closer to VII Corps, retreated from Lutowiska to Dwernik.

On 9 November, Army HQ ordered that the positions directly south of Lisko, on the upper San, and by Turka were to be held as long as possible. Only when the troops could no longer hold their
ground would the Army's right wing pull back gradually to the Carpathian crest. Then Karg's Group would guard the Uzsok Pass, Krautwald's Group the mountain crossing at Cisna, and VII Corps the Lupkow-Beskid Pass. III Corps would occupy the Dukla depression and IX Corps the road toward Zboro. If VII Corps drew the Russians after them into the mountains, and thus made possible a flanking attack, or if there was an opportunity for a thrust into the basin around Krosno, then Boroevic planned to make the Russians' advance difficult by a well-executed counter-thrust. However, as yet Boroevic didn't know how the situation would develop on his Army's left wing; the gap that was developing between 3rd and 4th Armies as the latter moved toward Cracow made caution necessary. A strong force of enemy cavalry had already entered Rzeszow on 9 November and apparently was seeking to ride up the Wislok and then around 3rd Army's left wing, which was still by Krosno and Jaslo.

Meanwhile General Dimitriev was leading his 3rd Russian Army forward very slowly between the Vistula and the Carpathian foothills. This was because he believed that some secret plan lay behind his opponents' retreat; he feared that the Austrians were falling back into the Carpathians only to strike his flank as he moved farther toward Cracow. Therefore he wanted 8th Army to first occupy the outlets from the mountains by Dukla, Baligrod and Turka before he himself marched to the west. Such a cautious advance, however, was not what Stavka had planned. On 12 November they had decided to launch a general offensive against the enemy front on the Silesian border, and urged that the simultaneous operations south of the Vistula should go forward. Therefore General Ivanov sent 3rd Army a strict order to carry out the advance to the Dunajec. At the same time, he told 8th Army to throw its opponents back from the northern slopes of the Carpathians and through the heights guarding the passes.451

General Brussilov was determined by his activity to make it impossible for the enemy to interfere with the neighboring 3rd Army as it moved west. Initially, he instructed Eck's Group and XXIV Corps to drive the Austrians from their forward positions at Turka, Baligrod and Bukowsko. For the time being VIII Corps would stay by Zarczyn, and XII Corps had been detached to Bircza to support the encirclement of Przemysl. Later XII Corps would move south and join with VIII Corps in an advance to the Dukla depression.

451 Korolkow, "Overview", pp. 120 ff. and 159 ff.
2. 3rd Army retreats to the Carpathian passes (10–19 November)

On 10 November, Brussilov's left wing group under General Eck attacked the blocking positions at Turka along a broad front. When darkness fell, FML Karg broke off the fighting and went back into the mountains. The enemy didn't interfere with his movement. On the 12th he occupied the heights in front of Uzsok Pass; on the 14th, when the Russians had begun to outflank him, he pulled back to the Pass itself.

Farther west, FML Krautwald fought an action against parts of 12 Sib Rifle Div at Dwernik, then pulled back on the 11th through Welinta to Cisna.

Meanwhile the advance of XXIV Russian Corps had made itself felt by VII k.u.k. Corps. In the afternoon of 10 November the outposts of 17 ID were thrown off of the heights north of Bukowsko. At the same time the Russians were advancing from Hoczew against the right wing. Here FML Fail-Griessler reinforced the battle lines of 20 Hon ID and 105 Lst Inf Bde with troops from 32 ID; he ordered FML Henriquez with 17 ID, which had been designated the Corps reserve, to counterattack at Bukowsko. On the next morning, FML Henriquez recaptured the heights north of Bukowsko. The parts of 32 ID still in the line were finally relieved and on the 12th moved back to Lupkow and Mezőlaborcz.

The left wing of 3rd Army (III, IX and XI Corps) were undisturbed on 10 November as they reached Dukla, Zmigrod and Jaslo. On the 11th, Russian cavalry moved against the Wisloka sector downstream from Jaslo. The k.u.k 4 CD fell back toward the west while fighting several skirmishes. 3rd Army HQ believed that this enemy activity was a forerunner of the advance of stronger forces; they felt that the north flank of XI Corps was endangered and so ordered the Corps to retreat from Jaslo to Biecz on the 12th. Although only Russian reconnaissance detachments had appeared in front of IX and III Corps, they were also pulled back, to the area south of Krempna–Jasliska.

On 12 November, Army HQ received a report from the high command that the Russian XVIII Corps was on the lower Dunajec, and that 3rd Army should take measures to guard the Tarnow–Neusandez road. For this purpose, Gdi Boroevic pulled XI Corps back to

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Grybow; 4 CD sent detachments to the upper Dunajec to protect communications through Neusandez.

While GdI Boroevic was sending XI Corps ever further to the west, and IX and III Corps moved south toward the summits of the Carpathian Mountains, VII Corps became engaged in new fighting. Henriquez' Group was attacked on 12 November and driven from the heights at Bukowsko. At the same time, pressure increased against FML Csanady's Group (20 Hon ID and the subordinate 105 Lst Inf Bde) on the Corps' right wing. In this tense situation, FML Fail-Griessler told Krautwald's Group to counterattack from Cisna through Baligrod; he ordered FML Henriquez to hold onto the routes through Bukowsko and Surowica, which led into the rear of VII Corps.

On the next day (13 November) the Russians launched a decisive attack. At first Henriquez' Group was able to hold its ground at Bukowsko in heavy fighting. On the other hand, Csanady's Group began to fall back. Meanwhile Brussilov had brought half of 12 Sib Rifle Div up from Dwernik and sent it on an enveloping maneuver from the east. Around noon, FML Krautwald intervened through Baligrod with the main body of 34 ID, but the action on the Corps' left wing was already decided. Here the exhausted troops of FML Henriquez could no longer withstand the onrush of Brussilov's soldiers, and some of them fell back to Surowica.

In the afternoon the threat to his flank led FML Fail-Griessler to order a halt to the action. Through the night and into the morning of the 14th, VII Corps and 34 ID retreated to the south, while engaged in lively fighting at Szczawne and Baligrod. FML Krautwald's Group went over to the defensive at Cisna. Csanady occupied positions which had been constructed in feverish haste at the Lupkow-Beskid Pass. 17 ID, as Corps reserve, came to Vidrany and Palota.

Thus by the evening of the 14th the right wing of 3rd Army had reached the crest of the mountains. The first actions at the Uzsok Pass, Cisna and Beskid Pass erupted the next day.

The defense of the passes

On 15 November General Eck sought to move around Karg's Group at the Uzsok Pass by sending parts of 12 Sib Rifle Div through Ustrzyki Grn. When this enemy force appeared, the outposts on Galician soil pulled back through Wolosate. To avoid being outflanked, FML Karg quickly sent several battalions of 38 Hon ID to his left flank. They succeeded in preventing the enemy from advancing through Wolosate. However, the strength of the
troops fighting at Uzsok Pass was soon used up, and they were not able to hold out for long against the Russian pressure. FML Karg evacuated the Pass on 17 November. On the next day he pulled back to the heights on both sides of the Ung Valley, on the line Havazköz-Patakofalu. Because of these developments, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin had Hofmann's Group retreat behind the protection of rear guards to Slawsko and Koziowa on the heights by Verecke and Wyszkow Passes. Pflanzer-Baltin also sent a detachment from 55 ID (three battalions and a battery under Col. Guilleaume) through Vezerszallas toward Tiha to help Karg's Group.

At the same time as Karg's Group was losing the Uzsok Pass, Krautwald's Group gave away the mountain crossings at Rostoki Grn. There was heavy fighting at Rostoki Grn. on the 16th and 17th, until the Russians finally drove the defenders off of the heights north of Zemplenoroszi and Zellö. On 18 November, FML Krautwald wanted to retake the heights by the pass, but he was confronted by Russian reinforcements (49 ID and 2 Comb Coss Div), whose counterattacks soon forced a further retreat. To keep the Russians from advancing into the Cziroka Valley and into the rear of VII Corps at Beskid Pass, GdI Boroevic sent 1 CD (which was in the rear at Nagyberezna) to the aid of Krautwald's hard-pressed Group. Nonetheless, further enemy attacks forced Krautwald's totally exhausted troops to retreat on the 19th to a line between Czirokaofalu and a point south of Telepocz.

Meanwhile the main body of Russian XXIV Corps was thrusting impetuously through Komancza and Radoszyce toward the Lupkow-Beskid Pass. Heavy fog impeded the defenders' visibility. As night fell, the 20 Hon ID on the Beskid Pass was taken by surprise. In hand-to-hand fighting the enemy advance guard broke into the Honveds' positions on the road from Radoszyce and captured four guns. Reports about this unexpected event alarmed troops of 17 ID at Palota and Vidrany, caused nervous reactions back to Mezőlaborcz, forced the evacuation of the railroad station at Lupkow when the enemy approached, and led to the loss of the narrow-gauge rail equipment on the Lupkow-Cisna line. They also delayed the departure of the last elements of 32 ID on the jammed railroads.

On the next morning (16 November) parts of 17 ID on the west wing of VII Corps launched a counterattack. Although they moved forward only slowly, they were able to somewhat restore the situation of 20 Hon ID. Around noon, however, the 105 Lst Inf Bde at Lupkow Pass lost some important high ground after heavy
fighting. Then it was reported that Russian reinforcements were approaching; these were the VIII Corps, which Brussilov now was sending to the Bukowsko area. In his need, FML Fail-Griessler that evening asked the neighboring III Corps for help. GdI Colerus willingly placed first 44 LW Bde and then 56 Inf Bde at his disposal.

On the 17th the heavy fighting around the Lupkow-Beskid Pass continued. At dawn GM Dieterich's gallant 105 Lst Inf Bde was able to reconquer the lost heights; however, a new attack soon gave the Russians firm possession of this strong point. Also the counterattack on the Corps' western wing was thwarted by enemy thrusts from Dolzyca. Finally on 18 November the counterattacks came to a halt before the reinforcements from III Corps (the main body of 28 ID) had arrived at the Pasika and Hanasiowka Heights on the Hungarian border.

Deliberations at 3rd Army HQ

While the Russian attack against VII Corps and Krautwald's and Karg's Groups was intensifying, GdI Boroevic at Bartfeld was weighing the pros and cons of an offensive by his Army's left wing, which was not yet engaged.

Around noon on 15 November, the high command informed 3rd Army HQ that per an intercepted radio broadcast the XXI Russian Corps would reach the west bank of the Dunajec near Tarnow on the 16th. However, it was still unclear whether the bulk of 3rd Russian Army would turn toward the Carpathians or toward west Galicia. The AOK asked for GdI Boroevic's opinion on how best to coordinate operations of his XI Corps with those of 4th Army. On the same day, Boroevic replied that he might reinforce XI Corps for a blow against XXI Russian Corps, but "the 3rd Army must be relieved of the responsibility of also guarding the routes through Neusandez." A thrust north by III and IX Corps "would, on the other hand, entail the abandonment of the Dukla depression and thus make it impossible to defend the Carpathians. Such an offensive cannot be planned until the enemy situation is clarified." Thereupon the high command declared that if Ljubicic's Group (the reinforced XI Corps) was used against the XXI Russian Corps, 3rd Army wouldn't be responsible also for guarding the roads through Neusandez. In the afternoon of 16 November they ordered XI Corps to prepare to attack through Rajbrot (as noted in the previous section).

Meanwhile GdI Boroevic, concerned about the serious situation of his Army's right wing, again considered the option of placing IX
and III Corps as well as 5 Hon CD (which was coming to Bartfeld) under the command of GdI Colerus and having him attack toward Bukowsko and Komancza. There were no indications that the main body of 3rd Russian Army (XI, IX and X Corps), which was apparently in the area north of Jaslo-Krosno, had any intention of turning toward the south. On the contrary, reconnaissance showed that the enemy's cavalry screen was moving over the Wisloka toward the west. Therefore on the morning of the 16th Boroevic ordered GdI Colerus to prepare an attack by III and IX Corps toward Bukowsko-Komancza; this would occur on the 18th.

On the morning of the 17th, however, the Przemysl fortress reported by radio that the Russian X Corps was marching into the area Strzyzow-Domaradz, while 13 ID of VII Corps and all of XII Corps were in 8th Army's sector by Rymanow and Zarszyn. Boroevic saw the appearance of such strong forces in front of his Army's left wing as a menace to the planned offensive by the k.u.k. III and IX Corps. Therefore he decided to postpone this undertaking and wait for further reports. To ensure that the Beskid Pass was held, the entire 28 ID was placed at the disposal of VII Corps to carry out a counterattack.

This change in the situation was reported to Teschen. If the Carpathian crest could not be held, 3rd Army would pull back under enemy pressure toward the southwest to the sector Eperjes-Varanno-Galszecs; meanwhile any opportunity would be taken to check the enemy advance by an offensive action.

At the time when this report was arriving at the AOK, it was becoming ever clearer that only the Russian 8th Army was advancing into the Carpathians, while most of the 3rd was concentrating toward the middle Wisloka River in the west. GdI Conrad was aware that GdI Boroevic's units weren't strong enough to halt both of these Russian armies in the Carpathians and in west Galicia. Therefore he gave GdI Boroevic only the task of fighting the Russian 8th Army; the operations of XI Corps on the lower Dunajec would be an independent campaign separate from the Carpathian front.453

However, Conrad could not agree with GdI Boroevic's apparent willingness to pull 3rd Army all the way back to Eperjes. If the left wing of Boroevic's Army could suddenly strike toward the northeast - while protected toward the north - before 3rd

452 The other division of Russian VII Corps, 34 ID, was at the Uzsok Pass with General Eck's Group.
Russian Army could finish its deployment, it seemed possible that significant damage could be done to the flank and rear of the VIII and XXIV Russian Corps. Meanwhile the lines of communication over the Tylicz Ridge and in the Poprad Valley would be guarded by 5 Hon CD, and the area around Neusandez covered by 4 CD.

The AOK issued orders for this offensive to 3rd Army on the evening of the 17th. Boroevic in turn told III and IX Corps to be ready to carry out the operation, now planned for the 19th.

However, in the night of 17–18 November GdI Colerus expressed some serious reservations. He stated that he couldn't carry out the planned thrust toward the east without guarding his own flank and rear, because strong enemy forces were in motion toward Zmigrod and Dukla. Therefore GdI Boroevic asked that the offensive be temporarily postponed until the situation was clarified. The AOK at Teschen agreed to his request, but still expected that the Russian advance through the Carpathians would be thwarted by stubborn resistance and by active operations.

Further reconnaissance on 18 November showed that a large enemy force was at Rymanow and the area to its north. In the afternoon the outposts of IX Corps which had been pushed forward to the heights south of Zmigrod were attacked by Russian cavalry. When an enemy infantry column came up and began to deploy, the outposts pulled back to Konty. Also the reconnaissance squadrons from 4 CD (which had gone back to Altsandez) had some minor skirmishes with Russian cavalry at Grybow on the 18th.

3rd Army HQ now calculated that the Russian X Corps was marching from Strzyzow to Zmigrod while XII Corps was staying by Rymanow. Because of this situation, GdI Boroevic abandoned the plan of an offensive by his Army's left wing. On 18 November he wrote to GdI Conrad: "When I deployed III and IX Corps in the Dukla depression and XI Corps at Gorlice, my primary intention was to use these forces for a thrust into the Krosno basin. The preconditions for this operation were:

. That the enemy should come close enough to us that we could strike them without moving too far from Dukla, and
. That VII Corps could guard my right flank against the Russian VIII and XXIV Corps.

Neither precondition has been met. VII Corps has pulled back under a flank attack from VIII and XXIV Corps. This makes an offensive to the north impossible, because if I want to defend the Carpathians I cannot leave the route to the [Dukla]
depression unguarded." Boroevic furthermore declared that although he had considered attacking toward the east instead of the north, the 3rd Army in its present condition was not capable of quick offensive thrusts. Therefore the best solution for the present was to "fight to gain time." 454

3. The Russian attack north of Homonna (19-22 November)

(see volume 1 leaflet 20)

At this point - on 18 November when Boroevic was abandoning the plan for an attack toward Komancza-Bukowsko - the IX and X Corps of 3rd Russian Army were moving west past the left wing of Boroevic's Army to the Biala River. Simultaneously, however, General Brussilov was lengthening the right wing of his 8th Army by bringing up XII Corps (12, 19 and 13 ID), which was no longer needed at Przemysl. This Corps marched to the area north of Dukla (town), covered on its right flank by 10 CD at Zmigrod. VIII Corps moved south from Bukowsko to the vicinity of Wislok Wk. and to Surawica; Brussilov's left wing - XXIV Corps and Eck's Group - had already climbed to the mountain crest between the Beskid and Uzsok Passes.

A heavy snow storm roared through the Carpathian Mountains on 19 November. The Russians seemed to remain inactive on this day; fog filled the valleys and covered Brussilov's preparations for a decisive attack. He sent 12 Sib Rifle Div, whose two brigades had hitherto been stationed at Cisna and Szczawne, to the front between XXIV and VIII Corps, i.e. between Komancza and Wislok Wk. He also stretched the right wing of VIII Corps to Jaslika to ensure a firmer connection with the XIIth. Thus Brussilov's right was massing for a thrust to the Dukla depression. However, his left wing was the first to attack in an attempt to envelop the defenders of the Lupkow-Beskid Pass. 455

At dawn on 20 November this first thrust of the Russians hit the worn-out 34 ID and drove it back from Zemplenoroszi and Zellö to Czirokaofalu. Meanwhile FML Krautwald had sent a detachment to Telepocz to protect the open flank of the neighboring VII Corps. At Szinna he positioned 1 CD, which Army HQ had sent up from Nagyberezna to help; from Szinna it could in either reinforce the right wing or protect the communications with VII Corps through Mehesfalva on the left. Nonetheless, on 21 November the

454 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 533
left wing of XXIV Russian Corps (49 ID and 2 Comb Coss Div) won a surprising amount of territory in a further attack. Krautwald's burnt-out Group was driven from its new position at Czirokaofalu around noon. At the same time a Russian force attacked through Telepocz against the weakly held flank of VII Corps and forced Krautwald's detachment in this sector to retreat to Mehesfalva. By this time FML Krautwald's badly damaged 34 ID had been reduced to about 1,500 riflemen; parts had already been driven back to Revhely. An attempt to rally the Division at Takcsany failed, and it fell back in quick marches to Szinna.

While Krautwald's Group was experiencing these serious setbacks, FML Karg was sending the 2 Lst Terr Bde through Havasköz to cooperate with Col. Guilleaume's detachment (which had come up from Hofmann's command to N. Rosztoka) against the Russian group attempting to advance through Tiha. Col. Guilleaume fought his way forward to a point south of Tiha, but FML Karg's Lst Terr column was pinned down west of Havasköz. In the night of 20-21 November, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin asked GdI Boroevic to order Karg's Group to not only attack with portions toward Tiha, but also with all available units through Fenyesvölgy. 3rd Army issued this order as requested. Therefore on the 21st FML Karg had his right wing (2 Lst Terr Bde and parts of 38 Hon ID) attack toward Tiha in the east, and also on both sides of the Ung valley toward Hajasd. At the same time he sent 8 CD to Utczas to guard his left wing, which was endangered by the advance of the Russians into the upper Cziroka valley. However, since Krautwald's Group was continuing to fall back toward Szinna, on the evening of the 21st FML Karg decided to break off the fighting and retreat to Soslak.

On the next day it was discovered that the enemy was staying in place at the Uzsok Pass, and that the Russian column at Tiha had pulled back. FML Karg now stationed his main body at Revhely, ready to thrust through Utczas and Kiskolon to Czirokaofalu and Takcsany, and into the flank and rear of the enemy units who were attacking Krautwald's Group. A smaller group at Soslak would provide protection from the Russians at Uzsok Pass. GdI Boroevic agreed to this deployment, which he hoped would restore the situation in Krautwald's sector. If the latter fell back any further, the way into the Laborcza valley and the rear of VII Corps at Lupkow-Beskid Pass would be left open to the enemy.

VII Corps was engaged in furious mountain fighting on 20 November. In the thick late autumn fog, the main body of FML Kralicek's 28 ID assembled in the morning on the heights along
the Galician-Hungarian border southwest of Radoszyce; their mission was to advance to Komancza and Wislok Wk. beginning at noon. Before the offensive could begin, however, the Russian 4 Rifle Bde attacked on both sides of Radoszyce. At Dolzyca the enemy was driven back by a quick counterattack by parts of 17 ID (now led by FML von le Beau). At the Beskid Pass the Russians once again penetrated into the positions of 20 Hon ID. At the Lupkow Pass they were driven back in the afternoon by 105 Lst Inf Bde in bloody hand-to-hand fighting. Meanwhile the attacking columns of 28 ID had crossed the mountains to strike the enemy in front of Komancza and Wislok Wk. Visibility was difficult in this heavily forested sector and it was impossible for the commanders to control the action. Surprise attacks and accidents thus played a major role in the fighting on VII Corps' western wing. At the end, 28 ID was defeated and parts fell back to the crest on the border; the enemy did not pursue.

28 ID renewed its attack on the morning of 21 November, but it was too late to win a decisive success. The entire 12 Sib Rifle Div was now in line at Wislok Wk. and Surowica; the Siberians, along with the left wing of VIII Corps, themselves went over to the offensive. Since 28 ID couldn't prevail against this new opponent, it fell back toward evening to the crest on the border.

Meanwhile the situation of VII Corps' right wing also become critical. Reports had already arrived in the morning that enemy units had crossed the border and the crest east of 105 Lst Inf Bde, which was fighting at Lupkow Pass. Soon afterward the Aus-Hung. outposts in this sector pulled back. Later in the morning, Army HQ ordered VII Corps to send all available forces through Virava to stave off the Russian envelopment, but the situation deteriorated in the afternoon. The Russians advanced on Lupkow Pass, and the much-weakened 105 Lst Inf Bde had to retreat to a position south of the heights at the Pass. VII Corps believed that its depleted units were in serious danger from the east. There was concern about the lines of communication, especially because of the defeat of Krautwald's Group.

However, GdI Colerus surveyed the situation with much less concern. He reported to Kaschau (where Boroevic's HQ had moved from Varanno on the 19th) that only a small enemy force had broken through east of VII Corps. Some March battalions of 28 ID had already been sent to Mezőlaborcz to restore the situation in this sector. They were ordered to attack through Virava and Alsoalmad, while 8 CD thrust from Utczas into the flank and rear
of the enemy troops attacking Kratwald. Based on this hopeful information, on the evening of the 21st GdI Boroevic ordered his units to hold their ground. If however the positions at Beskid and Lupkow Pass eventually had to be evacuated because of the threat from the east, VII Corps should prepare for new resistance on a line running from Laborczrev through Mezőlaborcz to Laborczfő, where it would connect with III Corps.

4. The flank attack by IX Austrian Corps (20-23 November)

(see volume 1 leaflet 20)

On 20 November the Russian XII Corps made their first hesitant advance against the outposts of 22 LW ID at Jasliska and of 6 ID at Tylawa. The Russians by Zmigrod also displayed little activity in front of IX Corps. Scouts from 10 ID and 5 Hon CD on the northern foothills of the Carpathians observed the uninterrupted march of Russian columns on the road from Gorlice to Grybow. A battalion of 26 LW ID was sent through Sekowa to determine whether the enemy was moving south; it reported on the 20th that all the roads leading south into the mountains from Gorlice, Ropa and Grybow were free of the Russians. Ropa and Gorlice themselves were occupied by large detachments of cavalry and infantry. On the other hand, a detachment of 4 CD stationed at Altsandez reported that a strong enemy cavalry force had moved into Neusandez and that infantry was following from the east. A message from Teschen stated that X Russian Corps was marching to the west.

Now that it was finally established that the entire 3rd Russian army was moving to the west, GdI Boroevic decided to relieve the developing crisis on his Army's right wing by attacking toward the east. For this purpose he had just IX Corps available, because substantial parts of the IIIrd had already been committed to support the VIIth, and because the rest of the IIIrd would have to stay in place against XII Russian Corps, which was nearing the Dukla depression. For this operation, IX Corps would be placed under GdI Colerus; on 20 November he was directed to attack the enemy at Zmigrod and farther south with 10 ID and to reach Polany with 26 LW ID. Then both divisions would thrust east into the flank of the enemy advancing toward the Dukla depression. At this point 6 ID would join the attack by IX Corps. GdI Boroevic emphasized that the enterprise would succeed only if it were carried out quickly and energetically.
On 21 November the right wing of VIII Russian Corps advanced from Surowica through Jasliska against the 22 LW ID; the Landwehr outposts were forced to retreat to the main defensive positions. In front of 6 ID, the left wing of the enemy XII Corps stayed in place northeast of Tylawa. The k.u.k. IX Corps, which had 10 ID and 52 Bde of 26 LW ID deployed in a widely dispersed line to cover all the mountain roads through Mszana, Krempna, Gladyszow and the Tylicz Ridge, had meanwhile begun to attack as ordered under the most difficult conditions. 51 LW Bde, which had been camped far in the rear, had to march to the front on the road from Zboro through Alsopagony; it didn't arrive until the afternoon in the center of 10 ID, then deployed to attack on both sides of Krempna. The mountain roads were covered with ice; horses slipped and fell, and guns were left behind. Toward evening, when the skirmishing lines of 51 LW Bde finally reached the area northeast of Krempna after tediously climbing up and down the hills, they found themselves in front of the enemy's entrenchments. Farther north the 10 ID had not been able to defeat the enemy units dug in at Zmigrod.

Meanwhile the Russians had recognized their danger, and built a defensive position on the right wing of XII Corps on a line running from the heights west of Hyrowa to Mszana.

For 22 November, GdI Colerus ordered FZM Friedel to pin down the enemy engaged at Zmigrod with most of 10 ID, while the rest of IX Corps attacked toward the east.

On 22 November, 51 LW Bde continued its attack toward the northeast, along with the right wing of 10 ID which had been reinforced by troops from 6 ID. In heavy fighting the Russians were driven from the heights west of Mszana and the town of Myscowa. In the afternoon the attackers were west of Hyrowa, and it seemed that the breakthrough into the flank of the Russian XII Corps would succeed, ending the enemy advance against Dukla Pass. However, a Russian counterattack toward evening recaptured the Dania Heights west of Hyrowa from the exhausted soldiers of 51 LW Bde. The main body of 10 ID had stayed in place on the left of the attacking group and faced toward the northwest; Russian units suddenly appeared in front of this Division in all parts of the area south of Konty toward Banica and Gladyszow. Despite threatening clouds in the west and the great exhaustion of the troops, FM Friedel wished to once again capture Dania Heights in a night attack and then continue the offensive.

At dawn on 23 November a Russian column outflanked the left wing of 10 ID at Banica, whereupon the Division fell back toward
Swiatkowa. At the same time, the enemy also broke through the troops of 10 ID who had been detached to the right wing of IX Corps. Threatened on two sides, 51 LW Bde now had to pull back to Krempna. Although the enemy broke off the action after a brief pursuit, the units of IX Corps were now confusingly intermingled and the troops were exhausted. That night and on the 24th the entire Corps retreated to a position south of Polany-Krempna. Thus the attack which was supposed to relieve the Army's right wing had ruined the combat effectiveness of IX Corps. Losses totalled about 5,500 men; this included a great number of prisoners, especially from the Czech soldiers of 10 ID.
5. Brussilov's principal attack in the Beskids (22 November–2 December)

*(see volume 1 leaflet 20 and sketches 43 and 44*)

Thus the situation in the Carpathians was worsening in the same days when the Germans were attempting to win a decisive victory at Lodz and the right wing of 4th Army was driving the enemy behind the Szreniawa. With reference to these other battlefields, in the afternoon of the 21st the 3rd Army was ordered by Teschen to "bar the roads leading into Hungary with the greatest stubbornness." The Army should repulse the enemy attacks at least until the anticipated victory was won at Cracow. Support was now forthcoming from GdK Pflanzer–Baltin, who was preparing to send 56 ID (7 battalions, 1 1/2 squadrons and 2 batteries) from Mikuliczyn. The high command sent two newly-raised Honved Brigades (200 and 201) as reinforcements from the homeland. Gdi Boroevic decided to employ these fresh forces on his Army's right wing, where they were most needed; they could take advantage of their situation by a blow against the Russians who'd broken into the Cziroka valley. Therefore both Honved Brigades would detrain at Nagymihaly, while 56 ID, coming from Pflanzer's Group, would detrain at Nagyberezna.

Before these reinforcements could intervene, Krautwald's burnt-out Group had to give up more ground to the Russians. On 22 November they were attacked at Szinna and forced to retreat to Homonna. Meanwhile FML Karg had sent 8 CD and 1st Lst Terr Bde under FML Lehmann toward Czirokaofalu; these weak units, however, could barely move forward on the miserable mountain roads. A similar fate befell a counterattack which VII Corps launched with great haste against the other flank of the Russian columns in the Cziroka valley, and it failed to break through.

Engaged in costly actions and threatened on their eastern flank, intermingled units of four different divisions (20 Hon ID, 17 ID, most of 28 ID, parts of 22 LW ID) plus the 105 Lst Inf Bde were stationed on the southern slope of the Lupkow Pass and on the heights west of this important crossing point through the mountains. The tired defenders prevented a breakthrough by 4 Russian Rifle Bde on the Beskid road, but only with difficulty. There were also lively actions on the entire front of III Corps, where the VIII Russian Corps was driving toward the Dukla Pass. Although the 22 LW ID (FML von Schmidt–Fussina) withstood the attack despite bitter cold and exhaustion, the enemy continued their efforts.
To help his VIII Corps forward, Brussilov massed the Siberians at Surowica and Jaslika. Wading through the snow, the 3 Rifle Bde and 12 Sib Rifle Div made their way through ravines and climbed the slopes until they deployed a number of groups between the k.u.k. VII and III Corps on the border crest.

This situation led GdI Boroevic on the evening of the 22nd to order IX Corps to pull back to positions on the pass north of Alsopagony. He told Colerus that in case the VII Corps and the right wing of the IIIrd could no longer retain the border heights they could fall back, pivoting on 6 ID, to the upper reaches of the Laborcza where they could renew their resistance. At the same time Boroevic ordered FML Karg's Group to thrust through Czirokaofalu and Takcsany against the flank and rear of the enemy units advancing to Homonna.

Meanwhile the positions of VII Corps on the steep slopes of the Lupkow-Beskid Pass had become untenable. Already in the night of 22-23 November the Corps began to retreat, still heavily engaged, behind the upper Laborcza. The withdrawal of these troops also necessitated the 28 ID (which again was commanded by III Corps) and 22 LW ID to pull back their lines to the heights west of Mezõlaborcz and Czeremcha. 6 ID stayed in place on the Dukla Pass.

Opposite VII Corps, the right wing of XXIV Russian Corps remained at the conquered Lupkow-Beskid Pass on 23 November. The 12 Sib Rifle Div, deployed to the right of XXIV Corps, wanted to climb the border crest into the Laborcza valley, but couldn't break the fierce resistance of the rear guards of the Austrian 28 ID. The 3 Russian Rifle Bde fared no better when it tried to burst through the new positions of 22 LW ID at Czeremcha. The enemy 13 ID (on the right wing of XII Corps) moved to Gladyszow to prepare a flanking attack against the left of k.u.k. IX Corps.

The left wing of Russian XXIV Corps gained considerable ground on this day. On his own initiative, General Kornilov thrust toward Homonna with 2 Comb Coss Div and 49 ID, hoping to capture the baggage and guns of his wavering opponent.\footnote{456} Krautwald's Group abandoned Homonna and fell back to a temporary position on both sides of Barko.

\footnote{456} Brussilov, pp. 90 ff.
a. The Aus-Hung. counterattack at Homonna, 24-28 November

By now, however, the 75 Hon Inf Bde and 2 Lst Terr Bde, which FML Karg had sent through Kiskolon, had already reached Takcsany on the evening of the 23rd. Here these troops were suddenly pummeled by Russian artillery fire, so they had to again evacuate the burning town; on the next day (24 November) FML Karg moved up once more to the outskirts of Takcsany. At the same time, FML Attems' 56 ID was detraining at Nagyberezna. Four battalions and two batteries of this newly arrived force reached the Takcsany battlefield that evening. Further northeast, FML Lehmann with 8 CD and 1st Lst Terr Bde was nearing Czirokaofalu; he hoped to reach the Cziroka valley on 24 November.

Also the perils of FML Krautwald's badly damaged Group were now ended. The Russians didn't advance through Homonna, and only their artillery directed its fire on Krautwald's new positions at Barko. From pilots' reports, it seemed that the advance of Karg's Group was already causing the enemy to evacuate Homonna. The first echelons of FML Kornhaber's newly formed Division were arriving at Nagymihaly; this Division had the 200 and 201 Honved Bdes and totalled 16 battalions, 2 squadrons and 16 guns. With this reinforcement, FML Krautwald felt able to once more attack. He decided to thrust through Homonna.

These glad tidings arrived at Army HQ from the right wing in the course of the 24th; there was also a report - later determined to be false - that Col. Guilleaume had retaken the Uzsok Pass.

Krautwald's Group was reinforced on 25 November by six battalions, one squadron and one battery of Kornhaber's arriving Division; however, it encountered very heavy resistance in front of Homonna. Also the attack on Takcsany - where FML Szurmay had assumed overall command of Karg's Group plus 56 ID - only gained ground slowly on the 25th. General Brussilov had by now recognized the great danger that menaced his left wing because of Kornilov's rash advance to Homonna. He quickly ordered troops from XXIV Corps to the east, sent reinforcements to Szinna and Takcsany and asked 11th Army, which now commanded Eck's Group, to have that force attack from Uzsok Pass.

On 25 November it had already been demonstrated that the situation behind FML Szurmay was not fully secure. The report

457 Brussilov, pp. 94 ff.
that the Uzsok Pass had been captured was proven to be completely false. Col. Guilleaume's detachment had driven back Russian outposts and occupied Tiha and Havasköz. Together with 76 Hon Inf Bde, which had been left at Malmomret to guard the rear of Szurmay's Group, Guilleaume then attempted to take Uzsok Pass. However, his attack soon bogged down in front of the well-constructed positions of Russian General Eck's Group, which itself was now threatening to counterattack. Because the Russians were also increasingly active in front of 55 ID on the Verecke Pass and Wyszkow Ridge, FML Hofmann asked that Guilleaume's detachment should be returned to him.

Nonetheless, GdI Boroevic wished to continue the envelopment attack against XXIV Russian Corps from the east. On the evening of the 25th he instructed FML Szurmay to first have his main force (75 Hon Inf Bde, 56 ID, 2 Lst Terr Bde) occupy the area around Szinna and Takcsany, while Lehmann's Group (8 CD and 1 Lst Terr Bde) secured the area around Czirokaofalu and thus cut off the enemy's line of retreat toward Cisna. If this was successful, then the attack should proceed farther west to Rostoki Grn., Vendegi and Mehesfalva. As soon as a decision was won at Szinna, FML Krautwald should advance up the Laborcza with most of his group, while sending a side column into the Udava valley toward Paphaza. He would thus attack the rear of the enemy units which had advanced past the upper Laborcza toward the west.

FML Szurmay's troops captured Nagypolany, Czirokaofalu and Takcsany on 26 November. On this day FML Krautwald was still engaged on the approaches to Homonna. He had made his main effort toward the northeast because he wanted to encircle the Russian units at Homonna, instead of attacking due north to give immediate assistance to the hard-pressed VII Corps. At 10:00 AM, however, he received instructions from Army HQ to act in accordance with the order he had received on the evening of the 25th.

On 27 November Szurmay's main body continued their attack toward Szinna; Col. Guilleaume's Detachment, 76 Hon Inf Bde and FML Lehmann's Group - at N. Rosztoka, Malomret and Juhaszlik - covered this envelopment maneuver against any possible attack from the Uzsok Pass and the other crossing points through the Carpathians farther west. One of FML Szurmay's columns captured Szinna toward evening. However, the town was lost again when the Russians counterattacked into the valley from Mehesfalva. Meanwhile FML Krautwald's operations around Homonna were still encountering stubborn Russian resistance. FML Krautwald sought
to encircle both of the enemy's wings. However, he was ordered by Army HQ on the morning of the 27th to make his main effort against Koskocz in the Laborcza valley, while sending a detachment into the Udava valley; by moving east from this area he could bypass Homonna on the north. FML Krautwald instead continued with his encirclement maneuver, and toward noon on 28 November he invested and took the town of Homonna, along with 1,500 Russian prisoners. Soon afterwards FML Szurmay stormed Szinna. General Kornilov's defeated troops retreated northwest into the mountains; they had lost about 2,000 men (killed, wounded or missing) as well as their supply train and a mountain battery. 458

### b. The loss of Dukla Pass, 24–28 November

Meanwhile, however, the troops of Boroievic's Army engaged on the upper Laborcza and the Dukla Pass had not been as fortunate as Krautwald. On 20 November, General Ivanov had ordered Brussilov to send units from the Carpathians to west Galicia to support 3rd Army's advance toward Cracow. Brussilov, however, believed that such a redeployment would not be feasible until the Austrians had been completely driven from the Carpathian crossing points; therefore he wanted to take the Dukla Pass after securing the Lupkow-Beskid Pass.

When the Russians advanced along the upper Laborcza on 24 November, they engaged the k.u.k. VII Corps in a new series of bitter actions. At Mezölaborcz the enemy broke into the thinly held lines of VII Corps, which had been reinforced by parts of 28 ID. The exhaustion of the troops and the intermingling of units from 20 Hon ID and 17 ID hampered an attempted counterattack, which was unsuccessful. In these critical hours, VII Corps HQ already feared that their line of retreat south toward Varanno could be cut; therefore they contemplated a retreat to the west, through the barren mountains toward Giralt. Boroievic intervened and ordered the Corps to hold its ground and await the result of the attack by the new units coming up from the southeast.

To the left of VII Corps, 28 ID had stopped the Russian advance west of Laborczfö. Meanwhile the situation of 22 LW ID was becoming more critical. To cover the flank of the troops wheeling toward Mezölaborcz, the 12 Sib Rifle Div thrust toward

458 Brussilov, pp. 94 ff.
On the right of the Siberians, 3 Rifle Bde sought to roll up the positions on the Dukla Pass from the east. The great length of the line defended by 22 LW ID and the difficulty of observing the fighting in the heavily forested mountains made it hard to control the action. The Russians broke into the trenches on the right wing of 22 LW ID late in the afternoon of the 24th. A brave group under Col. Zahradniczek threw themselves on the enemy and drove them back in the evening after a fierce action. The Russians also attacked the left wing of 6 ID, but were still hesitant in front of IX Corps.

To simplify the command structure and bring order to the intermingled formations, Army HQ now divided its left wing into two groups: VII and III Corps under GdI Colerus and IX Corps with 5 Hon CD and three Landsturm bns under FZM Friedel. Colerus' group was based on Sztropko; its mission was to defend the Laborcza line and the Dukla depression. Friedel's group would cover block the routes from Krempna and Konieczna toward Zboro and over the Tylicza Ridge.

On 25 November the enemy didn't advance any further through Mezölaborcz. However, a Russian detachment (apparently parts of 49 ID) crossed the Laborcza at Koskocz; GdI Boroevic therefore ordered 5 Hon CD to leave IX Corps and to move to Sztropko to guard the rear of VII Corps. On this day, the pressure of XII Russian Corps intensified against III Corps on the line Jasliksa-Krempna. The Russian 3 Rifle Bde was seeking to open a way from Czeremcha to the rear of Dukla Pass. However, the resolute troops of III Corps repulsed all attacks.

On the next morning, the enemy at first was passive in front of 3rd Army's left wing. Toward noon they launched new attacks against 22 LW ID from the Czeremcha area. The Russians broke into the trenches and pushed on toward the east flank of the Dukla Pass. Already some officers wished to pull back the endangered 6 ID to the southern slope of the mountain crest. Then, however, FML Schmidt-Fussina's 22 LW ID established a firm line along the heights to protect the Pass toward the east. Reserves were brought up quickly. That night a counterattack by three newly-arrived March companies of LW IR "Klagenfurt" #4 drove the enemy out of the positions they had captured on the mountains.

The fighting continued on 27 November. The Russian 48 ID, which had remained hesitantly in place at Mezölaborscz the day before, now crossed the Laborcza and attacked in the afternoon. The VII Corps, reinforced by hastily-sent parts of 28 ID (IR #27 from
Graz and # 47 from Marburg), was still able to stand its ground; the Corps was now led by Archduke Joseph after FML Fail-Griessler resigned due to illness. 22 LW ID was also able to withstand further attacks of VIII Russian Corps in heroic fighting; the Landwehr were reinforced by IR # 7 (Klagenfurt), which 6 ID had willingly sent to help out.

Contrary to expectations, on this day there was once again no serious attack against the weakened IX Corps. However, heavy artillery fire was directed against the positions of 10 ID on the heights south of Krempna. Brussilov was preparing to envelop the left wing of 3 Army, for which purpose he had sent 13 ID of his XII Corps toward Konieczna.

Now 3rd Army was approaching its breaking point. Weakened by all sorts of hardships, the tired and disease-ridden divisions were deployed in the snowy and forested mountains in thin skirmishing lines; they were only defending themselves with difficulty against the Russian attacks. The troops still lacked winter equipment. Ammunition and rations were brought up into the mountains with incredible toil. Because the area was so sparsely inhabited, the regiments often had to spend even their meager rest periods at night in the open despite the grim cold. There were heavy losses due to combat casualties, frostbite, and illness. In III Corps, 6 ID had 5700 riflemen, 22 LW ID had 3800, and 28 ID had 5500. VII Corps was in even worse shape; 20 Hon ID and 17 ID together had 7000 riflemen, and the other units were similarly reduced. There were ominous developments in IX Corps. Under the influence of political ideas which had affected March units from the Czech areas, there was a growing number of soldiers who no longer had the inner strength to withstand the enormous demands of mountain warfare in winter. Some sought to avoid the frightful ordeal by being taken prisoner.459

459 Translator's Note - The question of the extent of Czech disaffection at various points in the war remains open. The most controversial point is whether in fact the disaffection was due primarily to "political ideas" from the homeland, or whether the Czechs were simply not prepared to tolerate bungling by their superior officers. At least in this early stage of the war, the latter seems a more plausible explanation. A good summary of the issues appears in Christoph Führ, "Das k.u.k. AOK und die Innen-politik in Österreich 1914-17" (Graz, 1968), pp. 29 ff.
Colerus' Group retreats to the Ondava

Under these conditions, the strength of the units on the upper Laborcza and the Dukla Pass had diminished to a point where they could no longer withstand the Russian pressure. In the night of 27-28 November, after fighting which surged back and forth, the Russians broke into the long cordon along the heights in a few places. First in VII Corps, then in III and IX Corps, the troops began to give way. The extremely critical situation at Mezőlaborcz threatened the rear areas of the positions on the Dukla Pass. Before dawn GdI Colerus ordered all of VII and III Corps to pull back to the heights between the Laborcza and Ondava Rivers and establish a line running from Varihaza through Peszternye to Alsohimes. IX Corps would stay in place on the heights north of Alsopagony. GdI Colerus also asked Army HQ whether he could retreat further if necessary. He intended to withdraw VII and III Corps west to the Ondava in the area around Sztopko. The junction between III and IX Corps would be at Felsősodor. GdI Boroevic would have to decide the future disposition of 3rd Army.

Boroevic at this point had learned from Teschen that the attack of 4th Army at Cracow was being halted because of the intervention of 3rd Russian Army. The high command now intended to launch a surprise attack on the enemy south of the Vistula. 3rd k.u.k. Army was supposed to hinder the transfer of further Russian forces from the Carpathians to west Galicia. It should fight for time and guard the routes from the mountains into Hungary until the planned assault on 3rd Russian Army was successful.

In an attempt to implement these latest orders, GdI Boroevic planned an attack by his Army's left wing. However, GdI Colerus reported that the threatening situation and the poor condition of the troops of VII and IX Corps would make it impossible to mount any offensive for the time being. Therefore Boroevic dropped this idea. The Army commander indicated that his divisions should be able to find favorable terrain for defensive operations among the deep valleys of the Laborcza, Ondava and Tapoly Rivers. They should be able to withstand superior enemy forces. Nonetheless, because of the weakness of the troops it was questionable whether they would really hold off further Russian attacks. 3rd Army was especially concerned about the state of the left flank, where IX Corps had suffered heavy losses in the abortive attack at Krempna in addition to all its other hardships. It was known that the Russians were beginning to outflank the Corps through Gladyszow. If IX Corps lost the
important routes through Zboro and Bartfeld, the entire left wing of the Army might be rolled up and forced to retreat to Eperjes.

Although Boroevic was willing to contemplate such a long retreat if necessary, he was encouraged by the good news coming at this time out of Serbia; he still exhorted his troops to hold out as long as possible in the Carpathians. In the morning of the 28th he ordered GdI Colerus to retain a position on the heights between the Laborcza and Ondava, since the enemy had sent no new units to reinforce the Corps already in this sector (XII, VIII and XXIV) and was making his main effort in the Cracow area. Only in the most extreme need and under very heavy pressure would another withdrawal be permitted; in this scenario there would be a gradual retreat, in which IX Corps would move toward Eperjes, while III and VII Corps would move down the Ondava and Tápoly Valleys toward Tőketerebes.

Thus on 28 November the exhausted troops of VII and III Corps, after breaking free from the enemy in lively rear guard actions in the morning, deployed on the new Varihaza-Peszternye-Alsohimes line. In the afternoon the Russian main body didn't push forward; there were only some cautious probes by small forces. However, on this day Russian pressure became very evident in IX Corps' sector on the border heights north of Alsopagony.

c. The Russian thrust to Bartfeld, 28 November-2 December

On 27 November, General Ivanov ordered Brussilov to break off the offensive through the Carpathians and – in accordance with the earlier instructions of the 20th – to create a mobile reserve force in the area of Neusandez. Therefore Brussilov pulled XXIV Corps back to Komancza and Cisna. After the enemy was driven from the Dukla depression, VIII Corps began to march through Zmigrod toward Grybow. This redeployment, however, should remain hidden from the Austrians. Therefore Brussilov pretended to be advancing further into Hungary by having 3 and 4 Rifle Bdes and 12 Sib Rifle Div cautiously follow Boroevic's Army out of the valley of the upper Laborcza, and by sending XII Corps toward Bartfeld [Barta].

In the first hours of the morning of 28 November the Russian 13 ID attacked through Gladyszow and in costly actions drove
away the detachment of IX k.u.k. Corps which was stationed there; the defenders (one regiment from 52 LW Bde, reinforced by Landsturm) retreated through Konieczna to the heights south of Biharo. GdI Boroevic learned of this development, which caused him great concern, a few hours after he had ordered GdI Colerus to hold the heights northeast of the upper Ondava. If the enemy overcame the IX Corps, which was guarding the Army's flank, and reached Zboro, they would force the Corps to withdraw its main body from the position north of Alsopagony back to Bartfeld. Thereafter the scarcely established new position of VII and III Corps could be rolled up from the north.

In this dangerous situation, FZM Friedel pulled 10 ID back to Alsopagony and simultaneously ordered 26 LW ID to concentrate as quickly as possible at Komlospatak to protect the important route through Zboro. GdI Boroevic, however, didn't agree with these measures. On the evening of the 28th he ordered FZM Friedel to assemble a superior force to counterattack the Russian units which were breaking through at Konieczna. In this order, Boroevic opined that only weak Russian forces were opposite XII Corps, but this was incorrect. Friedel was facing all of the Russian XII Corps (13, 12 and 19 ID), whose westernmost column (13 ID) had carried out the envelopment through Konieczna. A quick and powerful counterstroke, such as Boroevic wanted, was impossible because of the difficult mountain terrain over which the already weakened battalions of 26 LW ID were spread out thinly. FZM Friedel also feared that the questionable condition of 10 ID made it likely that the Alsopagony position would be lost; therefore he asked that IX Corps be asked to retreat further.

At this point (still on the evening of the 28th) Boroevic once again placed IX Corps under GdI Colerus and empowered that commander, if necessary, to pull his widely dispersed battle group back to "the shorter defensive position from Bartfeld-Tapoly Brook to Felsőköcseny-Kerekret-Minyevagasa (on the Ondava)." Units from IX and III Corps should be gathered to create a mobile reserve, and the entire VII Corps should be held in readiness behind the right wing of III Corps in the Ondava Valley (north of Turany).

On 29 November, 10 ID was heavily attacked at Varadka and in the afternoon fell back to Szemelenye. Therefore GdI Colerus decided that on the next morning his entire group (IX, III and VII Corps) would fall back to the line authorized by Army HQ.

Early on the morning of the 30th, VII and III Corps carried out
their retreat without interference from the enemy. The Russians were digging in on the heights west of the Laborcza and only sent small detachments in pursuit of their opponents. However, XII Russian Corps pressed hard against the IX k.u.k. Corps at Zboro. Colerus wished to win as much time as possible for III Corps to complete its withdrawal through difficult terrain over the heights which run toward the northeast between the Ondava and Tapoly, an area which had no real roads; 6 ID in particular had to cross the deep Ondava Valley at Felsöodor. Therefore IX Corps, although it was under the heaviest pressure from the enemy, was supposed to hold Zboro as long as possible to cover the movement of the IIIrd. Thus it was that around noon the IX Corps, now led by FML Kralicek, was struck by Russians advancing on Zboro. 10 ID at Szemelenye had already reached the limit of its endurance; the enemy broke through its left wing and separated it from 26 LW ID. The smashed 10 ID now had to pull back from the chaotic action, and it seemed doubtful that IX Corps would be able to rally and offer serious resistance again at Bartfeld.

Continuation of fighting on 3rd Army's right wing

Because of the ever-worsening situation of his Army's left wing, GdI Boroevic was urging that the attack of the right wing should energetically continue. In the night of 28-29 November he ordered Szurmay's Group to take a brief pause to rest in the captured town of Szinna, and then to pursue the Russian 49 ID through Mehesfalva and Tölgyeshegy while leaving a rear guard in the direction of Uzsok Pass.460

However, the pursuit of the enemy through Mehesfalva and Papaza didn't begin until 30 November because of the great exhaustion of the troops. Then FML Attems advanced with his 56 ID to the Mehesfalva area, while FML Lehmann's 8 CD rode through Czirokaofalu toward Zemplenoroszi to block the mountain crossing at Cisna. Meanwhile the situation in the rear of Szurmay's Group was increasingly uncertain, because 76 Hon Inf Bde had been attacked on the 29th at Malomret and retreated toward Soslak. The withdrawal of his right wing group forced Szurmay to send parts of 75 Hon Inf Bde into the Ung Valley; with the support of Guilleaume's Detachment they would push the enemy back to the Uzsok Pass.

460 In Szurmay's Group, the remnants of 1st and 2nd Lst Terr Bdes were organized as a combined Landsturm Regiment which was assigned to the 56 ID.
FML Krautwald had sent Kornhaber's Division up the Udava Valley to defeat the Russian units at Tölgyeshegy and to drive them through Paphaza into the mountains. 34 ID and 1 CD advanced in the Laborcza Valley; after a brief action in the afternoon of the 29th they forced open the road to Laborczber; on the next day they came up against a new Russian position between Homonnaolyka and Obajna. FML Krautwald send 1 CD, reinforced by infantry, on an outflanking maneuver through Homonnaolyka; 5 Hon CD also attacked from this town. That night the Russian rear guards evacuated their now endangered lines, apparently to set up a new position farther in the rear.

Thus the strenuous and time-consuming movements of Krautwald's Group were progressing only slowly. To quickly help his Army's right wing gain the desired success, on the afternoon of the 30th Boroevic called on VII Corps, which was marching back to Turany. He ordered Archduke Joseph to redeploy the Corps so that it could intervene in Krautwald's action, to the left of 5 Hon CD. In the same hours, Boroevic learned the full details of the setback to IX Corps. To prevent the left wing of the Army from falling back any further, he now ordered GdI Colerus to thrust with parts of III Corps against the Russian 13 ID as it advanced toward Bartfeld and to "decisively beat" the enemy (while still guarding against enemy intervention from the north and east). However, this plan would not succeed.

The loss of Bartfeld

In the night of 30 November-1 December, the IX Corps took up a new position on both sides of Bartfeld - 10 ID was on the right, and 26 LW ID (reinforced by three Lst Etappen Bns) was on the left wing. The Russians pushed on vigorously from Zboro. At 11:00 AM they attacked Bartfeld and drove the Landsturm out of the town. At the same time another force thrust over the heights directly east of Bartfeld and pushed back the right wing of 26 LW ID. The rough terrain and thick fog made it difficult for FML Kralicek to oversee the action. He ordered a counterattack, but only the Corps' reserve of 600 men was available for this purpose. He eagerly awaited assistance from 6 ID.

This Division deployed at Belavesze to attack toward the west. However, around noon it was threatened by the approach of Russian units from the north and had to turn against the new opponent. Since it was reported that an enemy column was also moving in the Ondava Valley toward Sztropko against the right wing of III Corps, and since the attack by 6 ID, which had just
4800 riflemen, couldn't break through, in the afternoon GdI Colerus decided to retreat.

FML Lischka's 26 LW ID attempted to recapture Bartfeld but was defeated, after which the Division assembled on the heights south of the town. When the hope that 6 ID would intervene had proved futile, IX Corps also broke off its action. In the night, and in the course of 2 December, Kralicek's Corps and 6 ID moved back to the eastern slope of the wild Csergő Mountain, to Mag.-raslizvicza and to Mag.-karponcza, while 22 LW ID and 28 ID took up new positions in the area farther east, blocking the Tapoly and Ondava Valleys.

Depressed by the loss of Bartfeld, 3rd Army HQ once more considered whether to take the Army back to a fortified camp at Eperjes or even to the bridgehead at Budapest; this would allow the over-worked troops to finally get some rest away from the inclement weather and to receive replacement troops and ammunition. However, under FML Szurmay on the Army's right wing, 56 ID reached Telepocz after some light skirmishes, and 8 CD reached Zemplenoroszi. The advance guards of Group Krautwald, which was following the enemy toward Virava, no longer encountered serious resistance. Also VII Corps, which had begun to advance toward the northeast from the Ondava, reached Oroszagas and Varihaza on 1 December without seeing any action. Spies and scouts reported that the Russians had pulled back through Mezőlaborcz and Alsoalmad into the mountains. Thus it seemed that Brussilov's left wing was going to stay on the Carpathian crest. Farther west, however, the situation was still unclear. Apparently the Russian 3 Rifle Bde and parts of their XII Corps were following III Corps through Sztropko, Felsővizköz and Csarno, while the Russian 13 ID was still thrusting ahead through Bartfeld. On the evening of 1 December, GdI Boroevic ordered VII Corps back to Nagyberezsnye and Turany. He told Krautwald's Group to assemble at Laborczer and Paphaza behind a screen of covering troops. Szurmay's Group should stay in place while scouting toward the Carpathian crossings.

GdI Boroevic now informed his right wing that he planned to have units from Szurmay's and Krautwald's Groups shift toward their left; this would restore the situation on the Army's left wing.

6. Situation of Pflanzer's Armeegruppe at the end of November
In the eastern Carpathians, Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe wasn't attacked again by the enemy after the actions at Delatyn. Col. Fischer and his Streifkorps were guarding Czernowitz and the Czeremosz line with their usual energy; 54 ID (FML Schultheisz), 52 ID (FML Schreitter) and FML Durski's Polish Legionaries were covering the routes toward Hungary at Kuty, Mikuliczyn and Zielona. After 2nd Army retreated from Chyrow, FML Hofmann's Group was standing guard at the Verecke Ridge and in the area of the Wyszkow Pass with 55 ID (129 and 130 Inf Bdes) and the independent 131 Inf and 12 Lst Terr Bdes. Friend and foe restricted their activities to small scouting operations. The situation changed, however, on 20 November when General Ivanov placed General Eck's Group (which had advanced to the Uzsok Pass) and the Dniester Group under 11th Army. Despite the setback to the Russians' XXIV Corps, the enemy went over to the offensive in the eastern Carpathians in late November.

On 24 November - after Pflanzer-Baltin had sent 56 ID to the aid of 3rd Army - the enemy attacked over the Czeremosz at Waschkoutz. Parts of 54 ID thrust from Kuty in an attempt to drive the Russians back over the river, but failed. On 26 November Col. Fischer evacuated Czernowitz for the second time and with his weak units conducted a fighting retreat back to the Sereth. GdK Pflanzer sent most of the Polish legionaries from Zielona to Kuty. In the meantime, however, the Russians advanced farther into Bukovina; they forced Fischer's Streifkorps and 54 ID back to the upper Suczawa and to Uscie Putilla. Thus Pflanzer was forced to again give up the northern part of Bukovina.

In late November and the start of December pressure also intensified against Hofmann's Group. On 29 November the 12 Lst Terr Bde (Col. Burggasser) had to give up the Wyszkow Pass, and in the first days of December it fell back to Toronya and Ökörmező. At the same time 55 ID was enduring Russian attacks on the Verecke Ridge. Farther west, Col. Guilleaume's Detachment and 38 Hon ID (which had now been reunited) tried to recapture the Uzsok Pass. On the evening of 3 December they were able to take an important height on the border west of the mountain ridge. However, on the next day the main body of 38 Hon ID left the front to be transported to the left wing of 3rd Army. The remaining troops under Col. Csermak were hit by a

461 At the start of November, Pflanzer-Baltin's Group had about 62 battalions.
counterthrust from Russian 65 ID and fell back to Malomret.

Summary of the Carpathian actions through 2 December

Thus in the opening days of December the Russians were becoming more active against Pflanzer's Armeegruppe. At the same time the bulk of 3rd Army had pulled back from the eastern Beskids toward Eperjes after costly but gallant fighting. The troops of GdI Boroevic had held out as long as humanly possible. The deeds of III Corps in particular had been quite commendable in the actions since mid-November. While the divisions on the right wing of 3rd Army were assaulted by a larger force and had to fall back fighting from the Carpathian passes into the Laborcza Valley, the Corps from Graz detached men to help its hard-pressed neighbors but still was able to hold its ground in the Dukla depression. Finally the right wing of III Corps, which was heavily assaulted, had to pull back toward the west to maintain its connection to the VIIth. This gave Gen. Brussilov an opportunity to fall on the rear of the Austrians at the Dukla Pass by a sudden blow toward the west. However, the equally exhausted Russians lacked the strength for this operation. Meanwhile Boroevic was successful on his right wing, where a flank attack drove the Russian XXIV Corps, which had already thrust to Homonna, back into the mountains. On the left, the IX Corps (which had been badly damaged during its offensive toward Krempnna) had to give way at Bartfeld; III Corps, which was using up its last strength, was thus also obliged to retreat. At this perilous juncture, however, Brussilov had to suspend his attack through the Carpathians as he had been ordered. Thus Boroevic's Army regained its freedom of movement, and was ready for a new advance in the first weeks of December. This surprising change of fortune in the Carpathians took place while the opposing high commands were making new plans.

7. The next major decisions by the high commands

(see volume 1 sketch 45)

The Russians

After three months of warfare, the Russian Army had become so disorganized that General Quartermaster Danilov felt that "a fundamental renewal of our armed forces" was necessary. The
Russian ranks were thinned by casualties and sickness; men had also been lost through being taken prisoner, through desertion and through self-mutilation. The shortage of officers was shocking; some units were lacking 70% of their authorized number. There also had been insufficient replacements to make up the losses of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. An additional draft in October and November had brought in 1,400,000 men, but there were not enough rifles available to arm this host. A great shortage of horses was also becoming evident. Nonetheless, all these problems were overshadowed by the shortage of artillery ammunition which was harming the effectiveness of all of the Russian armies. Finally, the only units available as a strategic reserve were the IV Siberian Corps plus the two corps being rebuilt after their destruction at the Battle of Tannenberg (XIII and XV). In the foreseeable future the only other units that would be available were two regiments of the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Bde and some of the Trans-Amur Border Watch troops.

To decide how the next operations should proceed under these difficult circumstances, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevitch summoned the two Front commanders and their assistants to a conference at Siedlec on 29 November. The agenda was based on a suggestion by Danilov. The General Quartermaster was still adhering to the operational plan he had advocated before the war. Thus a decision should be sought by an offensive onto German territory as soon as the Army had regained its full capacity for action. Immediately, however, measures must be taken to ensure the security of the right wing of the forces which would once again advance out of the Vistula valley against Silesia. Thus East Prussia should be conquered by 10th Army from the east and by a new Army that would advance from the south with at least three Corps through Mlawa to Soldau. When these two Armies reached the lower Vistula, they would have shortened the front sufficiently to free units to reinforce the large attacking group in Poland. South of the Vistula, Ruszky would at first move his right wing forward only as far as Plock; Ivanov's main body would advance toward Czenstochau and Cracow, where they would attack the Aus-Hung. forces assembled there. Later Ivanov's target would be Oppeln. Danilov believed that success in this sector would drive his opponents away from

Vienna. Only a minimal amount of units would be left to defend Galicia.

However, this plan met lively opposition from the Front commanders at the Siedlec conference. Ivanov believed that he couldn't overcome the strong position at and north of Cracow. Ruszky was still pessimistic after the beating which his southern wing had taken from Mackensen. Therefore when the Grand Duke returned to Baranowicze he decided to pull back the Russian forces in the Vistula valley to the prepared positions immediately in front of Warsaw and Ivangorod. On 30 November the Stavka issued orders that preparations should be undertaken to retreat to the line Ilow (northwest of Sochaczew) - Tomaszow and to the Nida as far as its mouth. Before the retreat was actually initiated, Nicholas Nikolaievitch wished further clarification of the situation; in the meantime the Northwest Front should deploy strong reserves at Warsaw in case the Germans tried to attack through Mlawa. 10th Army should also spare some units for this purpose, but nevertheless was to adhere to its original assignment of driving the Germans out of their lines around the Masurian Lakes. Ivanov's Galician armies - 3rd, 8th and 11th - would stay in place to guard the portion of Galicia they had conquered; they should retreat to the San only as a last resort, and then they were to guard the river crossings under all circumstances.

These orders had just arrived at HQ of Southwest Front when Ivanov raised counter-proposals that fully contradicted the opinions he had expressed at Siedlec. Now he spoke out against the proposed retreat because it would demoralize both the Army and the nation. Ivanov told the Grand Duke that the road to Berlin led through Austria-Hungary, and therefore the first task was to destroy the armies of the Danube Monarchy. As long as this was possible, the present positions in Poland should be retained. To support his contentions, Ivanov asserted that three Aus-Hung. Corps (II, XIV and XVII) had fallen back through Cracow to the south in a disorganized state. Reports from spies indicated that the enemy intended to evacuate the fortress. The commander of 3rd Army, General Dimitriev, believed that a powerful attack on Cracow would surely succeed.

463 13 LW ID was actually the only unit of II Corps in the immediate vicinity of Cracow; the bulk of the Corps was on the north wing of Dankl's Army.

464 The reports of the Russian spies may have been derived from certain information which 4th Army HQ had disseminated as a
In his message to Baranowicze, Ivanov stated further that because of the local successes already won by 4th Army he was having Gen. Evert assemble reserves at Noworadomsk to assault the enemy units advancing from Wielun. 3rd Army would pin down its opponents south of the Vistula, while the west wing of 8th Army advanced toward Neusandez. However these plans would be impossible if the Stavka carried out its planned retreat on the central Vistula.

Ruszky, who was greatly astonished by his colleague's change of position, still wished to pull back 1st, 2nd and 5th Armies, if only to obtain reserves by shortening the front. However, after his initial acceptance of Stavka's ideas he also changed his mind soon afterwards. He declared that there were insufficient forces available at present to conquer East Prussia, and therefore he wished to forego the attack toward the Masurian Lakes.

Thus all the plans of the General Quartermaster had come to naught. In the embarrassing situation which Ivanov had created, the Stavka just let its two armies north of the Vistula stay in place. If, as was feared, the rest of Northwest Front south of the river had to fall back, a strong force would have to be assembled to protect their right wing.

The Allies

Three days after the conference of Russian generals at Siedlec, the commanders of the Central Powers assembled at Breslau. Archduke Frederick attended with the successor (Archduke Charles), and GdI Conrad brought Col. Metzger and Lt Col. Kundmann. Emperor Wilhelm presided, and was accompanied by Falkenhayn, Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Although Conrad expected ongoing discussions in the Emperor's railroad salon car, Falkenhayn announced a decision that had already been taken. The goal of the next operations on the Eastern front would be to push the Russians over the Vistula and the San. The principal role would be played by 9th German Army, for which several infantry and cavalry divisions were arriving as reinforcements. Falkenhayn stated that the task of the Aus-

deception measure to conceal the fact that units were moving through Cracow for a new offensive south of the Vistula.

Hung. Army would be to pin down the enemy and prevent them from transferring forces to the north.

For Conrad these disclosures were a disappointment. As he later wrote, "The great question of whether the main priority of operations would be moved [to the East] was for the DOHL already settled." The addition of just nine divisions would be insufficient to finally overthrow Russia. He did not again raise this basic question at the conference; he only stated that operations were also being undertaken south of the Vistula to gain ground in that sector. To drive the Russians over the Vistula, the German eastern forces should press them toward the southeast. If this was successful, then the k.u.k. armies would also be able to defeat the Russians decisively in Galicia and to throw them over the San. "In general", he declared, "I am of the opinion that if a decisive success against Russia is won by the commitment of significant forces, it will directly influence the overall military situation and lead to a decision in the West."

Thereafter the two Chiefs of Staff met privately together; Falkenhayn once again stated that there was no question of further units becoming available for the East.466

After returning to Teschen, Conrad turned his full attention to directing the operations which were supposed to envelop the Russian forces advancing south of the Vistula.

For the moment the situation seemed favorable. Mackensen and the north wing of Woysrch's Armeegruppe were successfully advancing toward the central Vistula, and the k.u.k. 4th Army was preparing to attack in Galicia. The 3rd Army, which was supposed to assist its neighbor on the left by pinning down the enemy forces in its own sector, had suffered a setback at Bartfeld; however, the Russians were retreating in front of the Army's right wing. Moreover, considerable parts of Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe were still holding their ground north of the Carpathian crest.

Unfortunately the continuous fighting and heavy casualties had reduced the strength of the main force opposing the Russians - 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies - to 300,000 riflemen. In addition

466 At the Breslau conference there was also a discussion regarding the occupation of the northeastern corner of Serbia. This matter is discussed below in the section on the autumn campaign in the Balkans.
to losses directly caused by the war, cholera and typhus were reducing the ranks. The arrival of replacement troops was not sufficient to make up losses. Moreover, intensified nationalist propaganda was affecting the performance of several units and causing depressing incidents. Thus in the recent actions some of the Czech personnel of IX Corps had gone over to the enemy; the AOK heard that the Sokol organizations had intervened to ensure that Slavic prisoners of war would receive better treatment in Russia than the others.

Politicians and their special interests also were making difficulties for the military leadership at this point. Hungary's Minister President, Count Tisza, had just returned with favorable impressions from a visit to the German supreme headquarters. On 2 December he expressed to the AOK his anxiety that the appearance of the Russians in Upper Hungary could have dire military consequences and might cause the Romanians to invade Transylvania. Therefore he demanded more troops for the defense of his own homeland. However, the AOK replied that - although everything possible would be done to strengthen Boroevic's Army - according to the Breslau conference the fighting in Poland would be decisive for the fate of both states of the Monarchy; therefore it would be an unforgivable error to further weaken the units in that sector.

Thus as the Christmas month of the eventful year 1914 began, the Aus-Hung. army in the northeast would once again attempt to strike a blow with its sword, already notched from a hundred days of difficult fighting. This was an urgent task. Already the Grand Duke-Generalissimo had promised the Czechs that they would be "liberated from the yoke of the Habsburgs and Germans"; his manifesto was secretly passed from hand to hand in Bohemia and Moravia. The Tsar in his headquarters was already planning the partition of the Danube Monarchy, much to the discomfort of the French ambassador. Thus the goal of the Aus-Hung. high command was nothing less than to bar the Cossack squadrons from advancing to Breslau, to Prague and to Vienna; for this purpose, with great determination, they assembled their depleted formations in the mountains of west Galicia.

In this same period decisive events were taking place in the southeast, on the Serbian front. The narrative will now turn in this direction.

V. The Campaign against Serbia and Montenegro in Fall 1914

A. The Battle of the Drina (6 September–4 October)

1. Both sides plan to attack

(see volume 1 leaflets 2 and 21)

Immediately after the failure of the August offensive, FZM Potiorek decided to overcome this misfortune. His first plan was to make 6th Army rather than the 5th his main striking force; he would deploy it north of the Sava along with IV Corps and 29 ID for a flank attack against the Serbs on the lower Drina. However, this idea was nullified when IV Corps was summoned to the Russian front. Thus the hope of a quick substantial success also disappeared; it seemed possible that the enemy could invade southeast Bosnia after it was substantially denuded of troops by the departure of 6th Army for the lower Drina. The defense of southeast Bosnia, however, was secondary to Potiorek's primary responsibility of preventing the Serbs from invading Hungary. The regrouping of forces which was ordered on 25 August (and intended to be complete on 1 September) addressed both defensive responsibilities. The bulk of 5th Army plus XV Corps would deploy on the lowest stretch of the Drina (from its mouth to Zvornik); XVI Corps would deploy in echelon farther right around Vlasenica, with 109 Lst Inf Bde forward at Srebrenica. On the north flank, 104 Lst Inf Bde and 29 ID were north of the Sava between the mouth of the Drina and Sabac, ready to launch an enveloping attack.

FZM Potiorek's task would be much simpler if Bulgaria could be induced to take part in the autumn campaign despite the recent Austrian misfortune on the Jadar. On 28 August he asked the AOK and also the Imperial Military Chancellery regarding prospects for Bulgarian intervention. To the AOK, which had resisted giving the BOK its independence, this was a timely opportunity to express their opinion. They replied that for the present Bulgaria couldn't be counted on; however, the Serbian ambassador at Athens had announced that his country would soon invade the Monarchy. Therefore FZM Potiorek should "do nothing that could lead to a new setback, and not to undertake anything without prior consultation with the AOK." Potiorek, in turn, notified
the Military Chancellery of this order, which restricted his independent command. When the Chancellery failed to intervene, on 1 September Potiorek finally asked the AOK to permit an offensive. He wanted on either the 3rd or 4th to attack the Serbian main body, which apparently was preparing to thrust over either the lower Drina or the Sava.

This request placed the AOK on the horns of a dilemma. The Foreign Minister was constantly asking that the recent setback be quickly redeemed to win over the wavering Turks and, above all, the Bulgarians. On the other hand, another defeat could destroy any hope of winning allies in southeast Europe. Finally FZM Potiorek was instructed to take advantage of a favorable moment to attack while the enemy was crossing one of the rivers. He would not be able to count on any reinforcements, but didn't need to fear that any further forces would be taken away. Above all the Feldzeugmeister was to avoid "any setbacks."

The following was the organization of the opposing forces at the beginning of September.468

UNDER THE k.u.k. BOK...
. Troops north of the Save and Danube (shown from west to east), under Lütgendorff -
  . 7 ID, k.u. Lst IR # 32, Globocnik's Group, Peterwardein garrison, 107 Lst Bde, Danube defenses (Landsturm Etappen bns), 5 Lst Eta Bde
  . Reinforced by 2 Lst Eta Bde
. 5th Army
  . VIII Cps (9, 21 ID), XIII Cps (36, 42 ID)
  . Independent N of the Sava - 29 ID, 104 Lst Bde
  . In rear - 8 Lst Eta Bde
. 6th Army
  . XV Cps (40, 48 ID; 13 Inf Bde), Group Gabriel (4 & 5 Mtn Bdes), XVI Cps (1, 18 ID)
  . Indep Bdes - Snjaric, 3 & 8 Mtn, 109 Lst, 4 & 9 Lst Eta
  . Indep Regts - k.u. Lst IR # 19, 30
  . Garrison of Cattaro forts - 47 ID

ENEMY FORCES
. 1st Army - Divs Dunav I, Dunav II, Sumadija I; Cavalry Div; Obrenovac Detachment; Belgrade Defense Group

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468 This information is not presented in the original text. The k.u.k. dispositions are from the Hungarian official history, and the enemy dispositions from Beilage 21 of the original ("Disposition on 5 September").
Potiorek's plans

The late arrival of fresh troops for 21 LW ID ultimately caused the offensive to be postponed. To make a more powerful attack on the enemy's north flank, this division was moved north of the Sava on 2 September. Because of the warning of the AOK and his own inclination, FZM Potiorek decided to have everything ready to fall upon the enemy at a decisive point with the greatest possible strength. FML Bogat had left just the 8 Mtn Bde on the upper Drina and marched toward Vlasenica with the bulk of 1st ID (i.e., 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes). GM Snjaric had also been directed to Vlasenica with three battalions and one mountain battery apiece drawn from 3 and 14 Mtn Bdes. Without counting these reserves—which would be available between 7 and 11 September—the 5th and 6th Armies and FML Lütgendorf's Group had 174 battalions, of which 138 were first-line units. The 5th Army was fully recovered from its defeat and had received equipment which prepared it better to fight in the difficult Balkan terrain. And so on 3 September the BOK sent an urgent request to GdI Conrad to obtain permission from Archduke Friedrich for the offensive to begin. The alternative, they said, was to send further units to the front in the northeast. This latter idea, which was hardly intended as a serious suggestion, would have unleashed a storm of protest from the Foreign Minister and the Minister President of Hungary; it served its intention of wringing permission from the AOK. An offensive "with forces concentrated in one place" was permitted. Other than this admonition, the AOK played no further part in the planning.

Orders were issued on 5 September for the crossing of the Drina to begin on the 7th. While 5th Army attacked frontally, the Serbs were also to be enveloped on both flanks—in the south by 48 ID, which would break through the strong fortifications at Leznica, and in the north by 29 ID at Jarak and by a Division under GM Erwin Zeidler at Sabac. The latter would contain troops drawn from FML Lütgendorf's Group and have strong artillery. XVI Corps on the southern wing had the task of threatening the Serbian defensive system from the south by a thrust onto the heights southeast of Krupanj. 1st ID would join this operation; the south flank of XVI Corps would be protected.
by 109 Lst Inf Bde against the enemy units identified at Ljubovija and Rogacica. However, strong rain storms delayed the preparations to cross the river, so that the beginning of the offensive was postponed until the 9th.

Putnik's plans

The Serbian high command counted on the transport of enemy units from Syrmia to the Russian front, and was not concerned about Uzice. The Montenegrins' Sanjak Group had reorganized itself and would soon consist of more than 20,000 combatants; this would make it possible to finally invade southeast Bosnia. It was known that the main body of FZM Potiorek's forces was concentrated on the Drina below Zvornik. The Serbs didn't realize that XVI Corps was staying behind at Vlasenica. As soon as it was certain that the last units of the enemy 2nd Army had left the theater, it would be possible for the Serbs to mount an incursion into the weakly defended provinces of Syrmia and the Banat, while maintaining a strong defensive force on the lower Drina.

These considerations led to the orders issued on 28 August for the regrouping of the Armies. 3rd Army (Divs Drina I, Drina II and Morava II) would guard the Drina from Zvornik to Ljesnica, 2nd Army (Divs Morava I, Timok I and II plus the Combined Div) would guard the river farther north to its confluence with the Sava. Security along the upper Drina from Zvornik to Ljubovija was entrusted to five battalions of the II and III Bans; similarly, the Sava was guarded by three battalions of the II and III Bans between Raca and Debrc. Farther east, the Sava-Danube line was guarded by the Obrenovac Detachment, the Belgrade Defense Group, and the Branicevo Detachment. The SOK at Valjevo had the Krusevac Reserve Regt as a HQ guard. The 1st Army was available for the offensive to the north - it had Sumadija Div I and the Cav Div at Sabac, Dunav Div I south of Belgrade and Dunav II at Pozarevac.

On 31 August there arrived at Serbian HQ an urgent request from Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch for an offensive in the near future. It was impossible to avoid this demand, even though some troops were still being rearmed with Russian rifles and there was insufficient equipment for the river crossings. After a conference between the Army commanders and Voivode Putnik, Gen. Bojovic on 3 September ordered Divs Dunav I and Sumadija I, plus the Cav Div, to assemble around the bend in the Sava at Debrc for the invasion of Syrmia. The orders from the SOK, in response to the Russian demand for help, were called the
"Preparation for the later offensive against the main enemy force on the Drina." They instructed 1st Army to cross the Sava on the 6th, to establish a bridgehead at Kupinovo, to drive the enemy away from the Sava as far as its mouth, and to thrust toward Ruma-Mitrovica. At midnight (6-7 September) 2nd Army would send Timok Div I over the Sava at Mitrovica to set up another bridgehead.

On 3 September the commander of the Uzice Armeegruppe, Gen. Bozanovic, advanced the Lim Detachment (18 battalions and 9 guns) along both banks of the lower Lim River. At the same time, the Serdar Vukotic moved the Montenegrin Sanjak Group toward Gorazde-Foca. Sumadija Div II (16 battalions and 6 batteries) would capture the commanding heights north and southeast of Visegrad, while the Uzice Bde (9 battalions and 2 batteries) would continue to stand guard on both sides of Rogatica.

The remaining Montenegrin units were deployed as follows: 9,000 men on the border of Herzegovina, 6,500 men opposite Cattaro, and 7,500 more facing Albania. This information was obtained with great difficulty by Serbian Gen. Jankovic, who had been named Chief of Staff to the Montenegrin Army.

2. The Serbs cross the Sava, 6-7 September

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 47)

On 6 September, after midnight, the Serbs opened a cannonade by Mitrovica and on the lowest stretches of the Drina in an attempt to divert attention from the area along the Sava between Mitrovica and Jarak, where the Timok Div I would cross. However, neither the Division nor the bridging equipment was ready on time. At 7:00 AM the crossing finally started, using eight pontoons; by noon 5 3/4 battalions and 3 guns had been brought over the river. At this point the boats were needed to help build a bridge, so the troops on the north bank couldn't be further reinforced until the floats were in place. In two days of hard fighting the k.u.k. 29 ID (now commanded by FML Alfred Krauss) drove the Serbs back over the Sava; Timok Div I had heavy losses of men and equipment.

469 Serbian official history, Vol. II, p. 53
This glorious episode, which was celebrated in popular lore as "The destruction of the Timok Division at Sasinci," was due to the initiative of several lower-ranking officers who quickly threw their gallant German and Czech troops against the enemy. The decisive blow was a thrust along the Sava at night that reached the Serbian bridges and sealed the fate of the units on the north bank. Many Serbs fell in action or in the waters of the Sava; another 62 officers and 4880 men were taken prisoner.\(^{471}\)

The Serbian 1st Army, which made a better-organized crossing of the Sava near Kupinovo, was more fortunate. Despite a gallant defense, the Hungarian Lst IR # 32 was unable to hold off detachments which attacked on both sides of a wide bend in the river. The enemy's bridge was completed at 3:30 AM on 6 September; Divisions Dunav I and Sumadija I set up a line on both sides of Obrez to cover the bridgehead, while a combined force of divisional cavalry occupied Kupinovo. Patrols from the Serbian Cav Div reached the area northwest of Obrez. Here they collided with k. u. Lst IR # 12, which was coming up from Klenak to cover the deployment of the first elements of GM Zeidler's combined 7 ID (7 battalions, 2 squadrons and 4 batteries). 14 Inf Bde, stationed with some heavy artillery at Semlin, was also available to oppose the Serbs. FML Lüttgendorf ordered both groups to contain the enemy for as long as possible.

The Serbian 1st Army was content for the time being with its gains on the 6th. The defeat of Timok Div I revealed that the k.u.k. forces in Syrmia were unexpectedly strong. Therefore it seemed advisable to await the arrival of Dunav Div II, which left Pozarevac on the 6th, and to consolidate the bridgehead. Meanwhile the Obrenovac Detachment crossed the Sava and dug in at Boljevci. The only actions on the 7th were a skirmish between the Cav Div and the western group of 7 ID, and an action by the Serbs' combined divisional cavalry against parts of 14 Inf Bde at Surcin; the latter ended when the Serbs had to retreat to Boljevci. 29 ID, which had finished mopping up isolated enemy groups on the bank of the Sava in the morning,

\(^{471}\) GM Schön, "Die Verteidigung von Syrmien im September 1914" (a manuscript); "Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg - Der 92er" (February edition, 1924); "- Der 42er" (May edition, 1924). Also see Krauss, "Ursachen", p. 146. The following received the Knight's Cross of the Maria-Theresia Order for Sasinci: GM Schön (commander of 57 Inf Bde), Col. Lutschounig (commander of IR # 74), and 1st Lt. Ritter von Cavallar of IR # 92.
returned from Mitrovica to Jarak and Sasinci; 104 Lst Inf Bde, which had been moving to Sasinci when it learned that the action there had already been won, returned to Bosut. Apparently the Serbian 1st Army HQ was not aware of these troop movements.

After the defeat at Sasinci the 2nd Serbian Army HQ was afraid for its north flank. It entrusted the badly weakened Timok Div I and much of Timok Div II with the defense of the Sava between Ravnje and Jarak; only one and a half regiments of the latter Div were kept in reserve. The Serbs didn't know that 21 LW ID had transferred to the area between the Sava and Bosut.

3. 6th Army gains ground east of the Drina, 8–13 September

(see volume 1 leaflet 21 and sketches 46 and 47)

8 September

Although 5th Army had planned to cross the Drina on 7 September, FZM Potiorek postponed the operation because the technical and artillery preparations were still incomplete. Around midnight of 7–8 September, 42 Hon ID of XIII Corps finally opened artillery fire as a diversion against the strong Serbian fortifications directly across the Drina. At dawn the 36 ID attempted to cross at Klenje, but the first echelon was soon defeated with heavy casualties. The VIII Corps was somewhat more fortunate. By noon the 9 ID had sent nine battalions across the northernmost stretch of the Drina, and 21 LW ID had sent three regiments across the Sava at the bend in that river just below the mouth of the Drina (the area called "the Parasnica"). Their opponent, Morava Div I, was taken completely by surprise when the Landwehr crossed over, and had only weak forces in the Parasnica sector. However, the swampy terrain gave the defenders many places where they could offer stubborn resistance. Thus only a little ground was gained in tiresome and costly combat; even the location chosen for building a bridge was still within the effective range of the Serbian artillery. In the afternoon the reserves from 2nd Serbian Army and Timok Div I began to arrive, and the commander of the k.k. 41 LW Bde pulled his unit back. Therefore VIII Corps HQ ordered both divisions (9 ID and 21 LW ID) to retreat back to the western banks. Meanwhile 104 Lst Inf Bde had made three unsuccessful attempts to cross the Sava at Bosut to help the Bohemian Landwehr.
The 6th Army had considerably greater success, and lost just 700 men while 5th Army was losing 4400. Here the north wing of XV Corps (79 Hon Inf and 40 Hon March Bdes) demonstrated opposite the strong positions at Loznica, while 80 Hon Inf Bde, 10 and 12 Mtn Bdes, and 13 Inf Bde advanced between Kozluk and Zvornik; 11 Mtn Bde took the heights east of the Drina directly next to Zvornik.

XVI Corps had deployed on the previous evening, covered by the heights west of the Drina. Initially it was opposed by just one Serbian battalion opposite the mouth of the Drinjaca. Farther back, two battalions of the Kragujevac Reserve Regt held a fortified position on the Cavcici Height. Morava Div II and the rest of the Kragujevac Regt were stationed at Krupanj. Three battalions and two batteries guarded the south flank of 3rd Serbian Army on Crni vrh # 890 and the heights of Radakovic and Bobije.

At dawn on 8 September the XVI Corps began to cross the Drina on a broad front on both sides of the mouth of the Drinjaca. 1 and 4 Mtn Bdes reached the Cavcici, where however the Serbs received reinforcements from hour to hour; the defenders were also supported by flanking fire from the north, while the mountain batteries of the two Aus-Hung. brigades had not yet come up. Nonetheless, the infantry worked their way onto the Cavcici. When darkness silenced the enemy artillery, the attackers stormed the entrenchments. However, their units became intermingled during the pursuit into the woods behind the position, so they were pulled back to the conquered heights to return order to the formations.

Meanwhile, on the eastern wing the 2 Mtn Bde turned toward Ljubovija, where 109 Lst Inf Bde overran a Serbian battalion of the III Ban, taking two guns and three machine guns.

When the SOK learned of the advance of the enemy XVI Corps, they hastened to send units to guard their southern wing. The Krusevac Reserve Regt came up from Valjevo to Krupanj, and the Dunav Div II of 1st Army was also ordered to move toward Krupanj. The Uzice Armeegruppe sent 9 battalions and 1 battery to join the main body; the remainder of the group was fortifying their positions to defend the routes to Uzice.\footnote{472 Serbian official history, Vol. II, p. 37} On the evening of the 9th the Armeegruppe opened a cannonade at Visegrad to prepare for an offensive, but then was ordered to cancel all attacks.
In Syrmia the Serbs stayed in place, awaiting the arrival of Dunav Div II (which reached Skela in the evening - but as noted above was then ordered to join 3rd Army). FML Krauss waited in vain for the enemy to advance toward Ruma so that he could fall on their flank. Instead, in the afternoon he began to advance himself; driving back outposts of the Serbian Cav Div, he reached the line Hrtkovci-Budjanovci.

Thus the start of FZM Potiorek's offensive had hindered the enemy's thrust into southeast Bosnia as well as their attack in Syrmia.

9 September

Since 5th Army needed a brief rest period, only 6th Army was engaged on 9 September. The Army could only attack slowly through the difficult mountain terrain of medium height, which gave excellent protection to the defenders while impeding movement. The three mountain brigades on the north wing of XVI Corps (5, 4 and 1) were unable to break the enemy resistance on the Cavcici, even after 9 Mtn Bde came up from reserve. However, FML Trollmann with 6 and 13 Mtn Bdes won some ground toward the Jagodnja in heavy fighting on the ridges on both sides of Lipniko, while 2 Mtn Bde stormed Sv. Petar. Therefore the commander of Morava Div II pulled back his force in this area - which had grown to 8 battalions and 4 batteries under Col. Misic of the Kragujevac Regt - to the principal crest in the Jagodnja-Sanac sector.

The inactivity of the enemy in Syrmia had caused the Austrians to believe that the crossing of the Drina by their main body had already forced the Serbs to completely abandon their offensive. FML Krauss therefore intended to fulfill his original instructions by leading 29 ID over the Sava at Jarak, while leaving the final expulsion of the enemy from Syrmia to FML Lütgendorf. Shortly after midnight, after hearing a report about a new Serbian incursion at Mitrovica, he was all the more willing to begin his march back to Jarak and Sasinci. There, however, he learned that the report from Mitrovica was incorrect. At the same time, he learned (correctly) that a Serb force had invaded the Banat and that GM Zeidler's now united 7 ID was engaged in serious actions at Prograr, where it had come up against the fortified position of Dunav Div I. Therefore FML Krauss immediately returned to the Roman Canal, where he drove away detachments of the Serbian Cav Div from the approaches with several cannon salvoes. Meanwhile the right wing of the Cav Div
was menacing the western flank of 7 ID, whose front was being pushed back through Becmen and Dec by Dunav Div I. Five companies from the Belgrade Defense Group crossed the Sava and dug in at Jakovo, on Zeidler's eastern (left) flank. Menaced by a double envelopment, 7 ID retreated in the evening to Alt-Pazua. The heavy guns were evacuated from Semlin under protection of the Danube Flotilla.

Thus it was clear that the Drina offensive as yet had not curtailed the Serbian plans of conquest north of the Sava and Danube. Therefore FML Krauss asked 5th Army to send him 104 Lst Inf Bde; he also asked FZM Potiorek to postpone the planned crossing of the Sava at Jarak until 29 and 7 ID could act together to fully rid Syrmia of the enemy. Thereupon the BOK gave FML Krauss "a completely free hand" and ordered 5th Army not to make another attempt to cross the Drina until the units in Syrmia became available to cross the Sava, and until 6th Army had gained ground toward the heights at Loznica.

10 September

However, the XV Corps of 6th Army gained only a little ground in very changeable fighting on 10 September. 40 Hon ID assembled as the Corps' reserve around Colopek, west of the Drina. Only the 40 Hon March Bde remained on the river opposite Loznica, where it pretended to be readying an attack. XVI Corps was making its way toward the high ridges. FML Trollmann realized that he could get at the enemy only by moving around them in the area east of the Ljubovija-Krupanj road. However, because of overwhelming artillery fire the 2 Mtn Bde couldn't move forward over the Zdrela Heights. Therefore FZM Wurm sent 7 Mtn Bde to reinforce Trollmann's group; GM Snjaric's combined brigade took the place of the 7th in XVI Corps reserve. FZM Potiorek, who recognized the importance of keeping the southern wing in motion, also decided to send reinforcements. Since the enemy was inactive along the upper Drina, he ordered the reserves of 8 Mtn Bde (3 battalions and 1 mountain battery) to the fighting.

After two days of action on the south end of the Sokolska pl. (called the Rozanj Heights), the 109 Lst Inf Bde drove back the enemy entrenched on Dugo Hill; this made it more likely that the Jagodnja could be outflanked. Therefore toward evening FML Trollmann sent 1 Mtn Bde to follow 2 Mtn Bde. He took personal command of this flanking group, while FML Bogat was left in charge of the frontal attack.

11 September
FML Bogat sent 7, 13, 9 and 6 Mtn Bdes forward to attack toward the Jagodnja at daybreak on 11 September. This operation was extraordinarily difficult. FML Trollmann's Group also moved forward only very slowly toward the Zdrela. Then, unexpectedly, the decision was won around noon on the left wing of XVI Corps. Supported by 11 Mtn Bde, GM Gabriel with 4 and 5 Mtn Bdes stormed the principal ridge in the area south of Crni vrh # 890 and captured five guns. Gen. Jurisic-Sturm, commander of 3rd Serbian Army, ordered his entire left wing to retreat to the Mramor Ridge, the Miokovac and the Kostajnik. Also the portions of Drina Div I which had been resisting so stubbornly on the slope of the Gucevo Ridge pulled back to the crest.

This setback to the Serbian southern wing coincided with the very promising start of the general offensive of 1st Serbian Army in Syrmia. The Dunav Div I had already advanced without fighting on 10 September to the line Semlin-Dec; farther left the advance guard of the combined divisional cavalry reached Vojka after an action. The Serbian Crown Prince made a ceremonial entrance into Semlin. The SOK hoped that 1st Army could advance to the line Indjija-Ruma. The activity of FML Krauss - whose 29 ID had hurried to Popinci-Golubinci to fall upon the flank of the units pursuing 7 ID - remained concealed from the Serbian Cav Div. The Serbs believed they could continue their successes on 11 September. With the cavalry in advance, the Dunav Div I moved on a broad front toward Indjija, and Sumadija Div I toward Ruma. The Dunav Div reached the line Alt-Banovce - Alt-Pazua - Golubinci in front of 7 ID and 58 Inf Bde without triggering a serious action. Meanwhile 57 Inf Bde at Popinci was approached from the south and southwest by the right wing of the Sumadija Div and from the southeast by the Cav Div. To avoid encirclement, the Bohemian Bde was obliged to evacuate the corn fields at the onset of darkness; fending off the Serbian advance guards, they fell back north toward the railroad. Thus the Sumadija Div could spend the night on the line Popinci-Jarak. FML Krauss decided to remain on the defensive for the present; this would allow time for the rehabilitation of 7 ID, the approach of 104 Lst Inf Bde, and the arrival of reinforcements which 5th Army was sending by rail (LW IR # 28 and two batteries).

At this point the Serbian high command lost interest in further adventures in Syrmia because of their setback on the southern wing of the Drina Battle. Voivode Putnik correctly recognized that the campaign would be decided in the area around Krupanj.
rather than north of the Sava. After a strenuous march, the Dunavr Div II had arrived at Pecka as reinforcements; however, it had just two regiments and wasn't very mobile because its artillery was pulled by oxen. The Ljubovija Detachment, which had been reinforced to four battalions, was only barely holding onto Rozanj and the Proslop Ridge against 109 Lst Inf Bde; thus the approaches to Pecka, and in turn to the rear of the southern wing, were endangered. Further reinforcements were needed in this area. 2nd Army had brought the Combined Div and Timok Div II into reserve; in a night march the former moved through Tekeris to Zavlaka while the latter reached the heights east of Ljesnica. They would be committed if — as expected — the enemy sent his center over the Drina against the north wing of 3rd Army, weakened by its support of Morava Div II. Also, 1st Army was to send a division that night to Valjevo; its other infantry plus the Cav Div would hold the bridgehead in Syrmia.

FZM Potiorek decided to give XVI Corps a well-earned day of rest on the 12th, while XV Corps attacked to complete the conquest of Gucevo Ridge. The reserve elements of 8 Mtn Bde, which were still approaching, were placed at the disposal of XV Corps.

However, the removal of the 8 Mtn Bde's battalions from the upper Drina was already having an unfortunate effect — the Montenegrins were suddenly filled with enthusiasm for an offensive. Since 9 September they had sought to pin down 3 Mtn Bde by incursions into the Gacko polje; this would prevent the Austrians from opposing the planned advance of the Sanjak Group. The advance began on 11 September when the troops from the Sanjak crossed the Drina at Foca; thereafter some of them moved toward Kalinovik, others down the river toward Gorazde.

12 September

The left wing of XV Corps moved forward only slowly on 12 September, amid heavy fighting. The right wing had more success. Movement in this rugged terrain was made even more difficult by gusts of rain, but the Biljeg was stormed that evening. Thus the entire main ridge of the Boranja pl. was now in the hands of the attackers. To make the conquest of the Gucevo crest easier, FZM Potiorek ordered 5th Army HQ to initiate another river crossing on the 13th by sending at least one division of XIII Corps over the Drina.

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On the morning of the 13th, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm ordered Dunav Div II to reinforce the defenders of the most endangered area, along the Krupanj-Zavlaka road on the Mramor Heights. Meanwhile the SOK was developing a plan to break through the flank and rear of the enemy in the Pecka area; this would simultaneously protect the roads to Valjevo and decisively influence the entire battle. 1st Army was ordered to pull Dunav Div I over the Sava that night and send it on the shortest route to Pecka; the Combined Div, which would be fully assembled at Tekeris by midnight, would moved in the same direction. The 3rd Army would leave only the minimum necessary force in the strongly built positions at Loznica, and throw all other units into the fight on its southern wing. However, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm didn't share the grandiose expectations of his commander; he ordered the leading regiment of the Combined Div to stay close behind the front at Krupanj on the heights northeast of the town.

In Syrmia, FML Krauss waited in vain throughout the morning for the Serbs to attack. Meanwhile an order arrived from the BOK which entrusted him with the overall command of all operations in Syrmia and the Banat. When 58 Inf Bde noticed that some enemy units were pulling to the rear, Krauss ordered both his divisions to advance. The movement began in the afternoon. 7 ID was opposed mainly by the Cavalry Div - which had taken the place of Dunav Div I - and won an easy success. 29 ID advanced from Golubinci in an attempt to envelop the east wing of Sumadija Div I (reinforced by a cavalry regiment) from both sides. Despite their orders, the Serbs were thus drawn into a serious action; the task of breaking contact with their opponents was made more difficult by the approach of 104 Lst Inf Bde against their west flank. However, they gathered their reserves together and launched a powerful flank attack from the southeast toward Popinci; at 5:00 PM it struck IR # 92, which was rushing ahead bravely but rashly and was deployed in thick formations. The Regiment from Komotau suddenly found itself in the middle of a fearful storm of fire and lost 32 officers and 1200 men in its worst setback of the entire war. The Brigade commander ordered a retreat back to the rail line. At nightfall the Serbs also fell back, to their bridgehead on the Sava.

On this day the weak Serbian units which had crossed into the Banat were drive back over the Danube by 107 Lst Inf Bde.

474 "Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg - Der 42er, Der 92er" (May issue, 1924)
13 September

42 Hon ID of XIII Corps began to cross the Drina rather early on 13 Sept at Batar, the same location where 36 ID had crossed in August; only weak units of Drina Div II were initially on the scene to oppose the operation. Despite heavy Serbian artillery fire, eight battalions reached the east bank by evening; at this point the Serbian defenders had only five battalions and four batteries, even though they had been reinforced by parts of Timok Div II. Meanwhile Gen. Jurisic-Sturm had learned of this latest Drina crossing, and in response had diverted the bulk of the Combined Div — which was already marching from Zavlaka toward Pecka — back to the crossroads east of Loznica.

Under XV Corps, FML Eisler had been ordered to take the heights at Grn. Borina with 11, 12 and half of 10 Mtn Bdes, and thus roll up the position on the Gucevo crest from the southeast flank. FML Braun would take Kuliste with the other half of 10 Mtn Bde, 13 Inf Bde and 79 Hon Inf Bde, and take Crni vrh # 769 with 80 Hon Inf Bde. Only the attack on Kuliste was fully successful. FML Eisler had to divert 11 Mtn Bde against the higher position of the Kostajnik which commanded the attackers' left flank; the rest of his group was unable to overcome the well-entrenched defenders of the Borina Heights, who launched frequent counterattacks.

After a rest day that was necessary because of bad weather, FZM Wurm sent the bulk of XVI Corps forward under FML Bogat — parts attacked the east slope of the Boranja pl., parts advanced from Sanac against Krupanj. FML Trollmann with 18 ID was instructed to guard the flank of the attacking group in the direction of Valjevo. However, he was not content with the occupation of the Sokolska pl.; he also sent 1 Mtn Bde against Mramor and 2 Mtn Bde against the Rozanj Heights. 109 Lst Inf Bde guarded the south flank on the Dugo Heights, while its artillery supported the attack of 2 Mtn Bde. 13 Mtn Bde was ordered to reinforce the offensive on the Sokolska pl.

While advancing through Krupanj, FML Bogat saw large enemy columns moving from Zavlaka, apparently in his direction; these were the bulk of the Combined Div which, as noted above, were soon diverted back toward Loznica. However, their appearance caused Bogat to immediately pull 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes back to a position south of Krupanj. A cold rain began toward evening, and at night it turned into snowfall on the higher elevations.

The SOK recognized that the 2nd Army would soon have to endure
new attacks on the lowest reaches of the Drina. Therefore 1st Army was ordered to immediately send Sumadija Div I and the Cav Div to Sabac; Army HQ itself was to move to Valjevo. 2nd Army would move Timok Div II closer to Ljesnica, where it could also support 3rd Army if necessary.

Thus FZM Potiorek's energetic offensive led to the liberation of Syrmia. FML Krauss had given his troops a rest day on the 13th; when they advanced toward the Sava on the 14th they found that the enemy had already disappeared.

On the other flank, the successes of the Montenegrin Sanjak Group had encouraged the Serbian Uzice Armeegruppe to move its troops closer to the upper Drina on the 13th, and to send advance guards to the western bank at Bajinabasta.

However, FZM Potiorek refused to be diverted by the threatening danger in southeast Bosnia, where besides half of 8 Mtn Bde only the 9 Lst Eta Bde was on hand at Vlasenica. He held fast to his decision to strike the Serbian main forces by a double envelopment, hopefully before the Serbian troops who had left Syrmia could intervene. Reports that the Serbian southern wing had already received substantial reinforcements indicated that the offensive of 6th Army might soon have to be curtailed. Therefore Potiorek was counting all the more on the attack by 5th Army, which had been ordered to come energetically to grips with the enemy, and on the appearance of FML Krauss' Group at the decisive point.

4. The Serbs attack on the south wing, 14-16 September

General Frank began his river crossing on 14 September with both XIII and VIII Corps. The attackers on the Drina had no luck. The Serbs had realized in advance that 36 ID was crossing at Janja, and annihilated the first echelon. On the other hand, 21 LW ID managed to ship eight battalions over the Sava by noon, and GM Alois Podhajsky led them about 3 kilometers inland. Thus bridge construction could proceed unhindered. An attack by three Serbian battalions was repulsed by the Landwehr before the enemy could penetrate their lines.

The remainder of the infantry of 42 Hon ID crossed to the east bank of the Drina by evening, but their prospects were by no means rosy. The strong Serbian fortifications at Sor barred any further advance, while enemy artillery pounded the positions of
the Domobranen and prevented them from building a bridge. The higher HQ were understandably concerned to relieve 42 Hon ID, which apparently had encountered a dead end. A step in this direction was the capture of Crni vrh # 769 by 80 Hon Inf Bde. The Hon Bde and 13 Inf Bde on Kuliste now were both placed under GM Stracker, commander of the 13th, and were supposed to advance to the heights south of Loznica.

Meanwhile the Serbian 3rd Army HQ had been forced to cancel the Combined Div's attack against 42 Hon ID, and instead sent the unit to support the hard-pressed defenders of the Gucevo Ridge. Two regiments were ordered to recapture Kuliste. As the Combined Div advanced, however, it received an order to divert one of the regiments to the heights at Grn. Borina, where the defenders were being attacked from three sides by FML Eisler. At this point FML Braun with the 79 Hon Inf Bde began to attack north from Kuliste; the Honveds and the regiment from the Combined Div pummelled each other in an action at Carigrad, which enabled FML Eisler's Group to finally storm the stubbornly guarded Borina Heights toward evening. Thus the entire crest of the Gucevo was in the hands of XV Corps.

The attack of the other Serbian regiments at Kuliste was unsuccessful, but prevented GM Stracker's Group from thrusting toward Loznica. His offensive was to be resumed on the following day with stronger forces. FML Karasz, the artillery brigadier of 40 Hon ID, was ordered to bring 40 Hon March Bde over the Drina at Koviljaca and to also take over Stracker's Group plus the reserves of 8 Mtn Bde, which were approaching the sector.

The XVI Corps was less fortunate. Parts of 11 Mtn Bde, GM Snjaric's Bde and half of 9 Mtn Bde attacked the Kostajnik Heights in vain. FML Trollmann gave up the thrust against the Mramor so that the bulk of his units could be employed against the Rozanj. However, the defending Ljubovija Detachment had received considerable reinforcements. The Dunav Div II pinned down the portion of 1 Mtn Bde which had been left opposite Mramor with powerful fire, partly on the Austrians' flank, and sent two and a half battalions to help defend Rozanj. Moreover, toward evening one of the two regiments sent by the Uzice

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475 Major Andreas Szepessy von Negyes, a battalion commander of Hon IR # 30, distinguished himself by his initiative in the action at Carigrad. Later he fell in action (on 11 January 1916 at Rarancze), but was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.

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Armeegruppe reached the scene. This fresh force decided the action in favor of the Serbs, after the strategic hill had changed owners three times. Meanwhile the Dunav Div II pushed 1 Mtn Bde back behind the Kriva after a severe action.

Another encouraging sign for the planned Serbian counterattack was that the Uzice Armeegruppe was finally displaying more energy. Its Lim Detachment, assisted by Montenegrins who had reached the Gorazde area, sent a regiment over the Drina at Ustipraca. Downstream from Visegrad, several small detachments crossed over using tiny vessels designed for only two men. The most successful unit of the Armeegruppe was the Uzice Brigade; since it was closest to the south wing of the main body of 6th Army, its activity was also potentially the most effective. About one regiment of the Brigade, assisted by numerous Komitaji groups, pushed the advance patrols of 9 Lst Eta Bde back to Osmace. FZM Potiorek hoped to restore the situation with a planned counter-attack by the main body of 9 Lst Eta Bde.

The BOK was not yet aware of the seriousness of the threat on the south wing, and was of the opinion that a decision could be quickly won on the north wing, under 5th Army. In this sector GdI Frank energetically combined his forces to build on the success of 21 LW ID. 9 ID, strengthened by 71 Inf Bde, was ordered to cross the Drina at its mouth; they would cooperate with the Landwehr to attack Crnabara, the southern strong point of the Serbian position sealing off the Parasnica river bend. The situation of 42 Hon ID improved in the night when the Division's bridge was completed. Finally, on the evening of the 14th FML Krauss was directed to undertake his original assignment, the crossing of the Sava at Jarak. However, he felt it would be more advisable to cross the river early on the 17th at Kupinovo; this would spare his troops a tiresome march and also pose a more direct threat to Valjevo. FZM Potiorek had nothing against a crossing west of Kupinovo, but insisted that it should take place on the 16th; every hour that was gained would be of great importance.

15 September

5th Army spent all of 15 September in relieving the troops guarding the west bank of the Drina with 72 Inf Bde and concentrating the other units for the planned offensive. Meanwhile the infantry of 21 LW ID suffered through some difficult hours. They were fired upon by unseen enemy batteries and repeatedly attacked both day and night by Serbian infantry. The left wing of the Landwehr was temporarily pushed back, and
the casualties of 21 LW ID already totalled about 2000 men.

42 Hon ID was furiously assaulted by Drina Div II; however the Croats gave the Serbs such a warm reception that they suffered great casualties; considerable parts of the Drina Division fell back in wild flight through Sor. Exaggerated reports of the strength of the enemy in this sector alarmed the Serbian HQ. Meanwhile the north wing of 3rd Serbian Army came under pressure from the attack of 40 Hon March Bde, GM Stracker's Group, and 79 Hon Inf Bde.

The HQ of 3rd Serbian Army was preparing to pull Drina Div II back to the heights by Grn. Dobric, but the SOK sent 2 battalions and a battery from 2nd Army to reinforce the 3rd. Meanwhile a second regiment from the Uzice Armeegruppe arrived and was sent to the lower Jadar Valley, and Sumadija Div I was ordered to march to Tekeris rather than Sabac.

To support the offensive on the southern flank ordered by the SOK, the Serbs had begun to attack 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes south of Krupanj on the night of 14-15 September. During the day both brigades were forced to withdraw to stronger positions, where however they were soon threatened by a flank attack from Mramor. Around this time they were placed under FML Trollmann, who sent his last reserve (two battalions of the Dalmatian IR # 22) against this latest enemy threat; the Serbs themselves were taken in the flank and hurriedly pulled back.

1st Mtn Bde withdrew to the Sokolska pl., pursued only by fire from Dunav Div II. There was a serious action on the south wing, where the Ljubovija Detachment - now 10 battalions strong - launched a counterattack. 2 Mtn Bde and half of 13 Mtn Bde fought like lions on the Rozanj, and parts of 109 Lst Inf Bde did the same at Prosllop.

Because of the serious danger to the Loznica sector, the SOK decided that the Combined Div would have to stay there instead of reinforcing the offensive by the south wing. Therefore they advised 1st Army HQ (now in charge of the wing) not to wait any longer but rather to energetically attack with Dunav Divs I and II, which were ready for action east of the Rozanj. Thus FML Trollmann's 12 battalions (of which the units from 18 ID had already suffered heavy casualties) were outnumbered 3 to 1 - threatened by 36 battalions, which were less worn down by losses.

16 September
In the morning of 16 September the Dunav Div II began to attack 1st Mtn Bde, whose thin defensive line held them off only with difficulty. Nonetheless, the Brigade was successful, in large measure because of the example of the divisional commander FML Trollmann who had entered the battle personally with his staff as a last reserve. The southeast flank at Laze wasn't engaged by the artillery of Dunav Div I until the afternoon.

Despite the favorable outcome of the actions on the Sanac and by FML Bogat's Group, the heavy losses and the hopelessness of any further offensive by 1st ID led FZM Wurm to allow the Division, as well as 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes, to pull back to a more defensible position along the high ridge from Kriva Jela through Jagodnja to Sanac.

This decision was also influenced by reports about enemy successes in southeast Bosnia. GM Andrian was forced at noon to pull 8 Mtn Bde back to guard the railroad through the Olovo Forest. FZM Potiorek originally believed that this group should deploy at Han Gromile to guard the road to Sarajevo, but soon received a report that the Serbs had already advanced to a point southwest of Srebrenica. Therefore he instead approved GM Andrian's initiative, and told him to concentrate on cleaning up the Srebrenica area in cooperation with Landsturm and March units.

The Serbian incursion into Bosnia also caused FML Trollman concern for the bridges at Ljubovija. Therefore he ordered the 109 Lst Inf Bde to move back to this sector, and to protect its southern flank in the direction of Srebrenica. The bulk of Trollman's troops were concentrated on the Miletina.

The right wing of XV Corps continued to attack without success on the Kostajnik; the left was equally unsuccessful in its attempt to capture the commanding heights southeast of Loznica.

In 5th Army the 42 Hon ID, which had already lost 40 officers and 2000 men, couldn't advance through Sor. 21 LW ID endured bitter combat; however, its position improved in the morning when 9 ID was able to send six battalions over the Drina next to Crnabara despite heavy enemy defensive fire. 476

476 Led by Col. Schöbl, two battalions of the "Ottocac" IR # 79 of 71 Inf Bde assisted 9 ID in this operation, and were instrumental in its success.
The easy passage of FML Krauss' Group to the south bank of the Sava meanwhile seemed to promise major relief to the rest of the front. Because it was simpler to assemble crossing and bridging equipment at Jarak than farther down the river, the General had finally decided to cross at that town. The Serbian 2nd Army, mostly pinned down on its front by the k.u.k. 5th Army, was robbed of expected reinforcement when Sumadija Div I was diverted toward Tekeris. Therefore the Sava was guarded only by the Cavalry Div and two battalions from the III Ban. When 29 ID crossed over on 16 September it was opposed by only a III Ban outpost (soon driven away) and one squadron. A bridge was already in place at Jarak by evening. East of this town, GM Panesch encamped for the night with 41 LW Inf Bde, which FML Krauss was bringing up to make contact with VIII Corps in the Macva. 104 Lst Inf Bde was at Hrtkovci, and half of 7 ID (14 Inf Bde) had reached Budjanovci.

FZM Potiorek hoped that the thrust into the Macva with these units would have a decisive effect on the entire battle. To ensure that there was a unified command structure, FML Krauss's Group (33 battalions, 11 squadrons and 16 batteries [13 cannon, 2 light and 1 heavy howitzer batteries]) would come under 5th Army HQ after it made contact with Frank's units. Until this northern group gained further ground, 6th Army (plus 42 Hon ID) would interrupt the offensive on the line Karacica-Zdrela-Biljeg-Kuliste and by Sor "for one or two days"; meanwhile they would merely pin down the enemy. The withdrawal of 18 ID behind the Krupanj-Ljubovija road in the Gracanica Valley would shorten the front of XVI Corps by 11 km. This was necessary because the Corps had already lost 6000 men and was facing a much larger enemy force.

The high hopes for a successful offensive by FML Krauss' Group ignored one very adverse factor – heavy rains which started on 13 September were turning the Macva into a swamp, in which large areas were totally inaccessible.

5. FML Krauss' Group attacks on the north wing, 17-18 September

At 6:00 AM on 17 September the two Serbian cavalry regiments and two battalions deployed at Drenovac were attacked by 29 ID; however, it was difficult for the latter to bring its numerical superiority to bear because of the swampy terrain. Around 3:00 PM, however, the Serbs were finally driven back in disorder
behind the Jerez. At the same time GM Panesch took the town of Sevarice with his 41 LW Bde. The HQ of 2nd Serbian Army feared that it would soon have to retreat, and prepared to bring Morava Div I back to the north slope of the Cer planina.

However, in the afternoon the SOK sent a regiment of Sumadija Div I forward to reinforce 2nd Army. When they heard that Gen. Stepanovic was contemplating a retreat, toward evening they also sent him the rest of this Division (except for one regiment and one battery which stayed at Tekeris). Meanwhile, the arrival of 4 battalions from Tîmok Div I in the evening allowed 2nd Army to build a new defensive position - it ran from the swamps where the Jerez bends south parallel to the Sava, through Prinincovic to Uzvece. This development and the expectation of the further reinforcements caused Gen. Stepanovic to call off the retreat which he had planned to begin that night.

FML Krauss' operation had not yet given 5th Army its intended relief. The Serbs opposite their front had used their time well and dug themselves in so that the continuing actions assumed the characteristics of trench warfare. The Serbs' excellent main line ran along the causeway road from Crnabara to Ravnje, and there were two advanced positions established ahead of it. 21 LW ID had to fight difficult actions, experiencing several setbacks, against these advanced lines. The k.u.k. 9 ID toiled forward, and by taking Serbsich Raca made contact with their Landwehr comrades in the Parasnica. Morava Div I carried on a very active defense; they inflicted considerable damage on the attackers, while themselves suffering little from artillery fire because of their strong fortifications.

On the 18th, FML Krauss sent 58 Inf Bde forward down the Sava, 57 and 14 Inf Bdes against Prinincovic, and 41 LW Bde against Uzvece. 104 Lst Inf Bde moved up the Sava, attempting to establish contact with VIII Corps. Prinincovic was defended by an enemy force that was ultimately reinforced to 8 battalions and 5 batteries. The fighting flowed back and forth, and was made difficult by the swamps, but the town was finally captured. Meanwhile 41 LW Bde took Uzvece. However, 104 Lst Inf Bde couldn't advance past Serbsich-Mitrovica and Nocaj. Direct intervention by Krauss in the fierce struggle in the Parasnica still lay far in the future.

Aerial reconnaissance reports led FZM Potiorek to believe that the Serbs in the Macva lacked substantial reserves and that the Combined Corps was opposed by a much weaker opponent. Therefore he wasn't pleased when Krauss reported that the attack was
proceeding only slowly because the necessary preparations cost time. Potiorek's impression was that the "good, but too cautious" operation of the Combined Corps was insufficient help in a critical situation in which every new hour might bring disaster. Therefore in the evening he sent a staff officer to FML Krauss "to orient him about the situation of 6th Army, and to tell him not to be drawn too much toward the southwest. He should send only secondary forces in this direction, while making his main effort to gain ground south toward Zavlaka. He should turn his cavalry loose." ⁴⁷⁷

6. 6 Army pulls back, 17–18 September

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 46)

The interruption of XV Corps' offensive gave the Serbs an opportunity to attack. Therefore GdI Appel decided to pull his left wing back on the evening of the 17th to a much better and shorter position on the principal crest of the Gucevo Ridge. Also the left wing of XVI Corps pulled back to the heights on the crest of the Boranja planina; they weren't pursued, and were able to consolidate their new position undisturbed. However, the retreat of 18 ID on the right of XVI Corps was very difficult. Early in the day the Serbs launched eight attacks against the main bulwark of the Division's position, the Sanac, which was held by GM Heinrich Goiginger and 6 Mtn Bde; finally they were worn out by their futile offensives. In the morning, the main body of 18 ID on the Sokolska planina received the order to retire to the new Karacica-Zdrela line. The evacuation of the Miletina had to be carried out in close proximity to an enemy force which was ready to strike and took advantage of its opportunity. The defenders disengaged from the attacking Serbs through very difficult terrain, and finally found themselves in the narrow valley of the upper Gracanica, where only a very narrow road led down the ravine. ⁴⁷⁸

Fortunately only portions of the seven and a half battalions of the worn-out Dunav Div II pursued the Austrians toward Zdrela, and then turned aside according to orders to directly support 3rd Army's operation against the Sanac. Thus FML Trollmann was able to re-assemble his battalions - many of whom had been

⁴⁷⁷ Per Potiorek's diary
⁴⁷⁸ Hoen, Waldstätten-Zipperer and Seifert, "Die Deutschmeister", p. 280
reduced to company size by casualties - in their new position. In response to these latest developments, at noon FZM Wurm ordered a further withdrawal behind the Uzovnica. This would shorten the front by 7 km and anchor the south wing more firmly on the Drina. However, FZM Potiorek decided to move the south wing even further back, behind the Velika. The burnt-out 1 and 2 Mtn Bdes now left the line and were held in reserve behind the right wing.

As the Dunav Div I followed up, its advance guards reached the heights west of the Uzovnica, while the main body (3 regiments) were on the heights east of the Uzovnica and south of Zdrela. Dunav Div II concentrated at the Sanac. The Serbian artillery was still far in the rear. However, the Serbs over-estimated their success and believed that the 6th Army was retreating over the Drina. They planned to pursue toward Zvornik, with 1st Army from the southeast and 3rd Army from the northeast. The SOK wished to heighten their opponents' difficulties by an energetic thrust of the Uzice Armee Gruppe into 6th Army's flank and rear. However, the difficulty of crossing the Drina in tiny vessels greatly impeded the Group's progress. The bridge at Visegrad had still not been rebuilt. In spite of everything, the Group did manage to assemble east of Rogatica by evening.

Besides coordinating operations with the Serbian main body, the commander of the Uzice Armee Gruppe - Gen. Bozanovic - was dealing with the more vexing question of joint operations with the Montenegrins. At issue were conflicting claims between Serbia and Montenegro on Bosnian territory. The problem for the Serbs was that their allies had an easier time crossing the Drina farther upstream and had a head start; they were occupying disputed territory in anticipation of future peace negotiations. Serbian General Jankovic, serving as Montenegro's Chief of the General Staff, wanted to halt his charges on the heights south of Praca to ensure they didn't interfere with Serbian interests. The Montenegrins refused to stop, however, and on the 17th they entered Rogatica two hours before the arrival of the first Serbian patrols. The SOK, citing the areas of responsibility assigned to each allied force, ordered the Montenegrins to stay in the area south of Praca while scouting toward Sarajevo.

Thus the continuation of operations in Bosnia would be difficult. The Montenegrins wouldn't be permitted to participate in the most militarily feasible thrust, through Vlasenica. However, they could take advantage of the Serbs' commitment in that area to capture Sarajevo. The Serbs could split the Uzice Armee Gruppe in half to pursue both objectives,
but this would contradict all the maxims of war. To march together with the Montenegrins against Sarajevo would expose the Group's right flank to the enemy and could lead to surprise counterattacks. The result of this dilemma was that the Group was advised to stay at Rogatica "until the situation in the principal theater of operations is clarified." 479

Meanwhile GM Andrian arrived on the 17th at the end of the Olovo Forest Railroad, where he found two battalions of 9 Lst Eta Bde; the main body of that Bde (3 battalions) was at Milici, east of Vlasenica. Potiorek told 8 Mtn Bde that its main task was to guard the important supply lines of XVI Corps. To interfere with the enemy advance toward the northwest, the Sarajevo fortress command was ordered to send a detachment out through Pale. It was hoped that the small available forces would be able to prevent any major catastrophe while the units attacking on the Sava - now designated "Krauss' Combined Corps" - decided the battle.

On 18 September the Serbs launched a concentric attack on 6th Army, believing they would encounter only rear guards; in almost all areas they suffered bloody setbacks. Their only success was on Crni vrh # 769, where a Serbian battalion broke into the defenses in the evening.

When FZM Potiorek learned of this latest development he decided to move the bulk of 42 Hon ID from its bridgehead at Sor - where it couldn't advance further anyway against the strong Serbian positions - to support XV Corps. However, the Drina Div II attacked the Croatian division around midnight. After repulsing this attack, the Division sent 3 battalions and 1 battery temporarily to the left wing of XV Corps. By this time the Serbs had already long been driven off of Crni vrh # 769.

The Serbian generals recognized that the capture of the mountain massif of the Jagodnja would seal the fate of the entire k.u.k. defensive position on the Boranja and Gucevo Ridges. Therefore the main attack would be directed on this stronghold; 1st and 2nd Armies would launch secondary offensives on the other fronts to prevent the enemy from sending reserves to the decisive sector.

479 Serbian official history, Vol. II, p. 271
7. The struggle for the Jagodnja, 19-22 September

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 48)

19 September

On the 19th, amid rain and fog, the Serbs continued their attack against 6th Army with wonderful persistence. A determined thrust broke into the positions of 10 and 11 Mtn Bdes on the Borina Heights and Biljeg; however, the defenders regained the entire position by a counterattack that night.  

On the same day, attack after attack fell upon the linchpins of the mountain position, the Kosutnja stopa and the Jagodnja. The attackers came on more strongly in the afternoon, while the defensive lines of 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes became ever thinner. Just before darkness fell, another Serbian attack forced the defenders from the highest summit of the Jagodnja. Then some gallant battalions from Lower Austria and south Styria counter-attacked; although not fully successful, they hemmed the Serbs on the summit into a narrow area.

This was the beginning of an intense contest for control of a small oval piece of ground at the summit, around 400 m wide, which was the key to the battlefield. The ensuing fighting was the bloodiest of the entire campaign in Serbia.

Although he had little hope for success, at this point FZM Wurm placed his reserves on the Cavcici - 1 Mtn Bde with little more than 1,000 riflemen - under FML Trollmann to carry out a counter-attack. The Bde didn't reach the heights until late in the night. Meanwhile FZM Potiorek decided that because of the critical situation of 6th Army, most of 72 Inf Bde on the lower Drina would be relieved by Landsturm and sent through Kozluk to the northwest part of the Gucevo. XIII Corps HQ would take over command of the forces which it was sending to the north wing of 6th Army, and of the bridgehead at Sor. If possible, further parts of 42 Hon ID would also be sent from that bridgehead to

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480 "Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg - Der 92er" (April and May editions, 1924)
481 The following battalions took part in the counterattack:
   III/49, IV/87 and IV/84, plus a March company from IR # 4
482 Hoen, Waldstätten-Zipperer and Seifert, "Die Deutchmeister", p 289
Gucevo.

Amid all his troubles on the 19th, it was comforting to the Feldzeugmeister that the Uzice Armeegruppe and the Montenegrins were staying in place in the area around Rogatica. However, a report that the enemy had encircled two March companies at Gromile gave GM Andrian the erroneous impression that this was the advance guard of an enemy column heading toward Sarajevo. He decided to attack toward Gromile; this decision was gladly approved by FZM Potiorek, who was pleased to believe that the Serbs' attention was diverted toward the southwest. At the same time the Sarajevo fortress command was again advised to send a detachment out through Pale. By the end of 19 September this group did reach Pale, while GM Andrian reached Kosutica with 8 Mtn Bde, driving away partisans and some weak raiding parties.

Because of the easy success which GM Andrian won against the troops threatening the two March companies at Gromile, Potiorek lost his hope that the Uzice Armeegruppe was making an effort in this direction (and thus wouldn't intervene in the more important fighting on the Drina). On the contrary, the advance of a Serbian infantry regiment with two batteries toward the heights south of Han Pijesak made it seem likely that Gen. Bozanovic had finally decided to commit his Armeegruppe in the sector where it would provide the most support to the Serbian main body in its difficult battle. Therefore GM Andrian was ordered to immediately return to the Olovo Railroad.

The setback which had befallen the raiding party at Gromile left a strong impression on Gen. Bozanovic, especially since at the same time his scouts had been driven away by the Austrian column advancing out of Sarajevo. He declined to mount a counter-attack, and was now even less inclined than previously to show initiative without receiving orders from his high command.

Meanwhile the hope that the 6th Army would soon be relieved by the offensive of the Combined Corps received a rude jolt. 5th Army HQ had asked FML Krauss to advance through Metkovic-Bogatic into the rear of the enemy forces that were so heavily engaged against VIII Corps. Therefore on 19 September Krauss sent his largest group - 14 and 57 Inf Bdes - from Pricinovic against

483 Translator's Note - The following description of the operations of the Combined Corps on 19 September has been moved from its position in the original text, where it appears somewhat confusingly after the description of the Jagodnja actions of 20 September.
Metkovic. 41 LW Bde would support them on the north by attacking from Uzvece against Glusci. 104 Lst Inf Bde would stay on the line Nocaj-Serbsch Mitrovica, except for one battalion which would support the flank of 41 LW Bde. 58 Inf Bde would hold Pricinovic and block the Drenovac-Sabac Road.

When Krauss' columns were already moving toward the west, the staff officer whom Potiorek had sent the day before (see above) arrived at Corps HQ to advocate a thrust toward the south. FML Krauss, however, remained convinced that his attack to the west would quickly succeed, and wasn't inclined to divert his best troops toward Zavlaka. Once the current operation had succeeded the entire 5th Army would be able to strike to the south. At this point reports arrived of the approach of strong Serbian forces opposite Pricinovic. This was interpreted as "probably an action to cover the Serbian retreat from the Macva", as expected.

However, Gen. Stepanovic no longer had any intention of retreating. The main body of his Sumadija Div I began to advance at 7:00 AM on the 19th; it attacked from Stitar through the southeast part of Pricinovic toward Drenovac-Sevarice. Timok Div I attacked through the northwest part of Pricinovic and Uzvece; if possible it was to advance along the south edge of the Bitva swamp toward Drenovac and into the enemy rear. As FML Krauss' columns marched west their flanks were vulnerable to the sharp Serbian attacks. Two battalions of Timok Div I reached Glusci without fighting in advance of 41 LW Bde, which then suffered a setback.\[484\] However, the attacks by the south wing of Timok Div I and of Sumadija Div I were brought to a standstill in front of 14, 57 and 58 Inf Bdes after some heavy fighting. That evening the Serb forces - 20 battalions and 30 guns - dug in about 150 to 400 paces in front of the Combined Corps.\[485\]

Meanwhile, under 5th Army the 21 LW ID took both of the Serbian advance positions in the Parasnica. 9 ID stormed Serbsch-Raca. However, their principal task, the capture of the strong position along the causeway road, still lay ahead; because of the lack of heavy artillery, this could be accomplished only by time-consuming sapper attacks.

\[484\] The Landwehr Bde was supported by FJB # 21 (of 14 Inf Bde); the Bn commander Lt Col. Johann Haas on this occasion won the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order. 

\[485\] Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg - Der 42er (June edition, 1924), Der 92er (July edition), Der 94er (February edition)

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20 September

The light of the new day had scarcely begun to penetrate the sea of fog that enveloped the Jagodnja, when fighting flared out again on 20 September. The weak 1st Mtn Bde joined the fighting (now led by Col. von Lukachich, who had succeeded GM von Novak-Arienti, badly wounded in front of the Cavcici), but it was unable to retrieve the situation. The Serbs broke into the half-circle of entrenchments around their position on the summit. However, because of the fog a long time passed before they recognized their own success; only in the noon-time sunshine did they realize that they had broken their opponents' line. Now the situation of the defenders was very critical. 6th Army had already lost 20,000 men in the September actions; its only reserve was the badly weakened 2nd Mtn Bde, which would have to be brought up from the southern wing.

Fortunately it took the HQ of 1st Serbian Army several precious hours before they could reorganize their forces on the Jagodnja. Then they sent 12 battalions along a narrow ridge to attack the Kosutnjak stropa. Massing so many troops in an area hardly large enough for the deployment of a regiment was an error on the part of the commanders of the two Dunav divisions. Meanwhile the k.u.k. units had been given time to reassemble their shattered battalions; the brigade commanders had formed groups to guard each sector along the ridges, powerfully supported by several machine gun detachments. 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes were helped by the fact that fire from 109 Lst Inf Bde, deployed south of the Drina, dominated the river valley in the Lipnik area so that the southern part of the defenders' line could be left thinly guarded. Finally, GM Heinrich Goiginger had been given overall command of the fighting on the Jagodnja, and was concentrating fire from all batteries available in the area on its heights.

On this day the front of XV Corps was quiet. Spies, deserters and prisoners all reported that the Serbs in this sector were worn out and badly needed a rest break. Therefore GdI Appel could help XVI Corps by finally extending the front of his 48 ID and thus freeing GM Snjaric's Brigade on the right wing for deployment elsewhere. The first battalion from Snjaric arrived just in time to help Col. Lukachich launch a counteroffensive with the northern group of the defenders of the Jagodnja. The Serbs, who'd suffered heavy losses, were driven back to the

486 The Serbian official history was justly critical of this deployment (Vol. II, p. 276)
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summit. Once again they were hemmed in by a half-circle of Austrians, although the latter consisted of hastily combined remnants of the battalions which had been decimated earlier in the day. The gallant commander of 1st Mtn Bde brought 3 machine gun detachments to some adjoining high ground to stiffen his firing line. The position was consolidated as the Serbs were forced by their own exhaustion and the onset of heavy rains to stay quiet for the night. Nonetheless, the Serbs had strengthened their fortifications on the summit and in a supporting position on the south wing by bringing a quick-firing battery up to the heights. At this point they had 17 battalions on the Jagodnja, 8 battalions and 5 batteries farther west on the Sanac, and 7 battalions facing 6th and 13th Mtn Bdes on the ridges east of Lipniko.

21 September

At dawn on 21 September, the groups organized by Col. Lukachich during the night began to attack the summit of the Jagodnja. At 10:00 AM the fighting escalated into a general offensive, in which the attackers penetrated the Serbian position and captured 8 machine guns. However, the Austrians weren't able to take the flanking entrenchment, and a counter-thrust by Serb reserves threw them back again.

The arrival of 2nd Mtn Bde made possible another general attack at 5:00 PM, despite the fact that twilight was already approaching. After another hot action, the attackers were able to maintain themselves in the trenches they had taken from the Serbs, but once again the flanking entrenchment wasn't taken. The Serbs were able to create a second line of resistance based on this entrenchment. The hotly contested summit - described by the Serbs as "completely red from the blood of men who had fallen" - lay between the two sides; the Serbian battery, whose personnel had become casualties, stood abandoned on the summit.

Under 5th Army, 9 ID had to ward off attempts by Morava Div I to retake Serbisch-Raca; parts of 71 Inf Bde supported this action. FML Krauss hoped to get his stalled offensive moving again by taking Glusci; 104 Lst Inf Bde would support the effort with flanking fire from Nocaj. However, all attempts to attack the town failed; the attackers couldn't bring their superior strength to bear on the narrow patches of dry ground in the swamps at Glusci and Radenkovic. The defenders were the Serbian Cav Div, reinforced by three and a half battalions of infantry and one battery.
On the south wing, a thrust by the Serbian Srebrenica Detachment became somewhat troublesome. Therefore FZM Wurm ordered 8 Mtn Bde, which had returned to Han Pijesak, to drive all enemy units out of the area around Srebrenica as far as the Drina.

Until this point the Montenegrins had stayed in the positions prescribed for them by the Serbs; now however their north wing penetrated into the area about 10 km west of Rogatica. At the same time their leader, the Serdar Vukotic, demanded that Gen. Bozanovic shift his Uzice Armeegruppe farther north to provide protection for the Montenegrin flank. Since two makeshift bridges had finally been constructed over the Drina at Visegrad, Bozanovic could no longer claim he had difficulty obtaining supplies. Nonetheless the Serbian commander didn't want to exceed the directives he had received and wasn't contemplating a thrust to the north to help the main body in their difficult struggle on the Jagodnja. He was entirely convinced that his only task was to stay in place until the Drina battle was successfully completed, and then to conquer Sarajevo to keep it out of the clutches of his allies.

22 September

Various accidents and the weather prevented the attack on the Jagodnja from commencing early on 22 September. When it finally opened, our artillery and machine guns didn't coordinate their activity completely with the infantry; nonetheless, the Serbian position, including the flanking trench, was taken. However, the Aus-Hung. troops didn't have long to savor their success. After a powerful artillery preparation, the Serbs opened a counter-attack. In the ensuing action, the Jagodnja summit changed hands four times before a concentric assault by 1, 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes finally secured the long-contested heights. The desperately fighting Serbs had been overcome in their trenches in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Because of a threat to their south flank, their reserves fled back to the Sanac. The victors seized a considerable supply of ammunition (including five wagons full), six guns and eight machine guns. 2,000 dead men - both friends and foes - covered the blood-soaked battlefield.

The 1st Serbian Army was badly shaken by this defeat. The high command had to intervene energetically to halt the retreat on the heights north and east of Krupanj. The Serbs were fearful of pursuit by the victorious Aus-Hung., troops, but this was actually impossible because the latter had used up their last strength and had no further reserves.
Meanwhile the left wing of 6th Army had also attacked. Heavy fog limited the effectiveness of the artillery preparation. GdI Appel wished to postpone the offensive for this reason, and also because 40 Hon ID - which had just been reinforced by absorbing the personnel of 40 Hon March Bde - was still very tired and couldn't participate. However, FZM Potiorek would not concur, because the fighting on the Jagodnja at this point still hadn't been decided. Therefore FML Czibulka advanced on the left wing with 72 Inf Bde around 2:00 PM, but gained only a little ground. That night 13 Inf Bde repulsed a strong Serbian counterattack at Kuliste.

Thus FZM Potiorek's latest attempt to change the course of the battle was only partly successful. Meanwhile on the other side Putnik came to the conclusion that it had been a mistake to let the Uzice Armeegruppe sit idly while the main body was so heavily engaged. Shortly after noon he ordered Gen. Bozanovic to thrust through Vlasenica into the flank and rear of the enemy - the immediate objective was to reach the Olovo Railroad and to destroy this important line of supply. At the same time, Gen. Jankovic at Cetinje was told to have the Montenegrin high command issue the necessary commands to the Serdar Vukotic so that Gen. Bozanovic and the Montenegrins could work together on a feint attack toward Sarajevo. 487

8. The fighting slackens for 6th Army, 23–24 September

Under the impact of the misfortune on the Jagodnja, early on 23 September Gen. Jurisic-Sturm ordered his 3rd Army to temporarily restrict itself to defensive operations. When the exhausted victors didn't carry out any further attacks, Putnik told 1st Army to thrust energetically ahead on the line running from just northwest of Krupanj through Sanac to Sv. Petar. They would restore the lost connection with the flank of 3rd Army.

When the north flank of XV Corps continued its offensive on 23 September, however, the lower-ranking commanders of 3rd Army didn't heed the order to stay on the defensive. They launched heavy counterstrokes; the commander of the Combined Div, who already had 26 battalions and 43 guns in his sector, even decided to unleash his own attack against Kuliste and the heights around it with 14 battalion. He intended to roll up the enemy's front and throw them into the Drina. The Army's other

487 Serbian official history, Vol. II, p. 375
divisions were requested to attack at the same time. The preparation of the attack group took so much time that the offensive had to be postponed until early on the 24th. Meanwhile, FML Czibulka's k.u.k. troops had gained very little ground on the 23rd. This factor, plus the obvious preparations of the enemy for a counterattack and a report that a long column (erroneously estimated to be an entire division) was advancing toward Loznica, led the commander of XV Corps - GdI Appel - to order his units to pull back to good defensive positions on the Gucevo. This very responsible and, as would soon be apparent, appropriate decision was one of the reasons why the General was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross of the Theresia Order for Visegrad and the Battle of the Drina. 488

The Drina I and Morava II Divs, unaware of the postponement of the offensive by the Combined Div, attacked the Borina Heights and the Biljeg during the 23rd. In the evening the Serbs broke into the fortifications on the former position; in the night they broke through the front left of the Biljeg and forced the Austrians to evacuate the so-called "Trench of Death". 489

Gen. Bozanovic of the Serbian Armeegruppe Uzice spent 23 September in negotiations with Serdar Vukovic about their joint offensive which was supposed to start on the 24th. It was believed that the Austrian force consisted of about two brigades, deployed respectively on the heights northwest of Sokolac and Gromile, and at the end of the Olovo Forest Railroad. The main body of the Lim Detachment would attack the former group while Sumadija II advanced in a broad front against the latter. Orders had come out of Cetinje, apparently influenced by Gen. Jankovic, that Serdar Vukotic should not launch a coup de main against the weakly held Bosnian capital of Sarajevo while the Serbs attacked toward Vlasenica. Instead Vukotic should advance only to the heights on both sides of the Praca to the line Senkovici-Praca dl.-Modropolje. To keep the Montenegrins occupied, their south wing would be permitted to operate toward Kalinovik.

Although Bozanovic's plans for the offensive also included his Srebrenica Detachment, that force had already been forced back. GM Lenz of 9 Lst Eta Bde, who had been placed under GM Andrian, had concentrated 5 battalions of his Bde by Milici on the 22nd,
and advanced on the 23rd along the road to Srebrenica. While he threw back some Serbian outposts and appeared in front of their main position, 8 Mtn Bde made a flank attack from the south through Dzile, forcing the enemy to flee.

New actions erupted on the next day, 24 September. After a difficult action XV Corps recovered the heights at Grn. Borina from the Serbs. For the time being the "Totenschanze" on the Biljeg remained in the enemy's hands. However, an attempt by the Serbs to exploit their capture of this position was frustrated by 11 Mtn Bde.

The Serbian Combined Div was forced by rain and fog to further postpone its offensive until almost noon. Then the attack against 79 Hon Inf and 13 Inf Bdes on both sides of Kuliste broke down completely under the defenders' "murderous artillery fire." This action ended after two fruitless assaults. For the next two nights however, the Serbian Combined Div made further attempts to storm the Kuliste, but its heavy sacrifices failed to win any success.

The k.u.k. XVI Corps was left in peace to consolidate its positions. When the Corps HQ learned of the victorious advance of GM Andrian's Group, which occupied Srebrenica on this day without fighting, 109 Lst Inf Bde was brought over the Drina to relieve 13 Mtn Bde on the southern end of the front. The 13th would rebuild itself while in Corps reserve.

FZM Potiorek ordered 6th Army to maintain itself on the heights it had conquered until it could make up its heavy losses by incorporating the arriving March units. XV Corps had already lost 12,000 combatants; XVI Corps had lost 13,000 wounded and sick men alone. The pause in the fighting also took account of the need of the troops to rest; they were tired and suffered from difficulties in bringing up supplies and from inclement weather. The only action for several days was the recovery of the "Toten-schanze" on the Biljeg by 48 ID on 28 September.490

9. 5 Army's attack is put on hold, 23-28 September

The Feldzeugmeister believed that the halt in operations by 6th Army would be brief; he was sure that 5th Army would be

490 "Die Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg - Der 92er" (May and August editions, 1924)
successful and thus bring the entire front back into motion.

On 23 September the VIII Corps made a desperate attempt to free itself of the wearisome trench warfare using its own resources; however, the attack broke down in front of the well-built position on the causeway road. 104 Lst Inf Bde launched a thrust along the south bank of the Sava from Serbisch-Mitrovica to link up with VIII Corps but couldn't get past the swamps by Zasavica.

On this day the Austrians received the unpleasant news that Serbian infantry had taken the place of the cavalry at Glusci and Radenkovic. It seemed possible that this force would attack toward Serbisch-Mitrovica, so FML Krauss gave up his plan of pulling 104 Lst Inf Bde out of that sector to strengthen his left wing south of Drenovac. To get the offensive of his Corps moving again, he asked FZM Potiorek if he could use the two most effective regiments of the Group in Syrmia and the Banat (which was again commanded by FML Lütgendorf). Potiorek gave him more than he requested. FML Lütgendorf was instructed to assemble all forces that weren't absolutely needed for the security of the Sava-Danube line, and to lead them over the Sava near Sabac to fall upon the Serbs' right flank. Meanwhile VIII Corps would carefully prepare to renew its own attack. As FML Lütgendorf planned the decisive blow against Sabac, he stated that he would like to have the distinguished IR # 73 attached from VIII Corps, to provide a solid nucleus for his own insufficiently trained troops.

The enemy in this sector still felt insecure about their position. On 24 September Gen. Stepanovic asked the supreme commander whether he should continue to build up his present front and stay in place to resist any attack by Krauss' Combined Corps, no matter how powerful. Putnik thereupon delegated to the 2nd Army commander authority to decide at one point a retreat should be conducted to a shorter line running from Sabac to the north slope of the Cer planina.

On 24 September the Aus-Hung. BOK became fully independent of the AOK at Neusandez. The occasion was a letter which FZM Potiorek had sent to GdI Bolfras on the 19th regarding the insufficiency of his ammunition supplies. The Emperor's Military Chancellery didn't hesitate to order the War Ministry to send more munitions trains to the Balkan front. At a time when all fronts were suffering from a munitions shortage and industry wasn't yet geared up to produce even half of what the troops required, this order disturbed the arrangements of the
high command. To avoid further interference in the sphere of the Etappen Oberkommando (responsible for the overall utilization of supplies), commander-in-chief Archduke Frederick ordered the Feldzeugmeister to send "each and every request" through the proper chain of command.\footnote{Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 830 and 835} Since this contradicted the Imperial order that placed the BOK directly under the Military Chancellery, Potiorek had to refer the Archduke's order to the Chancellery for resolution. The response on 24 September was that the Feldzeugmeister was not only to report directly to the Military Chancellery, but would also be responsible for his own press releases. Only in important cases would his releases have to be approved by the Emperor through the Chancellery, and they would never have to be submitted to the AOK. Thus GdI Conrad's attempt to eliminate the direct connection between the BOK and the Military Chancellery had only served to increase FZM Potiorek's independence. This outcome also fulfilled the desire of the Foreign Minister.\footnote{Conrad, Vol. IV, pp. 851 and 860. Translator's Note – Conrad's account also explains in great detail why Foreign Minister Berchtold wanted the soldiers to expend greater resources in the Balkans in an attempt to win over Bulgaria.}

At dawn on 25 September the VIII Corps again attacked the Serbian positions on the causeway road. Although the attackers came on with great elan and some penetrated into the enemy's obstacles, overwhelming frontal and flanking fire drove them back to the protection of their own trenches. Because of the enormous casualties, there could be no question of detaching IR # 73 from the Corps to Lütgendorf's Group in the foreseeable future.

Plans for the next offensive in the Macva

5th Army HQ was anyway opposed to having Lütgendorf cross the Sava at Sabac, because it would be difficult to send the necessary equipment downriver to that sector as long as the stretch of the Sava by Ravnje was completely dominated by Serbian artillery. GdI Frank therefore preferred that the reinforcements be sent directly to join Krauss' Combined Corps over the bridge already in place at Jarak. This would also avoid lengthening the battle front by 12 more km. At the same time the 5th Army commander was preparing to envelop the enemy at Ravnje by creating a force under GM Count Salis-Seewis (of 71 Inf Bde) at Mitrovica; it would consist of five battalions from 36 ID plus four battalions already in that area.
FZM Potiorek also forcefully recommended to FML Lütgendorf that he cross the Sava at what was apparently the easiest place, Jarak. The Feldzeugmeister was inclined to caution because of the latest misfortune of VIII Corps and some ominous reports from the southern wing of 6th Army (covered in the next section).

FML Lütgendorf had meanwhile assembled five March and Landsturm battalions with eleven and a half batteries at Klenak, plus four battalions apiece under GM Fülöpp at Platicevo and under GM Breit just north of that town. Farther east he had left 9 battalions at Asanja and Surcin to watch the Sava and 5 battalions in the Banat to watch the Danube. After a conversation with FML Krauss he was convinced that it would be of little value to the Combined Corps to receive reinforcements of poorly-trained troops. The two generals agreed to begin preparations for their further operations with artillery fire at Klenak from the 26th. On 28th the Sava would be crossed at Sabac, on the 29th the Combined Corps would attack from Pricinovic toward the south. FZM Potiorek placed Lütgendorf's Group under 5th Army HQ, but added that the river crossing would be carried out according to the plans which Lütgendorf had already made. The commander of the Peterwardein fortress, FML Adalbert von Tamasy, took over the groups in Syrmia and the Banat so that FML Lütgendorf would be free to devote all his attention to the offensive.

The preparations for the attack by Lütgendorf's Group and the Combined Corps received an annoying interruption on 28 September when the Serbs at Belgrade started to cross the Sava one hour after midnight. Supported by all the artillery of the Belgrade defensive district, five battalions soon took over the north bank of the river and captured four fixed guns. After an action lasting almost until noon they took Semlin, where they came under the fire of the Danube monitor group. A sharp attack by the k.u.k. security forces on the Sava drove the left wing of the invaders back a considerable distance; nonetheless the Serbs planned to construct a pontoon bridge and hold Semlin as a bridgehead.

That evening Linienschiffs-Leutnant Richard Wulff of the Danube flotilla led three vessels (monitors "Temes" and "Körös" and patrol boat "b") into the Sava. Disregarding the withering...
fire of the Serbian gunners, he destroyed the bridge just before it was ready. Now unable to reinforce the group north of the Sava, which was apparently in great danger, the commander of the Belgrade Defensive District ordered a retreat; the captured guns, except for one easily transportable mountain cannon, were left behind. A Serbian detachment did continue to occupy a small enclave around the former railroad bridge; supported by the artillery in Belgrade, they stayed in place until 21 October when forced to evacuate due to rising river waters. On the night of 28 September, Linienschiffs-Leutnant Wulff continued to sail up the Sava. In a heavy exchange of artillery he broke through a mine barrier at Obrenovac and brought his group safely to Sabac, where he rendered further outstanding service in the upcoming actions.  

After its unsuccessful assaults, the VIII Corps was ordered to turn to a type of fortress warfare against the Serbian positions. The lack of heavy artillery meant that the enemy could be approached only very slowly using siege tactics. Naturally GdI Frank continued to insist that the Groups of Krauss and Lütgendorf should assist VIII Corps by exerting pressure on the rear of the defenders of the causeway road. Frank sent GM Gerabek (who had been his Chief of Staff since 9 September) to Tuzla to win Potiorek over to his position. Potiorek, however, agreed with FML Krauss that there were already enough troops stuck in the Macva swamps, and went ahead with the plan to attack at Sabac. GM Goglia's Group, at least, would cross the river there with the assistance of Wulff's Sava monitor group. The Groups of GM Fülöpp and Breit would cross later at either Sabac or Jarak depending on the situation. Potiorek was mainly concerned that the operation should start on 29 September.

10. The Serbs and Montenegrins break into southeast Bosnia, 23–28 September

The sense of urgency which motivated the BOK was caused by the great dangers beginning to threaten the south flank of 6th Army. On the 23rd GM Snjaric, an expert in local conditions, was sent to south Bosnia to provide unified leadership for the local

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See Sokol, "Seekrieg", p. 740

494 For these accomplishments Wulff won the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.
volunteers and gendarmes who were fighting the always bold bands of Serbian and Montenegrin raiders. Although at this point the incursion of the Serbs and Montenegrins into Bosnia seemed to be only a nuisance, because hitherto the larger enemy forces had remained inactive, in fact the advance of the Serbian Uzice Armee-Gruppe was finally starting. On the 24th the Sumadija Div II had already covered half of the distance between Rogatica and its goal, the end of the Forest Railroad. The Montenegrins – part of the Drina Detachment in about brigade strength – opened artillery fire against the fortified camp at Kalinovik on the 25th. Farther north the Serbs became more active in southeast Bosnia. Already on 18 September Potiorek had considered whether to call up 3 Mtn Bde, which had stayed at Avtovac to fight the invaders from the Sanjak. However, this idea was abandoned because the Bde was needed to oppose continuous Montenegrin raids from the Duga Furche into the Gacko Polje, as well as against the small fortifications on the Avtovac-Bileca Road. However, there was a change in the weather in southern Herzegovina on 22 September, involving rain and cold temperatures; there was snowfall on the heights. The fighting therefore slackened, and the time had come to implement the Feldzeugmeister's plan of using 3 Mtn Bde to relieve the threatened camp at Kalinovik. The Brigade wasn't ready to march until 28 September, leaving the defense of the Gacko polje in the hands of some weak Landsturm units.

On the 25th the Sumadija Div II reached Mrkalje, already dangerously close to the Olovo Railroad. The Serbian Lim Detachment occupied the heights north of Sokolac without fighting, and small Montenegrin detachments reached the heights north of Gromile. On the negative side of the picture for Gen. Bozanovic was the defeat of the Srebrenica Detachment, which was driven back further on the 25th by the advance guards of GM Andrian at Osmace. On the 26th a small Aus-Hung. force of 2 battalions and 1 mountain battery under Lt Col. Chwostek offered such vigorous resistance to the incursion of Sumadija Div II that the Serbs were content with reaching Kusace and the heights south of the railroad. The threat to the important supply center at Vlasenica forced GM Andrian to send 9 Lst Eta Bde back to Milici. The bulk of 8 Mtn Bde thrust ahead toward Osmace and easily kept pushing back the Serbian Srebrenica Detachment, which was still awaiting some expected reinforcements.

On 27 September the Serbian Armeegruppe Uzice pushed Sumadija Div II forward only to the heights just north of the railroad, although Lt Col. Chwostek's small detachment had pulled back all the way to Vlasenica. Meanwhile GM Andrian inflicted a heavy
defeat on the Srebrenica Detachment after it had retreated through Osmace. First he threw back the Serbian north wing, and then so completely battered the southern wing that the Serbs didn't halt their flight until they had crossed the Drina. Besides a cannon, the Austrians captured a copy of the enemy's order for the offensive. It revealed that the Sumadija Div II was supposed to thrust through Vlasenica into the rear of 6th Army while the Srebrenica Detachment supported the offensive in the direction of Milici. Prisoners asserted that two regiments were coming up toward Bajinabasta to reinforce the Srebrenica group.

Now XVI Corps HQ ordered GM Andrian to at least hold onto the heights by Srebrenica, while Lt Col. Chwostek held Vlasenica. As reinforcements the Corps' reserve, 13 Mtn Bde, was set in motion toward Vlasenica.¹⁹⁵

On the Serbian side, Gen. Bozanovic ordered the Srebrenica Detachment to quickly regroup and again cross to the west bank of the Drina on 28 September. To make this operation easier, the Sumadija Div II would send two battalions and a battery east toward Dzile and the rear of Andrian's 8 Mtn Bde. The bulk of the Division would consolidate itself on the northeast edge of the Javor planina (Kraljeva gora), facing Milici and Vlasenica; reconnaissance detachments would move further forward. Thus parts of Sumadija Div II advanced closer to Vlasenica. Farther west the Serbian Lim Detachment moved toward Kladanj and Olovo.

This cautious but steady enemy advance and the always bold activities of the partisans, as well as the captured Serbian order for the offensive, caused FZM Potiorek to take further measures. He wanted to free the flank and rear of 6th Army from further disturbances, and to defeat the enemy regular troops, who provided a backbone to the partisans. Because the main body of the k.u.k. forces was already heavily engaged with the enemy armies, and because of the apparent threat to Sarajevo by the Montenegrins (who had one brigade apiece at Pale and Praca dl.) it wasn't easy to find sufficient forces for the operation. However FZM Potiorek was still able to help himself in this difficult situation. The Sarajevo fortress command would sent two Landsturm battalions and a mountain battery on the forest railroads to Cevljanovic and Vares. Under Lt Col. Hauser they

¹⁹⁵ Translator's Note - The original text erroneously places 13 Inf Bde rather than 13 Mtn Bde here. Situation maps and the rest of the section indicate that the reference is really to 13 Mtn Bde.
would join the Olovo detachment. Further forces would assemble at Tuzla, partly by rail and partly on foot - two battalions of IR # 79 and a mobile battery from 5th Army and three battalions and a mountain battery (under Lt. Col. von Hellebrott) from 6th Army. Together with k.k. Lst IR # 27 (arriving from Trieste) they would make up a group under Col. Karpellus; he would first lead them to Kladanj and then join Hauser's Group to thrust against the enemy's western flank.

FZM Potiorek was always striving to bring his active troops to the most important areas. Thus he also decided to pull the remaining parts of 72 Inf Bde away from the quiet sector they had been holding on the Drina in the gap between 5th and 6th Armies. They would be replaced by the k.u. 8 Lst Eta Bde, which became available on 27 September but still didn't have weapons or military clothing or equipment. The Brigade was given uniforms from dead troops and a hodgepodge of weapons, and on 7 October entered the line on the Drina to relieve the 72nd.

11. 5th Army comes to a dead end, 29 September-4 October

All urging by higher HQ to get the north wing to commence its attack more quickly came to nought because it took time for the Combined Corps to incorporate its March formations. The redeployment of the first line battalions who made up the attack group on the left was also lengthy. Potiorek had wanted to start on the 28th at the latest, but the attack couldn't start until the 29th. 5th Army HQ tried in vain to have the thrust directed southwest toward Metkovic-Belotic; however, FML Krauss insisted that this was the strongest point of the enemy front and that it was too far from Klenak, where batteries on the Hungarian side of the Sava were available to provide flanking fire. Therefore GdI Frank's only hope for direct support involved the planned thrust of GM Graf Salis' group toward Ravnje, which might have a decisive influence on the actions of VIII Corps. Meanwhile FML Lütgendorf would cross the Sava at Sabac with just nine battalions; GM Breit's Group, in reserve, was now diverted to cross the river at Jarak and move to Drenovac.

On 29 September, however, the offensive of the Combined Corps and the river crossing at Sabac were complete disappointments. Neither the pontoons which had been ordered from the interior nor the equally necessary pioneer company arrived in time to help FML Lütgendorf's Group. They attempted nonetheless to
start crossing the Sava with the equipment at hand, but soon
gave up because of effective artillery fire by the Serbian group
at Sabac. Only on the two islands southeast of Sabac were two
battalions able to establish themselves. The Serbs believed
that this abortive river crossing was merely a diversionary
maneuver.

57 and 14 Inf Bdes (18 battalions and 4 batteries) attacked
between the Sava and Pricinovic, while 58 Inf Bde pushed through
Pricinovic; the offensive only managed to take an advanced
Serbian position.496 Because of the weak strength, cohesion and
field experience of the forces in east Bosnia, FZM Potiorek was
waiting with great impatience for a substantial success on the
north wing that would pin down the enemy. He wired GdI Frank:
"The main thing now is to gain some ground; this must finally
happen. Goglia's Group must cross the Sava today. If it can't
cross at Klenak, it should do so farther north. By this evening
I wish to hear that all 13 battalions are on the Serbian side of
the Sava." 5th Army HQ therefore immediately sent GM Fülöpp's
Group and parts of GM Goglia's Group to Jarak.

On his north wing, FML Krauss didn't expect much from the
recently arrived March and Landsturm battalions. He felt that
they only added to the difficulty of providing supplies over the
only bridge and the inadequate roads. Krauss declared that an
advance by this force through Glusci, which GdI Frank was
advocating to provide direct support to VIII Corps, was
impossible until after the active troops had taken Tabanovic.
After a personal conference, 5th Army HQ ordered on 30 September
that FML Lütgendorf would take over the north (right) wing - 41
LW Bde and Fülöpp's Bde - with Glusci as his objective. FML
Krauss would attack Tabanovic with 29 ID, 14 Inf Bde, and GM
Breit's Group.

Because the attack in the Macva was making such slow progress,
the Austrians considered the option of having the north wing of
6th Army attack the Serbian front. After a Serbian column was
spotted leaving Loznica for the north, XIII Corps was emboldened
on 1 October to launch a thrust which gained considerable ground
on the left wing. However, on the night of 5-6 October the
enemy's Combined Div managed to establish itself on Height # 708
between Crni vrh # 769 and Kuliste. Neither sapper attacks nor
artillery cross fire were able to drive the Serbs away. On the

496 "Der Heimat Söhne im Weltkrieg. Der 42er" (July edition,
1924), ".... Der 92er" (August edition., 1924), and ".... Der
94er)" (February edition, 1923)
other hand, Col. Schirmer and his Zagreb IR # 53 took the Serbian border patrol building across the Drina from Han Palator; this bridgehead was a useful foothold on the heights by Loznica.

Meanwhile on 1 October Salis' Group attacked the enemy between the Sava and Zasavica and drove them back to the northeast edge of Ravnje; however, they could advance no further, despite first-rate support from the river monitors.

On 4 October the attack by 5th Army came completely to a halt. The failure was caused by a lack of officers and deficiencies in the ammunition supply. Industry couldn't keep up with the unanticipated demand for munitions. The artillery was forced to be extraordinarily stingy with its shells; thus it isn't surprising that the infantry had to resort to the slow techniques of siege warfare to move ahead.

In vain FZM Potiorek ordered that the Krauss-Lütgendorf Group with its 53 battalions should win a success in at least one area "regardless of casualties." 26 of the battalions in question were Landsturm units at half strength, led by just a handful of officers! 5th Army HQ did offer to send IR # 91 as reinforcements, but FML Krauss turned them down. He needed artillery ammunition, not more infantry.

12. The enemy invasion of southeast Bosnia, 29 September-10 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 49)

Halting the enemy, 29 September-3 October

On 29 September the 13 Mtn Bde made a powerful attack on the west wing of Sumadija Div II. The neighboring Lim Detachment attempted to launch a flank attack in relief, which however Col. Graf Berchtold deflected near Vlasenica. At the same time the Serbs lost the strong point of their right wing, the Vranji Kamen, where the Armeegruppe's reserve had to intervene to restore the situation. The Sumadija divisional commander described his situation as "very serious", whereupon the SOK ordered Gen. Bocanovic to fortify the most favorable position in front of Vlasenica and at least avoid a defeat. At this point the Srebrenica Detachment was reinforced to five battalions and placed under Col. Masic. To its front, FZM Potiorek ordered GM
Andrian to pull back to Milici, leaving just Battalion II/66 in Srebrenica.

The Serbs by Vlasenica managed to recapture the Vranji Kamen late in the evening of 30 September. The battalion which they had sent to scout toward Milici fell into the path of GM Andrian and was broken completely in pieces. On 1 October the Dalmatian Croats of Battalion III/22 made a surprise raid on the Vranji Kamen and took several hundred Serbs prisoner.

In the far south, the Montenegrins were becoming more active in the Krivosije and threatening the Trebinje-Bileca road. To put an end to these activities, ten companies from the Bocche di Cattaro launched thrusts against the Grahovo Basin; another ten companies advanced from Trebinje to the border. These counter-strokes were completely successful. In the next few weeks the sector was completely quiet except for the usual minor operations against partisans. Only the Vermac fortifications on Mt Lovcen continued their bombardment of Cattaro; although the French reinforced the Montenegrins with some heavy guns, the bombardment was ineffectual. The French Navy had made one attempt on 19 September to force its way into the Bocche, but soon gave up. It was obvious to them that the military harbor could be taken only from the land side.\(^\text{497}\)

Meanwhile the build-up against the Uzice Armeegruppe continued. On 2 October Lt Col. Karpellus' group was south of Kladanj and had almost reached the Olovo Forest Railroad, while Lt Col. Hauser's group had come together at the town of Olovo and would soon be ready to operate along with Karpellus. Still unaware of the danger from this quarter, the Sumadija Div II that morning moved against the east wing of 13 Mtn Bde, but was itself taken by surprise in a flank attack. The Serbs broke off the action at 11:00 AM and returned to their principal entrenchments.

The Srebrenica Detachment (5 battalions and 1 battery) had again crossed the Drina on 1 October, and on the 2nd it drove Battalion II/66 back to the heights west of Srebrenica. Nevertheless, FZM Potiorek still allowed 8 Mtn Bde to move even further away, from Milici back to Vlasenica, in order to concentrate all available forces in the area which was of the greatest importance for the time being. However, FZM Wurm did send Lt Col. Chwostek with 2 Landsturm battalions and a mountain battery to support Battalion II/66.

\(^{497}\) Translator's Note - The naval actions in and around the Bocche are described in Sokol, "Seekrieg", pp. 78-96.
Gen. Bozanovic, commander of the Serbian Armeegruppe, began to hear rumors that k.u.k. units were moving from the area northwest of Vlasenica toward Kladanj. When he passed this information on to his high command, he was instructed to thoroughly scout the area toward Kladanj and Olovo; the Montenegrins should advance to the Romanja planina and the heights south of Pale while scouting toward Sarajevo. The Ljubovija Detachment was ordered to cross the Drina and to cooperate with the Srebenica Detachment in an energetic thrust toward the Milici-Nova Kasaba road.

On 3 October the Srebenica Detachment again attacked Battalion II/66. Lt Col. Chwostek came up and threw back the Serbian south wing. Since the situation at Srebenica was becoming uncertain, FZM Wurm pulled 2 Mtn Bde out of the front of XVI Corps and held it as a reserve to commit in the threatened area if necessary.

The defeat of the Uzice Armeegruppe, 4-10 October

Col. Misic's Srebenica Detachment had meanwhile been reinforced by two more battalions (drawn from the Uzice Brigade). He sent these battalions to the Detachment's south wing, which had been driven back, in order to make another attempt to take the heights west of Srebenica. The cautious Serbian advance took all day on the 4th to approach the Austrian position. Lt Col. Chwostek had left only a small group in this sector and had moved most of his men to the heights south of Bratunac, opposite the Serbs' north flank. He drove back isolated patrols from the Ljubovija Detachment.

The position of the Uzice Armeegruppe deteriorated considerably at noon on 4 October. The approach of Lt Col. Karpellus' Group toward Nevacka was discovered; it threatened the advanced west wing of the Serbian position. Since the reserves were behind the east wing, the Armeegruppe was in an unfavorable position for responding to the Austrians' maneuver. Gen. Bozanovic urgently appealed for help to the SOK, but it was too late for the latter to intervene. The most promising response, an attack by the main Serbian forces, wasn't feasible because at this time Gen. Bojovic was reporting that his 1st Army was in no condition for an offensive; moreover the terrain in his sector was not favorable. Bojovic's only expedient was to pull several

498 Serbian official history, Vol. III, p. 54
499 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 58
battalions and some artillery from 1st Army's front and to send them to reinforce the striking power of the Ljubovija Detachment.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. III, p. 62}

Since Putnik had given the commander of the Uzice Armeegruppe the freedom to select the most favorable position in the Vlasenica area and had instructed him to avoid a defeat, the Serbian commander-in-chief must have recognized that the Armeegruppe would retreat. In that case the isolated thrust by the Ljubovija Detachment would become a dangerous adventure. Putnik didn't go further than to make suggestions to his subordinates. Gen. Bozanovic, in turn, believed that he had too little time to issue orders for the withdrawal of his troops. Thus the Serbians had really been surprised by the Austrian counter-stroke.

Meanwhile GM Pongracz with 3 Mtn Bde had driven the enemy away from the Kalinovik area; however, on the 4th he soon halted his pursuit because the Serbs had quickly pulled back all the way to Foca. Avtovac meanwhile was seriously threatened by strong Montenegrin forces after the departure of 3 Mtn Bde; this was of little importance to FZM Potiorek, who refused to be distracted by secondary sectors. On 2 October the developments at Kalinovik convinced the Montenegrins that 3 Mtn Bde had left Avtovac; they began to make small-scale attacks on the positions that barred their way out of the Duga Depression. On 4 October they stormed Stepen Ridge, the primary position west of the depression. Col. Waniek, who was responsible for the defense of the Gacko polje, was able to hold his second position. On the 5th his mobile reserves counterattacked and were successful enough to hold the much larger enemy force in check. For the next few days the Montenegrins merely bombarded the center of the second position on the Gat Heights, which dominated the route up from the valley.

GM Andrian, who'd been entrusted with overall command of the attack against the Uzice Armeegruppe at Vlasenica, sent 8 Mtn Bde against the Ploca Heights and 13 Mtn Bde against Igriste. The actions lasted until late evening of the 5th, and were fully successful. After darkness fell the Sumadija Div II retreated to the heights south of the railroad and reported that this new position in the forests couldn't be held because its flanks were unprotected.

At the same time, Lt Col. Chwostek made a surprise flank attack
on the north wing of the Srebrenica Detachment; after a bitter rear guard action he drove the Serbs back toward Osmace. The enemy's southern wing, which had remained inactive, followed the north wing to the rear.

Because of this setback, Gen. Bozanovic decided to pull his Armeegruppe back: Sumadija Div II would withdraw to the line Vratar-Vigova gora and the Lim Detachment to the line Paklinac-Senkovic. Bozanovic further proposed that the 9,000 men of the north wing of the Montenegrin Sanjak Group, which had established itself on the west edge of the Romanja planina, should move closer to the Serbs.

On this day 3 Mtn Bde was marching from Kalinovik toward Sarajevo; it suffered from a surprise fire attack by parts of the Montenegrin Drina Detachment, which had advanced to the heights south of Pale. Although the veteran k.u.k. battalions soon drove the enemy back, they had to return to Kalinovik to catch their breath. On 6 October they arrived in time to chase away an enemy force which once again had invested the fortified camp at Kalinovik.

At this time the SOK ordered the Montenegrins to withdraw from the Pale area to their earlier position on the line Kula-Praca dl.-Borovac and pulled the Srebrenica Detachment once more behind the Drina. Because of concern that the enemy might advance through Rogacica toward Valjevo, the Povljen Ridge (Debelo brdo) was occupied by a regiment from 1st Army.

On the 6th, GM Andrian's Group made a concentric advance toward Han Pijesak, opposed only by weak rear guards. Three columns were created to pursue the enemy from there toward Rogatica: Col. Hellebronth on the west wing, Lt Col. Karpellus in the center and 13 Mtn Bde on the east wing.

After a difficult advance, the energetic Serbian resistance made it clear on the 9th that the enemy had decided to hold onto the area around Rogatica. 13 Mtn Bde couldn't push through the main enemy position at Babljak, on the heights of Tisovo brdo and Visibaba. In the afternoon Lt Col. Karpellus came up against a strongly held advanced position on the Kitak and Stupe Heights. Col. Hellebronth was unable to overcome the well fortified and strongly held entrenchments north of Bandin Odzak.

The fact that GM Andrian's Group was smaller than the enemy couldn't be concealed for any long period of time. Gen. Bozanovic, whose troops were too widely dispersed to launch an
effective counterattack, asked the Serdar Vukotic to intervene with his Montenegrins. On the 10th they made a flank attack against Col. Hellebronth's Group, heavily engaged at Bandin Odzak, and forced them to quickly retreat toward Kosutica. Then the Serbian Lim Detachment pushed Lt Col. Karpellus' center column back to the fortified sector at Visevina.

The intervention of the Montenegrins took 6th Army by surprise. It was believed to be due to the inactivity of 3 Mtn Bde. Potiorek decided that unless he wanted to permanently tie forces down to guard the Olovo Railroad he would have to set up a more favorable defensive position on the upper Drina.
B. A Pause in Operations, 11-17 October

Reinforcements and new deployments

It was an advantage for the BOK that GdI Conrad, insufficiently informed about the situation in the Balkans by meager daily reports, had exaggerated concerns about the seriousness of the situation. Because of the uncertain status of Italy, several new Landsturm formations had been created for local defense along the Italian border. As the winter season approached, however, it seemed rather unlikely that hostilities with Italy would begin for the next few months. Therefore the Chief of the General Staff decided on 7 October to combine some of the units on the border into a brigade under Col. Heinrich von Wieden and to place it at the disposition of the BOK. To a certain degree, this was a replacement for the March formations of the active units in the Balkans (their II March units and some of the III units had been diverted to replenish the armies in Galicia). On the next day it was ordered that 7 Lst Terr Bde should also reinforce Potiorek; the Bde, under GM Franzel, was ready to leave Pilsen for the front on 12 October.

The BOK was particularly glad to be getting Widen's Brigade of 8 battalions and 6 batteries because it was mostly composed of Landsturm troops familiar with mountain conditions; unlike most of the Landsturm, they were armed with repeating rifles rather than the old Werndl models.

To prepare for the new offensive in southeast Bosnia, FZM Potiorek returned 1 ID (7 and 9 Mtn Bdes) to XV Corps. The defense of the southern part of the so-called Zvornik bridgehead, from the Jagodnja Heights down to the Drina, became the responsibility of GM Heinrich Goiginer's Combined ID (1, 2, 4, 6 and 14 Mtn Bdes 501) and of 109 Lst Inf Bde. FML Trollmann of 18 ID was also given command over GM Andrian's Group, which in turn was reinforced by 5 Mtn Bde.

3 Mtn Bde was instructed to pin down the main body of the Montenegrins by a thrust toward Foca, and if possible to drive them over the Drina. To maintain contact with 3 Mtn Bde, the Sarajevo garrison was ordered to send a small detachment south toward Kalinovik; another detachment would advance toward the Romanja planina to assist GM Andrian's Group.

501 The new 14 Mtn Bde was the former Brigade GM Snjaric.
The Serbian high command, dissatisfied with the performance of Gen. Bozanovic, replaced him with Gen. Aracic, hitherto the commander of Timok Div II.

**A period of minor actions**

Despite all efforts, Col. Wieden's Brigade couldn't begin entraining until 10 October; therefore the offensive in southeast Bosnia planned by FZM Potiorek couldn't start until the 18th at the earliest. FML Trollmann decided to stay with his division in his present position for the time being. When the Montenegrins learned that the column from Sarajevo was in motion toward the Romanja planina the report was enough to cause them to withdraw to their former positions. Their example was followed by the Serbian Lim Detachment. Gen. Aracic decided to retain the defensive position selected by his predecessor.

Anyway, a change in the weather on the 11th made large-scale operations impossible. The entire high plateau was covered with snow. Intervals of rain caused all the valleys and other lower areas to fill with bottomless mud. The soldiers wore the same damp uniforms all day long, and their footwear quickly deteriorated. At lest the k.u.k. troops received adequate rations, unlike their opponents. Sickness diminished the strength of both sides.

High water soon crested in the Drina. The enemy's improperly built bridges at Visegrad and Staribrod were swept away on the 12th. Fortunately for themselves, the Serbs had also repaired the stone bridge at Visegrad and the railroad bridge at Megjegja, so their link to their homeland wasn't totally interrupted. The debris from the Serbian bridges washed downstream and caused considerable damage to the bridges of the k.u.k. 6th Army. On the 13th the bridge of the Croatian 42 Hon ID at Batar was totally destroyed on the 13th, just at the time when the high water made it necessary to evacuate their bridgehead. Because the Drina was full of debris, the crossing was difficult during the day and impossible at night. The last Croatian detachments from the bridgehead could avoid capture only by swimming; many soldiers drowned.

The k.u.k. 5th Army in the Macva also suffered from floods and pouring rain. The trenches filled with water and could only be maintained with endless toil. Although the men eagerly wished to advance out of the "accursed swamp", their progress was extremely slow because of the active Serbian defense. The Austrians impatiently awaited the arrival of heavier artillery.
and the first improvised trench mortars.

To revive the stalled attack of GM Salis' Group at Ravnje, on the 14th GdI Frank reinforced the Group to thirteen battalions. Salis was also given command over a detachment led by Col. Schwarzenberg. Finally, five heavy guns from Pola and two heavy howitzer batteries from the interior were on their way to this sector by train.

On the heights, 6th Army had to struggle with difficult transport problems as it sought to keep its troops supplied in mountainous areas where there were no local rations available. Their Serbian opponents had learned that 1 ID was now assigned to XV Corps; this report, plus other troop transfers (such as the movement of parts of 72 Inf Bde to this sector after they were relieved on the lower Drina by 8 Lst Eta Bde) caused the Serbs to conclude that 6th Army was preparing a decisive blow on the Gucevo Ridge. To provide some relief for 3rd Army in anticipation of such an offensive, Voivode Putnik instructed 1st Army to attack the Boranja Ridge. This operation on 13 October, however, was restricted to a series of feint attacks that cost the Serbs some heavy casualties.

Meanwhile the detachment which had been sent south from Sarajevo under Major Balaban was opposed only by a heavy snow storm, and it restored communications with Kalinovik. This development and a report from Sarajevo that the enemy had pulled back from the area near the city made it seem likely that many of the Montenegrins had reinforced the Uzice Armeegruppe. Therefore GM Pongracz was ordered to leave just three battalions and two and half batteries as a garrison at Kalinovik. On the 16th he would move with the rest of 3 Mtn Bde to Sarajevo, where he would join five battalions from Col. Wieden's Bde (organized as 15 Mtn Bde) under a new 50 ID, to be commanded by GM von Kalser. Col. Wieden's other three battalions went to Han Pijesak to serve as the nucleus of 16 Mtn Bde, which would be formed under GM Erwin Zeidler.

FZM Wurm was placed in charge of the upcoming operation. FZM Potiorek wanted it to succeed as quickly as possible so that most of the troops could then be transferred to the main front on the Drina. Therefore he decided not to send 50 ID to attack along the road to Praca dl. into the enemy rear; the difficult terrain made a rapid advance impossible in this sector. Instead the Division would make a frontal advance directly onto the Romanja planina. Its southern flank would be secured by a small command under Lt Col. Heider, which had deployed at Pale on the
13th.

On the 15th, Gen. Aracic learned from some k.u.k. prisoners of Serbian nationality that his opponents were only awaiting the arrival of two more brigades before they launched simultaneous attacks in the center and from Sarajevo. The movement of 3 Mtn Bde, which was reported by the Montenegrins, confirmed this picture of the situation. Aracic ordered the Montenegrins to place their advance guards on the west edge of the Romanja planina, while the main body deployed on the Silvaja gala and at Nepravdici.

C. The Battle of the Romanja planina, 18–30 October

1. The capture of the high plateau, 18–21 October

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 49)

The principal assignment given to XVI Corps was to have 50 ID climb the steep western slopes of the Romanja planina, which on their higher elevations contained areas of fallen rock 200 to 500 meters long. To assist in this difficult task, the west wing of 18 ID would advance on the 18th on both sides of the Han Pijesak–Sarajevo road to the line Rastovac–Stupe; thus on the 19th it would be in position to threaten the rear of the defenders of the west edge of the Romanja planina, and force them to retreat.

Since all reports indicated that the western slopes of the Romanja planina were occupied in strength, the commander of 50 ID (GM Kalser) decided to send his main column around to the north, while GM Pongracz with 3 Mtn Bde demonstrated toward the front of the enemy on the Mokro–Orlovina line. On the 18th Pongracz reached Golubic, and Col. Wieden with the main column reached Bjelogorci.

The 8 Mtn Bde of 18 ID moved on both sides of the road and reached Sokolac and the heights of Pukovac and Majci without encountering any resistance worth mentioning. 5 Mtn Bde pushed back the advanced outposts of the Lim Detachment and reached Golo brdo. 17 Mtn Bde (formerly Lt Col. Karpellus' Group) unsuccessfully attacked the heights of Stupe and Kitak, whose weak garrisons were excellently supported by artillery.

Aerial scouts reported that the enemy forces on the Romanja planina were surprisingly weak. If this were so, the threat to
the rear of the Serbs and Montenegrins was unnecessary, and the
Austrians should move in strength against the enemy west wing.
However, the scouts from 50 ID reported that despite the aerial
reports the western edge of the Romanja planina was held in
strength. GM Kalser had Lt Col. Heider light numerous camp
fires at Pale to give the impression that a major force was
preparing to advance east down the Praca Ravine. Col. Wieden
was ordered to proceed through Brodze to reach the north edge of
the Romanja planina.

Meanwhile the three battalions at Kalinovik were sent forward on
the 18th toward Foca on a broad front; the main body moved from
Kalinovik toward Jelec. Their mission, which was completely
successful, was to make the Montenegrins afraid of being cut off
from their homeland. The fake camp fires at Pale apparently
added to the enemy's nervousness. The Drina Detachment was
instructed to deploy three battalions from Borovac to guard
toward the north. The advance guards on the Romanja planina
were told that keeping the enemy out of the Praca Valley was
their primary mission.

19 October

Contrary to all expectations, when GM Pongracz had his three
batteries open fire on the morning of the 19th the Montenegrins
evacuated the edge of the heights east of Mokro after just a few
shots were fired. Without any further incident, Pongracz' group
established themselves on the plateau. On the other hand, as Lt
Col. Heider's Group advanced on the Gorazde Road toward Gales
they encountered heavy firing from artillery and found the
heights along the pass heavily occupied. Col. Wieden and the
main column, on their now apparently unnecessary detour,
advanced only to Bredze, at the edge of the plateau.

The west wing of 18 ID was heavily engaged. The western group
of its 8 Mtn Bde was able to take the heights south of Gromile,
but soon had to ward off a powerful Montenegrin counterattack.
The eastern group of 8 Mtn Bde was successful at Bandin Odzak
after a hot action, but then came up against the main
Montenegrin position at Kula. The enemy, who was well aware
that their opponents were spread thinly over a wide front,
lunched a counter-thrust that reached Majci before it was
stopped.

5 Mtn Bde pushed back the Border Watch Comitajis who had held an
advance position at Pobraci; the Bde dug in on the heights by
Pobraci and held off a powerful attack by the Lim Detachment.
During the night they continued to be harassed by the Comitajis. 17 Mtn Bde conquered the Stupe Heights; however all of their efforts against Kitak were in vain because the foremost Serbian companies were still effectively supported by artillery fire from the Vigova gora and by sorties of Sumadija Div II from the main defensive position.

FZM Wurm ordered 50 ID to advance south of the Han Pijesak-Sarajevo Road in the direction of Rogatica. The west wing of 18 ID would join this attack. Afterward the Division's east wing would also thrust ahead. The Corps' reserve was meanwhile ordered to Mislovo to support the east wing of 18 ID.

20 October

Although GM Kalser instructed his troops to march quickly on 20 October, Col. Wieden's column was still lagging behind; moving through streams of rain it was only slowly approaching the battlefield in difficult terrain. Also GM Pongracz' group in the southern part of the Romanja planina didn't reach the strong Montenegrin position at Height # 1288 until noon. While the west wing of 8 Mtn Bde, as ordered, began to advance south of the road toward Rogatica, the east wing had already reconquered the heights at Bandin Odzak in the morning. At noon the Montenegrins made a strong but unsuccessful counterattack.

Around this time Gen. Aracic decided to send the Lim Detachment against Pobraci to relieve his allies; parts of Sumadija Div II, in turn, would support the Detachment by an advance from the Kitak-Paklinak front. Farther east the rest of the Sumadija Div would "actively reconnoiter." Thus heavy fighting developed in the afternoon, which FZM Wurm interpreted as an enemy attempt to break through. However, Col. Nöhring's 5 Mtn Bde stopped the attack of the Lim Detachment cold; 17 Mtn Bde dealt similarly with the Serbs' attempt to recapture the Stupe Heights. Toward evening the "Ottocac" IR # 79 stormed the stoutly-defended Kitak Heights and took most of its garrison prisoner. The "active reconnaissance" against 13 Mtn Bde developed into a fight around Visibaba which also ended unsuccessfully for the Serbs.

Meanwhile GM Pongracz had pushed the Montenegrins farther back, but lacked the strength to continue his advance as the defenders were reinforced. The west wing of 8 Mtn Bde, on the left of Pongracz' 3 Bde, reached the heights north of Novosevci. Col. Wieden came up to also join GM Pongracz' group.

21 October
The battle reached its high point on 21 October. The Montenegrins launched heavy attacks against Bandin Odzak; the Lim Detachment and substantial parts of Sumadija Div II attacked Pobraci, Stupe and Kitak. Their repeated assaults were repulsed only by strenuous exertions. The hottest fighting took place on the Kitak, defended by IR # 79, until around 5:00 PM a final Serbian wave forced the defenders to retreat to the Visevina. Assuming that further heavy fighting lay ahead for 18 ID, FZM Wurm that evening ordered 4 Mtn Bde from GM Goiginer's Combined ID to march to Milici (east of Vlasenica), so that it would be available as reinforcements. 7 Lst Terr Bde, which had arrived at Han Pijesak, took the place of 4 Mtn Bde in the Combined ID.

50 ID opened its attack toward the Siljava glava and Nepravdici rather early. Apparently the group which had been guarding the entry into the Praca Valley was drawn into this action, so that Lt Col. Heider - to his own surprise - was able to scale the Gales in the morning. Advancing along the plateau, GM Pongracz overcame the resistance of an enemy advanced group on his southern wing at 1:00 PM. Meanwhile Col. Wieden had attacked the Siljava glava from the north with two battalions, while four other battalions strove to circle around the heights north of Nepravdici. An enemy counterattack from that town was repulsed. At the same time the western group of 8 Mtn Bde worked its way up to the northernmost Montenegrin strong point, the Ticijak; by noon the attackers were already just 500 paces from the enemy position. As Pongracz' group was now also approaching, the assault was launched. The Montenegrins stood their ground in a bayonet fight, but were finally thrown back; they attempted in vain to establish a new position behind Nepravdici. The approach of darkness and the exhaustion of the troops brought the action to an end.

Beginning of the enemy retreat

The victors expected that the fight would be renewed on the next morning. However, the Montenegrins had been shaken by the heavy actions; now, moreover, the subversive activity which the Serbs had undertaken against their allies began to have an effect. The soldiers mistrusted their commanders and even the King. In one battalion exasperation led to mutiny. The men drove their officers away and the battalion marched through Rogatica toward home, intending to expound their grievances against their leadership to the King! 502

502 Serbian official history, Vol. III, p. 114
In this situation the Serdar Vukotic had no choice other than to order the Plevlje Division to retreat during the night behind the Praca to the heights north and northwest of Gorazde. The Drina Detachment wasn't informed of this movement, but when it was discovered in the morning of the 22nd the Detachment pulled its north wing back to the heights behind the Cemernica Brook. Serbian Gen. Aracic now had to pull the badly threatened Lim Detachment behind the Rokitnica, abandoning Rogatica. However, this new hook-shaped line was 15 km long and not connected to the Montenegrins farther south; it could hardly be seriously defended by the exhausted Serbs. Gen. Aracic didn't conceal his forebodings in his report to the SOK. The Serbian high command still hoped to bring the Montenegrins back in line, and ordered the Uzice Armeegruppe commander: "Hold your current position as long as possible and then proceed in accordance with the developments on the battlefield." 

2. The pursuit to the Drina, 22–30 October

To the great surprise of the troops fighting on the west wing of XVI Corps, no enemy was to be seen near or far on the morning of 22 October. The pursuit began immediately, but on this day was greatly hindered by heavy rains. By evening only some advanced mounted patrols had reached Rogatica. In front of XVI Corps' east wing, the Sumadija Div II still stood unwavering. However, because of the complete collapse of the Montenegrins Gen. Aracic had meanwhile decided to begin to retreat behind the Drina on the night of 22–23 October; the Serbian high command concurred. 

Thus on the 23rd the east wing of XVI Corps could also join the pursuit. 5 and 8 Mtn Bdes encountered more serious resistance at the Mednik and Tmor Heights, but these rear guards were soon driven back. Under 50 ID, 3 Mtn Bde reached the area west of Hadrovici on the road to Megjegja, and 15 Mtn Bde reached Rogatica, where it was joined by Lt Col. Heider's detachment.

During the 23rd the Serbian Uzice Armeegruppe carried out its withdrawal by sectors without difficulty. The Montenegrins, covered by the Drina Detachment which was deployed on the Jabuka Ridge, reached Gorazde and the heights south of that town in front of the Drina. Here King Nikola ordered the Serdar Vukotic to turn around, because he wanted to at least hold the ridge on

503 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 114
504 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 121
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the watershed south of the lower Praca. When this became known by the SOK, they ordered Gen. Aracic to stubbornly hold a line between Staribrod and the mouth of the Lim. Also he and the Montenegrins were instructed to operate actively together and to prevent the Austrians from falling on one of the two allied groups with all their strength.505

Therefore fighting broke out once again on 24 October. The southern column of 8 Mtn Bde came up against the Serbian position on the road from Rogatica and farther south at 9:00 AM and was in serious trouble. At 10:00 AM the northern column of 3 Mtn Bde intervened in this action in the forests, which surged back and forth but favored the Serbs. Finally around 3:00 PM the Tyrol Lst IR # I hurried forward from its reserve position to help, and the situation stabilized. Meanwhile the southern column of 3 Mtn Bde was engaged against a regiment of the Lim Detachment on the Stolac Heights.

Gen. Aracic discovered that the energetic order from King Nikola had not borne fruit. Col. Wieden advanced with a Landsturm battalion and a battery against the Jabuka Ridge; when he arrived in the low ground of the Praca Valley, he began an artillery bombardment and sent two companies ahead as scouts onto the Montenegrins' flanks. As soon as this happened the enemy pulled back toward Foca. Gen. Aracic didn't want to be left alone to confront the other k.u.k. columns as they came up, so at 4:00 PM he ordered his units to retreat over the Drina. A battalion of 3 Mtn Bde, which GM Pongracz had sent on an envelopment maneuver toward the Ivica, found that the enemy in this sector had disappeared; it wheeled north and forced the Serbs back, taking two guns. Toward evening the northern column of 8 Mtn Bde and advance guards of 5 Mtn Bde climbed the Veliko brdo. Somewhat earlier the fighting on the Stolac ended with the retreat of its defenders. This regiment of the Lim Detachment couldn't fall back through Megjegja, where a battalion of 15 Mtn Bde had already taken the crossing point on the Drina; it turned toward Visegrad instead. Thus it was the only Serbian unit still on the west bank of the Drina on 25 October when it was hit by the pursuers and pulled to pieces.

The XVI Corps had carried out the most important part of its assigned tasks, a considerable achievement for 29 battalions opposed by 40 1/2 (25 1/2 Serbian and 15 Montenegrin). FZM Potiorek's subsequent Army order was generous with words of praise. There is no doubt that the SOK itself bore much of the

505 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 128
responsibility for the course of these operations that turned out so unfavorably for Serbia. Another problem was the lack of a unified command for the allied forces who had invaded Bosnia. After the battle was lost, King Nikola was at first inclined to remedy this situation, but his willingness disappeared when the mutiny was investigated and he learned how much trouble the Serbs had stirred up against him.

3. Actions by Cattaro and in Herzegovina, 19-30 October

Moreover, during this period the King of Montenegro had done everything in his power in other sectors to relieve the burden on the units which had entered Bosnia. No doubt if his opponents had been less cool and rational he could have induced them to divert troops from the decisive action to the secondary areas of operation. Beginning on 19 October the Montenegrins' heavy guns, including some newer models with a range of 11 km, had thundered from Mt Lovcen against the fortifications of Cattaro. However, a shortage of ammunition forced them to be used sparingly after the 25th. Aus-Hung. planes based at the Bocche retaliated by throwing bombs on the harbor of Antivari to disrupt the arrival of supplies. Also, five Aus-Hung. torpedo craft attacked the harbor early on 18 October, despite the proximity of the French fleet, and made an effective bombardment which caused heavy damage.

At this time King Nikola also shook the Montenegrin Herzegovina Group out of its lethargy. The Group deployed batteries at Kosmac (east of Trebinje) and also east of Bileca. On 26 October a sortie by the garrison of Trebinje drove away the former battery; the latter - armed only with field guns - proved ineffective. However, these artillery operations were just feints which were supposed to divert the Austrians' attention from the principal attack on Avtovac which a Montenegrin "division" opened on the 23rd. Its first objective was the dominating height (Kobila glava) on the road to Bileca, which was captured on the afternoon of the 24th. FZM Potiorek's response was to order most of the Kalinovac garrison to hurry to Avtovac.

Heavy fighting erupted on the 25th around Gat Hill (south of Avtovac). A detachment which came up from Bileca as reinforcements was forced back, after suffering heavy losses, to the area around Plana; here, however, it was able to stop the pursuing Montenegrins on the 26th. On the same day Gat was held
in eight hours of hot combat; however, the whole position opposite the Dukla depression was evacuated in the evening because of a misunderstanding. At this point considerable reinforcements had already arrived, so that 16 k.uk. companies and 10 guns were available. Although this force had been patched together from a variety of sources, on the 27th it launched a counterattack and recovered the entire position; the detachment from Bileca provided useful support. After further actions on both flanks of the position overlooking the valley on the 29th, there was a lull in operations for a long time. Thus the danger in this sector had been overcome using modest resources.

Meanwhile on the 26th Col. Wieden, reinforced by Lt Col. Heider's Detachment, had driven the Montenegrins still encamped by Gorazde back over the Drina with artillery fire. On the same day parts of the Plevlje Division moved toward Foca to join up with the Drina Detachment. Therefore Col. Wieden turned in this direction, and by the evening of the 30th had driven the Montenegrins from the entire western bank of the upper Drina by Foca.

D. The Offensive to Valjevo, 24 October–15 November

(see volume 1 sketch 51 and 52)

1. Preparations for the attack

FZM Potiorek had scarcely freed himself of anxiety about the south, when new storm clouds appeared in northeast Serbia. Russian troops and considerable military equipment were allegedly approaching on transports on the Danube, and the Serbs were apparently preparing to once more cross the Sava, this time by Skela-Kupinovo. On 21 October the 5th Army HQ was instructed to have monitors destroy the bridging equipment which the Serbs were gathering on the Sava; at the same time the Army was told to finally finish the operations in the Macva before any Russians could intervene. As ordered, the monitor "Temes" and patrol boat "b" destroyed the Serbian river-crossing gear, but on the return voyage upstream "Temes" struck a mine off Grabovci and sank.

FZM Potiorek asked the AOk to give him authority over all March formations in the adjacent Hungarian territorial military districts in case they were needed to repulse a Russian invasion of the Banat. Gdi Conrad wouldn't agree to this, but he did place under Potiorek his last reserve, the 6th Lst Terr Bde from
the Prague Corps District. He also advised that 5th Army regroup to ensure the security of Hungary. At the same time as Conrad’s reply, the BOK received a report from the Temesvar Military Command of increased river traffic downstream from Orsova, and of enemy troop movements on the Danube by Dl. Milanovac. The actual cause of the activity was the assembly by the Serbs of the "Krajina Detachment" in this sector; its mission was really defensive, in response to rumors that 30,000 Aus-Hung. troops were deploying north of Orsova. The German Great General Staff in Berlin reported that a corps of 35,000 Russians was ready to be shipped to the Balkan, and that 20,000 Greek volunteers were coming to New Serbia to relieve the garrisons there for employment at the front.

Thus for good or evil FZM Potiorek now had be concerned about the security of the Banat, which should be ready to at least slow down the first wave of any enemy offensive. The Banat sector was removed from that of Syrmia (which came under the orders of 5th Army HQ), and placed under FML Hess, the military commander of Temesvar. He was reinforced by 6 Lst Terr Bde plus six squadrons and three batteries from 5th Army. That Army also placed a reserve force of several battalions reinforced with cavalry and artillery at Indjija, where it could assist either Syrmia or the Banat if needed. There were contingency plans for sending further troops to the Banat Group in an emergency.

Above all, however, the main concern of the BOK was to bring the strenuous actions on the Drina to a successful conclusion. FZM Potiorek once again planned to win by making frontal attacks with XIII and XV Corps along with thrusts against both Serbian flanks. 5th Army, which was expected to soon work its way out of the Macva, would conduct the northern thrust. In the south the XVI Corps would cross the Drina at Ljubovija and move through Pecka against the enemy's flank and rear.

According to orders which FZM Wurm received on the afternoon of the 24th, he was to leave about 10,000 men on the upper Drina under GM Snjaric; they would pretend to be preparing an immediate resumption of the offensive toward Uzice. The 4 Mtn Bde at Milici would cross the Drina at Rogacica to guard the south flank of the main body of XVI Corps while it simultaneously crossed farther downstream. The 9 and 7 Lst Terr Bdes would watch the Drina downstream from the mouth of the Zepa and ensure the security of the lines of communication of 6th Army.

The following was the order of battle of the Balkan units when
this new period of the campaign began.

5TH ARMY
(GdI Ritter von Frank; chief of staff was GM Gerabek)
. VIII Corps (FML von Scheuchenstuel; c/staff was Col Sündermann)
  Had 40 1/2 bns, 5 sqdns, 22 batties. 38,000 riflemen
    . 9 ID (GM Daniel) = 17 Bde (Col Hansmann), 18 Bde (Col Kornberger)
    . 21 LW ID (FML Przyborski) = 41 Bde (Col Keki), 42 Bde (GM Podhajsky), 71 Inf Bde (Col Wöllner)
  . Combined Corps (FML Alfred Krauss; c/staff was Lt Col Hittl)
  Had 42 bns, 6 sqdns, 21 batties. 29,000 riflemen
    . 7 ID (GM Letovsky) = 14 Bde (GM Baumgartner), 107 k.u. Lst Inf Bde (GM Breit)
    . 29 ID (GM Zanantoni) = 57 Bde (GM Schön), 58 Bde (GM Poleschensky), 104 k.u. Lst Inf Bde (GM Bekic)
  . Group Syrmia (FML Adalbert von Tamasy) - 26 1/2 bns, 7 sqdns, 8 1/2 batties. 17,000 riflemen
  . Group Banat (FML Hess; directly under BOK rather than 5 Army) - 11 1/2 bns. 8,000 riflemen
  . Independent on the lower Drina - 8 k.u. Lst Eta Bde (GM Kalic) with 7 bns, 2 sqdns, 2 batties. 5,000 riflemen
  . TOTAL strength of 5th Army plus Banat Group = 127 1/2 bns, 20 sqdns, 53 1/2 batties. 97,000 riflemen

6TH ARMY
(FZM Potiorek; chief of staff was GM Böltz)
. XIII Corps (GdI Freih. von Rhemen; c/staff was Alfred von Zeidler)
  Had 33 3/4 bns, 4 1/4 sqdns, 24 batties. 32,000 riflemen
    . 36 ID (FML Czibulka) = 13 Bde (GM Stracker), 72 Bde (Col Edler von Luxardo)
    . 42 Hon ID (GM Graf Salis) = 83 Bde (Col Mihaljevic), 84 Bde (Col Matasic)
  . XV Corps (GdI Edler von Appel; c/staff was Col von Falkhausen)
  Had 40 1/2 bns, 26 1/4 batties. 37,000 riflemen
    . 1 ID (FML von Bogat) = 7 Mtn Bde (Col Ströher), 9 Mtn Bde (GM Edler von Hrozny)
    . 40 Hon ID (GM Tabajdi) = 79 Bde (Col Ehmann), 80 Bde (GM Haber)
    . 48 ID (FML Ritter von Eisler) = 10 Mtn Bde (Col Edler von Droffa), 11 Mtn Bde (GM Lawrowski), 12 Mtn Bde (Col Ritter von Soretic)
  . XVI Corps (FZM Wurm; c/staff was Col von Loefen)
  Had 70 1/2 bns, 4 3/4 sqdns, 26 1/4 batties. 65,000 riflemen
    . Combined ID (Heinrich Goiginger) = 1 Mtn Bde (Col von
Lukachich), 2 Mt Bde (GM Gabriel), 6 Mtn Bde (Col von Hellebromth), 14 Mtn Bde (Col von Reinöhl); 109 k.u. Lst Inf Bde (GM Czeisberger), 7 k.k. Lst Terr Bde (GM Franzel). 18 ID (FML Trollmann) = 4 Mtn Bde (GM Konopicky), 5 Mtn Bde (GM Nöhring), 8 Mtn Bde (GM Andrian), 13 Mtn Bde (GM Graf Berchtold). 50 ID (GM Edler von Kalser) = 3 Mtn Bde (GM von Pongracz), 15 Mtn Bde (Col Edler von Wieden), 16 Mtn Bde (GM Erwin Zeidler); 9 k.u. Lst Eta Bde (GM Lenz).

Drina security force (FML Snjaric) had 15 1/4 bns, 1/2 sqdn, 7 1/2 batties. 10,000 riflemen

Units - 17 Mtn Bde (Lt Col Karpellus), Col Hauser's Group (of 3 Lst Terr bns).

TOTAL strength of 6th Army = 160 bns, 12 1/2 sqdns, 84 batties. 144,000 riflemen

FORTRESS GARRISONS

Sarajevo (6000), Kalinovik (8800), Mostar (4000), Fort Grad (120), Stolac (120), Avtovac (3500), Bileca (1670), Trebinje (1800), Cattaro (17,800)

Units in the fortresses totalled 25 1/4 bns, 6 batties. 43,810 riflemen

TOTAL STRENGTH of the BALKAN UNITS

312 3/4 bns, 32 1/2 sqdns, 143 1/2 batties. Rifle strength was 284,810 (of whom 45,000 were security forces on the Danube, Sava and Drina Rivers and at Sarajevo, and another 29,000 with the security force in Herzegovina). Therefore the field army had about 210,000 riflemen (plus 3000 cavalry and 600 guns)

The strengths shown above were achieved after incorporating all the March formations available to date, which offset casualties. Losses had run to about 50% of the units' original strength and included about 50 officers and 6000 men who'd been taken prisoner. On the other hand, the Austrians had taken prisoner about 70 officers and 15,000 men from the Serbs and Montenegrins, as well as 60 guns, 80 munitions wagons, 40 machine guns and 3 standards.

2. End of the fighting in the Macva; the Serbs attempt to break through on Gucevo Ridge (24-31 October)

(see volume 1 leaflet 22 and sketch 50)

Because of the imagined menace from the Russians, GdI Frank
strengthened GM Salis' Group at Ravnje in the Macva with four battalions from VIII Corps and one from the Combined Corps. These units were still on their way on the afternoon of 24 October when some improvised trench mortars threw high explosives into the Serbian trenches, which were already under very heavy artillery fire, and threw the defenders into confusion. Without waiting for orders, the k.u.k. IR # 37 (from south Hungary) stormed two parallel lines of the enemy position. A Serbian counterattack from Ravnje was warded off. However, when the attack was resumed early on the 25th the enemy was better prepared. Artillery cross fire swept over the narrow sector, and effective flanking fire from Radenkovic also took its toll. Therefore on the 26th a force of five and a half battalions (the most that could be deployed in the swamp) was sent against Radenkovic. This attack through difficult terrain broke down completely. There was also no further progress at Ravnje, despite very effective support from the monitors "Maros" and "Körös."

Meanwhile the artillery preparations for VIII Corps' attack on the causeway road were finally complete, and the offensive began at 7:00 AM on the 27th. 9 ID struck northwest of Crnabar, while the artillery kept the Serbs pinned in their trenches; 21 LW ID soon captured the adjacent portion of the position to the north. At 9:00 AM the commander of 2nd Serbian Army - Gen. Stepanovic - ordered a retreat to the second line at Banovopolje. Krauss' Combined Corps wasn't as far advanced with its preparations for the offensive and couldn't take advantage of the Serbs' precarious position. VIII Corps had taken 1000 unwounded prisoners, 4 guns, 8 machine guns and much military equipment; the Serbs also left 800 dead on the battlefield. To exploit this victory, GdI Frank ordered VIII Corps to thrust toward Bogatic and the east wing of Combined Corps toward Stitar. This would threaten the enemy with envelopment on both flanks while their center was pinned down by Krauss' west wing on the line Radenko-Pricinovic.

Gen. Stepanovic's future seemed even more uncertain because he was struggling with a constant shortage of ammunition. He gave his divisional commanders preliminary orders for a retreat, sent back his supply trains, and asked permission to evacuate the civilian population of the Macva. Finally, in the evening he asked to be relieved of his command "as a last attempt to obtain a larger provision of ammunition." 506

506 Serbian official history, Vol. III, pp. 145 and 152
Putnik didn't want to hear negative talk. His encouraging response was: "If we have no more artillery ammunition, we will defend ourselves solely with rifles. We will not give up to the damned Svaba." Although the Voivode thus sounded confident in his telephone conversation with Stepanovic, in fact he was more concerned than he admitted by the setback in Bosnia and by the critical situation of 2nd Army. This must be the explanation of why he now adopted a suggestion which had been made on the 24th by the commander of 3rd Army, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm. The General wished to attempt a breakthrough with his Army on both sides of Kuliste, while 1st Army pretended to attack in its sector.

Therefore on 28 October at 9:00 AM, encouraged by beautiful weather, 13 battalions of the Serbian Combined Div attacked on both sides of Kuliste, supported on their left wing by 3 battalions of Drina Div I. The main attack was opposed by 40 Hon ID, the "Domobranen" of 42 Hon ID, and the Croatian and Serbian troops of IR # 78 (from 13 Inf Bde). They fought gallantly against the enemy, who was only able to reach the defenses with part of their forces. Finally the Serbs gave up the offensive as hopeless.

The assault on the second Serbian line in the Macva wouldn't take place until the artillery was brought forward. However, Gen. Stepanovic had already decided to make a second retreat. The only question was whether he would move back step-by-step, as desired by the high command, or quickly pull back to the prepared line Sabac-Ljesnica. Supported by the united opinion of his divisional commanders, Stepanovic got Putnik to agree to the second scenario. On the night of 30-31 October he led his Army back through the swamp and down roads clogged by fleeing civilians, without being detected by the enemy. Putnik had now received a report that supplies, especially ammunition, would soon arrive at Salonika from France. Therefore he ordered that every man in the 2nd Army must be prepared to fight on in their new position until victory was won.

3. Attacks by the Aus-Hung. flanking groups, 1-5 November

(see volume 1 sketch 50 and 51)

507 Translator's Note - "Svaba" (Swabians) was a name for Austrians in Serbian slang. It probably derived from the fact that the German colonists in south Hungary had been known as Swabians.
On the morning of 31 October when GdI Frank’s troops moved forward to attack, they were surprised to meet only insignificant resistance from Serbian screening units. During the day they reached Glogovac, Bogatic, and the area northwest of Sabac.

On 1 November the VIII Corps also reached the Sabac-Ljesnica railroad without seeing action, but Krauss’ Combined Corps had to attack toward Stitar (with 14 Inf Bde, 104 and 107 Lst Inf Bdes) and Sabac (with 29 ID). Serbian advance guards on the causeway road from Stitar to Jerez were driven back. 29 ID, supported by monitors, fought a stubborn and difficult action until the onset of darkness, when the Serbs retreated from their position just north of Sabac. GM Schön occupied the town before midnight.

2 November was a day of rest in beautiful autumn weather while the enemy position was evaluated. The Serbs were deployed on a gently rising swell of ground; since the corn fields were bare after the harvest, the lack of cover posed extraordinary difficulties for the attackers. To initiate the envelopment desired by the BOK, GdI Frank attacked on 3 November toward the southeast, with a strong eastern wing. 14 Inf Bde and 104 Lst Inf Bde, although supported by GM Schön’s group from 29 ID, were unable to advance against the heights at Jevrenovac because of overwhelming artillery fire. Serb artillery also checked the other group of 29 ID (under GM Poleschensky), which had been sent toward Misar. A night attack by 29 ID was equally unsuccessful. It became evident that several days of preparation would be needed before the strong position could be overcome.

71 Inf Bde and 21 LW ID, which were supposed to thrust through Maovi toward Varna and through Dobric toward Slatina, were held in place by the Serbs’ advance position at Dobric.

9 ID was told to move forward from a line running between the north end of Lipolist and Ribari, while on its flank some battalions from 8 Lst Eta Bde guarded the area farther west to the Drina. The Division pushed Serbian cavalry out of Lipolist back to the first line held by Morava Div I south of the village.

Dobric was taken on 4 November, and the advanced position south of Lipolist on the 5th. The attack on the heights south of Sabac, however, failed to progress. In the general strategic plan for the offensive this was no great disadvantage.
pressure on the two Serbian flanks would have to take place simultaneously with the frontal assault to make the hoped-for success as great as possible.

XVI Corps was meanwhile being ably deployed behind the Drina; it enjoyed a few days of rest, and on 4 November entered Srebrenica. Although it was intended to give the Corps yet another rest day, the tense situation made it inadvisable to further delay the planned offensive. Therefore on the 5th the men moved to the Drina at Ljubovija, where they would cross on the night of 6-7 November behind the cover of the heights along the river.

Accordingly the XIII and XV Corps, along with Goiginger's Combined ID, were to begin their attacks early on the 6th. At the same time 5th Army would reinforce 21 LW ID with 41 LW Inf Bde (hitherto held in Corps reserve), so that all of its strength would be employed in the thrust against the rising ground south of Sabac.

To prepare for the great offensive, on the 5th the batteries on the Gucevo and the Boranja opened a heavy bombardment of the Serbian positions. To divert the enemy's attention from the sector of the attack, the batteries on the Danube and Sava were also firing, as were the guns opposite the Uzice Group on the Drina.

Gen. Stepanovic was already rather worried on 4 November by the continuing pressure from the 5th k.u.k. Army. To make his defensive operations easier, the Serbian high command reassigned Timok Div II to him from 3rd Army, and also ordered the Dunav Div II of 1st Army to reinforce 2nd Army. The Austrian cannonade on the 5th gave Gen. Bojovic a welcome reason to protest against the weakening of his 1st Army; however, he could only persuade Putnik to leave him one regiment of Dunav II. The rest of the Division began its march toward 2nd Army on the evening of 5 November.  

The Serbs' deployment thus was playing into FZM Potiorek's hands. This was in part to their trust in the strength of the carefully constructed field fortifications of 1st Army and in the morale of the troops, whose strength had been increased by the dissolution of several formations and the incorporation of their personnel - along with superfluous cavalry and artillery - into the front-line infantry. It was also due to the activities

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508 Serbian official history, Vol. III, p. 208
on the Aus-Hung. side of FML Snjaric. By numerous stratagems (such as lighting camp fires, conspicuous troop movements, etc.) he led the enemy to believe that XVI Corps was present on the upper Drina preparing to attack through Visegrad. Thus the Uzice Armeegruppe was still guarding the Drina from the Rogacica area up to the mouth of the Lim, where it linked up with 24,000 Montenegrins.

Therefore developments were favorable for the outcome of FZM Potiorek's planes. The next step was to get the Serbian center to continue to offer stubborn resistance until the offensive by the two flanking groups could have an effect. At that time the Serbs would have to retreat in the most difficult possible circumstances and might suffer a catastrophic defeat.
4. The victory on the Drina, 6-9 November

(see volume 1 sketch 50, 51, and 52)

6-7 November

A promising opening to the offensive was the successful storm of the advanced Serbian trench on Hill # 708 between Kuliste and Crni vrh # 769, carried out before dawn by parts of IR # 78 and of 36 ID.\textsuperscript{509} In the light of day, after a very thorough artillery preparation and destructive trench mortar fire, the whole XIII Corps attacked the Combined ID (which had been reinforced to 27 1/2 battalions and 37 guns); the first position was stormed at 3:00 PM, the second at 5:00 PM. The enemy pulled back to the third position behind the Stira. XV Corps was less successful. The north wing of GM Goiginger's Combined ID took the Nesino brdo, while the south wing, after a difficult crossing of a ravine, established a firm foothold in the advanced trenches of the defenses of Sv. Petar Ridge.

When the Serbian high command learned at noon about the difficult action of their Combined ID, they halted the northward march of Dunav Div II at Osecina. They ordered it to send a regiment through Zavlaka to 3rd Army. In the evening the situation still didn't seem dangerous.

Early on 7 November the Serbian front suffered heavy blows in two places. The south wing of GM Goiginger's ID, whose sector had never been quiet during the night, threw the Serbs off the Sv. Petar Ridge. GM von Hrozny's 9 Mtn Bde stormed the trenches on the Kozja stena, while 11 and 12 Mtn Bdes closed in on the Kostajnik in a half circle. The north wing of GM Goiginger's Div was halted by the resistance of a Serbian detachment on a crag southwest of Sanac; however, it plastered the enemy position with artillery fire and was only awaiting the arrival of the enveloping group from the south to launch its next attack.

At 1:00 PM this situation caused the commander of Dunav Div I to order a retreat to the line Krupanj-Zdrela-Veles. Therefore the Austrians were able to take the Sanac easily, while toward

\textsuperscript{509} During this feat of arms, Cpt. Emil Prochaska of the Slavonian IR # 78 was especially distinguished. Therefore he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.
evening GM Goiginger's north wing had already reached the new
station of Dunav Div I. Morava Div II had no choice other than
to pull back to the line Stolice Pass-Miokovac-Krupanj.
Contrary to expectations the Serbs had been evicted from almost
all of their strong mountain positions by a frontal assault;
only the heights of Stolica and Kostajnik were still holding
out, although seriously menaced.

The flank groups, which FZM Potiorek had expected to decide the
battle, were less successful than the center. The general
attack of 5th Army on 6 November was stopped cold because of
overwhelming Serbian fire. On the east wing the 58 Inf Bde,
supported by batteries on the north bank of the Sava and
especially by the monitors, was able to take a forward position
on the Misar Heights. However, the attack of 57 and 14 Inf Bdes
against the heights south of Sabac and at Jevremovac broke down
completely. On the next day the 21 LW ID worked its way to
within small-arms range of the enemy obstructions at Dobric, and
71 Inf Bde did the same at Maovi. However, they were still
pinned down by artillery firing from Jevremovac, and so decided
to resort to the technique of sapper attacks which had worked in
the Macva. The offensive of 7 and 29 ID stalled. On the other
hand, a group from Morava Div I which had been sent against
Lipolist in response to Gen. Stepanovic's order to conduct a
"powerful reconnaissance" was checked with heavy losses in an
action with 9 ID and fell back to its main defensive position.

Under XVI Corps, 3 Mtn Bde at Ljubovija was the first unit of 50
ID to begin crossing the Drina (after darkness fell on 6
November). The crossing of 18 ID farther upstream was postponed
until 2:00 AM on the 7th because the military bridging equipment
was delayed on the miserable roads. GM Konopicky's 4 Mtn Bde
was able to cross the river without incident below Rogacica.
Feints by 9 Lst Eta Bde and Col. Chwostek's Group were so
effective that the Uzice Bde believed they would cross the Drina
at Bajinabasta and directed all of its attention to that area.
13 Mtn Bde couldn't conquer the heights east of the river, so
that 18 ID had to begin building its bridges in the darkness and
the crossing of 5 and 8 Mtn Bdes had to be carried out in the
night.

The Serbian high command was already alarmed toward noon on 7
November by reports from the Ljubovija Detachment. Toward
evening they heard from the Uzice Armeegruppe that it was
confronted by "apparently fresh troops in dark uniforms." On
the other hand, news from Cetinje indicated that only weak
forces confronted the Sanjak Group and that the bulk of the
enemy had moved elsewhere. Putnik recognized that he was threatened with encirclement and could thank his good fortune that Dunav Div II hadn't been drawn into the actions of 1st Army, and therefore was available as a reserve. Nonetheless, he also realized that the Battle of the Drina was lost. Toward midnight he ordered 3rd Army to retreat to the line Kumovac (on the Cer planina) - Jarebice - Culiste Height # 383. The two armies on the wings would fall back to link up with this position.510

FZM Potiorek meanwhile felt that his work was still incomplete and that only a ruthless pursuit by the victorious divisions in the center could win the large-scale victory he was seeking. Therefore on the evening of the 7th he issued orders for the pursuit by 6th Army. As usual, all available units should be sent to the most important parts of the front. At the same time he ordered FML Snjaric in southeast Bosnia to send the greatest possible part of his group on a thrust through Visegrad toward Uzice.

8 November

On 8 November rain returned and soon turned the roads into morasses; this made the movement of the supply trains very difficult. The area was rich in food stuffs, which permitted the k.u.k. troops to feed themselves; all other military necessities were in short supply.

The main body of 3rd Serbian Army deployed in its new position. Many regiments seemed "totally unfit" for any other operations because of their heavy casualties and poor morale.

By evening Potiorek's XIII and XV Corps, after engaging Serbian rear guards, reached the heights just east of the Lozница-Крупанј Road. Goiginger's ID encountered more difficulty; its south wing had to fight hard on the stubbornly-defended Zdrela and Veles heights. At the same time 50 ID was advancing north of the road to Pecka and exerting heavy pressure on the retreating Dunav Div I - 16 Mtn Bde approached the Petkovo brdo and 3 Mtn Bde stormed the three-tiered position on the Dugo after a hot action. South of the road, 18 ID fought its way forward toward the Orovicka planina and finally came up against the advance elements of Dunav Div II, which were reinforcing this sector. 4 Mtn Bde was able to set foot on the chain of heights just east of the Drina after a difficult action; it

510 Serbian official history, Vol. III, p. 254
repulsed a thrust by parts of the Serbian Uzice Bde and finally reached a pass just in front of the fortified position at Zapolje which barred the way through the crest to the Rogacica-Valjevo Road.

Thus the flank attack of XVI Corps was being contained. Nevertheless the commander of 1st Army, Gen. Bojovic, suggested that his front be pulled back to the area northeast of Pecka. Putnik refused to agree; only in case of a retreat forced by the enemy could the Army pull back to a position on the heights west and south of Pecka. If this happened 3rd Army would go back to a line running from the ruins on the Cer planina through Zavlaka to Belcrrkva. After reaching the ruins on the heights, Timok Div II would come under command of 2nd Army.

The 2nd Serbian Army was still undefeated. Although an advance position at Jevremovac was lost to 104 Lst Inf Bde, the retreat of the Serbian left wing to the Kumovac Heights was so well protected by artillery that 9 ID and 21 LW ID gained very little ground.

Prisoners asserted to the Austrians that it had already been decided on the 7th to retreat to the Arangjelovac area. Before the war there had been much discussion about this position, where it was intended to defeat the invading "Svabas." Therefore the demoralized rank and file thought of nothing but retreating to this area, where they hoped a miracle would occur. Although no such orders had been issued by the Serbian leadership, the events of 8 November made it certain that 2nd Army would soon have to pull back. Therefore FZM Potiorek ordered 5th Army to thrust ahead to Koceljeva-Banjani, in the direction of Ub.

In the night of 8-9 November reports from Dunav Div II informed the SOK of the strong pressure against the southern flank. Therefore 3rd Army was advised to carry out its retreat to Zavlaka as soon as possible. 1st Army would pull back Morava Div II and Dunav I to maintain a continuous line with Dunav II on the flank.

9 November

Amid continuing rear guard actions, the k.u.k. XIII Corps advanced to the Kumovac (36 ID) and east of Jarebic (42 Hon ID). XV Corps reached a point west of Zavlaka (40 Hon and 48 ID) and Culiste (1 ID). XVI Corps was engaged in more difficult fighting. It attacked Dunav Div I from two directions – from
the northwest with the south wing of Goiginger's ID (over the
Sokolska planina) and from the south with 50 ID. 3 and 16 Mtn
Bdes took the several summits of the Sokolska from the Dunav Div
in heavy actions which lasted from early morning until noon.
Goiginger's north wing meanwhile fought difficult actions
against Morava Div II as the latter retreated behind the
Belacrkvansjka reka. 18 ID thrust toward Pecka, but Dunav Div
II was still blocking its way on both sides of the Proslop Pass.
After the loss of the Sokolska, around 1:00 PM the SOK ordered
1st Army to retreat to the Pecka-Osecina road (Morava Div II,
facing west) and to the heights on the Pecka-Stave Road (Dunav
Divs I and II, facing south). To cover the deployment on this
position, the group at Proslop was to hold out as long as
possible. At night the 8 Mtn Bde was able to storm a height
west of Proslop after suffering heavy casualties.

FML Trollmann had allowed 5 Mtn Bde on the Orovicka planina to
shift toward the Rogacica-Valjevo Road; this would threaten the
flank and rear of the Serbs who were blocking the advance of 4
Mtn Bde.

The 2nd Serbian Army was still staying stubbornly in place on
the rising ground south of Sabac. However, GM Poleshensky with
58 Inf Bde, brilliantly supported by the river monitors,
advanced along the Sava until by the evening of the 9th he was
near the mouth of the Dobrava, already in the rear of the Misar
position. On the other wing, 9 ID had made contact with 36 ID
on the Cer planina. 21 LW ID had repulsed heavy Serbian
counterattacks. In the morning Gen. Stepanovic learned by
chance of the imminent retreat of the other Armies. This caused
him to make a concerned inquiry to the SOK, which referred him
to the orders of the day before, under which if forced to
retreat he should take up a position behind the Dobrava.
Stepanovic didn't wish to be left behind. He now recognized
that a general retreat would be taking place soon, and pulled
2nd Army back to the line Dobrava-Slatina-Ruin Heights during
the night of 9-10 November.

In the late hours of the evening the SOK did finally decide on a
general retreat. 1st Army would hold its positions at Pecka to
firmly guard the south flank. 3rd Army would first pull back
along the Zavlaka-Valjevo road to the Crniljevo-Osecina road.
2nd Army would move along the Sabac-Koceljeva and Sabac-Ub roads
to a line running from the Stolica Heights to Dabrinje-Debrč
(see volume 1 sketch 52).

Putnik's victory was tarnished by a setback suffered by 6 Lst
Terr Bde (from Prague) at Semendria. Because hostilities were breaking out between Russia and Turkey it was now certain that the rumors of the approach of a Russian corps on the Danube River were merely a fantasy. Therefore the territorial command in the Banat wanted to add to the pressure against the enemy and proposed to cross the Danube at Semendria. The BOK greeted this "bold decision", from which it hoped to gain a psychological advantage. The somewhat rash enterprise on 9 November was at first successful against two Serbian Landsturm battalions guarding the river. However, in the afternoon two more battalions came up as reinforcements and counterattacked the Territorial Bde. The batteries on the north bank couldn't provide sufficient support due to shortage of ammunition; the infantry, insufficiently trained, soon were in great distress. Casualties mounted up, and included four battalion commanders. The demoralized troops thereupon fell back to their landing area, which only further confused the situation. There weren't enough boats to carry them all back to the Hungarian shore, so 1800 men were taken prisoner.

5. Pursuit actions, 10-12 November

(see volume 1 sketch 51 and 52)

10 November

Under streams of rain, the Morava Div II and Dunav Div I of 1st Army moved back toward Pecka in the night of 9-10 November along the miserable roads. Meanwhile Dunav Div II was concerned about its connection with Valjevo because k.u.k. 5 Mtn Bde, south of the Ljubovija Brook, was marching toward the east; therefore the Div hastily pulled back to the Suvodo. Flanking artillery fire from the heights northeast of Pecka prevented 18 ID from close pursuit. The SOK scraped ten battalions together to occupy the Borovnjak Heights and thus to keep 5 Mtn Bde from reaching the Rogacica-Valjevo Road; this force was known as the Rogacica Detachment. 5 Mtn Bde reached Ramne, but its main concern was to help 4 Mtn Bde, which had already been stuck for 36 hours amid the rocks in the pass below Zapolje Heights; only 40 paces away the enemy was defending himself very stubbornly by tossing hand grenades and rolling down boulders.

The north wing of 1st Serbian Army was hard pressed by 50 ID and Goiginger's ID. Only with difficulty was the Morava Div II able to hold onto the important flank strong point of the Kik.
The retreat of 3rd Serbian Army was delayed until the early afternoon because the order to retire arrived late and because the great magazines in Zavlaka and Osecina had to first be evacuated. However, the troops of XV Corps, who'd been held up during the night by Serbian rear guards, didn't open their own advance until 10:00 AM; therefore no major fighting broke out.

Under 2nd Serbian Army, the disengagement from the Dobrava was also delayed. However, 5th k.u.k. Army didn't immediately notice that the main body of the enemy had left their positions. The Combined and VIII Corps sent out pursuing detachments, which were held up in skirmishes against patrols which had been left on the Dobrava. The Army therefore deployed in force for its advance, but when it was ready to move it found the Serbian rear guards had already vanished.

Timok Div II on the south wing had a more difficult time. To assist 5th Army, XIII Corps was sent toward Tekeris in the morning - 36 ID moved through the Cer planina and Ljesnica valley, 42 Hon ID from Jarebic directly on Tekeris. The Domobranen advance guard threw back the rear guard of Drina Div II at Jugovici, then approached the left wing of Timok Div II on the Kik and at Tekeris. Awaiting the intervention of 36 ID, 42 Hon ID was at first content to prepare for the attack with artillery fire. 36 ID meanwhile had the difficult task of driving the enemy from Todorov rt. and the Trojan ruins. While this was accomplished, the south column of 36 ID moved on toward Tekeris in cooperation with the Domobranen, hampered only by artillery fire from Drina Div II. The Serbian garrison of the Trojan ruins was scattered, and Tekeris was taken. After suffering heavy losses, Timok Div II retreated; this movement was covered by a rear guard on the Kik, which still hadn't been taken. At the same time Drina Div II pulled back toward the upper Tamnava.

11 November

The SOK decided early on 11 November to move its headquarters from Valjevo to Kragujevac, while taking its Armies back to well built positions north and west of Valjevo. On the southern wing, the Rogacica Detachment fell back toward Debelo brdo, and the Uzice Armeegruppe moved south to the pass southwest of Kremna (24 km south of Rogacica). On the north wing, the Obrenovac Detachment was deployed in the Skela-Obrenovac area; its mission was to guard the flank of 2nd Army against any invasion over the Sava; the Cav Div, under 2nd Army, was
responsible for maintaining touch with the Detachment. The SOK apparently had little faith in a successful defense by Valjevo, because at the same time it was preparing orders for a further retreat to positions behind the Kolubara – the Obrenovac Detachment would deploy east of Obrenovac, the Cav Div at Konatice, and 2nd Army on both sides of Lazarevac. 3rd Army would cross the Kolubara at Slovac and Divic to deploy behind the Ljig at Moravci; 1st Army would send two divisions through Valjevo and behind the upper Ljig, and one division farther west into the mountains to block the road to Grn. Milanovac. All communications and bridges would be destroyed; rations and livestock would either be evacuated or also destroyed.

On the other side, the small amount of ground gained on 10 November caused FZM Potiorek to give up his hope that the breakthrough of the Serbs' front could be exploited to do great damage to their wings. If the assertions of prisoners taken from all parts of the front about an imminent retreat to Kragujevac were correct, several long marches lay ahead for the k.u.k. troops. Thus getting supplies to the two Armies, which were already suffering some shortages, would become ever more difficult.\textsuperscript{511} The situation wouldn't improve until the invaders could reach the narrow-gauge line running from Obrenovac to Valjevo. This would become a vitally important issue, because it was already clear that the roads – really areas of bottomless mud – were totally unusable.

11 November

Therefore the directives which FZM Potiorek gave to his Armies on 11 November prescribed a continuous advance to make it impossible for the Serbs to stand fast at Valjevo or on the Kolubara. 5th Army would reach the Kolubara between Obrenovac and the mouth of the Ljig, and send advance guards over the river so that the railroad could be taken without damage. 6th Army would reach a line from Dudovica (on the Ljig) through Mionica and Brezgje to Povljen Heights; XVI Corps would assemble

\textsuperscript{511} Attempts to extend the main rail lines on the northern bank of the Sava to Raca and Klenak, and to construct field rail lines to transport large amounts of goods through the mud, were unsuccessful. The small-gauge line through Tuzla and Simin Han was being extended toward Zvornik, but this construction was still incomplete. Horse-drawn lines were being built, but so far only the completed line from Sabac to Koviljaca was providing some relief to the strained transport system.
in the area south of Valjevo to prevent interference from the Uzice Armeegruppe. After these orders were carried out, there would be a rather long pause for some necessary rest.

Because the Serbs didn't want to begin their retreat on 11 November until the evening dusk, 1st Army was greatly troubled by attacks from XVI Corps. Around noon Goiginger's Division stormed the Kik after some bloody fighting and thrust ahead to the Bojcica, where it captured guns and all sorts of equipment from Morava Div II. 50 ID, supported by a flank attack of 8 Mtn Bde (from 18 ID) took the heights south of the Bojcica. This in turn opened the way to the east for 18 ID, which was approaching Suvodo by the evening. Dunav Div II had already retreated east and taken up a position on the Sovacki Kik.

The Rogacica Detachment on the Zapolje Heights had been ordered to retreat to the Debelo brdo Pass, but couldn't do so during the day because it was hard pressed by 4 Mtn Bde plus a detachment of 5 Bde which had come up to help. The Serbs had to renew their resistance on the Crnevo stenje until night fell, and also had to keep the bulk of 5 Mtn Bde from taking the Borovnjak.

Because of the defeat of Morava Div II, the 3rd Serbian Army had to pull back Drina Div I (on its south wing) shortly after 2:00 PM; the other divisions had to follow suit at 4:00. However, they were not pressed by XV Corps. Because of the wretched condition of the side-roads and the continuing bad weather, VIII Corps only reached the Sabac-Koceljeva road. FML Krauss' Combined Corps, to which 71 Inf Bde had been added, pursued on the Sabac-Ub road and the area farther south. A detachment which had been sent quickly ahead came upon some dismounted cavalry northwest of Debrc around 10:00 AM. Around noon, when more substantial parts of the advance guard came up, the Serbs pulled back to join their main body, which the lead elements of 29 ID briefly encountered.

12 November

Toward noon of 12 November the 2nd Serbian Army reached its allotted position between Ub and the Blizonjski visovi, after a march which under the circumstances was quite quick. Timok Div II, at least, "had been thrashed to the point where it was unemployable"; it was soon transferred to 3rd Army, because Gen. Stepanovic felt that commanding five divisions was too burdensome. The 3rd Army reached Kamenica.
Air observation reports received during the 12th gave FZM Potiorek new hope that he would be able to force the enemy to give battle by Valjevo under unfavorable circumstances. Serbian supply wagons, artillery and artillery support trains, and fleeing refugees were causing a traffic jam at Koceljeva; further congestion had developed at Kamenica and Valjevo. On the other hand, the poor roads and weather were also causing enormous difficulties for the pursuers. The artillery, although hauled by powerful oxen, was falling further behind, and the supply trains sank into the mud. Any attempt to make the roads usable turned out to be a labor of Sisyphus.

The sun finally broke through on 12 November. However, the joy was brief, since rain started again in the evening. In the night there was snowfall, which continued into the 13th. Only advanced units of 5th Army were able to approach the line Draganje-Banjani-Dren. The main columns were still far behind. This was especially true of VIII Corps, which had expected based on aerial reconnaissance to find the Gomile-Stolice positions still occupied by the Serbs (actually they had been evacuated the evening before). Therefore the Corps was deployed for battle, which only further delayed its advance along the horrible roads. The Serbian Cavalry Division, which was engaged in many skirmishes with the k.u.k. advance guard, fell back toward the east. This enabled 29 ID to also advance east, while 104 Lst Inf Bde on the extreme left moved down the Sava. The only relatively serious action was at Dren, where parts of 29 ID surprised some men of the Obrenovac Detachment who had come forward to support the Cav Div, and broke them up with flanking fire.

XIII and XV Corps reached the road Kamenica-Sabac. West of Kamenica and in front of the Jolina breza, GM Goiginger's combined ID came upon Serbian outposts which were covering the construction of the new fortified line. By afternoon the Serbs were driven back, but the attack on the strong main position had to be postponed until the artillery came up.

In XVI Corps' sector, 50 ID deployed in front of the center of 1st Serbian Army. 8 Mtn Bde of 18 ID attacked the Medvenik through extremely difficult, snow-covered terrain. 13 Mtn Bde came to a halt in front of the Jablanik; 5 Mtn Bde was unable to take the Borovnjak, although a group from 4 Mtn Bde had already reached the road in the enemy rear. The main body of 4 Bde had to turn against the Jasenovac Heights and toward the north wing of the Uzice Brigade.
The determined resistance encountered by XVI Corps led FZM Potiorek to conclude that the Serbs intended to hold their ground in front of Valjevo. Because FML Krauss was confident that he would reach the Kolubara on the 13th, the Feldzeugmeister expected all of 5th Army to do the same. He believed that XV and XVI Corps would take Valjevo on the 13th. However, the supply situation was precarious. Parts of XVI Corps in the snowy mountains were already receiving almost nothing.

6. The capture of Valjevo, 13-15 November

13 November

Toward noon on 13 November, the Morava Div II on the Joina breza found itself hard pressed by Goiginger's Division. Around 2:00 PM this important point was lost, and the Serbs were forced to crowd together on the nearest high ground. Now GM Goiginger also let his left wing advance, supported by 10 Mtn Bde, against the south wing of Drina Div I. At the same time, 1st ID stormed the center at Osladi and at 4:00 PM took the trenches in that town. 7 Mtn Bde was then pulled from the front so that it could help Goiginger's Division at the capture of Kamenica and the heights farther south. Around 7:00 PM victory had also been secured at Kamenica.

The situation of 1st Serbian Army in the mountains appeared no less critical, although a heavy snow storm considerably weakened the combat effectiveness of the attackers and made cooperation with the artillery almost impossible. A group which 4 Mtn Bde sent around the Debelo brdo soon approached the Ml. Povljen; this threatened to outflank the Rogacica Department, which therefore withdrew to the north. The Serbian command demanded "A decisive defensive action to the last drop of blood, because we may not fall farther back"; however, reserves were lacking and exhaustion was causing general apathy. The threat of draconian punishments bore little fruit. As a last measure, the Comitajis were authorized to use force against any of their compatriots found drifting toward the rear.

Fortunately for the Serbs, the 5th Army - despite self-sacrificing efforts - only gained ground slowly on the 13th because of the bad weather and condition of the roads. Nonetheless, its advance toward the lower Kolubara caused Voivode Putnik his greatest concern. Therefore he repeatedly ordered parts of 2nd Army to thrust toward Koceljeva; this might
cause the Austrians who were pushing against the Cavalry Division to fall back, and would provide information about the composition of the enemy units in the area.

Gen. Stepanovic interpreted this instruction as an order for an offensive. He planned to attack at 7:00 AM on 14 November, if possible as far as the heights at Suvoselo-Drageina. Gen. Jurisic-Sturm didn't want to be left behind, and planned to have the three divisions of his right wing thrust in a westerly direction on the road to Kamenica. At the same time he ordered Drina Div I to again have its south wing establish a firm footing on the heights south of Kamenica if possible. Although Gen. Bojovic considered the position of his 1st Army to be quite critical, he was filled with new confidence by his hope for a decisive counterattack; therefore he decided to have the Army stay in place for yet another day.

14-15 November

However, in the night of 13-14 November the SOK again changed their mind. They learned that the Obrenovac Detachment, except for a weak rear guard, had pulled back behind the Kolubara, and that the Cavalry Div on the right wing of 2nd Army was behind the Ub and the Tamnava. This made the planned thrust by 2nd Army pointless. Moreover, reports from 1st and 3rd Armies revealed the poor condition of the western sector in front of Valjevo. Therefore the offensive was cancelled at 3:00 AM, which deprived FZM Potiorek of his chance for a great success that might even have decided the entire campaign. Putnik once again was planning to offer battle behind the Kolubara. Meanwhile the Serbs would hold their present positions on the 14th so that the supply trains could be evacuated.

Gen. Bojovic issued secret instructions for the next retreat if "absolutely necessary." Morava Div II would pull back on both sides of the Obnica valley, while the two Dunav divisions would withdraw to the north slopes of the Povljen- and Bukovska-planina. Gen. Jurisic-Sturm also gave preliminary instructions for the retreat around 9:00 AM.

By noon on the 14th the situation on the Serbian western front was extremely threatening. The left wing of GM Goiginer's Combined ID repulsed the thrust of the south part of Drina Div I. Goiginger's right threw back all of Morava Div II, and simultaneously the left wing began to counterattack. 1st ID assaulted the center of the hard-pressed Drina Div I, while 48 ID stormed the strong points on its right wing. Gen. Jurisic-
Sturm had to begin his retreat. While the enemy was breaking through on the west front, the troops of 1st Army were collapsing; their morale was "below any criticism" and some battalions "were refusing to obey or to fight." Therefore Gen. Bojovic issued the order to retreat at 2:00 PM. The two Army commanders agreed that the 1st Army would fall back on the 15th east of the Gradac Brook while 3rd Army would be just west of Valjevo and behind the Rabas; the next stage of the retreat would commence on the night of 15-16 November.

Meanwhile the portions of 3rd Army that were facing north, along with the west wing of 2nd Army, were heavily engaged until the evening of 15 November against a powerful attack by GdI Frank's Army. Advancing from the north and west, 42 and 40 Ho ID captured several advanced positions from the Serbian Combined ID; 36 ID appeared in the late evening on the inner wings of Morava Div I and Timok Div II.

Meanwhile Morava I had learned that its neighbor on the left, Timok Div II, would begin to retreat around 5:30 PM, the last unit of 3rd Army to do so. Gen. Stepanovic thereupon asked the high command whether 2nd Army should also move back, but was merely told to conduct operations in agreement with 3rd Army HQ. Stepanovic didn't receive the explicit order he had expected, because the Voivode broke off the telephone conversation with a curt "Zbogom!" ("With God!") Stepanovic interpreted the conversation as giving him full freedom of movement, and ordered an immediate retreat behind the Kolubara. He didn't modify the order after he received instructions by telegram from Putnik that the retreat should be coordinated with that of 3rd Army. Stepanovic naturally didn't want to lose the opportunity of bringing his troops into the best possible order in their new position during the night. Moreover, the Kolubara sector was already endangered by the north wing of 5th k.u.k. Army. 104 Lst Inf Bde had taken Obrenovac and in the evening was fighting to cross the Tamnava east of the town. 29 ID was in possession of a bridge over the Tamnava between Piroman and Lisopolje, as well as a railroad bridge.

While 2nd Serbian Army was able to retreat undisturbed and in good order, the withdrawal of the other two Armies, amid heavy fighting, further weakened their already shaken discipline. Insufficient rations, defective clothing and miserable weather "destroyed any sense of duty and made men indifferent in the face of further combat." The lack of artillery ammunition was

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512 Serbian official history, Vol. IV, p. 50
especially troubling; in most units the stocks were insufficient, although the arrival of new supplies from France was impatiently awaited. The lack of adequate artillery support caused the morale of the infantry to sink to the point where they couldn't be counted on for further resistance.\footnote{513 Serbian official history, Vol. IV, p. 44}

Luckily for the Serbs, the victorious Austrians were also so exhausted that they were unable to take advantage of this favorable moment. A thrust by even some very small detachments could have resulted in catastrophe for the defenders. However, XVI Corps was suffering from difficulty in bringing up supplies; in the deep snow it was only able to deploy in a new position at Medvednik and Debelo brdo, ready to attack. 4 Mtn Bde won a brilliant success against the Uzice Bde, which it drove out of the position south of Crnevo st. This forced the Uzice Armee-gruppe to take wide-ranging measures to ensure its security toward the north.

Despite endless difficulties and numerous delays, the bulk of 3rd Serbian Army was able to come over the Kolubara by the evening of 15 November and to camp for the night on the heights northeast of Mionica. That evening the 1st Army was behind the eastern Valjevo-Uzice Road in the Klinci-Bacevci area. The wound which Gen. Bojovic had suffered on 22 August was again causing him pain, so he was replaced by Gen. Zivojin Misic, formerly Putnik's second-in-command. In this difficult situation the SOK considered themselves truly fortunate because there was no energetic pursuit by the victorious Aus-Hung. troops.

Under 5th Army, 7 ID had turned toward the east; after driving a rear guard on the lower Ub through Brgule, it reached the Kolubara. 29 ID reached the Kolubara at Lisopolje, with 71 Inf Bde coming up in the rear. 21 LW ID was engaged in a serious action against a rear guard of Sumadija Div I, and didn't advance far past the scene of this fighting. The advance guards of 9 ID took the position evacuated by Timok Div I; otherwise the unit stayed north of the Ub. Thus only some advance elements of VIII Corps pushed ahead toward its goal, Lajkovac. The Corps' artillery opened fire at noon, but was unable to substantially interfere with the river crossing by 2nd Serbian Army.

Under the k.u.k. 6th Army, XIII Corps moved ahead to the Karaula Heights; a detachment of the Corps headed toward Slovac, where
its approach caused the Serbs to blow up a bridge in the town.

The k.u.k XV Corps and Goiginger's ID advanced toward Valjevo; 48 ID had to drive away the rear guard of Morava Div II. Toward 4:00 PM the 48th entered Valjevo. 50 ID of XVI Corps was engaged against the rear guard of Dunav Div I for two hours before it captured the heights northeast of Tubravic. The exhausted troops could accomplish no more. 18 ID assembled in Tubravic, where it was mainly concerned with securing food. Farther south, 4 Mtn Bde was engaged against the Uzice Bde again this day, and moved somewhat forward. This was because the Serbs were ordered to pull back to cover Uzice toward the north.

The situation after the capture of Valjevo

The Habsburg Balkan forces had completed a major achievement. Although the Serbs had been thrust back by a frontal assault rather than destroyed, and although their difficult retreat at Valjevo hadn't been exploited, they had suffered heavy damage. In nine days of action the Serbs lost over 8,000 men as prisoners, as well as 42 guns, 31 machine guns and considerable military equipment.

FZM Potiorek had received reports from both Armies asking for a rest period. However, he thought that it would first be easy to take the heights east and south of the Obrenovac-Valjevo railroad. The obvious demoralization of the Serbs and their lack of artillery ammunition meant that they wouldn't be able to stay on the Kolubara for long. After the urgently needed rest period, the Austrians' next objective would be Belgrade, which would provide a more reliable supply line. Although it was possible that the Serbs might relinquish their capital without fighting, FZM Potiorek still had to issue orders for artillery and technical preparations for an assault on the strong fortifications covering the city from the south. GM Böltz, his Chief of Staff, sent these orders to GM Gerabek, GdI Frank's Chief of Staff, on the afternoon of the 15th. Perhaps the incident caused 5th Army HQ to pay more attention to this operation than was actually necessary. The Serbs were already saying that the loss of Valjevo "was unfavorably influencing" the outlook for the defense of Belgrade. One ray of light for the Serbs was news that the impatiently awaited artillery ammunition from France would arrive at Salonika on the 18th.

As so often in war, unexpected events occurred. A difficult and lengthy action broke out on the Kolubara, which forced the k.u.k. troops, already tired and suffering from insufficient
supplies, to fresh exertions. They wouldn't receive their badly needed rest and recovery.
E. The Battle on the Kolubara and the Ljig, 16–28 November

(see volume 1 leaflet 23 and sketch 53)

1. The difficult river crossing, 16–18 November

At this point the opposing forces were organized as follows (from north to south):\textsuperscript{514}

AUSTRIANS
. 5th Army – Combined Corps (104 Lst Bde; 29 & 7 ID), VIII Corps (21 & 9 ID)
. 6th Army – XIII Corps (36 & 42 ID), XV Corps (40, 48, 1 ID), XVI Corps (Div Goiginger; 50 & 18 ID), 9 Lst Eta Bde

SERBIANS
. 2nd Army – Obrenovac Detachment, Cav Div, Sumadija Div I, Timok Div I, Morava Div I
. 3rd Army – Drina Div II, Combined Div, Drina Div I; in reserve was Timok Div II
. 1st Army – Dunav Divs I and II; in reserve was Morava Div II
. Armeegruppe Uzice – Uzice Bde; Sumadija Div II (the Lim Detachment was subordinate to Sumadija II)

16 November

After the long period of rainy weather, 16 November was finally a warm autumn day with full sunshine. Joyously the columns of 5th Army and of XIII Corps marched toward the Kolubara. The troops of XV and XVI Corps were supposed to be given a rest period of five days to bring their completely disrupted supply services into order. During the 16th they made only short marches to reach the areas where they were to bivouac. The troops were permitted to go to Valjevo to purchase whatever they wanted – or at least whatever was still available.

FML Snjaric reported that the Serbs had evacuated Visegrad. He was instructed to thrust toward Uzice. 4 Mtn Bde, which had stopped on the Jasenovac, was also told to advance to Uzice after a suitable rest.

5th Army HQ sent its columns toward its allotted sector on the

\textsuperscript{514} Translator's note – In the original, this information is presented on a map, Skizze # 53
Kolubara, which stretched from that river's own mouth to the mouth of the Ljig. The columns were told to take the most favorable routes, regardless of preparations for the operation planned later toward Belgrade. Accidentally this caused a shift of the main effort in the direction of the north flank. This happened at a time when 2nd Serbian Army - preparing for an eventual retreat toward Arangjelovac, was shifting its main body farther south; the Army's main body was deployed on both sides of the road leading from Lazarevac to Arangjelovac.

Eight battalions of the Obrenovac Detachment were standing on the heights east of Obrenovac, between the Sava and Marica. These were rather good troops, against whom 104 Lst Inf Bde had little prospect of success. The wide area between the Marica and Turija was covered by the Cavalry Division plus 9 infantry battalions, mostly from the III Ban. Here FML Krauss deployed 29 ID with Konatice as its objective; the Army reserve, 71 Inf Bde, followed the 29th. The long stretch of nasty weather had turned the broad valley of the Kolubara into a swamp. The east arm of the river, called the Lukavica, had swollen into a considerable obstacle which couldn't be crossed without bridging equipment. This gear, however, was stuck far in the rear on the bottomless roads. Even bringing the equipment into the valley would be a problem. The guns had to be hauled by men with ropes through the swampy ground. Stuck in the mud, and lacking good observation points, the k.u.k. artillery could offer little help to the infantry, while the Serbian gunners fully dominated the valley from the heights on the other side. Thus the advance guard of 29 ID was unable to throw back the Serbs who had dug in west of the Lukavica.

7 ID, whose FJB # 21 had taken the only lightly damaged bridge at Skobalj the evening before, pushed its leading troops forward to the Lukavica. The Division was now opposed between the Turija and Pestan Brooks by Sumadija Div I, entrenched on the heights opposite the road.

Under VIII Corps, 21 LW ID was sent toward Lazarevac; however, by evening it had just reached the Kolubara and hadn't begun to fight Timok Div I. On the other hand, the vanguard of 9 ID opened its attack toward Lajkovac. Although opposed by artillery fire from the heights, the men got the impression that only a rear guard was in front of them. They didn't realize that the entire Morava Div I, reinforced by extra artillery, was on the other side of the river.

Under XIII Corps of 6th Army, 36 ID advanced toward Slovac, 42
Hon ID toward Divci. Because an advance detachment had reported the day before that the Serbs were present in strength on the heights opposite Slovac and on the ridge running from there to Mionica, GdI Rhenen decided to deploy all his artillery in a half circle around Slovac. This would place the defenders under a cross fire. Then he wanted 36 ID to carry out the attack, while the Domobranen waited at Divci until the 36th drove the Serbs from the ridge on the flank of the area where they would cross the Kolubara. This cautious, methodical plan failed to take into account the momentarily favorable situation, while chaotic conditions reigned among the Serbs in Mionica, where there was only one place to cross the Ribnica. At the crossing the supply trains of all three divisions of the 1st Serbian Army, whose exhausted horses had been driven without rest through the night, collided with those of 3rd Army as well as with the carts of many civilians who had been urged to evacuate by the SOK. The road to Grn. Toplica was blocked by carts and guns which had run into each other, and which the horses could hardly disentangle.

Gen. Misic had asked Gen. Jurisic-Sturm to leave at least one regiment on the heights north of Mionica to guard the flank toward the north until the rear guard of 1st Army arrived. Jurisic-Sturm, equally concerned for the safety of his 3rd Army, had ordered the entire Drina Div I to stay on the heights at Slovac. However, his order arrived too late. Drina I had begun its retreat rather early, and left just one regiment as a rear guard on the important heights. There was also one regiment of Drina II on the heights just east of Slovac; the main body of Drina II were waiting for Timok Div II to finish its withdrawal so that it could also move to the east.

Around 11:00 AM the Drina Div II began to march. Soon thereafter IR # 53 of 36 ID crossed over to the east bank of the Kolubara on the bridge at Slovac, which had only been partially destroyed. This caused the rear guard regiment of Drina II to hastily fall back to join the main body of the Division. Its withdrawal in turn made the position of the regiment from Drina I untenable. Without further incident, the leading troops of 36 ID reached the heights southeast of Slovac.

The 42 Hon ID had to first replace the fully-destroyed bridge at Divci with a new one, and was only able to send two regiments on this day to the ridge north of Mionica. Thus the bulk of 1st Army - Morava Div II and Dunav Div I - which had become bunched together at Grn. Toplica, weren't disturbed during the night. Dunav Div II, into which the Rogacica Detachment was being
merged, reached the heights between Grn. Toplica and Planinica.

In the evening the 3rd Serbian Army was already in its new position behind the Ljig, which was to be advanced somewhat forward during the next day. Timok Div II, behind the north wing, was the Army's reserve

17 November

The beautiful weather continued only until the afternoon of the 17th; then rain returned, and there was snow on the higher elevations. The day and a half of sunshine had one unfortunate consequence: snow had melted in the mountains, causing the Kolubara to swell even higher and to cover the lower ground with large pools of water. The insufficiently clothed combatants suffered greatly from the returning cold and their ranks were soon thinned by illnesses. Moreover, the mobile kitchens of Krauss' Combined Corps were still far in the rear, so that its men in the front lines didn't get a warm meal all day. The Corps also waited in vain throughout the 17th for the arrival of their bridging equipment. Nonetheless, the 29 and 7 ID were able to send their vanguards over to the east bank of the Lukavica. GM Letovsky, commander of 7 ID, received an erroneous report that a reconnaissance detachment on the east bank had found an intact bridge next to the mouth of the Turija. Therefore in the evening he prepared both of his brigades to be ready to cross the Lukavica on the 18th and to launch an envelopment attack on the Vk. Crljeni-Vreoci sector.

Because of this threat from his opponents, Gen. Stepanovic reckoned that the Cavalry Division would soon have to pull back. This would make the position of Sumadija Div I and indeed of the entire 2nd Army untenable. Therefore he began to plan to retreat to Arangjelovac. This makes it clear that the Combined Corps won certain advantages during the involuntary pause in its operations on the Lukavica.

Under VIII Corps, 3 battalions of 21 LW ID managed to cross the Kolubara at Lazarevac, but 9 ID was unable to cross either the Kolubara (at Lajkovac) nor the lower Ljig. Nevertheless, it was still hoped that the enemy's wedge-shaped formation, on parts of which the divisions' artillery had opened a flanking fire, could be enveloped and taken. XIII Corps cooperated by sending five battalions and three batteries under Col.-Brigadier von Luxardo in the direction of the cannon fire, against the heights northeast of Zupanjac. Because of more powerful resistance behind the high waters of the Ljig and flanking artillery fire
from Drina Div II, Luxardo's group was unsuccessful; in the late afternoon it was reinforced by 4 more batteries. A report from a reconnaissance detachment sent over the Mramor attested to the apparent stubbornness of the enemy's supposed "rear guard." The detachment observed a Serbian division marching from Grn. Toplica toward the east, where the bulk of 1st Army was deployed. If this column was still so far west of the Ljig, the "rear guard" on the lower course of this river had no intention of withdrawing. Since the area toward the south was now of special interest, each division of XIII Corps sent a battalion-sized group there for further scouting. The battalion from 36 ID joined the company already on the Mramor; the battalion of 42 Hon ID strengthened the company which was scouting toward the Bacinovac Heights.

Events to date had strengthened the impression of the BOK at Tuzla that the fighting on the Kolubara and Ljig was caused by temporary resistance from some security troops. This rear guard action was intended to gain time for the Serbs, who by all indications were demoralized, to retreat into the middle of their country. 5th Army and XIII Corps were expected to soon capture the heights from which the enemy artillery could interfere with traffic on the railroad; then they would receive three days of rest.

On the other hand, the SOK was again becoming more confident. They were considering a sketchy plan of Gen. Misic, commander of 1st Army, for a counterattack over the Suvobor against the enemy force on the road to Grn. Milanovac, which in Misic's opinion was pursuing recklessly. He placed the bulk of Morava Div II and Dunav Div I between the Kacer and Dragoviljska Brooks; their outposts west of the Ljig were on the ridge running between the Milovac (held by a detachment of Drina I from 3rd Army) to Vis. Misic hoped to soon reinforce this right wing with a division which the SOK had promised him from 3rd Army to create a strong attacking force. Dunav Div II, which was almost double-sized after incorporating the Rogacic Detachment, dug in on the Bacinovac on both sides of the road to Grn. Milanovac. It had a strong detachment on the Maljen, a high ridge on its left flank.

Misic's plan, although it presupposed great naivete by the Austrians, did boost the confidence of the SOK. However, it ignored the poor condition of 1st Army, which was reflected in the large number of missing soldiers. Whole detachments had surrendered to enemy patrols without fighting, and there were cases of disobedience and self-mutilation, especially in the badly damaged Dunav Div II.
In the night of 17-18 November the Morava Div I evacuated its advanced position where the Ljig flowed into the Kolubara; this post had thrust too far into the Austrian lines and was subject to cross fire. The Division also wished to evacuate its wedge-shaped center from the high ridges Vis # 385 and Vis # 295; however, the SOK forbade this move and said that "Covka Heights must be held at any cost."\textsuperscript{515} 3rd Army should stretch its north wing to Zupanjac to relieve a regiment of 2nd Army. The 3rd would also counteract the troublesome flanking fire of XIII Corps' batteries at Pepeljevac, not only with its own artillery but if necessary also with an infantry attack. Gen. Jurisic-Sturm, however, believed that the condition of his troops made an offensive unthinkable.

18 November

On 18 November the swelling of the Kolubara became even more noticeable, and forced the Combined Corps to again remain inactive. Under 7 ID, IR # 68 was able to cross the roaring waters of the Lukavica on a precarious plank bridge. However GM Baumgartner couldn't bring over the other regiment of his 14 Inf Bde, nor was GM Breit able to launch a frontal attack with the Division's other brigade (107 Lst).

Under VIII Corps, 21 LW ID brought all of its infantry over the river and captured Lazarevac; however, it was unable to take the parallel fortified lines of Timok Div I south of the town. Shortly after noon, two battalions of 9 ID gained the opposite bank and covered the building of a military bridge against enemy artillery fire. This enabled 17 Inf Bde to finally occupy the forward position evacuated by the Serbs. Two battalions of Col. Luxardo's group crossed the lowest reaches of the Ljig to provide cover on 17 Bde's flank. However, the bulk of Luxardo's men were unable to make progress because of artillery fire from Drina Div II on the other side of the Ljig, and of machine gun fire which raked the bridge at Zupanjac. In the morning GdI Rhemen sent GM Stracker toward Dudovica with four battalions and five and a half batteries in support of Luxardo, but the rain-soaked roads prevented them from reaching the Ljig until evening. By this time the bridge was destroyed and there were no pioneers available to repair it. It didn't seem advisable to deploy the bulk of 42 Hon ID in this sector because of the presence of stronger enemy forces on the heights on the southern flank.

\textsuperscript{515} Serbian official history, Vol. IV, p. 178
In the morning the scouting detachment from 36 ID which had gone over the Mramor became engaged with Serbian outposts on the Milovac. Although the attackers had just six companies and a mountain battery, the Serbs showed very little inclination to fight. A group of 400 men which had been sent toward the Mramor laid down their arms after brief resistance. The outposts from 1st Army soon evacuated the ridge running south from the Milovac; the regiment from Drina Div I had already begun to follow their example when Gen. Jurisic-Sturm energetically intervened. Thus the Serbs were at least able to hold the Milovac.

The regiment of Dunav Div II on the Bacinovac showed even less spirit. In the afternoon it was strongly attacked by the scouting detachment from 42 Hon ID; the Serbian infantry fled, leaving a battery behind, and threatened the military police and officers who attempted to stop them. Part of the unit, 5 officers and 1000 men, didn't flee but allowed themselves to be taken prisoner by the weak Domobranen battalion.

This event convinced Gen. Misic, the commander of 1st Army, that the planned attack to guard the road to Grn. Milanovac wasn't feasible. Moreover, reconnaissance detachments from XV and XVI Corps were appearing at Brezgje, on the flank of 1st Army's position; thus it seemed certain that the Austrians planned to drive Dunav Div II off the Suvobor before advancing toward Grn. Milanovac. Misic decided that at least for the present he would stay strictly on the defensive. He was aided by the fact that the Uzice Armeegruppe on its own initiative was sending eleven battalions and three batteries toward the north; posted at the heights of Kosjerici, they would guard the eastern road from Valjevo to Uzice and the lines of communication through the Maljen into the valley of the Western Morava.

The SOK took the sternest possible measures to restore morale and discipline. Deserters were to be executed and their property confiscated; severe penalties were also to be imposed on their relatives.

**Potiorek orders the offensive to continue**

The events of 18 November strengthened FZM Potiorek's conviction that only one more blow was needed to begin the dissolution of the entire Serbian Army. However, he deeply regretted the fact that the ever-worsening supply situation was curbing his operations. Because of the forced inactivity of the Combined
Corps, the rail line on which he was counting was still within the effective range of the Serbian artillery - especially the badly damaged bridge over the Tamnava, which would take a week to repair. Under these circumstances, there was much to be said for the cautious idea of keeping the bulk of 6th Army behind the Kolubara, with bridgeheads over the river at Valjevo and Slovac, until it could be rehabilitated. However, this would also give the enemy time to recover and to take away the fruits of all the Austrians' exertions to date. The k.u.k. military attache in Sofia reported that only rear guards were covering the retreat into the central part of Serbia around Kragujevac, and that the French government had forwarded to its representatives a report from the Serbian government "that this is the end of Serbia." This led Potiorek to spurn an easier course, and to use up the last strength and energy of his men and horses in order to finish off the enemy.

These were the conceptions behind the "Directives for continuing the offensive" which were promulgated in the evening of the 18th. They treated the upcoming occupation of the heights on the east bank of the Kolubara as a deed which would soon be accomplished, and instructed 5th Army to prepare by 22 November for an attack toward Belgrade from the area north of the Turija; the offensive would begin on the 23rd. By the same day, 6th Army should be in position about 20 km west of the Grn. Milanovac-Rudnik-Arangjelovac road. XIII Corps would deploy south of the Turija so that it could attack any Serbian columns which attempted to move from Arangjelovac toward Belgrade. 18 ID of XVI Corps would draw up in echelon behind the right wing in the area Druzetici-Grn. Dobrinja, ready to march toward either Cacak or Grn. Milanovac. FML Snjaric with the strengthened 17 Mtn Bde would advance from Visegrad as quickly as possible to Uzice; there he would unite with 4 Mtn Bde and in cooperation with 18 ID would guard the south flank. Later Snjaric would move along the Western Morava to threaten the enemy's flank and rear.

Later in the evening, Potiorek received reports that indicated that the enemy was stubbornly resisting XIII and VIII Corps. Therefore he ordered XV Corps to begin its advance on 19 November. However, because of the continuing lack of supplies and ammunition, GdI Appel's instructions to the Corps restricted the operation to a forward movement by 1st ID toward the high ground stretching north of Brezgje; its first elements should reach this position on the 19th. Above all, they should drive away the two Serbian regiments which had been identified on the Bacinovac Heights. This would prevent any surprise attack on
the south flank of 48 ID when that unit began to advanced to Grn. Toplica-Mionica on the 20th. 40 Hon ID and 8 Mtn Bde, which were both still in bad shape, would be allowed some more rest. 8 Mtn Bde was reassigned to 1st ID; it was replaced in 18 ID by 1st Mtn Bde, which thus returned to its original posting.

2. The situation is clarified, 19-22 November

(see volume 1 leaflet 23)

19 November

The high water in the rivers placed the foremost troops of the Combined Corps in a very difficult situation on 19 November. The bridge of 7 ID at Skobalj was damaged, the small island opposite Vreoci was flooded and had to be evacuated, and the plank bridge of IR # 68 was swept away. Only one skiff was available for crossing the river; GM Letovsky himself used it to visit the 68th. The regimental commander stated that he wished to remain in place at the mouth of the Turija, although the position was turning into a swamp. In the event, IR # 68 only had to repulse a very feeble attack from Sumadija Div I, whose own advanced units were in great difficulty because the Lukavica was overflowing its banks.

VIII Corps was heavily engaged on 19 November. Its 21 LW ID could advance no further from Lazarevac because it lacked artillery support. The Division did ship several guns over the Kolubara with unspeakable toil, but they weren't much help anyway because ammunition was in short supply. On the other hand, cross fire from the batteries of 9 and 36 ID was so effective that the defenders of the Vrace brdo began to waver around noon. After a sudden burst of fire from the infantry line, the Budejovice IR # 91 stormed forward and the Serbs were unable to withstand it. IR # 102 as well as the north wing of Luxardo's Group (IR # 16) joined the advance. However, the pursuit over the Vrace brdo was hindered by flanking artillery fire from the Covka and by a counterattack from a regiment of the Serbs' Army reserve. Now the commander of 9 ID, General Daniel, decided to deploy 18 Inf Bde left of 17 Bde to carry out an attack on the Covka over the northern part of the high ground, which was less exposed to artillery fire. At the same time, by capturing the village of Petka the 18 Bde would establish a link with 21 LW ID. Hour by hour it was becoming clearer to the commander of VIII Corps, FML Scheuchenstuel, that he was not engaged against rear guards but rather in a decisive action with the main Serbian body.
The SOK was alarmed by the misfortune at the Vrace brdo, and feared that the Covka – attacked on two sides – could not be held for long. Toward 5:00 PM they again renewed the order to 3rd Army to thrust toward Pepljevac, which was "the only possibility of saving the endangered position at Covka." Gen. Stepanovic, when he learned of this order, must have concluded that he was to hold the Covka at any price. He hastened to send the reserve units of Timok Div I to aid Morava Div I, so that there would be six regiments in the sector of the latter division.

Gen. Jurisic-Sturm was unwilling to drive his troops forward into an attack that would inevitably end in a new defeat. However, to comply with the categorical order he had received, he sent the last two regiments in his reserve (from Timok Div II) on a night march to join Drina Div II. These troops, however, didn't arrive in time and were so exhausted when they did that the planned attack had to be postponed until the next morning.

On 19 November the XIII Corps was hindered by events on its south flank from devoting all its strength to supporting VIII Corps to the north. The scouting detachment of 42 Hon ID on the Bacinovca already had to defend itself in the preceding night against five battalions of Dunav Div II. The group moreover reported that stronger forces were digging in on the ridge stretching east to the Vis Heights. The capture of the Vrace brdo strengthened GdI Rhemen's belief that the resistance of the supposed "Serbian rear guard" would soon be broken. Therefore he didn't attach much importance to the fact that the scouting detachment of 36 ID was pushed back from the Milovac to the Mramor. A heavy afternoon action on the Bacinovac also elicited only a request from XIII Corps that XV Corps should occupy this ridge on the 20th. There were still hopes that the enemy would soon begin to retreat if 83 Hon Inf Bde would advance on the 20th over the Mramor to take the crossing points over the Ljig at Moravci and at Ljig village.

At this point, however, Gen. Misic had no intention of retreating. On the contrary, he demanded that his divisional commanders remain as active as possible to restore the fighting spirit of 1st Army. Above all he wanted prisoners to be taken so he could determine the whereabouts of XV and XVI Corps. Apparently the Uzice Armeegruppe feared a thrust by these corps;

516 Serbian official history, Vol. IV, p. 206
therefore it reduced the group which was blocking the routes from Rogacica and Bajinabasta to five battalions and a march regiment. This made ten battalions available to create a new group to defend the western Valjevo-Uzice Road; it deployed between the original group and the Kosjerici Detachment.

20 November

On 20 November there was no action at all on the front of Krauss' Corps.

Under VIII Corps, the 21 LW ID suffered on the 20th from the flanking fire of the batteries of Sumadija Div I; the swamp in the rear of the Bohemian Landwehr made it difficult to bring up fresh ammunition and rations. 18 Inf Bde was only able to regroup for the planned offensive. Also there was no forward movement in front of Dudovica. On the other hand, the commander of 83 Hon Inf Bde (Col. Mihaljevic) brought Hon IR "Karlovac" # 26 and the cannon regiment of 42 Hon ID onto the Mramor in time to check the thrust of four battalions of Morava Div II against the scouting detachment of 36 ID. The Milovac was retaken in a counterattack; from this position the Domobranen could see a strong enemy force with artillery prepared for action on the heights on the other side of the Ljig. Farther south, meanwhile, the Bacinovac Heights were lost in costly fighting.

Now XIII Corps HQ could no longer doubt that they were engaged in a major battle. They decided to wait for the arrival of XV Corps. The XVth sent 48 ID south from Grn. Toplica and Orlovac toward the Cot and Vis Heights. 1st ID would attack from the west toward the Ruda-Vis ridge, which according to all reports was occupied by a Serbian division.

Gen. Misic urged the SOK to release to him the long-promised division from 3rd Army, but Putnik was still expecting that Army to attack over the lowest stretches of the Ljig. Finally repeated objections from Gen. Jurisic-Sturm and the fact that the bridging equipment had long before been sent back to Kragujevac caused Putnik to abandon this plan. Instead, the Serbs would "for the time being cause the greatest possible difficulties for the enemy and thus wear down their strength; then in the proper moment they would themselves go over to the attack."517

517 Serbian official history, Vol. IV, p. 271
Indeed the condition of the k.u.k. troops at this time left much to be desired. XIII Corps, which had been in constant motion since 6 November, asked for three days to rest; FZM Potiorek couldn't allow this because the railroad still hadn't been opened. On the 19th the supply trains of XV and XVI Corps were still stuck between Loznica and Zavlaka. Smaller columns did convey supplies from the trains to the front, but only enough rations to somewhat supplement items requisitioned from the local inhabitants. On the 20th the main supply lines were changed to the Sabac-Osecina and Presadi-Valjevo roads; however, because of the hopelessly wretched condition of the roads this didn't greatly improve the situation. The only solution would be uninterrupted use of the railroad on the Kolubara.

21 November

Although 5th Army HQ had correctly deduced that the Serbs were committed to a major battle on the Kolubara, this conviction was somewhat lessened on 21 November because of the optimistic directives of the BOK. The Army HQ also believed that by correctly assessing the enemy's position it could deploy the military bridging equipment, which had finally been brought to the Kolubara after endless toil, in the best position to make an attack which would be decisive for the entire front. This position was believed to be the sector of the Combined Corps. Therefore 71 Inf Bde was left with that Corps and not diverted to help the heavily engaged VIII Corps. However, the reserve forces of the Syrmia Group, under Col. Prince Schwarzenberg, were ordered to reinforce the VIIIth. This group - 6 battalions, 4 batteries and 2 1/2 squadrons, wouldn't begin to cross the Sava at Skela until the 22nd.518 The quick success of the Combined Corps' flank attack on Sumadija Div I was so definitely expected that orders for the next operation (against Belgrade) were already issued early on 21 November.

However, even after the arrival of the bridging equipment on the Kolubara, 29 ID had to overcome great difficulties on the 21st; by evening only one battalion of 58 Inf Bde had managed to cross to the other side of the river west of Konatice. 7 ID was also unable to commence operations at dawn as planned. Nonetheless, GM Baumgartner's 14 Bde was able to open its attack toward Vk. Crljjeni at 1:00 PM; despite flanking artillery fire from Stepojevac, it reached a point 500 paces from Vk. Crljjeni by evening. The other Bde (107 Lst) repulsed a counterattack by

518 Geschichte des Dragoner Regiments # 14, page 15
parts of the Serbian Cav Div from Stepojevac. The heavy pressure of 7 ID against Sumadija Div I provided relief to 21 LW ID in its difficult situation at Lazarevac, since it was no longer harassed by flanking Sumadija artillery fire. 18 Inf Bde of 9 ID advanced slowly in a frontal assault to a point half way up the high ground east of the river. Meanwhile, in the morning 17 Bde with attached portions of Col. Luxardo's group repulsed a flank attack by the two regiments of Timok Div II which Gen. Juricic-Sturm had ordered to satisfy the impatient demands of the SOK. Hit in front, flank and rear by the artillery of 9 and 36 ID, the Serbs suffered heavy casualties. In the afternoon the Timok regiments made two more attacks in conjunction with three regiments from Morava Div I; both were shattered by the first-rate fighting of IR # 16, 91 and 102, even though the k.u.k. regiments had been considerably weakened by losses.

Under XIII Corps of 6th Army, GM Stracker built two narrow bridges at Dudovica and sent IR # 52 to capture the heights on both sides of Onjeg Brook. Despite all precautions, the Regiment suffered a severe setback. Only the splendid steadiness of the firing line and a quick withdrawal saved the unit from total destruction by parts of the Combined Div and Drina Div II, which counterattacked with supporting artillery fire. This triumph, achieved by close coordination between infantry and artillery, raised the spirits of 3rd Serbian Army, which for a long time had almost despaired of victory.

GdI Appel was still of the opinion that the intervention of XV Corps would soon force the Serbian "rear guard" to retreat. Similar optimism infected FZM Wurm when he set XVI Corps in motion on the 21st and prescribed the goals it should reach by the 23rd; the units were sent ahead as follows:

1. Goiginger's Combined ID toward the Strazar and Brezgje,
2. 50 ID from the western to the eastern Uzice road (to cooperate with 4 Mtn Bde in the capture of Varda), and
3. 18 ID to Valjevo.

The reserve artillery of the Combined and 50 ID were sent to help XV Corps.

The attack of XV Corps on the Bacinovac Ridge suffered under

519 Translator's Note - At this point, per the situation map at Beilage 23, the Serbian "Cav" Div commanded, in addition to its own 4 cav regts, 15 inf bns and 5 batteries; moreover, it was being reinforced by IR # 7.

520 According to the notes of GM von Greger, at that time commander of IR # 52, it lost 14 officers and 728 men.
artillery fire; therefore its own batteries and 11 Mtn Bde first had to be deployed against the heights on both sides of the Dragoviljska Brook. With help from 80 Hon Inf Bde, the east wing of XV Corps took the Mednik in the evening twilight; the center of the Corps took the hotly contested summit of Bacinovac, and the west wing took the Ruda Heights. 9 Mtn Bde of XVI Corps was still engaged against the advanced Serbian position on the Maljen.

Because the front had been shortened, Drina Div I was placed under Gen. Misic. Eager for an attack, he thereupon sent 8 battalions to reinforce Dunav Div II. The defeat of the latter division, however, forced him at 10:30 PM to pull back to the main ridges on the line Prostruga-Rajac-Suvobor. Thus a right angle was created in the center of Misic's defensive position; the Gragjenik was still held as an advance position in front of the angle. The new line, which ran through high ground covered by deep snow, promised to further wear down the attackers.

Under the Uzice Armeegruppe, the Kosjerici Detachment occupied Razana with about one regiment and determined that the Aug-Hung. forces guarding this sector were moving toward the east. Therefore Gen. Aracic decided that on 22 November he would allow 6 battalions and 2 batteries of his own group to also thrust east along the main ridge.

After the events of the 21st, the majority of the k.u.k. commanders recognized that they weren't engaged in rear guard actions, but rather in a great battle on the Kolubara and the Ljig. Before the arrival of the evening reports, however, FZM Potiorek had begun to travel from Tuzla through Brod and Sabac because his HQ was being transferred to Koviljaca on the Drina (southwest of Loznica); for 24 hours he was out of touch with events. This had an adverse effect on the dispositions of his subordinate commanders in the large battle that had erupted on the whole wide front from Obrenovac to the roads leading toward Uzice.

FML Krauss planned to support the attack of 29 ID against Konatice with four battalions from 71 Inf Bde; this additional strength was expected to lead to a decisive success against the weaker foe. GdI Frank sent the Hungarian Lst IR # 1 from 7 ID to aid the hard-pressed 21 LW ID. On the north wing of XIII Corps, Col. Luxardo built a footbridge over the Ljig to bring three more battalions to the eastern bank.

GdI Appel ordered 40 Hon ID to advance toward the heights at
Moravica, 48 ID toward the heights on both sides of Dragoviljska Brook, and 1st ID to attack toward the Suvobor in cooperation with Goiginger's ID of XVI Corps. FZM Wurm sent 50 ID to follow Goiginger in the direction of Maljen. He ordered 18 ID to thrust along the eastern Uzice road against the enemy force reported to be at Razana. The Division should at least reach Kosjerici.

22 November

On the night of 21-22 November, 29 ID brought seven battalions of GM Poleschensky's 58 Inf Bde over the eastern arm of the Kolubara near Konatice. They were instructed to capture the heights on the northern and eastern approaches of the town. To assist a battalion which was still engaged on the western bank, the bulk of 58 Bde advanced north, with its left wing on the river. Soon, however, a deep water course that wasn't marked on the maps brought the advance to a halt. To drive away the enemy entrenched at this point, two companies were sent back over the Kolubara to hit the Serbs in the flank. Darkness fell before this movement was completed.

Meanwhile GM Schön's 57 Inf Bde got started a little later. Its IR # 42 arrived on the stream around noon on the right of 58 Bde. An intact bridge was discovered, but it lay under very heavy fire from Serbs who were entrenched in South Konatice and directly on the bank. Well supported by two cannon which were brought right up to the firing line, IR 42 stormed ahead and took Konatice.

This surprising success was achieved even though the attack of 58 Bde had stalled and the other IR of 57 Bde (# 92) hadn't yet deployed south of the town. It forced the commander of the Serbian Cavalry division to pull his troops back to the heights and to seal off the line where the 42nd had broken through with his sector reserves.

In VIII Corps' sector, five Serbian regiments threatened to repeat their attack against 17 Inf Bde and the attached portions of 36 ID. However, they were hit by cross fire from the artillery of 9 and 36 ID which caused Gen. Stepanovic to cancel the thrust. He sent the two regiments of Timok Div II, which were badly shot up, back to Gen. Jurisic-Sturm.

XIII Corps, which was waiting for the advance of the XVth, engaged only its artillery. The eleven batteries of 36 ID fired mainly upon the Serbian guns on the Covka, in order to keep them
from harassing the flank of the planned attack on Zupanjac by the three battalions which Col. Luxardo had brought over the Ljig.

XV Corps came up to the slopes toward Moravci and the Mednik-Vis Heights. 8 Mtn Bde, the Corps' reserve, was told to move to Mionica, where it would come under 1st ID; however, the Bde still hadn't worked its way through the high mountains. When strong Serbian forces were sighted on the Prostruga, the planned attack over the Ljig to assist XIII Corps seemed to have little prospect of success until XVI Corps could clear the sector farther southeast.

Meanwhile, 1st ID along with Goiginger's Combined ID had pursued the enemy toward Siljak; the resistance of the enemy's rear guard was broken by an enveloping attack on the south. The bulk of 9 Mtn Bde and 14 Mtn Bde stormed the forward part of the Maljen position. Behind Goiginger the 50 ID reached the area around Brezgje. 18 ID, after some forced marching by its side columns, secured the Bukovska planina on both sides of the road to Uzice.

These events caused the commanders of XV and XVI Corps, who had both stayed at Valjevo, to become ever more confident. GdI Appel hoped that the arrival of Goiginger's ID at the Prostruga would allow him to launch his own attack over the Ljig as early as the afternoon of the 23rd. FZM Wurm set the Golubac Heights northwest of Rudnik as the goal for Goiginger and the Galic west of Grn. Milanovac for 50 ID. 18 ID would send two brigades to the Druzetici-Grn. Dobrinja Road, and one brigade through Kosjerici to the Crnokosa northeast of Uzice; this would conform with FZM Potiorek's plans for 23 November. Even aside from the fact that these objectives involved considerable marching in extremely difficult terrain which favored the resistance of the enemy, they took little account of the condition of the troops. Without shoes and poorly clad, they were exposed to bitter weather in areas where there was no shelter. The rations were insufficient, and anyway couldn't be brought up to the places where they were needed. Supplies were even lacking in XIII Corps, which for several days hadn't advanced and which was fighting in lower, more thickly inhabited terrain; several of its battalions hadn't received bread for four days. XVI Corps was informed that for the immediate future it shouldn't count on receiving any supplies. Therefore its operations would have to stop by at least 4:00 PM each day to give the men time to forage for food.
FZM Potiorek arrived in Koviljaca on the 22nd, and received reports that revealed that the supposed rear guard actions had escalated into a great battle. However, the confidence of the Corps commander on the apparently decisive southern wing didn't indicate that there were very great difficulties to overcome. The intervention of a brigade northeast of Uzice would also ease the advance of 4 Mtn Bde and of 9 Lst Eta Bde, which was to join the 4th as a reinforcement. For the time being these units would not be joined by Snjaric's Group, which had crossed the Drina at Visegrad, because a Serbian regiment supported by some Montenegrins were positioned to threaten the flank of an advance toward Uzice from the south. FML Snjaric threw the Serbs back from the Suha gora on the 22nd, but they renewed their resistance on the even stronger position Vihra-Height # 961.

Although the SOK was sympathetic to Gen. Jurisic-Sturm's advice that the Austrians should be allowed to wear themselves out, they were concerned by the approach of stronger forces in the front and flank of 1st Army, which would be a menace if the Serbs had to make another retreat to their final position in the center of the country. Therefore at noon on 22 November Putnik was planning to relieve the pressure on 1st Army by having 2nd and 3rd Armies launch an offensive toward Mionica-Ub while Sumadija Div II thrust into the flank of the enemy attacking the Maljen. Meanwhile Gen. Aracic had reorganized his units, so that the Uzice Bde was deployed southeast of Dub and on the Varda; the Lim Detachment (6 battalions and 19 guns) guarded the routes from Valjevo into the western Morava Valley; two battalions and three batteries would be available in the afternoon of the 23rd to reinforce Sumadija Div II farther east.

3. Breaking into the Serbian center, 23–25 November

23 November

At dawn on 23 November the 58 Inf Bde found that the Serbs had pulled back from the watercourse which had blocked their advance the day before. They crossed the water and stormed a height east of Konatice, which however was soon retaken by the Serbs.

57 Inf Bde, despite the insertion of March Regt # 15, was unable to take the ridge south of the area captured by IR 42, which extended to Height # 147. The situation compelled GM Zanantoni to bring up 71 Inf Bde, which he would deploy between his own two brigades at Konatice. This contradicted instructions issued
at noon on the 22nd by GdI Frank, who wanted 71 Inf Bde to be ready to thrust south on the eastern bank of the Kolubara in support of 7 ID as soon as the fighting at Konatice was settled.

While 7 ID was still menaced on its north flank from Stepojevac, it was attacked in front by Sumadija Div I, well supported by artillery. After a substantial crisis and the commitment of the Division's last reserves, the Serbs were held off. Nonetheless the episode had given the enemy some breathing room. They were now able to deploy batteries to provide flanking fire against 21 LW ID, which kept that unit from gaining much ground against Timok Div I.

Under XIII Corps, the attack by Col. Luxardo against Zupanjac was a bloody failure. Therefore the XIIIth, as well as the XVth, placed all its hopes on the advance of FZM Wurm's XVI Corps.

However the approach of 50 ID, which was supposed to add energy to the attack against the Maljen and Suvobor, was made difficult by heavy snow.

18 ID collided at Razana with the reinforcements being sent to Sumadija Div II; thus the road to Kosjerici was blocked along the line Glogovac-Suvi vrh. 5 Mtn Bde, marching toward Druzetici, became engaged with a detachment of Sumadija Div II at Crni vrh. In response to an appeal for help from the Maljen Detachment, the main body of the Sumadija Div moved southeast to directly reinforce the defenders and to intervene on the flank and rear of the attackers. However, the Serbs gained little ground due to the difficult terrain.

In the morning GdI Appel had already reported that he was sure that he was opposed by the main Serbian forces. This seemed to provide the Austrians with an opportunity to decisively defeat the enemy before they could reach their strongly fortified defensive position in the middle of the country. Acting on this premise, FZM Potiorek ordered XVI and XV Corps to attack from the line Suvobor-Moravci toward the east. After they crossed the Ljig, XV Corps should swing to the northeast, while at the same time XIII Corps thrust energetically forward and 7 ID pushed toward the southeast. This pincers movement would be covered from the south by XVI Corps against Serbian interference from Uzice-Cacak, and from the north by 5th Army in the direction of Belgrade.

24 November
On 24 November it grew colder and in the evening there was a heavy snowfall. 29 ID took the heights around Konatice; then it stayed on the defensive to await the arrival of reinforcements (two Landsturm regiments from Syrmia and some heavy artillery).

VIII Corps was also waiting impatiently for the two Landsturm regiments which it was receiving from Syrmia. To date only the cavalry and batteries under Col. Schwarzenberg had reached Ub. Here they combined with the squadrons from Krauss' Corps to create a cavalry "brigade" which was made responsible for guarding the Kolubara between the Combined and VIII Corps.

While Frank's Army was still struggling in vain to secure all of the heights on the east bank of the Kolubara, 50 ID farther south finally took the Maljen Heights. The Serbian garrison fled to the south in disarray. Gen. Misic didn't learn about this setback for 24 hours. He also found himself threatened on the Suvobor by 3 Mtn Bde; it deployed on the right of 2 Mtn Bde, which was fighting on both sides of the road to Cacak. Thus Misic was forced to divert ever more forces toward his left wing.

This development was soon noted by XV Corps. Around 9:00 AM GdI Appel sent the bulk of 48 ID, behind which 1st ID assembled as a reserve, against the Bukva. By evening the 10 and 12 Mtn Bdes had made their way forward to the Ljig. In the night a spirited coup by a company from II Bn/IR # 92 captured the valley slope on the other side of the river; this would make it possible for the main body of 48 ID to cross over.

As pressure mounted against his 1st Army, Putnik impatiently urged 3rd and 2nd Armies to begin their offensive. However, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm wouldn't have the necessary bridging equipment available until the evening of the 25th. Before this happened, an event took place that ruined all of Putnik's plans for an attack.

25 November

At 11:00 AM on 25 November, 18 Inf Bde of the Czech-German 9 ID began to storm the summit north of Covka Heights, after effective preparation by 22 batteries. The three Serbian regiments defended themselves desperately, but were overwhelmed; the Bohemians took 4 guns and 1300 prisoners, then repulsed a counterattack by a regiment from the Covka in hand-to-hand fighting. As 17 Inf Bde and the north wing of 36 ID now began
to join the fray, the Serbs evacuated the Covka. The victory was complete at 3:30 PM; in the course of 9 days' fighting it had cost 9 ID 300 dead and 2925 wounded. The exhaustion of the troops and the onset of darkness hampered the pursuit, so that Gen. Stepanovic was able to prepare to defend the line Vis # 385-Zeoke with Morava Div I and Timok Div I.

That night Gen. Jurisic-Sturm had Drina Div I pull back to conform to the retreat of 2nd Army; the Div deployed on the ridge stretching south from Vis # 385. The Combined Div gave up the trenches on its southern wing to the major portion of Timok Div II, which had returned from 2nd Army.

In XV Corps, GdI Appel wanted 7 Mtn Bde to thrust in the morning against the Gragjenik; this would relieve 48 ID from a threat to its southern flank and begin the envelopment of the Bukva. However, the bulk of the Bde was drawn into the attack by 6 Mtn Bde against the Suvobor-Rajac ridge, so only parts turned toward the Gragjenik; at least they were able to pin down the enemy on that position.

On the northern flank of 48 ID, the 10 and 12 Mtn Bdes reached the upper part of the Bukva in the afternoon, about 2 km from the dominating summit. 12 Mtn Bde now faced toward the northeast, with 10 Mtn Bde farther southeast opposite the Bukva summit. Drina Div I hammered both Bdes with artillery fire. Since the Drina Div was only slightly engaged on the front between the Kacer and Dragoviljska Brooks it was able to lend a regiment to Morava Div II, which launched a counterattack from the Bukva with 8 battalions. 10 and 12 Mtn Bdes were thus engulfed in a fierce hand-to-hand fight, in which Serbian artillerists fired into the crowd without distinguishing between friends and foes. GdI Appel sent up 8 Mtn Bde to help, but by the time it arrived the Serbs had been repulsed.\footnote{The Machine Gun Detachment of III Bn/BH IR # 2 was especially distinguished in this defensive victory; its commander, 1st Lt Gojkomir Glagovac, was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order.} To relieve its comrades, 11 Mtn Bde attacked Drina Div I, but could advance only to the Ljig.

There was no decision in XVI Corps' fight on the Suvobor. 50 ID collided with Serbian reinforcements moving up toward the Maljen, and halted them. At the same time the commander of Dunav Div II finally learned that the Maljen had fallen, and pulled his left wing back toward Suvobor-Babina glava-Druzetici.
At Druzetici it was in contact with the right of the Uzice Armeegruppe. Sumadija Div II of the Uzice group, with the remnants of the Maljen Detachment, held fast on the Zajcica hills and on Zeleni breg against the 5 Mtn Bde.

FML Trollmann didn't want to send the main body of 18 ID into a frontal assault through deep snow against the enemy's strong position on the heights at Razana. Instead, he ordered 1 Mtn Bde to make a wide circle to the east, which was accomplished toward evening after very difficult marching. The Brigade, with barely 1000 riflemen, had reached Brajkovici on the only road which the Serbs could use to retreat. However, it wouldn't have the strength to hold off the much larger enemy force if 13 Mtn Bde couldn't pin the enemy frontally. 1 Mtn Bde therefore sought to deceive the Serbs by lighting numerous campfires over a wide front, which induced them to abandon their position at Razana. The enemy did make an attempt to break the lines of 1 Bde in a night attack, which was only foiled by the unshakable determination of the Ist Bn of the Silesian IR Kaiser # 1 and of IV Bn of Deutschmeister IR # 4.522

Gen. Aracic was now justifiably concerned that the western wing of his Uzice Armeegruppe would be cut off by 18 ID. He asked the SOK whether he could retreat to the Morava valley east of Pozega and behind the lower Moravica, and Putnik concurred. The right wing would stay in place as a pivot for the left; the Kosjerici Group would cover the withdrawal of the Uzice Brigade to the Pozega area.

4. 6th Army clinches the victory, 26-28 November

After the first shock had worn off, the misfortune of the middle of the Serbian front wasn't great enough to lead Voivode Putnik to retreat. The opposing 5th Army was unable to exploit its success because its troops were exhausted after the long action. Their uniforms were in tatters, their shoes falling apart and their rations in short supply; above all, the VIII Corps artillery could be dragged through the low ground on the Kolubara, which had been turned into a broad swamp, only with great difficulty. Putnik wished to postpone the evacuation of Belgrade, which would leave a bad impression, especially since

522 For this accomplishment, and the earlier capture of the Jagodnja, Col. von Lukachich of 1st Mtn Bde was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Maria Theresia Military Order
At this time the campaign of the "Russian steamroller" seemed to be taking a good turn. The Serbs believed that perhaps a great victory in the north and the collapse of the Central Powers would soon put an end to all their worries.

It would thus take further blows to compel the Serbs to retreat, and the situation was such that only blows in the mountains would be effective. In this sector however the wild and broken terrain, covered with ice and snow, would delay and encumber any offensive. Even after the capture of the Maljen it seemed that there was no prospect of substantial success in the immediate future. Moreover, if FZM Potiorek committed more troops to the mountain fighting, he might open the way for 2nd Serbian Army to seize the initiative in the more favorable lowland terrain; this would threaten his communications with Hungary and have an adverse effect on the entire battle front.

26 November

At Konatice the Serbian Cavalry Division, with 18 battalions and 5 batteries, stormed against the front of 29 ID, which formed a right angle. In a combat which lasted until the evening the Serbs were fended off, but 71 Inf Bde had been permanently drawn into this sector.

This development had an adverse effect on the plans of GdI Frank, who had counted on using 71 Inf Bde to reinforce 7 ID, so that it could push back Sumadija Div I and thus complete the victory against 2nd Serbian Army, momentarily shaken by the great success of 9 ID. Now Frank would have to wait for the situation to improve at Konatice, where GM Zanantoni was planning to send 57 Inf Bde on a flank attack along the Stepojevac Road toward the north, as soon as the Landsturm had arrived to relieve the Bde in line. Since this wouldn't happen until 29 November at the earliest, the repair of the Kolubara rail line would again be greatly postponed.

The unexpectedly quiet course of the 26 November on the south wing of 2nd Army strengthened the SOK's desire for an offensive. A repetition of the attack of the Obrenovac Detachment and Cavalry Division at Konatice, under the unified leadership of Col. Tufegdzic of the SOK staff, seemed to promise success. Gen. Stepanovic would support the operation and then thrust toward Slovac-Ub with his entire force.

In the evening, however, further bad news reached the SOK from the center of the front. 42 Hon ID had crossed the Ljig at
Dudovica and taken a strongly fortified position on the slope leading to the heights southeast of the town. Frantic counter-attacks by Morava Div II were unable to keep 10 and 8 Mtn Bdes from gaining significant ground toward the Bukva. Drina Div I, pinned in front by 11 Mtn Bde, was hit on the flank by 12 Mtn Bde and forced to withdraw toward the Glavica Dicska.

For a long time Gen. Misic had felt that his only salvation would be to withdraw 1st Army to a better and shorter position on the Rudnik-Grn. Milanovac road; there, after a short pause, he would be able to launch a counterattack. However, the SOK was unwilling to approve this course. It was necessary to hold onto the Suvobor for a while longer to cover the withdrawal of the Uzice Armeegruppe; thus for the time being the right wing of 1st Army could fall back only as far as an intermediate position on the Golubac. On the other hand, the SOK was convinced that 3rd Army in the center could not hold its present position much longer. If 3rd and 2nd Armies fell back, orders had been prepared for the deployment of the Obrenovac Detachment and the Belgrade defense troops to guard the northern flank on the line Sibnica-Kosmaj Heights.  

The Suvobor, considered impregnable and further guarded by snow and rain, was almost encircled on three sides during the course of the 26th. This was a result of a thrust by Col. Wieden's Group (15, 14 and 9 Mtn Bdes) toward the Babina glava. Dunav Div II had to pull back to the chord of the arc formed by its defensive line.

18 ID granted a rest day to 1st and 13 Mtn Bde. This was urgently necessary for the procurement of rations, but aided the retreat of the Uzice Armeegruppe. 4 Mtn Bde had come up to the front of the Uzice Bde, after taking the Varda Heights on the 24th by an attack from three sides. Its further advance was delayed until early on the 26th, and by that time the Uzice Bde had stolen away. Resistance by its rear guard on the Vk. Prisedo, plus logistical difficulties, delayed the entry of 4 Mtn Bde into Uzice until 27 November. The Lim Detachment was able to pull back to the heights on the Grn. Dobrinja-Pozega Road on the evening of the 26th; it was not disturbed by the Austrians.

27 November

523 Demazes and Naoumovitch, Les victoires des Serbes en 1914, Paris 1928 (pp. 93 ff.)
Although GdI Rhemen had reported that XIII Corps, especially 36 ID, needed at least two days of rest, for the 27th he ordered 42 Hon ID to make an envelopment attack against the dominant Zakinac Heights; 36 ID would lend support by artillery fire. However, in the morning the Serbs mounted their own counterattack, effectively supported by the batteries of Drina Div II and the Combined Div. The batteries of 36 ID weren't available because they were still making the difficult crossing of the Ljig; the north wing of the Domobranen was thrown back, with 500 fatal casualties, and the fortifications they had taken the day before were lost. Commitment of the reserves of 42 Hon ID and the gradual intervention of 36 ID restored the situation. In the evening the Serbs pulled back to the Zakinac.

The attack of XV Corps made little progress during the day, because the defending Serbian divisions were supported by artillery fire from both flanks. However, at night the darkness and fog enabled 40 Hon ID to storm the position of the Timok Div II, which was lacking many of its officers and hadn't dug well in. Entire Timok groups were overrun and captured. The 48 ID was less fortunate on the Glavica. Its three assaults up the steep slopes collapsed with heavy losses. The defending Drina Div I had also been badly shot up during the day; to relieve the pressure, Gen. Misic wanted to drive 10 Mtn Bde from the slopes of the Bukva. However, the infantry which was ordered to attack turned its weapons against its own officers and couldn't be brought under control. A regiment was to be brought over from the left wing to rally its wavering comrades.

This plan was nullified by the powerful attack of XVI Corps. Col. Ströher's 7 Mtn Bde drove the Serbs from the Gragjenik toward the southeast and around noon had reached the ridge west of Rajac. 2 Mtn Bde established itself firmly on the Siljak. Thus the stubborn defenders of the Suvobor were being threatened from behind. The Serbian regiment which had left the sector returned and pushed 7 Mtn Bde back somewhat; however, the Bde - supported by parts of 6 and 3 Mtn Bdes - held its ground on the slopes. This action raged with great bitterness until midnight, when it finally tapered off into skirmishes. The Suvobor group tried in vain to gain some breathing room and restore communications with the main body by thrusting toward the east. 2 Mtn Bde repulsed this attack and forced the Serbs back onto the defensive. The 109 Lst Inf and 16 Mtn Bdes slowly worked their way toward the Suvobor from the west; the latter resumed its advance in the night when it heard the sounds of the fighting between Rajac and Suvobor. In the course of the 27th, Col. Wieden captured six trenches on the Babina glava and made
himself master of this important strong point.

The commander of 18 ID, FML Trollmann, sent only his reserve artillery with part of the 13 Mtn Bde down the road through Kosjerici, so that they could eventually support 4 Mtn Bde at Uzice. Most of the Division (the bulk of 13 Bde plus 1 and 5 Mtn Bdes) swung toward the east to finally drive back the Serbs who had taken up a new position east of the Maljen-Pozega Road. However, on the 27th the attackers only gained several advanced positions.

Gen. Aracic, commander of the hard-pressed Uzice Armeegruppe, was already planing in the morning to pull Sumadija Div II and the Lim Detachment back on the Grn. Milanovac-Pozega Road (with the north wing positioned south of Druzetici). The SOK, however, wanted the Armeegruppe to hold onto the Zeleni breg and from this point to make an "energetic and active attack" to defeat the Austrians who were enveloping the Suvobor from the south.\textsuperscript{524} Gen. Aracic felt this would be impossible for his badly mangled troops. For the time being he ordered Sumadija Div II to concentrate on a line from Zeleni breg south to Krupniciste; the Lim Detachment would deploy on its left as far as the Smisalj Heights. The Uzice Bde, which wasn't being pursued, would hold itself in readiness at Pozega to provide flank support for the Lim Detachment.

28 November

In a thick fog at dawn on 28 November, Col. Tufegdzic began his attack against 29 ID. A fresh regiment which had arrived from Belgrade drove the defenders from the heights east of Konatice in its first rush, and pushed into the town. Gen. Stepanovic, who had already issued contingency orders for a possible retreat, instead took measures for further attacks when he learned of this victory. The commander of Timok Div I insisted that his division and Morava Div I should be allowed to attack toward Lazarevac. However, Stepanovic wasn't willing to go so far. He had received a report from Morava I that after the latest actions the troops were hiding in their fox-holes, and that "no threat, even of an immediate death penalty", could get them out.\textsuperscript{525} Therefore Stepanovic didn't want to stake everything on a general offensive. He did instruct Sumadija Div I to send one regiment to support a thrust by the Cavalry Div against the portion of the Konatice ridge around Point # 147;

\textsuperscript{524} Serbian official history, Vol. V, p. 211
\textsuperscript{525} Serbian official history, Vol. V, pp. 219 ff.
two regiments would assault 7 ID, which was under very heavy artillery fire, at Vk. Crljeni. The remaining Sumadija regiment would make an enveloping operation from the north to aid the "sharp reconnaissance" by seven and a half battalions from Timok Div I and Morava Div I toward Lazarevac.

The Serbian victory celebration was premature. The confusion among the Austrian field messes and other supporting services in Konatice was soon overcome. From all sides neighboring detachments and reserves converged on the Serbs, who were finally thrown back into their original positions by a powerful counterattack. The Serbian attacks against the front of 58 Inf Bde, which faced toward the north, were shattered. There was a dangerous moment around 11:00 AM, when the regiment from Sumadija Div I stormed the center of 57 Inf Bde, held by March Regt # 15. The Czech battalions didn't show much determination in the hand-to-hand fighting. Fortunately four battalions from the two Landsturm regiments which had been ordered to relieve 29 ID had arrived the night before; GM Schön led them in a counterattack. He fell upon the Serbs as they were approaching the foremost Austrian artillery position. Meanwhile parts of IR # 92 and 42 struck their flanks. The Serbs couldn't resist this onset from three sides, and fled back to the east.

Although the operation against Konatice had been shattered, it did achieve one objective. 29 ID, after the casualties it had suffered and after sending the remnants of March Regt # 15 as replacements to the regiments of VIII Corps, was now restricted to strictly defensive missions. 526

The 7 ID defended itself gallantly, so that toward evening the Sumadija Div I fell back into its trenches without achieving anything. 21 LW ID, which finally had been joined by a few batteries, was able by committing its reserves to deflect a dangerous enveloping attack from the north in the positions of its advance guards. In the front of the 21st a few forward positions were lost due to overwhelming Serbian artillery fire. However, 9 ID was able to send help, including support from the 3 of its 11 batteries which were now deployed for action.

The operations of 3rd Serbian Army on this day were influenced by the complete collapse of Timok Div II; although a third

526 For details about the actions at Konatice, see "Der Heimat Söhne - Der 42er" for December 1924 and January 1925, "Der 92er" for November-December 1924, and "Der 94er", March-April 1923. Also Zanantoni, "Das IR 94", Vol. I, p. 73
regiment was sent to support the Division from 2nd Army, it arrived exhausted after a hasty night march and was not able to stem the panic. The Timok Div left 19 officers and 1453 men as prisoners in the hands of 40 Hon ID, and fell back to the east. The Honveds, very exhausted from the heavy night action, stayed in the position they had conquered, which came under a heavy cross fire from the artillery of the two neighboring Serbian divisions. Drina Div I tried to mount a counterattack, but since the morning was under fire from the 8 reserve batteries of XV Corps. The Drina commander therefore decided that the time had come to pull back toward Golubac in accordance with Gen. Misić's contingency orders for a retreat, prepared the evening before. Then around 2:00 PM the resistance of the west wing collapsed under heavy blows from 11 and 12 Mtn Bdes. The victors advanced as far as the Glavica Dicska, where the Serbian rear guard was able to hang on until evening.

These events affected the actions of XIII Corps. While 36 ID made its way forward against Drina Div II on the western parallel ridge, 42 Hon ID attempted to take the Zakinac, which was stubbornly defended by the north wing of the Serbian Combined ID. When Timok Div II fell back, it also caused the center and south wing of the Combined ID to waver. Thereupon 42 Hon ID thrust its own south wing against the Zakinac; the defenders were now threatened from three sides and evacuated the position. The Croats, who had lost 2500 men in the last few days, halted after securing the heights. Since the front was collapsing, at 5:00 PM Gen. Jurisic-Sturm ordered a retreat to the line Metaljka-Kalanjevci-Motika.

During the course of the day, the left wing of the Serbian 1st Army was also greatly imperilled by the attack of XVI Corps. The 3, 6 and 7 Mtn Bdes drove a wedge ever deeper into the front of Dunav Div I, while 2 Mtn Bde finally drove the enemy from the Siljak slopes around 9:00 AM. One Serbian regiment was pushed toward the Rajac and one toward the Suvobor; this completed the isolation of the Suvobor group. 2 and 16 Mtn Bdes and 109 Lst Inf Bde, later assisted by the bulk of 9 Mtn Bde as it came up from the Babina glava, drew the circle around the Suvobor Heights ever closer. Meanwhile Col. Wieden with 14 and 15 Mtn Bdes pushed the left wing of Dunav Div II back toward the road leading south from the Suvobor.

Gen. Misić feared there would be a complete collapse if he continued to fight any longer in the high mountains in accordance with the wishes of the SOK. Under these circumstances he also felt that the retreat to Golubac, which he
had been authorized, was far too short. He decided to go back to the line Lipe (southwest of Rudnik) – Takovo (northwest of Grn. Milanovac) – Sarani. Anticipating opposition to his plans from the SOK, he didn't communicate with Voivode Putnik until night, after he had already issued his orders for the retreat. After the expected objections and a long argument, in which Misić threatened to resign, Putnik had to accept the fact that the retreat was already being implemented. However, he demanded that at least Gen. Misić's left wing should halt on the line Takovo-Galic-Vaskova glava to ensure that it stayed in touch with the Uzice Armeegruppe.

It is noteworthy that the SOK still declined to issue orders for the retreat of the Belgrade defense forces and 2nd Army. Probably they were still hoping that a decision in Poland was imminent. However, this continuing hesitation is inconsistent with a pessimistic report which was sent in the same night to the Minister of War. Putnik stated that the Uzice Group and 1st Army would hardly be able to stand for long even in their new positions because of the great exhaustion of the troops and their reduced strength – several regiments had no more than 600 riflemen.

On the southern wing of the 110 km long battle front, the shift in position of the Uzice Group had been exploited by the k.u.k. 118 ID. In the morning, 5 Mtn Bde stormed the Zajcica on the Pozega-Mionica road and held it that night against counter-attacks. On the other hand, when 1st Mtn Bde attempted to advance into the rear of the Zajcica position it collided with superior forces and had to withdraw to the Krupniciste. FML Trollmann decided that when 13 Mtn Bde arrived on the 29th he would use it to throw back the south wing of the enemy, aided by a detachment of 4 Mtn Bde which would attack the Smisalj; then the whole Serbian position would be rolled up. However, around midnight the HQ of the Uzice Group was told to fall back because of the retreat of 1st Army. Its new positions would be on the line Vaskova glava-Kita-Vk. Polje to the western Morava (Sumadija Div II and the Lim Detachment), and south of the Morava behind the Bjelica (Uzice Brigade).

**Situation of the k.u.k forces at the end of 28 November**

The k.u.k. troops still didn't know that they had won victory in the Battle on the Kolubara and on the Ljig. Under 5th Army the VIII Corps, after finally bringing up all its artillery, prepared in the night to attack Timok Div I and Morava Div I. 6th Army's 36 ID would cooperate with VIII Corps in the attack.
on Vis # 385. XIII Corps HQ planned to send its other component, the badly weakened 42 Hon ID, forward only as far as the road leading south from Vis # 385. GdI Appel of XV Corps would be content for now with the capture of the Parlog and the Glavica Diska, because his troops were at the limit of their endurance, as he reported to FZM Potiorek. Their ammunition supply was exhausted, and the artillery lacked horses to haul the guns. The condition of the soldiers' footwear was indescribable, and rations were insufficient. In the last 8 days there had only been enough bread to give each man at most one third of his daily allotment. The general health of the troops was questionable. Appel stated that a rest of several days was essential.

However, the effect of this warning was weakened by the fact that it came only from XV Corps. Since 18 November the Corps of 6th Army - but mainly XV Corps - had sent in almost daily complaints in which the commanders, in their concern for the men, pictured their material situation as very critical. They had then been able to overcome all of the undeniable difficulties. FZM Potiorek would have been glad to personally review the situation to see if the reports were correct. However, because of the poor communications he would have to take several days to visit the front, a period in which he would be absent from Koviljaca, where he was needed to stay in touch with all his subordinates and with the civil administration at Sarajevo. The BOK commander felt he couldn't be gone so long. Instead he had the chief of the Army supply services review the situation at the front. This officer reported that the problems were only temporary, and that measures were under way to bring up all the needed supplies. The supply trains had been brought in order, so that it was expected that the Army corps would soon have the material they needed.

A greater source of concern was the heavy casualty rate. The battalions were scarcely the size of companies. March units were still coming up, but not in the number needed; moreover they lacked weapons and other equipment due to a lack of reserves back home. The March troops had to be held back in Peterwardein until they could receive equipment that had belonged to the dead, wounded and sick front-line soldiers.

Moreover, GdI Appel weakened the impression of his own report by adding that he was planning active operations for the immediate future. His report anyway only envisioned a rest period of two to four days. The necessity for such a pause didn't seem to be as important as making one last strenuous effort that might
decide the entire war.  

F. The Setback, 29 November-15 December

1. Fateful decisions, 29 November-1 December

(see volume 1 leaflets 23 and 24)

The Serbs retreat

Thick fog covered all the battlefields on 29 November, which otherwise was the beginning of a period of better weather. VIII Corps postponed the attack which it had been scheduled to mount together with XIII Corps against Morava Div I and Timok Div I because the HQ didn't want to attack without abundant artillery support, which was impossible because of the fog. Although each of the divisions had been reinforced by one Landsturm regiment from Col. Schwarzenberg's group, 21 LW ID still had just 6,900 riflemen and 9 ID had 9,500. Therefore it was necessary to avoid further casualties as much as possible.

36 ID, however, adhered to the original plan of a combined attack. It had finally brought its artillery over the Ljig during the night, and despite the fog advanced against the ridge near Vis # 385 in the morning. To their great surprise, the men found the positions had been abandoned by Drina Div II, and took them over. In the afternoon the north wing of the 36th advanced past the ridge to Vis Height # 385 itself, which was still guarded by the south wing of 2nd Army, and took two Serbian positions. The enemy counterattacked, but was repulsed by the Croats. Since the men couldn't orient themselves among the tangled hills in the fog, the 36 ID didn't advance any further. 42 Hon ID reached the road leading south from Vis # 385 after some light actions.

On the Serbian side, the Morava Div I assumed that all the high ground in this area would soon be lost, and so informed Gen. Stepanovic. The general, in turn, asked the SOK for permission to retreat. Putnik wished to hear nothing about this, since it would force him to evacuate Belgrade. He replied that the commander of 2nd Army could make his own decision, but only

527 These considerations are based on FZM Potiorek's written justification dated 16 November 1919.
after a "critical evaluation of the situation." Naturally Gen. Stepanovic didn't wish to wait until his situation became desperate, and ordered his main body (Sumadija, Timok and Morava Divs I) to begin their retreat around 8:00 PM on both sides of the road to Arangjelovac as far as the side road that ran south from Vencani. The Obrenovac Detachment learned about this retreat by chance at 7:00 PM, and then asked the SOK directly for its own instructions, which didn't arrive until 11:00 PM. Because of these difficulties in the chain of command, the northern wing of the Detachment opposite 104 Lst Inf Bde didn't begin its withdrawal until dawn on the 30th. The orders for the retreat of the Belgrade Fortified District (14 territorial battalions and 35 guns) were also delayed; finally these troops were directed to withdraw to a position on both sides of the railroad, with their left wing on the Kosmaj. Thereupon Gen. Zivkovic ordered the men to retreat on a broad front.

Under XV Corps on 29 November, 40 Hon ID found the Parlog Heights already evacuated. 48 ID moved ahead over the Glavica Dicska; 1st ID began to assemble at Ljig town as a reserve.

XVI Corps saw action against enemy forces that had begun to retreat at 4:00 AM. Goiginger's Combined ID pursued to the main ridge of the Prostruga and around noon had to drive a rear guard from Rajac. Under 50 ID, the 16 Mtn Bde drove the rear guard of Dunav Div II off the Suvobor at 5:00 AM and then intervened in the action of Col. Wieden's group, which had to push an enemy rear guard away from Danilov vrh. The exhausted troops couldn't pursue the Serbs any further, and the fog made it impossible for the artillery to fire upon them. Therefore the Morava Div II and the two Dunav divisions weren't disturbed as they reached their new position and restored order among their components, which had become mixed up.

The Uzice Group also easily disengaged from 18 ID, whose patrols didn't know that the enemy had pulled back until noon. Then the 5 Mtn Bde advanced to the Ostrica, 1st Bde to the area west of the Siljkovica, and 13 Bde to the heights south of Grn. Dobinja. Thus they reached the positions which according to the orders of the BOK they should have taken on 23 November. The advanced detachment of 4 Mtn Bde occupied Pozega; the bulk of the Brigade stayed in Uzice. They were waiting to be relieved by 9 Lst Eta Bde and FML Snjaric's Group, which had pushed the west wing of the Serbs back to the Varda on the 24th, but had to repulse a heavy counterattack on the 29th.

The supply service of 18 ID had completely collapsed, and it was
impossible to replace the increasingly scarce ammunition. At least the surrounding area was rich enough to allow men and horses to live off the land. They washed and patched their ragged uniforms and obtained Opanken [translation unknown] to replace their ruined shoes. The other components of XVI Corps, in the barren mountains, didn't fare so well. The other corps were also in lamentable condition.

To the BOK, far in the rear at Koviljaca, all these signs that the supply system had broken down, and all of the sacrifices which the troops had undergone to win the latest victory, were of less importance than the fact that the Serbs had been brought to the breaking point. The number of deserters and of prisoners who capitulated without noteworthy resistance was growing. There were numerous reports that the Serbian Army and people were war-weary, and that young boys were being drafted to guard installations in the rear areas. The counterattacks which the SOK initiated had all either been quickly shattered or had never even started. The destruction of a bridge on the Vardar River had interrupted railroad traffic from Salonika, which was important for the shipment of ammunition from abroad. All of these factors indicated that the reward for all the exertions to date lay just ahead and that the last enemy resistance could be broken more quickly if the Serbs were denied time to recover from the impression of their defeats. It was anticipated that the Serbs planned to make their last desperate stand by Arangjelovac and Grn. Milanovac. If they still had any desire to attack, it would be in the direction of 18 ID, because of its isolation and because it was in a position to cause them the most damage when it resumed the offensive.

When 5th Army learned on 30 November that the Serbs had disappeared from Krauss' front, at 9:30 AM it ordered its two Corps "to stay on the heels of the enemy." Col. Schwarzenberg's cavalry group should thrust to the east between 29 and 7 ID. However, this order was ineffectively carried out.

The XIII and XV Corps of 6th Army were resting, to the extent that it was possible to "rest" under such dreary material conditions. The XVI Corps drove rear guards from the Golubac and the Vranovica; 50 ID on the right wing advanced to within artillery range of the Galic. Conforming to orders, and without interference from FZM Wurm even though he was better informed than Potiorek about the situation, the Corps was thus moving forward into the deep snow despite the fact that every kilometer made the already daunting task of bringing up supplies yet more difficult. On the other side of the high mountains there were
several villages beckoning to the troops, offering shelter, firewood and springs of water. This momentary advantage made the men forget that in the long run their chances of being supplied would be better if they stayed nearer the rail line and waited for it to be repaired.

Potiorek orders the capture of Belgrade and retention of a line east of the Suvobor

During 30 November the BOK issued new orders for the next few days. 6th Army was to cease major operations until 3 December, but would send its advanced guards to the line Galic-Golubac (XVI Corps)-Lipet-Parlog-Cukor (XV Corps)-Kremenica-Vis № 295-Zeoke (XIII Corps). 5th Army would rest after occupying Ostruznica (12 km northeast of Obrenovac) and ensuring the security of the railroad. It would prepare for the attack on Belgrade; this was also desired by the German high command which wished to create a route through northeast Serbia through which munitions could be shipped through Bulgaria to Turkey, where they were urgently needed.

GdI Falkenhayn had already raised this issue with FZM Potiorek on 24 November, and was considering whether to send a German division to cooperate in the endeavor. On the 27th the German Lt. Col. Hentsch, along with the chief of the Balkan group of the Operational Detachment of the AOK (Lt Col. Purscher) visited Koviljaca. Meanwhile GdI Conrad had turned down the idea of sending a German division to the Danube opposite northeast Serbia, prompting the Prussian Ministry of War to contact FZM Potiorek directly through the k.u.k. ambassador at Berlin. They wanted Potiorek to assemble a striking force at Orsova. The Feldzeugmeister deferred to the AOK, to whom he indicated that he couldn't spare any detachments from his forces, which were scarcely sufficient to fulfill their primary responsibilities, on secondary operations. GdI Conrad concurred with this opinion, and indicated to Lt Col. Hentsch that if this task were to be accomplished it would have to be with German forces. The meetings with Lt Col. Hentsch focused mainly on the possibility of sending munitions transports down the Danube. FZM Potiorek proposed that the road through Orsova could be cleared if two German divisions entered the northern Morava valley on the immediate left of the k.u.k. Balkan forces; naturally Lt Col. Hentsch lacked the authority to commit himself to this idea.\footnote{528 Based on the written justification of FZM Potiorek.} At this point, anyway, the solution which seemed to be in reach was the imminent occupation
GdI Frank decided, with the approval of FZM Potiorek, to undertake the Belgrade operation prior to giving his Army a rest; this would have priority over pursuing the Serbs, who were apparently pulling back toward the southeast. Col. Schwarzenberg, whose squadrons weren't prepared for a sudden breakthrough and were still assembling behind the Kolubara, reported that he couldn't thrust through Stepojevac because according to prisoners the road leading south from Cvetkov grob was well fortified. It seemed that the best way to force the Serbs out of their position would be to outflank them by sending the north wing toward Belgrade. Therefore on 1 December the columns of 5th Army were sent to the northeast. Col. Schwarzenberg was told to take Parcani to prevent the destruction of a tunnel through the hills. However, Frank's operation would prove to be a blow into thin air. The 2nd Serbian Army had already reached its allotted position in front of Arangjelovac; the Obrenovac Detachment, covered by the Cavalry Division, was in the area around Beljina and rather early on 1 December marched on to Sibnica.

The orders from the BOK had assigned XVI Corps a task that couldn't be accomplished merely by small advanced detachments. The Corps was still confronted by enemy rear guards that had to be chased away by deploying entire brigades. However, FZM Wurm had every reason to avoid combat until the supply problem had been solved. Meanwhile the troops would seek shelter in houses or in huts constructed of earth or snow; no major operations were expected in the immediate future.

FZM Wurm didn't raise any objections to FZM Potiorek because the first step to solving the supply problem, the capture of the railroad, had been achieved. The location of XVI Corps on either side of the mountains beyond the Kolubara would have no influence on the next operation, the capture of Belgrade. On the other hand, 18 ID would be isolated until the Pozega road was firmly secured; this might make it advisable to advance against the Galic. Finally it was decided to postpone any major attacks until the XVI Corps had at least replenished its ammunition supplies; there appeared to be no danger of a Serbian offensive in the next few days.

The fact that FZM Potiorek thought there was no reason to hurry was indicated by another action taken at this time. The 18 Mtn Bde was formed under Col Franz Skvor at the Bocche di Cattaro from parts of 47 ID and some new units. It was to take the
place of 17 Mtn Bde, which was still pinned down southeast of Visegrad, as a reinforcement for 18 ID in the upcoming offensive. However, even by using the railroad to Rogatica the new Brigade wouldn't reach Uzice until 12 December.

On 1 December even GdI Appel, who was opposed to provoking the enemy, ordered 48 ID and 40 Hon ID to drive away the Serbian advanced posts, because their artillery was shelling the Austrian camps. Very little ground was won on this day.

Goiginger's Combined ID of XVI Corps pushed back the Serbian rear guards and reached the line which was its goal. However, 50 ID encountered energetic resistance. While 15 Mtn Bde made a frontal advance toward the Galic, 16 Bde on its left launched an envelopment from the north. 18 ID sent two battalions toward the Vaskova glava to secure its connection with the Pozega road; they encountered and defeated a Serbian cavalry detachment.

(see volume 1 leaflets 23 and 24)

The Serbs plan their counterattack

Gen. Misic couldn't have wished for anything better than the way in which XVI Corps was scattering itself in front of his Army. After two days of rest with abundant rations, and having replaced lost men and munitions, the morale of the Serbian troops was rising again. The SOK also did as much as possible to increase fighting spirit. Captured Serbian-speaking soldiers of 42 Hon ID had revealed the miserable condition of the Aus-Hung. troops; this information was widely disseminated as an encouragement. At the same time commanders received the right to take the sharpest punitive measures "to prevent further shameless flight from the enemy, who is of lower quality than ourselves." Propaganda dwelt on ending the national shame, and on the desire for revenge and for liberation of Serbian soil. Gen. Misic was especially adept at stirring up his compatriots' feelings, and he got an enthusiastic response to the following remarks on 1 December:

"The wretched enemy's difficult situation must now be exploited. They must be attacked at all times and at every place and given no rest; the operation shouldn't halt until the enemy is destroyed or driven from our land. All our strength, bravery and self-sacrifice must now come into play because this is the favorable hour for vanquishing the

529 Serbian Official History, Vol. V, p. 369
enemy troops who have penetrated into our land."\(^{530}\)

The division commanders, particularly of Dunav Div II, which had been especially weakened in the recent fighting, agreed with the Army commander that the enemy should first be allowed to exhaust himself before the counterattack opened. Gen. Misić therefore planned to open his offensive early on 3 December, unless the Austrians attacking the Galic began to collapse sooner.

2. The Capture of Belgrade

While storm clouds were thus gathering on the southern wing, XIII Corps was shifting to the north to relieve VII Corps. 5th Army marched northeast toward the Serbian capital, and on 1 December reached Ostruznica (104 Lst Inf Bde) - Meljak (29 ID and 71 Inf Bde) - Bacevac (7 ID) - Borak (21 LW ID) and the Volujak Heights (9 ID). According to prisoners the Serbs had pulled back to the Kosmaj, and the rail installations at Parcani were apparently destroyed. The Syrmia Group HQ reported that the artillery in Belgrade opposite Semlin was no longer firing. Air scouts reported that Belgrade looked "like an abandoned city", but that about three divisions were stationed west of Arangjelovac, partly entrenched.

The commander of 5th Army evaluated the situation correctly. However, he was torn between the need to deal with the enemy forces reported to be building entrenchments on the road to Vencani and the demand that he seize Belgrade as soon as possible "for political reasons" and to establish a worth while new supply line.

Therefore on 2 December the 21 LW ID moved due east toward Parcani and crossed the road leading to Vencani. The Combined Corps reached the water-shed ridge Ljuta strana (7 ID), Petrov grob (29 ID) and Zeleznik (104 Lst Inf Bde); 9 ID stayed in place except for scouting detachments. The 21 LW ID, the scouts from 9 ID, and Col. Schwarzenberg's squadrons fought actions with the Serbian Cavalry Division, which retreated to a point south of Sibnica. Here the Serbian horsemen deployed at the end of the position of the Obrenovac Detachment, which stretched east to the Kosmaj. The Detachment had abandoned Sibnica because it had been obliged to send its best regiment along with a battery to Mladenovac, where they were to entrain for shipment.

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530 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 368
to Cacak at the other end of the front.

Early on the morning of the 2nd, a detachment of 104 Lst Inf Bde neared Belgrade, but found that the city had already been occupied by Aus-Hung. troops. In the night, FML Tamasy had sent parts of the nine battalions assembled at Semlin over the river, and at dawn had already taken the most important objectives in the city without any fighting. A general staff officer from 29 ID hurried ahead in an auto and hoisted the black-yellow standard on the Konak (the building which had housed the Serbian government). The operation thus ended much more smoothly than either the BOK or 5th Army HQ had anticipated. GdI Frank wanted to hold a victory parade in the enemy capital; FZM Potiorek gave his permission, on the condition that only a small number of troops would take part. He wanted the left wing of 5th Army to move without stopping and as quickly as possible to Ralja, and to have a detachment take Semendria.

6th Army postpones its offensive

On 2 December the XIII Corps finished taking over the front as far as Pestan Brook; its advance guards came up to the Mramor. Under XV Corps, 40 Hon ID moved ahead a bit to Cukor Heights and supported 48 ID, which after capturing the Vrlaja and Lipet Heights advanced to the Golubac Mountain. Thus during the "rest period", the only part of XV Corps which actually rested were the troops of 1st ID. GdI Appel reported that it was anyway

531 Long before Belgrade was taken, an episode in September had caused the Serbian authorities grave concern for their capital. On 19 September the Aus-Hung. Landsturm units on the Danube and Sava had been ordered to make a strong demonstration against Belgrade, to keep the Serbs from sending the troops on their northern borders to reinforce the heavy fighting in the Macva. Although only a few small barges were available, on 21 September the Hungarian Lst IR # 32 was shipped to the large Zigeuner ("Gypsies'") Island opposite Belgrade. This threat was so effective that Minister President Pasic demanded that the SOK assemble a strong force to defend the capital. The Austrians sent an emissary under flag of truce to demand the surrender of the city; although the Serbs didn't bother to reply, the incident convinced them even more that the threat was real. On the other hand, the Regiment on Zigeuner Island suffered heavy casualties from Serbian artillery fire; these included regimental commander Lt Col August Schmidt from k.u.k. IR # 66, who was killed. (Serbian Official History, Vol. II, p. 415)
impossible to rehabilitate his units because all necessities were lacking. Based on the latest events, he believed that the Serbs were by no means defeated, and would be capable of making several offensive thrusts. FZM Potiorek immediately heeded this warning and extended the rehabilitation period for two more days. He expected that traffic could begin to roll over the Tamnava railroad bridge on the 3rd, which would at least begin to remedy the ever growing shortage of ammunition. The future supply lines were already being established in detail: 5th Army would be based solely on Belgrade while the railroad to Valjevo would be used only by 6th Army. In the next two days 5th Army would regroup; it was hoped that on the evening of 5 December it would be on the line Vencani-Ralja, ready for an immediate thrust into the north flank of the Serbian position which was believed to stretch from Vlaska through the Kosmaj to Arangjelovac. XIII Corps would support this offensive by advancing toward Arangjelovac-Grn. Satornja. XV Corps would pin down the enemy in its front, while XVI Corps thrust energetically through Rudnik-Grn. Milanovac and farther south, toward Kragujevac.

FZM Potiorek hadn't wanted to postpone his offensive for two days, because the most recently taken enemy prisoners sounded more confident as a result of the information about the condition of the k.u.k. troops gleaned from the Serbs of 42 Hon ID. The captured officers were convinced that their army would be able to make a glorious stand in the area of Arangjelovac-Grn. Milanovac if they could only have a brief time to recuperate. Therefore FZM Potiorek felt he still had to move swiftly. However, there was no hint that the Serbs themselves were ready to spring. Thus Potiorek, confident in the future, still found time to create and garrison a bridgehead force at Belgrade under GM Haala, and sent the HQ of the newly formed "Serbian Military Government" (under FML Sarkotic) from Sabac to Belgrade. The Austrians began to prepare the Konak to become the new home of the BOK. Finally, a new 60 ID began to form from troops in Syrmia and the Banat.\footnote{Translator's Note - Although the original doesn't say so, it was possible to create a new Division from the garrison troops north of the Danube since the capture of Belgrade removed any threat to this area. However, 60 ID never actually came together due to the impending catastrophe.}

Also on 2 December, 50 ID of the k.u.k. XVI Corps still wanted to storm the Galic, where 3 Mtn Bde came up to reinforce 15 and 16 Bdes which were already in position by the heights. However,
it became obvious that there was no prospect of a successful attack because lack of ammunition made artillery support impossible. Therefore 3 Mtn Bde had to remain content with gaining a little ground on the road to Grn. Milanovac.

18 ID (1, 13 and 5 Mtn Bdes) stood on both sides of the upper Kamenica Brook; the Serbians in front of the Division were becoming more active and it was necessary to keep them from pushing between 18 and 50 ID.

About 70 km southwest of XVI Corps, FML Snjaric on 1 December readied his group for a flanking attack on the Vihra Heights, 11 km southeast of Visegrad. On the next day the offensive was initiated by Col. Schöbl with the 1st and 2nd Bns of his "Ottocac" IR # 79 (which were attached to 17 Mtn Bde), and captured this strongest point of the enemy's western wing.\textsuperscript{533} In the night the Serbs evacuated the remainder of their position. However, Snjaric's Group was still not free to march to Uzice, because when they pursued the Serbs and Montenegrins they again encountered stubborn resistance behind the Lim.

Meanwhile during 2 December Gen. Misic issued the orders for the counterattack of his 1st Serbian Army. Because on 28 November he had already forced his high command into a decision to retreat by threatening his resignation, he was now more than ever confident in his own judgment and resisted any interference in his plans by the SOK. Once again he didn't tell them what he was going to do until the orders had been published. At the same time, he asked that the other Armies should also attack. Putnik didn't resist at all, but was carried along by the energy of his subordinate. At 3:00 PM the commanders of all the Armies, and of the Uzice Group, received orders by telephone to open a general offensive. Written confirmation was issued just two hours later. The components on the right wing under the SOK's direct command (the Belgrade Group, Obrenovac Detachment and Cavalry Div) would stay in place to guard the offensive against interference from the north.

\textbf{Situation of 5th Army after the fall of Belgrade}

Thus storm clouds had developed along the entire horizon of 6th Army, and the explosion was about to take place. At this time the HQ of 5th Army was naturally even less aware of this danger than the commanders on the immediately threatened front. 5th

\textsuperscript{533} For the storm of Vihra Heights, Col. Schöbl won the Knight's Cross of the Military Maria Theresia Order.
Army's main concern was to prevent the three Serbian divisions which pilots had reported in the Sibnica-Arangjelovac area from interfering in what was still expected to be the last act of the dramatic conquest of Serbia.

Therefore GdI Frank wanted 7 ID to take up a position on the Belgrade-Arangjelovac Road at Ripanj. VIII Corps would deploy on the road to Vencani on the line Parcani-Bozdarevac, with a detachment maintaining touch with XIII Corps between the Turija and Pestan Brooks. 29 ID, which was now the Army's reserve, deployed mainly at Kumodraz while guarding the road to Grocka at Ekmekluk. Early on the 3rd an order arrived from the BOK that the left wing should be ready to attack at Ralja by evening of the 5th; this task was allotted to 7 ID.

GdI Frank now expected that after taking Belgrade his Army would receive its long-promised rest break. From his standpoint it is understandable that the bulk of 9 ID was shifted north to Bozdarevac and most of 29 ID to Kumodraz in case of an enemy attempt to recover Belgrade. He wanted to prepare a solid line to counter this possibility. Also he needed a strong reserve far in the rear in case troops from northeastern Serbia, who hitherto hadn't been engaged and therefore were fresh for battle, marched against him along the Danube. Therefore Col. Schwarzenberg was also instructed to move toward the east. However, the overall strategic purposes of FZM Potiorek would have been better served if 29 ID had made a shorter and easier march south to Ripanj. Under the unexpected blows that were about to fall, it would soon be very unfortunate that 29 ID was too far back, a day's march north of Ripanj.

The supply situation of the two sides

The Serbs had thus selected the most favorable possible moment for their counter-offensive, although they were unaware that 5th Army had shifted too far to the northeast. The Kolubara railroad was opened to traffic on 4 December, after which greater amounts of supplies began to arrive at Valjevo daily.534

534 This 70 km-long narrow gauge railroad was taken by the k.u.k. troops on 24 November, but it had been destroyed in two places. The Serbs had evacuated all of the rolling stock to Arangjelovac, so it had to be replaced by equipment from the Monarchy. Attempts to interfere by the enemy and the need to await the arrival of the new trains postponed the opening of repairs until 28 November, and they were completed on 4 December. At that point only 350 T of goods could be moved
Thereafter every day that went by would work to the Serbs' disadvantage. The weather also favored the Serbs for the moment. The roads froze on 3 December, which made it possible for their artillery to follow right behind the advancing infantry. A heavy fog that morning concealed their deployment until 9:00 AM, and afterwards there were several days of beautiful sunshine. The clear air made it easier for the Serb gunners to spot targets. Moreover, they didn't need to ration their ammunition; even though the Vardar bridge had been destroyed (as FZM Potiorek had heard), this happened only after munitions in large quantities had arrived at the arsenal in Kragujevac. As Gen. Misic had ordered, the gunners were able to lay down a powerful barrage at the outset which broke enemy resistance and opened the way to the infantry. The confidence of the foot soldiers, enhanced at first by this artillery support, soon swelled to a feeling of invincibility. Their units had been at least partly brought back to strength by incorporating new recruits and gendarmes; several regiments which had been cut to pieces were able to reform their third and even their fourth battalions.

Thus all circumstances were combining to place the Aus-Hung. forces at a disadvantage. The superiority they had hitherto enjoyed and everything they had gained by their hard-won victories over a larger enemy army were about to be lost. An old truth was about to be proven again, which Napoleon had put into these words: "L'art de vaincre est perdu sans l'art de subsister." This factor, along with the unfortunate direction of the k.u.k. offensive in the last few days and the effects of the autumn rains, would ruin a campaign which otherwise might have become a classic example of an invasion thanks to masterly generalship and the strenuous exertions of the troops.

daily, but this soon increased to 600 T. Some of the supplies were brought to the rail line by river transport; others were shipped to Zabrez (on the Sava north of Obrenovac) and then over the river. This of course caused serious delays, and therefore it was planned to build a transom bridge over the Sava. Of course the forced evacuation of Valjevo and loss of the railroad soon put an end to this plan. Nonetheless the quick repair of the Kolubara line was a considerable achievement of the civilian and military offices and workers who were involved.
3. The Battle of Arangjelovac

a. The decisive actions of 3 and 4 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 24)

At this point the opposing forces were organized as follows:

**AUSTRIANS**

5th Army
- VIII Corps had 34 bns, 4 sqdns and 21 batteries: 9 ID (17 & 18 Bdes), 21 LW ID (41 & 42 Bdes)
- Krauss' Combined Corps had 44 1/2 bns, 7 1/2 sqdns and 24 batteries: 7 ID (14 Inf Bde, 107 k.u. Lst Inf Bde), 29 ID (57, 58 & 71 Inf Bdes; 104 k.u. Lst Inf Bde, GM Schön's Group)
- The Belgrade bridgehead had 8 bns, 1 sqdn and 19 batteries
- In Syrmia (including Peterwardein) and the Banat there were 24 bns, 9 1/2 sqdns and 17 batteries

6th Army
- XIII Corps (which transferred on 9 Dec to 5th Army) had 28 bns, 4 1/4 sqdns and 25 1/3 batteries: 36 ID (13 & 72 Bdes), 42 Hon ID (83 & 84 Bdes)
- XV Corps had 44 1/4 bns, 3 1/4 sqdns and 30 batteries: 1 ID (7, 8 & 9 Mtn Bdes), 40 Hon ID (79 & 80 Bdes), 48 ID (10, 11 & 12 Mtn Bdes)
- XVI Corps had 65 1/2 bns, 4 1/2 sqdns and 35 1/2 batteries: Goiginger's ID (2, 6 & 14 Mtn Bdes plus 109 k.u. Lst Inf Bde and 7 Lst Ers Bde), 18 ID (1, 4, 5 & 13 Mtn Bdes), 50 ID (3, 15 & 16 Mtn Bdes; 9 Lst Eta Bde)
- FML Snjaric's Group (the Drina security force) had 17 1/2 bns, 1/2 sqdn and 6 1/2 batteries
- Security forces in the BHD garrisons totalled 22 3/4 bns; they had no sqdns or field batteries, but many fixed fort arty comps

**SERBS (from north to south)**
- Directly under the SOK - Branicevo Det., Belgrade Fortified District troops, Obrenovac Det., Cavalry Div
- 2nd Army - Divs Sumadija I, Timok I, Morava I
- 3rd Army - Divs Drina II, Combined, Timok II
- 1st Army - Divs Drina I, Morava II, Dunav I, Dunav II
- Uzice Group - Div Sumadija II, Lim Detachment (Apparently the

535 Translator's Note - The Austrian organization is given in Conrad, Vol. V, Anlage # 30. The Serbian organization appears on Beilage 24 of the original.
Early on 3 December the Uzice Group attacked 18 ID, which was shuffling its components; the Serbs' objective was the Babina glava, on a major ridge. Sumadija Div II sent its main body forward between the Cemernica and Kamenica Brooks, with a side column west of the Kamenica against the Ostrica. The brigade-sized Lim Detachment moved against the Siljkovica. The 1st Mtn Bde soon halted the Lim Detachment, and half of 13 Mtn Bde kept the left column of Sumadija II at bay with flanking fire. The main Sumadija column was checked in time by 5 Mtn Bde south of the road to Grn. Milanovac, and was unable to break through despite its numerical superiority.

The offensive of 1st Serbian Army, which opened at the same time, was more successful. As instructed, the Dunav Div II attacked the right wing of 50 ID (15 and 16 Mtn Bdes) only to pin the Austrians down. Gen. Misic's other three divisions surged forward on a front 10 km wide on both sides of the two roads leading to the Suvobor; their objective was Prostruga Ridge. In a mighty collision, Dunav Div I threw 3 Mtn Bde back against the heights southeast of Banjani; here, however, the Bde was able to hold fast thanks to the intervention of parts of 14 Mtn Bde on its left flank. Moreover, the 14th was also not only able to repulse the attack of Morava Div II on its own position, but helped the sorely pressed 2 Mtn Bde in the middle of Goiginger's Division. 2nd Bde had been pushed back by Drina Div I from its weakly held main position south of Boljkovci, and had heavy losses. Thereafter its line stabilized, thanks to the help from 14 Bde on the south and also from parts of 6 Mtn Bde (which wasn't yet heavily attacked) and of 109 Lst Inf Bde on the north. The main body of 109 Lst Bde on the heights east of Boljkovci, and all of 10 Mtn Bde on the Golubac, were opposed by a side detachment of Drina Div I; this Serbian group was waiting for the attack of 3rd Army, and only displayed a little activity in the afternoon.

At the last moment, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm of 3rd Army had decided to postpone the start of his attack until the afternoon because of the late approach of the southern wing of 2nd Army on his right. However, in the morning the 12 Mtn Bde of 48 ID advanced past Lipet Hill, which it found evacuated, and toward the Motika. Therefore at least the so-called Dragolj Detachment (2 infantry regiments and all of the artillery of Timok Div II) was
obliged to strike toward the Vrlaja. The order for the rest of 3rd Army to attack was issued around 1:00 PM. To enhance morale, reports were issued describing the successes already won by 1st Army in the morning, and the King himself appeared among his troops.

Because of the late start of the Serbs, the only part of 48 ID heavily engaged was 11 Mtn Bde, which finally had to concede the eastern part of the Vrlaja to the enemy. The forward units of 40 and 42 Hon ID defended themselves with stubborn bravery, as the enemy themselves conceded; they gave way only because of the Serbs' superior numbers and powerful artillery support. Thus toward evening the two Serbian divisions between the Kacer and Onjeg Brooks (Combined and Drina II) approached the well-constructed main position of 40 Hon ID on both sides of the Cukor Heights, which dominated the battlefield.

As the enemy attack broke out against the north wing of XV Corps, the 7 and 9 Mtn Bdes of 1st ID were already marching toward the front to temporarily relieve 48 ID. When XVI Corps appealed for help, GdI Appel spontaneously diverted both of these Brigades to help his neighbor, despite the danger to his own front. At 4:00 PM they moved south toward Boljkovci, leaving only 8 Mtn Bde in Appel's Corps reserve. Around 5:00 PM it was arranged that the entire 1st ID would deploy through Boljkovci on 4 December.

The first objective of 2nd Serbian Army was to recover the positions it had held in the Battle of the Kolubara. Therefore Timok Div I thrust forward along the road to Lazarevac against 36 ID, which was dug in between Pestan Brook and the Kremenica; Morava Div I fought the 42 Hon ID farther south. The Morava troops worked their way up to the main ridge south of the Kremenica, and took the Trnavci Heights; thus they were threatening the key Kremenica position from the south. Timok Div I stormed the Vis Heights # 295 on the road, while its north wing drove the northern part of 36 ID back toward Burovo in an impetuous rush. Without seeing action, the main body of Sumadija Div I advanced between the Pestan and Turija Brooks, while its advance guards came up against the parts of 9 ID which had stayed on the Volujak. North of the Turija one regiment reached the Okresak. The Cavalry Division, covering the north wing, skirmished north of Sibnica with the foremost elements of 21 LW ID.

Based on reports that arrived by evening, the BOK believed that the Serbian attack was directed only against XVI Corps, while
the actions against the center and north wing of 6th Army were merely diversions. They believed that the intervention of 1st ID, and that of 5 and 13 Mtn Bdes which 18 ID was sending against the Galic, would soon relieve the pressure on XVI Corps. 4 Mtn Bde was told to assemble at Pozega to support 1st Mtn Bde. The activity of the Serbs made it advisable to accelerate the planned major offensive by 5th Army, which was told to be ready to attack on the evening of 4 December rather than of 5 December as originally envisioned.

The Serbian 2nd and 3rd Armies took advantage of the attacking spirit of their troops to continue the offensive into the night. However, the only advantage was gained by Drina Div II, which at 2:00 AM took the heights south of Smrdljikovac from the southern wing of 42 Hon ID in hand-to-hand fighting.

Meanwhile the victory parade had taken place in Belgrade. A telegram was sent in homage to the aged Emperor, which led to celebration throughout the Monarchy. Therefore the soldiers and sailors around Belgrade were promised a day of rest. However, at 7:45 PM GdI Frank received the alarming request from Potiorek that he should accelerate the planned offensive, and the rest day was cancelled. 7 ID was ordered to deploy on the heights south of Parcani-Ralja; 104 Lst Inf Bde would go to Ripanj, 29 ID (including 71 Inf Bde) to Vrcin, east of the road to Ralja. These dispositions, which diverged from the intentions of the BOK, were apparently prompted by increased Serbian activity at Semendria. Until that town could be occupied by the detachment of Col. Haubert (1 infantry regiment, 1 battery and half a squadron from the newly-forming 60 ID), there was concern for the safety of 5th Army's left flank. No new orders were necessary for VIII Corps, since it had already been planning to take part in the attack which XIII Corps had originally scheduled for the 4th. It was believed that the VIIITH would only encounter a rear guard in the fortifications at Sibnica, because pilots had reported that long supply columns were retreating toward Arangjelovac-Topola-Grn. Satornja and that entrenchments were being vigorously constructed in that area. Unfortunately FML Krauss in Belgrade was in communication with his troops only by means of mounted messengers; this greatly delayed the transmission of orders.

On 4 December the VIII Corps sent 21 LW ID ahead to the line Stojnik-Beljina. Only LW IR # 6 was engaged; on the heights south of Beljina it came up against 2nd Cav Bde, reinforced by
parts of the Obrenovac Detachment. The Serbs tried in vain to throw back the gallant Egerland regiment. The main body of 9 ID reached the Okresak Heights, where an artillery duel developed. A detachment of the 9th pushed from Volujak toward the southeast, where it was defeated in a fierce hand-to-hand action with two regiments of Sumadija Div I.

Although XIII Corps had been engaged throughout the night, it still wished to stick with the plan for a counterattack. Along the road, the center of 36 ID recovered the Vis Heights # 295 from Timok Div I. In the Kremenica-Trnavci sector the Croats were engaged with Morava Div I; eight Serbian battalions were bunched tightly together as a storm group on the north wing, supported by effective fire from eight batteries. However, their attacks on the Kremenica were repulsed. The Domobranen were also forced onto the defensive on the Trnavci, where Morava Div I attacked with the regiment on its southern flank out of the Onjeg valley. However, the diversion of this regiment gave the southern wing of 42 Hon ID an opportunity to recapture the heights south of the Onjeg Brook, which had been lost to the north wing of Drina Div II during the night; the Serbs were driven back beyond the ravine. Thus XIII Corps won a superb defensive victory, although it had deployed only 17,000 riflemen on a front of 15 km.

The success of the Domobranen made it easier for 40 Hon ID to defend the Cukor. After several false starts, nine Serbian battalions launched a major attack around 2:00 PM. After a few steps the attack broke down in the frontal fire of the Hungarians and the flanking fire from the Croats farther north. Moreover, the Croats at the same time counterattacked the flank of the attacking group and forced it to waver. Thereafter the Drina Div II and Combined Div made no other combined attacks. 48 ID was kept in suspense by the activity of the Dragolj Detachment and of the bulk of Timok Div II, as well as by heavy artillery fire on the Vrlaja and the Lipet-Golubac front.

Meanwhile, after a quiet night the Serbian 1st Army pressed hard against XVI Corps. Gen. Misić sent Drina Div I along the road through Bojkovci, and the Morava II and Dunav I Divs between the two roads leading into the Ljig Valley. Their objectives were the Prostruga and Rajac. Dunav Div II was sent against the Suvobor and Babina glava. The central group and left wing were each supported by one regiment which was in the Army's reserve.

14 Mtn Bde, which like all parts of XVI Corps was now also suffering from a lack of rifle ammunition, bore the brunt of the
attack. Assaulted in front by Morava Div II and from the south by the right wing of Dunav Div I, both 14 Bde and the 2 Mtn Bde on its left fell back with heavy losses. They linked up with 7 Mtn Bde of 1st ID south of Boljkovci. 1st ID counterattacked around 4:00 PM with 7, 8 and 9 Mtn Bdes, which threw Drina Div I back on both sides of the road.\(^{536}\) However, this misfortune didn't cause Gen. Misic to divert units from his center to the right wing, because he recognized that if he took the Prostruga as planned the Austrians would be unable to retain their positions at Boljkovci. Indeed, by this time the 14 Mtn Bde had been beaten again and thrown back to the Prostruga. At noon the left wing of Dunav Div II pushed 3 Mtn Bde off the Makljis Heights southeast of Banjani; this forced 50 ID to also give way before Dunav II.

The situation made it impossible for 1st ID to exploit its victory by a further advance. 7 Mtn Bde, on the contrary, was soon defending itself against the victorious surge of Morava Div II. Darkness and exhaustion finally brought the bitter actions to an end.

By this time the 50 ID had 15 and 16 Mtn Bdes on both sides of the road to the Suvobor, on Ravni gaj and Danilov vrh; 3 Mtn Bde was north of Banjani; 2 and 14 Mtn Bdes, reduced to a total of 1600 riflemen, were assembling on the Prostruga. 1st ID and the north wing of Goiginger's Combined ID were also ordered back to the line Golubac-Prostruga. 18 ID was heavily engaged and therefore unable to send any men to support the sector opposite the Galic.

Because of this difficult situation, FZM Potiorek repeatedly demanded that 5th Army should immediately advance. Moreover, the 5th should send six battalions and one battery to Mionica to reinforce FZM Wurm; GdI Frank selected parts of 60 ID, a March battalion, and a battery of VIII Corps for this purpose. FML Snjaric was told to immediately send the 1st and II Bns of IR # 79 and a battery from Visegrad to Uzice. FZM Wurm ordered four battalions and two batteries of 18 ID to the Sjecina Heights, in order to operate against the west flank of the enemy menacing XVI Corps. Parts of 1st ID and of 109 Lst Inf Bde were to plug the gaps in the middle of the Corps.

The successes already won by 1st Serbian Army encouraged Gen. Misic as early as 11:00 AM to set the line Vis Heights # 707 - Bacinovac - Maljen as the next goal of his troops. However,

\(^{536}\) Ehrenbuch der Hesser, Vol. II, p. 204
because of the situation of the Uzice Group the SOK didn't want to cross the crest of the mountains between the Kolubara and the Morava. Moreover, the appearance of Schwarzenberg's cavalry in front of Grocka caused such fears for the security of northeast Serbia that Gen. Zivkovic of the Belgrade Defense Group had to send two battalions with artillery to Umcari. His concern about thus weakening his forces was allayed by the promise that he would be reinforced by a division if necessary. Indeed his Vencani-Kosmaj front was about to be attacked by VIII Corps and 7 ID. For the k.u.k. Balkan forces the question now was whether XVI Corps could hold out long enough for the thrust of 5th Army to turn the tide in the Battle of Arangjelovac.

b. XVI Corps retreats behind the Kolubara, 5-7 December

5 December - 6th Army sector

In the morning hours of 5 December the Dunav Divs I and II attacked toward the Suvobor and Rajac, driving 50 ID from its positions on Ravni gaj, Danilov vrh and north of Banjani. Gen. Misic asked Putnik to publish these early favorable reports in order to inspire the other Armies. However, part of 18 ID, led by GM Nöhring of 5 Mtn Bde, soon intervened on the front of Dunav Div II on the Sjecina and checked its victorious course. Also parts of 1st ID fell upon the eastern flank of Morava Div II as it headed toward the Prostruga, while the bulk of the 1st and the north wing of Goiginger's Division fended off the advance of Drina Div I through Golubac-Boljkovci. However, the overwhelming artillery fire, to which the defenders could hardly respond with rifle fire, forced open the way to Rajac for 1st Serbian Army by noon. By 3:00 PM the main ridge had been taken as far as the Suvobor. FZW Wurm prepared a second line of resistance, which ran from the Maljen (5 Mtn Bde) through Ruda Heights (50 ID) and the Bacinovac Ridge (Goiginger's ID) to the Mednik (1st ID). 18 ID was ordered to pull back to the Crni vrh and Kozomor.

This bad news compelled FZM Potiorek to order XV Corps to bend its south wing (48 ID) back to the Glavica and the heights on the Ljig north of Kacer Brook. On the other hand, 40 Hon ID, XIII Corps and 5th Army should carry out an attack with all their energy.

The retreat of XVI Corps was very difficult. The troops of different units became completely intermingled, which made it impossible to organize a coherent defense of the new position.
The commander of Dunav Div I, the first to reach the ridge, continued to pursue from Rajac toward Bacinovac, despite a renewed order to halt from the SOK, which was concerned because the other Armies were stuck in place. In the difficult terrain the Dunav Div was unable to cut off the escape route of the Aus-Hung. troops toward Mionica.

To enable 40 Hon ID to attack according to the orders of the BOK, GdI Appel decided to have it shift toward its flank on the Vrlaja and on the ridge which stretches south of the Kacer Brook to the Glavica Dicska; thus the Division would face toward the south. This deployment would also help 1st ID, which during continuous actions had been unable to pull back behind the line Bukva-Gragjenik. At this point the 12 Mtn Bde, following its orders, evacuated the Lipet and left that hotly-contested height in the hands of Timok Div II. However the Combined ID and Drina Div II, after their heavy losses, were in no shape to renew the attack on the Cukor despite the obvious superiority of their artillery.

2nd Serbian Army made tremendous exertions to recover the heights by Lazarevac. Fired up by the presence of their King, the Serbs had already sought unsuccessfully in the night to overrun the Kremenica and the Vis Heights # 295 along the road. In the morning the Kremenica was supposed to be taken by Morava Div I in an outflanking movement from the north. Although the defenders' artillery, hampered by lack of ammunition, couldn't respond to the frightful preliminary Serbian bombardment, and although the attackers came on with self-sacrificing spirit, the Croats stood their ground. In spite of this, the north wing of Morava Div I was able to establish a firm foothold on the ridge north of the Kremenica around 10:00 AM. Then Timok Div I joined in with a thrust to reach the road in the rear of Vis # 295. In the afternoon Morava Div I made two more attacks against the Croats on the Kremenica, but couldn't take the position. The commander of the Serbian division believed he wouldn't be able to advance again until several days of artillery bombardment wore down the enemy; for this opinion he was judged "tired and weak." Gen. Stepanovic ordered him to attack again before nightfall "regardless of casualties."\(^{537}\) The Morava south wing was finally able to take several trenches on the southern slope after a wild melee, but the main position on the Kremenica still withstood all attacks. Meanwhile the Timok Div I, after heavy fighting with 36 ID (including some hand-to-hand combat) worked its way to within 2 km of the road. The Vis Heights # 295 were

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\(^{537}\) Serbian official history, Vol. VI, p. 179
now coming under concentric artillery fire and were threatened from the rear; they seemed likely to fall, which would also mean the loss of the Kremenica. The group of 9 ID south of the Turija had already been pushed back toward the Volujak around 10:00 AM by half of Sumadija Div I.

5 December - 5th Army sector

At this point the operations of 5th Army afforded some relief to the Croatian corps. The advance of the western column of 21 LW ID toward Sibnica compelled Gen. Stepanovic to order the diversion of 5 battalions of Sumadija Div I which were already nearing the Okresak north of the Turija, as well as the Cavalry Division. This in turn forced the Sumadija group south of the Turija to suspend its offensive. Meanwhile the detachment which Gen. Zivkovic had sent toward Umcar reported that Grocka was threatened by Col. Haubert's group and that Umcar itself had been occupied by Col. Schwarzenberg. Moreover, a strong Austrian column was marching south from Vrcin. Therefore at 6:00 PM Putnik ordered the Timok Div I to be sent to Gen. Zivkovic; without this Division the 2nd Serbian Army had to give up the advantages they had won during the day.

This, however, was the extent of the relief brought by 5th Army. Its 21 LW ID had allowed itself to be halted by two battalions and two cavalry regiments north of the main positions of the Obrenovac Detachment. 7 ID stayed on the heights south of Vr. Sopot, because 104 Lst Inf Bde on its left had only come up to Popovic, and 29 ID only to Ml. Pozarevac; therefore the eastern flank of the 7th wasn't protected from the enemy on the Varovnice. GdI Frank was placing his hopes on an energetic attack by FML Krauss' Combined Corps on 6 December. This would entail sending 7 ID (half of which was composed of Landsturm) against the linchpin of the Serbian northern front, the Kosmaj; meanwhile 104 Lst Inf Bde would move against Vlaska and 29 ID against Varovnice, with an eastern side column through Dubona against Parlog. This deployment came to the attention of FZM Potiorek too late to be modified, even though the Feldzeugmeister felt that the front was too wide. He immediately told 5th Army HQ that it should strengthen the right wing of Combined Corps and send it toward Topola (11 km southeast of Arangjelovac). Potiorek believed it should be possible to move along the heights on the Ralja-Arangjelovac Road and to break through the enemy's long line, which was held only by a weak division-sized group of III Ban soldiers.

5 December - Operations of 18 ID
The BOK received encouraging news from 18 ID. Throughout the night of 4-5 December and during the 5th, Col. Karl Panzenböck with the parts of 5 and 15 Mtn Bdes still under his command had held Sumadija Div II in check. Therefore all of Gen. Misic's urging that the Sumadija Div should send a regiment into the mountains remained in vain. The presence of 1st Mtn Bde on the Siljkovica menaced the Serbs' flank and hampered their thrust against the Ostrica, which in turn dominated the battlefield of the right wing of Sumadija Div II. Therefore the Lim Detachment was strengthened by an additional regiment and ordered to use all its strength to capture the Siljkovica. The area where the attack would be launched was outflanked in the west by forward detachments of 1st Mtn Bde on heights with rock faces that couldn't be climbed. On the other hand, the k.u.k. troops on the heights southeast of Siljkovica were spread out thinly, lacked ammunition, and could easily be enveloped from the east. The Serbs sought to take advantage of this position and had already deployed close enough to initiate an attack when Col. Lukachich's last reserve, two very well-led battalions, appeared in the rear of the Serbian group and suddenly opened a raking fire. The would-be attackers fled, as did the rest of the Serbian line. The whole Lim Detachment retreated, except for a group which found itself cut off and opened negotiations to surrender. At this point, however, the Aus-Hung. division received FZM Wurm's order to retreat.

This success of 18 ID, which was the most poorly-supplied unit, strengthened hopes that XVI Corps - for which supplies of all sorts were now arriving at Valjevo - would be able to hold the upper Kolubara. In the evening FZM Potiorek telegraphed the AOK: "A new infantry division placed at my disposal now would soon decide the Serbian campaign and place me in a position to release much stronger forces to the northern front." Since the arrival of such a reinforcement would of course take some time, Potiorek must have been expecting the Serbian offensive to stall on the Kolubara. The AOK, which at this time was committing its last strength to halt the Russian "steamroller", couldn't even consider diverting a large combat force to Serbia due to the shortage of weapons and equipment.

538 In November the Honved Ministry had voluntarily considered reinforcing FZM Potiorek with a newly-formed Honved division; this evidently encouraged him to make this request on 5 December. By this time, however, the new division under Kornhaber had been sent to the Carpathians.
6 December - The offensive of 5th Army

Early in the morning of 6 December, the BOK learned from an intercepted telegram that Gen. Stepanovic believed it would be impossible to hold onto the line in front of Arangjelovac. This was immediately forwarded to 5th Army HQ as an encouragement. However, it was insufficient to add fresh impetus to the attack of VIII Corps, while the troops of the Combined Corps were over-tired. 104 Lst Inf Bde soon came to a halt on both sides of the railroad. 29 ID was able to support each of its brigades with just a section of artillery; its other 36 guns were held back at Vrcin to await ammunition. With this minimal artillery support, 71 Inf Bde and the bulk of 58 Bde (together 8 1/2 battalions) could hardly expect to prevail against the advanced position of the Varovnice group at and west of Sepecin; moreover, Gen. Zivkovic had reinforced the position to 9 battalions and 6 batteries. The k.u.k. troops at Sepecin could hear in their rear the sounds of another action at Umcari. Here Col. Schwarzenberg had been joined by two and a half battalions which Col. Haubert brought up from Grocka, and opened an attack in the early morning against the detachment from the Serbs' Belgrade Group. The enemy was stationed in a well-fortified position northeast of Umcari, and had received two more battalions from 2nd Army. Eventually four battalions of 29 ID and the battalion of the Division's reserve were drawn into this action, so that 57 Inf Bde was left with just one regiment to advance against Dubona. After an initial success against a weak covering force, the 57th Bde didn't gain enough ground to suppress the troublesome flanking fire that the Serbs at Dubona were directing against the 58th and 71st. Under these circumstances it wasn't surprising that the "hitherto fresh elan of the troops of 29 ID seemed to wear out" and that the Division, fortunately for the Serbs, "wasn't up to the mark." Since the Varovnice remained unconquered, it was impossible to threaten the Kosmaj position with envelopment; 7 ID alone was too weak to take the Kosmaj, although according to the Serbs the Division caused the defenders "to be heavily shaken."

Meanwhile a new setback had already befallen XVI Corps early in the morning. After the heavy casualties, there was a great disparity between its strength and that of the enemy, whose morale was soaring because of success. A general feeling of inferiority was developing because of the lack of ammunition for the rifles and the knowledge that the commanders had overtaxed the men. Thus when the Dunav Div I advanced against the

539 Zanantoni, "Die deutsch-böhmische 29. ID", p. 50
Bacinovac at dawn on 6 December the defense soon collapsed. Parts of Goiginger's ID were willing to hold on as long as they were only attacked frontally and as long as the enemy artillery, which was still in the rear, wasn't a factor. But when the artillery began to fire and the Serbs found a way to outflank the position from the east, the important heights were abandoned just before 10:00 AM. Meanwhile 50 ID lost Ruda and pulled back on both sides of the road toward Brezgje. Around 11:00, FZM Potiorek decided that XVI Corps could take up a position behind the Kolubara from Valjevo to Rabas Brook; XV Corps would deploy on its left from the brook to a point downstream from Slovac. XIII Corps would pull it right wing back initially to the Covka, then if necessary it would go back over the Kolubara in the sector stretching to Vreoci. 5th Army would carry on its offensive with all its strength.

At 2:00 PM, GdI Frank advised VIII Corps that in case XIII Corps retreated the 9 ID should hold the line Vreoci-Okresak, while the rest of 5th Army vigorously attacked. At the same time he learned that XIII Corps was still preparing for an offensive. The BOK once more indicated that the principal thrust of the Combined Corps should be in the direction of Topola. "The outcome of all actions to date depends on the weight of this thrust." This was the last hope for an improvement in the situation of 6th Army. To relieve FML Krauss of concern for his eastern flank as much as possible, the elements of 60 ID which were already available at Belgrade (1 battalion, 2 1/2 squadrons and 2 batteries) were ordered to immediately reinforce Col. Haubert's detachment.

6 December - XVI and XV Corps fall back

Meanwhile a new calamity had befallen XVI Corps. Although most of Dunav Div I had stayed on the Bacinovac, one regiment with two guns advanced along the road to Mionica. By this time substantial portions of Goiginger's ID (6 Mtn Bde and 109 Lst Inf Bde) had wound up in 1st ID's sector. The remaining parts of the decimated Division (2 and 14 Mtn Bde - which together had just 1000 riflemen - and parts of 7 Lst Terr Bde with obsolete weapons) weren't able to contest this latest enemy advance. The Serbs reached the north end of the ridge and their two guns opened fire on the massed supply columns of XV and XVI Corps on the road through Grn. Toplica to Mionica. The wagons were an easy target. Panic broke out and the drivers fled for their lives, taking parts of Goiginger's ID with them. Amid the confusion, Serbian patrols thrust ahead as far as Mionica.
Faced with an impending breakthrough, FZM Wurm bowed to necessity. 50 ID would retreat to the heights north of Valjevo, Goiginger's battered ID to the heights northeast of Valjevo as far as Rabas Brook, and 18 ID to the heights west of the Gradac Brook.

Because of the disaster to his neighbor, around 10:00 AM GdI Appel ordered his supply trains to pull back, and soon thereafter the combat units of XV Corps. 1st ID would go to the heights west of Grn. Toplica, 48 ID to those east of the town, 40 Hon ID to the ridge northwest of Moravci. After these orders were issued, FZM Potiorek's commands for the retreat arrived; XV Corps was advised that if possible it was to hold onto the heights south of the Kolubara. Around 1:15 PM the BOK also indicated their preference that 40 Hon ID, if possible, should be left on the heights east of Moravci so that it could support the anticipated attack of XIII Corps.

1st ID, covered by a rear guard on the Gragjenik and Bukva, pulled back during the course of the morning to a position on the Mednik. Gragjenik was evacuated around noon, and at 2:00 PM the Division received its orders for the further retreat; thus the exhausted troops began to march toward Grn. Toplica. The wreckage of the Division was assembled at midnight in camps west of that town.

The 6 and 10 Mtn Bdes held off the right wing of Morava Div II until 6:00 PM, at which point 48 ID had withdrawn and the Drina Div I was approaching. Timok Div II was content to reach the Glavica Dicska. The Combined Div and Drina Div II stood ready to spring upon 40 Hon ID and the south wing of 42 Hon ID as soon as they commenced their retreat. Because of the Serbian breakthrough to Mionica, the retreat of 48 and 40 ID was postponed until evening, so that the disengagement took place under very difficult conditions. 48 ID had the easiest time, and reached the heights northeast of Grn. Toplica by midnight.

The Combined Div and Drina Div II didn't overcome the resistance of a rear guard on the Cukor until 3:00 PM and it was already getting dark when the former reached the Parlog and the latter the road to Lazarevac at a point east of Dudovica. At this point most of 40 Hon ID was deploying on the ridge northwest of Moravci. A rear guard which the Division had left on the east bank of the Ljig was heavily engaged during the night with the closely pursuing Combined Div.

For the 7th, GdI Appel ordered 1st ID, which was already on the
road through Mionica, to move through Slovac to the north bank of the Kolubara. 48 ID and 40 Hon ID would maintain a bridgehead south of the river, south and southeast of Slovac.

The Serbian breakthrough to Mionica seemed to threaten the rear guard which 50 ID had left on the Cerovo brdo; therefore it retreated in the evening toward Valjevo and around midnight set up a bridgehead south of the Kolubara to cover the withdrawal of the supply trains and of at least part of the 6,000 sick and wounded men in the city.

7 December - The Serbian advance continues

Because of the uncertain situation of 3rd Army and of the left wing of his own 1st Army, Gen. Misic wished to reorganize on the line Bukva-Bacinovac and bring order to his supply and munitions services. Only detachments would continue the pursuit on the 7th, while the majority of the units stayed in place, ready to either help 3rd Army or to open an attack from Brezgje against Valjevo. The Uzice Group had lost all contact with 4 Mtn Bde (which had pulled back to Uzice) and with 18 ID, whose 1st Mtn Bde had already reached Razana on the evening of the 6th. 13 Mtn Bde was marching to Razana, 5 Bde to the Izvrsac. Gen. Aracic, commander of the Uzice Group, sent his troops directly to the west, and thus away from the main battlefield. The pause by 1st Army on the 7th would give XVI Corps time to prepare a position by Valjevo, and could have been a decisive factor if 5th Army had been able to take advantage of the situation and win a victory on the Serbian northern flank.

Already during the night of 6-7 December a battalion from the Serbian Combined Div had overrun an outpost and crossed the Ljig below Moravci, causing terrible confusion among the drowsy soldiers of 40 Hon ID. Toward morning the enemy battalion fell upon parts of 42 Hon ID, whose south wing had been up all night to oppose the onrush of Drina Div II. The Domobranen, who had hitherto fought so bravely, were taken completely by surprise and could no longer be controlled by their officers. Deserted by the men, the officers proudly refused to surrender and fought on until wiped out.

This misfortune initiated a very stressful day for XV Corps. The regimental commanders of Morava Div II on the Mednik saw the Austrian traffic jam on the Ljig-Grn. Toplica road and decided to attack it not just with small detachments, but with their entire units; they were joined from the east by a regiment of Drina Div I with a battery. However, 48 ID had started to
withdraw so early that only a rear guard on the Mramor was still around to oppose the enemy. 1st ID also was not greatly troubled by the regiment of Dunav Div I that had broken through to Mionica; by evening 1st ID had crossed the Kolubara at Slovac without suffering further damage. Anyway, the Dunav regiment had become involved in an action by its left wing detachment against a weak rear guard that Goiginger's ID had left south of the bridge at Divci to cover the crossing of the numerous stragglers. The larger Serbian force compelled the detachment to withdraw, enabling the victors to take many prisoners and even some guns.

The retreat of 40 Hon ID was very difficult. It was able to hold off a regiment of the Combined Div which had followed its very successful advanced battalion to the Topalsko brdo. However, east of the Mramor the Honveds were also under attack from one regiment apiece of Drina Div I and Morava Div I. They finally broke through the attackers toward the north at 10:00 AM. Soon thereafter (around 11:00) the Combined Div, which had thrown a second regiment into the fighting, deployed a gun in the front line on the Topalsko brdo. Its fire not only caused chaos in the ranks of the retreating 40 Hon ID, but also caused the southern wing of 42 Hon ID to fall back to the west bank of the Ljig. The Domobranen didn't give up the heights southeast of Dudovica until 2:00 PM, when they were occupied by the west wing of Drina Div II, which had been shifted to support 2nd Army. However, the Drina Div's east wing pushed forward against the Kremenica and was already approaching the Trnavci Heights. Therefore the retreat of the south wing of 42 Hon ID to the lower Ljig valley was also very difficult. By the time 40 Hon ID assembled in the evening on the heights southeast of Slovac, it was completely ruined by its great losses in men and guns and by total exhaustion. The 48 ID south of Slovac and the 1st ID, which spent the night in Corps reserve between Divci and Slovac, were in better condition.

The two Dunav Divisions, like their neighbors, didn't pause in their operations as 1st Army had prescribed. However, their progress was delayed by the diversion of a regiment of Dunav II to reinforce the northern front and by the late evacuation of the Maljen by the rear guard of 5 Mtn Bde. Thus the left wing of 1st Army didn't begin its advance toward Valjevo until 10:00 AM, and by evening hadn't passed the Cerovo brdo. This allowed

540 Translator's Note - The reference to Drina Div I may be in error, since Drina Div II was in the area and # I wasn't, unless perhaps there was also a detachment of # I around.
50 ID to occupy the heights northwest and north of Valjevo without disturbance, leaving outposts south of the Kolubara. Goiginger's ID occupied the line east of the 50th as far as the point north of Divci. Under 18 ID, in the night of 7-8 December the 1st Mtn Bde reached the heights behind the Grada Brook southwest of Valjevo; 13 and 5 Mtn Bde had only reached Veliko b.-Bacevci. FZM Wurm was able to bring some order into the remnants of XVI Corps, and reinforced them with line of communications troops and battalions from Syrmia. The men also received rations and ammunition. Railroad trains could still reach Valjevo without interference, because the Serbs hadn't pushed past the line Dudovica-Mionica.

The advance of the Uzice Group was so slow that the units under GM Lenz at Uzice (4 Mtn Bde, 9 Lst Eta Bde and the two battalions of IR # 79), were not disturbed. FML Snjaric turned back to Visegrad, in order to organize the defenses of the Drina.

7 December - The crisis at its height

The quiet morning on the front of XVI Corps strengthened FZM Potiorek's conviction that the Serbs couldn't have suddenly gained the capability to mount a sustained offensive, and that he could count on their staying in place on the upper Kolubara. Meanwhile he hoped that 5th Army could completely retrieve the situation. On the other hand, the impression gained by GM Bölzt in his morning conversations with the Corps chiefs of staff was quite depressing. XVI Corps complained not only about the reduced size of the units, but also about the complete exhaustion of the troops and their loss of nerve. Under XV Corps, the average front-line strength of the battalions was just 200 men. XIII Corps felt that it would soon have to retreat over the Kolubara. GM Gerabek (Chief of Staff to 5th Army) stated that his Army was aware that the decision rested with them, and especially with the Combined Corps; they would do their best. However, the 5th Army troops were also exhausted, and even when not engaged moved forward only with difficulty.

GM Bölzt therefore was of the opinion that 7 December was the day on which it would be decided whether the battle should be either continued or broken off; this in turn was dependent on the successes of 5th Army, especially of VIII Corps. FZM Potiorek, on the other hand, felt that operations in XIII Corps' sector would be decisive. Early in the afternoon he ordered XV and XVI Corps to hold the Kolubara line no matter what happened. The main body of XIII Corps should remain east of the Kolubara
as long as possible, fighting in close cooperation with VIII Corps. "The final result depends on the steadiness of XIII Corp!"

It was thus conceded that GdI Appel could bring 48 ID and 40 Hon ID over the Kolubara. In fact he had already ordered them to move to the other bank on his own responsibility, but cancelled the order around 1:00 PM when XVI Corps reported that the enemy wasn't pushing ahead. In the afternoon the pursuit of XV Corps also slackened considerably. The decision to leave the two divisions in place was consistent with the desire to protect the all-important railroad and also to make it easier for the neighboring XIII Corps to remain on the south bank of the Kolubara, as the BOK so urgently desired.

The earlier retreat of XV Corps anyway had already adversely affected XIII Corps, since it allowed Drina Div II to press ever closer to the Kremenica. The south wing of Morava Div I aided the Drina troops, and in the afternoon the center of the Morava Div escalated this threat from the flank into yet another (vain) attack on the hotly-contested high ground. Meanwhile XIII Corps had completed preparations to take up a new position in front of Lazarevac on the line Zupanjac-Burovo. Thus the Serbs only had to deal with a rear guard when they finally took the Kremenica around midnight.

GdI Frank warned the neighboring VIII Corps that flyers reported strong enemy forces assembling at Arangjelovac and heavy railroad traffic north of the city. Although the flyers had actually spotted only supply trains, Frank wanted VIII Corps to exert all its efforts to defeat the enemy before the arrival of the anticipated reinforcements. However, the VIIItth was scattered over a 20 km front and because of its reduced strength could barely even maintain its connection in line with the Combined Corps. Its attempts to attack were halted completely by powerful defensive fire; its opponents, the Serbian Cavalry Division and Obrenovac Detachment, believed that the offensive was merely a weak demonstration. Similarly, 7 ID moved so slowly against the Kosmaj positions that Gen. Zivkovic believed that it was only trying to pin down the defenders. On the other hand, the powerful attacks by 104 Lst Inf Bde and 29 ID made a strong impression on the enemy. The former won significant ground on both sides of the railroad, so that the weakly held lines connecting the Kosmaj and Varovnice positions were seriously threatened. In the morning the 71 and 58 Inf Bdes of 29 ID had already overrun the advanced position northwest of Varovnice that had defeated them the day before. However, their
further progress was hindered by flanking fire from Dubona, and by the paralyzing effects of the actions raging at Umcari in their rear.

The reinforced Serbian Umcari Detachment, apparently supported by parts of the Branicevo Detachment, made another advance against 57 Inf Bde early in the morning. The 57th couldn't shake off the enemy, even though GM Zanantoni sent it three more batteries in addition to its original artillery support. As the bulk of Timok Div I came up, Gen. Zivkovic moved it on from the Kosmaj to his right wing.

At noon, the SOK instructed 1st and 3rd Armies to advance to the Kolubara on the 8th. 2nd Army, supported by Drina Div II of 3rd Army, would only try to drive XIII Corps over the river if the success of its neighbors afforded it a favorable opportunity.

4. The decision to break off the Arangjelovac Battle, 8-9 December

8 December

At 10:00 AM on 8 December the commander of 2nd Serbian Army sent the bulk of Sumadija Div I, after powerful artillery preparation, against the Volujak (10 km northeast of Lazarevac); this would prevent VIII Corps from interfering with his Army's offensive on both sides of the Arangjelovac-Lazarevac Road against XIII Corps. This advance had already started earlier in the morning.

Under 3rd Army, Drina Div II (east of the Ljig) moved against the Covka. The main column of the Combined Div attacked Pepeljevac; its side columns (one regiment apiece) moved along the Ljig and against the Strazara. A major action developed on this position, into which Drina Div I and Morava Div II each sent a regiment. Timok Div II assisted later in the morning by sending a regiment toward Slovac.

Around 1:00 PM the right column of the Combined Div reached the Kolubara next to the mouth of the Ljig; its main body and that of Timok Div II drove back a rear guard of 40 Hon ID east of Slovac but then were halted by the determined resistance of the east wing of XV Corps.

Farther west, Gen. Misic was planning a powerful thrust against
Valjevo; for this purpose he wished Dunav Div I, already opposite the city, to stay in place until his other 3 divisions concentrated in the area. Therefore the Dunav Div only sent scouting detachments against Valjevo, rather early in the morning. This caused the covering troops of 50 ID to fall back with unnecessary haste, and the Serbs entered the city. Street fighting broke out, in which civilians took part from concealment. Although the Serbs were finally driven out, the fact that such an obviously small group had advanced so far proved that the fighting strength of XVI Corps' troops had evaporated.

This incident convinced FZM Potiorek that the Serbs had no intention of stopping on the Kolubara. Moreover, FZM Wurm and GdI Appel both reported that their Corps would need at least two weeks of rehabilitation; in the meantime, the Serbs would in any case be free to fall upon 5th Army with greatly superior forces. Both factors were reasons for breaking off the battle. Potiorek decided that XIII Corps should retreat that night and that 5th Army should cancel its offensive.

Meanwhile the 5th Army had been pushing hard against the Serbs' northern front. Early in the morning GM Schön drove the Umcari Detachment back a substantial distance; at the same time the units from 60 ID expelled a smaller enemy force from the heights on the Danube east of Grocka. 58 and 71 Inf Bdes pushed closer to the enemy position on the Varovnice, and 104 Lst Inf Bde captured the western half of Vlaska. Also early in the day, 7 ID broke into the Kosmaj position and flung back a counterattack by reserves. Thereupon the Serbs' III Ban troops fled in panic, although a small number of line companies held their ground on the Kosutica. In the afternoon a brilliant follow-up action led to the capture of the summit of the Kosmaj.

At 1:30 PM, when GdI Frank received Potiorek's order to stop attacking, he suggested that this promising offensive should continue anyway. 7 ID would next turn its 107 Lst Inf Bde against the flank of the Obrenovac Detachment, which would bring the stalled attack of 21 LW ID into motion. FZM Potiorek agreed, but insisted that Frank should also begin to prepare a defensive line running from Stepojevac to the Mostine Heights northeast of Grocka in case 5th Army were to be attacked by larger enemy forces. Thereupon GdI Frank ordered VIII Corps to pull back its right wing in the evening to the line Vreoci-Volujak-Arapovac, so that it would remain level with XIII Corps.

The energetic Col. Tufegdzic frustrated the plans for a further
attack by 107 Lst Inf Bde. He scraped together 12 battalions, with which at 4:00 PM he recovered the position which had been lost in the morning on the Kosmaj, along with 10 guns which the Hungarians had briefly captured. Undisturbed by this setback, FML Krauss ordered 29 ID to mount a night attack against the Varovnice Heights, demanded that 104 Lst Inf Bde complete its capture of Vlaska, and told 7 ID to once again capture the Kosmaj. The lower-ranking commanders weren't briefed about the overall situation, apparently so that their will to attack would not be weakened. The result was that the Combined Corps suffered further bloody losses which could have been averted if the offensive had been cancelled.

To heighten the tragedy, this squandering of the Corps' last strength in an already lost cause wasn't even needed to bring relief to 6th Army. The temporary occupation of the Kosmaj had already shaken the SOK, so that at 5:30 PM they ordered 2nd Army to immediately pull Morava Div I out of the front and to send it north in a forced march during the night. The Morava Div would leave just one regiment with two batteries on the road in front of Lazarevac, while Sumadija Div I stretched its south wing to take over the positions formerly held by the Morava troops north of the road. By this point the attackers were already within one kilometer of the line of 36 ID on the east edge of Lazarevac and Drina Div II was in position to storm the trenches of 42 Hon ID. XIII Corps HQ feared that it would suffer a calamity when it retreated over the river during the night. However, their tension was soon relieved. After darkness fell the troops crossed the river without being disturbed; the overland march of the north wing of 36 ID to keep up the connection with VIII Corps was equally uneventful. Meanwhile 9 ID on the western wing of VIII Corps had repulsed three attacks by Sumadija Div I. When the Sumadija Div fell back, 9 ID was able to redeploy its right flank during the night at Vreoci without incident.

When GdI Appel learned that FZM Potiorek was planning to pull back over the Kolubara, he ordered the retreat of XV Corps to take place as darkness fell. First it had to endure heavy fighting. The defenders were especially hard-pressed southeast of Slovac, where 48 ID supported 40 Hon ID with two mountain brigades. Toward evening the Serbs were so close to the defenders that it seemed questionable that the latter could disengage to cross the river. Then some hastily-assembled reserves counterattacked and completely routed parts of two Serbian regiments that had been advancing from the east. In the darkness a panic broke out, and spread over the entire front of the Serbian Combined Div. Although reserves of Timok Div II
soon restored the situation southeast of Slovac, the Serbs were so intimidated that they no longer attempted to interfere with the river crossing. Toward midnight the badly wounded XV Corps completed its retreat, and the bridge at Slovac was blown up.

The XVI Corps survived 8 December in better shape than had seemed likely after the events of the morning. Because of reports that XVI Corps was collapsing, Gen. Misic sent Dunav Div I in motion against Valjevo. The Division was to determine whether the enemy was withdrawing to the Drina or to the Sava. Morava Div II was reorganizing and resting at Mionica. Drina Div I was ordered to continue marching through Mionica toward Valjevo; it would be available to help Dunav I in the capture of the city if the defenders proved stronger than expected. In any case Drina I would stop once it was north of Valjevo, and then follow Dunav I toward the west.

When the Serbian advanced guard wanted to cross the Kolubara around noon, it came under effective artillery fire from 18 ID on the heights west of the Gradac, and was pinned down until 4:00 PM. After Serbian artillery intervened, however, three battalions crossed the Kolubara in the gathering dusk and dug in just north of Valjevo. At this time the foremost elements of Drina Div I, which had also been sent to the north edge of the city, were approaching the mouth of the Gradac Brook. Because of the late hour, the continuation of the action at Valjevo was postponed until the following day after contact was established with Dunav Div II north of Bacevci.

The bulk of the Uzice Group reached the western Valjevo-Uzice Road on the 8th. They could not yet occupy Uzice itself because GM Lenz didn't evacuate the town and march toward Rogacica until around midnight.

9 December

On 9 December, Generals Misic and Jurisic-Sturm strove to open the way over the Kolubara for 2nd Army. It was possible to erect a small bridge next to the mouth of the Ljig, upon which a regiment of the Combined Div began to cross the Kolubara early on the 9th. Gen. Misic had a regiment of Morava Div II advance toward Divci along with artillery and pioneers, in order to protect the new bridge and to threaten the west flank of the enemy standing in front of 3rd Army. Moreover, 1st Army planned to drive XVI Corps, which was presumed to want to retreat toward the Jadar valley, toward the north; this would prevent the Corps from digging in anew on the Gucevo-Boranja ridges south of
Loznica. Not much resistance was expected from the Austrians on the heights around Valjevo, who were presumed to be a rear guard. Dunav Div I seemed to be strong enough to drive them away, to take the city, and to pursue toward Kamenica and Stave. On the right of Dunav I, the Drina Div I would take up a position north of Valjevo on the Blizonjski visovi; Dunav Div II would be on the left (western) flank of Dunav I. Morava Div II would stay south of Valjevo as a reserve. If Gen. Misic had anticipated serious resistance, he would have sent Dunav Div II farther west, as the Division in fact expected, to envelop the southern wing of 18 ID.

Contrary to the expectations of 1st and 3rd Army HQ, the SOK wanted to divert as many units as possible directly against 5th Army, whose advance was becoming dangerous. In the morning the parts of Morava Div I still with 2nd Army were ordered to the northern front, and Drina Div II was reassigned to Gen. Stepanovic. Just before noon, Gen. Jurisic-Sturm received an order to also send the Combined Div to the north. Thus five line divisions (Morava I, Timok I, Sumadija I, Drina II and Combined) would be committed against 5th Army, as well as the Cavalry Division and about two divisions worth of III Ban units. By this point, Frank's Army had lost about half of its combat strength in the last month; including the portions of 60 ID which had joined it, the Army had no more than about 36,000 men (15,000 in VIII Corps, 21,000 in Combined Corps).

The fighting at Valjevo began at 5:00 AM on the Gradac, when six battalions of Dunav Div I tried to cross the brook between Valjevo and the Markovac Heights, opposed by 18 ID. At 8:00 AM, eight battalions of Drina Div I opened an attack against 16 Mtn Bde of 50 ID at the northern powder magazine, while three battalions of Dunav I hit 3 Mtn Bde on the heights west of Valjevo. Around 10:00 AM a regiment stormed the height next to the powder magazine. 15 Mtn Bde and parts of Goiginger's ID in the vicinity made a counterattack which, according to Serbian witnesses, was carried out in perfect order. A third regiment of Drina I had to intervene to restore the situation. Around this time, Dunav Div II came up the eastern Uzice road into artillery range of 18 ID; however, it didn't press forward to the Markovac but waited until its batteries had pinned down the enemy on the Velko brdo. Then, as ordered, it marched along the front of 18 ID toward Valjevo.

Early in the morning the approach of strong enemy columns and lack of trust in the combat value of his morally and physically drained troops had already led FZM Wurm to issue orders for the
eventuality of a forced retreat. Goiginger's ID would go back to the Blizonjski visovi, 50 ID to the Jautina and 18 ID to the heights by Kamenica. Toward noon the resistance of the defenders north of Valjevo began to waver. Drina Div I was still held at bay by the east wing of 50 ID and by parts of Goiginger's ID until 2:00 PM, but then the northern group of XVI Corps began to retreat. This enabled Dunav Div I to turn against 3 Mtn Bde on the heights northwest of Valjevo with superior force. 3 Bde found itself threatened in the rear, and at 3:00 PM evacuated its positions. This, in turn, placed 1st Mtn Bde in danger on the heights south of Valjevo. 1st Bde was instructed to cover the retreat of the south wing of 18 ID (13 and 5 Mtn Bdes), in the course of which it was attacked by four fresh Serbian battalions on the Gradac Brook. Col. Lukachich had to open the way to Kamenica by a counter thrust against the heights at the western powder magazine.

On the eastern wing of XVI Corps, meanwhile, the weak 6 Mtn Bde had barred the advance of a regiment of Morava Div II which had reached the north bank. When the Serbs attempted to break through at 3:00 PM, the defenders hit them in their east flank and drove half of the regiment back over the Kolubara. The other half then didn't interfere with the departure of 6 Mtn Bde.

The Kolubara line is abandoned

Based on the reports of XVI Corps about the necessity to retreat, FZM Potiorek decided at noon to pull the XVIth back in one bound through Koceljeva to the heights at Draginje, while simultaneously the XV Corps moved back through Banjani to a point southeast of Debrec. The supply trains were sent to the bridges at Mitrovica and Sabac. XIII Corps was reassigned to 5th Army, which would hold a large bridgehead south of Belgrade and Obrenovac. FML Snjaric would be in charge of security on the Drina: his original units would guard the upper course of the river along with 18 Mtn Bde under Col. Skvor; GM Lenz would be on the central river, and three Landsturm battalions under GM Komm on the lower Drina. 60 ID was dissolved.\(^{541}\)

In the afternoon, XV Corps' 1st ID began to retreat through Karaula toward Pambukovica, 40 Hon ID to Banjani and 48 ID to

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\(^{541}\) Translator's Note - Actually 60 ID had never been assembled; now the battalions that were to join it were instead divided up among other units. See Conrad, Vol. V, p. 711
Ub; the Serbs didn't interfere with them. XIII Corps began to march toward Piroman.

Under 5th Army, the Combined Corps had been attacking during the night of 8–9 December, but gained no ground by morning of the 9th. The principal attacking group of 29 ID, assisted by the east wing of 104 Lst Inf Bde, attempted a surprise thrust but made too much noise, including premature firing. The storm of the Varovnice Heights failed; because of the intensity with which the brave north Bohemian regiments fought that night they had very heavy casualties. The divisional commander must have been bitter that he had been instructed to use up his last strength in this effort, after he reported to Corps HQ and received the following instructions on the phone: "All has been in vain; make no more efforts; we must go back. Orders follow."  

GM Schön, who since the morning of the 7th had also been in charge of Col. Haubert's Landsturm group, still didn't know about the impending retreat. Instructed to guard the flank and rear of 5th Army at Grocka, he attacked the right flank of the Serbian line and drove it half way back to Semendria. 7 ID had also exerted all its strength in an attack rather early on the 9th. With bitter courage the Division had again broken into the Kosmaj position in hand-to-hand fighting when it learned around 9:00 AM that it would have to retreat. Because its flank was threatened from the east, it suffered painful losses in the afternoon as it pulled back to the heights south of Vš. Sopot.

When Gen. Stepanovic learned in the morning about the surprising disappearance of XIII Corps, he ordered Sumadija Div I to proceed energetically against 9 ID. Drina Div II was supposed to assist this attack, but failed to do so because of misunderstandings. Sumadija Div I made unsuccessful attacks until darkness began to gather; around 3:00 PM it noticed that its opponent had meanwhile pulled back. Similarly, the retreat of 5th Army took place without interference on the rest of the front. Thus the second part of the great action on the Kolubara, called the "Battle of Arangjelovac", came to an end.  

FZM Potiorek reported the withdrawal of the Balkan forces to the AOK in the afternoon. He also explained the necessity of three weeks of rehabilitation for XV and XVI Corps and for 5th Army to

542 Zanantoni, "Die Deutsch-böhmische 29. ID", p. 55
543 Ratzenhofer, "Arangjelovac", in the Öst. Wehrzeitung issues # 24, 25, 27 and 29 of 1928
stay at Belgrade, "until both Armies are rebuilt and it will be possible to resume the offensive." Thus he still didn't recognize the seriousness of the defeat he had suffered. The events of the next few days would show that his optimism was in error.
5. XV and XVI Corps retreat to the Sava, 10–13 December

By the evening of 9 December GM Böltz was already of the opinion that XV and XVI Corps needed a longer, undisturbed rest north of the Sava. FZM Potiorek hoped this could be avoided. In a letter to GdI Bolfras late that evening, he wrote "openly and frankly that this retreat is a great and painful setback. However, if we keep our heads we must and will redeem the situation." He anticipated receiving 22,000 men as replacements by Christmas, 30,000 more by January 10. Although at the moment XV and XVI Corps together had just 18,000, and 5th Army had 44,000, Potiorek thus expected to have at least 115,000 combatants available within a month (actually more, since some recovered wounded would return and other men could be gleaned from dissolved line of communication units). He believed that he had already fulfilled his minimum task of defending the Monarchy, and had no fears for the security of Bosnia. In a month, if he could be also reinforced by two or three divisions, he could make a final reckoning with the Serbs.

In the morning of 10 December, however, it already became obvious that the new positions were too extended for the weak units of 6th Army to cover the whole line. Therefore the retreat would continue slowly toward Sabac, while the men avoided serious combat. The supply trains would pull back over the Sava. GdI Appel was empowered to decide whether the combat units should follow them.

Because of the thaw, the retreat of the two corps took place along roads that were again in wretched condition. Since the supply services had once more totally collapsed, the march forced the troops to use up the last of their strength. The slowly crawling supply trains blocked the lines of march, on which many soldiers lay down exhausted and horses lay dying. Although only the most necessary rest stops were taken, and although the enemy didn't interfere, it took XV Corps 27 hours of marching to cover 40 km. They reached the position southeast of Debrc around midnight of 10–11 December.\textsuperscript{544} XVI Corps was closer to its goal – Draganje – but it was harassed by small pursuing detachments which caused frequent stops for defensive action. At Koceljeva the rear guard gained some relief from the pesky pursuers by opening a lengthy cannonade. However, in 18 ID only 13 Mtn Bde was on schedule; 1st and 5 Mtn Bdes had to stop after reaching Tamnava for a rather lengthy rest.

\textsuperscript{544} Ehrenbuch der Hesser, Vol. II, p. 206
Meanwhile the Serbian commanders were completely in the dark regarding the Austrians' whereabouts. Gen. Zivkovic had expected to be attacked on the night of 9-10 December; he didn't get his troops moving until the afternoon of the 10th, mainly because he had to reorder and reorganize his intermingled units. Therefore during the morning of the 10th the 5 Army was able to take up the following positions without interference: GM Schön's group on the Mostine, 29 ID on the Krajkova bara, 104 Lst Inf Bde on the Lipa and Koviona, 7 ID north and west of Parcani, 21 LW ID on the Gradac and on Talambas Ridge. Only 9 ID, which took up a position north of the Beljanica, was somewhat troubled by artillery fire from the Sumadija Div I, which started operations rather early; an artillery duel opened which lasted throughout the day. XIII Corps, slightly harassed by the cavalry of Drina Div II, reached Piroman (42 Hon ID) and Lisopolje (36 ID).

Late in the evening the SOK issued orders for the deployment during the next advance. Gen. Zivkovic was in charge east of the Orient Express railroad; 2nd Army deployed west of the railroad as far as the Beljanica; 3rd Army was between the Beljanica and Kolubara, except for Timok Div II which was sent through Ub toward Obrenovac to guard the flank against XIII Corps, erroneously believed to be retreating toward Sabac. 1st Army would hold Valjevo while sending pursuit detachments after XV and XVI Corps, believed to be moving toward Bosnia.

Meanwhile at noon FZM Potiorek had instructed 5th Army to prepare a strong position on the line Duboko brdo (8 km east of Obrenovac) - Cvetkov grob - Avala - Mostine. This line was intended to be held by a relatively small number of men for about three weeks. During this period it was anticipated that no additional forces would be available, and that there would be dangers of Serbian incursions over the Sava downstream from Kupinovo, and also over the Danube. GdI Frank wanted to postpone the occupation of this new line until he had united with XIII Corps and until the long supply trains had crossed the Sava. He also objected that the sector to be held by VII Corps was too long, and that the Combined Corps should deploy next to the Avala Heights in forested terrain that was much more favorable for defense. He anticipated that the main Serbian attack would take place from the direction of Semendria, where strong forces could be quickly assembled by the railroad and which was the shortest route (through Grocka) to Belgrade. If the Serbs did advance from Semendria and defeated the Combined Corps, then VIII Corps - which was 40 km from the Belgrade
bridges - would be in a very dangerous position. Therefore in
the night of 12-13 December the VIII Corps pulled back to a line
running through Meljak and Bacevac, and in the following night
would carry out a longer retreat.

Potiorek's short report regarding the retreat of 6th Army caused
alarm in Vienna and Teschen. The Military Chancellery sent a
request by telegram for more specific information. Soon
afterwards the AOK requested data regarding the strength and
battle worthiness of the Balkan units, as well as the security
of the Monarchy's territory. Because he was moving his HQ to
Peterwardein, FZM Potiorek put these chores off during 11
December. That morning, before leaving, he approved the retreat
of 6th Army behind the Sava: north of the river, XV Corps would
deploy at Subotiste-Golubinci, XVI Corps at Tovarnik-Ruma.
Around noon the Feldzeugmeister stopped for a couple hours at
Sabac and was deeply depressed by the state of the supply trains
that had arrived in the area. The report that he prepared as he
resumed his journey prescribed "purely defensive operations" for
the next few weeks, and made the renewal of his offensive
dependent upon getting two or three more divisions.

The dead-tired columns of 6th Army moved toward Sabac on 11
December, fighting rear guard actions on the Debelo brdo and at
Kronic, then at Lojanice and Matijevac. The 1st Serbian Army was
not as inactive as Putnik had ordered, but still only sent
detachments of at most regimental strength after the enemy.
Although their pursuit was half-hearted, the Serbs still
captured 1200 exhausted men, 12 wrecked guns, and numerous
wagons. For 12 December, Gen. Misic ordered Drina Div I to
advance toward Debrc-Sabac, Dunav II toward Sabac-Ljesnica and
Dunav I to the banks of the Drina between Ljesnica and Zvornik.

During the 11th, Gen. Zivkovic's group and 2nd Army moved up to
the new front of the k.u.k. 5th Army. 3rd Army, although slowed
by dragging artillery through the swampy Turija valley, opened
the way to the highway bridge over the Bejanica south of
Stepojevac and began to envelop the enemy's right wing at
Konatice. Toward evening the Serbs realized that they weren't
coming up against rear guards, but rather against the entire 5th
Army. Therefore the SOK wanted to divert Drina Div I through Ub
toward Konatice. Gen. Misic instead sent Morava Div II, which
had stayed at Valjevo, through Lazarevac to directly reinforce
3rd Army. He didn't want the reconquest of northwest Serbia to
be disturbed by the withdrawal of Drina Div I.

On 12 December the XVI Corps crossed the Sava on the bridges at
Sabac while XV Corps and parts of 18 ID crossed in boats; the movement was practically undisturbed by the enemy. The removal of the military bridges began before midnight. 11 Mtn Bde, which had stayed at the edge of Sabac as a rear guard, crossed in boats during the night. The bridges were removed by 6:00 AM on the 13th. Stragglers continued to cross over until 1:00 PM, covered by monitors and artillery; then the first Serbian patrols appeared on the river bank. The military bridge at Mitrovica stayed in place for the use of supply trains and stragglers until 3:00 PM.

Although 6th Army had reached safety, the depression caused by the sad end of its costly actions now began to sink in for the first time.

6. The evacuation of Belgrade, 12–15 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 24 and 25)

Retreat to the bridgehead around the city

Potiorek's hopes of retaining the area south of Belgrade already received their first blow on the night of 11–12 December. At 9:00 PM on the 11th, the strong point of the west wing of 21 LW ID was lost, after a whole day's artillery bombardment. Thereupon the Serbs stormed against the entire front. They broke through on the Gradac, and were thrown back only with very great exertion after the last reserves were committed to a bayonet action. The defenders awaited the next assault of the Obrenovac Detachment with great concern.

Because of this danger, FML Krauss sent 71 Inf Bde, and GdI Frank sent two Landsturm battalions from the Belgrade bridgehead as well as IR # 78 of XIII Corps (which was approaching along the Kolubara) to help VIII Corps. However, these units wouldn't arrive until the afternoon of the 12th. The problem was that as the west wing of 21 LW ID was pushed back, the east flank of 9 ID became exposed; therefore the VIII Corps couldn't postpone its retreat until the evening of the 12th. FML Scheuchenstuel requested permission to start to withdraw early in the morning. Before the movement could be initiated, however, the Serbian 2nd Army sent Sumadija Div I against 21 LW ID; 3rd Army sent Drina Div II against Borak, and the Combined Div against the flank at Konatice. The Serbs took the Gradac and Talambas Heights; it was only due to the intervention of 7 ID that 21 LW ID, now reduced to 2000 riflemen, was able to maintain a continuous line on the east wing of VIII Corps. By the end of the morning,
however, the Landwehr were once again driven back past Bozdarevac. Now the eastern flank of 9 ID was totally disrupted; the Division was ordered to immediately retreat during the daylight hours to the intermediate position Progon-Vis # 259. (It had been hoped to postpone this movement until nightfall because of the dangerous enemy attacks.) it was very difficult to disengage from the Serbs, who were ready to pounce. Meanwhile the enemy's 1st Cav Bde struck the flank group at Konatice. However, the Croats of 36 ID put up a desperate resistance; finally a heroic rear guard battalion covered the group's retreat in an action north of Konatice until sunset.

On the left wing of XIII Corps, IR # 78 was hurrying to close the gap in the line at Bozdarevac, but a Serbian regiment arrived first. A counterattack failed, and the intermediate position had to be abandoned. Nonetheless, 78th IR plus parts of 9 ID were able to prevent Sumadija Div I from breaking through north of Bozdarevac and on Vis # 259. Next to Vranic, a rear guard held off the right wing of the Combined Div and the 2 Cav Bde as they advanced along the Stepojevac-Meljak Road. Meanwhile XIII Corps deployed on the Duboko brdo (42 Hon ID) and on a line running southeast to the Marica (36 ID); 71 Inf Bde plugged the gap in the line west of the Combined Corps.

Based on a false report that the heights east of the Lipa had been taken the evening before, in the early morning of the 12th Gen. Zivkovic attacked the Lipa Heights themselves to smash the center of his opponents' front. 104 Lst Inf Bde inflicted a bloody defeat on the Serbs. Then the Morava Div I and Timok Div I stormed the entire front between Gradac and the heights east of Lipa, hoping to break through and then roll up the Austrian line on both sides. The pressure was so great that FML Krauss placed 71 Inf Bde, south of Ripanj, under 7 ID.

In the evening the 21 LW ID, thoroughly exhausted by its earlier combats and suffering from lack of sleep and water, finally collapsed. A general retreat was now inevitable, and would have to continue as far as the shorter position chosen because it could be held by a diminished force. Orders for the new deployment went out around midnight: XIII Corps would hold the line between Ostruznica and Sremcica, VIII Corps from Sremcica to the railroad, and Combined Corps from the railroad to the Avala Heights and then behind the Bolecica Brook to the Danube.

While these decisions were being made in Belgrade, at 9:00 PM on 12 December the Morava Div I attacked the Krajkova bara and the Lipa. The ensuing action raged until morning. The resistance
was so fierce that the Serbs mistook the 58 Inf Bde for an entire division. Meanwhile VIII Corps began its retreat during the night, and XIII Corps followed at 6:00 AM. While the Combined Corps was receiving its order to retreat, the Serbs attacked anew but were repulsed so strongly by the gallant 58 Inf Bde that they lost any desire to continue the offensive.

On the Lipa, however, the Croatian Landsturm who had hitherto retained their cohesion during hand-grenade attacks, succumbed on the morning of 13 December to a thrust by five battalions from two sides. Because the surprising order to retreat had arrived so late at Combined Corps HQ, making it impossible to use the night hours of 12-13 December to pull back, the Corps had intended to stay in place until evening of the 13th. However, the defeat of 104 Lst Inf Bde broke open the Corps' center. At 10:45 AM the remnants of the rear guard which the Brigade had left on the height east of the railroad, 1500 men, surrendered to the Serbs who were besetting them on all sides.

However, when 29 ID began to disengage from the enemy at 10:00 AM on 13 December, the operation went much more smoothly than was expected considering the close proximity of the two sides. The only portion of Gen. Zivkovic's group which was still eager to interfere, his east wing, was held in check by the river monitors.

VIII and XIII Corps reached their new positions during the morning without incident. FML Scheuchenstuel had 9 ID occupy the Petrov grob; the 21 LW ID, which now had just 1,000 riflemen, formed the reserve along with two battalions of IR # 16. As of noon the 2nd Serbian Army hadn't advanced past the Ljuta strana, while 3rd Army by this time had already occupied the Cvetkov grob.

Putnik issued orders around noon for an advance down three roads to Belgrade: Gen. Zivkovic's group on the road from Grocka, 2nd Army on the one from Ralja, and 3rd Army on the one from Stepojevac through Stremcica. Meanwhile the Sumadija Div I supported the attack on the Petrov grob from the east; the defending 9 ID was separated from 36 ID by the thrust of the Combined Div at Sremcica and thus was also threatened on its western flank. A counterattack by VIII Corps' weak reserves was fruitless. Around 3:00 PM the order which GdI Frank had already prepared in the morning for a forced withdrawal to a small bridgehead around Belgrade was issued. The forces on the wings of this position would be bent forward to guard the bridges from gunfire: on the left GM Schön would deploy on the ridge east of
the Erino brdo, on the right XIII Corps would occupy the line Heights # 208 - Zeleznik-Sava. However, XIII Corps couldn't hold its allotted position due to a lack of manpower, and finally stopped farther back on the Banovo brdo. VIII Corps, reinforced in the evening by 7 ID - which had come back from the Avala Heights - held a line farther south as far as Kumodraz, where the remnants of 104 Lst Inf Bde were also attached.

The forward elements of Timok Div I, pushing ahead on the Ralja Road, reached the position next to the Avala Heights ahead of the rear guard of 7 ID, which was unmolested until evening. The resulting alarm was very disturbing to 29 ID as it pulled back farther east; the Division didn't receive the amended order to retreat to the Ekmekluk until evening. 57 Inf Bde then occupied the Ekmekluk heights, with 58 Inf Bde behind it in reserve.

The last act of the campaign

Putnik believed that 5th Army would continue to retreat over the Sava without halting. He forbade any pursuit to avoid damage to the capital city, which was almost empty of inhabitants. Only the Cavalry Division and one regiment of 2nd Army would push ahead to occupy it.

After receiving one piece of bad news after another, the AOK put aside the BOK's independent status with the following telegram, which arrived at Peterwardein at 6:45 PM on the 13th: "To avoid a complete collapse of our defenses in the southern theater of war, it is essential that 5th Army avoid a defeat." FZM Potiorek passed this on to 5th Army HQ with the additional comment that he would abandon the attempt to retain Belgrade:

. if GdI Frank was not absolutely certain that the city could be held, and
. would be able to retreat over the Sava without damage to his Army.

GdI Frank responded, "I cannot guarantee either point. Whichever is my next assignment, I will do my utmost to accomplish. I am sending a written report by auto." The report spoke of the exhaustion of the Army, reduced by seven weeks of combat and other troubles to 40,000 combatants, of the superiority of the enemy and of the unfinished state of the fortifications. Thus there was no certainty of either retaining Belgrade or of conducting a retreat without suffering damage due to unfavorable local conditions. Because of a mechanical breakdown, the courier bearing the report to Potiorek didn't reach Peterwardein until late morning of the next day. Thus for
At 8:00 AM on 14 December, the Corps commanders on their own initiative spoke out to Army HQ against further attempts to hold on. They found that the General Staff Detachment was already making plans for a retreat in the evening.\textsuperscript{545} While the Corps commanders waited in Belgrade, since early morning the Combined Div and 1st Cav Bde fought 42 Hon ID on the Banovo brdo, and Drina Div II and 2nd Cav Bde fought 36 ID at the entry to the valley of the Topciderska. The latter attack, as well as that of Sumadija Div I against the southern front, suffered under flanking artillery fire from a height at Kumodraz; therefore the Timok Div I was urgently ordered to take the height. On the eastern flank, the Timok Div was supported by two regiments of Gen. Zivkovic's group; the rest of his force was gaining ground very slowly, since it was caught in a cross fire from the Ekmekluk, Erino brdo and the monitors on the river.

During these hot actions, FZM Potiorek arrived at Semlin; after waiting in vain for Frank's report he wanted a personal conference with the higher commanders, which anyway was superfluous. GdI Frank informed him by telephone of the critical situation at the front, and that Belgrade couldn't be held. Then several days of rehabilitation would be needed before the Army could recover from the damage it would undoubtedly suffer during the retreat and again be fully operational. Based on this information, FZM Potiorek ordered 5th Army to pull back to the area Ruma-Banovce (on the Danube east of Pazua); 6th Army would go to the area north of Mitrovica. At noon GdI Frank issued the orders for retreat. Leaving weak rear guards behind, the east wing should go back at 4:00 PM, the center at 5:00 PM, and then finally XIII Corps in the west. The XIII and VIII Corps would cross over the military and railroad bridges, and Combined Corps would use a bridge of boats, as well as three steamers at Visnjica.

The troops held on with commendable stubbornness. VIII Corps, supported by the attached 7 ID, fought for every house and every farmstead. After 2:00 PM the FJB # 21 and the gallant Varasdiner of IR # 16 threw back the right wing of the attackers and caused the west wing of Timok Div I, which was enveloping the heights at Kumodraz, to waver. With redoubled fury the Serbs now threw themselves against the heights, and took them around 3:45 from 104 Lst Inf Bde, whose will to resist had been

\textsuperscript{545} Krauss, "Ursachen", p. 163
weakened by the order to retreat. Fortunately the Serbs failed to thrust further from Kumodraz through the ground that descended toward Belgrade, upon which there were no further good defensive positions; they would have been able to threaten the rear of the two Austrian wings, which were still holding out. FML Krauss was able to rally the Landsturm Bde to hold the "Loudon trenches" on the south edge of the city. VIII Corps, as it fell back to Hill # 208 and the heights farther east, was engaged by Sumadija Div I; however, the Serbian Division received a report about an impending Austrian counterattack and therefore didn't advance past the water-filled ground west of # 208. The Combined Corps retreated without interference. IR # 42 covered its withdrawal so well that Gen. Zivkovic cancelled the night attack he had planed against Ekmekluk and Erinovo brdo. Thus the Regiment wasn't pursued when it followed the rest of GM Schön's group to the river steamers. The courageous resistance of XIII Corps completely wore down the Serbian 3rd Army. Most of the fighting died down when night fell. The covering troops of XIII and VIII Corps on the Banovo brdo and the heights farther east were undisturbed until morning.

Troop movements became congested in the city, which lay fully in darkness, and disorderly columns of wagons filled the routes to the bridges. Nonetheless, the river crossing, which lasted until 8:00 AM on 15 December, was successful. A rear guard held a position covering the bridges and enabled stragglers to cross. Around 8:00 a battalion of the Combined Div approached, followed later by part of the Cavalry Div; Serbian batteries deployed on the Banovo brdo. The monitors however held the enemy in check, so that the military bridges could be dismantled and moved. Part of the bridge of boats had to be destroyed by Aus-Hung. artillery fire. Around 11:00 AM the rear guard crossed over the railroad bridge, which then was blown up.

GM Schön's group, which assembled at Visnjica around 5:00 AM, didn't want to risk steaming down the river to Semlin in daylight and instead crossed over to Pancsova. After they disembarked safely at 9:00 AM, they received a report that about 800 men were still at Visnjica. Because of danger from Serbian artillery, the ship's captain refused to go back over the river. However, GM Schön himself took charge to rescue the stragglers; he kept them in place on the heights until they could be shipped over. Although Serbian infantry approached, they were held off by the monitors.  

546 Willingness to risk himself for the sake of his men was the most important of GM Schön's many leadership skills. The
Serbs noted that even the men of his 57 Inf Bde who were taken prisoner were impressed by his conduct (Serbian official history, Vol. VII, p. 68).
G. Summary and Results of the Campaign

The Battle of the Drina

The fall campaign opened when the Serbs, bowing somewhat to Russian pressure for an offensive, attacked into weakly-defended Syrmia. This was an area where they expected a success which would make a good impression on their allies. FZM Potiorek frustrated this hope. With an admirable ability to ignore secondary theaters of operation, he concentrated his forces to respond with a thrust over the Drina that might decide the campaign. The measures of the Serbian high command, in turn, thwarted his effort. The contest between two leaders, both of whom had firm objectives in mind and exerted all his efforts to attain them, lent a dramatic quality to the Battle of the Drina. Potiorek's primary plan was to pin the enemy's front on the Drina with the bulk of 5th Army while his "Guard", the 6th Army, struck on the south flank toward the rear and the excellent 29 ID struck on the north flank. The plan was only partly carried out, and not with the necessary speed. 29 ID had to turn against the enemy in Syrmia. Meanwhile the period of good weather, which was a precondition for a quick advance in the Macva, was coming to an end. Moreover, as time elapsed the Serbian 2nd Army recovered from the shock of the catastrophe to a great part of its Timok Div I. 6th Army was prevented from moving quickly more by the difficult terrain of the medium-sized mountains than by the resistance of a relatively weak opposing force. The fact that the terrain proved so troublesome even to the troops of 6th Army who were equipped and trained to deal with it provides an answer to the critics who suggested that the flank thrust could have been reinforced by parts of 5th Army (which didn't include any mountain brigades).

Because 5th Army was stuck in place, the Serbian command was able to order their Combined Div to the left flank. The Division, however, was diverted to oppose the river crossing by 42 Hon ID. The Domobranen also pinned down parts of Timok Div II and eventually Sumadija Div I for a while, although thus placing themselves under great pressure.

Putnik intended to create a strong attacking force on the decisive southern flank, but his plans were watered down by his subordinates. Nonetheless, the Voivode succeeded in obtaining a three to one advantage in the southern fighting at the right moment. He was aided by the fact that when XVI Corps tried to break through at Krupanj it committed only two mountain
brigades, because other units were still completing the capture of the Gucevo crest. Moreover, the breakthrough attempt was called off when the Serbian Combined Div appeared on the horizon, even though that unit was soon diverted as noted above.

Putnik's flank attack received further assistance when FML Trollmann attempted to fulfill his task - to protect the right flank of the Austrian offensive against the Valjevo area - by carrying out an offensive. This was consistent with pre-war training and doctrine. As a result, XVI Corps was attacking in three different directions (north, northeast and east) while FML Trollmann was sending his three mountain brigades toward the distant Mramor-Rozanj area. Fortunately for him, the success of the Uzice Group forced Trollmann to pull back his right wing before the larger enemy forces ended the costly action by dealing him a destructive defeat.

As soon as the dangers to the south wing became clear, FZM Potiorek urged 5th Army to make an enveloping attack on the north wing; also, a thrust of the left wing of 6th Army through Loznica was supposed to first relieve 42 Hon ID and then make 5th Army's offensive easier. Convinced that the Serbs wouldn't even consider attempting to break through over the Drina between the two k.u.k. Armies as long as they were kept under heavy pressure at the points of attack, the BOK kept moving troops from the central sector. Some went south to reinforce the left wing of 6th Army, others went north to the area near the mouth of the Drina, where VIII Corps had established a firm foothold at the loop of the Sava at Parasnica. FML Krauss' group, free for other employment after the 1st Serbian Army evacuated Syrmia, was ordered to immediately intervene over the Sava.

At this point the units in the Serbian center in the Jadar Valley were already contemplating a retreat to a position far in the rear. The units at Krupanj, not yet aware of the success of the flank attack on the south wing, were also preparing to pull back from the Austrians. FZM Potiorek, however, was fully aware of the miserable situation of his southern wing. He decided that the wing should fall back considerably to a shorter front on the heights; then it would stay temporarily on the defensive. The poor weather and the consequent conversion of the Macva into a swamp was a severe hindrance to his operations. Moreover the withdrawal of the left wing of 6th Army, which hitherto had put pressure on the enemy center, now allowed the Serbs to reinforce the defenders of the Macva. At the same time the Serbian south wing rushed against the most important position of XVI Corps, the Jagodnja, where Putnik hoped to decide the battle.
Failure of Serbian-Montenegrin cooperation

Unbounded confidence caused the otherwise prudent Serbian leadership to forget the basic military rule that all forces should work together at the decisive point without being diverted to secondary tasks. The Serbs were concerned about the size of their portion of the hide of a bear they had not yet slain. Therefore the Uzice Group, which had crossed the Drina, wasn't sent to exert irresistible pressure against the south flank and rear of XVI Corps. Instead they remained in place near Rogatica to ensure that the Montenegrins didn't make any conquests which they could claim as prizes after the final victory.

Only when the actions on the Jagodnja were drawing to an unsatisfactory conclusion was the Uzice Group ordered to attack, and still in such a fashion as to leave the Montenegrins behind. Before the Group could intervene effectively, the 1st Serbian Army suffered a severe defeat on the Jagodnja. The resulting disappointment was so great that if the k.u.k. 6th Army could have committed fresh troops in a counterattack the Serbian defeat might have become a catastrophe. In any case, 1st Army was no longer capable of a joint offensive along with the Uzice Group.

Undeterred by the danger threatening the south flank, FZM Potiorek worked to gain a successful decision. The stretch of the Drina between his two Armies was almost fully denuded of troops in order to build up 6th Army's left wing for a new thrust against Loznica; parts of 42 Hon ID, which was stuck in place, were also ordered to reinforce the operation. Serbian counter-thrusts soon brought the initial offensive to a halt. A second attack was more successful, but still wasn't strong enough to be decisive; it was thwarted by units which the enemy had planned to shift to the northern front, but then left in place. Meanwhile, on his own northern wing FZM Potiorek had committed soldiers from the Syrmia and Banat groups who were only half-prepared for field service. This last levy was unsuccessful, as were the numerous attempts to storm the causeway road at Crnabara.

FZM Potiorek had to turn his attention to defending against the Uzice Group, which was already a serious menace to his lines of communication. This however didn't keep him from concentrating against the main body of the enemy so that eventually he could resume the interrupted Battle of the Drina after receiving
reinforcements from March formations and replenishing the ammunition supplies. Thus the secondary operations in Bosnia, although momentarily his center of attention, didn't divert him from his long-range primary goal. He removed only the minimum possible force from the principal front; nonetheless he was able to once more scrape together enough men to triumph in the secondary theater before turning his gaze back to the Drina.

The SOK, on the other hand, was depressed by the lack of munitions and by the decline in morale – especially in 1st Army. The Serbs' activity slackened; they hoped merely to pin down as many enemy units as possible until the Russian "steamroller", which was getting into gear, would decide the war. Thus the momentary military situation was not as important as the desire to appear at the eventual peace negotiations as a fully worthy ally, and the effort to limit the territorial pretensions of the Montenegrins. The initial actions on the Jadar had made a good impression on Serbia's allies, but this had been somewhat tarnished by the unsuccessful incursion into Syrmia. Now the operation in southeast Bosnia, though undertaken with limited means, was supposed to restore Serbian prestige. Although the setback at Vlasenica wasn't offset either by an attack of the main force or by a renewal of the constantly unsuccessful thrusts of the Uzice Group against Srebrenica, it was hoped that at least the conquered territory around Rogatica could be held. The lack of a unified command and the fact that the Montenegrins were strictly limited to operations in a specified area forced their contingent to bear the brunt of the Battle of the Romanja planina. The Montenegrins, neither equipped nor trained for regular warfare, collapsed. The Serbs also had to retreat; Putnik intervened to insist that at least a small part of the conquered territory should be retained. The result was another defeat, and all of Bosnia was evacuated.

From the Drina to Valjevo

Then the Serbs suffered further misfortune in the Parasnica. There was an ill-founded hope that this loss could be offset by having 3rd Army capture the Kuliste Heights and then announce the victory to the world; a more solid success was impossible due to the general situation. Therefore the SOK agreed with Gen. Jurisc-Sturm's plan of attack on the Kuliste. They ignored the efforts of the k.u.k. 5th Army against Gen. Stepanovic's 2nd Army, which indicated that the fighting on the lower Drina, the principal theater, was heating up. Moreover, in his quest to cover all sectors Putnik didn't think to bring up substantial forces from the Uzice Group. He apparently trusted in the
strength of the fortifications which he had erected along the entire front. Moreover, at this time the Russian "steamroller" appeared to be carrying all before it. It seemed that the Serbian armies could hold their positions for the short period of time which the Russians would need to win the war in Poland and Silesia.

On 3 November the 5th Army opened its victorious advance into the Macva. Even this pressure on the northern flank didn't change the plans of the Serbian high command. However, from 6 November the strong positions on the heights were lost to a series of enemy blows. On the other hand, Potiorek's hope to encircle the Serbs was frustrated by the early withdrawal of the Serbian southern wing and the slow progress of XVI Corps, which was supposed to reach the enemy's rear. Meanwhile the SOK was able to organize the defense of the threatened flank by committing the bulk of Dunav Div II, which fortunately was available as a reserve.

FZM Potiorek had immediately determined that only a rapid advance by his troops on the entire front could still make good these setbacks to his plan. Although the bad weather and condition of the roads worked against Potiorek's desire, he was aided by the SOK's refusal to withdraw any units which were not hard-pressed by the Austrians. This policy had little prospect of success, because the Serbs had no reserves available which they could send to repair damage done to any part of their lines. Early on 9 November the 3rd Army had to pull back to Zavlaka. More because of the superior insight of the Army commanders than because of the will of the SOK, a catastrophe to the north wing of 2nd Army was avoided when the covering force on the flank was reinforced by Dunav Div I. Therefore, only the southern wing was heavily damaged on 10 November after the SOK on the evening before finally ordered a general retreat to the positions by Valjevo.

The new positions had not yet been occupied when orders were being prepared for a further retreat behind the Kolubara and the Ljig, in case the idea of offering stubborn resistance at Valjevo had to be abandoned. Instructions for the destruction of communications and for the removal or destruction of all foodstuffs made it appear that the Serbs would emulate the Russians of 1812. Thus the invaders would be weakened as they extended their lines of supply through difficult terrain amidst unfavorable weather, while the defenders drew nearer to their own sources of strength. Actually, however, Generals Misic and Jurisic-Sturm didn't propose this strategy to the SOK until a
few days later. The high command didn't realize that damage done to the small gauge Obrenovac–Valjevo rail line, which would obviously be undertaken during a retreat, would be the salvation of Serbia.

In the next few days the SOK completely lost control of the situation. At Valjevo the arbitrary behavior of Gen. Stepanovic gravely endangered the retreat of 1st and 3rd Armies. The fact that catastrophe was avoided was not due to any intervention by the supreme command. Instead, the wretched condition of the roads after the passage of Serbian soldiers, supply trains and refugee columns, as well as the snow and rain, became Putnik's allies. They prevented FZM Potiorek from evaluating the status of his admirably planned operation, which despite unforeseeable accidents still promised success. Although he hadn't caught the enemy in a pincers as he had originally wanted, he still might have been able to exploit the difficult Serbian retreat to inflict an annihilating blow.

However, the preconceived notion that the Serbs intended to pull back at one bound into the center of their country, and the realization that most of the troops of 6th Army needed rest, were the main reasons why the BOK failed to exploit this favorable moment. It is true that XIII Corps needed to pause at least as much as did XV and XVI Corps. But if they could have just continued marching a little further they probably would have made it impossible for the enemy to dig in behind the Ljig and in the mountains. This episode was one of many in military history which shows that one of the most difficult tasks of a commander is to keep victorious troops in motion and not to let them slacken in their pursuit of a beaten enemy.547 On the other hand, if the Feldzeugmeister expected a prolonged action on the Kolubara he would not have allowed 5th Army to deploy as it actually did.

It seemed possible that the SOK had deliberately spread the rumor that it next planned to offer resistance in the center of the country, so that the Austrians would rush impetuously over the Kolubara. On the contrary, however, it appears that they deliberately strove to suppress rumors that might undermine their troops' willingness to stand and fight. The Serbs intended to conduct very stubborn resistance on the Kolubara to guard a position whose loss couldn't be concealed from the world, and which would leave a very bad impression - Belgrade!

547 This point was raised by Potiorek in his written self-justification.
European public opinion hardly noticed whether fighting took place on the Drina or the Kolubara, or whether Valjevo had to be evacuated. On the other hand, even though the national capital lay on the Austrian border and its evacuation would be understandable, this event would be very surprising and disillusioning after the Serbs' earlier joyous announcements of victories.

The Battle of the Kolubara

It was to the Serbs' advantage that the heart of their country lay behind their left wing and was protected by the mountains. Thus they could hold the north wing weakly and deploy their main forces on the left. FZM Potiorek, on the other hand, was torn between two mutually exclusive needs. In the first place, he needed to make his main effort in the mountains in order to strike the Serbs in the most vital area; to heighten the effect, he also needed to use the invasion route through Uzice into the valley of the Western Morava. This was why he sent 18 ID over the mountains, where for some time it was isolated and where it was even further from supply sources. Because of the unforeseen enemy resistance on the Kolubara, this movement of 18 ID seemed to be a dispersal of force at a time when it was necessary to keep the units close together to make up for their reduced strength during the heavy actions.

Potiorek's second need was to ensure the protection of the Monarchy. If there were any unfavorable turn of events, the Balkan forces should still be in position between the enemy and the Sava-Danube border, and thus the most favorable avenue for the offensive against Serbia led from north to south. This, however, was a reason for making the left wing strong rather than the right, so that Belgrade could soon be captured. Belgrade was needed as a base from which the left wing could pivot south and thus strike what was believed to be the main Serbian position (Arangjelovac-Grn. Milanovac) on its northern flank.

Thus it happened that 5th Army was assigned a quite broad area of advance. The impression that the two Armies were operating in opposite directions was increased as the Kolubara battle developed. A victory on the northern wing wouldn't do the Serbs great damage, but it would force them to soon evacuate their positions. For FZM Potiorek, this was a justification for his belief that the enemy was about to retreat. However, unfavorable weather and terrain kept the Combined Corps from breaking through quickly, while the Serbs were still reeling
from their recent misfortunes and hadn't recovered their poise.

Despite all reports, the SOK didn't pay enough attention to the moral condition of their troops. The high command stubbornly insisted that the advanced position at the bend of the Ljig should be held despite the fact that it was vulnerable on both flanks. They also considered a series of offensive plans, which were never implemented because of the passive resistance of the Army commanders, who had a better grasp of the situation.

The decision was finally reached on the south wing. XV and XVI Corps admirably carried out their difficult tasks, although in the process they used up their physical and moral strength to the point of exhaustion. It was no doubt a disadvantage that there was no unified command over these two corps. Such a headquarters would have been in a position after the fighting was over to recognize that further operations would have to take into account the reduced strength of the units and their lack of munitions. FZM Potiorek had sought to give GdI Appel this coordinating role, but there was a reluctance at the beginning of the war to set up new command structures. Since Appel didn't have a separate staff to oversee both corps, and since he himself wasn't freed of his responsibilities as a corps commander, he couldn't actually serve as overall chief of the south wing.

The difficult battle had enabled the Serbs to prevent the enemy from using the railroad on the Kolubara for two weeks. This caused Potiorek's units to suffer more from lack of supplies than from the effects of the battle itself. The SOK was still just playing for time and hoping to retain Belgrade; they expected events on the Russian front to free them from all their problems. On 22 November, before they learned that the Russians had broken out of near encirclement at Lodz, they feared that their allies were on the point of suffering a severe defeat; therefore the Serbs decided to launch their own desperate offensive by 2nd and 3rd Armies. After the Russians overcame their danger, the Serbian leadership once again expected from day to day that their ally would win the campaign in the north; therefore they kept putting off the evacuation of Belgrade for as long as possible.

FZM Potiorek pushes ahead - 6th Army is defeated

After his dearly-won victory, the question of whether FZM Potiorek should give his Armies an extended pause to rest became more urgent than ever. However, it seemed that the destruction
of the enemy was near and that only a little more pressure might bring it to pass. On one hand the need to rehabilitate our own troops prescribed caution. On the other hand, it would not be wise to give the Serbs time to recover their confidence and to gain reinforcements and equipment of every type from the nearby center of their country.

At this point the disadvantage of having the BOK completely independent of the AOK at Teschen became apparent. The AOK was naturally in a much better position to assess the overall situation. At the end of November the main concern of the high command was the continuing action against the much larger Russian Army. If the Russians were victorious, the whole war would be decided and it would be irrelevant whether the Serbs were defeated or not. The Bulgarians were also watching the Russian front and felt that it would be unwise to enter the war while the Russians were doing so well, regardless of how much they wished to attack Serbia. Therefore by this point the k.u.k. Balkan forces had already accomplished much more than could be expected, and there was no urgent need to accomplish more. The danger that the Serbs would quickly replenish their strength would be more than offset by a favorable turn of events in the north which would in turn lead to the long-expected intervention of Bulgaria.

FZM Potiorek no longer had much confidence in Bulgarian intervention, and wanted to completely destroy the Serbs. While forced to wait until a steady flow of supplies was available, he planned to deploy his forces in such a fashion that they could immediately deliver the final decisive blow as soon as each Army had a secure supply line. If 6th Army had enough strength to capture the positions in the snowy mountains which the Serbs considered impregnable, it should also be capable of a last burst of strength which would clinch the final victory. This belief was influenced by the erroneous perception that for the immediate future the Serbs would be unable to do anything but wait in their central position while rebuilding their strength.

Putnik ordered 1st Serbian Army to include the Galic in its position in front of Grn. Milanovac in order to maintain contact with the Uzice Group. Although Army HQ felt that this order watered down the "entire decision" for the next operation, in fact it proved beneficial for the Serbs and laid the groundwork for their successful counterattack. 50 ID was unable to peacefully occupy the Galic, but had to deploy its troops in day-long actions and use up a great part of its already scanty munitions.
Perhaps it was an error that XVI Corps HQ, in its concern about organizing the supply line and remaining in touch with 18 ID, stayed in Valjevo along with XV Corps HQ. If it had been in closer contact with the front, the HQ might not have allowed the fighting around the Galic to drag on. At the very least, the staff would have pulled back to the main ridges under cover of rear guards at the first sign of a major Serbian counterattack. This would have won vital time for the troops; it would have been especially beneficial because supplies began to flow down the railroad on 4 December, and because of the imminent intervention of 5th Army. Perhaps the staff would also have prevented the over-hasty commitment of 1st ID on the eastern wing, which was the least threatened; the thrust by 1st ID on this battlefield could not have influenced the outcome of the main action in the center. In actuality, the two division south of the main ridges (50 ID and Goiginger's) suffered a decisive defeat. Thus the entire battle, which had hitherto favored Austro-Hungarian arms, was lost.

5th Army's operations south of Belgrade

The only hope for overcoming the heavy setback in the south was to bring 5th Army down from the north. FZM Potiorek had been aware that the Serbian capital might fall into the Army's hands like a ripe fruit, but also prepared for a desperate struggle at Belgrade. The resulting orders allowed GdI Frank to reckon with either stubborn initial enemy resistance or with a possible counterattack by Serbian forces assembled at Semendria up the Danube to liberate the capital city. Moreover, it is possible that the resistance which the 5th Army commander had encountered on the Kolubara made him less likely to believe in the impending collapse of Serbia which 6th Army had been reporting almost daily.

When 2nd Serbian Army fell back from the Kolubara, it was still necessary for 5th Army to advance somewhat further to secure the railroad from attacks. GdI Frank decided to include in this advance the capture of Belgrade; the city would become his new supply base and allow the Kolubara rail line to be used solely by 6th Army. He deployed his forces so that they could halt any Serbian counterthrust along the Danube rather than in accordance with the wishes of the BOK. Thus when he was surprised to be suddenly directed to thrust toward Arangjelovac, the attack was rather late and too dispersed. Moreover, the intervention of the Serbs' Umcari Detachment increased his concern about an attack along the Danube, which would threaten the flank and rear.
of his east wing as it sought to strike a decisive blow toward Arangjelovac.

Thus, although the brave troops of 5th Army finally won some success, they were at least two days too late to relieve 6th Army. Moreover, the losses they suffered by attacking considerably lessened the chance that they would be at least able to retain Belgrade as compensation for all of their efforts. This would have weakened the impression of the unfortunate end of the campaign.

Until the intervention of the AOK, FZM Potiorek was firmly determined to leave 5th Army south of the Sava. However, the outcome of the fighting south of Belgrade made it doubtful that this was really possible. Although on 14 December the Serbs only had three and a half line divisions engaged in this sector, they had won decisive successes in the center. This was partly due to the fact that the defenders' will to resist was weakened by rumors that they were about to be ordered to retreat. Anyway, the Serbs had two and half more divisions available to join the fighting on 15 December (and another unit, Timok Div II, was at Obrenovac where it could be quickly brought up). Presumably the fear of the AOK that 5th Army would be lost was caused by the very unfavorable conditions surrounding the retreat.

Response to the defeat

The outcome of the costly campaign had a depressing effect upon the entire Monarchy. For the AOK it was all the more painful because it occurred at the same time as the Russian "steamroller" was forced to retreat, thus fulfilling a condition for winning over Bulgaria. Now there was no hope of Bulgarian assistance, which would have freed some badly-needed reinforcements for the northern theater of operations. Indeed, it was feared that it would be necessary to divert units to assist FZM Potiorek's badly shattered Armies in the defense of Hungary against Serbia. On 14 December the Archduke-Successor Charles was sent to Vienna with a letter from Commander-in-Chief Archduke Friedrich. It asked the Emperor to allow Col. Purtscher and a representative of the Imperial Military Chancellery to personally review the condition of the Balkan forces. Also, GdI Conrad prepared a memorandum listing the measures which should be immediately taken to protect the

When FML Ritter von Marterer and Col. Purtscher arrived at the BOK in Peterwardein at noon on the 16th, FZM Potiorek was already very active. He was carrying out the measures which GdI Conrad at the same time recognized as necessary, such as building fortifications and preparing the railroads for rapid troop transfers. After a brief conference with the Feldzeugmeister, both envoys spent two days travelling among the two Armies, where they found conditions quite disturbing.

Archduke Charles had already been instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to raise with the Emperor the question of whether FZM Potiorek should be removed from his post. At the same time Minister-President Count Tisza, in his concern for Hungary's security, raised the same question. After FML Marterer's inspection, Potiorek's responsibility for the calamity couldn't be denied. GdI Bolfras referred to this conclusion in a letter he sent to a friend on 20 December; he cited "unfathomable errors" which were now known to all the world, and which were solely the responsibility of the theater commander. Bolfras emphasized that he would have to set things in order among the Balkan forces.

By the time this letter was written, FZM Potiorek however was starting to look more confidently toward the future. Stragglers and men who had been detached rejoined the units of XV and XVI Corps in quarters in Syrmia, where they were being rehabilitated; several march companies had also arrived. Thus the combat strength of the two corps had risen to 44,162 men. 5th Army had been reduced to 31,955 combatants at the end of the fighting, and thus had lost 16,000 men since the start of the Battle of Arangjelovac. Counting the 22,639 men under FML Snjaric, there was a total of 98,756 available to oppose the Serbs. Moreover, because of the great losses which the enemy had also suffered they were staying on the defensive.

The inquiries of the Chief of the Military Chancellery left open the question whether Potiorek would make the deficiencies of his

549 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 747
550 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 748
552 Translator's Note - I could not determine from the context who was the "friend" referred to in this sentence. Bolfras' numerous letters to GdI Conrad were included in Conrad's memoirs, which contain no correspondence dated December 20.
subordinates responsible for the result of the campaign. He promptly responded on the 21st, "that the responsibility for all that happened rests finally upon myself. I will bear any consequence of this responsibility silently and with soldierly resolution." He would have offered to resign after ordering the evacuation of Belgrade, except he hadn't wanted to give the impression that he was throwing in the towel. Until a decision was made at a higher level, he considered it his duty "to do everything possible to make good the misfortune for which I was responsible."

Soon after this letter was sent, the BOK learned over the telephone that GM Böltz, the Chief of Staff, was being given a command in the north. This made it clear that further changes were to be expected. That night FZM Potiorek asked the Military Chancellery, the AOK and the War Ministry that he be relieved from active service.

The business was settled immediately. GdK Archduke Eugene was named commander of 5th Army, which would take over all the Balkan forces. FML Krauss became his Chief of Staff. Soon thereafter FML Sarkotic became commanding general in BHD, and was also entrusted with the position of chief of the territorial government.

As he departed, FZM Potiorek gave his opinion that the Serbs were no longer capable of a major thrust over the borders. This prophecy fulfilled itself far beyond anyone's hopes. The Serbian armed forces for a long time lay exhausted; they were of so little account that in January and February 1915 the Combined, VIII and XIII Corps could be spared for the Carpathian fighting. In May the XV and XVI Corps were sent to the Isonzo front. Thus in terms of the larger struggle the sacrifices in the campaign actually had won a military advantage. Unfortunately the political and moral effects of the setback were more far-reaching, and had a very depressing effect on the self-confidence and esteem of the Monarchy. On the other hand, it must be said of FZM Potiorek that he bore his fate worthily and without complaint.

Estimates of casualties

A total of about 12,000 officers and 450,000 men came to the southern theater of operations between the start of the war and the middle of December. (This includes troops on the lines of communications and the fortress garrisons.) According to statistics compiled in February 1915, the following were the
losses in this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>2,599</td>
<td>7,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>27,216</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>73,988</td>
<td>118,911</td>
<td>44,177</td>
<td>266,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>28,276</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>74,644</td>
<td>122,122</td>
<td>46,716</td>
<td>273,804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the general rule that three quarters of the 168,838 wounded and sick troops were again fit for service after recovery, the absolute total loss was about 147,000 men. Losses increased in the winter months because of illnesses which were brought out of Serbia. Although the spread of cholera, dysentery and typhus was soon halted in the Monarchy, these diseases raged for some time in Serbia and carried off the majority of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners along with many Serbs.

According to the Serbian official history (Vol. VII, p. 397), 270 officers and 40,000 men were taken prisoner; if this was correct, about 480 officers and almost 36,000 men reckoned as "missing" were in fact killed. Thus the total fatal casualties would have been approximately 64,000. However, after the conquest of Serbia in 1915 the k.u.k. central statistical bureau accounted for 1,494 officers and 74,903 men that had been prisoners of the Serbs; this figure included prisoners who had subsequently perished. Since the vast majority of the men had been captured in the 1914 campaign, it seems that the Serbs greatly under-estimated the number they had taken. It is not surprising that Serbia, itself ravaged by disease, had little care or concern about the number or welfare of its prisoners.

After the successful conclusion of the fall 1915 campaign, only a few more than 2,000 men returned to the Monarchy from captivity. When the Serbs retreated to the Albanian coast they handed the remainder still living - 460 officers and 21,000 men - over to Italy.

The SOK reckoned its own losses as 22,000 dead, 91,000 wounded, and 19,000 prisoners. (This is based on a secret Serbian document that was captured on 22 December 1914.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - As often in military history, there has never been a final resolution of the number of casualties in this campaign. A more recent estimate appears in the statistical section of "Chronicle of the First World War" (New York, 1990: Vol. I, p. 282). It shows that the Austrians lost 227,088 men (including 45,000 prisoners), as well as 179 guns.
and 36 machine guns plus one river monitor (subsequently raised). The Serbs lost 170,000 men (of whom 15,000 were taken prisoner) and 42 guns. Montenegrin casualties are completely unknown. The French naval detachment attached to the Montenegrins lost 24 sailors and 2 guns. The typhus epidemic referred to in the text was responsible for the deaths of at least 150,000 Serbian soldiers and civilians in 1915.
VI. The Limanowa-Lapanow Campaign

As of 1 December 1914, the following was the organization of the k.u.k. forces on the northeastern front. (The strength notations show battalions, squadrons, then batteries; thus IV Corps (24-6-17) had 24 bns, 6 sqdns and 17 batties.)

2nd ARMY
- IV Corps (24-6-17) = 31, 32 ID
- XII Corps (22-5-18) = 16, 35 ID
- Cav Corps Hauer (1-54-6) = 3, 9 CD
- 27 ID (20-2-7) - Arriving from 1st Army

1st ARMY
- Ziegler's Group (13-27-10) = 12 ID, 2 CD
- II Corps (26-5-16) = 4, 25 ID
- XVIII Corps (ex Group Tschurtschenthaler; 30-5-21) = 43 & 44 LW ID; 101 k.u. Lst Inf Bde
- Ist Corps (30-5-15) = 5 ID, 46 LW ID
- V Corps (40.5-7-25) = 14 & 33 ID; 37 Hon ID; 36 k.k. Lst Inf Bde
- X Corps (19.75-8.25-20) = 2, 24 ID
- VI Corps (19-6-17) = 15 ID, 39 Hon ID

4th ARMY
- XVII Corps (17-6-22) = 19 ID, 82 Hon Inf Bde (The 22 batteries included heavy batteries attached from Fortress Cracow)
- XI Corps (28-10-26) = 11, 30 ID
- XIV Corps (41-7-30) = 3, 8 ID; 13 LW ID
- Nagy's Cav Corps (2-29-6) = 6 CD, 11 Hon CD
- Independent = 1st Polish Legion Regt (3-1-33), 10 CD (0-14-0), German 47 Reserve ID (13-1-9)

3rd ARMY
- 4 CD (2-16-3)
- IX Corps (21-6-18) = 10 ID, 26 LW ID
- III Corps (32-7-25) = 6, 28 ID; 22 LW ID
- VII Corps (18.25-15-22) = 17 ID, 20 Hon ID, 5 Hon CD
- Krautwald's Group (24.5-28.25-19.5) = 1 & 8 CD; remnants of 34 and 56 ID, 40 Lst Inf Bde, and 17 Lst Terr Bde
- FML Szurmay's Group (just 38 Hon ID; 15-2-10.33)
- (1 & 2 Lst Terr Bdes had merged into 56 ID. 102 Lst Bde

553 Translator's Note - This information isn't in the original. It appears as Anlage "E" in Vol. V of Conrad's memoirs.
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merged into 38 Hon ID, 103 Lst Bde into 20 Hon ID, and 105 Lst Bde into III Corps)

Pflanzer-Baltin's ARMEEGRUPPE

- Hofmann's Group (or 55 ID; 32-1.5-9.5)
- Colonel Haller's Group (2.75-.25-1)
- 52 ID (8-.5-4)
- FML Durski's Polish Legion (5-2-.25)
- 54 ID (7-1-2.33)
- Colonel Fischer's Group (6.25-1-1)

Other

- Under German command = 7 CD (strength not listed)
- Cracow Fortress (55.5-7-5) = 45 LW ID, 106 Lst ID; 1, 35 & 110 k.k. Lst Inf Bdes; garrison troops totalling 26-3-0
- Przemysl Fortress (under siege; 68.25-6-4 plus 43 fort arty comps, 52 Lst arty detachments) = 23 Hon ID, 85 LW Inf Bde; 93, 108, 111 k.k. Lst Inf Bdes; 97 k.u. Lst Inf Bde

Total strength of the main field forces (i.e. of the 4 armies and Pflanzer's group, not including units listed as "other") = 513 battalions, 277 3/4 squadrons, and 381 1/2 batteries.

A. Events north of the Vistula

1. 2nd Army intervenes in actions south of Lodz, 29 November-14 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 26 and sketch 54)

At the end of November, the 9th German Army in Poland was fighting between the Widawka and Vistula Rivers. After XXV Res Corps and 3 Gd ID had broken through the ring of enemy units to Brzeziny, the Army's main body held off Russian attacks west and north of Lodz. After 26 November the Germans succeeded in closing the dangerous gap that had developed between their main body and the left wing, which had been pushed back by larger enemy forces. In the next few days, however, the situation on the lower Bzura became very critical. New Russian divisions thrust forward out of Lowicz; they threatened to roll up 9th Army from east to west and cut its communications with its bases at Thorn and Gnesen. On the other side of the Vistula, GLt von Zastrow was given command of the "Graudenz Group" of Landwehr, Ersatz and Landsturm units on the borders of West and East
Prussia; his mission was to advance toward the Narew front to bring relief to the hard fighting 9th Army. In East Prussia, finally, the 8th Army in the first half of November had been pushed out of its positions on the border by the larger 10th Russian Army. The Germans pulled back slowly and established a new line on the Angerapp and between the Masurian Lakes, where they were able to fend off the enemy attacks.

Toward the end of November the combat strength of 9th Army began to weaken after the eventful actions at Lodz; nonetheless, GFM Hindenburg decided to renew the offensive. The eagerly awaited reinforcements from the West, which both he and Conrad had repeatedly demanded from the DOHL, were finally arriving. The units were:

- II Corps, which was sent from Kalisz against the southwest corner of the Russian front by Lodz;
- the HQ of XXIV Res Corps with 48 Res ID, which came up from Kreuzburg and deployed on the west of II Corps; and
- 26 ID (from XIII Corps), which was used on the northern wing; it moved from Wreschen to the area northeast of Lowicz.\(^{554}\)

Moreover, 1st ID had been brought from East Prussia; it was sent from Thorn to help Mackensen's left wing. On Conrad's request, Hindenburg had moved 47 Res ID to Cracow, whence it was sent to the south wing of the k.u.k. 4th Army.

On 30 November an offensive was opened by XXIV German Res Corps (48 Res ID and GLt Menges' Div), Frommel's Cavalry Corps (7 Aus-Hung. CD, 5 and 8 German CD, reinforced by a Landwehr brigade) and II German Corps (3 and 4 ID). They attacked from the line Widawa-Zdunski Wola in an attempt to break through between 4th and 5th Russian Armies, and then to roll up the enemy front at Lodz from the south. In accordance with orders of the AOK issued on the 26th, Woyrsch's Army Detachment was to help by preventing the Russians from "diverting units north against the 9th German Army", and then by "joining Mackensen's attack, beginning on the northern wing."

On the eve of the new German operation, Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army stood on the north wing of Woyrsch's Detachment; XII Corps was about a day's march west of Noworadomsk on both sides of the Warta, with IV Corps farther north. The German 1st Gd Res Bde and Hauer's Cavalry Corps had reached the Widawka on 28 November

\(^{554}\) German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 101 and 248 ff.
Wulffen, "Die Schlacht bei Lodz" (Oldenburg, 1918), pp. 95 ff.
after difficult fighting; on the 29th, however, they were compelled by larger Russian forces to retreat behind the Sosnia sector.

2nd Army HQ ordered GdK Tersztyanszky, commander of IV Corps, to again thrust toward Szczercow. However, reports which arrived late on the evening of the 29th showed that the bulk of the units identified between 4th and 5th Russian Armies (7 ID from V Corps and about three and a half cavalry divisions) had been diverted south from Lask toward Szczercow.\(^{555}\) Moreover, Böhm-Ermolli's staff got the impression from a variety of indications that the XIX Corps as well as the Grenadier Corps was deployed in front of 2nd Army.\(^{556}\) Therefore GdK Böhm-Ermolli gave up the attack on Szczercow which had been planned for the 30th, and made a new request to the AOK for reinforcements. He believed that this would enable him to thrust toward Belchatow with a good chance of breaking between 4th and 5th Russian Armies. GdI Conrad, however, didn't want to weaken the front northwest of Cracow, where Dankl still expected Russian attacks, in favor of Böhm-Ermolli, at least until the new offensive of the k.u.k. 4th Army south of the Vistula gained a decisive success.

Meanwhile new reports arrived. The Ural and 5 Don Coss Divs had occupied the Widawka sector by Szczercow, and Russian 7 ID was assembled in the area northeast of Widawa. The German XXIV Res Corps was fighting to secure the river crossing in that area, and on 1 December wished to resume its attack on the east bank toward the north. To support this effort, Hindenburg wanted 1st Gd Res Bde and Hauer's Cavalry Corps to open a new advance.\(^{557}\) On the evening of 30 November, Böhm-Ermolli was ordered by Conrad as well as by Woyrsch to have 2nd Army join the offensive in the direction of Piotrkow on the next day, beginning on its left wing.

Accordingly the Army commander ordered that 1st Gd Res Bde, as well as "31 ID, which should advance as early as possible in echelon," should capture "the north bank of the Widawa by Szczercow and the area to the southeast." The next step would be an advance to Belchatow. 32 ID was to be prepared to attack either toward the northeast or toward the east. XII Corps, finally, would hold its present positions.

\(^{555}\) German official history, Vol. VI, p. 267
\(^{556}\) Translator's Note - Actually XIX Russian Corps was farther north covering Lask, and opposed by Frommel's cavalry and the II German Corps (see Beilage 26).
\(^{557}\) German official history, Vol. VI, pp. 267 and 270 ff.
Thus on the morning of 1 December, half of 31 ID and 1st Gd Res Bde, both under FML Lütgendorf of 31 ID, opened the attack by the north wing of 2nd Army. The Guard Reserves drove the Ural Cossacks back from Szczercow, and the half of 31 ID on their right established themselves on the Widawka in light fighting; farther down the river, Hauer's Cavalry Corps reached the eastern bank. On the left of the Aus-Hung. horsemen the 48 Res ID of German XXIV Res Corps, which was exhausted after a forced march to the battlefield and by night actions at the crossing points of the Widawka, was unable to advance. Still farther north, however, Frommel's Cavalry Corps was already approaching the Szczercow-Lask road, and the German II Corps was engaged west of Pabianice.

Meanwhile GFM Hindenburg was urging the HQ at Teschen and Koschentin to help the hard-pressed 48 Res ID. Therefore the AOK and von Woyrsch ordered Böhm-Ermolli to carry on the offensive with as much force as possible.

On 2 and 3 December the inner wings of the k.u.k. 2nd and German 9th Armies encountered only a little resistance. On the 2nd, Lütgendorf and Hauer reached a point half way between Szczercow and Belchatow, and 48 Res ID advanced to the area west of Wadlew. On the 3rd, the 1st Gd Res Bde threw the Russian cavalry back through Belchatow, and the half of 31 ID stormed Grocholice. Since Lütgendorf's group had now advanced so far toward the east, the north wing of 32 ID was sent to protect the group's southern flank; the troops from the 32nd reached the area of Chorzenice. Moreover GdK Hauer was ordered to move both of his cavalry divisions from the extreme north wing of 2nd Army toward the right in order to fill the gap which had developed between Lütgendorf and 32 ID. Frommel's Cavalry Corps would pursue the enemy while moving toward its right; it was ordered to reach the Lodz-Piotrkow Road in the rear of the Russians who were opposing II German Corps at Pabianice. Although Frommel's Aug-Hung. 7 CD, which was in the van, couldn't break through southeast of Lask on 2 December, it was able to move past the upper Grabia on the 3rd. 48 German Res ID was also successful at Wadlew.

Thus the attack on the inner wings of Böhm-Ermolli's and Mackensen's Armies seemed to be achieving its objectives. Then
intercepted radio messages indicated that the Russians were planning an attack from the south on Belchatow: enemy cavalry would hurry forward from Piotrkow while III Caucasian Corps, hitherto deployed at Zarki, intervened by marching through the Kaminsk area. Woyrsch declared that he couldn't divert any more of his Armeegruppe toward the left. Böhm-Ermolli, however, suggested that the half of 1st Gd Res ID which was still at Zarki should be replaced in line so that it could move to help his threatened northern wing. Before this was finally ordered after the intervention of Falkenhayn, Tersztyanszky's Corps was already dealing with the Russian attack from the south. 559

On 3 December, FML Lütgendorf pursued the defeated Russian cavalry divisions through Belchatow east toward Piotrkow. Meanwhile, pilots were already reporting the approach of stronger Russian columns through Kaminsk. At this point GO Woyrsch was visited at his HQ in Koschentin by the German Emperor, Falkenhayn and Böhm-Ermolli; these strong-willed leaders were ready to deal with the tense situation. The goal was to prevent the Russian attack toward Belchatow from having an unfavorable effect on 9th Army, which was seeking a decision in action by Pabianice. 560 Woyrsch believed that this goal could be achieved only by attacking. Böhm-Ermolli agreed and ordered Hauer and Tersztyanszky to advance toward the southeast on the 4th, against the oncoming III Caucasian Corps. To protect the flank and rear of this operation, the Army commander asked that Frommel's Cavalry Corps should be sent against Piotrkow at the same time.

At the point when these decisions were made, GdK Tersztyanszky had already halted Lütgendorf's movement toward Piotrkow. The Budapest IV Corps soon collided with the enemy on the 4th. 32 ID on the right wing gained ground toward Kaminsk, but late in the afternoon a counterattack by 2 Gren Div (on the former north wing of 4th Russian Army) drove the Hungarians back to Rogowiec. In the center, Hauer pushed the enemy 13 CD through Grocholice, but then was himself forced out of the town by the foremost units of III Caucasian Corps. The half of 31 ID advanced into the area southwest of Bogdanow; there it was engaged until late in the winter night on both sides of Borowa Hill, whose moon-lit barren cone dominated the surrounding snow-covered fields. Farther to the left, 1st Gd Res Bde deployed after darkness fell on the new front facing south; its left wing was engaged about 10 km south of the Belchatow-Piotrkow Road.

559 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 276
560 Ibid, Vol. VI, p. 276
The bulk of Frommel's Cavalry Corps had turned to the northeast in order to fall on the rear of the enemy units still resisting II German Corps at Pabianice. Frommel left just one brigade of German 8 CD west of Mzurki to guard the Grabia; thus there was danger of a Russian attack on the open flank and rear of Tersztyanszky's Corps.

Meanwhile intercepted radio messages indicated that the Russians were shifting two or three more divisions toward the north behind the front of their 4th Army.

Because of this situation, on 3 December the AOK told GdK Dankl to use troops of 1st Army to relieve the half of 1st Gd Res ID which was still at Zarki, so that it could proceed to Böhm-Ermolli's north wing. Since Dankl had reported to Teschen that the positions of his Army were now fortified strongly and could be held with diminished manpower, the AOK decided on the same day to pull 27 ID out of the front near Cracow, and to send it by rail to Sieradz to assist Woyrsch.

III Caucasian Corps attacks at Belchatow

Because the Russians were shifting new forces toward the north, the HQ at Koschentin considered the situation to be quite critical on the evening of the 4th. GdK Böhm-Ermolli initially wanted to continue the offensive on the next day, but then had second thoughts because of the heavy casualties suffered by Hauer's Cavalry Corps. By wire, Woyrsch asked both Teschen and Posen for assistance. To give new impetus to the operation, on the night of 4-5 December Conrad informed Böhm-Ermolli of Hindenburg's conviction that III Caucasian Corps was in wretched condition and greatly reduced in strength. Therefore it should be possible to keep the Caucasians away from the decisive actions near Lodz without for the moment sending any reinforcements to Tersztyanszky.

On 5 December, Tersztyanszky was heavily assaulted by the Caucasian Corps (which had 21 and 52 ID). The left wing of 1st Gd Res Bde was in great danger because of Frommel's shift toward the northeast; when the Russian cavalry squadrons assembled at Piotrkow thrust forward, the Brigade had to turn its front completely around, from the south to the north. On the other hand, the battalions of Lütgendorf's 31 ID on both sides of Borowa Hill and Hauer's Cavalry Corps at Grocholice made a

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561 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 278
glorious stand against the onrushing Caucasians. The reserve of IV Corps (the other half of 31 ID) tried to relieve the exhausted cavalry, but their attack stalled in the swamps along the Widawka; in the night these troops were assembled as a second line of defense behind Hauer's Corps. 16 ID, on the north wing of XII Corps, was also supposed to thrust forward to provide assistance to Tersztyanszky. However, the positions of its opponents on the road to Noworadomsk, the Russian Grenadier Corps, had been built as strong as a fortress, so the operation was abandoned as hopeless. Instead the 16 ID sent a detachment in motion to reinforce IV Corps directly. Meanwhile on the north wing Tersztyanszky became concerned that his whole group could be rolled up by the enemy advance from Piotrkow; therefore after darkness fell he had Lütgendorf move his men back to a front facing the east.

While these actions were raging on the battlefield near Belchatow, the eagerly awaited reinforcements were hurrying to the scene. On the evening of the 5th, the remaining half of 1st Gd Res ID from Zarki arrived in the area northwest of Czenstochau, while the first troops of 27 ID were leaving their trains at Sieradz.

The impending arrival of these reinforcements made it virtually certain that the III Caucasian Corps would be held off. However, Woyrsch no longer counted on a breakthrough by Böhm-Ermolli's Army, because the Russians had extended their positions by Piotrkow and received substantial reinforcements themselves. So the favorable moment when it would have been possible to advance between the enemy's 4th and 5th Armies had passed. Unhappiness about the late arrival of the new units was clearly expressed by Woyrsch's HQ in telephone discussions with Hindenburg's staff.562

The situation was also becoming less promising for Mackensen's Army. On his southern wing Frommel had advanced the farthest toward the east, but his Cavalry Corps didn't have enough striking power to carry out a decisive thrust. The attacks by the Army's center and left wing were being countered by Russian reinforcements in all sectors (in front of Pabianice, east of Lutomiersk, on the lower Morga and west of the Bzura). The German commanders hoped, however, that the divisions arriving from the West would finally make possible a decisive success.563

562 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 279
563 German official history, Vol. VI, p. 279
In the night of 5–6 December it was learned from intercepted radio broadcasts that the Russians were evacuating their position at Lodz. Would the enemy also retreat from the position in front of Belchatow? It was true that the Caucasians had stopped trying to break through, and that the Russian horsemen in front of Frommel's Cavalry Corps pulled back somewhat.

Shortly after this surprising news arrived at Wielun (which since the 4th had been the location of 2nd Army HQ), Böhm-Ermolli ordered the commander of IV Corps to be ready to immediately attack the enemy troops if they withdrew. Then the HQ tensely awaited further reports. An order from GO Woyrsch conjectured that the Russians would also pull back in front of 2nd Army toward Piotrkow-Noworadomsk, but that in this case there shouldn't be any over-hasty pursuit; probably the enemy would soon stand fast on a new fortified line.

Woyrsch's cautious evaluation of the situation was proven correct. It was soon obvious that by evacuating Lodz the Russians only wanted to shorten their front by giving up a bulge that had extended far to the west; they retained all their trenches in front of Böhm-Ermolli's Army. New actions began already on the evening of the 6th on the inner wings of Lütgendorf's Division and Hauer's Corps; Terszyanszky had to commit his Corps reserve (half of 31 ID), which had deployed behind the cavalry. GdK Böhm-Ermolli wanted to relieve Hauer with troops from 31 ID and then redeploy him on the left of 1st Gd Res Bde for a new attack toward Piotrkow; there he could break the Vienna-Warsaw railroad, which the Russians were apparently using to shift new units toward the north. If this caused the enemy to pull back, IV and XII Corps could advance toward the stretch of the railroad running south from Piotrkow through Kaminsk to Noworadomsk. However, Terszyanszky took exception to this plan because he believed that the diminished cavalry units were no longer capable of fulfilling the mission. Rather he intended to await the arrival of 27 ID and the remaining half of 1st Gd Res ID (the 15 Res Bde) before renewing the attack on the left wing.

In the event, the Russians renewed their attack against the north wing of 2nd Army early on the morning of the 7th, so that it was impossible to carry out any coordinated counter-offensive. Hauer's Cavalry Corps was hard hit, and its 9 CD had to pull back; the pressure on the cavalry was relieved by a counter-attack by GM Dani's group (half of 31 ID) along the north bank of the Widawka. Fortunately at this point the first
troops of 27 ID arrived on the Belchatow battlefield after a forced march from Sieradz and Lask. In the afternoon the Division opened a counterattack on the left of 1st Gd Res Bde and after a hard action drove Gillenschmidt's cavalry back in the area north of Bogdanow.

In the night of 7-8 December and during the 8th the Russians several times launched attacks toward Belchatow. Some trenches were lost in Hauer's sector, but were recovered by parts of 1st Gd Res Bde and by the foremost elements of 15 Res Bde as it arrived.

The fighting dies down

On the 9th the Russians remained inactive. GdK Böhm-Ermolli pulled Hauer's Cavalry Corps out of the front, still intending it to attack toward Piotrkow. Meanwhile, however, it was discovered that the Russian XIV Corps, hitherto in front of Dankl's Army, had moved to Piotrkow. Moreover, after the evacuation of Lodz the Russians opposing Mackensen's right wing had dug in on a new line between Wolborz and Brzeziny, and then behind the Mroga. Because of these developments, GO Woyrsch advised GdK Böhm-Ermolli to be content with maintaining his present position.

Thus there was a lull in operations for several days, during which the commander of 2nd Army used newly-arrived March companies to replenish his forces, and brought order to his units, which had become intermingled in the recent fighting. As of 12 December, the XII Corps (35 and 16 ID) still stood on the right wing by Prusiecko on both sides of the Warta; IV Corps (32 and 31 ID) was in the center, as far as the Widawka at Rogowiec. Still further north, on the left wing, Hauer's Cavalry Corps was 8 km east of Belchatow and 27 ID was on the road to Piotrkow. The now reunited 1st Gd Res ID was assembled around Belchatow. At Böhm-Ermolli's suggestion the commander of the Guard Res Corps (GdA von Gallwitz) was given command over 27 k.u.k. ID and the 1st Gd Res ID.

Once again 2nd Army HQ wanted to attack Piotrkow, beginning on 13 December, and once again Woyrsch ordered a postponement. Böhm-Ermolli expected the right wing of 9th German Army to assist his offensive; at this point, however, Mackensen instead wanted to seek a decision with his left wing on the lower Bzura. Only if the XIV Russian Corps at Piotrkow were diverted farther north to fight Mackensen would it be possible for 2nd Army to attack the city.
Thus on 13 December the troops of Gallwitz' newly assembled corps were just held in readiness for a possible offensive toward Piotrkow. It was impossible to conduct aerial reconnaissance because of rain and fog; detachments which were sent forward toward the city on the ground to gather information met heavy resistance everywhere. Because the situation remained uncertain, there were also no actions on the 14th.

2. Activities of 1st Army

In general, the front was quiet on the right wing of Woyrsch's Army Detachment after the last days of November. 1st Army, deployed north of the Cracow fortress, was ordered to hold a line between Bialy Kosciol and Zarki and to pin down the Russian units in the vicinity. Through 3 December the Russians were active, but made just sporadic minor attacks. Thereafter the enemy 9th Army fired only brief artillery barrages against the Aus-Hung. lines. As already noted, the III Caucasian and XIV Corps left for the north; meanwhile the XXI and X Corps moved back from the north to the south bank of the Vistula. The departure of these units obliged Letschitzky's units to spread out, so his infantry dug strong positions. Thus the Russians were weakening the southern end of their front in Poland to reinforce more decisive sectors.

This gave the k.u.k. 1st Army a respite during which it could restore order to its units and continue strengthening its positions. Since aerial reconnaissance revealed that Letschitzky's front was being weakened, Dankl was able to also send reinforcements to the north (27 ID, as noted above), as well as to the south where they assisted 4th Army in its difficult struggle.

B. The Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow

At this point 1st Army deployed (from south to north) the VI, X, V and 1st Corps, Tschurtschenthaler's Group, and finally II Corps. The Cracow fortress itself was placed under 4th Army HQ.
1. Opening and crisis, 1–10 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 27 and sketch 55)

a. Initial situation of the k.u.k. 4th and 3rd Armies

On 1 December the k.u.k. XIV Corps was preparing to attack the south wing of Dimitriev's Army. Most of the Corps had reached the area Chabowka-Mszana Dl. — the higher HQ, the infantry and several batteries had arrived by train, the rest on foot. The German 47 Res ID had not yet detrained, since it was delayed by the limited capacity of the one-track line (which could accommodate just 24 transports of 50 axles, with a one hour interval between trains).

At this point the Russian 3rd Army south of the Vistula apparently had four or five infantry divisions of XI and IX Corps deployed toward Wieliczka-Dobczyce, while two or three cavalry divisions with some infantry were in the area Dobczyce-Tymbark.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had told FML Roth that after preparing his group at Mszana Dl.-Chabowka-Jordanow he should advance with a strong right wing on Bochnia, and thus against the flank and rear of the enemy forces south of the Vistula. On Roth's left, FZM Ljubicic's Group would initially hold its positions, then join the advance of his neighbor as it began to progress. Because of the delays in rail transport, the attack wouldn't begin until 3 December.

FML Roth wanted to first capture the Tymbark area, thus bringing his right wing forward as far as possible. For this purpose the roads leading from the detraining stations to Tymbark should be cleared of the enemy. Therefore the first unit which became available, 13 LW ID, was sent ahead to Kasina Wk. to support 6 CD and 11 Hon CD, which together had a strength of just 1,000 horsemen. The Landwehr were already intervening successfully in the actions of 6 CD on 1 December. The force of circumstances thus made it impossible for all components to begin the operation at once; rail transportation, the march to the front, and the deployment for battle took place as a continuous activity.

The 3 ID, which reached the vicinity of Mszana Dl. on the 1st, was assembled two days later to the east of 13 LW ID and became engaged on the road to Dobra. Behind 3 ID the 8 ID and the first echelon of 47 Res ID were approaching.
FML Roth planned to drive the Russians away from his Group's only line of deployment and supply as quickly as possible. Under cover from the first units to confront the enemy, the rest of his men would push ever forward to the east and then to the north, going around Dimitriev's south wing. However, the success of the operation depended on whether the Russians would be prevented from receiving reinforcements from Brussilov farther east. Nagy's Cavalry Corps was responsible for guarding the Austrian right during the thrust to the northeast and also for scouting deep behind the rear of the enemy 3rd Army. Therefore, on the 2nd the 6 CD rode through Rzegocina toward Bochnia, the 11 Hon CD toward Neusandez and the 10 CD through Neumarkt [Nowytarg] through the upper Dunajec valley toward Altsandez. 10 CD was also supposed to check or at least delay any enemy units advancing south of the Beskids. Mixed detachments were sent toward Limanowa, Slopnice (southeast of Tymbark), and to the bend in the Dunajec north of Na Rzece.

The primary mission of Boroevic's Army was to pin down the enemy on its front and to prevent Brussilov from moving units to help Dimitriev. However, after the actions and strenuous retreats of the last few days the troops of the k.u.k. 3rd Army were almost completely exhausted. Even if the Russians intended to withdraw some of the units in front of Boroevic, at this point the k.u.k. troops were hardly able to carry out their mission, which would require offensive actions. The Army commander reported to Teschen that IX Corps in particular had very little combat value after undergoing 11 days of marching and 35 days of battle. The withdrawal of this Corps through Bartfeld had adversely affected the entire operational situation; the already considerable gap between 3rd and 4th Armies had now widened to almost 100 km (see volume 1 leaflet 27).

On 1 December, Boroevic informed the AOK that his troops urgently needed a period to recuperate before they would be capable of new operations; therefore they would be unable to hold their present positions for long in the event of continued enemy pressure. In fact, if the Russians continued their advance Boroevic and his subordinates were considering whether to fall back to a position northeast of Kaschau; measures were already being taken to fortify this line for prolonged resistance. By this point (as noted earlier) the Russians actually had no intention of pushing farther over the Carpathians and had entirely other plans. However, this wasn't evident to 3rd Army HQ in view of the recent enemy thrust to Bartfeld. Thus the prospects weren't good for close cooperation.
between 4th and 3rd Armies.

The area around Neusandez was of prime importance because any forces which Brussilov sent west would have to pass through it. Therefore the AOK ordered 3rd Army HQ to send 4 CD to reconnoiter this sector; the Division would harass any enemy units moving toward the north and northwest.

4 CD, reinforced by three Landsturm Etappen battalions, had been guarding the most important routes between Eperjes and Neusandez ever since the latter town had been evacuated on 19 November. On 1 December, detachments of the Division were driven out of Muszyna by Russian cavalry, which advanced through Rytro into the Poprad valley. This caused concern that the enemy could thrust through Alt Lublau and break the vital Kaschau-Oderberg railroad. Therefore the AOK ordered 3rd Army to keep the Russians away from the stretch of rail from Poprad through Iglo to Wallendorf, and the Army in turn gave this responsibility to 4 CD. The Division initially assembled for this purpose on the 2nd at Alt Lublau; thence it would move up to a position where it could block the narrowest part of the Poprad valley.

On the 2nd the enemy didn't continue their thrust against IX Corps through Bartfeld. Nonetheless, GdI Boroevic was still concerned about his important western wing, and therefore decided to strengthen it with the 12 battalions of FML Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID; they would move from Homonna to Eperjes. After Kornhaber departed, FML Krautwald was ordered to hold his ground with the remainder of his Group in the Takcsany-Totalmad area (not far from the point where the Virava flows into the Laborcza); Krautwald was also given command over 56 ID and 8 CD, which had formerly been under Szurmay.

While the HQ at Kaschau was planning to pull 3rd Army farther back from the enemy, the Russian commanders considered their own

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565 The Hungarian Minister President, concerned about the Russian advance onto Hungarian soil, had approached the commander of 3rd Army about this danger. Boroevic was not at all influenced by the message from Tisza, but at this time was very depressed about the situation on the west wing. Therefore he agreed to transfer Kornhaber's Group, his last fully intact unit, to this area; his primary goal was to recover Bartfeld. (This is based on a letter in the Military Archive from GM Anton Pitreich, dated 17 May 1929.)

566 This alteration in the chain of command was necessary because FML Szurmay had temporarily left active service.
situation to be very dangerous. It was becoming apparent that Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was sending a group to attack the portions of the Russian Southwest Front just south of the Vistula. At the same time Ruzsky was appealing to Ivanov for help, which might only be available if the units in the Cracow area pulled back to a shorter line. On the other hand, the Russians were reluctant to abandon their gains south of the Vistula. Ivanov had ordered Brussilov to send VII and XXIV Corps from the areas of Mezölabórcz and Wola Michowa toward Neusandez and Gorlice, without worrying about the security of his own south flank or the need to cover the blockade of Przemysl.

In the beginning these latest Russian movements avoided detection by the Austro-Hungarians.

Thus on 3 and 4 December the k.u.k. 3rd Army still hadn't penetrated the darkness that surrounded the Russians' intentions. The enemy didn't undertake any serious offensive operations on either day. They probed cautiously toward Magyarraszlavicz, to which the shattered IX Corps had retired; they left III Corps almost entirely alone, and fought only some insignificant skirmishes against covering troops of VII Corps and of 5 Hon CD, and against the foremost elements of Krautwald's Group. However, the Russians' inactivity at least hinted at the fact that they were transferring units to the west, which 3rd Army had been ordered to prevent.

At this point the main body of 4 CD, originally directed toward Neusandez, was halted to cover the detraining of the Combined Hon ID. Although the enemy group at Muszyna remained quiet, a strong detachment of 4 CD at Leluchow had to fight a Russian column which was approaching from Bartfeld.

Thus the situation called for the transfer of further strength to the Army's west wing. Boroevic turned to 38 Hon ID, which hitherto had been instructed to recover the Uzsok Pass. On the 4th, the major part of the Division - 8 battalions and 5 batteries - was ordered to entrain for Hethras, where Kornhaber's Division was already moving. The rest of 38 Hon ID,

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568 Under III Corps, the parts of 28 ID which were returning from VII Corps assembled at Giralt. Two Russian battalions skirmished against the front of 22 LW ID on 3 December, but were put to flight by half a battalion of the LW IR "Marburg" # 26.
under Col. Csermak, was left opposite Uzsok Pass to prevent General Eck's Russians from invading the Ung valley.

On the morning of 5 December the veil which covered the movements of 8th Russian Army was finally ripped aside. It was learned from an intercepted radio broadcast that the enemy VIII Corps HQ had already arrived at Neusandez. Beyond the Russian lines, troops were moving toward the northwest, apparently to reinforce Dimitriev. However, during the day the 3rd Army HQ received information that confused the picture again; in VII Corps' sector the enemy drove 5 Hon CD out of Homonnaolyka, and opposite Krautwald a strong Russian column moved down the Laborcza valley. On the other hand, there were also reports of enemy units pulling back. Army HQ strengthened FML Krautwald and told him to finally resolve the doubts about the enemy's plans by launching his own offensive; he would thrust ahead toward Baligrod and in the Oslawica valley.

Meanwhile the south wing of the Archduke's army had already been engaged in furious actions for two days.

b. The flank attack against Dimitriev's south wing (3-6 December)

(see volume 1 leaflet 27 and sketch 55)

3 December

Under FML Roth's Group on 3 December, the 8 ID kept pushing against the enemy units which had fallen back to the east after the fighting at Dobra the day before. The Division pivoted to the right through Slopnice, which forced the Russians to evacuate Tymbark; the advance guard pursued the enemy as far as the fork in the road at Lososina Grn. 3 ID and 13 LW ID turned sharply toward the north; only the latter unit was engaged. 6 CD reached Rzegocina, but with just one regiment; the bulk of 11 Hon CD entered Limanowa. FML Roth moved his HQ up to Dobra, where it remained until the end of the battle.

The Russian pressure against FZM Ljubicic had slackened since the 2nd; however, an attempt by his right wing to advance in support of Roth's attack was shattered on the 3rd. 30 ID had met resistance from a well-entrenched enemy. Therefore Ljubicic decided to mark time until the flank attack by his neighbor had won more success.
Both the AOK and 4th Army HQ kept emphasizing the importance of a rapid advance into the enemy's rear; the troops were supposed to march as strenuously as possible. The cavalry was to carry out active scouting and destroy communications behind the Russian lines. FML Roth, with the same intentions as his superiors, ordered 6 CD and half of 11 Hon CD to thrust on the 4th toward Bochnia, against the enemy's lines of supply. Only the remaining half of 11 Hon CD would still be deployed in the direction of Neusandez, under GM Graf Bissingen; however, he was supported by some detachments of infantry. Bissingen, along with 10 CD plus the 4 CD of Boroevic's Army, was instructed to "break up" the Russian units reported to be at Neusandez, or at least to keep them from advancing to Limanowa.

4th Army's offensive was laboring under extremely unfavorable terrain and weather conditions. The heavily forested hills were covered with ice. There was only one winding mountain road at the service of the troops and supply trains of four infantry and two cavalry divisions. Continued delays in the train transport of 47 Res ID made it advisable to hold the unit in place until all its men arrived. This was important because FML Roth intended to use this German division, with its full strength of 12,000 riflemen, as a united attack group; it would deploy on his extreme right wing during the outflanking maneuver.

FML Kuk, the commander of Cracow, was instructed to pin down the enemy by frequent and powerful sorties from the southeast and northeast fronts of the fortifications. He was also supposed to interfere with any attempt by the Russians to cross the Vistula at Niepolomice. In the next few days the troops in Cracow effectively carried out these instructions in support of the field armies, under the guidance of 4th Army HQ. Thus Dimitriev's confidence that the fortified city on the Vistula could be taken easily was shown to be misplaced.

4 December

On the morning of 4 December the Russian XI and IX Corps, despite the growing danger of being outflanked from the south and southeast, were still standing in place facing toward the west. Although the assembly of Roth's Group couldn't be concealed from Russian pilots, who had circled over their deployment area on the 2nd, Dimitriev apparently underestimated his new opponent. The Russians didn't deploy reserves to

569 A Russian scouting patrol had prepared a report about
guard their flank until the afternoon of the 4th. Until this point the Aus-Hung. divisions (from left to right: 13 LW ID, 3 ID and 8 ID) encountered mostly cavalry as they changed the direction of their march from east toward the north. Then they encountered effective resistance for the first time. Major actions developed along the entire front; both sides switched constantly between launching furious attacks and offering stubborn defense. In a surprise night action, 8 ID took the heights north of Zbydniow; 3 ID was engaged farther to the west. 13 LW ID advanced on both sides of the Stradomka, but finally came to a halt in front of strongly fortified Gora Sw. Jana, a town which dominated the surrounding area. The lead brigade of 47 Res ID, reinforced by mountain artillery, entered the fray at Rzegocina after a commendable march; the Division's other Brigade was back in Group reserve at Lososina Grn.

6 CD attempted to pierce the Russian line to begin its reconnaissance, but was unsuccessful; it pulled back to the Widoma Heights. Only one regiment of the Division was able to advance through Rajbrot; it raided enemy supply trains at Lipnica. The half of 11 Hon CD, also striving to move forward, turned aside through Iwkowa. GM Bissingen, fulfilling his mission of guarding toward the east, encountered only enemy cavalry; his advance guard reached the area east of Kanina. The Russians were driven out of Altsandez by 10 CD, advancing from the west, and by Col. von Weisz' detachment (7 squadrons, 1 battery and a Landsturm battalion from 4th CD), which came out of the Poprad valley. However, neither Aus-Hung. group was able to push further ahead with its reconnaissance.

At this point the strength of the Russians at Neusandez was still completely unknown. The reports were contradictory: some indicated there were just a few battalions and squadrons involved, others spoke of an entire infantry division plus a cavalry division. However, there was no expectation of any immediate intervention from this area against Roth's Group.

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570 Unfortunately there is no authentic Russian source which describes their operations during this period. According to Nesnamov (Vol. III, p. 18) "at the time the assembly of VIII and XXIV Corps (from 8th Army) in the vicinity of Neusandez was still far from complete. Parts of XXIV Corps had reached Gorlitz, but VIII Corps was still in the Lisko-Sanok area." However, it isn't advisable to accept Nesnamov's work as fully reliable because of several errors in his account.
Therefore 4th Army HQ decided not to further reinforce the units deployed in the direction of Neusandez. They felt that their primary task now was to send the right wing of the Army toward the north, and they wanted to pursue this course with the largest possible force. FML Roth analyzed the situation in the same fashion. His guiding idea was to strengthen his right wing at the expense of the left; as the Army swung north the left would aim at Gdow, the right at Bochnia. Therefore the orders to Roth's Group for 5 December prescribed an energetic continuation of the advance to the Raba and to the main highway at Bochnia. 6 CD with parts of 11 Hon CD would move toward Brzesko; all bridges over the Dunajec north of Neusandez were to be destroyed.

5 December

However, the plans couldn't be carried out. On 5 December the further attack of Roth's Group foundered upon very heavy resistance. 13 LW ID fought all day in an attempt to take the strongly fortified Gora Sw. Jana; although part of 3 ID also intervened on the flank, the action was unsuccessful. The rest of 3 ID gained little ground. On its right, 8 ID fended off a furious enemy counterattack, but was itself stuck in place. 47 Res ID attempted a surprise attack in the night, but was defeated. At daybreak, however, the Germans renewed the offensive in an enveloping maneuver supported by artillery from 11 Hon CD; this time they broke through and took about 1,000 Russian prisoners. Both Brigades of the 47th advanced to the Stradomka.

FML Nagy ordered the Polish Legion as well as 6 CD to thrust toward Brzesko. After encountering an enemy force at Rajbrot, the 6th detoured to Iwanowka, where they camped for the night. The half of 11 Hon CD serving in this area was used as scouts; however, the Honved reconnaissance detachments didn't advance past the line of heights north of the Lipnica-Zakliczyn highway.

Farther south, GM Bissingen reached a point 6 km from Neusandez. Here, however, he collided with three Russian battalions and some artillery, then fell back to Kanina. He wasn't pursued by the enemy. The attempts of Weisz' Detachment and 10 CD to break through to Neusandez were also shattered by Russian counterattacks.

In the northernmost sector of 4th Army, XVII Corps still stayed in place. XI Corps pushed ahead its right wing (30 ID and 11 ID) to keep pace with 13 LW ID; they reached the area by
Thus 5 December had been characterized by increasing Russian resistance, as enemy reinforcements hurried to the sector. Aus-Hung. pilots spotted strong columns moving from the north toward Bochnia, from the east toward Brzesko and from Grybow to Neusandez. Moreover, an intercepted radio message revealed that X Russian Corps was being shifted over the Vistula to the southeast, while parts of VIII Corps were moving on the west wing of Brussilov's Army. The direction in which VIII Corps was moving - which was also confirmed by scouts from 4 CD - indicated that the enemy commanders planned to thrust between 3rd and 4th Armies with substantial forces; then they would ruin the promising offensive of the Archduke by falling on his flank and rear. The AOK had no doubt that this was the Russians' intention. However, Conrad rated the possible success of Roth's operation, although increasingly hazardous, more important than gaining security against a possible enemy breakthrough by cancelling the attack. As always, he sought a solution by attacking; therefore, he decided now to draw 3rd Army into the decisive action. The immediate danger to the flank and rear of the Archduke's Army would have to be addressed before Boroevic's advance had time to become effective.

Therefore the high command, upon the request of 4th Army HQ, ordered 45 LW ID (6700 rifles), which had been under the Cracow fortress HQ, to immediately move by rail to the Tymbark area. 39 Hon ID (4800 rifles) and VI Corps HQ were also sent to join the Archduke. Since the Honved Division first had to relieved by other units of 1st Army, most of the men didn't begin to entrain northwest of Cracow until the evening of 7 December. Only part of the Division had begun to roll along the rails through Oswiecim and Saybusch on the 6th. Finally, GM Bissingen was ordered to cooperate with 10 CD and Weisz' Detachment on the 6th to throw back the enemy at Neusandez and destroy the bridges there.

6 December

Despite the critical situation, the pressure exerted by Roth's Group had already had an important result: the Russians' front facing to the west had become untenable. In the night of 5-6 December the enemy began to evacuate their positions by Wisniowa, beginning on the south end of the front and then farther north. To avoid unnecessary casualties, the k.u.k. XVII Corps followed the Russians only to the line of heights
northwest of Dobczyce, while XI Corps kept pace with Roth's Group.

Under Roth, the 13 LW ID made a surprise attack on Gora Sw. Jana during the night and took the town; during the day they pushed the Russians back over the heights north of the Stradomka. 3 ID also pushed the enemy back step by step over the river, and established themselves on the south bank. 8 ID, on the other hand, remained pinned down by a strong Russian position. In heavy actions, the west wing of 47 Res ID stormed the heights north of the Stradomka; however, neither this wing nor the main body of the German division could overcome the enemy's stubborn resistance on the line south of the road running along the heights from Leszczyna to Muchowka, and in front of Rajbrot. IX Russian Corps was making a determined stand to cover the withdrawal of XI Corps toward the east. The Russians repeatedly turned back to assault the oncoming lines of their opponents, in order to fend off the danger to their line of retreat. Although these assaults failed under the fire of the allied troops, FML Roth's Group itself was unable to advance further uphill against the Russians' well-sited new positions, which were also well fortified and supported by effective artillery fire. Most of the numerous prisoners taken on 6 December were from some regiments of the Russian XXI Corps, which Dimitriev was already moving to the south bank of the Vistula.

The 6 CD wished to renew its attempt to break through to Brzesko on 6 December. South of the Tymowa-Lipnica road the Division repulsed a Russian thrust which was aimed against the right flank of 47 Res ID; then, however, it was itself struck in the flank by enemy columns which had crossed the Dunajec. After a difficult night march through hills and valleys, the men reached Ujanowice early on the 7th. The Division detached just one regiment and a dismounted detachment (barely 250 men) at Rajbrot to guard the open flank of 47 Res ID, which had already committed all of its own reserves. A wide 15 km hole in the line gaped farther south, as far as GM Bissingen's group on the Neusandez Road. The assault groups of Brussilov's VIII Corps were now thrusting into this hole.

Based on information from prisoners, 4 CD had already reported the advance of Russian VIII Corps the day before. However, 4th Army HQ and Roth's Group considered this report untrustworthy because aerial reconnaissance had reported that all the roads leading to Neusandez were empty of enemy troops. Even after reports from 10 CD seemed to confirm the presence at Neusandez of a strong enemy force - apparently VIII Corps - FML Roth
initially believed that this Corps planned to move north along the road east of the Dunajec, covered by substantial detachments west of the river. Nonetheless he took measures to counter any intervention by new forces against his eastern flank. Eight Landsturm companies were concentrated at Limanowa and work intensified on the construction of field works on the heights around the town. The transportation by train of 45 LW ID was accelerated; its first elements were beginning to arrive at Lososina Grn. and Limanowa. During the night, FML Roth received a report from 6 CD regarding the advance of Russian units through Tymowa and farther south; in response, he told 89 LW Inf Bde (which was already at Limanowa) to move past Widoma Hill to the heights east of Rzegocina. As the rest of 45 LW ID came up, it would follow 89 Bde.

The units sent toward Neusandez - Bissingen's Group, 10 CD and Weisz' Detachment - didn't reach their goal on the 6th. FML Nagy was given command of all these troops to ensure that they had coordinated leadership.

Thus on 6 December the offensive of 4th Army failed to win the hoped-for success; indeed, it was evident that the offensive potential of the all-important right wing was declining. There was serious concern about the insufficient protection to the flank of 47 Res ID. Despite efforts to hasten, the approach of 45 LW ID over the over-loaded and inefficient local rail lines was drawn out; thus the Landwehr troops were becoming available only in dribs and dabs. Anyway, the 45th had just 9 battalions and 4 batteries, so it would not be enough to ensure success. Only the commitment of further fresh forces would give the offensive the necessary impetus.

Effective assistance now became available just in time. The concentric advance of 4th Army had shortened the line, so that 30 ID and 22 Inf Bde of XI Corps could be pulled from the front. Archduke Joseph Ferdinand placed this division and a half at the disposal of Roth's hard-pressed Group; he ordered them to march as soon as possible from Raciechowice to Lapanow. As of the 6th, part of the intended line of march was still in the enemy's hands. However, based on the general situation Roth figured that his men would be in possession of the route on the next day. Because of the need to keep the offensive going quickly, he decided to live with the disadvantage of having the reinforcements march directly behind the line of battle.

The parts of XI Corps which would join Roth wouldn't begin their march until 8:00 AM on the 7th. The remainder of the XIth - 21
Inf Bde - was placed under XVII Corps, and formed its right wing. A Landsturm Group from the Cracow fortress garrison (1st and 35 Lst Inf Bdes) was created under Col Brauner and deployed on the left of XVII Corps. GdI Kritek of XVII Corps was given control over Brauner's troops, and his whole command became "Group Kritek."\(^{571}\)

Thus FML Roth had decided to provide substantial support to the right wing of 47 Res ID from 45 LW ID. He wanted to deploy 30 ID to the left of the German division in order to bring the offensive forward. The main target of the attacking group would be Bochnia.

\(^{571}\) By this point the gradual reinforcement of Roth's Group had made it much larger than any other part of 4th Army. The Archduke recognized this fact by placing the remainder of the units under Kritek. The new command structure would give Roth the strength and tactical control he needed to win the long-expected victory. (Based on correspondence from Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to the Military Archive, 8 February 1929.)
c. The high point of the battle (7–10 December)

7 December

The battle raged on. In the area immediately south of the Vistula the enemy continued to retreat on 7 December without offering noteworthy resistance. Kritek's Group followed up, almost without seeing action, and reached a line from Gdow to Grabie (on the Vistula) by the time darkness fell. On their right, Roth's 13 LW ID reached the heights south of Gdow without any serious fighting.

However, farther east the Russian resistance was becoming more fierce. Already in the night of 6–7 December their 42 ID (IX Corps) made repeated attacks on 8 ID to parry the threat to the Stradomka crossings. Since the enemy had established a new position opposite 3 and 8 ID on the heights south of the Lapanow Road, Roth had 13 LW ID swing to the east in an envelopment maneuver. 30 ID, which was joining his Group, was directed through Lapanow to Leszczyna whence it could advance against the flank of the Russians opposing 47 Res ID. To cover this operation, 3 and 8 ID would first drive the enemy farther north (and away from the line of march of 30 ID), and then push east to force them over the Stradomka. The Russians, however, avoided this flank attack by evacuating the west bank of the Stradomka in one bound. An order captured the day before revealed that the enemy planned to hold a strong defensive position east of the stream. It would run from the point where the Stradomka flows into the Raba down to the Glinska Gora, facing west; then it followed the course of the eastern branch of the Stradomka as far as the crossroads at Muchowka, facing south.

GLt von Besser's 47 Res ID continued to endure continuous Russian counterattacks at Leszczyna. To relieve him, parts of 8 and 30 ID crossed the Stradomka; after a hot and bloody action they took the Glinska Gora. However, the Russians continued to hold the portion of their front facing south with their usual stubbornness. The right wing of 47 Res ID could gain ground only slowly in the thickly wooded hills; to guard its outermost flank the leading brigade of 45 LW ID (the 89th) moved through Rzegocina to the heights south of Rajbrot.

As the enemy's front contracted due to the withdrawal, so did the front of the attackers. Therefore the 13 LW ID, 22 Inf Bde and most of 8 ID could leave the front and assemble at Lapanow.
at the disposal of the Group commander.

Thus the attack by the left wing and center of 4th Army was progressing, although amid heavy fighting in some places. On the other hand, the situation of the right was becoming ever more critical as the Russian VIII Corps intervened. It was launching a thrust against the flank and rear of the Archduke's Army in its most vulnerable spot. All reports from the k.u.k. cavalry agreed that strong enemy columns were approaching the wide-spread battlefield from the northeast, east and south.

Parts of X Russian Corps, which had come over from the north bank of the Vistula, were sent to support and lengthen the defensive front stretching east of the Glinska Gora. Meanwhile the bulk of VIII Corps (14 and 15 ID) was approaching ever closer to Rajbrot, on both sides of the Lososina valley and along the Neusandez-Lososina Grn. railroad. Farther south, the Russian 10 CD was advancing up the Dunajec. VIII Corps also sent 13 ID into the Poprad valley to block the 4 k.u.k. CD from its objective, Neusandez. Perhaps the Division could have already reached this goal, but in the previous days (as noted above) it had been held back at Hethars to cover the deployment of troops on Boroevic's western flank. Now, however, when the divisional commander GM Berndt marched forward from Alt Lublau on the 7th he had to be satisfied with the capture of Piwniczna. His force consisted of 8 squadrons, 3 Landsturm infantry battalions and 2 batteries. At Jaworzna the burnt-out k.u.k. 6 CD was engaged against the Russian 14 ID, which was advancing into the Lososina valley and the area to its south; rather early on the 7th the cavalry already had to fall back to Laskowa.

At this point FML Nagy's Group consisted of 10 CD, three squadrons from 11 Hon CD, a battalion from IR # 59, two batteries, Col. Pilsudski's Polish Legion, and several Landsturm companies; at Kanina they fought against the advanced elements of 15 Russian ID. Outflanked from the north, Nagy's troops fell back to the entrenchments east of Limanowa, which had been finished just in time. Although for the moment the enemy didn't press any further ahead, the danger to Roth's flank and lines of communication made it necessary for the troops of 45 LW ID to detrain farther in the rear as they arrived.

572 According to Nesnamov, the X Corps didn't move to the south bank of the Vistula until 9 December. In reality, however, prisoners from the 9 ID of this Corps were already being taken by our forces south of the river on 6 December.
Despite the threatening turn of events, commanders at all levels from Roth's HQ up to the AOK remained determined to carry on the offensive thrust to the north. "All orders from the AOK concentrated upon continuing and directing the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow until victory. Directions were given not only for the diversion of further forces to 4th Army but for the earliest possible advance by 3rd Army to intervene in the fighting."^573 1st Army was ordered to move 15 ID and the combined Inf Bde of GM Reymann (which was standing in reserve with 6 battalions and 4 batteries) to 4th Army. 15 ID would have to be relieved by garrison troops from the Cracow fortress, then could begin to march through Wieliczka to Gdow on the 9th. On the same day Reymann's Brigade would begin to move by rail behind 39 Hon ID.

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was as determined as ever to seek a decision by pinning down the enemy units facing west in the Lipnica area, while enveloping them and perhaps moving behind them from the south. Kritek would pursue them with his south wing along the Raba, while Roth pushed ahead to the east and northeast. 39 Hon ID, which was moving by train toward Tymbark, would be placed under Roth along with FML Arz' VI Corps HQ.

8 December

FML Roth was compelled by the situation to make his major effort on the left wing of his Group (30, 8 and 3 ID plus 22 Inf Bde). For 8 December he ordered the wing to attack toward the Bochnia-Muchowka Road. 47 Res ID was to hold its ground while its right wing tried to envelop the Russians in cooperation with 89 LW Bde as the latter came up through Rajbrot; 13 LW ID, the Group reserve, would follow these units toward Muchowka. Despite the altered balance of forces, FML Roth was also still prepared to take any opportunity which might arise to outflank the enemy's eastern wing. 6 CD in the Lososina valley, strengthened by some infantry, would try to gain as much ground as possible. GM Graf Herberstein, who as the newly-appointed commander of 10 CD was now leading Nagy's Group, would recover the village of Kanina if possible, or at least hold onto the position at Limanowa. The parts of the 45 LW ID which were still arriving would follow the leading 89 Bde through Rzegocina to Rajbrot.

3 ID was ordered to capture the heights on both sides of Sobolow. On 8 December it reached the Stradomka after difficult marches along the icy roads deep into the night. Ignoring its

^573 Conrad, Vol. V, p. 64
exhaustion, GM Horsetzky sent his central column back into motion after a short rest so that it would remain hard on the heels of the withdrawing enemy. At dawn the Salzburg-Upper Austrian IR # 59 and the Tyrolean Kaiser Jaeger Regt # 2 suddenly fell upon the enemy at Sobolow. They unleashed a powerful hail of fire at short range from three directions. Then these excellent troops advanced with precision against the unprepared Russians; in a bitter hand-to-hand action the defenders were either killed or taken prisoner. 

On the heights north of Sobolow, however, the Russians were sitting in a heavily-entrenched position and prevented any further advance with murderous flanking fire. No assistance was expected from Kritek's Group, which was becoming engaged with Russian reinforcements along its front facing to the northeast. Finally FML Roth sent the Moravian LW IR # 14 (two battalions with about 500 rifles) to help his north wing. The Landwehr along with the Upper Austrian line IR # 14 took the stoutly defended heights during the night.

At the same time, FML Fabini with his 8 ID plus 88 L-Sch Bde stormed the forested and hilly ground south of the heights and drove the enemy toward the east. The heights northwest of Leszczyna and the town itself were captured by 30 ID, 22 Inf Bde, and parts of 47 Res ID. However, the main body of the German Division gained ground only slowly in the forest north of Rajbrot; soon the approach of 14 Russian ID forced the Germans to bend their right wing toward the east and to divert their reserves in the same direction. 89 Bde of 45 LW ID, which at this time had only four battalions present, was sent through Rajbrot to envelop the enemy; however, when the Russian 14 ID arrived and its advanced troops took the Kobyla, the Landwehr had to deploy to occupy the heights lying west of that hill.

The attack of the reinforced 6 CD in the Lososina valley bogged down at Laskowa. Moreover, enemy units of unknown strength were pushing into the area between this town and the Widoma, and seeking to strike the rear of the battle group at Rzegocina. Therefore the parts of Roth's group reserves which were still

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574 The Austrians took 1500 prisoners plus 5 machine guns.
575 Since the retreat from Przemysl this Brigade had been serving under 30 ID.
576 The transport of the remaining parts of 45 LW ID was still delayed by technical difficulties on the railroads; the Division's last battalion didn't arrive at Tymbark until 10:30 PM.
available - 4 1/2 battalions (2000 rifles) and 9 batteries of the 13 LW ID - were moved up from the Lapanow area to the rear of 89 LW Bde.

The advanced troops of 15 ID, reinforced by some cavalry, launched an outflanking attack from Kanina in the afternoon against Herberstein's Group at Limanowa; the Russians advanced on both sides of the road and also from the south. When their artillery began to fire upon the supply trains northwest of Limanowa, several oil tanks in a nearby refinery caught fire; some of the defending Landsturm detachments began to collapse, and the situation was momentarily critical. However, the arrival of reserves solidified the front, especially toward evening when the first echelon of 39 Hon ID arrived by train.

To provide unified direction to the defenders in the Rzegocina-Limanowa area, command was given to FML Smekal of 45 LW ID; he led his own Division plus 6 and 10 CD and parts of 11 Hon CD.

Between the Vistula and Raba, Kritek's Group followed closely behind the enemy. His wing on the Raba, which had hung back somewhat the day before, now pushed ahead with energy; it fought lively actions with Russian reinforcements. Because the Army's northern flank was vulnerable to intervention from Russian forces on the other side of the Vistula, GdI Kritek ordered his northernmost units to halt at Grabie.

4 CD of Boroevic's Army, which had advanced through Rytro, was apparently opposed by half of the enemy 13 ID, barring the way past the mouth of the Poprad south of Altsandez. In the afternoon it was reported that 10 Russian CD was riding up the west bank of the Dunajec. Its route was blocked by Weisz' Detachment, which after withdrawing the day before was guarding the narrow part of the valley at Na Rzece.

Further planning by the opposing commanders

The situation of 4th Army was nearing its most critical stage. The Archduke's HQ expected the approach of further enemy reinforcements from the north bank of the Vistula. This was based on an intercepted radio message from the commander of the Southwest Front to 9th Army, which was ordered to help Dimitriev's hard-pressed forces by taking over the portion of their front north of the Vistula. Thus all of X and XXI Corps would be released to cross to the south bank, forcing the Archduke to confront the entire 3rd Army. Moreover, there were further signs that strong enemy forces were concentrating behind Brussilov's west wing. VIII Corps had already entered the
fighting; XXIV Corps had reached the Biala at Gromnik and Ciezkowice and thus was two days' march from the battlefield.  

When the Russians retreated behind the Stradomka on 7 December they had ended the Archduke's opportunity to envelop Dimitriev's south wing; however, he still needed to pay attention to this sector because fresh enemy units were hurrying there from the east. Since only weak Austrian forces held the covering position at Limanowa, the situation was very serious. The solution was the immediate intervention of 3rd Army, which was being urged by the AOK.

General Ivanov had not been able to make good his promises during his proposals at the strategy conference at Siedlec on 29 November. Under pressure from the k.u.k. 4th Army, Dimitriev had to pull back large portions of his front; although his southern wing had been able to hold off the German 47 Res ID and cover the retreat of the northern wing, it had lost ground and suffered heavy casualties.

The commander of Southwest Front still considered Dimitriev's situation perilous; therefore he was sending 4 3/4 corps to the endangered sector - X and XXI Corps from 9th Army, VIII (with its three divisions) and XXIV Corps along with 3 Rifle Bde from 8th Army. He was sure that the intervention of these powerful reinforcements would regain the initiative for the Russians and enable them to go over to the offensive.

577 Nesnamov, Vol. III, p. 19
578 Nesmanov's description (Vol. III, p. 19) is incorrect. He writes: "Because of failure to make a decision as to whether the 4th and 9th Armies should retreat to the Pilica, the X and XXI Corps were still holding their positions north of the Vistula, even though they were available for transfer to 3rd Army and the transfer had been planned. It was considered impossible to reduce the strength of 9th Army. These circumstances forced the commander of the Southwest Front to halt the offensive by 11 ID and IX Corps which was already developing; on 25 November [8 December by the Gregorian calendar] they were pulled back to the line Niepolomice-Targowisko-Krolowka." Although Nesmanov here refers to an "already developing" offensive, in fact the 3rd Army had been forced to retreat for the last three days. Also the transfer of forces to Dimitriev had begun; on 8 December a radio message from Ivanov to Letschitzky (commander of 9th Army) was overheard in which the former referred to a "heavy action" and demanded "Help to stem and repulse the onslaught of the enemy..."
However, a fresh misfortune befell Dimitriev on 9 December. The attacking forces of Roth's Group (3, 8 and 30 ID plus the left wing of 47 Res ID) once again assaulted the heights north and east of Sobolow and took them after heavy fighting. The main body of the German division remained in the position they had already won, waiting for the left wing of Roth's Group to continue its advance in the direction of Wisnicz.

In the sector south of 47 Res ID, FML Roth now gave the commander of VI Corps, FML Arz, overall responsibility for the Group's southern wing. Here the 13 LW ID, supported by parts of 45 LW ID, captured the important Kobyla Heights; 6 CD, on the other hand, gained only a little ground during the day. Meanwhile the Russian 15 ID was advancing slowly against Herberstein's Group and seemed about to envelop its southern wing; as a counter-measure, when five battalions and six batteries of 39 Hon ID arrived by train at 8:00 PM they were sent to thrust south over the heights south of Limanowa.

The enemy was also more active between the Vistula and the Raba and engaged Kritek in some heavy fighting. However, despite local successes won by the Viennese 1st Landsturm Bde and the 11 ID, the operations here had no influence on the overall situation.

Although the offensive by 4th Army was still succeeding despite heavy opposition, and although 10,000 prisoners had been taken, an incident on its southern wing could well have had serious consequences. After Col. Weisz' Detachment had been driven back toward Na Rzece in the Dunajec valley, the way was open for 10 Russian CD to thrust through the Kamienica valley into the Army's open southern flank. The Russians had an opportunity to destroy the important line of communications from Mszana Dl. to Tymbark, and to disrupt the numerous troop headquarters established in the Lososina valley. However, FML Roth was notified of the danger in time, and hastily scraped together some combat soldiers and military laborers to guard the roads. Thus the small enemy cavalry detachments that advanced through Zalesie were opposed by a sufficient number of defenders. Anyway, the Russian commander didn't seize his chance to make a major mounted raid, and stayed at the town of Kamienica. On the next day, when (as narrated below) the Archduke's Army was placed in a very dangerous position by a successful attack, the Russian 10 CD was called back to Neusandez at Brussilov's
command.

The 4 CD was engaged south of Altsandez in a difficult struggle with parts of the Russian 13 ID, without reaching a decision. Col. Weisz' Detachment tried to assist the main body of 4th Division, but was compelled to fall back to Na Rzecz.

Regardless of other aspects of the strategic situation, reports from pilots and secret agents led 4th Army HQ to believe that the enemy would retreat during the night in the sector between the lower Raba and the town of Muchowka. They ordered that if this happened Kritek's Group and the north wing of FML Roth's Group should pursue toward the northeast. The first objective would be the line Zakliczyn-Brzesko-Chobot (12 km northeast of Niepolomice); Roth's main body would thrust toward Zakliczyn to block the retreat of VIII Russian Corps to the north.

FML Roth also ordered that on the 10th FML Arz should continue to attack north of the Lososina valley with 13 and 45 LW ID as well as 6 CD. GM Herberstein was entrusted with the defense of the Limanowa area; moreover, he was to go over to the offensive if he had any opportunity to do so.

As on the previous days, the troops of the Cracow garrison took part in the actions of the field forces. 106 Lst ID and all the mobile fortress batteries sortied over the northeastern line of defenses in order to keep the enemy from shifting units from the north to the south bank of the Vistula. The result was a lively action on the approaches to the fortifications which lasted all day.

A report was received - later proved to be incorrect - that the Russians opposite the left wing of 4th Army were pulling back to Brzesko and were leaving just 4 battalions on the Raba to block the main road. Because of all the similar news about enemy troops and supply trains withdrawing to the east, it seemed conceivable that only rear guards now remained in front of the Archduke. Every opportunity was to be taken to prevent the enemy from establishing themselves unhindered in any new positions.

10 December

At dawn on 10 December, GM Horsetzky's 3 ID opened another attack. Its first objective was the capture of the commanding and strongly fortified Heights # 364. The operation seemed to succeed at first, and the foremost enemy trenches were taken.
Then, however, Dimitriev's Army, reinforced by X and XXI Corps, launched a powerful surprise counterattack in the entire sector between the Vistula and the Lapanow-Muchowka Highway. The Russians made their main thrust from the Bochnia-Pogwizdow area against the Heights #364 and farther south as far as Leszczyna. Although the 3, 8 and 30 ID fought heroically, they were driven back over the Stradomka; the left wing of 47 Res ID tried to make a supporting thrust but couldn't save the situation. Only the fire of the well-led and self-sacrificing k.u.k. artillery brought the enemy to a standstill along the river line.\(^{579}\)

Dimitriev had thus freed himself of the dangerous pressure on the most vulnerable part of his front. On the other hand, his offensive against the northern wing of 4th Army was repulsed after gaining only some insignificant ground.

To close the gap that had now developed between the flanks of Roth's and Kritek's Groups, 4th Army ordered up 15 ID, which was marching through Gdow in the Army's reserve. The new Division, along with 3 ID, would occupy the heights at the point where the Stradomka flows into the Raba. To replace the 15th in Army reserve, the best troops of 95 Lst Inf Bde (which was on the lines of communication) created a group of 4 battalions under Col. Grzesicki; moving forward, they reached Swiatniki Grn. (12 km south of Cracow) on the 10th.

After the arrival of 39 Hon ID at the front, its commander FML Hadfy also took over the former Group Herberstein. Strong enemy forces attacked this group before dawn on the 10th, but were driven back in wild hand-to-hand fighting by the Hussar Regiments of 10 CD.\(^{580}\) The troops of 39 Hon ID sent into the sector also held off the Russians. The attacks of the enemy north of the road to Limanowa were also in vain; the Russians were only successful southeast of Rajbrot, where they recaptured the hotly-contested Kobyla Heights from 13 LW ID after difficult fighting. During the day Reymann's combined Inf Bde detrained in the Group's reserves and was held in readiness in the

\(^{579}\) FKR # 42 of 3 ID was particularly distinguished in this action.

\(^{580}\) At this point the k.u.k. cavalry, which before the war had been trained only to fight on horseback, still didn't have entrenching tools to prepare strong defensive positions; thus they suffered from lack of cover. Since they left their sabers with their horses while fighting dismounted, and as yet hadn't been issued bayonets, their only weapons in the hand-to-hand fighting were the butts of their carbines.
Slopnice-Dobra area.

4 CD was confronted by an overwhelming force of enemy infantry and had to pull back to the heights north of Rytro; the Division's detachment under Col Weisz was still pinned down at Na Rzece.

Despite the successful counterattack at Lapanow, the wishes of the Russian high command weren't completely fulfilled. Brussilov had ordered VIII Corps to "commit all units so that we will occupy the Rzegocina-Limanowa road today [10 December]," but this had not been accomplished.

The k.u.k. AOK was well informed about the transfer of new units to support Dimitriev. At the same time, tidings about the unfortunate fighting in Serbia were arriving at Teschen. Finally there was a report that numerous desertions in certain units of Boroevic's Army during its recent retreat were a result of anti-Austrian propaganda.

Thus it is understandable that after the setbacks at Lapanow GdI Conrad declared that 10 December was one day that demanded extraordinary patience and equanimity. However, he was still determined "to carry on [this action] to a victorious conclusion, and to commit further forces to its prosecution." In view of the general situation, he decided to pull more men from 1st Army. Dankl's HQ was ordered to withdraw XVIII Corps from the front and have it ready by the 14th for eventual movement to 4th Army. (The Corps had just been created from Group Tschurtschenthaler and contained 43 and 44 LW ID.)

For 11 December, 4th Army HQ intended to forego major attacks in order to avoid casualties, but would skirmish with the enemy; on the south flank they would await the result of the envelopment movement being prepared by 39 Hon ID and the intervention of 3rd Army.

For FML Roth it was significant that the Russians had stopped their advance at the Stradomka; this indicated that their ability to mount an offensive was faltering. Moreover, he had 15 ID as an available reserve to support his north wing. On the other hand, the enemy thrusts toward Limanowa were increasing in size and strength, so a rapid response on the south wing was necessary. Since the reinforcements sent by the AOK would soon

581 Nesnamov, Vol. III, p. 21
582 Conrad, Vol. V., p. 713
be available, FML Roth therefore returned to his original plan of seeking victory by enveloping the enemy's left (southern) wing. FML Arz was entrusted with the tactical direction of this plan, and given command of 39 Hon ID and of Reymann's Combined Inf Bde.583

Despite the setback at Lapanow, the prospects for the further operations of 4th Army on the evening of 10 December thus had some promise of success. New reserves were deploying for an attack on the southern wing. The intervention of the westernmost column of Boroevic's Army was soon expected in the decisive sector. Thus the continuation of the offensive was ensured.

2. Offensive by the k.u.k. 3rd Army, 6-10 December

a. Orders for the attack

On 5 December the AOK learned during a discussion with GdK Pflanzer-Baltin that three days earlier 3rd Army HQ had issued orders for a retreat to the area northeast of Kaschau. When asked for clarification, GdI Boroevic responded by wire that he had issued the orders in question only as a contingency if absolutely necessary. He intended to immediately advance as soon as the enemy began to withdraw units. Moreover, he had decided to attack Bartfeld on the 7th from the south and west.

The answering message of the AOK on the afternoon of the 5th included a complaint about 3rd Army's planning in the last few days:

"The situation of 4th Army makes it urgently necessary to prevent the Russian 8th Army from intervening toward the west and northwest. To detect any enemy redeployment in front of 3rd Army in the future, energetic contact must be maintained; any attempt to withdraw units must be exploited by an immediate attack. We gladly concur with the deployment of strong forces on the west wing of 3rd Army;

583 In his paper, "The Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow" (p. 69), GO Roth credits Arz as the originator of the idea of attempting a new envelopment from the south, which finally led to victory. This is confirmed in the account by Arz himself (pp. 44 ff.)
this must be accelerated by every method so that the Army can begin active operations as soon as possible."

A few hours later, however, another order from Teschen indicated Conrad's firm desire that 3rd Army should intervene directly in its neighbor's battle. The AOK passed on a pilot's report that a Russian column—consisting of at least a brigade—was marching from Grybow, and that its head reached Neusandez at 1:00 PM. Boroevic was ordered to immediately send the strongest possible force into an attack, with his left wing through Neusandez. The enemy must thereby be prevented from sending further reinforcements thorough this city and the area to its north. Above all, 4 CD should try to operate against the rear of the units moving through Neusandez.

This order was at cross purposes with the intentions of the commander of 3rd Army. Boroevic wanted to use both divisions which had moved through Hethars (38 Hon ID and Kornhaber's) for a flank attack against Bartfeld; after this was accomplished his west wing would move either northeast toward Neusandez or directly north, depending on the situation. Therefore he asked the AOK to decide whether he should follow his original plan (to attack Bartfeld, then Neusandez), or whether he should direct all his efforts toward Neusandez immediately.

This was not an easy decision for the AOK. Although the general situation seemed to call for the earliest possible effort to relieve the Archduke's Army from danger in the area of Neusandez, it was not possible to dismiss GdI Boroevic's considerations out of hand. If the two divisions were sent against Neusandez, their movement wouldn't be effective until the 10th because the enemy could easily block the narrow Poprad valley and force them to detour through Krynica. An attack on Bartfeld, on the other hand, would influence the situation at Neusandez, and could be carried out at an earlier point in time. The AOK wished to leave both options open. They told Boroevic that on the 7th the 4 CD should move against Neusandez (as already described above) and that FML Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID should move through Krynica and Tylicz, then northwest to support 4 CD. 38 Hon ID, commanded at the moment by GM Paul Nagy, would deploy behind Kornhaber at Orlo-Lelucho. The main body of 3rd Army should assemble south of Bartfeld, ready to attack. "Whether the attack [on Bartfeld] should be carried through, or whether the Army's whole left wing should proceed toward Neusandez, can be decided based on the situation on the evening of the 7th."
On 6-7 December the Combined Hon ID detrained and marched from Hethars to the area around Muszyńska village, which had been evacuated by the enemy. 38 Hon ID was considerably delayed on the railroads, so its deployment at Orlo wouldn't take place until the 8th. Thus the Army HQ's plans for the attack on Bartfeld, originally scheduled to begin on the 7th, were considerably upset.

Meanwhile the AOK at Teschen was becoming impatient. The success of the Archduke's battle would be seriously jeopardized if the Russian thrust through Neusandez wasn't stopped as soon as possible. A decisive victory over the much larger enemy armies in the East was necessary to impress the governments in Rome, Bucharest and Sofia, who were currently becoming inclined toward the Entente because of the defeat in Serbia. To prevent further procrastination by 3rd Army HQ on the grounds that 38 Hon ID was delayed, the AOK ordered that the attack on Bartfeld must begin on 8 December.

Boroevic in turn ordered GdI Colerus, the commander of III Corps, to begin a frontal attack on the city between 8:00 and 10:00 AM between the Csergő Mountains and the Tapolv valley; Colerus would lead his own 6 and 28 ID plus IX Corps. Meanwhile the Russians' flank would be enveloped by the advance of the Combined Hon ID through Tylicz and the Tylicz Pass (part of the Division would stay at Krynica as a covering force). Whatever parts of 38 Hon ID became available would also advance from the northwest (from Leluchow to the Bartfeld road). Finally, a detachment of III Corps would move toward the Bartfeld area from west of the Csergő. Likewise, VII Corps would advance at 10:00 AM on both sides of the Tondava valley, with its main strength on the right wing; its objective was Sztropko. 22 LW ID, which at this time was thrust forward in isolation from the rest of the Army, would at first stay in place; later it would participate in the attack of Archduke Joseph's VII Corps.

b. Activity of the Przemysl garrison

Just as the Cracow fortress was actively supporting the operations of 4th Army, the Przemysl fortress - which since 8 November had been enduring its second siege - would assist the offensive by Boroevic's 3rd Army. The garrison consisted of 23 Hon ID, 85 LW Bde, and the 93, 97, 108 and 111 Lst Inf Bdes; the total strength was 68 1/4 battalions, 6 squadrons, 4 mobile batteries, 43 fortress artillery companies, 52 Landsturm artillery detachments and 8 sapper companies. This relatively
large group was already pinning down substantial enemy forces by carrying out numerous offensive operations. The fortress commander soon realized that the Russians were afraid to mount a major attack and didn't threaten to open an effective bombardment; they planned to compel the fortified position to surrender because of hunger.

Soon after the new siege had begun, the garrison undertook several small sorties to disrupt the Russian supply services and to gain information about the besieging army. 15 battalions and 8 batteries attacked toward the north on 14 November in an attempt to delay the march of Dimitriev's Army toward the west as they crossed the San north of Przemysl; however, they found that the Russian columns had already departed. Six days later GdI Kusmanek sent troops toward the southwest and south to learn whether the enemy had already pulled all of his first line divisions away. The sortie revealed that 81 ID was deployed on the southwest front. On 28 November the Russians made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Na Gorach heights to the north of the fortifications, and the area north of Batycz. (These sectors had been occupied by the garrison as an advance position since the beginning of the second siege.) On the other hand, when the defenders attempted on the 30th to drive away the Russians who had dug in near this high ground, they were defeated.

Occasionally a Russian plane would cruise over the fortress and drop some bombs; no substantial damage was done.

Kusmanek reported that local civilians had seen some of the besieging troops leave the lines of encirclement to enter the Carpathians. Therefore on 8 December the 3rd Army HQ sent a radio message to the fortress commander to ask that he make a sortie to tie down the Russians in his area. This would provide substantial support to the offensive which was to begin on that day.

**c. Boroevic's Army begins to attack**

**6-7 December**

The condition of 3rd Army's troops had improved during the rest days through 7 December, and they approached their new task with
a good attitude.\textsuperscript{584} On the Army's eastern wing the majority of Krautwald's Group - 34 and 56 ID\textsuperscript{585} - had already begun their advance on the 6th with a successful surprise attack against the Russians at Laborczber; on the 7th parts of VII Corps also supported the fighting in the Laborcza valley, and the enemy was again pushed back. When most of 38 Hon ID had departed to the other wing, Col. Csermak had stayed behind to hold the positions west of the Uzsok Pass with 7 battalions, 1 squadron and 4 batteries.

On the Russian side, Brussilov decided to respond to Dimitriev's urgent call for help by leaving just XII Corps (one infantry and a cavalry division) opposite Boroevic's Army, and by hastening the march of VIII and XXIV Corps.\textsuperscript{586} Thus there was a race by the two opponents to reach the Neusandez area with strong forces.

8 December

Early on 8 December the bulk of 3rd Army began to advance. On the right wing, Krautwald's main body in the Laborcza valley came up against a Russian position on both sides of Ökröske. Archduke Joseph's and Colerus' groups neared Sztropko and Bartfeld, respectively. On the left wing, the two Honved divisions pivoted against the latter city from the west.

Tension built up at Teschen. The offensive by VIII Russian Corps was threatening to wipe out all the gains achieved to date by 4th Army. Therefore on the evening of the 8th the AOK wired Boroevic that he should do everything possible to support the action of his neighbor on the left. If the envelopment attack on Bartfeld caused the Russians to pull back through Zboro, the Army would immediately launch a powerful pursuit to the north, while sending the strongest possible force "to march as hard as possible to Neusandez." They should seize the city and the

\textsuperscript{584} However, at the start of the offensive GdI Colerus believed that his men were capable of marches of just 15 km per day. The combat strength of his III Corps was still considerably reduced; the LW IR "Graz" # 3, for example, had just 250 riflemen.

\textsuperscript{585} 56 ID had little combat value; it had been scraped together from the remnants of various units, mostly Landsturm. Its components had almost no active officers, and their armament consisted of three different rifle models; they also lacked field kitchens and sufficient telephones.

\textsuperscript{586} Brussilov, pp. 95 and 97
bridges over the Dunajec there "as soon as they can" to finally put a halt to the transfer of men from Brussilov to Dimitriev and to separate the two enemy Armies. After Neusandez was taken, Boroevic would either push on into the rear of VIII Russian Corps or, in case the Archduke's Army was still engaged, intervene on the flank of that battle.

Boroevic ordered the Combined and 38 Hon ID, hitherto advancing on Bartfeld, to change direction toward the northwest against Neusandez. This force of 20 battalions, 7 squadrons and 6 batteries was placed under the command of FML Szurmay, who had just returned to active service. The Army's 11 Lst Terr Bde (5 battalions under GM Nottes) was placed under 4 CD; however, the Bde wasn't able to deploy at Alt Lublau until the 10th. Until this Brigade and Szurmay's Group arrived, GM Berndt's 4 CD would prevent the enemy from advancing any further to the west. The rest of 3rd Army would continue their offensive toward the north.

9 December

meanwhile the Stavka was wavering in its decisions. As long as the two northern Armies of the Southwest Front (4th and 9th) continued to stand on the defensive in their present positions instead of withdrawing to the Pilica, Dimitriev's X and XXI Corps would be unable to intervene in the ever hotter fighting south of the Vistula. Gen. Ivanov now decided to pin down the enemy in southwest Poland with 4th and 9th Army. In an order of 9 December he prescribed the operations of his other three armies, which would carry out an offensive. Above all, Dimitriev would send his entire X Corps south of the Vistula as soon as possible. 8th Army was instructed to push the k.u.k. forces back to the southwest as soon as they emerged from the Carpathians, while the Army's right wing supported the offensive of 3rd Army. To assist Brussilov, 11th Army would draw Pflanzer-Baltin's units toward itself.\(^{587}\) The 11th was also still responsible for the blockade of Przemysl and the security of Lemberg.

The commander of Southwest Front didn't consider his situation to be very rosy. On the 9th he asked the Stavka to either send him two corps or to allow him to shorten his front in the north as far as the sector opposite Czenstochau. The high command

\(^{587}\) Besides overseeing the blockade of Przemysl, since November the 11th Army HQ was also commanding the units at the Uzsok Pass and farther east.
however wouldn't allow any withdrawal, and put Ivanov off by promising reinforcements when they became available at some future date.

The offensive of Boroevic's Army continued on 9 December. Meanwhile the Army received a continuous stream of wires from Teschen and from Wadowice (the HQ of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand), demanding the immediate advance of the west wing on Neusandez.

In the night of 8-9 December the Russians had already pulled back from Bartfeld through Zboro. Therefore FML Szurmay and the two Honved divisions was able to march undisturbed toward the northwest in two columns. Spurred on to hurry by 3rd Army HQ, 38 Hon ID reached Nowa Wies by evening after a short action with enemy cavalry while Kornhaber's Division reached Czynra. However, Szurmay was still 20 km from his objective, Neusandez.

Under Colerus' Group, parts of 10 ID entered Bartfeld early on the 9th after it had been evacuated by the enemy. Fighting with Russian rear guards, the IX Corps advanced up the road toward Zboro; III Corps shifted 22 LW ID toward the east to support the attack of VII Corps on Sztropko. Archduke Joseph's troops took Sztropko in the morning, after which VII Corps was uncertain whether it should push ahead to the north or northeast; 3rd Army HQ finally ordered it to march northeast toward Havaj.

Before Krautwald's main body began its attack on the Russian position at Ökröske, the enemy here also had slipped away under cover of darkness. They took up a new position at Laborczrev. Krautwald's detached column in the Virava valley drove the Russians out of Vilag; farther east, parts of 56 ID took the town of Telepocz and the heights next to Felsöalmad. 8 CD tried to send its attached infantry around the heights at the pass north of Zemplenoroszi, which were occupied by the enemy.

At the same time, however, the Russians at the Uzsok Pass struck against the Army's extreme eastern wing. They enveloped Csermak's Brigade on both flanks and forced it to pull back to the Malomzet railroad station on the night of 8-9 December.

As ordered by Emperor Franz Joseph, on 9 December the Chief of his Military Chancellery, GdI Freiherr von Bolfras, came to Teschen to present a marshal's baton to Commander-in-Chief Archduke Frederick and the newly-created Military Service Cross 1st Class to his Chief of Staff. Although this recognition would have been gratifying to the recipients in another situation, it did nothing to help them through their immediate
concerns. Their minds were distracted by fear that the "hesitant" conduct of Boroevic's Army could ruin the effect of the offensive by 4th Army. GdI Conrad was annoyed when he learned that XXIV Russian Corps was also on its way to reinforce Dimitriev, and told his officers that "3rd Army has now let nearly three corps slip away from its front, and still doesn't move forward as far as is necessary."\(^\text{588}\)

No doubt it was partly the fault of the leadership of 3rd Army that the enemy was thus able to reshuffle their forces. However, the condition of the troops after the fighting retreats through the Carpathians should not be overlooked. Their will to fight was weakened by the loss of Bartfeld on 1 December, the wretched condition of IX Corps, and a general war-weariness that emerged at this time as a result of the surprisingly long duration of a campaign which everyone had believed would soon be decided. The general officers had wanted to disengage the Army from the enemy to help the troops regain their fighting capacity during a rest period. The disadvantage was that the Russians had thus received a grace period of one week in which they could take measures to improve their grim situation in west Galicia without interference from Boroevic.

Moreover, it is now clear that the AOK's own decision to let the attack on Bartfeld take place before the advance to Neusandez was mistaken. It delayed Szurmay's appearance in front of Neusandez by at least a day. The length of the marches by 3rd Army on 8 and 9 December didn't come up to the eager expectations of the high command; the next few days would prove that the troops were capable of greater exertions. Moreover, if further troops were shifted to the west wing this would weaken the position on the east; the effort to ensure adequate security for the right flank limited the effort to gain ground toward the north. From all sectors there were reports that 8th Russian Army was in retreat, leaving rear guards behind.

Based on these factors, the high command issued orders on the afternoon of the 9th that were remarkably critical and demanded a ruthless advance. "Considering the seriousness of the situation, 3rd Army HQ must counteract any weakening of the offensive spirit by all available means. The AOK strongly objects to the course taken thus far. Negligence and passivity has given the enemy full freedom of operations, even though the AOK has advised since 5 December that Russian units have been marching away from the area."

\(^{588}\) Conrad, Vol. V, pp. 707 and 714
GdI Boroevic passed this criticism on to his own subordinates, and promised to make good the previous deficiencies in the next few days. In his new orders he even surpassed the instructions of the AOK for the ongoing offensive. Strong forces would move northwest to directly support 4th Army. 6 ID would follow 38 Hon ID from Bartfeld through the Tylicz Pass and Nowa Wies, then turn aside toward Grybow. IX Corps would push ahead toward Ropa and Gorlice without pausing. To protect these units as they shifted to the left, the main body of III Corps (22 LW ID and 28 ID) was ordered to thrust through Krempna as far as possible toward Zmigrod; VII Corps would advance through the Dukla Pass to the Tylawa-Jaliska area; FML Krautwald would continue the attack on Mezőlaborcz and the Beskid Pass while standing guard in the direction of Cisna and the pass north of Zemplenoroszi. Finally, Col. Csermak would hold his ground west of the Uzsok Pass.

10 December

On the 10th, Szurmay's 38 Hon ID - just 8 battalions and 5 1/2 batteries strong - advanced along the road to Neusandez. East of Nawojowa they came across an entrenched and obviously reinforced Russian force (3 Rifle Bde with parts of 10 CD and 13 ID); they couldn't break the enemy resistance by a frontal assault. The neighbors of the 38th were unable to help out; the Combined Hon ID on the right was marching through Polany in a sector where there were no roads, and 6 ID in the rear - coming up from Bartfeld in a forced march - had just reached Mochanaczka.

At this point the situation of 4th Army at Limanowa had reached the crisis described above; therefore further wires were sent from Wadowice to Kaschau urging that Szurmay should thrust through Neusandez to Kanina. In the afternoon the AOK also demanded that 3rd Army immediately advance past the line Grybow-Gorlice-Zmigrod-Dukla; this would allay any danger to Szurmay's isolated group and prevent enemy forces from using the route through Krosno and Jalso to reach the battlefield of the Archduke's Army.

On the 10th the Russians did nothing to prevent the advance of IX Corps to Gladyszow and Uscie Ruskie. III Corps fought successfully against enemy rear guards, but then came to a standstill in front of a strong position at Ozenna. Under VII Corps, 17 ID advanced briskly to the Ladomerméző area, brushing aside resistance from Russian detachments in several positions;
20 Hon ID, however, allowed itself to be halted more than was necessary. Krautwald's main body gained ground in the Laborcza valley, but the advance of his right wing had stalled.

Following the request of 3rd Army HQ, on 9 December the Przemyśl fortress had begun a sortie with 19 3/4 battalions, 2 squadrons and 15 batteries; after driving back the Russian covering troops they almost reached the main position of the besieging force. However, there was no prospect of gaining any further success, so on 10 December the units pulled back to their own fortifications.  

3. Activities of Pflanzer-Baltin's Group, 4-12 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 27 and sketch 56)

Meanwhile there was continuous fighting in the forest Carpathians by Pflanzer-Baltin's small Armeegruppe over a vast front. Some of these operations were interrelated with those of the main body of the k.u.k. forces.

As of 4 December, the Group's east wing was still north of the Carpathian crest, but its commander was now sure that his 40,000 second line riflemen would not be able to hold this glacis in front of the mountain wall for much longer against increasing pressure from the 70,000 men of the Russian Dniester Group. Moreover, since 2 December he had been aware that his neighbor Boroevic was contemplating a retreat to the area northeast of Kaschau. Once the Russians broke through the Uzsok Pass, Pflanzer's position in the Carpathians would lose its anchor on the left. For the energetic commander of the Group, this was reason enough to assist the offensive operation of 3rd Army – directly by sending Guilleaume's Detachment toward the Pass, and indirectly by having FML Hofmann launch a diversionary attack toward the northwest. The 38 Hon ID, however, was unable to drive back the defenders of the position in front of Uzsok Pass, and on 5 December the majority of this Division began to transfer to the left wing of 3rd Army. The troops who stayed on both sides of the Ung Valley under Col. Csermak had to stay strictly on the defensive.

Nonetheless, GdK Pflanzer-Baltin was still hesitant to abandon

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589 The activity of the fortress is described by k.u. Major a.D. Dr. Stuckheil in "Die zweite Einschliessung der Festung Przemysl", (special edition of the "Militärwissenschaftlichen und technischen Mitteilungen", Vienna 1926)
further parts of the Bukovina and south Galicia. At the very least, he wanted to drive away the Russians who were besetting his units. While Col. Fischer held his positions on the extreme right wing, on 6 December parts of 54 ID and of Durski's Polish Legion moved ahead to the town of Uscie Putilla, which meanwhile had been evacuated by the Russians. 52 ID attempted a surprise attack against Delatyn, which failed; Lt Col. Haller's Poles made a feint in the direction of Pasieczna.

On the same day, however, the Russians advanced from Toronya against Col. Burggasser's 12 Lst Terr Bde and pushed it back to Ökörmező. This seemed to be a serious threat to Hofmann's right flank, and to the rail line through Huszt, which was absolutely essential for bringing up supplies. Pflanzer-Baltin could no longer hesitate. To restore the situation at Ökörmező, he ordered his east wing (54 and 52 ID) back toward the mountain crest. This would shorten the line, and enable FML Durski's Polish group - which had just struck a blow against the Russians at Krzyworownia - to leave the front; they would move by rail to the Huszt area and reinforce Col Burggasser, along with a Landsturm Hussar Regiment.

As these orders were carried out, the following was the situation on the Group's east wing as of the 8th:
. Col. Fischer was deployed between Hadikfalva and Straza;
. 54 ID (FML Schultheisz) was in the mountains north of Seletin and on the commanding Kopilas, opposite the enemy group at Uscie Putilla;
. 52 ID (FML Schreitter) was on the Jablonica (Tartar) Pass; and
. Haller's Poles were at Rafailowa.

On the west wing, Col Burggasser's 2000 riflemen were able to hold their position north of Ökörmező, because the Russians had diverted some of their force against Hofmann. However, the situation of Hofmann's group was worsening because Col Csermak was being driven back in the Ung valley (as noted in the previous section).

Pflanzer-Baltin asked the AOK to have 3rd Army reinforce Csermak or at least return 56 ID to this sector from Krautwald's group. This was in vain, since 3rd Army had been assigned other priorities.

On 12 December Col. Csermak was placed under Pflanzer-Baltin's command. He fell back under continuing Russian pressure through Fenyvesvölgy; finally reinforced by several Landsturm battalions and mountain artillery, he fought with varying fortune. Csermak's neighbor on the right, FML Hofmann, wished to refresh
the fighting capacity of his troops, who had been in continuous action since the start of October; therefore on the 10th he began to gradually pull his main body back to Szt. Miklos, while leaving behind some mixed detachments to confront the enemy. This operation proceeded smoothly, because Durski after arriving in Ökörmező was able to win some breathing room for Hofmann's hard-pressed detachments by launching a relief attack. Farther east the other Polish group, under Haller, staved off repeated Russian attacks at Rafailowa.
4. The decision, 11-13 December

(see volume 1 leaflet 27)

11 December – 4th Army

After the crisis of 10 December, FML Roth's Group of 4th Army consisted of nine infantry and three cavalry divisions – 3, 8, 13, 15, 30 ID, 39 Hon ID (with Reymann's Combined Inf Bde attached), 45 LW ID, 47 German Reserve ID, and half of 11 ID, plus 6, 10 and 11 CD. Around this time the Aus-Hung. infantry divisions had between 2000 and 3000 riflemen; on 11 December the 3 ID, however, had just 900. Because of these extraordinarily reduced strengths, the fighting power of the Group of course was nowhere near as great as the large number of its units would indicate. Nonetheless, it was proving impossible for the small staff of XIV Corps HQ, which was leading the Group, to control the numerous rear echelons and supply trains and to handle all the personnel and financial affairs. Therefore the Army HQ decided to alter the grouping of its units. Beginning at 6:00 AM on 11 December the following order of battle was in effect:

- FML Roth commanded
  - FML Arz' Group – Which in turn had two sub-groups
    - FML Hadfy – 39 Hon ID, 11 Hon CD, 10 CD
    - FML Smekal – 6 CD; 45 and 13 LW ID; Reymann's Combined Inf Bde
  - 47 German Res ID
- FML Ljubicic commanded half of 11 ID and all of 30, 8, 3 and 15 ID
- GdI Kritek commanded half of 11 ID, all of 19 ID, half of 41 Hon ID, and Col. Brauner's Group (over 1 and 35 Lst Inf Bdes)

The VIII Russian Corps hadn't fulfilled its assigned task for the 10th, the capture of the Rzegocina-Limanowa Road; it tried its luck once more under cover of darkness during the night of 10-11 December. Several assaults were launched on both sides of the Lososina and toward Limanowa, but they were shattered by the unwavering defenders. Especially distinguished were the dismounted cavalry, who threw themselves against Russian

590 In the narrative of Conrad (Vol. V, pp. 726 ff.) he refers several times to Arz' Group as being directly responsible to Army HQ alongside another group led by FML Roth. This error apparently was due to Conrad's desire in the interest of simplicity to avoid differentiating between "groups, sub-groups, and sub-sectors."
bayonets with extraordinary elan and in hand-to-hand combat drove away the troops who had entered the Austrian trenches. The action continued into the daylight hours, and throughout the 11th. VIII Russian Corps launched powerful thrusts but gained nothing except a few pieces of ground on both sides of Limanowa.

Parts of 39 Hon ID which were supposed to join the attack on the enemy south wing had to be thrown into the fighting next to Limanowa to hold the line. However, the Division's 77 Hon Inf Bde was able to swing far to the south; its attack took the enemy by surprise and by dusk the Brigade had made its way to a position directly next to and behind the enemy's southern wing by the Golcow Heights.

The Russians made no further attacks against FZM Ljubicic. The Feldzeugmeister's Group pushed ahead once again to the Stradomka without meeting any resistance worthy of note.

On the Army's northern wing, Kritek was attacked by the Russians at daybreak on the 11th. Although the assault involved substantial forces, it broke down completely with heavy losses due to our artillery fire. The same fate befell an attack directed against Roth's Group in the afternoon.

Col. Weisz' Detachment from 4 CD, reinforced by a bicycle battalion and by parts of the Polish Legion, drove back a Cossack regiment in the Dunajec valley. Then they prepared to support the attack of Berndt and Szurmay on the next day (the 12th).

11 December - western sector of 3rd Army

Now the weight of 3rd Army's advance began to affect the situation. Part of GdI Boroevic's orders for the 11th stated: "The advance of our Army is proceeding into the enemy's rear and against his lines of communication; therefore we anticipate they will soon retreat. This favorable situation should be made clear to every man, because the result of the battle and perhaps of the entire campaign depends on the soldiers of 3rd Army."

Boroevic planned to concentrate at least five divisions in the Tuchow area by the 13th. This group would fall on the flank of the enemy as they retreated. Meanwhile, however, the Russians

591 The position south of Limanowa was lost by some worn-out Landsturm detachments, but recovered by the foot detachment of HR # 9 in a ferocious action. The Regiment's commander, Col. Othmar Murh, met a hero's death at the front of his troops.
at Nawojowa and Altsandez had been stoutly resisting the thrust by the west wing of 3rd Army toward Neusandez, so that neither 38 Hon ID nor 4 CD could break through. The Combined Hon ID of FML Szurmay's Group still hadn't entered the fighting, and 11 Lst Terr Bde wasn't in place to help GM Berndt.

Therefore for 11 December FML Szurmay ordered Kornhaber's Combined Hon ID to launch a flank attack through Kamionka Wk. to support the frontal attack by 38 Hon ID. Before daybreak, however, the AOK intervened in the operation and ordered 3rd Army HQ to send 6 ID not toward Grybow, but rather to support Szurmay directly so that Neusandez could be taken as soon as possible. Therefore the division from the Alps hastened in several separate columns along the road through Nowa Wies toward the battlefield of the Honveds. Since FML Szurmay expected Kornhaber's attack from the north to open on time, he diverted the first five battalions of 6 ID to the left of the road, and onto the Ostra Heights; he intended them to launch a second flanking attack against the Russians from the south.

An unforeseen development intervened. On the day before, enemy detachments had already appeared at Florynka on the flank of Kornhaber's Division; his advance guard had to turn aside to parry this threat. Szurmay intended to leave only the smallest possible force in this sector, while sending the main body as ordered to intervene in 38 Hon ID's fighting. However, this proved to be impossible. As the Combined Hon ID toiled ahead on the 11th along the road through the snow-covered hills and forests, it was struck in the flank by a powerful Russian attack; even the parts of the Division that had already advanced as ordered toward Kamionka Wk. had to come back to join the defensive fighting at Florynka.

It was soon determined that parts of the Russian 48 ID, from XXIV Corps, had delivered this attack and ruined Szurmay's plans. 38 Hon ID, left on its own, couldn't gain any ground toward Nawojowa. The parts of 6 ID that had been diverted onto the Ostra Heights found it so difficult to climb to the summit of the hill that they didn't arrive there until darkness fell. The rest of the 6 ID, exhausted by the quick march, was forced to take a long rest on the road. Thus vanished the hope of taking the city of Neusandez on the 11th, even though its houses were already visible to the k.u.k. troops from a distance.

The AOK, which didn't know all the extenuating circumstances behind the conduct of operations in Szurmay's Group, was extremely dissatisfied. In the night of 11-12 December, they
called a staff officer of 3rd Army HQ to the phone and told him bluntly that Szurmay should once again be prodded to advance more quickly. Detailed orders would follow shortly.

The impatience of the high command regarding the activity of Szurmay's Group stemmed from their concern that the victory in Galicia could still be spoiled at the eleventh hour. Success on the Russian front was becoming all the more necessary because of reports from Serbia that the 5th and 6th Armies in the Balkans were in full retreat to the Sava River.

Meanwhile the IX Corps had advanced fighting almost to the Gorlice-Ropa Road. This lightened the pressure on 4th Army because it halted the march of XXIV Russian Corps toward the west. The Russians instead had to deploy to guard their southern flank against the Bohemian Corps. Within 3rd Army, the outcome of the actions by Kralicek and Kornhaber would determine whether the k.u.k. VII Corps marched to the north or to the northwest.

For the 12th, GdI Boroevic ordered Berndt and Szurmay to continue the attack on Alt- and Neusandez, while Kralicek and Kornhaber kept the enemy forces in front of them from moving to the west or north. Because the Army commander didn't believe that these units would be sufficient to deal decisively with XXIV Russian Corps, he instructed the k.u.k. III Corps to fall upon the flank and rear of the Russian Corps by moving through Biecz. Boroevic also hoped to disrupt the numerous supply trains of the enemy between Biecz and Jaslo.

11-12 December - eastern sector of 3rd Army

While the western wing of 3rd Army was thus engaged in winning the battle by Limanowa, the other columns of the Army were continuing to advance.

592 The AOK objected primarily against the diversion of the troops of 6 ID through the Ostra Heights; they were less concerned about the diversion of Kornhaber, which was certainly necessary because of Russian activity. At the time there was also a difference of opinion between Group commander FML Szurmay and GM Stöhr, the commander of the detachment of 6 ID on the Ostra, as to the necessity of sending troops in this direction. (Based on letters from GdI and Honved Minister a.D. Baron Szurmay to the Military Archive on 30 December 1928, and from FML von Stöhr on 15 January 1929.)
III Corps had been ordered to move through Zmigrod to Jaslo; on the 11th it came up against a strong Russian rear guard position at Krempna. 28 ID, in the van, began to attack up the snow-covered slopes on the 12th, but during the course of the day gained very little ground. Cavalry detachments were sent to raid the Russian supply columns massed around Jaslo, but were unable to break through.

VII Corps was ordered to advance through the town of Dukla toward Krosno. On the 11th, its 17 ID took the Dukla Pass, but soon thereafter came up against a new enemy position at Barwinek and had to halt for the time being. 20 Hon ID, lagging somewhat behind, came up to join 17 ID at this point. Farther east the 5 Hon CD drove a weak Russian force back at Laborczfö and pursued it to Czeremcha. Following their usual procedure during a retreat, the Russians pulled back from Barwinek under cover of darkness. However, when VII Corps renewed its advance on the morning of the 12th it was still hampered because a bridge had been destroyed at Tylawa; during the day the Corps only reached a position south of Dukla town.

In the afternoon of the 11th, FML Krautwald took Mezőlaborcz and followed the enemy toward Vidrany and Palota; 1 CD of his Group raced ahead and reached the snow-covered Beskid Pass by the time total darkness fell. On the next day the Cavalry Division resumed its pursuit, drove away enemy detachments in the Oslawica valley, and reached Kulaszne. 34 ID, coming up behind the horsemen, reached Radoszyce. Part of this Division was diverted toward Wola Milowa; they enabled 56 ID to also climb the mountain crest and advance to the neighborhood of that town. 8 CD reached the northern outlet of the Zemplen Pass.

At the Uzsok Pass, the Russians were content with the success they had gained on the 9th. Col. Csermak fended off some weak attacks against his southern wing; on the 12th the enemy again began to feel their way toward his positions, but were once more driven off. On the same day, at the suggestion of 3rd Army HQ Csermak's Group was reassigned to GdK Pflanzer-Baltin's command because its nearest neighboring units and its supply lines were in the latter's zone of operations.

12 December - clinching the victory

By now the Russian units fighting west of Dunajec were in a very dangerous situation. After the momentary success of their counterattack on the 10th, which perhaps was just undertaken to give them some breathing room before the inevitable retreat,
they found that the Aus-Hung. front had again become so solid that all further offensive thrusts were shattered. The breakthrough against VIII Russian Corps, the envelopment which was developing by the hour against the desperately fighting defenders of Neusandez, and the new threat to the lines of communication toward the east by Boroevic's Army were forcing the commander of the Southwest Front to stop hesitating and to make a decision. Yet the Russian leaders were still withdrawing their hard-pressed left wing toward the north only in slow stages, and masked by the usual security measures – increased artillery activity and occasional counterattacks. During the night of 11-12 December and all through the 12th the parts of VIII Corps south of the Lososina valley fell back to a temporary position running from Rajbrot east to the bend in the Dunajec north of Witowice; they held this line during the 13th. To ensure the safety of his main communication line (Brzesko-Tarnow-Debica) Ivanov ordered the preparation of a defensive front toward the south. Therefore the main body of VIII Corps moved back to Zakliczyn, XXIV Corps – along with 4 Rifle Bde and two Cossack Divisions – to the line Ciezkowice-Biecz and XII Corps to the area Zmigrod-Dukla-Rymanow-Bukowko.

4th Army HQ now recognized that the arrival of substantial Russian reinforcements south and southwest of Bochnia meant that a continuation of the attack in the original direction, toward Wisnicz, would probably not succeed and only cause unnecessary casualties. With the concurrence of the AOK, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand therefore decided to have the center of his Army stay in place and allow the enemy to wear themselves out by attacking. Only Roth's right wing would continue the flank attack south of Limanowa. The Archduke wanted to send all of XVIII Corps, which the AOK had pulled from the front of 1st Army and placed under his command, to the right wing. However, the rail line to Tymbark was inadequate to transport this Corps. To avoid losing time, only 86 LW Bde was therefore sent in this direction; the rest of XVIII Corps went through Cracow to Wieliczka for the time being.

The west wing of 3rd Army advanced victoriously on the 12th.

4 CD took Altsandez, and Col. Weisz' Detachment advanced into the Dunajec valley. In front of Szurmay's Group the enemy finally evacuated Neusandez. In the morning FML Kornhaber had already driven the Russians at Florynka back to Grybow. IX Corps was also successful against the withdrawing XXIV Russian Corps. Its 10 ID had to fight hard to take Gorlice; after the town was secure it turned toward Biecz, where it encountered
furious defensive fire. 26 LW ID took Ropa and sent a
detachment into the Biala valley as far as Stroze railroad
station; the main body reached the rail line running from Stroze
to Biecz.

The Russians west of the Dunajec fell back further due to
pressure from Arz' Group (39 Hon ID and parts of the former
Group Herberstein). Arz originally was heading toward
Neusandez. However, 4th Army HQ had correctly deduced that the
enemy was pulling back toward the north; therefore they ordered
FML Roth to intercept VIII Russian Corps. Roth meanwhile had
diverted most of Arz' Group north toward Jakobkowice on his own
initiative. The concentric advance from the south and west led
to some confused mixing of units. This factor plus the
exhaustion of the troops, most of whom had been engaged in
almost continuous heavy fighting since November, slowed the pace
of the pursuit. By evening the 39 Hon ID reached the area
northwest of Neusandez; a detachment of this Division and the
first elements of Szurmay's force had already entered the city
in the afternoon. Thus the fronts of 4th and 3rd Armies were
linked firmly together.

The south wing of Smekal's Group (parts of 45 LW ID, Reymann's
Combined ID, 6 CD and 11 Hon CD) followed the Russians along the
heights south of the Lososina valley. 10 CD and parts of 11 Hon
CD left the fighting and moved to the area southwest of Dobra
for rehabilitation; their artillery, however, remained in
action.

In case the enemy initiated a general retreat, the other parts
of 4th Army would pursue them toward the northeast, initially to
the line Zakliczyn-Brzekso-Bogucice-Chobot. 47 Res ID of Roth's
Group would thrust through Lipnica to Zakliczyn and cut off the
line of retreat of the enemy units west of the Dunajec.

Significance of the victory

Thus the capture of Neusandez and the retreat of VIII Russian
Corps on 12 December was the decisive moment in the eight days
of heavy fighting west of the Dunajec, now won by the k.u.k.
Armies.

Among the commanders, history will no doubt single out FML Roth
as the most important for his leadership of the outflanking
group. For his achievements he was enrolled in the Maria
Theresa Military Order, and added to his name the predicate
"von Limanova-Lapanow." His subordinate FML Arz later received
the Commander's Cross of the Maria Theresia Order for several accomplishments, among which the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow occupied an important place.

The wide-reaching significance of the Aus-Hung. success in this action was recognized by General Ruzsky, who then commanded the Russian Northwest Front. He told a North American war reporter: "The Battle of Limanowa was a strategic masterpiece, brilliantly conceived and carried out with virtuosity. It compelled us to give up our operation against Cracow and set back our efforts to cross the Carpathians. This Battle was the first decisive setback which the Grand Duke's Armies suffered in Galicia. Until this point, the situation of the Austrians in the Carpathians was poor. We in Russia believed it was possible to totally destroy the Aus-Hung. Army. Thus the outcome of the Battle was all the more shocking. The keen Austrian attack totally surprised us and was directed at the most dangerous point of the entire front."593

**C. Retrospective: Damming the Russian Flood**

The Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, which raged at the beginning of December between the Lososina and the Raba, expanded in a few days to encompass the entire area between Cracow and the mountains on the upper San. The fighting continued unbroken through Christmas week and into the first days of the new year. However, its high point was reached at the moment when the troops of Generals Arz and Szurmay at Limanowa and Neusandez made their decisive thrust against the inner wings of Dimitriev's and Brussilov's Armies. Since this day coincided precisely with the end of the Battle of Lowicz (6-12 December), won by the German eastern armies west of Warsaw, we may say that this eventful week marked the end of the second phase of the war with Russia, which had begun in mid-September.

The first offensive in western Poland

At the conferences at Neusandez on 18 September, GdI Conrad had proposed that the German units which weren't needed in East Prussia should deploy at Cracow in close proximity to the Aus-Hung. Armies; this was contrary to Hindenburg's desire to concentrate his 9th Army farther north at Kreuzburg. Conrad felt that close cooperation was necessary because of the reduced

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593 Interview of General Ruzsky with Withney of the "Canadian Democrat" in 1915; quoted in Roth, "Die Schlacht bei Limanowa-Lapanow", p. 82
strength of his own Armies, but also to ensure that the future activities of the allies would be directed to a common purpose. This had been sadly lacking in the first phase of the war.

At the inter-allied meetings it was hoped that by resuming the offensive they could pin down the Russian units west of the San and north of the Vistula and defeat them in detail. This didn't happen because the enemy, over-cautious and methodical, fell back in good time.\textsuperscript{594} Meanwhile the Russian high command was finding it difficult to force their self-willed subordinates Ruzsky and Ivanov to act together in pursuit of a common objective. The Russians decided to make their main effort in the lands west of the Vistula because they offered more room for maneuver than the smaller area of west Galicia; moreover they had no desire to push forward over the difficult terrain of the Carpathians, although small detachments were already deep in the mountains by mid-September. The final decision to form a "great steamroller" directed at Germany from Warsaw and the central Vistula wasn't taken until the end of September, when it was clear that the Germans had concentrated north of Cracow.

This enormous redeployment of the enemy forces was at first only gradually discovered by the allies. Finally, however, they were able to follow the Russians' movement with a certainty almost unique in history, thanks to the ease with which they intercepted and deciphered their opponents' radio messages.

Because the situation was still unclear at the outset of the allied advance, 9th German Army had to storm ahead in great haste toward the stretch of the Vistula north of the mouth of the San. However, neither the Germans nor the northern group of the k.u.k. 1st Army were able to pin down substantial Russian forces on the wrong side of the river line. Meanwhile reports of the movement of large enemy groups east of the Vistula and the danger of counterattacks from Ivangoord and Warsaw made it inadvisable to try to cross the river.

The Russians in Galicia were equally quick to fold their tents west of Przemysl and pull back behind the lower San and to the Chyrow area. Since by this point the regrouping of the Russian Armies had become clear, it was necessary for the allies to reverse the roles of their two wings. The German 9th Army, which hitherto had been attacking, would go over to the

\textsuperscript{594} Translator's Note - It is obviously unfair to criticize the Russians' actions as "over" cautious when in fact they nullified the effect of the Allied offensive.
defensive; the Aus-Hung. armies in Galicia were entrusted with the responsibility of carrying on the offensive. As in August, the k.u.k. AOK intended to make its main effort toward Lublin while guarding against a counterthrust from the east.

The October fighting in Galicia and west Poland

The offensive in central Galicia soon stalled on the bloody battlefield stretching from Turka through Chyrow to the eastern part of the Przemyśl fortifications. This was due mainly to the congestion of the attacking forces. It was undoubtedly unfortunate that the 2nd Army on the southern wing was deployed too close to the main body (in similar fashion to Hindenburg's initial deployment just north of Cracow). Thus Böhme-Ermolli was unable to make a real envelopment attack out of the Carpathians; when the enemy failed to withdraw as expected, he was drawn into a frontal attack in the narrow stretch of level ground at Chyrow. The later attempts to create new groups to outflank the enemy at Turka and farther east were always parried by the Russians. Even these thrusts by small forces caused Brusilov great apprehension, as he later stated in his memoirs. How much greater would the effect have been if the bulk of 2nd Army had advanced in this sector!

Meanwhile the danger along the Vistula increased from hour to hour. Initially the enemy units at Ivangorod could be confined within the vicinity of the fortress; however, a large and menacing force was building up behind the walls of Warsaw. Even before the Aus-Hung. offensive in central Galicia was in full swing, Hindenburg had already abandoned his hopes of capturing the Polish capital by a surprise attack, and thus preventing the enemy offensive at the last minute. Now the German eastern army was holding thin lines south and west of the Warsaw fortifications, while the enemy assembled an enormous force around the city.

The operations of 9th German Army didn't meet with Conrad's approval. He wasn't happy about their impetuous advance to the Vistula followed by their redeployment in front of Warsaw. Some high-ranking German officers had similar thoughts, in opposition to those of Col. Hoffmann, who at that time was Ludendorff's principal assistant. Per GLt Freytag-Loringhoven, "On 30 October Colonel von Sauberzweig arrived in Neusandez. He was very depressed about the unfortunate course of the operations...The Colonel noted...correctly that if 9th Army

595 Brusilov, pp. 82 ff.
hadn't advanced so hastily to the Vistula it wouldn't have become so widely scattered along the river. Although it is true that the Aus-Hung. 1st Army failed, we had left them on their own. I could only concur with Sauberzweig."

Unfortunately Conrad's memoirs don't clearly state what he would have done differently to solve the problem of guarding the flank against Warsaw. Some hints allow us to conjecture that Conrad would have preferred to concentrate large forces west of Ivangorod, and then launch a powerful counterattack on the enemy as they advanced out of Warsaw. Although such a plan offered some possibility of success, the allied flank would have been in danger of encirclement from the west; then they might have been driven from their lines of communication. The result could have been an even more serious setback than what actually happened at Ivangorod at the end of October. Another possible solution would have been to initially deploy 9th Army farther to the north, around Thorn and Gnesen. From this point they could have advanced on Warsaw without dividing their forces. However, the difference in strength between the allies and the Russians was such that no alteration in strategy could have led to a decisive victory.

This observation brings us to the central question that would dominate planning at the highest level: would the Germans make their main effort in the West or in the East? Conrad and Hindenburg argued emphatically for the latter course. The German official history, after studying the situation in the West in great detail, came down unequivocally on the side of the Eastern commanders. The further course of the campaign in west Poland and Galicia undoubtedly proves the contention that a timely transfer of substantial reinforcements from France would have led to a considerably more decisive victory than was possible with the all-too scanty forces actually employed.

Fighting the Russian steamroller

597 Hindenburg, pp. 110 and 112
Translator's Note - This issue has remained a bone of contention ever since, and in the nature of things will never be resolved. At this time the most recent study of the question appears in Holger Herwig's "The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918" (London, 1997); it is a major theme of the entire first half of the book.
The great concept of keeping the Russian steamroller away from Silesia and Posen by thrusting into its flank from Thorn was no doubt a product of the command of the German eastern armies. For Conrad this meant he would have to give up the ground he had recently won, and this of course was not easy. Indeed, at this point he still hadn't given up all hope for the offensive of his southern wing. When it became clear, however, that the front near the Vistula could no longer be maintained the Aus-Hung. Chief of Staff didn't hesitate for a second to draw the necessary conclusions. As usual, he took the entire situation into account. His allies suggested that he hold a line from Przemyśl to Cracow facing north; meanwhile they would leave the way toward Silesia seemingly wide open to the Russians to draw them deeper into a trap. Conrad objected to both ideas for the same reasons he had objected to separate Austrian and German operations in September (as explained above). He was determined to pull back the bulk of his own Armies toward the west on both sides of the Vistula. He didn't want to lose contact with the German eastern armies for a day and therefore directed 2nd Army to move to the area north of Czenstochau, even though this greatly weakened the front in the Carpathians. Böhm-Ermolli's two corps appeared at the right moment on the south wing of the German 9th Army (now commanded by Mackensen). They protected Mackensen's right flank, drew substantial Russian forces against themselves, and guarded Prussian Silesia. During the days while Böhm-Ermolli's first trains were rolling toward Silesia, Falkenhayn wrote, "The Aus-Hung. Army has suffered heavy losses. Nevertheless their high command is doing everything possible to conduct operations as a true ally. They have moved three armies north of the Vistula and left only weak forces in Galicia. This is practically self-sacrifice..."

In the second half of November the 4th and 1st Armies north of Cracow performed the same functions as 2nd Army north of Czenstochau - they pinned down enemy forces. Despite the dedication of individual soldiers, it was impossible to achieve more with badly-reduced divisions and artillery that lacked ammunition. Captured Russian officers testified that the regiments from the Alpine lands in XIV Corps fought with a willingness to face death that was even greater than that of the Japanese. However, the forces north of the Vistula weren't

strong enough to throw back the enemy before their flank was menaced by Russians advancing into west Galicia, south of the river. Now these same divisions which were trying to catch their breath along the Szreniawa — reduced in size from 15,000 combatants to just 2000 or 3000 — had to hurry to the aid of their comrades south of Cracow. They were joined by a German reserve division and by the Honveds on the left wing of the k.u.k. 3rd Army. The result was the Battle of Limanowa–Lapanow.

According to the available sources, the Russian forces (not counting XXIV Corps) consisted of 11 to 13 infantry and 4 cavalry and Cossack divisions. Assuming that these units were at about half of their authorized strength, and not considering any replacements that may have arrived during the battle, this meant the Russians had about 110,000 to 120,000 combat troops. The 4th and 3rd Aus-Hung. Armies committed 13 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions (counting independent brigades as half-divisions). These totalled 90,000 combatants, of whom 10,000 (the left wing of 3rd Army) didn't appear on the battlefield in full force until 12 December. Thus the ratio of strength was 11:7 or 12:7 in favor of the Russians. Unfortunately there is insufficient data to provide comparable information about casualties.

On a tactical level, the battle was extraordinarily lively. It was a mobile action, a kind of fighting which would soon become very rare. The armies were alternately on the attack or on the defensive, and outflanking the enemy or being outflanked. The kaleidoscopic changes forced leaders at all levels to make new decisions daily and hourly. Flexibility, adaptability and strong nerves were all necessary. There were many moments in which the bloody game seemed lost. Finally, however, the strong will of the Aus-Hung. troops and their commanders was triumphant. The enemy evacuated the battlefield.

According to Danilov's works, it appears that at the Siedlec conference of 29 November — even before the actions of the first week of December — it had already been decided that the Russians south of the Vistula would have to retreat. However, this in no way detracts from the importance of the Battle of Limanowa–Lapanow. At this time, as always until April 1915, Ivanov opposed the Stavka and believed that the priority of the Russian armies should not be the capture of East Prussia or a major action against the Germans, but rather the overthrow of the Aus-Hung. armed forces. It is quite likely that if Ivanov had continued to make progress in west Galicia he would have finally won the Stavka over to his way of thinking. The Front
commanders had been able to overcome the opposition of their own high command before and would do so again throughout the war.

However, the defeat southeast of Cracow meant that Ivanov's goal of defeating Austria-Hungary would take place only in the distant future, if at all. Much more blood would be shed in the forests of the Carpathians before the Grand Duke-Generalissimo once again made this sector a priority. Thus Conrad could claim with right that at Limanowa-Lapanow he had rammed a sword in the earth which "saved the homeland from a Russian invasion." The wall which barred the Russian masses from the west, and which was established in the Battles of Lodz-Lowicz and Limanowa-Lapanow, was never breached during the war. The sounds of battle now began to fill the Carpathians, and would do so for the second half of December and thereafter. In the next few months the mountains would be the main theater of the great contest between the Tsarist Empire and the Danube Monarchy.

VII. Appendix - Chronology of 1914 Campaigns

The following abbreviations refer to the principal fronts:
. B = Balkans
. R-GF = Russia, German front
. R-AF = Russia, Austrian front
. W = West front

. July 25 to Aug 12 - Deployment of the Balkan units [B] by 5th and 6th Armies, part of 2nd Army

. Aug 4-16 - Capture of Liege [W]
. Aug 6-23 - Deployment of the Austrian northern armies [R-AF]: 1st, 3rd & 4th Armies and Armeegruppe Kövess
. Aug 9-10 - 1st Battle of Mülhausen [W] by 7th Army
. Aug 12-15 - 5th Army crosses the Drina [B]
. Aug 14-17 - Offensive against Montenegro [B] by 6th Army
. Aug 16-19 - Battle on the Jadad and actions at Sabac [B] by 5th Army and parts of 2nd Army
. Aug 16 - Sinking of the "Zenta" [Naval]
. Aug 18 to Sept 8 - 2nd Army moves from south Hungary to Galicia [B to R-AF]
. Aug 18 to Sept 2 - 6th Army drives the enemy from Herzegovina [B]
. Aug 18-19 - Battle of the Gette [W] by 1st Army
. Aug 19-20 - Battle of Gawaiten-Gumbinnen [R-GF] by 8th Army
. Aug 19 - II Battle of Mülhausen [W] by 7th Army
. Aug 20-24 - 5th Army retreats from Serbia [B]

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Aug 21-24 - Actions at Sabac [B] by parts of 2nd and 5th Armies
Aug 22-23 - Battle of Neufchateau [W] by 4th Army
Aug 22-27 - Battle of Longwy-Longuyon [W] by 5th Army
Aug 22 to Sept 14 - Battle of Nancy-Epinal [W] by 6th and 7th Armies
Aug 23-31 - Battle of Tannenberg [R-GF] by 8th Army
Aug 23-28 - Battle of Krasnik [R-AF] by 1st Army
Aug 23-24 - Battle of Mons [W] by 1st Army
Aug 23-24 - Battle of Namur [W] by 2nd Army
Aug 23-24 - Battle of Dinant [W] by 3rd Army
Aug 24-30 - Battle of the Meuse [W] by 4th Army (for 24-29 Aug) and by 3rd Army (for 27-30 Aug)
Aug 25-27 - Battle of Solesmes and Le Cateau [W] by 1st Army
Aug 26 to Sept 1 - Battle of Lublin [R-AF] by 1st Army and Kummer's Armeegruppe
Aug 26 - Sept 2 - Battle of Komarow [R-AF] by 4th Army
Aug 26-27 - Battle of Zloczow [R-AF] by 3rd Army and Kövess' Armeegruppe
Aug 27 - Surrender of Togo [Africa]
Aug 28 - Battle of Helgoland [Naval]
Aug 29-30 - Battle of the Gnila Lipa [R-AF] by 3rd & 2nd Armies
Aug 29-30 - Battle of St Quentin [W] by 2nd Army
Aug 31 to Sept 5 - Fighting on the Aisne [W] by 3rd Army
Sept 2 - Evacuation of Lemberg [R-AF] by 3rd Army
Sept 2-9 - Russian counterattack at Lublin [R-AF] against 1st Army
Sept 2-3 - 1st Battle of Varennes [W] by 5th Army
Sept 5-15 - (1st) Battle of the Masurian Lakes [R-GF] by 8th Army
Sept 5-12 - (1st) Battle of the Marne [W] by 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies
Sept 6-11 - Battle of Rawa Russka-Lemberg [R-AF] by 4th, 3rd and 2nd Armies
Sept 6 to Oct 4 - Battle of the Drina [B] by 5th and 6th Armies
Sept 11-15 - Retreat to the San and into the Carpathians [R-AF] by 1st, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Armies
Sept 15-22 - Battle of Jovincourt [W] by 7th Army
Sept 16-29 - Retreat to the Dunajec and farther into the Carpathians [R-AF]
Sept 16 - Beginning of 1st siege of Przemysl [R-AF]
Sept 17-24 - II Battle of Varennes [W] by 5th Army
Sept 23 to Oct 6 - Battle on the Somme [W] by 6th Army
Sept 26 - Action of Sandfontein [SW Africa]
. Sept 27 to Oct 11 - Advance to the Vistula-San line [R-AF] by German 9th, Aus-Hung. 1st, 4th and 3rd Armies
. Sept 27 to Oct 9 - Siege of Antwerp [W]

. Oct 1-10 - Clearing the Russians out of the forest Carpathians [R-AF] by Military Command Munkacs and parts of Armeegruppe Pflanzer-Baltin (latter newly formed in Transylvania)
. Oct 2-7 - Crossing the Carpathians [R-AF] by 2nd Army
. Oct 4-5 - Actions at Radom, Opatow, Klimontow and Sandomierz [R-AF] by 9th German Army and north wing of 1st Aus-Hung. Army
. Oct 6-8 - Actions at the San-Vistula confluence [R-AF] by south wing of 1st Army
. Oct 8-11 - Advance through Rzeszow to Jaroslau [R-AF] by 4th Army
. Oct 8-12 - Relief of Przemysl [R-AF] by 3rd Army
. Oct 8-10 - Advance through Chyrow to Stary Sambor [R-AF] by 2nd Army
. Oct 9-26 - Battle of Ivangoerd [R-AF] by 9th German and 1st Aus-Hung. Armies
. Oct 10 to Nov 2 - Battle on the San, at Przemysl and at Chyrow [R-AF] by 4th, 3rd and 2nd Armies plus parts of 1st Army
. Oct 18 to Nov 30 - Battle of the Yser [W] by 4th Army
. Oct 19-30 - Actions against the Montenegrins [B] by parts of 6th Army
. Oct 22 to Nov 6 - Pflanzer-Baltin's Armeegruppe crosses the Carpathians [R-AF]
. Oct 29 - Turkey declares war on the Entente, opening up new fronts
. Oct 30 to Nov 24 - Battle of Ypres [W] by 6th Army
. Oct 31 to Nov 2 - Action on the Opatowka [R-AF] by 1st Army

. Nov 1 - Battle of Coronel [Naval]
. Nov 3-4 - Battle of Tanga [East Africa]
. Nov 5 to Dec 15 - Actions at Czenstochau, Szczerczow, Belchatow and on the Pilica [R-AF] by Armeegruppe Woyrsch and from Nov 17 also by 2nd Aus-Hung. Army
. Nov 6-11 - Battle of Göritten [R-GF] by 8th Army
. Nov 6-15 - Retreat to west Galicia and into the Carpathians, while 2nd Army moves to Prussian Silesia [R-AF]
. Nov 6 to Dec 2 - Carpathian actions [R-AF] by 3rd Army
Nov 7 - Surrender of Tsingtau [China]
Nov 8 - 2nd siege of Przemysl begins [R-AF]
Nov 10-15 - Battles of Wloclawek and Kutno [R-GF] by 9th Army
Nov 13-16 - Battle of the Rominter Heide [R-GF] by 8th Army
Nov 16 to 15 Dec - Battle of Lodz [R-GF] by 9th Army
Nov 16-30 - Battle of Cracow and Czenstochau [R-AF] by 1st and 4th Armies
Nov 16-28 - Battle of the Kolubara and the Ljig [B] by 5th and 6th Armies
Nov 24 to Dec 2 - Actions in the Bukovina [R-AF] by Armeegruppe Pflanzer
Nov 30 to Dec 17 - Battle of Lowicz-Sanniki [R-GF] by 9th Army

Dec 1-13 - Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow [R-AF] by 4th and 3rd Armies
Dec 2 - Occupation of Belgrade [B] by parts of 5th Army
Dec 3-9 - Battle of Arangjelovac [B] by 5th and 6th Armies
Dec 8 - Battle of the Falklands [Naval]
Dec 10-13 - Retreat of 6th Army behind the Drina and Sava [B]
Dec 12-15 - Evacuation of Belgrade and retreat of 5th Army behind the Sava and the Danube [B]
Dec 13-20 - Pursuit of the Russians to the Nida and the Dunajec [R-AF] by 1st, 4th and 3rd Armies
Dec 14-24 - December Battle in French Flanders [W] by 6th army
Dec 15-31 - Actions at Uzsok Pass and in the Bukovina [R-AF] by Armeegruppe Pflanzer
Dec 16-31 - Rebuilding and reorganization of the 5th and 6th Armies under new commander of the Balkan units, GdK Archduke Eugene [B]
Dec 18-31 - Battle of the Rawka-Bzura [R-GF] by 9th Army
Dec 19-31 - Actions on the Lososina and Czarna [R-AF] by Armee-Abteilung Woyrsch and 2nd Aus-Hung. Army
Dec 20-30 - Ist Battle of Perthes [W] by 3rd Army
Dec 21-31 - Russian counterattack on both sides of the Vistula [R-AF] against 1st, 4th and 3rd Armies